The product implements a Security Token mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, the Security Tokens generated in the system are incorrect.

Systems-On-a-Chip (SoC) (Integrated circuits and hardware engines) implement Security Tokens to differentiate and identify actions originated from various agents. These actions could be "read", "write", "program", "reset", "fetch", "compute", etc. Security Tokens are generated and assigned to every agent on the SoC that is either capable of generating an action or receiving an action from another agent. Every agent could be assigned a unique, Security Token based on its trust level or privileges.

Primary

Resultant

Architecture and Design

Implementation

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Access Control
Modify Files or Directories
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Read Memory
Modify Memory
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
High
Incorrectly generated Security Tokens could result in the same token used for multiple agents or multiple tokens being used for the same agent. This condition could result in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or the execution of an action that in turn could result in privilege escalation or unintended access.

Architecture and Design
Implementation

Generation of Security Tokens should be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
Security-Token definition and programming flow should be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Consider a system with a register for storing an AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is 128 bits long implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and register, AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY, is defined to provide necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents, using a Security Token, may access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register is used to define a Security Token. There could be a maximum of 32 Security Tokens that are allowed access to the AES-key registers. When set (bit = "1") bit number allows action from an agent whose identity matches that bit number. If Clear (bit = "0") the action is disallowed for the corresponding agent.

Assume the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller. The respective Security Tokens are "1" and "2".

Register
Description
Default

AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0
AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption
0x00000000

AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1
AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption
0x00000000

AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2
AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption
0x00000000

AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3
AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption
0x00000000

AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY
AES key access register [31:0]
0x00000002

An agent with a Security Token "1" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_3 registers. As per the above access policy, the AES-Key-access policy allows access to the AES-key registers if the security Token is "1".

The SoC incorrectly generates Security Token "1" for every agent. In other words, both Main-controller and Aux-controller are assigned Security Token "1".
Both agents have access to the AES-key registers.
The SoC should correctly generate Security Tokens, assigning "1" to the Main-controller and "2" to the Aux-controller

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

Arun Kanuparthi, Hareesh Khattri, Parbati Kumar Manna, Narasimha Kumar V Mangipudi
Intel Corporation
2020-03-06
4.1
2020-02-24

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Weakness_Ordinalities

Generation of Incorrect Security Identifiers