The product conducts a secure-boot process that transfers bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) into Volatile Memory (VM), but it does not have sufficient access control or other protections for the Volatile Memory.

Adversaries could bypass the secure-boot process and execute their own untrusted, malicious boot code.
As a part of a secure-boot process, the read-only-memory (ROM) code for a System-on-Chip (SoC) or other system fetches bootloader code from Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) and stores the code in Volatile Memory (VM), such as dynamic, random-access memory (DRAM) or static, random-access memory (SRAM). The NVM is usually external to the SoC, while the VM is internal to the SoC. As the code is transferred from NVM to VM, it is authenticated by the SoC's ROM code.

Primary

Architecture and Design
This weakness can be introduced during hardware architecture or design but can be identified later during testing.

Access Control
Integrity
Modify Memory
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
High
If the volatile-memory-region protections or access controls are insufficient to prevent modifications from an adversary or untrusted agent, the secure boot may be bypassed or replaced with the execution of an adversary's code.

Manual Analysis
Ensure the volatile memory is lockable or has locks. Ensure the volatile memory is locked for writes from untrusted agents or adversaries. Try modifying the volatile memory from an untrusted agent, and ensure these writes are dropped.

High

Manual Analysis

Analyze the device using the following steps:

Identify all fabric master agents that are active during system Boot Flow when initial code is loaded from Non-volatile storage to volatile memory.
Identify the volatile memory regions that are used for storing loaded system executable program.
During system boot, test programming the identified memory regions in step 2 from all the masters identified in step 1.

Only trusted masters should be allowed to write to the memory regions. For example, pluggable device peripherals should not have write access to program load memory regions.

Moderate

Architecture and Design
Ensure that the design of volatile-memory protections is enough to prevent modification from an adversary or untrusted code.

Testing
Test the volatile-memory protections to ensure they are safe from modification or untrusted code.

A typical SoC secure boot's flow includes fetching the next piece of code (i.e., the boot loader) from NVM (e.g., serial, peripheral interface (SPI) flash), and transferring it to DRAM/SRAM volatile, internal memory, which is more efficient.
The volatile-memory protections or access controls are insufficient.
The memory from where the boot loader executes can be modified by an adversary.
A good architecture should define appropriate protections or access controls to prevent modification by an adversary or untrusted agent, once the bootloader is authenticated.

CVE-2019-2267
Locked memory regions may be modified through other interfaces in a secure-boot-loader image due to improper access control.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-2267

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi
Intel Corporation
2020-04-25
4.1
2020-02-24

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-02-29
4.14
2024-02-29
updated Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Common_Consequences, Description

Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi
Lattice Semiconductor
2021-10-20
suggested content improvements

Hareesh Khattri
Intel Corporation
2021-10-22
provided detection method

Insufficient Protections on the Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code