The product does not adequately protect confidential information on the device from being accessed by Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test (OSAT) vendors.

In contrast to complete vertical integration of architecting, designing, manufacturing, assembling, and testing chips all within a single organization, an organization can choose to simply architect and design a chip before outsourcing the rest of the process to OSAT entities (e.g., external foundries and test houses). In the latter example, the device enters an OSAT facility in a much more vulnerable pre-production stage where many debug and test modes are accessible. Therefore, the chipmaker must place a certain level of trust with the OSAT. To counter this, the chipmaker often requires the OSAT partner to enter into restrictive non-disclosure agreements (NDAs). Nonetheless, OSAT vendors likely have many customers, which increases the risk of accidental sharing of information. There may also be a security vulnerability in the information technology (IT) system of the OSAT facility. Alternatively, a malicious insider at the OSAT facility may carry out an insider attack. Considering these factors, it behooves the chipmaker to minimize any confidential information in the device that may be accessible to the OSAT vendor.
Logic errors during design or synthesis could misconfigure the interconnection of the debug components, which could provide improper authorization to sensitive information.

Primary

Resultant

Implementation

Confidentiality
Integrity
Access Control
Authentication
Authorization
Availability
Accountability
Non-Repudiation
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Modify Memory
Modify Files or Directories
Medium
The impact depends on the confidential information itself and who is inadvertently granted access. For example, if the confidential information is a key that can unlock all the parts of a generation, the impact could be severe.

Architecture or Design Review
Appropriate Post-Si tests should be carried out to ensure that residual confidential information is not left on parts leaving one facility for another facility.
High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
Appropriate Post-Si tests should be carried out to ensure that residual confidential information is not left on parts leaving one facility for another facility.
Moderate

Architecture and Design

Ensure that when an OSAT vendor is allowed to access test interfaces necessary for preproduction and returned parts, the vendor only pulls the minimal information necessary. Also, architect the product in such a way that, when an "unlock device" request comes, it only unlocks that specific part and not all the parts for that product line.
Ensure that the product's non-volatile memory (NVM) is scrubbed of all confidential information and secrets before handing it over to an OSAT.
Arrange to secure all communication between an OSAT facility and the chipmaker.

Moderate

The following example shows how an attacker can take advantage of a piece of confidential information that has not been protected from the OSAT.
Suppose the preproduction device contains NVM (a storage medium that by definition/design can retain its data without power), and this NVM contains a key that can unlock all the parts for that generation. An OSAT facility accidentally leaks the key.
Compromising a key that can unlock all the parts of a generation can be devastating to a chipmaker.
The likelihood of such a compromise can be reduced by ensuring all memories on the preproduction device are properly scrubbed.

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

This entry might be subject to CWE Scope Exclusion SCOPE.SITUATIONS (Focus on situations in which weaknesses may appear); SCOPE.HUMANPROC (Human/organizational process; and/or SCOPE.CUSTREL (Not customer-relevant).
This entry is still under development and will continue to see updates and content improvements.

Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna
Intel Corporation
2020-05-29
4.2
2020-08-20

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Applicable_Platforms

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-06-28
updated Applicable_Platforms

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Maintenance_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Weakness_Ordinalities