Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
    int len = 0, l;
    int c;
    int count = 0;

#ifdef DEBUG
    nbParseNameComplex++;
#endif

    /*
     * Handler for more complex cases
     */
    GROW;
    if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
        return(NULL);
    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
    if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) == 0) {
        /*
	 * Use the new checks of production [4] [4a] amd [5] of the
	 * Update 5 of XML-1.0
	 */
	if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
	    (!(((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
	       ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
	       (c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
	       ((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
	       ((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
	       ((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
	       ((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
	       ((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
	       ((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))))) {
	    return(NULL);
	}
	len += l;
	NEXTL(l);
	c = CUR_CHAR(l);
	while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* accelerators */
	       (((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'z')) ||
	        ((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'Z')) ||
	        ((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) || /* !start */
	        (c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
	        (c == '-') || (c == '.') || (c == 0xB7) || /* !start */
	        ((c >= 0xC0) && (c <= 0xD6)) ||
	        ((c >= 0xD8) && (c <= 0xF6)) ||
	        ((c >= 0xF8) && (c <= 0x2FF)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x300) && (c <= 0x36F)) || /* !start */
	        ((c >= 0x370) && (c <= 0x37D)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x37F) && (c <= 0x1FFF)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x200C) && (c <= 0x200D)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x203F) && (c <= 0x2040)) || /* !start */
	        ((c >= 0x2070) && (c <= 0x218F)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x2C00) && (c <= 0x2FEF)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x3001) && (c <= 0xD7FF)) ||
	        ((c >= 0xF900) && (c <= 0xFDCF)) ||
	        ((c >= 0xFDF0) && (c <= 0xFFFD)) ||
	        ((c >= 0x10000) && (c <= 0xEFFFF))
		)) {
	    if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
		count = 0;
		GROW;
                if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
                    return(NULL);
	    }
	    len += l;
	    NEXTL(l);
	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
	}
    } else {
	if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
	    (!IS_LETTER(c) && (c != '_') &&
	     (c != ':'))) {
	    return(NULL);
	}
	len += l;
	NEXTL(l);
	c = CUR_CHAR(l);

	while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
	       ((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
		(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
		(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
		(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
		(IS_EXTENDER(c)))) {
	    if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
		count = 0;
		GROW;
                if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
                    return(NULL);
	    }
	    len += l;
	    NEXTL(l);
	    c = CUR_CHAR(l);
	    if (c == 0) {
		count = 0;
		GROW;
                if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
                    return(NULL);
		c = CUR_CHAR(l);
	    }
	}
    }
    if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
        xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name");
        return(NULL);
    }
    if ((*ctxt->input->cur == '\n') && (ctxt->input->cur[-1] == '\r'))
        return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - (len + 1), len));
    return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'Fix handling of parameter-entity references

There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.

Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================

The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.

- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken

The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.

- xmlParseEntityValue

Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.

- xmlParseSystemLiteral

Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.

- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect

Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.

- xmlLoadEntityContent

This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.

This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.

This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.

xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================

When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.

There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.

This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.

Additional hardening
====================

A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.'