The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

There are two main variations:

Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks the input credentials against a hard-coded set of credentials. In this variant, a default administration account is created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. It can also be difficult for the administrator to detect.
Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains hard-coded credentials for connecting to that component. This variant applies to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be easily discovered. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product.

Primary

Architecture and Design
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

High

Access Control
Bypass Protection Mechanism
If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users will gain access to the account in question.
Any user of the product that hard-codes passwords may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control
Other
Read Application Data
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Other
This weakness can lead to the exposure of resources or functionality to unintended actors, possibly providing attackers with sensitive information or even execute arbitrary code.
If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.

Black Box
Credential storage in configuration files is findable using black box methods, but the use of hard-coded credentials for an incoming authentication routine typically involves an account that is not visible outside of the code.
Moderate

Automated Static Analysis
Automated white box techniques have been published for detecting hard-coded credentials for incoming authentication, but there is some expert disagreement regarding their effectiveness and applicability to a broad range of methods.

Manual Static Analysis
This weakness may be detectable using manual code analysis. Unless authentication is decentralized and applied throughout the product, there can be sufficient time for the analyst to find incoming authentication routines and examine the program logic looking for usage of hard-coded credentials. Configuration files could also be analyzed.
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Manual Dynamic Analysis

For hard-coded credentials in incoming authentication: use monitoring tools that examine the product's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the product was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.
Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using call trees or similar artifacts from the output, examine the associated behaviors and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Network Sniffer
Forced Path Execution

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

High

Automated Static Analysis

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Configuration Checker

SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

High

Architecture and Design

For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7].
In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.

Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.

Architecture and Design
If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.

Architecture and Design

For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash.
Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.

Architecture and Design

For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a database:

...DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger");...

This is an example of an external hard-coded password on the client-side of a connection. This code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password. Once the program has shipped, there is no going back from the database user "scott" with a password of "tiger" unless the program is patched. A devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system. Even worse, if attackers have access to the bytecode for application, they can use the javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for the example above:

javap -c ConnMngr.class22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql24: ldc #38; //String scott26: ldc #17; //String tiger

The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password in the back-end:

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
if (strcmp(password, "Mew!")) {

printf("Incorrect Password!\n");return(0)
}printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");return(1);
}

int VerifyAdmin(String password) {if (!password.equals("Mew!")) {return(0)}//Diagnostic Modereturn(1);}

Every instance of this program can be placed into diagnostic mode with the same password. Even worse is the fact that if this program is distributed as a binary-only distribution, it is very difficult to change that password or disable this "functionality."

The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a hard-coded cryptographic key.

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
if (strcmp(password,"68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {

printf("Incorrect Password!\n");return(0);
}printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");return(1);
}

public boolean VerifyAdmin(String password) {if (password.equals("68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {System.out.println("Entering Diagnostic Mode...");return true;}System.out.println("Incorrect Password!");return false;

int VerifyAdmin(String password) {if (password.Equals("68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {Console.WriteLine("Entering Diagnostic Mode...");return(1);}Console.WriteLine("Incorrect Password!");return(0);}

The cryptographic key is within a hard-coded string value that is compared to the password. It is likely that an attacker will be able to read the key and compromise the system.

The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.
This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
...webapp.ldap.username=secretUsernamewebapp.ldap.password=secretPassword...

The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.

...<connectionStrings><add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /></connectionStrings>...

Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.

In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
Multiple vendors used hard-coded credentials in their OT products.

CVE-2022-40263
Software for biological cell analysus has hard-coded credentials, leading to leak of Protected Health Information (PHI)
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-40263

CVE-2022-29953
Condition Monitor firmware has a maintenance interface with hard-coded credentials
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-29953

CVE-2022-29960
Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-29960

CVE-2022-29964
Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-29964

CVE-2022-30997
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) has a maintenance service that uses undocumented, hard-coded credentials
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-30997

CVE-2022-30314
Firmware for a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) has hard-coded credentials for access to boot configuration
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-30314

CVE-2022-30271
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used in typical deployments
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-30271

CVE-2021-37555
Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-37555

CVE-2021-35033
Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-35033

CVE-2012-3503
Installation script has a hard-coded secret token value, allowing attackers to bypass authentication
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-3503

CVE-2010-2772
SCADA system uses a hard-coded password to protect back-end database containing authorization information, exploited by Stuxnet worm
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-2772

CVE-2010-2073
FTP server library uses hard-coded usernames and passwords for three default accounts
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-2073

CVE-2010-1573
Chain: Router firmware uses hard-coded username and password for access to debug functionality, which can be used to execute arbitrary code
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1573

CVE-2008-2369
Server uses hard-coded authentication key
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2369

CVE-2008-0961
Backup product uses hard-coded username and password, allowing attackers to bypass authentication via the RPC interface
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0961

CVE-2008-1160
Security appliance uses hard-coded password allowing attackers to gain root access
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1160

CVE-2006-7142
Drive encryption product stores hard-coded cryptographic keys for encrypted configuration files in executable programs
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-7142

CVE-2005-3716
VoIP product uses hard-coded public credentials that cannot be changed, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-3716

CVE-2005-3803
VoIP product uses hard coded public and private SNMP community strings that cannot be changed, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-3803

CVE-2005-0496
Backup product contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a back door, which allows remote attackers to access the file system
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-0496

MSC03-J
Never hard code sensitive information

ASCSM-CWE-798

Part 3-3
Req SR 1.5

Part 4-2
Req CR 1.5

Allowed-with-Review
While this entry is at a Base level of abstraction, it has lower-level children that cover specific kinds of credentials.
Consider children such as CWE-259 and CWE-321.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-01-15
1.8
2010-02-16
More abstract entry for hard-coded password and hard-coded cryptographic key.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-04-05
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Common_Consequences, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-09-27
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-12-13
updated Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-27
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-09-13
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-02-21
updated Applicable_Platforms, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-01-19
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-01-03
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-09-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-12-10
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-06-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-02-29
4.14
2024-02-29
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-07-16
4.15
2024-07-16
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-11-19
4.16
2024-11-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Detection_Factors, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Observed_Examples, Relationships

"Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group
CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG
2023-01-24
4.10
2023-01-31
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Abhi Balakrishnan
2024-02-29
4.15
2024-07-16
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability