The product does not properly compartmentalize or isolate functionality, processes, or resources that require different privilege levels, rights, or permissions.
When a weakness occurs in functionality that is accessible by lower-privileged users, then without strong boundaries, an attack might extend the scope of the damage to higher-privileged users.

Primary

Separation of Privilege
Some people and publications use the term "Separation of Privilege" to describe this weakness, but this term has dual meanings in current usage. This node conflicts with the original definition of "Separation of Privilege" by Saltzer and Schroeder; that original definition is more closely associated with CWE-654. Because there are multiple interpretations, use of the "Separation of Privilege" term is discouraged.

Architecture and Design
COMMISSION: This weakness refers to an incorrect design related to an architectural security tactic.

Implementation

Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Bypass Protection Mechanism
The exploitation of a weakness in low-privileged areas of the software can be leveraged to reach higher-privileged areas without having to overcome any additional obstacles.

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Compare binary / bytecode to application permission manifest

SOAR Partial

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

High

Architecture or Design Review

According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:

Highly cost effective:

Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction

Cost effective for partial coverage:

Attack Modeling

High

Architecture and Design
Break up privileges between different modules, objects, or entities. Minimize the interfaces between modules and require strong access control between them.

Single sign-on technology is intended to make it easier for users to access multiple resources or domains without having to authenticate each time. While this is highly convenient for the user and attempts to address problems with psychological acceptability, it also means that a compromise of a user's credentials can provide immediate access to all other resources or domains.

The traditional UNIX privilege model provides root with arbitrary access to all resources, but root is frequently the only user that has privileges. As a result, administrative tasks require root privileges, even if those tasks are limited to a small area, such as updating user manpages. Some UNIX flavors have a "bin" user that is the owner of system executables, but since root relies on executables owned by bin, a compromise of the bin account can be leveraged for root privileges by modifying a bin-owned executable, such as CVE-2007-4238.

CVE-2021-33096
Improper isolation of shared resource in a network-on-chip leads to denial of service
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-33096

CVE-2019-6260
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) device implements Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) bridges that do not require authentication for arbitrary read and write access to the BMC's physical address space from the host, and possibly the network [REF-1138].
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-6260

Allowed
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.

There is a close association with CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges). CWE-653 is about providing separate components for each "privilege"; CWE-250 is about ensuring that each component has the least amount of privileges possible. In this fashion, compartmentalization becomes one mechanism for reducing privileges.
The term "Separation of Privilege" is used in several different ways in the industry, but they generally combine two closely related principles: compartmentalization (this node) and using only one factor in a security decision (CWE-654). Proper compartmentalization implicitly introduces multiple factors into a security decision, but there can be cases in which multiple factors are required for authentication or other mechanisms that do not involve compartmentalization, such as performing all required checks on a submitted certificate. It is likely that CWE-653 and CWE-654 will provoke further discussion.

Pascal Meunier
Purdue University
2008-01-18
Draft 8
2008-01-30

Eric Dalci
Cigital
2008-07-01
updated Time_of_Introduction

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2008-09-08
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Relationships, Other_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2009-01-12
updated Name

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2010-12-13
updated Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Terminology_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2011-06-01
updated Common_Consequences

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-05-11
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2012-10-30
updated Potential_Mitigations

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2014-07-30
updated Detection_Factors

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2017-11-08
updated Applicable_Platforms, Causal_Nature, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-02-24
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2020-12-10
updated Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2021-10-28
updated Description, Name, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2022-10-13
updated References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-04-27
updated References, Relationships

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-06-29
updated Mapping_Notes

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2023-10-26
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2024-02-29
4.14
2024-02-29
updated Type

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-09-09
4.18
2025-09-09
updated References

CWE Content Team
MITRE
2025-12-11
4.19
2025-12-11
updated Relationships

Design Principle Violation: Insufficient Compartmentalization
Insufficient Compartmentalization