atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: _lasso_check_assertion_issuer(LassoSaml2Assertion *assertion, const gchar *provider_id)
{
	if (! LASSO_SAML2_ASSERTION(assertion) || ! provider_id)
		return FALSE;

	if (! assertion->Issuer || ! assertion->Issuer->content)
		return FALSE;

	return lasso_strisequal(assertion->Issuer->content,provider_id);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-347'], 'message': 'Fix signature checking on unsigned response with multiple assertions

CVE-2021-28091 : when AuthnResponse messages are not signed (which is
permitted by the specifiation), all assertion's signatures should be
checked, but currently after the first signed assertion is checked all
following assertions are accepted without checking their signature, and
the last one is considered the main assertion.

This patch :
* check signatures from all assertions if the message is not signed,
* refuse messages with assertion from different issuers than the one on
  the message, to prevent assertion bundling event if they are signed.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static ssize_t add_slot_store(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
			      const char *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
	char drc_name[MAX_DRC_NAME_LEN];
	char *end;
	int rc;

	if (nbytes >= MAX_DRC_NAME_LEN)
		return 0;

	memcpy(drc_name, buf, nbytes);

	end = strchr(drc_name, '\n');
	if (!end)
		end = &drc_name[nbytes];
	*end = '\0';

	rc = dlpar_add_slot(drc_name);
	if (rc)
		return rc;

	return nbytes;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': 'PCI: rpadlpar: Fix potential drc_name corruption in store functions

Both add_slot_store() and remove_slot_store() try to fix up the
drc_name copied from the store buffer by placing a NUL terminator at
nbyte + 1 or in place of a '\n' if present. However, the static buffer
that we copy the drc_name data into is not zeroed and can contain
anything past the n-th byte.

This is problematic if a '\n' byte appears in that buffer after nbytes
and the string copied into the store buffer was not NUL terminated to
start with as the strchr() search for a '\n' byte will mark this
incorrectly as the end of the drc_name string resulting in a drc_name
string that contains garbage data after the n-th byte.

Additionally it will cause us to overwrite that '\n' byte on the stack
with NUL, potentially corrupting data on the stack.

The following debugging shows an example of the drmgr utility writing
"PHB 4543" to the add_slot sysfs attribute, but add_slot_store()
logging a corrupted string value.

  drmgr: drmgr: -c phb -a -s PHB 4543 -d 1
  add_slot_store: drc_name = PHB 4543°|<82>!, rc = -19

Fix this by using strscpy() instead of memcpy() to ensure the string
is NUL terminated when copied into the static drc_name buffer.
Further, since the string is now NUL terminated the code only needs to
change '\n' to '\0' when present.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Reformat change log and add mention of possible stack corruption]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315214821.452959-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int ossl_init(void)
{
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) &&  \
  !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
  const uint64_t flags =
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
    /* not present in BoringSSL */
    OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN |
#endif
#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
    OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG |
#else
    OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG |
#endif
    0;
  OPENSSL_init_ssl(flags, NULL);
#else
  OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();

#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
  ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
#endif

/* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION was introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
   0.9.8e */
#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
#endif

#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
  CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
                         CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
                         CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
#endif

  /* Lets get nice error messages */
  SSL_load_error_strings();

  /* Init the global ciphers and digests */
  if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
    return 0;

  OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif

  Curl_tls_keylog_open();

  /* Initialize the extra data indexes */
  if(ossl_get_ssl_data_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 ||
     ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0)
    return 0;

  return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-290'], 'message': 'vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()

To make sure we set and extract the correct session.

Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html

CVE-2021-22890'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: size_t zmalloc_size(void *ptr) {
    void *realptr = (char*)ptr-PREFIX_SIZE;
    size_t size = *((size_t*)realptr);
    /* Assume at least that all the allocations are padded at sizeof(long) by
     * the underlying allocator. */
    if (size&(sizeof(long)-1)) size += sizeof(long)-(size&(sizeof(long)-1));
    return size+PREFIX_SIZE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'Fix wrong zmalloc_size() assumption. (#7963)

When using a system with no malloc_usable_size(), zmalloc_size() assumed
that the heap allocator always returns blocks that are long-padded.

This may not always be the case, and will result with zmalloc_size()
returning a size that is bigger than allocated. At least in one case
this leads to out of bound write, process crash and a potential security
vulnerability.

Effectively this does not affect the vast majority of users, who use
jemalloc or glibc.

This problem along with a (different) fix was reported by Drew DeVault.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
			  const union bpf_attr *attr,
			  union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
{
	struct btf *btf;
	int err;

	if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
		if (check_abnormal_return(env))
			return -EINVAL;
		return 0;
	}

	btf = btf_get_by_fd(attr->prog_btf_fd);
	if (IS_ERR(btf))
		return PTR_ERR(btf);
	env->prog->aux->btf = btf;

	err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
	if (err)
		return err;

	err = check_btf_line(env, attr, uattr);
	if (err)
		return err;

	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-307'], 'message': 'bpf: Dont allow vmlinux BTF to be used in map_create and prog_load.

The syzbot got FD of vmlinux BTF and passed it into map_create which caused
crash in btf_type_id_size() when it tried to access resolved_ids. The vmlinux
BTF doesn't have 'resolved_ids' and 'resolved_sizes' initialized to save
memory. To avoid such issues disallow using vmlinux BTF in prog_load and
map_create commands.

Fixes: 5329722057d4 ("bpf: Assign ID to vmlinux BTF and return extra info for BTF in GET_OBJ_INFO")
Reported-by: syzbot+8bab8ed346746e7540e8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210307225248.79031-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void inline ConvertXYZToJzazbz(const double X,const double Y,
  const double Z,const double white_luminance,double *Jz,double *az,double *bz)
{
#define Jzazbz_b  1.15  /* https://observablehq.com/@jrus/jzazbz */
#define Jzazbz_g  0.66
#define Jzazbz_c1  (3424.0/4096.0)
#define Jzazbz_c2  (2413.0/128.0)
#define Jzazbz_c3  (2392.0/128.0)
#define Jzazbz_n  (2610.0/16384.0)
#define Jzazbz_p  (1.7*2523.0/32.0)
#define Jzazbz_d  (-0.56)
#define Jzazbz_d0  (1.6295499532821566e-11)

  double
    gamma,
    Iz,
    L,
    Lp,
    M,
    Mp,
    S,
    Sp,
    Xp,
    Yp,
    Zp;

  Xp=(Jzazbz_b*X-Z*(Jzazbz_b-1));
  Yp=(Jzazbz_g*Y-X*(Jzazbz_g-1));
  Zp=Z;
  L=0.41478972*Xp+0.579999*Yp+0.0146480*Zp;
  M=(-0.2015100)*Xp+1.120649*Yp+0.0531008*Zp;
  S=(-0.0166008)*Xp+0.264800*Yp+0.6684799*Zp;
  gamma=pow(L/white_luminance,Jzazbz_n);
  Lp=pow((Jzazbz_c1+Jzazbz_c2*gamma)/(1.0+Jzazbz_c3*gamma),Jzazbz_p);
  gamma=pow(M/white_luminance,Jzazbz_n);
  Mp=pow((Jzazbz_c1+Jzazbz_c2*gamma)/(1.0+Jzazbz_c3*gamma),Jzazbz_p);
  gamma=pow(S/white_luminance,Jzazbz_n);
  Sp=pow((Jzazbz_c1+Jzazbz_c2*gamma)/(1.0+Jzazbz_c3*gamma),Jzazbz_p);
  Iz=0.5*Lp+0.5*Mp;
  *az=3.52400*Lp-4.066708*Mp+0.542708*Sp+0.5;
  *bz=0.199076*Lp+1.096799*Mp-1.295875*Sp+0.5;
  *Jz=((Jzazbz_d+1.0)*Iz)/(Jzazbz_d*Iz+1.0)-Jzazbz_d0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-369'], 'message': 'https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/3295'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType PasskeyEncipherImage(Image *image,
  const StringInfo *passkey,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
  assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
  assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
  if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
    (void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
  assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
  assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
  (void) passkey;
  ThrowBinaryException(ImageError,"CipherSupportNotEnabled",image->filename);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-369'], 'message': 'possible divide by zero + clear buffers'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int fuse_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool isdir)
{
	struct fuse_mount *fm = get_fuse_mount(inode);
	struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc;
	int err;
	bool is_wb_truncate = (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC) &&
			  fc->atomic_o_trunc &&
			  fc->writeback_cache;
	bool dax_truncate = (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC) &&
			  fc->atomic_o_trunc && FUSE_IS_DAX(inode);

	err = generic_file_open(inode, file);
	if (err)
		return err;

	if (is_wb_truncate || dax_truncate) {
		inode_lock(inode);
		fuse_set_nowrite(inode);
	}

	if (dax_truncate) {
		down_write(&get_fuse_inode(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
		err = fuse_dax_break_layouts(inode, 0, 0);
		if (err)
			goto out;
	}

	err = fuse_do_open(fm, get_node_id(inode), file, isdir);
	if (!err)
		fuse_finish_open(inode, file);

out:
	if (dax_truncate)
		up_write(&get_fuse_inode(inode)->i_mmap_sem);

	if (is_wb_truncate | dax_truncate) {
		fuse_release_nowrite(inode);
		inode_unlock(inode);
	}

	return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-459'], 'message': 'fuse: fix bad inode

Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):

  The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
  dnotify mark to the open directory.  After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
  finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
  make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:

          inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;

  This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
  properly and eventually crashes.

Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode.  Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.

This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...

Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int create_new_entry(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args,
			    struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry,
			    umode_t mode)
{
	struct fuse_entry_out outarg;
	struct inode *inode;
	struct dentry *d;
	int err;
	struct fuse_forget_link *forget;

	forget = fuse_alloc_forget();
	if (!forget)
		return -ENOMEM;

	memset(&outarg, 0, sizeof(outarg));
	args->nodeid = get_node_id(dir);
	args->out_numargs = 1;
	args->out_args[0].size = sizeof(outarg);
	args->out_args[0].value = &outarg;
	err = fuse_simple_request(fm, args);
	if (err)
		goto out_put_forget_req;

	err = -EIO;
	if (invalid_nodeid(outarg.nodeid) || fuse_invalid_attr(&outarg.attr))
		goto out_put_forget_req;

	if ((outarg.attr.mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
		goto out_put_forget_req;

	inode = fuse_iget(dir->i_sb, outarg.nodeid, outarg.generation,
			  &outarg.attr, entry_attr_timeout(&outarg), 0);
	if (!inode) {
		fuse_queue_forget(fm->fc, forget, outarg.nodeid, 1);
		return -ENOMEM;
	}
	kfree(forget);

	d_drop(entry);
	d = d_splice_alias(inode, entry);
	if (IS_ERR(d))
		return PTR_ERR(d);

	if (d) {
		fuse_change_entry_timeout(d, &outarg);
		dput(d);
	} else {
		fuse_change_entry_timeout(entry, &outarg);
	}
	fuse_dir_changed(dir);
	return 0;

 out_put_forget_req:
	kfree(forget);
	return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-459'], 'message': 'fuse: fix bad inode

Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):

  The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
  dnotify mark to the open directory.  After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
  finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
  make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:

          inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;

  This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
  properly and eventually crashes.

Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode.  Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.

This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...

Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int fuse_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *entry,
			    struct file *file, unsigned flags,
			    umode_t mode)
{
	int err;
	struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(dir);
	struct dentry *res = NULL;

	if (d_in_lookup(entry)) {
		res = fuse_lookup(dir, entry, 0);
		if (IS_ERR(res))
			return PTR_ERR(res);

		if (res)
			entry = res;
	}

	if (!(flags & O_CREAT) || d_really_is_positive(entry))
		goto no_open;

	/* Only creates */
	file->f_mode |= FMODE_CREATED;

	if (fc->no_create)
		goto mknod;

	err = fuse_create_open(dir, entry, file, flags, mode);
	if (err == -ENOSYS) {
		fc->no_create = 1;
		goto mknod;
	}
out_dput:
	dput(res);
	return err;

mknod:
	err = fuse_mknod(dir, entry, mode, 0);
	if (err)
		goto out_dput;
no_open:
	return finish_no_open(file, res);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-459'], 'message': 'fuse: fix bad inode

Jan Kara's analysis of the syzbot report (edited):

  The reproducer opens a directory on FUSE filesystem, it then attaches
  dnotify mark to the open directory.  After that a fuse_do_getattr() call
  finds that attributes returned by the server are inconsistent, and calls
  make_bad_inode() which, among other things does:

          inode->i_mode = S_IFREG;

  This then confuses dnotify which doesn't tear down its structures
  properly and eventually crashes.

Avoid calling make_bad_inode() on a live inode: switch to a private flag on
the fuse inode.  Also add the test to ops which the bad_inode_ops would
have caught.

This bug goes back to the initial merge of fuse in 2.6.14...

Reported-by: syzbot+f427adf9324b92652ccc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: TEST_F(HttpConnectionManagerConfigTest, NormalizePathDefault) {
  const std::string yaml_string = R"EOF(
  stat_prefix: ingress_http
  route_config:
    name: local_route
  http_filters:
  - name: envoy.filters.http.router
  )EOF";

  EXPECT_CALL(context_.runtime_loader_.snapshot_, featureEnabled(_, An<uint64_t>()))
      .WillOnce(Invoke(&context_.runtime_loader_.snapshot_,
                       &Runtime::MockSnapshot::featureEnabledDefault));
  HttpConnectionManagerConfig config(parseHttpConnectionManagerFromYaml(yaml_string), context_,
                                     date_provider_, route_config_provider_manager_,
                                     scoped_routes_config_provider_manager_, http_tracer_manager_,
                                     filter_config_provider_manager_);
#ifdef ENVOY_NORMALIZE_PATH_BY_DEFAULT
  EXPECT_TRUE(config.shouldNormalizePath());
#else
  EXPECT_FALSE(config.shouldNormalizePath());
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path

Fixes: CVE-2021-29492

Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <yavlasov@google.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int dissect_CPMSetBindings(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *parent_tree, gboolean in, void *private_data)
{
	gint offset = 16;
	struct CPMSetBindingsIn request;

	col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "SetBindings");
	if (in) {

		struct mswsp_ct *ct = NULL;
		struct message_data *data = NULL;
		proto_item *ti;
		proto_tree *tree, *pad_tree;
		guint32 size, num, n;
		gint64 column_size;

		ti = proto_tree_add_item(parent_tree, hf_mswsp_msg, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
		tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_mswsp_msg);

		proto_item_set_text(ti, "SetBindingsIn");

		pad_tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_mswsp_pad, &ti, "Padding");

		proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_hcursor, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
		request.hcursor = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
		offset += 4;
		request.brow = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
		proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_cbrow, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
		offset += 4;

		size = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
		request.bbindingdesc = size;
		proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_desc, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
		offset += 4;

		request.dummy = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
		proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_dummy, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
		offset += 4;

		num = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
		request.ccolumns = num;
		ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_ccolumns, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
		offset += 4;

		proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_acolumns, tvb, offset, size-4, ENC_NA);

		/* Sanity check size value */
		column_size = num*MIN_CTABLECOL_SIZE;
		if (column_size > tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset))
		{
			expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_mswsp_msg_cpmsetbinding_ccolumns);
			return tvb_reported_length(tvb);
		}

		ct = get_create_converstation_data(pinfo);

		request.acolumns = (struct CTableColumn*)wmem_alloc(wmem_file_scope(),
						   sizeof(struct CTableColumn) * num);
		for (n=0; n<num; n++) {
			offset = parse_padding(tvb, offset, 4, pad_tree, "padding_aColumns[%u]", n);
			offset = parse_CTableColumn(tvb, pinfo, offset, tree, pad_tree, &request.acolumns[n],"aColumns[%u]", n);
		}
		data = find_or_create_message_data(ct, pinfo,0xD0,in, private_data);
		if (data) {
			data->content.bindingsin = request;
		}

	} else { /* server only returns status with header */
	}

	return tvb_reported_length(tvb);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-770'], 'message': 'MS-WSP: Don't allocate huge amounts of memory.

Add a couple of memory allocation sanity checks, one of which
fixes #17331.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void dname_pkt_copy(sldns_buffer* pkt, uint8_t* to, uint8_t* dname)
{
	/* copy over the dname and decompress it at the same time */
	size_t len = 0;
	uint8_t lablen;
	lablen = *dname++;
	while(lablen) {
		if(LABEL_IS_PTR(lablen)) {
			/* follow pointer */
			dname = sldns_buffer_at(pkt, PTR_OFFSET(lablen, *dname));
			lablen = *dname++;
			continue;
		}
		log_assert(lablen <= LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN);
		len += (size_t)lablen+1;
		if(len >= LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN) {
			*to = 0; /* end the result prematurely */
			log_err("bad dname in dname_pkt_copy");
			return;
		}
		*to++ = lablen;
		memmove(to, dname, lablen);
		dname += lablen;
		to += lablen;
		lablen = *dname++;
	}
	/* copy last \0 */
	*to = 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-617'], 'message': '- Fix Assert Causing DoS in dname_pkt_copy(),
  reported by X41 D-Sec.'