type: attack-pattern
spec_version: 2.1
id: attack-pattern--65f2d882-3f41-4d48-8a06-29af77ec9f90
created: 2020-02-11T18:41:44.783Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
external_id: T1003.001
source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory
description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
source_name: Deep Instinct LSASS
description: Gilboa, A. (2021, February 16). LSASS Memory Dumps are Stealthier than Ever Before - Part 2. Retrieved December 27, 2023.
url: https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2
source_name: Graeber 2014
description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
source_name: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021
description: Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021.
url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
source_name: Powersploit
description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.
url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit
source_name: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector
description: Symantec. (2021, June 10). Attacks Against the Government Sector. Retrieved September 28, 2021.
url: https://symantec.broadcom.com/hubfs/Attacks-Against-Government-Sector.pdf
source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection
description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-10-24T17:48:52.657Z
name: LSASS Memory
description: Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550).

As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.

For example, on the target host use procdump:

* procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump

Locally, mimikatz can be run using:

* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp
* sekurlsa::logonPasswords

Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:

* rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector)

Similar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS)

Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.(Citation: Graeber 2014)

The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:

* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
* CredSSP: Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.(Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)

kill_chain_phases: kill_chain_name: mitre-attack
phase_name: credential-access
x_mitre_attack_spec_version: 3.2.0
x_mitre_contributors: Edward Millington
Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
Olaf Hartong, Falcon Force
Michael Forret, Quorum Cyber
x_mitre_deprecated: no
x_mitre_domains: enterprise-attack
x_mitre_is_subtechnique: yes
x_mitre_modified_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
x_mitre_platforms: Windows
x_mitre_version: 1.5