atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void HeaderMapImpl::removePrefix(const LowerCaseString& prefix) {
  headers_.remove_if([&](const HeaderEntryImpl& entry) {
    bool to_remove = absl::StartsWith(entry.key().getStringView(), prefix.get());
    if (to_remove) {
      // If this header should be removed, make sure any references in the
      // static lookup table are cleared as well.
      EntryCb cb = ConstSingleton<StaticLookupTable>::get().find(entry.key().getStringView());
      if (cb) {
        StaticLookupResponse ref_lookup_response = cb(*this);
        if (ref_lookup_response.entry_) {
          *ref_lookup_response.entry_ = nullptr;
        }
      }
    }
    return to_remove;
  });
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-400', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.

Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.

Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <asraa@google.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: const HeaderEntry* HeaderMapImpl::get(const LowerCaseString& key) const {
  for (const HeaderEntryImpl& header : headers_) {
    if (header.key() == key.get().c_str()) {
      return &header;
    }
  }

  return nullptr;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-400', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.

Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.

Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <asraa@google.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: TEST(HeaderMapImplTest, LargeCharInHeader) {
  HeaderMapImpl headers;
  LowerCaseString static_key("\x90hello");
  std::string ref_value("value");
  headers.addReference(static_key, ref_value);
  EXPECT_EQ("value", headers.get(static_key)->value().getStringView());
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-400', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.

Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.

Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <asraa@google.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void gfs2_clear_rgrpd(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp)
{
	struct rb_node *n;
	struct gfs2_rgrpd *rgd;
	struct gfs2_glock *gl;

	while ((n = rb_first(&sdp->sd_rindex_tree))) {
		rgd = rb_entry(n, struct gfs2_rgrpd, rd_node);
		gl = rgd->rd_gl;

		rb_erase(n, &sdp->sd_rindex_tree);

		if (gl) {
			spin_lock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock);
			gl->gl_object = NULL;
			spin_unlock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock);
			gfs2_glock_add_to_lru(gl);
			gfs2_glock_put(gl);
		}

		gfs2_free_clones(rgd);
		kfree(rgd->rd_bits);
		return_all_reservations(rgd);
		kmem_cache_free(gfs2_rgrpd_cachep, rgd);
	}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'GFS2: don't set rgrp gl_object until it's inserted into rgrp tree

Before this patch, function read_rindex_entry would set a rgrp
glock's gl_object pointer to itself before inserting the rgrp into
the rgrp rbtree. The problem is: if another process was also reading
the rgrp in, and had already inserted its newly created rgrp, then
the second call to read_rindex_entry would overwrite that value,
then return a bad return code to the caller. Later, other functions
would reference the now-freed rgrp memory by way of gl_object.
In some cases, that could result in gfs2_rgrp_brelse being called
twice for the same rgrp: once for the failed attempt and once for
the "real" rgrp release. Eventually the kernel would panic.
There are also a number of other things that could go wrong when
a kernel module is accessing freed storage. For example, this could
result in rgrp corruption because the fake rgrp would point to a
fake bitmap in memory too, causing gfs2_inplace_reserve to search
some random memory for free blocks, and find some, since we were
never setting rgd->rd_bits to NULL before freeing it.

This patch fixes the problem by not setting gl_object until we
have successfully inserted the rgrp into the rbtree. Also, it sets
rd_bits to NULL as it frees them, which will ensure any accidental
access to the wrong rgrp will result in a kernel panic rather than
file system corruption, which is preferred.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: MagickExport void *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
  void
    *data;

  assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
  if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
    (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
  if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
    {
      (void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
      RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
    }
  blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
  blob_info->length=0;
  blob_info->offset=0;
  blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
  blob_info->error=0;
  blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
  blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
  blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
  data=blob_info->data;
  blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
  blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
  blob_info->custom_stream=(CustomStreamInfo *) NULL;
  return(data);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-416', 'CWE-399'], 'message': 'https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: S3BootScriptLabelInternal (
  IN        BOOLEAN                        BeforeOrAfter,
  IN OUT    VOID                         **Position OPTIONAL,
  IN        UINT32                         InformationLength,
  IN CONST  CHAR8                          *Information
  )
{
  UINT8                 Length;
  UINT8                 *Script;
  EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION  ScriptInformation;

  Length = (UINT8)(sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION) + InformationLength);

  Script = S3BootScriptGetEntryAddAddress (Length);
  if (Script == NULL) {
    return RETURN_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
  }
  //
  // Build script data
  //
  ScriptInformation.OpCode     = S3_BOOT_SCRIPT_LIB_LABEL_OPCODE;
  ScriptInformation.Length     = Length;


  ScriptInformation.InformationLength = InformationLength;

  CopyMem ((VOID*)Script, (VOID*)&ScriptInformation, sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION));
  CopyMem ((VOID*)(Script + sizeof (EFI_BOOT_SCRIPT_INFORMATION)), (VOID *) Information, (UINTN) InformationLength);

  SyncBootScript (Script);

  return S3BootScriptMoveLastOpcode (BeforeOrAfter, Position);

} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'MdeModulePkg/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib: Fix potential numeric truncation (CVE-2019-14563)

REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2001

For S3BootScriptLib APIs:

S3BootScriptSaveIoWrite
S3BootScriptSaveMemWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfgWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2Write
S3BootScriptSaveSmbusExecute
S3BootScriptSaveInformation
S3BootScriptSaveInformationAsciiString
S3BootScriptLabel (happen in S3BootScriptLabelInternal())

possible numeric truncations will happen that may lead to S3 boot script
entry with improper size being returned to store the boot script data.
This commit will add checks to prevent this kind of issue.

Please note that the remaining S3BootScriptLib APIs:

S3BootScriptSaveIoReadWrite
S3BootScriptSaveMemReadWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfgReadWrite
S3BootScriptSavePciCfg2ReadWrite
S3BootScriptSaveStall
S3BootScriptSaveDispatch2
S3BootScriptSaveDispatch
S3BootScriptSaveMemPoll
S3BootScriptSaveIoPoll
S3BootScriptSavePciPoll
S3BootScriptSavePci2Poll
S3BootScriptCloseTable
S3BootScriptExecute
S3BootScriptMoveLastOpcode
S3BootScriptCompare

are not affected by such numeric truncation.

Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: mldv2_query_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int len)
{
    const struct icmp6_hdr *icp = (const struct icmp6_hdr *) bp;
    u_int mrc;
    int mrt, qqi;
    u_int nsrcs;
    register u_int i;

    /* Minimum len is 28 */
    if (len < 28) {
            ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid len %d]", len));
	return;
    }
    ND_TCHECK(icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
    mrc = EXTRACT_16BITS(&icp->icmp6_data16[0]);
    if (mrc < 32768) {
	mrt = mrc;
    } else {
        mrt = ((mrc & 0x0fff) | 0x1000) << (((mrc & 0x7000) >> 12) + 3);
    }
    if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
            ND_PRINT((ndo," [max resp delay=%d]", mrt));
    }
    ND_TCHECK2(bp[8], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
    ND_PRINT((ndo," [gaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[8])));

    if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
        ND_TCHECK(bp[25]);
	if (bp[24] & 0x08) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo," sflag"));
	}
	if (bp[24] & 0x07) {
		ND_PRINT((ndo," robustness=%d", bp[24] & 0x07));
	}
	if (bp[25] < 128) {
		qqi = bp[25];
	} else {
		qqi = ((bp[25] & 0x0f) | 0x10) << (((bp[25] & 0x70) >> 4) + 3);
	}
	ND_PRINT((ndo," qqi=%d", qqi));
    }

    ND_TCHECK2(bp[26], 2);
    nsrcs = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[26]);
    if (nsrcs > 0) {
	if (len < 28 + nsrcs * sizeof(struct in6_addr))
	    ND_PRINT((ndo," [invalid number of sources]"));
	else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
	    ND_PRINT((ndo," {"));
	    for (i = 0; i < nsrcs; i++) {
		ND_TCHECK2(bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)],
                        sizeof(struct in6_addr));
		ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[28 + i * sizeof(struct in6_addr)])));
	    }
	    ND_PRINT((ndo," }"));
	} else
                ND_PRINT((ndo,", %d source(s)", nsrcs));
    }
    ND_PRINT((ndo,"]"));
    return;
trunc:
    ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|icmp6]"));
    return;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': '(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check

Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.

Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: vrrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
           register const u_char *bp, register u_int len,
           register const u_char *bp2, int ttl)
{
	int version, type, auth_type = VRRP_AUTH_NONE; /* keep compiler happy */
	const char *type_s;

	ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
	version = (bp[0] & 0xf0) >> 4;
	type = bp[0] & 0x0f;
	type_s = tok2str(type2str, "unknown type (%u)", type);
	ND_PRINT((ndo, "VRRPv%u, %s", version, type_s));
	if (ttl != 255)
		ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (ttl %u)", ttl));
	if (version < 2 || version > 3 || type != VRRP_TYPE_ADVERTISEMENT)
		return;
	ND_TCHECK(bp[2]);
	ND_PRINT((ndo, ", vrid %u, prio %u", bp[1], bp[2]));
	ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);

	if (version == 2) {
		auth_type = bp[4];
		ND_PRINT((ndo, ", authtype %s", tok2str(auth2str, NULL, auth_type)));
		ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %us, length %u", bp[5], len));
	} else { /* version == 3 */
		uint16_t intvl = (bp[4] & 0x0f) << 8 | bp[5];
		ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %ucs, length %u", intvl, len));
	}

	if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
		int naddrs = bp[3];
		int i;
		char c;

		if (version == 2 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
			struct cksum_vec vec[1];

			vec[0].ptr = bp;
			vec[0].len = len;
			if (in_cksum(vec, 1))
				ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
					EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
		}

		if (version == 3 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
			uint16_t cksum = nextproto4_cksum(ndo, (const struct ip *)bp2, bp,
				len, len, IPPROTO_VRRP);
			if (cksum)
				ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
					EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
		}

		ND_PRINT((ndo, ", addrs"));
		if (naddrs > 1)
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%d)", naddrs));
		ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
		c = ' ';
		bp += 8;
		for (i = 0; i < naddrs; i++) {
			ND_TCHECK(bp[3]);
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
			c = ',';
			bp += 4;
		}
		if (version == 2 && auth_type == VRRP_AUTH_SIMPLE) { /* simple text password */
			ND_TCHECK(bp[7]);
			ND_PRINT((ndo, " auth \""));
			if (fn_printn(ndo, bp, 8, ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
				ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
				goto trunc;
			}
			ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
		}
	}
	return;
trunc:
	ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vrrp]"));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': '(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14463/VRRP: Add a missing bounds check

In vrrp_print().

This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.

Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *obj_tptr,
                            int total_subobj_len, int offset)
{
    int hexdump = FALSE;
    int subobj_type, subobj_len;

    union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
        float f;
        uint32_t i;
    } bw;

    while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
	subobj_type = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset);
	subobj_len  = EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 1);
	ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t    Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
		tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
			"Unknown",
			subobj_type),
			subobj_type,
			subobj_len));
	if (subobj_len < 4) {
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short)"));
	    break;
	}
	if ((subobj_len % 4) != 0) {
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, " (not a multiple of 4)"));
	    break;
	}
	if (total_subobj_len < subobj_len) {
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, " (goes past the end of the object)"));
	    break;
	}
	switch(subobj_type) {
	case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t      Switching Type: %s (%u)",
		tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
			"Unknown",
			EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)),
			EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 2)));
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t      Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
		tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
			"Unknown",
			EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)),
			EXTRACT_8BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 3)));
	    ND_TCHECK_32BITS(obj_tptr + offset + 4);
	    bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t      Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
                bw.f*8/1000000));
	    bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t      Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
                bw.f*8/1000000));
	    break;
	case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
	    ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t      Wavelength: %u",
		EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
	    break;
	default:
	    /* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
	    hexdump=TRUE;
	    break;
	}
	total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
	offset+=subobj_len;
    }
    return (hexdump);
trunc:
    return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-120', 'CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': '(for 4.9.3) LMP: Add some missing bounds checks

In lmp_print_data_link_subobjs(), these problems were identified
through code review.

Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Update two tests outputs accordingly.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: label (const uint8_t * src, size_t srclen, uint8_t * dst, size_t * dstlen,
       int flags)
{
  size_t plen;
  uint32_t *p;
  int rc;
  size_t tmpl;

  if (_idn2_ascii_p (src, srclen))
    {
      if (flags & IDN2_ALABEL_ROUNDTRIP)
	/* FIXME implement this MAY:

	   If the input to this procedure appears to be an A-label
	   (i.e., it starts in "xn--", interpreted
	   case-insensitively), the lookup application MAY attempt to
	   convert it to a U-label, first ensuring that the A-label is
	   entirely in lowercase (converting it to lowercase if
	   necessary), and apply the tests of Section 5.4 and the
	   conversion of Section 5.5 to that form. */
	return IDN2_INVALID_FLAGS;

      if (srclen > IDN2_LABEL_MAX_LENGTH)
	return IDN2_TOO_BIG_LABEL;
      if (srclen > *dstlen)
	return IDN2_TOO_BIG_DOMAIN;

      memcpy (dst, src, srclen);
      *dstlen = srclen;
      return IDN2_OK;
    }

  rc = _idn2_u8_to_u32_nfc (src, srclen, &p, &plen, flags & IDN2_NFC_INPUT);
  if (rc != IDN2_OK)
    return rc;

  if (!(flags & IDN2_TRANSITIONAL))
    {
      rc = _idn2_label_test(
	TEST_NFC |
	TEST_2HYPHEN |
	TEST_LEADING_COMBINING |
	TEST_DISALLOWED |
	TEST_CONTEXTJ_RULE |
	TEST_CONTEXTO_WITH_RULE |
	TEST_UNASSIGNED | TEST_BIDI |
	((flags & IDN2_NONTRANSITIONAL) ? TEST_NONTRANSITIONAL : 0) |
	((flags & IDN2_USE_STD3_ASCII_RULES) ? 0 : TEST_ALLOW_STD3_DISALLOWED),
	p, plen);

      if (rc != IDN2_OK)
	{
	  free(p);
	  return rc;
	}
    }

  dst[0] = 'x';
  dst[1] = 'n';
  dst[2] = '-';
  dst[3] = '-';

  tmpl = *dstlen - 4;
  rc = _idn2_punycode_encode (plen, p, &tmpl, (char *) dst + 4);
  free (p);
  if (rc != IDN2_OK)
    return rc;

  *dstlen = 4 + tmpl;

  return IDN2_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Perform A-Label roundtrip for lookup functions by default

This adds another check to avoid unexpected results.
It was a longstanding FIXME.

Thanks to  Jonathan Birch of Microsoft Corporation,
Florian Weimer (GNU glibc) and Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (GnuTLS)
for investigation, discussion and testing.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: _nc_find_type_entry(const char *string,
		    int type,
		    bool termcap)
{
    struct name_table_entry const *ptr = NULL;
    const HashData *data = _nc_get_hash_info(termcap);
    int hashvalue = data->hash_of(string);

    if (data->table_data[hashvalue] >= 0) {
	const struct name_table_entry *const table = _nc_get_table(termcap);

	ptr = table + data->table_data[hashvalue];
	while (ptr->nte_type != type
	       || !data->compare_names(ptr->nte_name, string)) {
	    if (ptr->nte_link < 0) {
		ptr = 0;
		break;
	    }
	    ptr = table + (ptr->nte_link + data->table_data[data->table_size]);
	}
    }

    return ptr;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'ncurses 6.1 - patch 20191012

+ amend recent changes to ncurses*-config and pc-files to filter out
  Debian linker-flags (report by Sven Joachim, cf: 20150516).
+ clarify relationship between tic, infocmp and captoinfo in manpage.
+ check for invalid hashcode in _nc_find_type_entry and
  _nc_find_name_entry.
> fix several errata in tic (reports/testcases by "zjuchenyuan"):
+ check for invalid hashcode in _nc_find_entry.
+ check for missing character after backslash in fmt_entry
+ check for acsc with odd length in dump_entry in check for one-one
  mapping (cf: 20060415);
+ check length when converting from old AIX box_chars_1 capability,
  overlooked in changes to eliminate strcpy (cf: 20001007).
+ amend the ncurses*-config and pc-files to take into account the rpath'