The product performs a power or debug state transition, but it does not clear sensitive information that should no longer be accessible due to changes to information access restrictions.

A device or system frequently employs many power and sleep states during its normal operation (e.g., normal power, additional power, low power, hibernate, deep sleep, etc.). A device also may be operating within a debug condition. State transitions can happen from one power or debug state to another. If there is information available in the previous state which should not be available in the next state and is not properly removed before the transition into the next state, sensitive information may leak from the system.

Primary

Architecture and Design

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Control
Accountability
Authentication
Authorization
Non-Repudiation
Read Memory
Read Application Data
High
Sensitive information may be used to unlock additional capabilities of the device and take advantage of hidden functionalities which could be used to compromise device security.

Manual Analysis
Write a known pattern into each sensitive location. Enter the power/debug state in question. Read data back from the sensitive locations. If the reads are successful, and the data is the same as the pattern that was originally written, the test fails and the device needs to be fixed. Note that this test can likely be automated.
High

Architecture and Design
Implementation
During state transitions, information not needed in the next state should be removed before the transition to the next state.

This example shows how an attacker can take advantage of an incorrect state transition.

Suppose a device is transitioning from state A to state B. During state A, it can read certain private keys from the hidden fuses that are only accessible in state A but not in state B. The device reads the keys, performs operations using those keys, then transitions to state B, where those private keys should no longer be accessible.

During the transition from A to B, the device does not scrub the memory.

After the transition to state B, even though the private keys are no longer accessible directly from the fuses in state B, they can be accessed indirectly by reading the memory that contains the private keys.
For transition from state A to state B, remove information which should not be available once the transition is complete.

CVE-2020-12926
Product software does not set a flag as per TPM specifications, thereby preventing a failed authorization attempt from being recorded after a loss of power.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-12926

Power

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Parbati Kumar Manna, Hareesh Khattri, Arun Kanuparthi
Intel Corporation
2020-05-31
4.1
2020-02-24

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Functional_Areas

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Applicable_Platforms

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated References, Relationships

Debug/Power State Transitions Leak Information