The product contains a hard-coded password, which it uses for its own inbound authentication or for outbound communication to external components.

There are two main variations of a hard-coded password:

Inbound: the product contains an authentication mechanism that checks for a hard-coded password.
Outbound: the product connects to another system or component, and it contains a hard-coded password for connecting to that component.

Primary

Implementation
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Architecture and Design

High

Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
If hard-coded passwords are used, it is almost certain that malicious users can gain access through the account in question.

Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Hide Activities
Reduce Maintainability
A hard-coded password typically leads to a significant authentication failure that can be difficult for the system administrator to detect. Once detected, it can be difficult to fix, so the administrator may be forced into disabling the product entirely.

Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic.
Attach the monitor to the process and perform a login. Using disassembled code, look at the associated instructions and see if any of them appear to be comparing the input to a fixed string or value.

Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
High

Architecture and Design
For outbound authentication: store passwords outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible.

Architecture and Design
For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password.

Architecture and Design
Perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded password. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.

Architecture and Design

For inbound authentication: apply strong one-way hashes to your passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When receiving an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the hash that you have saved.
Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that you generate. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.

Architecture and Design

For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete.

The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords which are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals.
Next, the passwords used should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access.
Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay style attacks.

The following code uses a hard-coded password to connect to a database:

...DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger");...

This is an example of an external hard-coded password on the client-side of a connection. This code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password. Once the program has shipped, there is no going back from the database user "scott" with a password of "tiger" unless the program is patched. A devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system. Even worse, if attackers have access to the bytecode for application, they can use the javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for the example above:

javap -c ConnMngr.class22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql24: ldc #38; //String scott26: ldc #17; //String tiger

The following code is an example of an internal hard-coded password in the back-end:

int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
if (strcmp(password, "Mew!")) {

printf("Incorrect Password!\n");return(0);
}printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");return(1);
}

int VerifyAdmin(String password) {if (!password.equals("Mew!")) {return(0);}//Diagnostic Modereturn(1);}

Every instance of this program can be placed into diagnostic mode with the same password. Even worse is the fact that if this program is distributed as a binary-only distribution, it is very difficult to change that password or disable this "functionality."

The following examples show a portion of properties and configuration files for Java and ASP.NET applications. The files include username and password information but they are stored in cleartext.
This Java example shows a properties file with a cleartext username / password pair.

# Java Web App ResourceBundle properties file
...webapp.ldap.username=secretUsernamewebapp.ldap.password=secretPassword...

The following example shows a portion of a configuration file for an ASP.Net application. This configuration file includes username and password information for a connection to a database but the pair is stored in cleartext.

...<connectionStrings><add name="ud_DEV" connectionString="connectDB=uDB; uid=db2admin; pwd=password; dbalias=uDB;" providerName="System.Data.Odbc" /></connectionStrings>...

Username and password information should not be included in a configuration file or a properties file in cleartext as this will allow anyone who can read the file access to the resource. If possible, encrypt this information.

In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
Multiple vendors used hard-coded credentials in their OT products.

CVE-2022-29964
Distributed Control System (DCS) has hard-coded passwords for local shell access
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-29964

CVE-2021-37555
Telnet service for IoT feeder for dogs and cats has hard-coded password [REF-1288]
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-37555

CVE-2021-35033
Firmware for a WiFi router uses a hard-coded password for a BusyBox shell, allowing bypass of authentication through the UART port
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-35033

Password Management: Hard-Coded Password

Use of hard-coded password

A3
Broken Authentication and Session Management
CWE More Specific

MSC03-J
Never hard code sensitive information

SFP33
Hardcoded sensitive data

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Variant level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

It might be appropriate to split this entry into an inbound variant and an outbound variant. These variants are likely to have different consequences, detectability, etc., although such differences are not suitable for a split. More importantly, from a vulnerability theory perspective, they might be characterized as different behaviors. The difference is in where the hard-coded password is stored - on the component performing the authentication, or the component that is connecting to the external component that requires authentication. However, as with many weaknesses, the "vulnerability topology" should not be regarded as important enough for splits. For example, separate weaknesses do not exist for client-to-server buffer overflows versus server-to-client buffer overflows.

In the Inbound variant, a default administration account may be created, and a simple password is hard-coded into the product and associated with that account. This hard-coded password is the same for each installation of the product, and it usually cannot be changed or disabled by system administrators without manually modifying the program, or otherwise patching the product. If the password is ever discovered or published (a common occurrence on the Internet), then anybody with knowledge of this password can access the product. Finally, since all installations of the product will have the same password, even across different organizations, this enables massive attacks such as worms to take place.
The Outbound variant can apply to front-end systems that authenticate with a back-end service. The back-end service may require a fixed password that can be discovered easily. The programmer may simply hard-code those back-end credentials into the front-end product. Any user of that program may be able to extract the password. Client-side systems with hard-coded passwords pose even more of a threat, since the extraction of a password from a binary is usually very simple.

7 Pernicious Kingdoms
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Time_of_Introduction

KDM Analytics
2008-08-01
added/updated white box definitions

Veracode
2008-08-15
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-10-14
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-11-13
Significant description modifications to emphasize different variants.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-11-24
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-01-12
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-03-10
updated Potential_Mitigations

KDM Analytics
2009-07-17
Improved the White_Box_Definition

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-07-27
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, White_Box_Definitions

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-02-16
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-04-05
updated Applicable_Platforms

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-09-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-12-13
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
updated Demonstrative_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-01-19
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-05-03
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Causal_Nature, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, White_Box_Definitions

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-01-03
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated References, Relationships, Type

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-12-10
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-01-31
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated Detection_Factors, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-02-29
4.14
2024-02-29
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Maintenance_Notes, Other_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Relationships

Hard-Coded Password