type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--8a2f40cf-8325-47f9-96e4-b1ca4c7389bd
created: 2020-01-19T16:10:15.008Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001
external_id: T1098.001
source_name: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence
description:  Vaishnav Murthy and Joel Eng. (2023, January 30). How Adversaries Can Persist with AWS User Federation. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-adversaries-persist-with-aws-user-federation/
source_name: Expel IO Evil in AWS
description: A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020.
url: https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/
source_name: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation
description: Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
url: https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5
source_name: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals
description: Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020.
url: https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/
source_name: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024
description: Detecting AI resource-hijacking with Composite Alerts. (2024, June 6). Lacework Labs. Retrieved July 1, 2024.
url: https://www.lacework.com/blog/detecting-ai-resource-hijacking-with-composite-alerts
source_name: GCP SSH Key Add
description: Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020.
url: https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add
source_name: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023
description: Ian Ahl. (2023, September 20). LUCR-3: SCATTERED SPIDER GETTING SAAS-Y IN THE CLOUD. Retrieved September 25, 2023.
url: https://permiso.io/blog/lucr-3-scattered-spider-getting-saas-y-in-the-cloud
source_name: Blue Cloud of Death Video
description: Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019.
url: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815
source_name: Blue Cloud of Death
description: Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.
url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1
source_name: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords
description: Microsoft. (2023, October 23). Enforce Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication with legacy applications using app passwords. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords
source_name: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance
description: MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
url: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
source_name: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024
description: Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, Adrian Hernandez, Sarah Bock, and Jonathan Leathery. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
url: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations
source_name: Expel Behind the Scenes
description: S. Lipton, L. Easterly, A. Randazzo and J. Hencinski. (2020, July 28). Behind the scenes in the Expel SOC: Alert-to-fix in AWS. Retrieved October 1, 2020.
url: https://expel.io/blog/behind-the-scenes-expel-soc-alert-aws/
source_name: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0
description: SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. (2023, July 11). SCARLETEEL 2.0: Fargate, Kubernetes, and Crypto. Retrieved July 12, 2023.
url: https://sysdig.com/blog/scarleteel-2-0/
source_name: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation
description: Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
url: https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:04.839Z
name: Additional Cloud Credentials
description: Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death Video) These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.(Citation: Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals)

In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004), adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP.(Citation: GCP SSH Key Add) This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS)(Citation: Expel Behind the Scenes)

Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the CreateLoginProfile API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538).(Citation: Permiso Scattered Spider 2023)(Citation: Lacework AI Resource Hijacking 2024) If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. [Cloud Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004)).(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)(Citation: Sysdig ScarletEel 2.0) For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) 

In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to [Forge Web Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606) tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.
(Citation: Crowdstrike AWS User Federation Persistence)

In Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account.(Citation: Mandiant APT42 Operations 2024) As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID App Passwords)
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: persistence
kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: privilege-escalation
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Expel
Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix
Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
Zur Ulianitzky, XM Cyber
Alex Soler, AttackIQ
Dylan Silva, AWS Security
Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security
Arun Seelagan, CISA
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: IaaS
Identity Provider
SaaS
x_mitre_version: 2.8