Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void tipc_mon_rcv(struct net *net, void *data, u16 dlen, u32 addr,
		  struct tipc_mon_state *state, int bearer_id)
{
	struct tipc_monitor *mon = tipc_monitor(net, bearer_id);
	struct tipc_mon_domain *arrv_dom = data;
	struct tipc_mon_domain dom_bef;
	struct tipc_mon_domain *dom;
	struct tipc_peer *peer;
	u16 new_member_cnt = mon_le16_to_cpu(arrv_dom->member_cnt);
	int new_dlen = dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, new_member_cnt);
	u16 new_gen = mon_le16_to_cpu(arrv_dom->gen);
	u16 acked_gen = mon_le16_to_cpu(arrv_dom->ack_gen);
	u16 arrv_dlen = mon_le16_to_cpu(arrv_dom->len);
	bool probing = state->probing;
	int i, applied_bef;

	state->probing = false;

	/* Sanity check received domain record */
	if (dlen < dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, 0))
		return;
	if (dlen != dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, new_member_cnt))
		return;
	if (dlen < new_dlen || arrv_dlen != new_dlen)
		return;

	/* Synch generation numbers with peer if link just came up */
	if (!state->synched) {
		state->peer_gen = new_gen - 1;
		state->acked_gen = acked_gen;
		state->synched = true;
	}

	if (more(acked_gen, state->acked_gen))
		state->acked_gen = acked_gen;

	/* Drop duplicate unless we are waiting for a probe response */
	if (!more(new_gen, state->peer_gen) && !probing)
		return;

	write_lock_bh(&mon->lock);
	peer = get_peer(mon, addr);
	if (!peer || !peer->is_up)
		goto exit;

	/* Peer is confirmed, stop any ongoing probing */
	peer->down_cnt = 0;

	/* Task is done for duplicate record */
	if (!more(new_gen, state->peer_gen))
		goto exit;

	state->peer_gen = new_gen;

	/* Cache current domain record for later use */
	dom_bef.member_cnt = 0;
	dom = peer->domain;
	if (dom)
		memcpy(&dom_bef, dom, dom->len);

	/* Transform and store received domain record */
	if (!dom || (dom->len < new_dlen)) {
		kfree(dom);
		dom = kmalloc(new_dlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
		peer->domain = dom;
		if (!dom)
			goto exit;
	}
	dom->len = new_dlen;
	dom->gen = new_gen;
	dom->member_cnt = new_member_cnt;
	dom->up_map = mon_le64_to_cpu(arrv_dom->up_map);
	for (i = 0; i < new_member_cnt; i++)
		dom->members[i] = mon_le32_to_cpu(arrv_dom->members[i]);

	/* Update peers affected by this domain record */
	applied_bef = peer->applied;
	mon_apply_domain(mon, peer);
	mon_identify_lost_members(peer, &dom_bef, applied_bef);
	mon_assign_roles(mon, peer_head(peer));
exit:
	write_unlock_bh(&mon->lock);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'tipc: improve size validations for received domain records

The function tipc_mon_rcv() allows a node to receive and process
domain_record structs from peer nodes to track their views of the
network topology.

This patch verifies that the number of members in a received domain
record does not exceed the limit defined by MAX_MON_DOMAIN, something
that may otherwise lead to a stack overflow.

tipc_mon_rcv() is called from the function tipc_link_proto_rcv(), where
we are reading a 32 bit message data length field into a uint16.  To
avert any risk of bit overflow, we add an extra sanity check for this in
that function.  We cannot see that happen with the current code, but
future designers being unaware of this risk, may introduce it by
allowing delivery of very large (> 64k) sk buffers from the bearer
layer.  This potential problem was identified by Eric Dumazet.

This fixes CVE-2022-0435

Reported-by: Samuel Page <samuel.page@appgate.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 35c55c9877f8 ("tipc: add neighbor monitoring framework")
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Page <samuel.page@appgate.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'