auren-research/cyber-sec huggingface dataset:
type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--cba5667e-e3c6-44a4-811c-266dbc00e440
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1181
external_id: T1181
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:14.549Z
name: Extra Window Memory Injection Mitigation
description: This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.

Although EWM injection may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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modified: 2024-12-10T16:28:27.046Z
name: Audit
description: Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures.

Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: 

System Audit:

- Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies.
- Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks.

Permission Audits:

- Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation.
- Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions.

Software Audits:

- Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector.
- Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives.

Configuration Audits:

- Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA).
- Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems.

Network Audits:

- Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections.
- Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--cc2399fd-3cd3-4319-8d0a-fbd6420cdaf8
created: 2019-06-11T17:06:14.029Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1047
external_id: M1047
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created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1105
external_id: T1105
source_name: University of Birmingham C2
description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:14.725Z
name: Remote File Copy Mitigation
description: Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
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id: course-of-action--cfc2d2fc-14ff-495f-bd99-585be47b804f
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1138
external_id: T1138
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:14.907Z
name: Application Shimming Mitigation
description: There currently aren't a lot of ways to mitigate application shimming. Disabling the Shim Engine isn't recommended because Windows depends on shimming for interoperability and software may become unstable or not work. Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. 

Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions.
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created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1129
external_id: T1129
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:15.125Z
name: Execution through Module Load Mitigation
description: Directly mitigating module loads and API calls related to module loads will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying and correlated subsequent behavior to determine if it is the result of malicious activity.
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--d01f473f-3cdc-4867-9e55-1de9cf1986f0
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1140
external_id: T1140
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:15.308Z
name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Mitigation
description: Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to deobfuscate or decode files or information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--d0415180-51e9-40ce-b57c-c332b0b441f2
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1086
external_id: T1086
source_name: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass
description: Sutherland, S. (2014, September 9). 15 Ways to Bypass the PowerShell Execution Policy. Retrieved July 23, 2015.
url: https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:15.501Z
name: PowerShell Mitigation
description: It may be possible to remove PowerShell from systems when not needed, but a review should be performed to assess the impact to an environment, since it could be in use for many legitimate purposes and administrative functions. When PowerShell is necessary, restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators and to only execute signed scripts. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration. (Citation: Netspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass) Disable/restrict the WinRM Service to help prevent uses of PowerShell for remote execution.
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1001
external_id: T1001
source_name: University of Birmingham C2
description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
object_marking_refs: marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168
modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:15.675Z
name: Data Obfuscation Mitigation
description: Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
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type: course-of-action
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id: course-of-action--d256cb63-b021-4b4a-bb6d-1b42eea179a3
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1046
external_id: T1046
source_name: Beechey 2010
description: Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/application/application-whitelisting-panacea-propaganda-33599
source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT
description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
url: https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html
source_name: NSA MS AppLocker
description: NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
url: https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/tech-briefs/application-whitelisting-using-microsoft-applocker.cfm
source_name: Corio 2008
description: Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
url: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx
source_name: TechNet Applocker vs SRP
description: Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee791851.aspx
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:15.857Z
name: Network Service Scanning Mitigation
description: Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices.

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
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modified: 2024-12-11T19:22:37.296Z
name: Exploit Protection
description: Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software.

Operating System Exploit Protections:

- Use Case: Enable built-in exploit protection features provided by modern operating systems, such as Microsoft's Exploit Protection, which includes techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG).
- Implementation: Enforce DEP for all programs and enable ASLR to randomize memory addresses used by system and application processes. Windows: Configure Exploit Protection through the Windows Security app or deploy settings via Group Policy.
`ExploitProtectionExportSettings.exe -path "exploit_settings.xml"`
Linux: Use Kernel-level hardening features like SELinux, AppArmor, or GRSEC to enforce memory protections and prevent exploits.

Third-Party Endpoint Security:

- Use Case: Use endpoint protection tools with built-in exploit protection, such as enhanced memory protection, behavior monitoring, and real-time exploit detection.
- Implementation: Deploy tools to detect and block exploitation attempts targeting unpatched software.

Virtual Patching:
- Use Case: Use tools to implement virtual patches that mitigate vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems until official patches are applied.
- Implementation: Use Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to block exploitation attempts on known vulnerabilities in outdated applications.

Hardening Application Configurations:

- Use Case: Disable risky application features that can be exploited, such as macros in Microsoft Office or JScript in Internet Explorer.
- Implementation: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policies to disable execution of macros in downloaded files.
x_mitre_deprecated: no
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type: course-of-action
spec_version: 2.1
id: course-of-action--d2a24649-9694-4c97-9c62-ce7b270bf6a3
created: 2019-06-11T17:10:57.070Z
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revoked: no
external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1050
external_id: M1050
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id: course-of-action--d2dce10b-3562-4d61-b2f5-7c6384b038e2
created: 2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1170
external_id: T1170
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:16.043Z
name: Mshta Mitigation
description: Mshta.exe may not be necessary within a given environment since its functionality is tied to older versions of Internet Explorer that have reached end of life. Use application whitelisting configured to block execution of mshta.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
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external_references: source_name: mitre-attack
url: https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1133
external_id: T1133
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modified: 2025-04-18T18:00:16.387Z
name: External Remote Services Mitigation
description: Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Disable or block remotely available services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028). Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of [Multi-Factor Authentication Interception](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111) techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.
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