Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void dd_sanitize_mode_and_owner(struct dump_dir *dd)
{
    /* Don't sanitize if we aren't run under root:
     * we assume that during file creation (by whatever means,
     * even by "hostname >file" in abrt_event.conf)
     * normal umask-based mode setting takes care of correct mode,
     * and uid:gid is, of course, set to user's uid and gid.
     *
     * For root operating on /var/spool/abrt/USERS_PROBLEM, this isn't true:
     * "hostname >file", for example, would create file OWNED BY ROOT!
     * This routine resets mode and uid:gid for all such files.
     */
    if (dd->dd_uid == (uid_t)-1)
        return;

    if (!dd->locked)
        error_msg_and_die("dump_dir is not opened"); /* bug */

    DIR *d = opendir(dd->dd_dirname);
    if (!d)
        return;

    struct dirent *dent;
    while ((dent = readdir(d)) != NULL)
    {
        if (dent->d_name[0] == '.') /* ".lock", ".", ".."? skip */
            continue;
        char *full_path = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, dent->d_name);
        struct stat statbuf;
        if (lstat(full_path, &statbuf) == 0 && S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode))
        {
            if ((statbuf.st_mode & 0777) != dd->mode)
            {
                /* We open the file only for fchmod()
                 *
                 * We use fchmod() because chmod() changes the permissions of
                 * the file specified whose pathname is given in path, which
                 * is dereferenced if it is a symbolic link.
                 */
                int fd = open(full_path, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW, dd->mode);
                if (fd >= 0)
                {
                    if (fchmod(fd, dd->mode) != 0)
                    {
                        perror_msg("Can't change '%s' mode to 0%o", full_path,
                                   (unsigned)dd->mode);
                    }
                    close(fd);
                }
                else
                {
                    perror_msg("Can't open regular file '%s'", full_path);
                }
            }
            if (statbuf.st_uid != dd->dd_uid || statbuf.st_gid != dd->dd_gid)
            {
                if (lchown(full_path, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid) != 0)
                {
                    perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", full_path,
                               (long)dd->dd_uid, (long)dd->dd_gid);
                }
            }
        }
        free(full_path);
    }
    closedir(d);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'lib: fix races in dump directory handling code

Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>:

    dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
    use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.

    ...

    The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
    links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
    code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
    with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.

Related: #1214745

Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>'