Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok)
{
	static struct strbuf cwd = STRBUF_INIT;
	struct strbuf dir = STRBUF_INIT, gitdir = STRBUF_INIT;
	const char *prefix = NULL;
	struct repository_format repo_fmt = REPOSITORY_FORMAT_INIT;

	/*
	 * We may have read an incomplete configuration before
	 * setting-up the git directory. If so, clear the cache so
	 * that the next queries to the configuration reload complete
	 * configuration (including the per-repo config file that we
	 * ignored previously).
	 */
	git_config_clear();

	/*
	 * Let's assume that we are in a git repository.
	 * If it turns out later that we are somewhere else, the value will be
	 * updated accordingly.
	 */
	if (nongit_ok)
		*nongit_ok = 0;

	if (strbuf_getcwd(&cwd))
		die_errno(_("Unable to read current working directory"));
	strbuf_addbuf(&dir, &cwd);

	switch (setup_git_directory_gently_1(&dir, &gitdir, 1)) {
	case GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT:
		prefix = setup_explicit_git_dir(gitdir.buf, &cwd, &repo_fmt, nongit_ok);
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED:
		if (dir.len < cwd.len && chdir(dir.buf))
			die(_("cannot change to '%s'"), dir.buf);
		prefix = setup_discovered_git_dir(gitdir.buf, &cwd, dir.len,
						  &repo_fmt, nongit_ok);
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_BARE:
		if (dir.len < cwd.len && chdir(dir.buf))
			die(_("cannot change to '%s'"), dir.buf);
		prefix = setup_bare_git_dir(&cwd, dir.len, &repo_fmt, nongit_ok);
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_HIT_CEILING:
		if (!nongit_ok)
			die(_("not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): %s"),
			    DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT);
		*nongit_ok = 1;
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_HIT_MOUNT_POINT:
		if (!nongit_ok)
			die(_("not a git repository (or any parent up to mount point %s)\n"
			      "Stopping at filesystem boundary (GIT_DISCOVERY_ACROSS_FILESYSTEM not set)."),
			    dir.buf);
		*nongit_ok = 1;
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP:
		if (!nongit_ok) {
			struct strbuf quoted = STRBUF_INIT;

			sq_quote_buf_pretty(&quoted, dir.buf);
			die(_("unsafe repository ('%s' is owned by someone else)\n"
			      "To add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
			      "\n"
			      "\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"),
			    dir.buf, quoted.buf);
		}
		*nongit_ok = 1;
		break;
	case GIT_DIR_NONE:
		/*
		 * As a safeguard against setup_git_directory_gently_1 returning
		 * this value, fallthrough to BUG. Otherwise it is possible to
		 * set startup_info->have_repository to 1 when we did nothing to
		 * find a repository.
		 */
	default:
		BUG("unhandled setup_git_directory_1() result");
	}

	/*
	 * At this point, nongit_ok is stable. If it is non-NULL and points
	 * to a non-zero value, then this means that we haven't found a
	 * repository and that the caller expects startup_info to reflect
	 * this.
	 *
	 * Regardless of the state of nongit_ok, startup_info->prefix and
	 * the GIT_PREFIX environment variable must always match. For details
	 * see Documentation/config/alias.txt.
	 */
	if (nongit_ok && *nongit_ok) {
		startup_info->have_repository = 0;
		startup_info->prefix = NULL;
		setenv(GIT_PREFIX_ENVIRONMENT, "", 1);
	} else {
		startup_info->have_repository = 1;
		startup_info->prefix = prefix;
		if (prefix)
			setenv(GIT_PREFIX_ENVIRONMENT, prefix, 1);
		else
			setenv(GIT_PREFIX_ENVIRONMENT, "", 1);
	}

	/*
	 * Not all paths through the setup code will call 'set_git_dir()' (which
	 * directly sets up the environment) so in order to guarantee that the
	 * environment is in a consistent state after setup, explicitly setup
	 * the environment if we have a repository.
	 *
	 * NEEDSWORK: currently we allow bogus GIT_DIR values to be set in some
	 * code paths so we also need to explicitly setup the environment if
	 * the user has set GIT_DIR.  It may be beneficial to disallow bogus
	 * GIT_DIR values at some point in the future.
	 */
	if (/* GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT, GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED, GIT_DIR_BARE */
	    startup_info->have_repository ||
	    /* GIT_DIR_EXPLICIT */
	    getenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT)) {
		if (!the_repository->gitdir) {
			const char *gitdir = getenv(GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT);
			if (!gitdir)
				gitdir = DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT;
			setup_git_env(gitdir);
		}
		if (startup_info->have_repository)
			repo_set_hash_algo(the_repository, repo_fmt.hash_algo);
	}

	strbuf_release(&dir);
	strbuf_release(&gitdir);
	clear_repository_format(&repo_fmt);

	return prefix;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765

8959555cee7 (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.

An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.

An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):

  $ git -C /tmp init

To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.

This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.

Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.

While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>'