type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e4dc8c01-417f-458d-9ee0-bb0617c1b391
created: 2022-04-01T17:59:46.156Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1622
external_id: T1622
source_name: Apriorit
description: Apriorit. (2024, June 4). Anti Debugging Protection Techniques with Examples. Retrieved March 4, 2025.
url: https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/367-anti-reverse-engineering-protection-techniques-to-use-before-releasing-software
source_name: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021
description: Check Point Research. (2021, January 4). Stopping Serial Killer: Catching the Next Strike. Retrieved September 7, 2021.
url: https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/stopping-serial-killer-catching-the-next-strike/
source_name: hasherezade debug
description: hasherezade. (2021, June 30). Module 3 - Understanding and countering malware's evasion and self-defence. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://github.com/hasherezade/malware_training_vol1/blob/main/slides/module3/Module3_2_fingerprinting.pdf
source_name: Cado Security P2PInfect 2023
description: jbowen. (2023, December 4). P2Pinfect - New Variant Targets MIPS Devices. Retrieved March 18, 2025.
url: https://www.cadosecurity.com/blog/p2pinfect-new-variant-targets-mips-devices
source_name: AlKhaser Debug
description: Noteworthy. (2019, January 6). Al-Khaser. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/tree/master/al-khaser/AntiDebug
source_name: wardle evilquest partii
description: Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021.
url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html
source_name: ProcessHacker Github
description: ProcessHacker. (2009, October 27). Process Hacker. Retrieved April 11, 2022.
url: https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker
source_name: Positive Technologies Hellhounds 2023
description: PT Expert Security Center. (2023, November 29). Hellhounds: operation Lahat. Retrieved March 18, 2025.
url: https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/hellhounds-operation-lahat
source_name: vxunderground debug
description: vxunderground. (2021, June 30). VX-API. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://github.com/vxunderground/VX-API/tree/main/Anti%20Debug
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:32.196Z
name: Debugger Evasion
description: Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)

Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.

Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying `/proc/self/status` for the `TracerPID` field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools.(Citation: Cado Security P2PInfect 2023)(Citation: Positive Technologies Hellhounds 2023) Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)

Malware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program’s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program’s execution to continue.(Citation: Apriorit)

Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: discovery
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: TruKno
Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Linux
macOS
Windows
x_mitre_version: 1.1