The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

Primary

Resultant

Session Riding

Cross Site Reference Forgery

XSRF

CSRF

Architecture and Design
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Medium

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Non-Repudiation
Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Bypass Protection Mechanism
Read Application Data
Modify Application Data
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
The consequences will vary depending on the nature of the functionality that is vulnerable to CSRF. An attacker could trick a client into making an unintentional request to the web server via a URL, image load, XMLHttpRequest, etc., which would then be treated as an authentic request from the client - effectively performing any operations as the victim, leading to an exposure of data, unintended code execution, etc. If the victim is an administrator or privileged user, the consequences may include obtaining complete control over the web application - deleting or stealing data, uninstalling the product, or using it to launch other attacks against all of the product's users. Because the attacker has the identity of the victim, the scope of CSRF is limited only by the victim's privileges.

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, and for minimizing false positives assuming an understanding of business logic. However, it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. For black-box analysis, if credentials are not known for privileged accounts, then the most security-critical portions of the application may not receive sufficient attention.
Consider using OWASP CSRFTester to identify potential issues and aid in manual analysis.

High
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Automated Static Analysis
CSRF is currently difficult to detect reliably using automated techniques. This is because each application has its own implicit security policy that dictates which requests can be influenced by an outsider and automatically performed on behalf of a user, versus which requests require strong confidence that the user intends to make the request. For example, a keyword search of the public portion of a web site is typically expected to be encoded within a link that can be launched automatically when the user clicks on the link.
Limited

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

SOAR Partial

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Web Application Scanner

High

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer

High

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

SOAR Partial

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

SOAR Partial

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

SOAR Partial

Architecture and Design
Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]

Implementation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Architecture and Design
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).

Architecture and Design
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79).

Architecture and Design

Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]

Note that this can probably be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79), or when using web technologies that enable the attacker to read raw headers from HTTP requests.

Architecture and Design
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Implementation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
Note that this can be bypassed using XSS (CWE-79). An attacker could use XSS to generate a spoofed Referer, or to generate a malicious request from a page whose Referer would be allowed.

This example PHP code attempts to secure the form submission process by validating that the user submitting the form has a valid session. A CSRF attack would not be prevented by this countermeasure because the attacker forges a request through the user's web browser in which a valid session already exists.
The following HTML is intended to allow a user to update a profile.

<form action="/url/profile.php" method="post"><input type="text" name="firstname"/><input type="text" name="lastname"/><br/><input type="text" name="email"/><input type="submit" name="submit" value="Update"/></form>

profile.php contains the following code.

// initiate the session in order to validate sessions
session_start();

//if the session is registered to a valid user then allow update

if (! session_is_registered("username")) {

echo "invalid session detected!";

// Redirect user to login page
[...]
exit;
}

// The user session is valid, so process the request

// and update the information

update_profile();
function update_profile {

// read in the data from $POST and send an update

// to the database
SendUpdateToDatabase($_SESSION['username'], $_POST['email']);[...]echo "Your profile has been successfully updated.";
}

This code may look protected since it checks for a valid session. However, CSRF attacks can be staged from virtually any tag or HTML construct, including image tags, links, embed or object tags, or other attributes that load background images.
The attacker can then host code that will silently change the username and email address of any user that visits the page while remaining logged in to the target web application. The code might be an innocent-looking web page such as:

<SCRIPT>function SendAttack () {form.email = "attacker@example.com";
// send to profile.php
form.submit();}</SCRIPT>
<BODY onload="javascript:SendAttack();">
<form action="http://victim.example.com/profile.php" id="form" method="post"><input type="hidden" name="firstname" value="Funny"><input type="hidden" name="lastname" value="Joke"><br/><input type="hidden" name="email"></form>

Notice how the form contains hidden fields, so when it is loaded into the browser, the user will not notice it. Because SendAttack() is defined in the body's onload attribute, it will be automatically called when the victim loads the web page.
Assuming that the user is already logged in to victim.example.com, profile.php will see that a valid user session has been established, then update the email address to the attacker's own address. At this stage, the user's identity has been compromised, and messages sent through this profile could be sent to the attacker's address.

CVE-2004-1703
Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1703

CVE-2004-1995
Add user accounts via a URL in an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1995

CVE-2004-1967
Arbitrary code execution by specifying the code in a crafted img tag or URL
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1967

CVE-2004-1842
Gain administrative privileges via a URL in an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1842

CVE-2005-1947
Delete a victim's information via a URL or an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1947

CVE-2005-2059
Change another user's settings via a URL or an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2059

CVE-2005-1674
Perform actions as administrator via a URL or an img tag
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1674

CVE-2009-3520
modify password for the administrator
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-3520

CVE-2009-3022
CMS allows modification of configuration via CSRF attack against the administrator
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-3022

CVE-2009-3759
web interface allows password changes or stopping a virtual machine via CSRF
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-3759

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

A5
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Exact

9
Cross-site Request Forgery

Allowed
This is a well-known Composite of multiple weaknesses that must all occur simultaneously, although it is attack-oriented in nature.
While attack-oriented composites are supported in CWE, they have not been a focus of research. There is a chance that future research or CWE scope clarifications will change or deprecate them. Perform root-cause analysis to determine if other weaknesses allow CSRF attacks to occur, and map to those weaknesses. For example, predictable CSRF tokens might allow bypass of CSRF protection mechanisms; if this occurs, they might be better characterized as randomness/predictability weaknesses.

There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.

The CSRF topology is multi-channel:

Attacker (as outsider) to intermediary (as user). The interaction point is either an external or internal channel.
Intermediary (as user) to server (as victim). The activation point is an internal channel.

PLOVER
2006-07-19
Draft 3
2006-07-19

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-01-12
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Theoretical_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-03-10
updated Potential_Mitigations

Tom Stracener
2009-05-20
Added demonstrative example for profile.

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-05-27
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-12-28
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-02-16
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-06-21
updated Common_Consequences, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-09-27
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-03-29
updated Description

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Common_Consequences

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-27
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-09-13
updated Potential_Mitigations, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-02-21
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2013-07-17
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2015-12-07
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Applicable_Platforms, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2018-03-27
updated References, Relationship_Notes, Research_Gaps

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2019-09-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-06-25
updated Relationships, Theoretical_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-08-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-07-20
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-06-28
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-11-19
4.16
2024-11-19
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-04-03
4.17
2025-04-03
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities

Abhi Balakrishnan
2024-02-29
4.17
2025-04-03
Contributed usability diagram concepts used by the CWE team.