type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--ac08589e-ee59-4935-8667-d845e38fe579
created: 2020-02-21T20:32:20.810Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001
external_id: T1562.001
source_name: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369
description:  Guillaume Lovet and Alex Kong. (2023, March 9). Analysis of FG-IR-22-369. Retrieved May 15, 2023.
url: https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/fg-ir-22-369-psirt-analysis
source_name: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation
description: ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.
url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem
source_name: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022
description: BlackBerry Research and Intelligence Team. (2022, February 3). Threat Spotlight: WhisperGate Wiper Wreaks Havoc in Ukraine. Retrieved March 18, 2025.
url: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/02/threat-spotlight-whispergate-wiper-wreaks-havoc-in-ukraine
source_name: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot
description: Cocomazzi, Antonio. (2024, July 17). FIN7 Reboot | Cybercrime Gang Enhances Ops with New EDR Bypasses and Automated Attacks. Retrieved September 24, 2025.
url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fin7-reboot-cybercrime-gang-enhances-ops-with-new-edr-bypasses-and-automated-attacks/
source_name: OutFlank System Calls
description: de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
url: https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/
source_name: disable_win_evt_logging
description: Heiligenstein, L. (n.d.). REP-25: Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved April 7, 2022.
url: https://ptylu.github.io/content/report/report.html?report=25
source_name: chasing_avaddon_ransomware
description: Hernandez, A. S. Tarter, P. Ocamp, E. J. (2022, January 19). One Source to Rule Them All: Chasing AVADDON Ransomware. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/chasing-avaddon-ransomware
source_name: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike
description: Hurley, S. (2021, December 7). Critical Hit: How DoppelPaymer Hunts and Kills Windows Processes. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-doppelpaymer-hunts-and-kills-windows-processes/
source_name: avoslocker_ransomware
description: Lakshmanan, R. (2022, May 2). AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Using New Trick to Disable Antivirus Protection. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
url: https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-using-new.html
source_name: dharma_ransomware
description: Loui, E. Scheuerman, K. et al. (2020, April 16). Targeted Dharma Ransomware Intrusions Exhibit Consistent Techniques. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/targeted-dharma-ransomware-intrusions-exhibit-consistent-techniques/
source_name: MDSec System Calls
description: MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/
source_name: SCADAfence_ransomware
description: Shaked, O. (2020, January 20). Anatomy of a Targeted Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 18, 2022.
url: https://cdn.logic-control.com/docs/scadafence/Anatomy-Of-A-Targeted-Ransomware-Attack-WP.pdf
source_name: demystifying_ryuk
description: Tran, T. (2020, November 24). Demystifying Ransomware Attacks Against Microsoft Defender Solution. Retrieved January 26, 2022.
url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/demystifying-ransomware-attacks-against-microsoft-defender/ba-p/1928947
source_name: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021
description: Van Ta, Jake Nicastro, Rufus Brown, and Nick Richard. (2021, December 7). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved March 18, 2025.
url: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:49:13.019Z
name: Disable or Modify Tools
description: Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware)

Adversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)

Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to [Indicator Blocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/006), adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012).(Citation: BlackBerry WhisperGate 2022)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence FIN13 2021)

Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.(Citation: disable_win_evt_logging) 

On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation)(Citation: Analysis of FG-IR-22-369)

In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.

Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.(Citation: chasing_avaddon_ransomware)(Citation: dharma_ransomware)(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)(Citation: doppelpaymer_crowdstrike) For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.(Citation: demystifying_ryuk)

Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068)), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.(Citation: avoslocker_ransomware)
kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: defense-evasion
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.3.0
x_mitre_contributors: Gordon Long, LegioX/Zoom, asaurusrex
Ziv Karliner, @ziv_kr, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Nathaniel Quist, Palo Alto Networks
Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security
Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol
Cian Heasley
Alex Soler, AttackIQ
Sarathkumar Rajendran, Microsoft Defender365
Lucas Heiligenstein
Menachem Goldstein
Nay Myo Hlaing (Ethan), DBS Bank
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Containers
IaaS
Linux
macOS
Network Devices
Windows
x_mitre_version: 1.7