The product accepts input in the form of a backslash absolute path ('\absolute\pathname\here') without appropriate validation, which can allow an attacker to traverse the file system to unintended locations or access arbitrary files.

Primary

Resultant

Implementation

Confidentiality
Integrity
Read Files or Directories
Modify Files or Directories

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Implementation
Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

High

Implementation
Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

CVE-1999-1263
Mail client allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via an e-mail message containing a uuencoded attachment that specifies the full pathname for the file to be modified.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-1263

CVE-2003-0753
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via a full pathname to the target file in config parameter.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0753

CVE-2002-1525
Remote attackers can read arbitrary files via an absolute pathname.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1525

File Processing

File or Directory

\absolute\pathname\here ('backslash absolute path')

FIO05-C
Identify files using multiple file attributes

SFP16
Path Traversal

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

PLOVER
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-11-24
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-07-27
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-03-29
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Common_Consequences

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-09-13
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Applicable_Platforms, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-06-25
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Affected_Resources, Functional_Areas

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Detection_Factors, Weakness_Ordinalities

Path Issue - Backslash Absolute Path - \absolute\pathname\here