The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

Primary

Resultant

An access control list (ACL) represents who/what has permissions to a given object. Different operating systems implement (ACLs) in different ways. In UNIX, there are three types of permissions: read, write, and execute. Users are divided into three classes for file access: owner, group owner, and all other users where each class has a separate set of rights. In Windows NT, there are four basic types of permissions for files: "No access", "Read access", "Change access", and "Full control". Windows NT extends the concept of three types of users in UNIX to include a list of users and groups along with their associated permissions. A user can create an object (file) and assign specified permissions to that object.

AuthZ
"AuthZ" is typically used as an abbreviation of "authorization" within the web application security community. It is distinct from "AuthN" (or, sometimes, "AuthC") which is an abbreviation of "authentication." The use of "Auth" as an abbreviation is discouraged, since it could be used for either authentication or authorization.

Architecture and Design
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.

Operation

High

Confidentiality
Read Application Data
Read Files or Directories
An attacker could bypass intended access restrictions to read sensitive data, either by reading the data directly from a data store that is not correctly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to read the data.

Integrity
Modify Application Data
Modify Files or Directories
An attacker could bypass intended access restrictions to modify sensitive data, either by writing the data directly to a data store that is not correctly restricted, or by accessing insufficiently-protected, privileged functionality to write the data.

Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Bypass Protection Mechanism
An attacker could bypass intended access restrictions to gain privileges by modifying or reading critical data directly, or by accessing privileged functionality.

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
An attacker could use elevated privileges to execute unauthorized commands or code.

Availability
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)
DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)
DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)
An attacker could gain unauthorized access to resources on the system and excessively consume those resources, leading to a denial of service.

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. Even if they can be customized to recognize these schemes, they might not be able to tell whether the scheme correctly performs the authorization in a way that cannot be bypassed or subverted by an attacker.

Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may not be able to find interfaces that are protected by authorization checks, even if those checks contain weaknesses.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.

Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Forced Path Execution
Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

High

Architecture and Design

Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.

Architecture and Design
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Architecture and Design
Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].

Architecture and Design

For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.

System Configuration
Installation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

The following code could be for a medical records application. It displays a record to already authenticated users, confirming the user's authorization using a value stored in a cookie.

$role = $_COOKIES['role'];if (!$role) {$role = getRole('user');if ($role) {// save the cookie to send out in future responsessetcookie("role", $role, time()+60*60*2);}else{ShowLoginScreen();die("\n");}}if ($role == 'Reader') {DisplayMedicalHistory($_POST['patient_ID']);}else{die("You are not Authorized to view this record\n");}

The programmer expects that the cookie will only be set when getRole() succeeds. The programmer even diligently specifies a 2-hour expiration for the cookie. However, the attacker can easily set the "role" cookie to the value "Reader". As a result, the $role variable is "Reader", and getRole() is never invoked. The attacker has bypassed the authorization system.

CVE-2025-24839
collaboration platform allows attacker to access an AI bot by using a plugin to set a critical property
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-24839

CVE-2025-32796
LLM application development platform allows non-admin users to enable or disable apps using certain API endpoints
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-32796

CVE-2021-39155
Chain: A microservice integration and management platform compares the hostname in the HTTP Host header in a case-sensitive way (CWE-178, CWE-1289), allowing bypass of the authorization policy (CWE-863) using a hostname with mixed case or other variations.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-39155

CVE-2019-15900
Chain: sscanf() call is used to check if a username and group exists, but the return value of sscanf() call is not checked (CWE-252), causing an uninitialized variable to be checked (CWE-457), returning success to allow authorization bypass for executing a privileged (CWE-863).
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-15900

CVE-2009-2213
Gateway uses default "Allow" configuration for its authorization settings.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-2213

CVE-2009-0034
Chain: product does not properly interpret a configuration option for a system group, allowing users to gain privileges.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-0034

CVE-2008-6123
Chain: SNMP product does not properly parse a configuration option for which hosts are allowed to connect, allowing unauthorized IP addresses to connect.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-6123

CVE-2008-7109
Chain: reliance on client-side security (CWE-602) allows attackers to bypass authorization using a custom client.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-7109

CVE-2008-3424
Chain: product does not properly handle wildcards in an authorization policy list, allowing unintended access.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3424

CVE-2008-4577
ACL-based protection mechanism treats negative access rights as if they are positive, allowing bypass of intended restrictions.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4577

CVE-2006-6679
Product relies on the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header for authorization, allowing unintended access by spoofing the header.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-6679

CVE-2005-2801
Chain: file-system code performs an incorrect comparison (CWE-697), preventing default ACLs from being properly applied.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2801

CVE-2001-1155
Chain: product does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup because of operator precedence (CWE-783), allowing bypass of DNS-based access restrictions.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1155

Part 4-1
Req SD-4

Part 4-2
Req CR 2.1

Part 4-2
Req CR 2.2

Part 3-3
Req SR 2.1

Part 3-3
Req SR 2.2

Part 4-1
Req SVV-1

Part 4-1
Req SVV-4

Part 4-1
Req SD-1

Allowed-with-Review
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit

Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-05-24
1.13
2011-06-01

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-27
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-09-13
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-02-21
updated Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-12-10
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Alternate_Terms

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-02-29
4.14
2024-02-29
updated Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-11-19
4.16
2024-11-19
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Diagram

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

participants in the CWE ICS/OT SIG 62443 Mapping Fall Workshop
2023-11-14
4.14
2024-02-29
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443

Abhi Balakrishnan
2024-02-29
4.16
2024-11-19
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability