This attack relies on client side code to access local files and resources instead of URLs. When the client browser is expecting a URL string, but instead receives a request for a local file, that execution is likely to occur in the browser process space with the browser's authority to local files. The attacker can send the results of this request to the local files out to a site that they control. This attack may be used to steal sensitive authentication data (either local or remote), or to gain system profile information to launch further attacks.
High
High

1
Explore
[Identify web application URL inputs] Review application inputs to find those that are designed to be URLs.
Manually navigate web site pages to identify URLs.
Use automated tools to identify URLs.

2
Experiment
[Identify URL inputs allowing local access.] Execute test local commands via each URL input to determine which are successful.
Manually execute a local command (such as 'pwd') via the URL inputs.
Using an automated tool, test each URL input for weakness.

3
Exploit
[Execute malicious commands] Using the identified URL inputs that allow local command execution, execute malicious commands.
Execute local commands via the URL input.

The victim's software must not differentiate between the location and type of reference passed the client software, e.g. browser

Attacker identifies known local files to exploit

Confidentiality
Read Data

Integrity
Modify Data

Implementation: Ensure all content that is delivered to client is sanitized against an acceptable content specification.
Implementation: Ensure all configuration files and resource are either removed or protected when promoting code into production.
Design: Use browser technologies that do not allow client side scripting.
Implementation: Perform input validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Perform output validation for all remote content.
Implementation: Disable scripting languages such as JavaScript in browser

J2EE applications frequently use .properties files to store configuration information including JDBC connections, LDAP connection strings, proxy information, system passwords and other system metadata that is valuable to attackers looking to probe the system or bypass policy enforcement points. When these files are stored in publicly accessible directories and are allowed to be read by the public user, then an attacker can list the directory identify a .properties file and simply load its contents in the browser listing its contents. A standard Hibernate properties file contains
hibernate.connection.driver_class = org.postgresql.Driverhibernate.connection.url = jdbc:postgresql://localhost/mydatabasehibernate.connection.username = usernamehibernate.connection.password = passwordhibernate.c3p0.min_size=5hibernate.c3p0.max_size=20
Even if the attacker cannot write this file, there is plenty of information to leverage to gain further access.

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2014-06-23

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2015-12-07
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2017-08-04
Updated Attack_Phases, Description, Description Summary, References

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2018-07-31
Updated Attack_Phases

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2020-07-30
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2020-12-17
Updated @Abstraction

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Example_Instances