The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.

Primary

A certificate is a token that associates an identity (principal) to a cryptographic key. Certificates can be used to check if a public key belongs to the assumed owner.

Architecture and Design

Implementation
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Implementation
When the product uses certificate pinning, the developer might not properly validate all relevant components of the certificate before pinning the certificate. This can make it difficult or expensive to test after the pinning is complete.

Integrity
Authentication
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
When a certificate is invalid or malicious, it might allow an attacker to spoof a trusted entity by interfering in the communication path between the host and client. The product might connect to a malicious host while believing it is a trusted host, or the product might be deceived into accepting spoofed data that appears to originate from a trusted host.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Web Application Scanner

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Man-in-the-middle attack tool

High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)

High

Architecture and Design
Implementation
Certificates should be carefully managed and checked to assure that data are encrypted with the intended owner's public key.

Implementation
If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.

This code checks the certificate of a connected peer.

if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) && host)foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN==foo))

// certificate looks good, host can be trusted

In this case, because the certificate is self-signed, there was no external authority that could prove the identity of the host. The program could be communicating with a different system that is spoofing the host, e.g. by poisoning the DNS cache or using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack to modify the traffic from server to client.

The following OpenSSL code obtains a certificate and verifies it.

cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);if (cert && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl)==X509_V_OK)) {

// do secret things

}

Even though the "verify" step returns X509_V_OK, this step does not include checking the Common Name against the name of the host. That is, there is no guarantee that the certificate is for the desired host. The SSL connection could have been established with a malicious host that provided a valid certificate.

The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate and allows the use of expired certificates.

if (cert = SSL_get_peer(certificate(ssl)) {
foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);if ((X509_V_OK==foo) || (X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED==foo))

//do stuff

If the call to SSL_get_verify_result() returns X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, this means that the certificate has expired. As time goes on, there is an increasing chance for attackers to compromise the certificate.

The following OpenSSL code ensures that there is a certificate before continuing execution.

if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got a certificate, do secret things

Because this code does not use SSL_get_verify_results() to check the certificate, it could accept certificates that have been revoked (X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED). The software could be communicating with a malicious host.

The following OpenSSL code ensures that the host has a certificate.

if (cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) {

// got certificate, host can be trusted

//foo=SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);

//if (X509_V_OK==foo) ...

}

Note that the code does not call SSL_get_verify_result(ssl), which effectively disables the validation step that checks the certificate.

CVE-2019-12496
A Go framework for robotics, drones, and IoT devices skips verification of root CA certificates by default.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-12496

CVE-2014-1266
Chain: incorrect "goto" in Apple SSL product bypasses certificate validation, allowing Adversary-in-the-Middle (AITM) attack (Apple "goto fail" bug). CWE-705 (Incorrect Control Flow Scoping) -> CWE-561 (Dead Code) -> CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) -> CWE-393 (Return of Wrong Status Code) -> CWE-300 (Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint). The code's whitespace indentation did not reflect the actual control flow (CWE-1114) and did not explicitly delimit the block (CWE-483), which could have made it more difficult for human code auditors to detect the vulnerability.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2014-1266

CVE-2021-22909
Chain: router's firmware update procedure uses curl with "-k" (insecure) option that disables certificate validation (CWE-295), allowing adversary-in-the-middle (AITM) compromise with a malicious firmware image (CWE-494).
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-22909

CVE-2008-4989
Verification function trusts certificate chains in which the last certificate is self-signed.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4989

CVE-2012-5821
Web browser uses a TLS-related function incorrectly, preventing it from verifying that a server's certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority (CA)
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-5821

CVE-2009-3046
Web browser does not check if any intermediate certificates are revoked.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-3046

CVE-2011-0199
Operating system does not check Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in some cases, allowing spoofing using a revoked certificate.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-0199

CVE-2012-5810
Mobile banking application does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-5810

CVE-2012-3446
Cloud-support library written in Python uses incorrect regular expression when matching hostname.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-3446

CVE-2009-2408
Web browser does not correctly handle '\0' character (NUL) in Common Name, allowing spoofing of https sites.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-2408

CVE-2012-2993
Smartphone device does not verify hostname, allowing spoofing of mail services.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-2993

CVE-2012-5822
Application uses third-party library that does not validate hostname.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-5822

CVE-2012-5819
Cloud storage management application does not validate hostname.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-5819

CVE-2012-5817
Java library uses JSSE SSLSocket and SSLEngine classes, which do not verify the hostname.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-5817

CVE-2010-1378
chain: incorrect calculation allows attackers to bypass certificate checks.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1378

CVE-2005-3170
LDAP client accepts certificates even if they are not from a trusted CA.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-3170

CVE-2009-0265
chain: DNS server does not correctly check return value from the OpenSSL EVP_VerifyFinal function allows bypass of validation of the certificate chain.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-0265

CVE-2003-1229
chain: product checks if client is trusted when it intended to check if the server is trusted, allowing validation of signed code.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-1229

CVE-2002-0862
Cryptographic API, as used in web browsers, mail clients, and other software, does not properly validate Basic Constraints.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0862

CVE-2009-1358
chain: OS package manager does not check properly check the return value, allowing bypass using a revoked certificate.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-1358

A10
Insecure Configuration Management
CWE More Specific

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

CWE Community
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19
Submitted by members of the CWE community to extend early CWE versions

Veracode
2008-08-15
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-10-14
updated Background_Details, Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-12-28
Critical
Converted from category to weakness class.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-02-21
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Description, Name, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Type

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-06-23
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-01-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated Background_Details, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-09-19
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Observed_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Observed_Examples, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Description, Modes_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Diagram, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Certificate Issues