Stephen I Miran: The inflation outlook
Central bank: fed | Type: speech | Date: 2025-12-16

For release on delivery
9:30 a.m. EST
December 15, 2025
The Inflation Outlook
Remarks by
Stephen I. Miran
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
The School of International and Public Affairs , Columbia University
New York, New York
December 15, 2025
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate the opportunity to speak here today.1
When I offered my assessment of policy in my first speech as a Federal Reserve
Governor in September, I assumed inflation for core goods and nonhousing core services
would continue to run at current rates.2 While that was a useful working assumption at
the time, today I will break down my inflation outlook in more detail . Specifically, I’ll
share my interpretation of inflation’s components and how this influences my perception
of progress toward our 2 percent target.
Shelter Inflation
Shelter costs are top of mind for households , and a l arge component of inflation
indices. But calculating shelter inflation is far from simple . For instance, the personal
consumption expenditures ( PCE) price index that the Fed targets includes housing costs
for all households in the economy. That seems appropriate for captur ing prices
associated with all consumer spending but not ideal as a measure of current supply and
demand pressures. Figure 1 makes that clear: As the economy emerged from the
pandemic, demand for housing outstripped supply, and market rents for new tenants
jumped. But the PCE shelter index for all households lagged, as rents only reset when
people move or renew their leases. PCE will always lag market rents.
As recently as last year, the PCE shelter index still had catching up to do, creating
uncertainty as to how long measured shelter inflation would remain elevated. This is no
longer the case. Indeed , a separate all-tenant rent index—drawn from the same microdata
Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
2 Mira n, Stephen I. (2025), “Nonmonetary Forces and Appropriate Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at
the Economic Club of New York, New York, N.Y., September 22,
 .
as PCE shelter—caught up to new -tenant rents, while PCE shelter has actually overshot
new rents .3 Based on this catchup being complete, I expect a faster fall in PCE shelter
inflation .
The current elevated readings for shelter inflation are an after -echo of previous ,
rather than current, supply–demand imbalances in the economy. For the p ast two years,
we’ve seen extremely low increases in new-tenant rent s. Measures by Cotality and
Apartment List show that’s persisted in recent quarters . I therefore expect a faster
decline in PCE shelter inflation. Two factors give me additional confidence : first, the
negative population shock resulting from a reversal in net migration, and second, an
elevated ratio of nominal shelter services consumption relative to over all consumption,
which has historically been mean -reverting.
Core Nonhousing Service s Inflation
Another important part of household budgets is the cost of services besides
housing, food, and energy . These services are about half of household spending and
include childcare, education, entertainment, and medical expenses. Core nonhousing
services inflation has moved sideways this year, somewhat above the average level
observed from 2002 to 2007, a useful reference period when core PCE inflation averaged
2 percent. However, I am not worried about nonhousing services.
Wages are the primary driver of service inflation. Many service prices are driven
by labor costs; for instance, labor compensation is about 60 percent of value added in
3 The main differences are a set of sample restrictions; for example , PCE shelter imputes many missing
observations that are dropped from the other two indices. A comparison of the different indices is a vaila ble
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPI rents flow into PCE rents) at -
series/r-cpi-ntr.htm
leisure and hospitality and 83 percent in education and health services. Over the medium
term, nonhousing services will follow labor market pressures .
Unemployment has trended higher for over two years , and wage growth lower.
Additional measures of labor market tightness —such as job openings, consumer surveys
about the difficulty of finding jobs, long -term layoffs, and the duration of
unemployment —have suggested a loose ning labor market for several years, tilting
nominal wage growth risks toward the downside.
A notable aspect of core services inflation is that not all components are measured
from directly observed transactions. Many services components in the index are imputed
in various ways and do not capture information about supply–demand imbalances that are
relevant for monetary policy. A prime example is portfolio management service s, which
have contributed a quarter -point to core PCE inflation in the last year , well above their
long-run average.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis measures portfolio management costs based on
overall revenues generated by asset managers . If the stock market goes up and boosts
assets under management, revenues move in tandem since they are typically a fixed
percentage fee of assets. What ought to be recorded as an increased quantity of services
consumed is instead recorded as increased prices. There may, for national accounting
purposes, be a good reason for doing it this way . But, for monetary policy purposes ,
there is none, and it would be foolish of us to chase statistical quirks rather than focus on
actual consumer prices .
Remarkably, long-term trends in the asset management industry point toward fee
compression, indicating trend deflation. Morningstar found the average expense ratio
paid by investors fell nearly 6 percent in 2024.4 By contrast, PCE recorded a roughly 20
percent increase in portfolio management fees in this period, contributing about 30 basis
points to core PCE. If PCE had instead matched industry data with a 6 percent decline,
core PCE would have been about 40 basis points lower than officially reported .
Fees have consistently fallen each year for the past two decades, now less than
half of what they were in 2005, as seen in figure 2.5 The PCE portfolio management
measure contains no signal regarding tightness in the asset management industry, let
alone the economy. It contains no signal for the inflation forecast going forward. It
should not be used to frame underlying inflation. Yet here we are, keeping interest rates
too high because of the phantom inflation of portfolio advisory fees .6
For these reasons , I do not take much signal from nonmarket -based components .
When looking at m arket-based services , inflation in this category has come down
dramatically from its peak and moved sideways since mid-2024, at around 3 percent.
That is about 10 basis points below its average from 2002 to 2007, which, again, was a
period in which PCE inflation was broadly at target. Core nonhousing services inflation
only remains elevated compared with this period because of nonmarket components.
Core Goods Inflation
Turning to goods prices , they have been relatively less likely to rise than other
index components since the turn of the century . That trend was abruptly disrupted in the
aftermath of the pandemic. After that, core goods inflation fell into negative territory for
4 Morningstar Manager Research (2024), “How Fund Fees are Evolving in the US,” July 16 Insights (blog) ,
(updated October 8), -fund -fee-study .
6 Monetary policy should not mechanically respond to as set prices vis-à-vis the inflation channel. Fina ncial
markets reflect a host of factors—including technology, tax and regulatory policy, population, trade, and
many other things—which may have separate or joint implications for neutra l ra tes, the output gap and
inflation but which require nuanced analysis and interpretation.
a brief period of around one year. Over the p ast 12 months, core goods inflation has
picked up. The dominant narrative explaining this pattern blames U.S. tariff policy. I am
not convinced.
Consider the timing, as shown in figure 3. In core goods PCE, it appears that the
increase coincides with the imposition of tariffs during this year. However, in the
consumer price index , the upturn began in the middle of 2024. We don’t target CPI, but
it contains useful information . The evidence that tariff policy neatly coincides with the
increase in core goods prices is conflicted .
When thinking through the effect of tariff s on prices, we must remind ourselves
that the larger share of incidence or burden of any economic policy—tax, subsidy, or
tariff —falls on the more inelastic or inflexible party. This is because the more elastic or
flexible party can change its behavior to avoid the burden of the tax. As an importer, the
U.S. is relatively more elastic , since we can substitute demand across borders or
manufacture goods at home . But producers’ factories are installed capital that is stuck in
place, and their labor is generally immobile and not easily substitutable across tradable
and nontradable sectors . As the largest trade deficit country , there are few substitutes, if
any, for American demand , but many substitutes for potential supply.
Product-level estimates of demand and supply elasticities from A nson Soderbery
can be used to examine goods -level incidence. 7 Figure 4 draws predicted isoincidence
lines. The 45-degree line characterizes goods which have equal supply and demand
elasticities, meaning incidence is evenly split between exporter and importer. The
overwhelming majority of goods lie below the 45-degree line, meaning importers bear
7 Anson Soderberry (2018), “ Tra de Ela sticities, Heterogeneity, a nd Optima l Ta riffs,” Journal of
International Economics , vol. 114 (September), pp. 44 –62.
less burden. Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution of import value based on the
incidence absorbed by exporters . These elasticities imply that, for about 70 percent of
import goods value, the exporter bears at least 70 percent of the incidence , and for about
half of goods value, the exporter bears at least 80 percent of the incidence. 8
Of course , there are goods for which importers bear material incidence, and that
will mean relative price changes —but whether they prove to be relevant for aggregate
prices depends on other considerations. Given the Soderbery (2018) elasticities and a
split of the domestic incidence between wholesale importers and consumers, it is
8 The weighted mean incidence drawn from the Soderbery (2018) elasticities is 70 percent borne by the
exporter. This number is not far from what would be implied by using an aggregate demand elasticity of
negative 3, in line with the tra de litera ture, and a supply elasticity of 1. Unfortunately, much of the
litera ture question begs la rge supply ela sticities a s a result of Dixit-Stiglitz style production characterized
by constant markups, constant marginal cost, and free entry.
Papers that move away from these assumptions find lower supply elasticities or pass -through of
marginal cost shocks into prices; for instance, see Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2019) without constant
ma rkups (Mary Amiti, Oleg Itskhoki, a nd Jozef Konings (2019), “International Shock, Variable Markups,
and Domestic Prices,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 86 (6), pp. 2356–402); Bergstrand, Cray and
Gervais (2023) without constant marginal costs (Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, Stephen R. Cray, and Antoine
Gervais (2023) “Increasing Marginal Costs, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Gains from ‘Deep’ International
Trade Agreements,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 144 (September)); or Alessandria, Choi and
Ruhl (2021) without free entry (George Alessandria, Horag Choi, and Kim J. Ruhl (2021), “Trade
Adjustment Dynamics and the Welfare Gains from Trade,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 131
(July)).Therefore, I prefer to use the Soderbery (2018) estimates, which don’t require these assumptions .
Subsequent work by Soderbery, with Farid Farrokhi, employs some of these micro-founding assumptions
on production , which, like in other papers, lead to large elasticities of supply . See Farid Farrokhi and
Anson Soderbery (2024), “Trade Elasticities in General Equilibrium: Demand, Supply, a nd Aggrega tion,”
The Review of Economics and Statistics .
Working outside the trade general equilibrium literature, Horioka and Ford (2025) model ca pita l
mobility without comparative advantage, and if factor shares in this model are adjusted to reflect higher
capital shares in surplus countries than deficit countries, incidence largely falls on the tariffed nation. See
Charles Yuji Horioka and Nicholas Ford (2025), “A New Modeling Approach to Help Address the Trump
Ta riffs,” Discussion Paper Series DP2025-31 (Japan: Kobe University, December), 
u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/DP1300.pdf
Moreover, installed capital is usually the least elastic factor of production , and, with imperfect
substitutability between tradable and nontradable labor, there is a real sense in which labor in those
fa ctories is simila rly insta lled; welders do not ea sily become hairdressers . It is exceedingly strange that
much of the literature on trade and tariff incidence neglects to study not only capital altogether but installed
ca pita l in pa rticula r, which, in many public finance settings, can serve as an incidence sink .
plausible that the ultimate effect of tariffs on consumer price levels will be in the
neighborhood of two-tenths of a percent —noise. 9
By contrast, many analyses for what tariffs would do to inflation were based on
empirical studies of the U.S.–China trade conflict before the pandemic . However, these
studies suffer from bias from trade rerouting and de minimis exemptions. If a Chinese
exporter can avoid bearing incidence by costly transshipment or exploitation of the de
minimis loophole , the incentive to do so will be highly correlated with the incidence
absorbed. In other words, goods for which China would have to absorb a greater share of
the tariff cost drop from the sample, while goods for which China could push through
tariff costs to importers remain in the sample , violating identification restrictions .
Jackson Mejia has studied this bias in pass-through estimates and finds evidence that up
to 40 percent of product categories exposed to tariffs are affected by transshipment, with
trade volumes approaching 25 percent for intermediate and capital goods .
10 The de
minimis exemption poses similar identification problems , meaning the transshipment
effects are lower bounds on the identification problem in this literature .11 Additionally ,
these studies are short term in nature, and incidence analyses are usually long term; a
difference in short -run and long -run elasticities is not controversial.
9 The ca lculation is the product of a 12.3 percent change in ta riffs, a 30 percent domestic share of incidence,
a 50 percent split between wholesale importers and consumers, and a roughly 10% import share of overall
PCE. If wholesa le importers take all the tariff incidence on margin, the effect on consumer prices will be
zero. If they take none of it on margin, and are able to pass through the entirety of the incidence to
consumers, the effect will be about 0.4 percent. Two-tenths is the midpoint. Moreover, standard incidence
calculations require competitive markets. To account for potential imperfect competition, a broader set of
parameters may be necessary, a s in Weyl and Fabinger (2013), but identifica tion would tax an already
burdened empirical tra de litera ture beyond what I fea r it might bear. E. Glen Weyl and Michal Fabinger
(2013), “Pas s-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition,”
Journal of Political Economy , vol. 121 (June), pp.437 –641.
10 Jackson Mejia (2025), “Selection into Tariff Avoidance and the Measured Welfare Cost of Tariffs ,”
working paper , Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October, avai l abl e at
 .
11 Though the exemption was eliminated in 2025, the bias will infect studies drawn from earlier data.
Moreover, any claim that tariffs are a current driver of inflation must be
accompanied by a clear description of the counterfactual . Several analyses use the two
decades before the pandemic as the relevant counterfactual; I do not find these periods to
be reasonable given large concurrent shocks that pollute the analysis . Attributing all
excess inflation over the pre -trend to tariffs is something that could be done for m any
recent policies or shocks , such as an emphasis on supply chain resilience after the
pandemic unrelated to tariffs .
One counterfactual I think makes sense to use compares import-intensive core
goods versus overall core goods , as shown in f igure 6.12 If tariffs were the driver of
recent inflation , then one would expect import-intensive core goods to see substantially
more inflation . In fact, total core goods prices have risen at approximately the same rate
as import-intensive goods since the end of last year.
I also compare the level of inflation in the U.S. to that of other industrialized
countries , displayed in figure 7. If U.S. tariff policy were a material driver of domestic
inflation , then U.S. goods inflation would visibly stick out from major trading partners .
Yet U.S. inflation is comparable to that in Canada and the U.K., slightly above that in the
European Union, and below that in Mexico ; the U.S. doesn’t stand out in any direction.
Neither counterfactual suggests tariffs are the primary driver of core goods inflation.
12 Federal Reserve Board staff replicated and extended a methodology described in The Council of
Economic Advisers (2025), Imported Goods Have Been Getting Cheaper Relative to Domestically
Produced Goods (Washington: Council of Economic Advisers), -
content/uploads/2025/03/Imported -Goods-Have -Been-Getting-Cheaper -Rela tive-to-Domestica lly-
Produced-Goods.pdf. On Figure 6, the blue import content measure uses import content data from 2019
a nd the red import content measure is more disaggregated and comes from recently released 2023 data. I
included both aggregations to preserve comparability with the earlier CEA study which was produced when
only the 2019 aggregation was available.
Even if one believes that tariffs are driving goods inflation, the standard practice
is for central bankers is to “look through” a transient shock , as a one-time increase in the
price level differs from a persistent shift to inflation. This mirrors how value-added taxes
are treated by central banks. Monetary policy achieves stable prices through balancing
aggregate supply and demand; changes in prices stemming from relative tax
adjustments —incidence aside—are not indicative of supply– demand imbalances .
While the burden from tariffs will ultimately be borne by the exporter s, this
analysis is drawn from long-term elasticities. In the short run, it may take time for threats
of moving supply chains to become credible, creating a lag before exporters reduce
selling prices. A lthough I do not yet see meaningful tariff -driven inflation , it may
materialize. But over time , short-run elasticities would converge with long-run
elasticities. Not only would the increase in inflation be transitory, but likely so would the
increase in the price level, meaning subsequent offsetting deflation.13
If tariffs are not the likely cause of the recent rise in goods inflation, then what is?
One possibility is that the rise in prices is noise in a volatile series , though this is not a
satisfying answer. A second possibility is that the U.S. and other advanced foreign
economies are still following post-pandemic bullwhips of gradual oscillation around a
lower mean level of core goods inflation. Under that scenario, last year’s core goods
inflation was “too low” and now it is “too high” ; perhaps next year i t will be “too low”
13 For an example of recent research that uses dynamic elasticities to show that real wages can first decline
and then go up (similar to inflation going up then down), albeit through a different channel than I’m
describing, see Alessandria, George A., Jiaxiaomei Ding, Shafaat Y. Khan, and Carter B. Mix (2025), “The
Tariff Tax Cut: Tariffs as Revenue,” NBER Working Paper Series 33784 ( Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, May ), .
A third, unsavory , possibility is that goods inflation is settling in at a higher level
than prevailed immediately pre -pandemic . After all, there were previous regimes with
stable but higher core goods inflation. Higher global goods inflation could result from a
longer-term trend of trade restructuring that encompasses much more than tariffs ,
including a reduced willingness to rely on unfettered access to exports in favor of
national security and geoeconomic concerns . Attention to supply chain security and
resilience—which predates this year’s tariffs—may mean higher core goods inflation for
a longer period, though perhaps not this high .
I accept I don’t know what’s driving higher goods inflation currently. As former
Bank of England Governor , Mervyn King, and economist , John Kay, urged in Radical
Uncertainty , pretending we have more knowledge than possible will stymie our
understanding of reality. 14 Shedding that hubris will help us reach a clearer
understa nding of the dynamic s and make better decisions .
I do see reasons to be optimistic about goods inflation . One is that the rapid
deregulatory push to expand supply will, all else equal, decrease prices. Another is that
work by Bloomberg Economics using AI to analyze thousands of public company
earnings calls indicates price pressures in measured goods inflation will begin to decline
within two quarters. 15
The lack of a clear downward forecast for core goods prices might suggest
keeping interest rates elevated . However , I expect more than enough disinflation from
14 John Kay and Mervyn King (2020), Radical Uncertainty (New York: W. W. Norton & Company )
15 Anna Wong, Joshua Danial, and Alex Tanzi (2025), “17,500 Earning Calls Greenlight Big Fed Cuts in
2026,” Bloomberg Economics , December 12
housing services to counterbalance that possibility . Core goods represents just 25 percent
of the core PCE index. Indeed, my earlier forecasts were conditioned on core goods
inflation staying at this rate for longer. The risk s to my forecast are if shelter inflation
picks up again, or if core goods inflation remains well above 2 percent . I judge those
cases to be unlikely . If I am right about shelter but wrong about tariffs , we will
undershoot our inflation target.
To summarize, we must be thoughtful in considering genuine underlying
inflationary pressures . Excess measured inflation is unreflective of current supply–
demand dynamics . Shelter inflation is indicative of a supply –demand imbalance that
occurred as much as two to four years ago , not today. Given monetary policy lags, we
need to make policy for 2027, not 2022.
A better measure of underlying inflation would account for distortions from
shelter and imputed prices . Removing imputed phantom inflation like portfolio
management , market-based core inflation is running below 2.6 percent, as seen in f igure
8. If we further remove housing and look at market -based core ex shelter, underlying
inflation is running below 2.3 percent, within noise of our target . Once shelter inflation
has normalized from the anomalous post-pandemic experience, ordinary market -based
core may be more appropriate .
Some might accuse me of cherry -picking a preferred measure, but my gauge of
underlying inflation exclude s less of the index than some other measures . It is also easy
to understand and ha s a straightforward rationale for discarding certain slices of the
index. Market -based core includes 75 percent of overall PCE, and market -based core
ex housing includes 60 percent; core services ex housing is only 51 percent of PCE and
discards goods, which are salient. Moreover, James Stock and Mark Watson find that
market-based prices are more tightly related to cyclical measures of the economy than
poorly measured components like imputed prices. 16
Keeping policy unnecessarily tight because of an imbalance from 2022, or
because of artifacts of the statistical measurement process, will lead to job losses . There
was a large bout of inflation that resulted in a n increase in prices after the pandemic.
While American families are still rightly distraught with that experience and unhappy
with affordability, prices are now once again stable, albeit at higher levels. Policy should
reflect that.
Fortunately, the shelter outlook appears relatively clear —because market rents
lead measured inflation —and powerful enough to overwhelm even the possibility of
sustained higher goods inflation. Underlying inflation is near, and further approaching,
our target.
On the other side of our mandate, e xperience suggests that labor market
deterioration can occur quickly and nonlinearly and be difficult to reverse . In part
because monetary policy lags several quarters , a quicker pace of easing policy—as I have
advocated —would appropriately move us closer to a neutral stance.
Recessions are an inevitable part of the business cycle, and at some point, we will
suffer one . We should strive to ensure that point is as far in the future and as shallow as
possible by appropriately calibrating monetary policy.
16 See James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson (2019), “Slack and Cyclically Sensitive Inflation,” NBER
Working Paper Series 25987 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June),
 See also the related work of the San Francisco Federal Reserve
Ba nk of Sa n Fra ncisco on cyclical inflation, availa ble a t -
and -indica tors/cyclica l-and -acyclical -core-pce-infla tion/.
The Inflation Outlook
Stephen I. Miran
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
The School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University, New York, New York
December 15, 2025
Figure 1: Housing inflation
Note: The gray shaded bar indicates a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: Fe bruary 2020 to April 2020. In the right panel, data
are monthly, except for BLS new tenant and all tenant indices, which is quarterly. PCE is personal consumption expenditures.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics; Bureau of Economic Analysis via Haver Analytics; Cotality; Apartment List via Haver Analytics.
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 2: Portfolio management prices: Morningstar vs. PCE
Source: Morningstar Direct; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Haver Analytics
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 3: Core goods prices
Note: The gray shaded bar indicates a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: Fe bruary 2020 to April 2020. CPI is consumer price
index; PCE is personal consumption expenditures index.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics; Bureau of Economic Analysis via Haver Analytics
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 4: Tariff isoincidence lines by product
Note: U.S. product-level elasticities from Soderbery (2018), aggregated from country-HS4 by 2024 import weight to the HS4 level. Data points are scaled by relative 2024 import
volume. Dots represent groups of goods. The dashed 45-degree line represents a 50% exporter burden. Isoincidence lines give the combinations of demand and supply
elasticities that predict a given incidence split.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Anson Soderbery (2018), “Trade Elasticities, Heterogeneity, and Optimal Tariffs,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 114 (September), pp. 44 –62;
author calculations.
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 5: Exporter share of tariff burden by product
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Note: Cumulative share of 2024 country-HS4 imports by value, up through a given exporter burden as implied by Soderbery (2018) elasticities.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Anson Soderbery (2018), “Trade Elasticities, Heterogeneity, and Optimal Tariffs,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 114 (September), pp. 44 –62;
author calculations.
Figure 6: Overall and imported core goods
Note: The figure shows cumulative percent changes in core goods prices under different weights for aggregating the individual core goods categories. Aggregation using personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) weights yields the standard core goods price index, and aggregation using PCE times import con tent upweights goods categories that are more
imported. The blue import content measure uses import content data from 2019. The red import content measure is more disaggregated and comes from recently released 2023
data. Both aggregations are presented, to preserve comparability with a previous Council of Economic Advisers study put out ear lier this year when only the 2019 data were
available.
Source: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis via Haver Analytics.
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 7: International CPI inflation
Note: The gray shaded bar indicates a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: Fe bruary 2020 to April 2020. CPI is consumer price
Source: Official national statistics via Haver Analytics.
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
Figure 8: Underlying inflation
Note: The gray shaded bar indicates a period of business recession as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research: Fe bruary 2020 to April 2020. PCE is personal
consumption expenditures.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis via Haver Analytics.
Governor Stephen I. Miran | Columbia SIPA| December 15, 2025
The Inflation Outlook
Stephen I. Miran
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
The School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University, New York, New York
December 15, 2025