type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--24769ab5-14bd-4f4e-a752-cfb185da53ee
created: 2020-12-28T21:59:02.181Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002
external_id: T1484.002
source_name: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024
description: Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
url: https://reinforce.awsevents.com/content/dam/reinforce/2024/slides/TDR432_New-tactics-and-techniques-for-proactive-threat-detection.pdf
source_name: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection
description: CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a
source_name: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain
description: Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
url: https://o365blog.com/post/federation-vulnerability/
source_name: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation
description: Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/whatis-fed
source_name: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods
description: Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/ADFSDomainTrustMods.yaml
source_name: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain
description: Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/troubleshoot/active-directory/update-federated-domain-office-365
source_name: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023
description: Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
url: https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection
source_name: Sygnia Golden SAML
description: Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
url: https://www.sygnia.co/threat-reports-and-advisories/golden-saml-attack/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:48:32.244Z
name: Trust Modification
description: Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.

Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge [SAML Tokens](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002) without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) 

An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: privilege-escalation
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender
Praetorian
Obsidian Security
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Identity Provider
Windows
x_mitre_version: 2.2