auren-research/cyber-sec huggingface dataset:
During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.

Low
High

An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.

An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis.

Integrity
Alter Execution Logic

Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.

Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adversary involved in the generation of microcode defining the chip’s function(s) inserts a malicious instruction that will become part of the chip’s program. When integrated into a system, the chip will produce an effect intended by the adversary.

1195.003
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-06-24

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
Software produced by a reputable developer is clandestinely infected with malicious code and then digitally signed by the unsuspecting developer, where the software has been altered via a compromised software development or build process prior to being signed. The receiver or user of the software has no reason to believe that it is anything but legitimate and proceeds to deploy it to organizational systems.
This attack differs from CAPEC-206, since the developer is inadvertently signing malicious code they believe to be legitimate and which they are unware of any malicious modifications.

Medium
High

An adversary would need to have access to a targeted developer’s software development environment, including to their software build processes, where the adversary could ensure code maliciously tainted prior to a build process is included in software packages built.

The adversary must have the skills to infiltrate a developer’s software development/build environment and to implant malicious code in developmental software code, a build server, or a software repository containing dependency code, which would be referenced to be included during the software build process.

Integrity
Confidentiality
Read Data
Modify Data

Access Control
Authorization
Gain Privileges
Execute Unauthorized Commands

Have a security concept of operations (CONOPS) for the IDE that includes: Protecting the IDE via logical isolation using firewall and DMZ technologies/architectures; Maintaining strict security administration and configuration management of configuration management tools, developmental software and dependency code repositories, compilers, and system build tools.
Employ intrusion detection and malware detection capabilities on IDE systems where feasible.

An adversary who has infiltrated an organization’s build environment maliciously alters code intended to be included in a product’s software build via software dependency inclusion, part of the software build process. When the software product has been built, the developer electronically signs the finished product using their signing key. The recipient of the software product, an end user/customer, believes the software to reflect the developer’s intent with respect to functionality unaware of the adversary’s malicious intent harbored within.

1195.002
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-06-24

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings
An adversary alters the functionality of a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) by causing an FPGA configuration memory chip reload in order to introduce a malicious function that could result in the FPGA performing or enabling malicious functions on a host system. Prior to the memory chip reload, the adversary alters the program for the FPGA by adding a function to impact system operation.

Low
High

An adversary would need to have access to FPGA programming/configuration-related systems in a chip maker’s development environment where FPGAs can be initially configured prior to delivery to a customer or have access to such systems in a customer facility where end-user FPGA configuration/reconfiguration can be performed.

An adversary would need to be skilled in FPGA programming in order to create/manipulate configurations in such a way that when loaded into an FPGA, the end user would be able to observe through testing all user-defined required functions but would be unaware of any additional functions the adversary may have introduced.

Integrity
Alter Execution Logic

Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management including for FPGA programming and program uploads to FPGA chips.
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.

An adversary with access and the ability to alter the configuration/programming of FPGAs in organizational systems, introduces a trojan backdoor that can be used to alter the behavior of the original system resulting in, for example, compromise of confidentiality of data being processed.

1195.003
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-06-24

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-02-22
Updated References

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings
An adversary obtains decommissioned, recycled, or discarded systems and devices that can include an organization’s intellectual property, employee data, and other types of controlled information. Systems and devices that have reached the end of their lifecycles may be subject to recycle or disposal where they can be exposed to adversarial attempts to retrieve information from internal memory chips and storage devices that are part of the system.

Medium
Medium

An adversary needs to have access to electronic data processing equipment being recycled or disposed of (e.g., laptops, servers) at a collection location and the ability to take control of it for the purpose of exploiting its content.

An adversary may need the ability to mount printed circuit boards and target individual chips for exploitation.
An adversary needs the technical skills required to extract solid state drives, hard disk drives, and other storage media to host on a compatible system or harness to gain access to digital content.

Accountability
Bypass Protection Mechanism

Backup device data before erasure to retain intellectual property and inside knowledge.
Overwrite data on device rather than deleting. Deleted data can still be recovered, even if the device trash can is emptied. Rewriting data removes any trace of the old data. Performing multiple overwrites followed by a zeroing of the device (overwriting with all zeros) is good practice.
Use a secure erase software.
Physically destroy the device if it is not intended to be reused. Using a specialized service to disintegrate, burn, melt or pulverize the device can be effective, but if those services are inaccessible, drilling nails or holes, or smashing the device with a hammer can be effective. Do not burn, microwave, or pour acid on a hard drive.
Physically destroy memory and SIM cards for mobile devices not intended to be reused.
Ensure that the user account has been terminated or switched to a new device before destroying.

A company is contracted by an organization to provide data destruction services for solid state and hard disk drives being discarded. Prior to destruction, an adversary within the contracted company copies data from select devices, violating the data confidentiality requirements of the submitting organization.

1052
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-06-24

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-02-22
Updated Mitigations, References

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2023-01-24
Updated Related_Weaknesses
Malware is inserted in a server motherboard (e.g., in the flash memory) in order to alter server functionality from that intended. The development environment or hardware/software support activity environment is susceptible to an adversary inserting malicious software into hardware components during development or update.

Low
High

An adversary with access to hardware/software processes and tools within the development or hardware/software support environment can insert malicious software into hardware components during development or update/maintenance.

Integrity
Execute Unauthorized Commands

Purchase IT systems, components and parts from government approved vendors whenever possible.
Establish diversity among suppliers.
Conduct rigorous threat assessments of suppliers.
Require that Bills of Material (BoM) for critical parts and components be certified.
Utilize contract language requiring contractors and subcontractors to flow down to subcontractors and suppliers SCRM and SCRA (Supply Chain Risk Assessment) requirements.
Establish trusted supplier networks.

Malware is inserted into the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) software that resides on a flash memory chip soldered to a computer’s motherboard. It is the first thing to turn on when a system is booted and is allowed access to almost every part of the operating system. Hence, the malware will have extensive control over operating system functions and persist after system reboots. [REF-685]

1195.003
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-10-21

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2023-01-24
Updated @Name

Server Functionality Compromise
During the system build process, the system is deliberately misconfigured by the alteration of the build data. Access to system configuration data files and build processes is susceptible to deliberate misconfiguration of the system.

Low
High

An adversary has access to the data files and processes used for executing system configuration and performing the build.

Integrity
Execute Unauthorized Commands

Access Control
Gain Privileges

Confidentiality
Modify Data
Read Data

Implement configuration management security practices that protect the integrity of software and associated data.
Monitor and control access to the configuration management system.
Harden centralized repositories against attack.
Establish acceptance criteria for configuration management check-in to assure integrity.
Plan for and audit the security of configuration management administration processes.
Maintain configuration control over operational systems.

‘Make’ is a program used for building executable programs and libraries from source code by executing commands and following rules in a ‘makefile’. It can create a malicious executable if commands or dependency paths in the makefile are maliciously altered to execute an unwanted command or reference as a dependency maliciously altered code.

1195.002
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-10-21

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29
Updated Taxonomy_Mappings

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2023-01-24
Updated Description
An adversary takes advantage of missing or incorrectly configured access control within memory to read/write data or inject malicious code into said memory.

Hardware product designs often need to implement memory protection features to prevent users from reading and modifying memory reserved for security operations such as secure booting, authenticating code, device attestation, and more. However, these protection features may be missing if not configured by developers. For example, this can occur if the developers assume these features are configured elsewhere. Additionally, developers often attempt to impose proper protection features, but may incorrectly configure these controls. One such example would be setting controls with insufficient granularity for protected address regions. If an adversary is able to discover improper access controls surrounding memory, it could result in the adversary obtaining sensitive data, executing code, circumventing security mechanisms, escalating privileges, or even denying service to higher privilege software.

Medium
Very High

Access to the hardware being leveraged.

Ability to craft malicious code to inject into the memory region.
Intricate knowledge of memory structures.

Integrity
Modify Data

Confidentiality
Read Data

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Execute Unauthorized Commands
Run Arbitrary Code

Confidentiality
Access Control
Authorization
Gain Privileges

Ensure that protected and unprotected memory ranges are isolated and do not overlap.
If memory regions must overlap, leverage memory priority schemes if memory regions can overlap.
Ensure that original and mirrored memory regions apply the same protections.
Ensure immutable code or data is programmed into ROM or write-once memory.

A hardware product contains non-volatile memory, which itself contains boot code that is insufficiently protected. An adversary then modifies this memory to either bypass the secure boot process or to execute their own code.

A hardware product leverages a CPU that does not possess a memory-protection unit (MPU) and a memory-management unit (MMU) nor a special bit to support write exclusivity, resulting in no write exclusivity. Because of this, an adversary is able to inject malicious code into the memory and later execute it to achieve the desired outcome.

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-10-21
An adversary exploits missing or incorrectly configured access control within registers to read/write data that is not meant to be obtained or modified by a user.

Hardware systems often utilize trusted lock bits to prevent a set of registers from being written to or to restrict a register to only being written to once. Registers are also frequently used to store sensitive data leveraged in additional security operations, such as secure booting, authenticating code, device attestation, and more. However, the access control mechanisms meant to protect these registers may be fully missing or ineffective due to misconfiguration. If an adversary is able to discover improper access controls surrounding registers, it could result in the adversary obtaining sensitive data and/or modifying data that is meant to be immutable. This can ultimately result in processes like secure boot being circumvented or in protected configurations being modified.

Medium
High

Awareness of the hardware being leveraged.
Access to the hardware being leveraged.

Intricate knowledge of registers.

Integrity
Modify Data

Confidentiality
Read Data

Design proper access control policies for hardware register access from software and ensure these policies are implemented in accordance with the specified design.
Ensure security lock bit protections are reviewed for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.
Test security lock programming flow in both pre-silicon and post-silicon environments.
Leverage automated tools to test that values are not reprogrammable and that write-once fields lock on writing zeros.
Ensure that measurement data is stored in registers that are read-only or otherwise have access controls that prevent modification by an untrusted agent.

During a System-on-Chip's (SoC) secure boot process, the code to be authenticated is measured to determine the code's validity. This entails the one-way hash of the code binary being calculated and extended to the previous hash. The value obtained after completion of the boot flow is then stored in a register with the intent of later verifying this value to determine if the boot flow has been tampered with. However, the register being used does not prevent an adversary from modifying the register's contents, which can result in the adversary spoofing the measurement data used in the attestation process.

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-10-21
An adversary takes advantage of missing or incorrectly configured security identifiers (e.g., tokens), which are used for access control within a System-on-Chip (SoC), to read/write data or execute a given action.

A System-on-Chip (SoC) often implements a security identifier mechanism to differentiate what actions are allowed or disallowed when a transaction originates from an entity. However, these mechanisms may be exploitable due to any number of the following:

The security identifiers are missing
The security identifiers are incorrectly implemented or generated
The security identifiers are generated with an obsolete encoding
The security identifiers are generated and implemented correctly, but are improperly protected

If the security identifiers leveraged by the SoC are missing or misconfigured, an adversary may be able to take advantage of this shortcoming to circumvent the intended access controls. This could result in the adversary gaining unintended access, performing a Denial of Service (DoS), escalating privileges, or spoofing actions from a trusted agent.

Medium
Very High

Awareness of the hardware being leveraged.
Access to the hardware being leveraged.

Ability to execute actions within the SoC.
Intricate knowledge of the identifiers being utilized.

Integrity
Modify Data

Confidentiality
Read Data

Confidentiality
Access Control
Authorization
Gain Privileges

Review generation of security identifiers for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.
Review security identifier decoders for design inconsistencies and common weaknesses.
Test security identifier definition, access, and programming flow in both pre-silicon and post-silicon environments.

A system contains a register (divided into four 32-bit registers) that is used to store a 128-bit AES key for encryption/decryption, in addition to an access-policy register. The access-policy register determines which agents may access the AES-key registers, based on a corresponding security identifier. It is assumed the system has two agents: a Main-controller and an Aux-controller, with respective security identifiers "1" and "2". The Main-controller (ID "1") is meant to have access to the AES-key registers, while the Aux-controller (ID "2") has access to the access-policy register. If a SoC incorrectly generates security identifier "1" for both agents, then both agents will have access to the AES-key registers. This could further result in a Denial-of-Service (DoS) or the execution of an action that in turn could result in privilege escalation or unintended access.

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2021-10-21
An adversary alters the metadata of a resource (e.g., file, directory, repository, etc.) to present a malicious resource as legitimate/credible.

One approach to this attack entails the adversary altering a maliciously modified resource's metadata in order to hide their malicious activity. Another approach involves altering the metadata of an adversary-created resource to make the source appear more credible. Adversaries may spoof a variety of metadata across a number of resources, such as the following:

Authors of Version Control System (VCS) repository commits
Open source package statistics
File attributes, such as when a file was last update

The ultimate goal of a Metadata Spoofing attack is to trick victims into believing the malicious resource being provided originates from a reputable source. However, the victim instead leverages the malicious resource, which could result in a number of negative technical impacts.

Medium
High

Identification of a resource whose metadata is to be spoofed

Ability to spoof a variety of metadata to convince victims the source is trusted

Integrity
Modify Data

Accountability
Hide Activities

Access Control
Authorization
Execute Unauthorized Commands

Validate metadata of resources such as authors, timestamps, and statistics.
Confirm the pedigree of open source packages and ensure the code being downloaded does not originate from another source.
Even if the metadata is properly checked and a user believes it to be legitimate, there may still be a chance that they've been duped. Therefore, leverage automated testing techniques to determine where malicious areas of the code may exist.

CAPEC Content Team
The MITRE Corporation
2022-09-29