auren-research/cyber-sec huggingface dataset:
modified: 2024-12-18T20:22:48.602Z
name: Restrict Library Loading
description: Restricting library loading involves implementing security controls to ensure that only trusted and verified libraries (DLLs, shared objects, etc.) are loaded into processes. Adversaries often abuse Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) Injection, DLL Search Order Hijacking, or LD_PRELOAD mechanisms to execute malicious code by forcing the operating system to load untrusted libraries. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: 

Enforce Safe Library Loading Practices:

- Enable `SafeDLLSearchMode` on Windows.
- Restrict `LD_PRELOAD` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH` usage on Linux systems.

Code Signing Enforcement:

- Require digital signatures for all libraries loaded into processes.
- Use tools like Signtool, and WDAC to enforce signed DLL execution.

Environment Hardening:

- Secure library paths and directories to prevent adversaries from placing rogue libraries.
- Monitor user-writable directories and system configurations for unauthorized changes.

Audit and Monitor Library Loading:

- Enable `Sysmon` on Windows to monitor for suspicious library loads.
- Use `auditd` on Linux to monitor shared library paths and configuration file changes.

Use Application Control Solutions:

- Implement AppLocker, WDAC, or SELinux to allow only trusted libraries.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows-Specific Tools:

- AppLocker: Application whitelisting for DLLs.
- Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC): Restrict unauthorized library execution.
- Signtool: Verify and enforce code signing.
- Sysmon: Monitor DLL load events (Event ID 7).

Linux-Specific Tools:

- auditd: Monitor changes to library paths and critical files.
- SELinux/AppArmor: Define policies to restrict library loading.
- ldconfig and chattr: Secure LD configuration files and prevent unauthorized modifications.

Cross-Platform Solutions:

- Wazuh or OSSEC: File integrity monitoring for library changes.
- Tripwire: Detect and alert on unauthorized library modifications.
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--e8242a33-481c-4891-af63-4cf3e4cf6aff
created: 2019-06-11T17:00:01.740Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1044
external_id: M1044
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--e8d22ec6-2236-48de-954b-974d17492782
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1111
external_id: T1111
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:18.793Z
name: Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation
description: Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes.

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--e9362d25-4427-446b-99e8-b8f0c3b86615
created: 2019-04-24T17:02:25.107Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1492
external_id: T1492
source_name: Ready.gov IT DRP
description: Ready.gov. (n.d.). IT Disaster Recovery Plan. Retrieved March 15, 2019.
url: https://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/IT
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:18.994Z
name: Stored Data Manipulation Mitigation
description: Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure the data related to those processes against tampering. Ensure least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. Consider encrypting important information to reduce an adversaries ability to perform tailor data modifications. Where applicable, examine using file monitoring software to check integrity on important files and directories as well as take corrective actions when unauthorized changes are detected. 

Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and manipulate backups.
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modified: 2024-12-10T19:21:06.027Z
name: Disable or Remove Feature or Program
description: Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: 

Remove Legacy Software:

- Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash).
- Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date.

Disable Unused Features:

- Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required.
- Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue.

Control Applications Installed by Users:

- Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools.
- Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment.

Remove Unnecessary Services:

- Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices.
- Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations.

Restrict Add-ons and Plugins:

- Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes.
- Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.


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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--eb88d97c-32f1-40be-80f0-d61a4b0b4b31
created: 2019-06-11T16:45:19.740Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1042
external_id: M1042
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--ec418d1b-4963-439f-b055-f914737ef362
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1118
external_id: T1118
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:19.168Z
name: InstallUtil Mitigation
description: InstallUtil may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--ec42d8be-f762-4127-80f4-f079ea6d7135
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1054
external_id: T1054
source_name: Microsoft ETW May 2018
description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Event Tracing. Retrieved September 6, 2018.
url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/etw/event-tracing-portal
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:19.335Z
name: Indicator Blocking Mitigation
description: Ensure event tracers/forwarders (Citation: Microsoft ETW May 2018), firewall policies, and other associated mechanisms are secured with appropriate permissions and access controls. Consider automatically relaunching forwarding mechanisms at recurring intervals (ex: temporal, on-logon, etc.) as well as applying appropriate change management to firewall rules and other related system configurations.
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--ed202147-4026-4330-b5bd-1e8dfa8cf7cc
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1112
external_id: T1112
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:19.537Z
name: Modify Registry Mitigation
description: Misconfiguration of permissions in the Registry may lead to opportunities for an adversary to execute code, like through [Service Registry Permissions Weakness](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1058). Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to modify the Registry by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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x_mitre_version: 1.0
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--ef273807-c465-4728-9cee-5823422f42ee
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1198
external_id: T1198
source_name: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017
description: Graeber, M. (2017, September). Subverting Trust in Windows. Retrieved January 31, 2018.
url: https://specterops.io/assets/resources/SpecterOps_Subverting_Trust_in_Windows.pdf
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:19.718Z
name: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Mitigation
description: Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Also ensure that these values contain their full path to prevent [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

Consider removing unnecessary and/or stale SIPs. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)

Restrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories.

Enable whitelisting solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications to Registry keys are not prevented.
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x_mitre_deprecated: yes
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_version: 1.0
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--effb83a0-ead1-4b36-b7f6-b7bdf9c4616e
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1091
external_id: T1091
source_name: Microsoft Disable Autorun
description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/967715
source_name: TechNet Removable Media Control
description: Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772540(v=ws.10).aspx
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:19.889Z
name: Replication Through Removable Media Mitigation
description: Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to infect removable media or may result from tainted removable media, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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x_mitre_deprecated: yes
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x_mitre_version: 1.0
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1080
external_id: T1080
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:20.088Z
name: Taint Shared Content Mitigation
description: Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).

Reduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.

Identify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--f27ef4f2-71fe-48b6-b7f4-02dcac14320e
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1145
external_id: T1145
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:20.273Z
name: Private Keys Mitigation
description: Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. When possible, store keys on separate cryptographic hardware instead of on the local system. Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Use separate infrastructure for managing critical systems to prevent overlap of credentials and permissions on systems that could be used as vectors for lateral movement. Follow other best practices for mitigating access through use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).
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