atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void tcp_cwnd_reduction(struct sock *sk, const int prior_unsacked,
			       int fast_rexmit, int flag)
{
	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
	int sndcnt = 0;
	int delta = tp->snd_ssthresh - tcp_packets_in_flight(tp);
	int newly_acked_sacked = prior_unsacked -
				 (tp->packets_out - tp->sacked_out);

	tp->prr_delivered += newly_acked_sacked;
	if (delta < 0) {
		u64 dividend = (u64)tp->snd_ssthresh * tp->prr_delivered +
			       tp->prior_cwnd - 1;
		sndcnt = div_u64(dividend, tp->prior_cwnd) - tp->prr_out;
	} else if ((flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) &&
		   !(flag & FLAG_LOST_RETRANS)) {
		sndcnt = min_t(int, delta,
			       max_t(int, tp->prr_delivered - tp->prr_out,
				     newly_acked_sacked) + 1);
	} else {
		sndcnt = min(delta, newly_acked_sacked);
	}
	sndcnt = max(sndcnt, (fast_rexmit ? 1 : 0));
	tp->snd_cwnd = tcp_packets_in_flight(tp) + sndcnt;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction

Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().

To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:

1) The proportional reduction mode
   inflight > ssthresh > 0

2) The reduction bound mode
  a) inflight == ssthresh > 0

  b) inflight < ssthresh
     sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh

Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.

In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events.  For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.

Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int jas_image_writecmpt(jas_image_t *image, int cmptno, jas_image_coord_t x, jas_image_coord_t y, jas_image_coord_t width,
  jas_image_coord_t height, jas_matrix_t *data)
{
	jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
	jas_image_coord_t i;
	jas_image_coord_t j;
	jas_seqent_t *d;
	jas_seqent_t *dr;
	int drs;
	jas_seqent_t v;
	int k;
	int c;

	if (cmptno < 0 || cmptno >= image->numcmpts_) {
		return -1;
	}

	cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
	if (x >= cmpt->width_ || y >= cmpt->height_ ||
	  x + width > cmpt->width_ ||
	  y + height > cmpt->height_) {
		return -1;
	}

	if (jas_matrix_numrows(data) != height || jas_matrix_numcols(data) != width) {
		return -1;
	}

	dr = jas_matrix_getref(data, 0, 0);
	drs = jas_matrix_rowstep(data);
	for (i = 0; i < height; ++i, dr += drs) {
		d = dr;
		if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, (cmpt->width_ * (y + i) + x)
		  * cmpt->cps_, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
			return -1;
		}
		for (j = width; j > 0; --j, ++d) {
			v = inttobits(*d, cmpt->prec_, cmpt->sgnd_);
			for (k = cmpt->cps_; k > 0; --k) {
				c = (v >> (8 * (cmpt->cps_ - 1))) & 0xff;
				if (jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_,
				  (unsigned char) c) == EOF) {
					return -1;
				}
				v <<= 8;
			}
		}
	}

	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Added fix for CVE-2016-2089.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: create_policy_2_svc(cpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
    static generic_ret              ret;
    char                            *prime_arg;
    gss_buffer_desc                 client_name,
        service_name;
    OM_uint32                       minor_stat;
    kadm5_server_handle_t           handle;
    const char                      *errmsg = NULL;

    xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);

    if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    ret.api_version = handle->api_version;

    if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
        ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
        goto exit_func;
    }
    prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;

    if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
                                                       rqst2name(rqstp),
                                                       ACL_ADD, NULL, NULL)) {
        ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
        log_unauth("kadm5_create_policy", prime_arg,
                   &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);

    } else {
        ret.code = kadm5_create_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
                                       arg->mask);
        if( ret.code != 0 )
            errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);

        log_done("kadm5_create_policy",
                 ((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
                 &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);

        if (errmsg != NULL)
            krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
    }
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
    free_server_handle(handle);
    return &ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]

In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler.  Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails.  Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails.  Discovered by Simo Sorce.

CVE-2015-8631:

In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one.  Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: modify_policy_2_svc(mpol_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
    static generic_ret              ret;
    char                            *prime_arg;
    gss_buffer_desc                 client_name,
        service_name;
    OM_uint32                       minor_stat;
    kadm5_server_handle_t           handle;
    const char                      *errmsg = NULL;

    xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);

    if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    ret.api_version = handle->api_version;

    if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
        ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
        goto exit_func;
    }
    prime_arg = arg->rec.policy;

    if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
                                                       rqst2name(rqstp),
                                                       ACL_MODIFY, NULL, NULL)) {
        log_unauth("kadm5_modify_policy", prime_arg,
                   &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
        ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_MODIFY;
    } else {
        ret.code = kadm5_modify_policy((void *)handle, &arg->rec,
                                       arg->mask);
        if( ret.code != 0 )
            errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);

        log_done("kadm5_modify_policy",
                 ((prime_arg == NULL) ? "(null)" : prime_arg), errmsg,
                 &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);

        if (errmsg != NULL)
            krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
    }
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
    free_server_handle(handle);
    return &ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]

In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler.  Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails.  Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails.  Discovered by Simo Sorce.

CVE-2015-8631:

In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one.  Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void UTFstring::UpdateFromUTF8()
{
  delete [] _Data;
  // find the size of the final UCS-2 string
  size_t i;
  for (_Length=0, i=0; i<UTF8string.length(); _Length++) {
    uint8 lead = static_cast<uint8>(UTF8string[i]);
    if (lead < 0x80)
      i++;
    else if ((lead >> 5) == 0x6)
      i += 2;
    else if ((lead >> 4) == 0xe)
      i += 3;
    else if ((lead >> 3) == 0x1e)
      i += 4;
    else
      // Invalid size?
      break;
  }
  _Data = new wchar_t[_Length+1];
  size_t j;
  for (j=0, i=0; i<UTF8string.length(); j++) {
    uint8 lead = static_cast<uint8>(UTF8string[i]);
    if (lead < 0x80) {
      _Data[j] = lead;
      i++;
    } else if ((lead >> 5) == 0x6) {
      _Data[j] = ((lead & 0x1F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F);
      i += 2;
    } else if ((lead >> 4) == 0xe) {
      _Data[j] = ((lead & 0x0F) << 12) + ((UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+2] & 0x3F);
      i += 3;
    } else if ((lead >> 3) == 0x1e) {
      _Data[j] = ((lead & 0x07) << 18) + ((UTF8string[i+1] & 0x3F) << 12) + ((UTF8string[i+2] & 0x3F) << 6) + (UTF8string[i+3] & 0x3F);
      i += 4;
    } else
      // Invalid char?
      break;
  }
  _Data[j] = 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-200', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'EbmlUnicodeString: don't read beyond end of string

The conversion from an UTF-8 encoded string into a wchar_t one was
reading from beyond the end of the source buffer if the length indicated
by a UTF-8 character's first byte exceeds the number of bytes actually
present afterwards.

Fixes the issue reported as Cisco TALOS-CAN-0036.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
	php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
	
	switch(option) {
		case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
			if (ts->meta) {
				zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
			}
			return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
		default:
			if (ts->innerstream) {
				return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
			}
			return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
	}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #71323 - Output of stream_get_meta_data can be falsified by its input'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_set_chunk_size)
{
	int			ret;
	long		csize;
	zval		*zstream;
	php_stream	*stream;

	if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl", &zstream, &csize) == FAILURE) {
		RETURN_FALSE;
	}

	if (csize <= 0) {
		php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The chunk size must be a positive integer, given %ld", csize);
		RETURN_FALSE;
	}
	/* stream.chunk_size is actually a size_t, but php_stream_set_option 
	 * can only use an int to accept the new value and return the old one.
	 * In any case, values larger than INT_MAX for a chunk size make no sense.
	 */
	if (csize > INT_MAX) {
		php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The chunk size cannot be larger than %d", INT_MAX);
		RETURN_FALSE;
	}
	
	php_stream_from_zval(stream, &zstream);

	ret = php_stream_set_option(stream, PHP_STREAM_OPTION_SET_CHUNK_SIZE, (int)csize, NULL);
	
	RETURN_LONG(ret > 0 ? (long)ret : (long)EOF);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #71323 - Output of stream_get_meta_data can be falsified by its input'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static inline pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
	spin_lock_init(&mm->context.list_lock);
	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.pgtable_list);
	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->context.gmap_list);
	return (pgd_t *) crst_table_alloc(mm);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 's390/mm: four page table levels vs. fork

The fork of a process with four page table levels is broken since
git commit 6252d702c5311ce9 "[S390] dynamic page tables."

All new mm contexts are created with three page table levels and
an asce limit of 4TB. If the parent has four levels dup_mmap will
add vmas to the new context which are outside of the asce limit.
The subsequent call to copy_page_range will walk the three level
page table structure of the new process with non-zero pgd and pud
indexes. This leads to memory clobbers as the pgd_index *and* the
pud_index is added to the mm->pgd pointer without a pgd_deref
in between.

The init_new_context() function is selecting the number of page
table levels for a new context. The function is used by mm_init()
which in turn is called by dup_mm() and mm_alloc(). These two are
used by fork() and exec(). The init_new_context() function can
distinguish the two cases by looking at mm->context.asce_limit,
for fork() the mm struct has been copied and the number of page
table levels may not change. For exec() the mm_alloc() function
set the new mm structure to zero, in this case a three-level page
table is created as the temporary stack space is located at
STACK_TOP_MAX = 4TB.

This fixes CVE-2016-2143.

Reported-by: Marcin Kościelnicki <koriakin@0x04.net>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void queue_delete(struct snd_seq_queue *q)
{
	/* stop and release the timer */
	snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
	snd_seq_timer_close(q);
	/* wait until access free */
	snd_use_lock_sync(&q->use_lock);
	/* release resources... */
	snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->tickq);
	snd_seq_prioq_delete(&q->timeq);
	snd_seq_timer_delete(&q->timer);

	kfree(q);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close

ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client.  This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.

This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int snd_hrtimer_start(struct snd_timer *t)
{
	struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;

	atomic_set(&stime->running, 0);
	hrtimer_cancel(&stime->hrt);
	hrtimer_start(&stime->hrt, ns_to_ktime(t->sticks * resolution),
		      HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
	atomic_set(&stime->running, 1);
	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()

hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself.  This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.

However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall.  This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.

This patch tries to fix the issue again.  Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback.  The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.

Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void rng_random_request_entropy(RngBackend *b, size_t size,
                                        EntropyReceiveFunc *receive_entropy,
                                        void *opaque)
{
    RndRandom *s = RNG_RANDOM(b);

    if (s->receive_func) {
        s->receive_func(s->opaque, NULL, 0);
    }

    s->receive_func = receive_entropy;
    s->opaque = opaque;
    s->size = size;

    qemu_set_fd_handler(s->fd, entropy_available, NULL, s);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'rng: add request queue support to rng-random

Requests are now created in the RngBackend parent class and the
code path is shared by both rng-egd and rng-random.

This commit fixes the rng-random implementation which processed
only one request at a time and simply discarded all but the most
recent one. In the guest this manifested as delayed completion
of reads from virtio-rng, i.e. a read was completed only after
another read was issued.

By switching rng-random to use the same request queue as rng-egd,
the unsafe stack-based allocation of the entropy buffer is
eliminated and replaced with g_malloc.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1456994238-9585-5-git-send-email-lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
	pr_warn_once("Bits 55-60 of /proc/PID/pagemap entries are about "
			"to stop being page-shift some time soon. See the "
			"linux/Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt for details.\n");
	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
	char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error;
	zend_string *stub;
	size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;

	if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|ss", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
		return;
	}

	stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);

	if (error) {
		zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
		efree(error);
		return;
	}
	RETURN_NEW_STR(stub);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix bug #71860: Require valid paths for phar filenames'