auren-research/cyber-sec huggingface dataset:
type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--2497ac92-e751-4391-82c6-1b86e34d0294
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1020
external_id: T1020
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:46.545Z
name: Automated Exfiltration Mitigation
description: Identify unnecessary system utilities, scripts, or potentially malicious software that may be used to transfer data outside of a network, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--25d5e1d8-c6fb-4735-bc57-115a21222f4b
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1010
external_id: T1010
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:46.728Z
name: Application Window Discovery Mitigation
description: Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--25e53928-6f33-49b7-baee-8180578286f6
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1019
external_id: T1019
source_name: TCG Trusted Platform Module
description: Trusted Computing Group. (2008, April 29). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
url: http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:46.901Z
name: System Firmware Mitigation
description: Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. (Citation: TCG Trusted Platform Module)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--28adf6fd-ab6c-4553-9aa7-cef18a191f33
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1002
external_id: T1002
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:47.085Z
name: Data Compressed Mitigation
description: Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to compress files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)

If network intrusion prevention or data loss prevention tools are set to block specific file types from leaving the network over unencrypted channels, then an adversary may move to an encrypted channel.
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modified: 2024-12-18T16:09:24.873Z
name: Limit Hardware Installation
description: Prevent unauthorized users or groups from installing or using hardware, such as external drives, peripheral devices, or unapproved internal hardware components, by enforcing hardware usage policies and technical controls. This includes disabling USB ports, restricting driver installation, and implementing endpoint security tools to monitor and block unapproved devices. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Disable USB Ports and Hardware Installation Policies:

- Use Group Policy Objects (GPO) to disable USB mass storage devices:
 - Navigate to Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Removable Storage Access.
 - Deny write and read access to USB devices.
- Whitelist approved devices using unique serial numbers via Windows Device Installation Policies.

Deploy Endpoint Protection and Device Control Solutions:

- Use tools like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Symantec Endpoint Protection, or Tanium to monitor and block unauthorized hardware.
- Implement device control policies to allow specific hardware types (e.g., keyboards, mice) and block others.

Harden BIOS/UEFI and System Firmware:

- Set strong passwords for BIOS/UEFI access.
- Enable Secure Boot to prevent rogue hardware components from loading unauthorized firmware.

Restrict Peripheral Devices and Drivers:

- Use Windows Device Manager Policies to block installation of unapproved drivers.
- Monitor hardware installation attempts through endpoint monitoring tools.

Disable Bluetooth and Wireless Hardware:

- Use GPO or MDM tools to disable Bluetooth and Wi-Fi interfaces across systems.
- Restrict hardware pairing to approved devices only.

Logging and Monitoring:

- Enable logging for hardware installation events in Windows Event Logs (Event ID 20001 for Device Setup Manager).
- Use SIEM solutions (e.g., Splunk, Elastic Stack) to detect unauthorized hardware installation activities.

*Tools for Implementation*

USB and Device Control:

- Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO)
- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
- Symantec Endpoint Protection
- McAfee Device Control

Endpoint Monitoring:

- EDRs
- OSSEC (open-source host-based IDS)

Hardware Whitelisting:

- BitLocker for external drives (Windows)
- Windows Device Installation Policies
- Device Control 

BIOS/UEFI Security:

- Secure Boot (Windows/Linux)
Firmware management tools like Dell Command Update or HP Sure Start
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--2995bc22-2851-4345-ad19-4e7e295be264
created: 2019-06-11T16:28:41.809Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1034
external_id: M1034
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modified: 2024-12-24T14:36:46.335Z
name: User Training
description: User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Create Comprehensive Training Programs:

- Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting.
- Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives.

Use Simulated Exercises:

- Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training.
- Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols.

Leverage Gamification and Engagement:

- Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats.

Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding:

- Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees.
- Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures.

Regular Refresher Courses:

- Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries.
- Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed.

Emphasize Real-World Scenarios:

- Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering.
- Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--2a4f6c11-a4a7-4cb9-b0ef-6ae1bb3a718a
created: 2019-06-06T16:50:04.963Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1017
external_id: M1017
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--2a8de25c-f743-4348-b101-3ee33ab5871b
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1022
external_id: T1022
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:47.256Z
name: Data Encrypted Mitigation
description: Identify unnecessary system utilities, third-party tools, or potentially malicious software that may be used to encrypt files, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--2ace01f8-67c8-43eb-b7b1-a7b9f1fe67e1
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1083
external_id: T1083
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:47.438Z
name: File and Directory Discovery Mitigation
description: File system activity is a common part of an operating system, so it is unlikely that mitigation would be appropriate for this technique. It may still be beneficial to identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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modified: 2024-12-24T14:26:43.340Z
name: User Account Control
description: User Account Control (UAC) is a security feature in Microsoft Windows that prevents unauthorized changes to the operating system. UAC prompts users to confirm or provide administrator credentials when an action requires elevated privileges. Proper configuration of UAC reduces the risk of privilege escalation attacks. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enable UAC Globally:

- Ensure UAC is enabled through Group Policy by setting `User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode` to `Enabled`.

Require Credential Prompt:

- Use Group Policy to configure UAC to prompt for administrative credentials instead of just confirmation (`User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt`).

Restrict Built-in Administrator Account:

Set `Admin Approval Mode` for the built-in Administrator account to `Enabled` in Group Policy.

Secure the UAC Prompt:

- Configure UAC prompts to display on the secure desktop (`User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation`).

Prevent UAC Bypass:

- Block untrusted applications from triggering UAC prompts by configuring `User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated`.
- Use EDR tools to detect and block known UAC bypass techniques.

Monitor UAC-Related Events:

- Use Windows Event Viewer to monitor for event ID 4688 (process creation) and look for suspicious processes attempting to invoke UAC elevation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Windows Tools:

- Group Policy Editor: Configure UAC settings centrally for enterprise environments.
- Registry Editor: Modify UAC-related settings directly, such as `EnableLUA` and `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin`.

Endpoint Security Solutions:

- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Detects and blocks UAC bypass techniques.
- Sysmon: Logs process creations and monitors UAC elevation attempts for suspicious activity.

Third-Party Security Tools:

- Process Monitor (Sysinternals): Tracks real-time processes interacting with UAC.
- EventSentry: Monitors Windows Event Logs for UAC-related alerts.
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--2c2ad92a-d710-41ab-a996-1db143bb4808
created: 2019-06-11T17:14:35.170Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052
external_id: M1052
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--2c3ce852-06a2-40ee-8fe6-086f6402a739
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1062
external_id: T1062
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:47.647Z
name: Hypervisor Mitigation
description: Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a hypervisor.
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created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1150
external_id: T1150
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modified: 2025-04-18T17:59:47.826Z
name: Plist Modification Mitigation
description: Prevent plist files from being modified by users by making them read-only.
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