The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly.

Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components.
Input can consist of:

raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size

Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:

specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data

Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.

Primary

Architecture and Design

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
If a programmer believes that an attacker cannot modify certain inputs, then the programmer might not perform any input validation at all. For example, in web applications, many programmers believe that cookies and hidden form fields can not be modified from a web browser (CWE-472), although they can be altered using a proxy or a custom program. In a client-server architecture, the programmer might assume that client-side security checks cannot be bypassed, even when a custom client could be written that skips those checks (CWE-602).

High

Availability
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)
DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)
An attacker could provide unexpected values and cause a program crash or arbitrary control of resource allocation, leading to excessive consumption of resources such as memory and CPU.

Confidentiality
Read Memory
Read Files or Directories
An attacker could read confidential data if they are able to control resource references.

Integrity
Confidentiality
Availability
Modify Memory
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
An attacker could use malicious input to modify data or possibly alter control flow in unexpected ways, including arbitrary command execution.

Automated Static Analysis

Some instances of improper input validation can be detected using automated static analysis.
A static analysis tool might allow the user to specify which application-specific methods or functions perform input validation; the tool might also have built-in knowledge of validation frameworks such as Struts. The tool may then suppress or de-prioritize any associated warnings. This allows the analyst to focus on areas of the software in which input validation does not appear to be present.
Except in the cases described in the previous paragraph, automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.

Manual Static Analysis
When custom input validation is required, such as when enforcing business rules, manual analysis is necessary to ensure that the validation is properly implemented.

Fuzzing
Fuzzing techniques can be useful for detecting input validation errors. When unexpected inputs are provided to the software, the software should not crash or otherwise become unstable, and it should generate application-controlled error messages. If exceptions or interpreter-generated error messages occur, this indicates that the input was not detected and handled within the application logic itself.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners

High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Host Application Interface Scanner
Monitored Virtual Environment - run potentially malicious code in sandbox / wrapper / virtual machine, see if it does anything suspicious

High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

High

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Attack Modeling

High

Architecture and Design
Attack Surface Reduction
Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]

Architecture and Design
Libraries or Frameworks
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).

Architecture and Design
Implementation
Attack Surface Reduction
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.

Implementation
Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

High

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.

Implementation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Implementation
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.

Implementation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Implementation

Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.

Implementation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

This example demonstrates a shopping interaction in which the user is free to specify the quantity of items to be purchased and a total is calculated.

...public static final double price = 20.00;int quantity = currentUser.getAttribute("quantity");double total = price * quantity;chargeUser(total);...

The user has no control over the price variable, however the code does not prevent a negative value from being specified for quantity. If an attacker were to provide a negative value, then the user would have their account credited instead of debited.

This example asks the user for a height and width of an m X n game board with a maximum dimension of 100 squares.

...#define MAX_DIM 100...
/* board dimensions */

int m,n, error;board_square_t *board;printf("Please specify the board height: \n");error = scanf("%d", &m);if ( EOF == error ){die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");}printf("Please specify the board width: \n");error = scanf("%d", &n);if ( EOF == error ){die("No integer passed: Die evil hacker!\n");}if ( m > MAX_DIM || n > MAX_DIM ) {die("Value too large: Die evil hacker!\n");}board = (board_square_t*) malloc( m * n * sizeof(board_square_t));...

While this code checks to make sure the user cannot specify large, positive integers and consume too much memory, it does not check for negative values supplied by the user. As a result, an attacker can perform a resource consumption (CWE-400) attack against this program by specifying two, large negative values that will not overflow, resulting in a very large memory allocation (CWE-789) and possibly a system crash. Alternatively, an attacker can provide very large negative values which will cause an integer overflow (CWE-190) and unexpected behavior will follow depending on how the values are treated in the remainder of the program.

The following example shows a PHP application in which the programmer attempts to display a user's birthday and homepage.

$birthday = $_GET['birthday'];$homepage = $_GET['homepage'];echo "Birthday: $birthday<br>Homepage: <a href=$homepage>click here</a>"

The programmer intended for $birthday to be in a date format and $homepage to be a valid URL. However, since the values are derived from an HTTP request, if an attacker can trick a victim into clicking a crafted URL with <script> tags providing the values for birthday and / or homepage, then the script will run on the client's browser when the web server echoes the content. Notice that even if the programmer were to defend the $birthday variable by restricting input to integers and dashes, it would still be possible for an attacker to provide a string of the form:

2009-01-09--

If this data were used in a SQL statement, it would treat the remainder of the statement as a comment. The comment could disable other security-related logic in the statement. In this case, encoding combined with input validation would be a more useful protection mechanism.
Furthermore, an XSS (CWE-79) attack or SQL injection (CWE-89) are just a few of the potential consequences when input validation is not used. Depending on the context of the code, CRLF Injection (CWE-93), Argument Injection (CWE-88), or Command Injection (CWE-77) may also be possible.

The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.

private void buildList ( int untrustedListSize ){if ( 0 > untrustedListSize ){die("Negative value supplied for list size, die evil hacker!");}Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];list[0] = new Widget();}

This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.

This Android application has registered to handle a URL when sent an intent:

...
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.URLHandler.openURL");MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver();registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
...

public class UrlHandlerReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver {
@Overridepublic void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
if("com.example.URLHandler.openURL".equals(intent.getAction())) {String URL = intent.getStringExtra("URLToOpen");int length = URL.length();

...
}
}
}

The application assumes the URL will always be included in the intent. When the URL is not present, the call to getStringExtra() will return null, thus causing a null pointer exception when length() is called.

CVE-2024-37032
Large language model (LLM) management tool does not
validate the format of a digest value (CWE-1287) from a
private, untrusted model registry, enabling relative
path traversal (CWE-23), a.k.a. Probllama
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-37032

CVE-2022-45918
Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using "../" sequences (CWE-24)
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-45918

CVE-2021-30860
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-30860

CVE-2021-30663
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) leads to integer overflow (CWE-190) in mobile OS, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-30663

CVE-2021-22205
Chain: backslash followed by a newline can bypass a validation step (CWE-20), leading to eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-22205

CVE-2021-21220
Chain: insufficient input validation (CWE-20) in browser allows heap corruption (CWE-787), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21220

CVE-2020-9054
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in username parameter, leading to OS command injection (CWE-78), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-9054

CVE-2020-3452
Chain: security product has improper input validation (CWE-20) leading to directory traversal (CWE-22), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3452

CVE-2020-3161
Improper input validation of HTTP requests in IP phone, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3161

CVE-2020-3580
Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in firewall product leads to XSS (CWE-79), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3580

CVE-2021-37147
Chain: caching proxy server has improper input validation (CWE-20) of headers, allowing HTTP response smuggling (CWE-444) using an "LF line ending"
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-37147

CVE-2008-5305
Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5305

CVE-2008-2223
SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2223

CVE-2008-3477
lack of input validation in spreadsheet program leads to buffer overflows, integer overflows, array index errors, and memory corruption.
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3477

CVE-2008-3843
insufficient validation enables XSS
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3843

CVE-2008-3174
driver in security product allows code execution due to insufficient validation
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3174

CVE-2007-3409
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-3409

CVE-2006-6870
infinite loop from DNS packet with a label that points to itself
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-6870

CVE-2008-1303
missing parameter leads to crash
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1303

CVE-2007-5893
HTTP request with missing protocol version number leads to crash
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5893

CVE-2006-6658
request with missing parameters leads to information exposure
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-6658

CVE-2008-4114
system crash with offset value that is inconsistent with packet size
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4114

CVE-2006-3790
size field that is inconsistent with packet size leads to buffer over-read
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3790

CVE-2008-2309
product uses a denylist to identify potentially dangerous content, allowing attacker to bypass a warning
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2309

CVE-2008-3494
security bypass via an extra header
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3494

CVE-2008-3571
empty packet triggers reboot
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3571

CVE-2006-5525
incomplete denylist allows SQL injection
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-5525

CVE-2008-1284
NUL byte in theme name causes directory traversal impact to be worse
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1284

CVE-2008-0600
kernel does not validate an incoming pointer before dereferencing it
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0600

CVE-2008-1738
anti-virus product has insufficient input validation of hooked SSDT functions, allowing code execution
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1738

CVE-2008-1737
anti-virus product allows DoS via zero-length field
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1737

CVE-2008-3464
driver does not validate input from userland to the kernel
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3464

CVE-2008-2252
kernel does not validate parameters sent in from userland, allowing code execution
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2252

CVE-2008-2374
lack of validation of string length fields allows memory consumption or buffer over-read
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2374

CVE-2008-1440
lack of validation of length field leads to infinite loop
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1440

CVE-2008-1625
lack of validation of input to an IOCTL allows code execution
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-1625

CVE-2008-3177
zero-length attachment causes crash
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3177

CVE-2007-2442
zero-length input causes free of uninitialized pointer
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-2442

CVE-2008-5563
crash via a malformed frame structure
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5563

CVE-2008-5285
infinite loop from a long SMTP request
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5285

CVE-2008-3812
router crashes with a malformed packet
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3812

CVE-2008-3680
packet with invalid version number leads to NULL pointer dereference
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3680

CVE-2008-3660
crash via multiple "." characters in file extension
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-3660

Input validation and representation

A1
Unvalidated Input
CWE More Specific

ERR07-C
Prefer functions that support error checking over equivalent functions that don't

FIO30-C
Exclude user input from format strings
CWE More Abstract

MEM10-C
Define and use a pointer validation function

20
Improper Input Handling

SFP25
Tainted input to variable

Discouraged
CWE-20 is commonly misused in low-information vulnerability reports when lower-level CWEs could be used instead, or when more details about the vulnerability are available [REF-1287]. It is not useful for trend analysis. It is also a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar). Finally, it is often used when the root cause issue is related to how input is incorrectly transformed, instead of "validated" to be correct as-is.
Within CWE, the "input validation" term focuses on the act of checking whether an input is already safe, which is different from other techniques that ensure safe processing of input. Carefully perform root-cause analysis to be sure that the issue is not due to techniques that attempt to transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component. If the issue is truly due to imroper input validation, consider using lower-level children such as Improper Use of Validation Framework (CWE-1173) or improper validation involving specific types or properties of input such as Specified Quantity (CWE-1284); Specified Index, Position, or Offset (CWE-1285); Syntactic Correctness (CWE-1286); Specified Type (CWE-1287); Consistency within Input (CWE-1288); or Unsafe Equivalence (CWE-1289).

CWE-116 and CWE-20 have a close association because, depending on the nature of the structured message, proper input validation can indirectly prevent special characters from changing the meaning of a structured message. For example, by validating that a numeric ID field should only contain the 0-9 characters, the programmer effectively prevents injection attacks.
Multiple techniques exist to transform potentially dangerous input into something safe, which is different than "validation," which is a technique to check if an input is already safe. CWE users need to be cautious during root cause analysis to ensure that an issue is truly an input-validation problem.

As of 2020, this entry is used more often than preferred, and it is a source of frequent confusion. It is being actively modified for CWE 4.1 and subsequent versions.
Concepts such as validation, data transformation, and neutralization are being refined, so relationships between CWE-20 and other entries such as CWE-707 may change in future versions, along with an update to the Vulnerability Theory document.
Input validation - whether missing or incorrect - is such an essential and widespread part of secure development that it is implicit in many different weaknesses. Traditionally, problems such as buffer overflows and XSS have been classified as input validation problems by many security professionals. However, input validation is not necessarily the only protection mechanism available for avoiding such problems, and in some cases it is not even sufficient. The CWE team has begun capturing these subtleties in chains within the Research Concepts view (CWE-1000), but more work is needed.

The "input validation" term is extremely common, but it is used in many different ways. In some cases its usage can obscure the real underlying weakness or otherwise hide chaining and composite relationships.
Some people use "input validation" as a general term that covers many different neutralization techniques for ensuring that input is appropriate, such as filtering, i.e., attempting to remove dangerous inputs (related to CWE-790); encoding/escaping, i.e., attempting to ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included in output to another component (related to CWE-116); or canonicalization, which often indirectly removes otherwise-dangerous inputs. Others use the term in a narrower context to simply mean "checking if an input conforms to expectations without changing it." CWE uses this narrow interpretation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred. Developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.

7 Pernicious Kingdoms
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

Veracode
2008-08-15
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-11-24
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-01-12
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-03-10
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-05-27
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-07-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-10-29
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Maintenance_Notes, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-12-28
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-02-16
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-04-05
updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Potential_Mitigations, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-09-27
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-12-13
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-03-29
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Relationship_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-09-13
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-02-21
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-07-17
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-02-18
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-01-19
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-05-03
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-01-03
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-06-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-09-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-06-25
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-03-15
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-04-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-06-28
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-10-26
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-07-16
4.15
2024-07-16
updated Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-11-19
4.16
2024-11-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Mapping_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Detection_Factors, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Abhi Balakrishnan
2024-02-29
4.17
2025-04-03
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.

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