type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d
created: 2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484
external_id: T1484
source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
source_name: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016
description: Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=2716
source_name: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate
description: Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/28/using-microsoft-365-defender-to-coordinate-protection-against-solorigate/
source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
source_name: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks
description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
description: Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
source_name: Wald0 Guide to GPOs
description: Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
url: https://wald0.com/?p=179
source_name: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions
description: Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
url: https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/
source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
url: https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/golden-saml-attack/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:33.897Z
name: Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
description: Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.

Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.

With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include: 

* modifying GPOs to push a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005) to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)
* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks)
* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a [Rogue Domain Controller](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207).
* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)

Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: privilege-escalation
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Obsidian Security
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Windows
Identity Provider
x_mitre_version: 3.2