Naoki Tamura: Economic activity, prices and monetary policy in Japan
Central bank: boj | Type: speech | Date: 2025-06-25

Bank

of

Japan J u n e 2 5 ,

2 0 2 5

## Economic Activity, Prices, and Monetary Policy in JapanSpeech at a Meeting with Local Leaders in Fukushima

## TAMURA NaokiMember of the Policy Board

## I.

Economic Activity and Prices

## A.

Current Situation of and Outlook for Economic Activity and PricesI

will

begin

my speech by talking about developments in economic activity and prices in Japan.

Simply put, my current assessment of these developments can be summarized into three points.First, until March 2025, Japan's underlying inflation, measured by the consumer price index (CPI), had been on track toward achieving the price stability target of 2 percent and had been rising at a slightly faster pace than expected.

Therefore, it could be judged that the likelihood of achieving the price stability target had increased further and the upward risks to prices had also grown further.Second, regarding the U.S. tariff policy announced afterward, I assume that it will highly likely exert downward pressure on Japan's economic activity and prices.

Nevertheless, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI is likely to continue rising at around 2 percent through fiscal 2027.Third, despite the downward pressure, I take the risk to be low of Japanese firms' wage- and price-setting behavior reverting to the past behavior observed when wages and prices did not rise easily, and it is unlikely that underlying CPI inflation, which has been increasing, will turn downward.Now, I will explain these points in more detail, touching on the Bank of Japan's outlook for economic activity and prices.First, the Bank assesses that the economy has recovered moderately on the whole, although some weakness has been seen in part.

In terms of the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts -- as presented in the April 2025 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report) -- Japan's real GDP growth rate is expected to be at 0.5 percent for fiscal 2025, 0.7 percent for fiscal 2026, and 1.0 percent for fiscal 2027 (Chart 1).

The forecasts were revised downward from those made

in January because

Japan's

economy

was

projected

to see a deceleration, mainly due to a slowdown in overseas economies induced by the impact of U.S.Chart 1: The Bank's Forecasts for Real GDPs.a., ann., tril. yen|

| January 2025 Outlook Report

|

| April 2025 Outlook Report

||---------|-------------------------------|----|-----------------------------|| FY 2025 | 1.1%

| →

| 0.5%

|| FY 2026 | 1.0%

| →

| 0.7%

|| FY 2027 | -

|

| 1.0%

|Notes: 1.

Forecasts are the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts.

Real GDP values for fiscal 2025 onward are calculated by multiplying the actual figure for fiscal 2024 by all successive projected growth rates for each year.2.

There are extremely high uncertainties regarding the future course of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction and the impact of these policies on economic activity and prices at home and abroad.

The baseline scenario in the April 2025 Outlook Report was developed based on assumptions including the following: negotiations between jurisdictions will progress to some extent, and significant disruptions of global supply chains

will

be

avoided.

Attention

is

warranted

on

the

possibility

that

the

outlook

for

economic

activity

and

prices

could

change considerably depending on the future course of the policies in each jurisdiction and the response of firms and households in these jurisdictions to the policies.Sources: Cabinet Office; Bank of Japan.tariff

policy.

Thereafter,

Japan's

economic

growth

rate

is

likely

to

rise,

with overseas economies returning to a moderate growth path.Second, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items excluding fresh food is slightly above 3.5 percent.

In terms of the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts presented in the April Outlook Report, the rate of increase is expected to be at 2.2 percent for fiscal 2025, 1.7 percent for fiscal 2026, and 1.9 percent for fiscal 2027 (Chart 2).

The forecasts were revised downward from those made in January, mainly reflecting a decline in crude oil prices and the downward revision of the GDP growth rates.

Nevertheless, the rate of increase is likely to continue rising at around 2 percent.Chart 2: The Bank's Forecasts for the CPIy/y % chg.Notes: 1.

Figures are the CPI for all items less fresh food, excluding the effects of the consumption tax hikes.3.

There are extremely high uncertainties regarding the future course of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction and the impact of these policies on economic activity and prices at home and abroad.

The baseline scenario in the April 2025 Outlook Report was developed based on assumptions including the following: negotiations between jurisdictions will progress to some extent, and significant disruptions of global supply

chains

will

be

avoided.

Attention

is

warranted

on

the

possibility

that

the

outlook

for

economic

activity

and

prices

could

change considerably depending on the future course of the policies in each jurisdiction and the response of firms and households in these jurisdictions to the policies.2.

The locations of , △ , and ▼ in the chart indicate the figures for each Policy Board member's forecasts.

The risk balance assessed by each Policy Board member is shown by the following shapes: indicates that a member assesses "upside and downside risks as being generally balanced," △ indicates that a member assesses "risks are skewed to the upside," and ▼ indicates that a member assesses "risks are skewed to the downside." The dotted black lines show the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts.Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Bank of Japan.

## B.

Wage and Price DevelopmentsAs I mentioned at the outset, my view is that Japan's underlying CPI inflation had been on track toward achieving the price stability target of 2 percent and had been rising at a slightly faster

pace

than

expected until

March 2025 -- prior

to

the

period

when the

Policy Board members made the aforementioned forecasts on the CPI for the April Outlook Report.

This view is

based

on

factors

such

as

the

wage

and

price

situation

in

Japan

at

that

time.

The situation has remained basically unchanged even up until now, and the CPI figures for April and May are higher than expected.First, regarding wages, the provisional results of the 2025 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations show that wage growth has exceeded the solid wage growth achieved last year (Chart 3).

In particular, the rate of increase in base pay in 2025 for small and mediumsized firms has been greater than that for large firms, compared with 2024.

It is necessary to continue to monitor how the 2025 labor-management wage negotiations turn out and whether wage

hikes

spread

to

small

and

medium-sized

firms

that

do

not

have

labor

unions.

Nevertheless, I believe that the momentum for wage hikes is strong enough at present.Chart 3: Results of the Annual Spring Labor-Management Wage NegotiationsRengo's sixth aggregate results (as of June 2)Notes: 1.

Figures for "CPI inflation" are for all items less fresh food, excluding the effects of the consumption tax hikes, on a calendar-year basis. 2.

Figures for "actual base pay increase" and "actual regular wage increase" from 1991 to 2014 are those published by the Central Labour Relations Commission, while those from 2015 to 2024 are figures released by the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo).

Figures are based on the wage negotiation results of labor unions for which the base pay increase is clear.Sources: Central Labour Relations Commission; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Rengo.Next, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items excluding fresh food is slightly above 3.5 percent, and that for all items excluding fresh food and energy, for which prices fluctuate significantly, is slightly above 3 percent (Chart 4).

This is mainly because firms have continued to pass on higher personnel expenses to selling prices and because there have been effects of the past rise in import prices and of the rise in food prices such as rice prices.Chart 4: Consumer Pricesy/y % chg.In relation to this, I would now like to raise four points I am focusing on in terms of price developments.

The first point is developments in the seasonally adjusted month-on-month rate of increase in the CPI for all items excluding fresh food and energy on an annualized basis.

This rate of increase provides a snapshot of recent CPI developments since it is not affected by price developments in the same month of the previous year.

After hovering at low levels for a long time, the rate of increase rose sharply from 2022 to 2023, fueled by higher import prices.

The CPI inflation rate subsequently settled down around the first half of 2024.

However, due to what can be called another round of pass-through to selling prices of higher personnel expenses and other costs, the rate of increase has accelerated again since June 2024, maintaining an increase of around 3 percent on an annualized basis (Chart 5).Chart 5: Consumer Prices (Annualized Month-on-Month Rate of Change)s.a., ann., m/m % chg.Note : Figures are the CPI for all items less fresh food and energy.

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.The second point is developments in services prices, which are important in assessing the degree of the pass-through of wages to selling prices.

On the surface, the year-on-year rate of increase in services prices has tracked at somewhat below 2 percent (Chart 6).

Nevertheless,Chart 6: Consumer Prices (Housing Rent and Public Services)y/y % chg.Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.services

include

housing

rent 1 and

public

services, 2 which

are

considered

to

structurally follow developments in general prices with a significant time lag. 3 Therefore, it is important to note that housing rent and public services are pushing down increases in services prices1 The small rate of increase in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in Japan's CPI for housing rent has

been

attributed

to

the

high institutional barriers

against

raising

rent,

and

because

surveys

on housing rent include ongoing rents, the impact of increases in new contract rents made at the time of a change of resident is not fully accounted for.

A downward bias in housing rent is also created by the fact

that

a

quality

adjustment

to

housing

for

rent

in

terms

of

deterioration

from

aging

is

not incorporated.

It is important to note that these effects are reflected not only in private housing rent but also in imputed rent, which has a large weight in the CPI.percent for public services.2 Public services in the CPI include not only items under legal prices and ordinance-based prices, regulated either by the central or local governments, but also items under licensed prices, which require the

approval

of

the

central

government

for

price

changes,

and items

under notified

prices,

whose changes are reported to the government.

One of the reasons why the rise in such administered prices in Japan has been sluggish is that government subsidies for supplementing revenues are constantly injected to public firms, and administered prices do not sufficiently reflect operating expenses and depreciation costs of equipment (see Box 4 of the July 2016 Outlook Report).

Although higher fire and earthquake insurance premiums and optional auto insurance premiums have recently pushed up the price of public services, the rate of increase remains sluggish when these premiums are excluded. 3 The weight in services prices is 36 percent for private housing rent (including imputed rent) and 25overall.

I refer to services prices that exclude these components as "market-based services prices."

These

prices

have

continued

to

grow

by

more

than

2

percent

in

recent

years.

Moreover, prices of the two components, housing rent and public services, have also recently begun to rise gradually.The third point involves developments in the price of fresh food.

As fresh food prices fluctuate significantly

in

line

with

one-off

factors,

changes

in

these

prices

are

considered

to

be temporary, which is why fresh food is often excluded when assessing underlying inflation.

In fact, developments in fresh food prices, when averaged out, more or less tracked overall price developments until around 2021, albeit with large fluctuations (Chart 7).

However, since theChart 7: Consumer Prices (Fresh Food and Other Food)CY 2020 = 100Note: "Fresh food" consists of fresh fish and seafood, fresh vegetables, and fresh fruits. "Food (less fresh food)" consists of rice, raw meat, eggs, various processed food products, and dining-out.Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.beginning of 2022, although the extent of fluctuation has remained large, the rate of increase in fresh food prices has risen much faster than that in overall prices, even when averaged out.

This is mainly attributable to (1) lower supply capacity due to labor shortages, (2) an increase in

utility

and

shipping

costs

and

various

other

costs,

and

(3)

higher

personnel

costs

for producing fresh food.

These factors cannot be considered temporary.

Furthermore, there is a significant impact from irregular weather due to climate change, and many point out that such factors will continue to push up prices.

The same holds true for food other than fresh food.

A rise in the price of fresh food and other food has a significant negative impact on households and substantially affects their inflation expectations, which can give rise to sustained upwardpressure on prices.

I therefore believe it necessary to closely monitor developments in fresh food prices.Fourth, medium- to long-term inflation expectations have been rising gradually in a situation where prices in general have been increasing (Chart 8).

The Tankan (Short-Term EconomicFirmsChart 8: Inflation ExpectationsHouseholdsEconomistsNotes: 1.

Figures for firms in the left panel are based on the Tankan , and are averages of all industries and enterprises.2.

Figures for households in the middle panel are based on the Opinion Survey on the General Public's Views and Behavior .

Figures for the quantitative question are based on numerical values for expected inflation rates provided by respondents, and the average of those is calculated by excluding 0.5 percent of the highest and lowest figures, respectively, in order to avoid extremes.

Figures for the qualitative question are estimated using the modified Carlson-Parkin method, quantifying the results of the 5-choice question, asking respondents their expectations for whether and to what degree prices will go up or down.Survey of Enterprises in Japan) shows a moderate rise in firms' inflation outlook for general prices, with their inflation outlook for five years ahead remaining above 2 percent.

The results of the

Bank's Opinion Survey on the General Public's Views and Behavior show that the median of households' inflation outlook for five years ahead has been significantly above 2 percent and the average outlook has recently been rising, although bias in expected price levels

should

be

taken

into

account.

The

outlook

among

experts

remains

somewhat

low compared with that of firms and households, but I personally believe that the focus should be placed on the inflation expectations of firms and households, who are the actual drivers of economic activity.

I take these expectations to have already reached around 2 percent.

Unlike the

United

States

and

Europe,

where

inflation

expectations

have

been

stable

at

around

2Sources: JCER, "ESP Forecast"; Bank of Japan.percent, Japan has seen inflation expectations rise from a low level, and attention needs to be paid to whether any further rise is more than expected.

## C.

Impact of U.S. Tariff PolicyGiven the aforementioned price developments, my view was that achievement of the price stability target came close, but the ground shifted significantly following the announcement of the U.S. tariff policy (Chart 9).

In the April 2025 Outlook Report released in early May,Chart 9: Impact of Trade Policies Impact on Japan's Economic Activity and Prices The Bank's Forecasts for Real GDP and the CPI (April 2025 Outlook Report)y/y % chg.|

| GDP

| Inflation

|

| Real GDP

| CPI

| CPI

||--------------------------------------------------|-------|-------------|---------|---------------|-----------------|----------------------------|| Channel

|

|

|

| Real GDP

| Less fresh food | Less fresh food and energy || (1) Weaker global demand (2) Decrease in exports |

|

| FY 2025 | +0.5 ( -0.6 ) | +2.2 ( -0.2 )

| +2.3 ( +0.2 )

|| (3) Decrease in corporate profits

|

|

| FY 2026 | +0.7

| + 1.7

| +1.8

|| (4) Exchange rate fluctuations

|

|

|

| ( -0.3 )

| ( -0.3 )

| ( -0.3 )

|| (5) Supply-chain disruptions, etc.

|

|

| FY 2027 | +1.0 (-)

| +1.9 (-)

| +2.0 (-)

|Note: Figures in the right panel are the medians of the Policy Board members' forecasts.

Figures in parentheses indicate changes from the January 2025 Outlook Report.

There are extremely high uncertainties regarding the future course of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction and the impact of these policies on economic activity and prices at home and abroad.

The baseline scenario in the April 2025 Outlook Report was developed based on assumptions including the following: negotiations between jurisdictions will progress to some extent, and significant disruptions of global supply chains will be avoided.

Attention is warranted on the possibility that the outlook for economic activity and prices could change considerably depending on the future course of the policies in each jurisdiction and the response of firms and households in these jurisdictions to the policies.the Bank revised downward its outlook for economic activity and prices from that made in January, mainly based on the assumption that tariff negotiations between jurisdictions will progress to some extent and significant disruptions of global supply chains will be avoided.

Nevertheless,

the

Bank

does

not

expect

the

U.S.

tariff

policy

to

induce

a

massive

shock similar to the Global Financial Crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic.

Naturally, the impact of the tariff policy varies from firm to firm and the Bank should assess the economic situation without preconceptions, but when looking at Japan as a whole, I believe the basic scenario is that Japan will be able to weather the impact, and the economy will merely experience aSource: Bank of Japan.slowdown.

The main reason for this is that the direct impact of the U.S. tariff policy is limited to

export-oriented

manufacturers

and

firms

associated

with

those

manufacturers'

supply chains.

Of course, the indirect impact also warrants attention, but the manufacturing industry accounts for only about 20 percent of GDP and about 15 percent of the number of employed persons in Japan.

The year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI is likely to continue rising at around 2 percent through fiscal 2027, but if global production systems

are disturbed and supply chains are disrupted, prices in Japan may be pushed up, mainly through a rise in import prices.Nonetheless, how U.S. tariff policy turns out and how firms respond to the policy are both fluid.

Therefore, the Bank's outlook for economic activity and prices can be described as provisional

at

this

point

and,

depending

on

future

developments,

could

be

revised considerably, either upward or downward.

The Bank needs to carefully examine developments in Japan's economic activity and prices, but I think that particular attention should be paid to whether firms' wage- and price-setting behavior reverts to the past behavior observed when wages and prices did not increase easily.

## D.

Firms' Price- and Wage-Setting Behavior in JapanNow, I would like to look back at some of the changes observed in Japan's corporate behavior in recent years.First, firms' price-setting behavior has become more active in terms of raising prices, and this trend has been taking root.

Dividing the percentage of firms responding in the Tankan that output prices would rise, by the percentage of firms responding that input prices would rise, shows that this value dropped after the bursting of the bubble economy and remained at that level for a long time (Chart 10).

Although not precise, this calculation gives a rough idea of how many firms facing higher input prices will raise their output prices.

In other words, it shows

how active firms

are

in

terms

of

raising

prices.

From

2022,

however,

this

figure recovered to its previous level and has since remained at a relatively high level.

This seems to be because the rise in input prices in recent years was so large that firms had no choice but to raise their output prices and, since numerous firms had to take similar action, the trend of raising output prices began to take root, which changed firms' perceptions and behavior.Chart 10: Changes in Firms' Price-Setting Behavior%Note : Figures are based on the Tankan , and are for all industries and enterprises.

There is a discontinuity in the data for December 2003 due to a change in the survey framework.Source: Bank of Japan.Next, firms' wage-setting behavior has also become more active.

A regression using data from fiscal

1992

through

fiscal

2022 -- with the rate of increase in base pay

as

the

dependent variable and the inflation rate, nominal labor productivity, and medium- to long-term inflationexpectations as explanatory variables -- shows that the actual values of increases in base pay are clearly above the fitted values from fiscal 2023 onward (Chart 11).

This suggests that firms' wage-setting behavior has become significantly more active in recent years.Chart 11: Changes in Firms' Wage-Setting Behavior Base Pay Increase (Actual and Fitted Value)%Notes: 1.

Figures for CPI inflation are for all items less fresh food, excluding the effects of the consumption tax hikes, etc. Figures for actual base pay increases from fiscal 1992 to 2013 are those published by the Central Labour Relations Commission, while those from fiscal 2014 onward are figures released by Rengo (the figure for fiscal 2025 is from Rengo's fourth aggregate results).Base pay increase = 0.33 × CPI inflation (t-1) + 0.24 × nominal labor productivity growth (t-1)2.

The base pay regression for the estimation of base pay increases is specified as shown below.

The estimation period is from fiscal 1992 to 2022.+ 0.13 × medium- to long-term inflation expectations (t-1)Sources: Cabinet Office; Central Labour Relations Commission; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; Rengo; etc.Unless there is a reversal in the wage- and price-setting behavior of firms, which has changed and has become more active, it is unlikely that underlying CPI inflation, which has been increasing toward the price stability target of 2 percent, will turn downward.

Then, how high is

the

risk

of

firms'

wage- and price-setting

behavior reverting to

the

past

behavior?

The impact of U.S. tariff policy is highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict precisely, but at this point in time, I take the risk to be low.First, I expect that, with labor shortages continuing in the future, actual supply capacity will stay below demand, and wages and prices will be under upward pressure.

The Bank's estimate of the output gap has been at around 0 percent recently, and this estimate seems likely to be pushed down because firms have been unable to operate their facilities sufficiently due to labor shortages (Chart 12).

The high levels of order backlogs for construction and machineryalso suggest that supply capacity has been unable to adequately meet the robust demand for business fixed investment (Chart 13).

## Chart 12: Output Gap%inverted, DI ("excessive" - "insufficient"), % pointsNotes: 1.

Figures for the output gap are Bank staff estimates.Source: Bank of Japan.2.

The Tankan factor utilization index is calculated as the weighted average of the production capacity DI and the employment conditions DI for all industries and enterprises.

Capital and labor shares are used as weights.

There is a discontinuity in the data for December 2003 due to a change in the survey framework.Chart 13: Business Fixed InvestmentBusiness Fixed Investment Plans(Tankan)Order BacklogsNotes: 1.

In the left panel, figures include software and R&D investments and exclude land purchasing expenses.

Figures are for all industries including financial institutions.Sources: Cabinet Office; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Bank of Japan.2.

In

the

right

panel,

figures

for

"construction"

are

based

on

a

survey

of

50

major

construction

companies,

and

calculated

as

the

value

of construction work yet to be executed at the end of the last month of the quarter divided by the average value of construction work executed over the preceding 12 months.

Figures for "machinery" are calculated as the value of machinery orders yet to be executed at the end of the last month of the quarter divided by the average sales over the preceding three months, and these data are seasonally adjusted.Second, as firms have become accustomed to raising their prices, they have come to recognize again

the

importance

of

price-setting

strategies.

According

to

the

Bank's

survey

of

firms conducted

during

the

period

from

November

2023

to

February

2024,

72

percent

of

the respondents said that they thought it preferable for prices and wages to rise moderately.

I believe that, encouraged in part by various support measures by the government, it is highly likely that there will be a sustained shift among firms from management oriented toward costcutting, to management oriented toward growth by creating high added value.

## II.

Conduct of Monetary Policy

## A.

Future Conduct of Monetary PolicyNow, I would like

to turn to

the

Bank's

conduct of monetary policy.

The

Bank

conducts monetary

policy

with

the

aim

of achieving

the

price

stability

target

of

2

percent

in

a sustainable and stable manner.

Since the changes in the monetary policy framework made in March 2024, the Bank has returned to conventional monetary policy, employing the guidance of the short-term interest rate as a primary policy tool.The Bank's outlook for prices is as follows.

Underlying CPI inflation is likely to be sluggish for the time being, mainly due to the deceleration in the economy.

Thereafter, however, it is expected to increase gradually, since it is projected that a sense of labor shortage will grow as the economic growth rate rises, and that medium- to long-term inflation expectations will rise.

In

the

second

half

of

the

projection

period

presented

in

the

April

2025

Outlook Report -- which covers the period through fiscal 2027 -- underlying CPI inflation is likely to be at a level that is generally consistent with the price stability target.

On the other hand, the Bank's outlook for economic activity and prices can be described as provisional, and attention is also warranted on upside risks to prices.

In this situation, I believe there is a good possibility that the price stability target will be achieved earlier than expected.Given that real interest rates -- calculated as the nominal interest rate minus the expected rate of inflation -- are currently at significantly low levels, my basic thinking is that the Bank will analyze the data and various information without preconceptions, and will accordingly raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation in a timely and appropriate manner in line with improvements in economic activity and prices, without hasteor delay.

I do not expect uncertainties to be entirely cleared up, but at each Monetary Policy Meeting (MPM), the Bank has to decide the policy interest rate for the intermeeting period.

When the likelihood of achieving the price stability target increases or, when upside risks to prices grow, I believe that the Bank may face a situation where it should act decisively, despite heightened uncertainties.On the other hand, some have voiced the opinion that Japan's policy interest rate has remained under 0.5 percent over the past three decades, and that there is a significant barrier to raising the

rate

higher

than

0.5

percent.

However,

I do

not consider that

there is a barrier

of 0.5 percent for two reasons.First is the change in the level of the inflation rate.

In 2007 and 2008, when the policy interest rate stood at 0.5 percent, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI for all items excluding fresh food was at around 0.0 percent and around 1.5 percent, respectively, whereas the rate is slightly above 3.5 percent at present.Second is the change in the level of lending rates of commercial banks (Chart 14).

In 2007Chart 14: Market Interest Rates and Lending Rates%Note : Lending rates indicate average contract interest rates on new loans and discounts of domestically licensed banks (6-month backward moving averages).

Figures are yen-denominated loans on the banking book, excluding loans to financial institutions.

Source: Bank of Japan.and 2008, short-term lending rates were in the range of 1.5-1.7 percent, but the rate currently remains low at around 0.7 percent. 4 Interest rate spreads on loans seem likely to be narrowing significantly, but by more than can be explained solely by the decline in credit costs compared with 2007 and 2008.

The same can be said for housing loans, for which the borrowing interest rate is still lower than that in 2007 and 2008.

## B.

Plan for the Reduction of the Purchase Amount of Japanese Government BondsI have talked about the Bank's conduct of monetary policy, and now I would like to touch on the

plan

for

the

reduction

of

the

purchase

amount of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) decided at the June 2025 MPM (Chart 15).

At the meeting, the Bank conducted an interim

## Chart 15: Plan for the Reduction of the Purchase Amount of JGBs (June 2025)1.

Long-term interest rates: to be formed in financial markets in principleIn principle, the Bank will reduce the planned amount of its monthly purchases of JGBs each calendar quarter as follows.2.

JGB purchases: appropriate for the Bank to reduce its purchase amount of JGBs in a predictable manner, while allowing enough flexibility to support stability in the JGB markets2. 3.  From April-June 2026 to January-March 2027 : about 200 billion yen4.

Until January-March 2026 : about 400 billion yen (the reduction plan decided in July 2024 will be maintained)5.  The Bank will gradually reduce its purchase amount so that it can improve the functioning of the JGB markets in a manner that supports stability in the markets.

## Amount of monthly JGB purchases

## Reduction in a Predictable Manner

## Allowing Enough Flexibility2.In the case of a rapid rise in long-term interest rates, the Bank will make nimble responses by, for example, increasing the amount of JGB purchases.1.

The Bank will conduct an interim assessment of the plan at the June 2026 MPM.3.

The Bank is prepared to amend the plan at the MPMs, if deemed necessary.assessment of the plan for the reduction in its JGB purchases decided at the July 2024 MPM, and then decided that (1) the Bank will reduce the planned amount of its monthly purchases of JGBs so that it will be about 2 trillion yen in January-March 2027; and (2) the amount will4 Even omitting the impact of a time lag before a policy interest rate hike affects lending rates, there is a difference in the level of lending rates.

The lowest lending rate before the policy interest rate increased to 0.5 percent was 1.3 percent in 2007 and 2008, whereas, in recent years, the rate has been at 0.4 percent.be cut, in principle, by about 400 billion yen each calendar quarter until January-March 2026, and by about 200 billion yen each calendar quarter from April-June 2026.

In addition, a t the June 2026 MPM, the Bank will conduct an interim assessment of the plan for the reduction of its purchase amount of JGBs.

In principle, the Bank intends to maintain the plan for the reduction

after

the

assessment,

while

it

may

modify

the

plan

as

appropriate,

if

deemed necessary after reviewing the developments in and functioning of the JGB markets.

At the meeting, it will also discuss a guideline for its JGB purchases from April 2027 and announce the results.

These decisions were made based on the judgment that it is appropriate for the Bank to reduce its purchase amount of JGBs in a predictable manner, while allowing enough flexibility to support stability in the JGB markets.At the June 2025 MPM, I voted against the proposal on changing the pace of reduction of JGB purchase amount, considering that there was no need for the Bank to change the pace of reduction in the amount of its monthly outright purchases of JGBs by 400 billion yen.

This was because I judged that the Bank should allow long-term interest rates to be determined by the market and its participants, and that the level of amount outstanding of its JGB holdings should be normalized at the earliest possible time.

Reducing the purchase amount at the pace decided at the June MPM will require longer time for the Bank to normalize its balance sheet --that

is,

to

reduce

the

amount

outstanding

of

its

JGB

holdings

to

a

level

where

further reductions are no longer necessary.

The degree of JGB market functioning has stayed low, albeit having improved, and such aftereffects of the Bank's large-scale monetary easing will likely remain for some time.

I therefore believe that, although it will take time, the Bank needs to

proceed

steadily

with

the

normalization

of

its

balance

sheet,

while

closely

monitoring market conditions.Thank you.