Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int udp_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
	int rc;
	int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);

	/*
	 *	Charge it to the socket, dropping if the queue is full.
	 */
	if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
		goto drop;
	nf_reset(skb);

	if (up->encap_type) {
		/*
		 * This is an encapsulation socket so pass the skb to
		 * the socket's udp_encap_rcv() hook. Otherwise, just
		 * fall through and pass this up the UDP socket.
		 * up->encap_rcv() returns the following value:
		 * =0 if skb was successfully passed to the encap
		 *    handler or was discarded by it.
		 * >0 if skb should be passed on to UDP.
		 * <0 if skb should be resubmitted as proto -N
		 */

		/* if we're overly short, let UDP handle it */
		if (skb->len > sizeof(struct udphdr) &&
		    up->encap_rcv != NULL) {
			int ret;

			ret = (*up->encap_rcv)(sk, skb);
			if (ret <= 0) {
				UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk),
						 UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS,
						 is_udplite);
				return -ret;
			}
		}

		/* FALLTHROUGH -- it's a UDP Packet */
	}

	/*
	 * 	UDP-Lite specific tests, ignored on UDP sockets
	 */
	if ((is_udplite & UDPLITE_RECV_CC)  &&  UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {

		/*
		 * MIB statistics other than incrementing the error count are
		 * disabled for the following two types of errors: these depend
		 * on the application settings, not on the functioning of the
		 * protocol stack as such.
		 *
		 * RFC 3828 here recommends (sec 3.3): "There should also be a
		 * way ... to ... at least let the receiving application block
		 * delivery of packets with coverage values less than a value
		 * provided by the application."
		 */
		if (up->pcrlen == 0) {          /* full coverage was set  */
			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "UDPLITE: partial coverage "
				"%d while full coverage %d requested\n",
				UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, skb->len);
			goto drop;
		}
		/* The next case involves violating the min. coverage requested
		 * by the receiver. This is subtle: if receiver wants x and x is
		 * greater than the buffersize/MTU then receiver will complain
		 * that it wants x while sender emits packets of smaller size y.
		 * Therefore the above ...()->partial_cov statement is essential.
		 */
		if (UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov  <  up->pcrlen) {
			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING
				"UDPLITE: coverage %d too small, need min %d\n",
				UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->cscov, up->pcrlen);
			goto drop;
		}
	}

	if (sk->sk_filter) {
		if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
			goto drop;
	}

	rc = 0;

	bh_lock_sock(sk);
	if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
		rc = __udp_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
	else if (sk_add_backlog(sk, skb)) {
		bh_unlock_sock(sk);
		goto drop;
	}
	bh_unlock_sock(sk);

	return rc;

drop:
	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
	atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
	kfree_skb(skb);
	return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-400'], 'message': 'net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account

Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.

We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.

Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.

Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'