type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--f005e783-57d4-4837-88ad-dbe7faee1c51
created: 2020-01-30T17:37:22.261Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001
external_id: T1550.001
source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
description:  Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
source_name: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019
description: Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
url: https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/
source_name: AWS Logging IAM Calls
description: AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html
source_name: AWS Temporary Security Credentials
description: AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html
source_name: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019
description: Cai, S., Flores, J., de Guzman, C., et. al.. (2019, August 27). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens
source_name: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials
description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials
source_name: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage
description: Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring
source_name: okta
description: okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.
url: https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen
source_name: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles
description: Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration
source_name: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017
description: Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
url: https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:35.227Z
name: Application Access Token
description: Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) 

OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)

For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)

Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)

Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated.(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence) Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: lateral-movement
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)
Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)
Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)
Mark Wee
Ian Davila, Tidal Cyber
Dylan Silva, AWS Security
Jack Burns, HubSpot
Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
Pawel Partyka, Microsoft Threat Intelligence
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: SaaS
Containers
IaaS
Office Suite
Identity Provider
x_mitre_version: 1.8