The product searches for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that can point to resources that are not under the product's direct control.

This might allow attackers to execute their own programs, access unauthorized data files, or modify configuration in unexpected ways. If the product uses a search path to locate critical resources such as programs, then an attacker could modify that search path to point to a malicious program, which the targeted product would then execute. The problem extends to any type of critical resource that the product trusts.
Some of the most common variants of untrusted search path are:

In various UNIX and Linux-based systems, the PATH environment variable may be consulted to locate executable programs, and LD_PRELOAD may be used to locate a separate library.
In various Microsoft-based systems, the PATH environment variable is consulted to locate a DLL, if the DLL is not found in other paths that appear earlier in the search order.

Primary

Untrusted Path

Implementation

High

Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
There is the potential for arbitrary code execution with privileges of the vulnerable program.

Availability
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
The program could be redirected to the wrong files, potentially triggering a crash or hang when the targeted file is too large or does not have the expected format.

Confidentiality
Read Files or Directories
The program could send the output of unauthorized files to the attacker.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.
Attach the monitor to the process and look for library functions and system calls that suggest when a search path is being used. One pattern is when the program performs multiple accesses of the same file but in different directories, with repeated failures until the proper filename is found. Library calls such as getenv() or their equivalent can be checked to see if any path-related variables are being accessed.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
High

Manual Analysis
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Architecture and Design
Implementation
Attack Surface Reduction
Hard-code the search path to a set of known-safe values (such as system directories), or only allow them to be specified by the administrator in a configuration file. Do not allow these settings to be modified by an external party. Be careful to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-426 and CWE-428.

Implementation
When invoking other programs, specify those programs using fully-qualified pathnames. While this is an effective approach, code that uses fully-qualified pathnames might not be portable to other systems that do not use the same pathnames. The portability can be improved by locating the full-qualified paths in a centralized, easily-modifiable location within the source code, and having the code refer to these paths.

Implementation
Remove or restrict all environment settings before invoking other programs. This includes the PATH environment variable, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and other settings that identify the location of code libraries, and any application-specific search paths.

Implementation
Check your search path before use and remove any elements that are likely to be unsafe, such as the current working directory or a temporary files directory.

Implementation
Use other functions that require explicit paths. Making use of any of the other readily available functions that require explicit paths is a safe way to avoid this problem. For example, system() in C does not require a full path since the shell can take care of it, while execl() and execv() require a full path.

This program is intended to execute a command that lists the contents of a restricted directory, then performs other actions. Assume that it runs with setuid privileges in order to bypass the permissions check by the operating system.

#define DIR "/restricted/directory"
char cmd[500];sprintf(cmd, "ls -l %480s", DIR);
/* Raise privileges to those needed for accessing DIR. */

RaisePrivileges(...);system(cmd);DropPrivileges(...);...

This code may look harmless at first, since both the directory and the command are set to fixed values that the attacker can't control. The attacker can only see the contents for DIR, which is the intended program behavior. Finally, the programmer is also careful to limit the code that executes with raised privileges.
However, because the program does not modify the PATH environment variable, the following attack would work:

The user sets the PATH to reference a directory under the attacker's control, such as "/my/dir/".
The attacker creates a malicious program called "ls", and puts that program in /my/dir
The user executes the program.
When system() is executed, the shell consults the PATH to find the ls program
The program finds the attacker's malicious program, "/my/dir/ls". It doesn't find "/bin/ls" because PATH does not contain "/bin/".
The program executes the attacker's malicious program with the raised privileges.

The following code from a system utility uses the system property APPHOME to determine the directory in which it is installed and then executes an initialization script based on a relative path from the specified directory.

...String home = System.getProperty("APPHOME");String cmd = home + INITCMD;java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);...

The code above allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the elevated privilege of the application by modifying the system property APPHOME to point to a different path containing a malicious version of INITCMD. Because the program does not validate the value read from the environment, if an attacker can control the value of the system property APPHOME, then they can fool the application into running malicious code and take control of the system.

This code prints all of the running processes belonging to the current user.

//assume getCurrentUser() returns a username that is guaranteed to be alphanumeric (avoiding CWE-78)
$userName = getCurrentUser();$command = 'ps aux | grep ' . $userName;system($command);

If invoked by an unauthorized web user, it is providing a web page of potentially sensitive information on the underlying system, such as command-line arguments (CWE-497). This program is also potentially vulnerable to a PATH based attack (CWE-426), as an attacker may be able to create malicious versions of the ps or grep commands. While the program does not explicitly raise privileges to run the system commands, the PHP interpreter may by default be running with higher privileges than users.

The following code is from a web application that allows users access to an interface through which they can update their password on the system. In this environment, user passwords can be managed using the Network Information System (NIS), which is commonly used on UNIX systems. When performing NIS updates, part of the process for updating passwords is to run a make command in the /var/yp directory. Performing NIS updates requires extra privileges.

...System.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("make");...

The problem here is that the program does not specify an absolute path for make and does not clean its environment prior to executing the call to Runtime.exec(). If an attacker can modify the $PATH variable to point to a malicious binary called make and cause the program to be executed in their environment, then the malicious binary will be loaded instead of the one intended. Because of the nature of the application, it runs with the privileges necessary to perform system operations, which means the attacker's make will now be run with these privileges, possibly giving the attacker complete control of the system.

CVE-1999-1120
Application relies on its PATH environment variable to find and execute program.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-1120

CVE-2008-1810
Database application relies on its PATH environment variable to find and execute program.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1810

CVE-2007-2027
Chain: untrusted search path enabling resultant format string by loading malicious internationalization messages.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2027

CVE-2008-3485
Untrusted search path using malicious .EXE in Windows environment.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3485

CVE-2008-2613
setuid program allows compromise using path that finds and loads a malicious library.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2613

CVE-2008-1319
Server allows client to specify the search path, which can be modified to point to a program that the client has uploaded.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1319

Program Invocation
Code Libraries

System Process

Untrusted Search Path

Relative path library search

ENV03-C
Sanitize the environment when invoking external programs

Allowed-with-Review
This CWE entry is often confused with another closely-related entry about search paths.
CWE-426 and CWE-427 are often misused because they both mention search paths, although CWE-426 is focused on attacker control of the search path itself, while CWE-427 applies when the attacker cannot modify the search path but can write to one of the locations specified in the search path. Also, this entry is classified in a part of CWE's hierarchy that does not have sufficiently low-level coverage, which might reflect a lack of classification-oriented weakness research in the software security community. Conduct careful root cause analysis to determine the original mistake that led to this weakness. If closer analysis reveals that this weakness is appropriate, then this might be the best available CWE to use for mapping. If no other option is available, then it is acceptable to map to this CWE.

PLOVER
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

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MITRE
2008-11-24
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

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MITRE
2009-01-12
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-03-10
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-12-28
updated References

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MITRE
2010-02-16
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-04-05
updated Applicable_Platforms

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MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations

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MITRE
2010-09-27
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CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-03-29
updated Demonstrative_Examples

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MITRE
2011-06-01
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MITRE
2011-09-13
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CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
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CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-02-18
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CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
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CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Type

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-01-03
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

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MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

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MITRE
2019-09-19
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MITRE
2020-02-24
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MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Demonstrative_Examples

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MITRE
2021-10-28
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MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Research_Gaps

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MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Description

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MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction

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MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-07-16
4.15
2024-07-16
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities