auren-research/cyber-sec huggingface dataset:
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--d8940e76-f9c1-4912-bea6-e21c251370b6
created: 2019-08-09T16:14:58.254Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1512
external_id: T1512
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-19.html
external_id: APP-19
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:28.248Z
name: Video Capture
description: An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. 

 

Malware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1513) due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen. 

 

In Android, an application must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user. 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: collection
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 2.1
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--d916f176-a1ca-4a78-9fdd-4058bc28162e
created: 2022-04-06T15:52:07.711Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1481/003
external_id: T1481.003
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:28.337Z
name: One-Way Communication
description: Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. 

 

Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: command-and-control
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.2
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--d9e88203-2b5d-405f-a406-2933b1e3d7e4
created: 2017-10-25T14:48:10.285Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1471
external_id: T1471
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-28.html
external_id: APP-28
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:28.514Z
name: Data Encrypted for Impact
description: An adversary may encrypt files stored on a mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: impact
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
x_mitre_version: 3.2
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--dc01774a-d1c1-45fb-b506-0a5d1d6593d9
created: 2022-04-01T18:44:32.808Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1629/001
external_id: T1629.001
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-22.html
external_id: APP-22
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:28.687Z
name: Prevent Application Removal
description: Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated by the user before the application could be uninstalled. This was later updated so the user could deactivate and uninstall the administrator application in one step.

Adversaries may also abuse the device accessibility APIs to prevent removal. This set of APIs allows the application to perform certain actions on behalf of the user and programmatically determine what is being shown on the screen. The malicious application could monitor the device screen for certain modals (e.g., the confirmation modal to uninstall an application) and inject screen input or a back button tap to close the modal. For example, Android's `performGlobalAction(int)` API could be utilized to prevent the user from removing the malicious application from the device after installation. If the user wants to uninstall the malicious application, two cases may occur, both preventing the user from removing the application.

* Case 1: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `2` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_HOME`, the malicious application may direct the user to the home screen from settings screen 

* Case 2: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `1` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK`, the malicious application may emulate the back press event 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Shankar Raman, Gen Digital and Abhinand, Amrita University
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
x_mitre_version: 1.2
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--dd818ea5-adf5-41c7-93b5-f3b839a219fb
created: 2017-10-25T14:48:33.574Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1421
external_id: T1421
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:29.321Z
name: System Network Connections Discovery
description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised device they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. 

 

This is typically accomplished by utilizing device APIs to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular tower connections. On Android, this can be done by querying the respective APIs: 

 

* `WifiInfo` for information about the current Wi-Fi connection, as well as nearby Wi-Fi networks. Querying the `WiFiInfo` API requires the application to hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission. 

* `BluetoothAdapter` for information about Bluetooth devices, which also requires the application to hold several permissions granted by the user at runtime. 

* For Android versions prior to Q, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getNeighboringCellInfo()` method. For Q and later, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getAllCellInfo()` method. Both methods require the application hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: discovery
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
x_mitre_version: 2.1
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
modified: 2024-04-16T20:24:13.854Z
name: SSL Pinning
description: Adversaries may use [SSL Pinning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/003) to protect the C2 traffic from being intercepted and analyzed.

[SSL Pinning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/003) is a technique commonly utilized by legitimate websites to ensure that encrypted communications are only allowed with a pre-defined certificate. If another certificate is presented, it could indicate device compromise, traffic interception, or another upstream issue. While benign usages are common, it is also possible for adversaries to abuse this technology to protect malicious C2 traffic.

In normal, not pinned SSL validation, when a client connects to a server using HTTPS, it typically checks whether the server’s SSL/TLS certificate is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) in the device’s trust store. If the certificate is valid and signed by a trusted CA, the connection is established. However, with [SSL Pinning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/003) , the client is configured to trust a specific SSL/TLS certificate or public key, rather than relying on the device’s trust store. This means that even if the server’s certificate is signed by a trusted CA, the client will only establish the connection of the certificate or key is pinned.

There are two types of [SSL Pinning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/003) :

1.	Certificate Pinning: The client stores a copy of the server’s certificate and compares it with the certificate received during the SSL handshake. If the certificates match, then the client proceeds with the connection. This approach also works with self-signed certificates.

2.	Public Key Pinning: Instead of pinning the entire certificate, the client pins just the public key extracted from the certificate. This is often more flexible, as it allows the server to renew its certificate without having to update the pinned certificate or breaking the SSL connection.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: command-and-control
x_mitre_contributors: Takahashi Wataru, NEC Corporation
Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India
Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.0
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--dfafc230-5465-4993-8dc5-f51fa9fec002
created: 2024-03-29T15:04:38.566Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1521/003
external_id: T1521.003
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--dfe29258-ce59-421c-9dee-e85cb9fa90cd
created: 2017-10-25T14:48:24.488Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1461
external_id: T1461
source_name: Wired-AndroidBypass
description: Andy Greenberg. (2015, September 15). Hack Brief: Emergency Number Hack Bypasses Android Lock Screens. Retrieved December 23, 2016.
url: https://www.wired.com/2015/09/hack-brief-new-emergency-number-hack-easily-bypasses-android-lock-screens/
source_name: Kaspersky-iOSBypass
description: Chris Brook. (2016, November 17). iOS 10 Passcode Bypass Can Access Photos, Contacts. Retrieved December 23, 2016.
url: https://threatpost.com/ios-10-passcode-bypass-can-access-photos-contacts/122033/
source_name: TheSun-FaceID
description: Sean Keach. (2018, February 15). Brit mates BREAK Apple’s face unlock and vow to never buy iPhone again. Retrieved September 18, 2018.
url: https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/5584082/iphone-x-face-unlock-tricked-broken/
source_name: SRLabs-Fingerprint
description: SRLabs. (n.d.). Fingerprints are not fit for secure device unlocking. Retrieved December 23, 2016.
url: https://srlabs.de/bites/spoofing-fingerprints/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:29.764Z
name: Lockscreen Bypass
description: An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:

* Biometric spoofing: If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism. Both iOS and Android partly mitigate this attack by requiring the device’s passcode rather than biometrics to unlock the device after every device restart, and after a set or random amount of time.(Citation: SRLabs-Fingerprint)(Citation: TheSun-FaceID)
* Unlock code bypass: An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (“shoulder surfing”) the device owner’s use of the lockscreen passcode. Mobile OS vendors partly mitigate this by implementing incremental backoff timers after a set number of failed unlock attempts, as well as a configurable full device wipe after several failed unlock attempts.
* Vulnerability exploit: Techniques have been periodically demonstrated that exploit mobile devices to bypass the lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device or OS vendor once disclosed.(Citation: Wired-AndroidBypass)(Citation: Kaspersky-iOSBypass)

kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: initial-access
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.3
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e083305c-49e7-4c87-aae8-9689213bffbe
created: 2020-12-16T20:16:07.673Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: yes
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1605
external_id: T1605
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:30.335Z
name: Command-Line Interface
description: Adversaries may use built-in command-line interfaces to interact with the device and execute commands. Android provides a bash shell that can be interacted with over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or programmatically using Java’s `Runtime` package. On iOS, adversaries can interact with the underlying runtime shell if the device has been jailbroken.

If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: execution
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.0
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e0b9ecb8-a7d1-43c7-aa30-8e19c6a92c86
created: 2022-04-01T13:17:52.740Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/003
external_id: T1636.003
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-13.html
external_id: APP-13
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:30.430Z
name: Contact List
description: Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `Contacts` framework. 

 

If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the [Contact List](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/003) without the user’s knowledge or approval. 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: collection
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.1
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e1c912a9-e305-434b-9172-8a6ce3ec9c4a
created: 2019-10-10T15:12:42.790Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1533
external_id: T1533
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/stack-threats/STA-41.html
external_id: STA-41
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:30.706Z
name: Data from Local System
description: Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration. 

 

Access to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions. 

 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: collection
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.1
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e2c2249a-eb82-4614-8dd4-9c514dde65e2
created: 2022-04-06T13:29:47.590Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1640
external_id: T1640
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:31.052Z
name: Account Access Removal
description: Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts. 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: impact
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
x_mitre_version: 1.1
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e2ea7f6b-8d4f-49c3-819d-660530d12b77
created: 2017-10-25T14:48:19.265Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426
external_id: T1426
source_name: Android-Build
description: Android. (n.d.). Build. Retrieved December 21, 2016.
url: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/os/Build
source_name: NIST Mobile Threat Catalogue
url: https://pages.nist.gov/mobile-threat-catalogue/application-threats/APP-12.html
external_id: APP-12
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:31.141Z
name: System Information Discovery
description: Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1426) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. 

 

On Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build` class. (Citation: Android-Build) iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running. 
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-mobile-attack
phase_name: discovery
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Android
iOS
x_mitre_version: 1.2
x_mitre_tactic_type: Post-Adversary Device Access
type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--e30cc912-7ea1-4683-9219-543b86cbdec9
created: 2017-10-25T14:48:28.786Z
revoked: yes
external_references: source_name: mitre-mobile-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1442
external_id: T1442
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:31.232Z
name: Fake Developer Accounts
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: mobile-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: no
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
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