atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
	      bool *outname_needs_removal, FILE *ofp)
{
    static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;

    file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
    FILE *pipefp = 0;
    size_t chars_read;

    if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
	int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
	if (inerrno != ENOENT)
	  {
	    *outname_needs_removal = true;
	    copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
	  }
	sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
		 verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
		 outname);
	fflush (stdout);
	pipefp = popen(buf, binary_transput ? "wb" : "w");
	if (!pipefp)
	  pfatal ("Can't open pipe to %s", quotearg (buf));
    }
    for (;;) {
	char ed_command_letter;
	beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
	chars_read = get_line ();
	if (! chars_read) {
	    next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
	    break;
	}
	ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
	if (ed_command_letter) {
	    if (pipefp)
		if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
		    write_fatal ();
	    if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
	        p_pass_comments_through = true;
		while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
		    if (pipefp)
			if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, pipefp))
			    write_fatal ();
		    if (chars_read == 2  &&  strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
			break;
		}
		p_pass_comments_through = false;
	    }
	}
	else {
	    next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
	    break;
	}
    }
    if (!pipefp)
      return;
    if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, pipefp) == 0
	|| fflush (pipefp) != 0)
      write_fatal ();
    if (pclose (pipefp) != 0)
      fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);

    if (ofp)
      {
	FILE *ifp = fopen (outname, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
	int c;
	if (!ifp)
	  pfatal ("can't open '%s'", outname);
	while ((c = getc (ifp)) != EOF)
	  if (putc (c, ofp) == EOF)
	    write_fatal ();
	if (ferror (ifp) || fclose (ifp) != 0)
	  read_fatal ();
      }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fix arbitrary command execution in ed-style patches (CVE-2018-1000156)

* src/pch.c (do_ed_script): Write ed script to a temporary file instead
of piping it to ed: this will cause ed to abort on invalid commands
instead of rejecting them and carrying on.
* tests/ed-style: New test case.
* tests/Makefile.am (TESTS): Add test case.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: bool CephxAuthorizeHandler::verify_authorizer(CephContext *cct, KeyStore *keys,
					      bufferlist& authorizer_data, bufferlist& authorizer_reply,
                                              EntityName& entity_name, uint64_t& global_id, AuthCapsInfo& caps_info, CryptoKey& session_key,  uint64_t *auid)
{
  bufferlist::iterator iter = authorizer_data.begin();

  if (!authorizer_data.length()) {
    ldout(cct, 1) << "verify authorizer, authorizer_data.length()=0" << dendl;
    return false;
  }

  CephXServiceTicketInfo auth_ticket_info;

  bool isvalid = cephx_verify_authorizer(cct, keys, iter, auth_ticket_info, authorizer_reply);

  if (isvalid) {
    caps_info = auth_ticket_info.ticket.caps;
    entity_name = auth_ticket_info.ticket.name;
    global_id = auth_ticket_info.ticket.global_id;
    session_key = auth_ticket_info.session_key;
    if (auid) *auid = auth_ticket_info.ticket.auid;
  }

  return isvalid;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-287', 'CWE-284'], 'message': 'auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge

Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge.  The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.

The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit.  Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)

# Conflicts:
#	src/auth/Auth.h
#	src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
#	src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
#	src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
#	src/msg/Dispatcher.h
#	src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc

- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void addECSOption(char* packet, const size_t& packetSize, uint16_t* len, const ComboAddress& remote, int stamp)
{
  string EDNSRR;
  struct dnsheader* dh = (struct dnsheader*) packet;

  EDNSSubnetOpts eso;
  if(stamp < 0)
    eso.source = Netmask(remote);
  else {
    ComboAddress stamped(remote);
    *((char*)&stamped.sin4.sin_addr.s_addr)=stamp;
    eso.source = Netmask(stamped);
  }
  string optRData=makeEDNSSubnetOptsString(eso);
  string record;
  generateEDNSOption(EDNSOptionCode::ECS, optRData, record);
  generateOptRR(record, EDNSRR);


  uint16_t arcount = ntohs(dh->arcount);
  /* does it fit in the existing buffer? */
  if (packetSize - *len > EDNSRR.size()) {
    arcount++;
    dh->arcount = htons(arcount);
    memcpy(packet + *len, EDNSRR.c_str(), EDNSRR.size());
    *len += EDNSRR.size();
  }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'dnsreplay: Bail out on a too small outgoing buffer'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int compat_get_timex(struct timex *txc, const struct compat_timex __user *utp)
{
	struct compat_timex tx32;

	if (copy_from_user(&tx32, utp, sizeof(struct compat_timex)))
		return -EFAULT;

	txc->modes = tx32.modes;
	txc->offset = tx32.offset;
	txc->freq = tx32.freq;
	txc->maxerror = tx32.maxerror;
	txc->esterror = tx32.esterror;
	txc->status = tx32.status;
	txc->constant = tx32.constant;
	txc->precision = tx32.precision;
	txc->tolerance = tx32.tolerance;
	txc->time.tv_sec = tx32.time.tv_sec;
	txc->time.tv_usec = tx32.time.tv_usec;
	txc->tick = tx32.tick;
	txc->ppsfreq = tx32.ppsfreq;
	txc->jitter = tx32.jitter;
	txc->shift = tx32.shift;
	txc->stabil = tx32.stabil;
	txc->jitcnt = tx32.jitcnt;
	txc->calcnt = tx32.calcnt;
	txc->errcnt = tx32.errcnt;
	txc->stbcnt = tx32.stbcnt;

	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field

Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex().  Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.

If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g.  because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.

Fix it by adding the memset() back.

Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static ssize_t match_busid_show(struct device_driver *drv, char *buf)
{
	int i;
	char *out = buf;

	spin_lock(&busid_table_lock);
	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BUSID; i++)
		if (busid_table[i].name[0])
			out += sprintf(out, "%s ", busid_table[i].name);
	spin_unlock(&busid_table_lock);
	out += sprintf(out, "\n");

	return out - buf;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors

usbip_host updates device status without holding lock from stub probe,
disconnect and rebind code paths. When multiple requests to import a
device are received, these unprotected code paths step all over each
other and drive fails with NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors.

The driver uses a table lock to protect the busid array for adding and
deleting busids to the table. However, the probe, disconnect and rebind
paths get the busid table entry and update the status without holding
the busid table lock. Add a new finer grain lock to protect the busid
entry. This new lock will be held to search and update the busid entry
fields from get_busid_idx(), add_match_busid() and del_match_busid().

match_busid_show() does the same to access the busid entry fields.

get_busid_priv() changed to return the pointer to the busid entry holding
the busid lock. stub_probe(), stub_disconnect() and stub_device_rebind()
call put_busid_priv() to release the busid lock before returning. This
changes fixes the unprotected code paths eliminating the race conditions
in updating the busid entries.

Reported-by: Jakub Jirasek
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void put_busid_priv(struct bus_id_priv *bid)
{
	spin_unlock(&bid->busid_lock);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe()

stub_probe() calls put_busid_priv() in an error path when device isn't
found in the busid_table. Fix it by making put_busid_priv() safe to be
called with null struct bus_id_priv pointer.

This problem happens when "usbip bind" is run without loading usbip_host
driver and then running modprobe. The first failed bind attempt unbinds
the device from the original driver and when usbip_host is modprobed,
stub_probe() runs and doesn't find the device in its busid table and calls
put_busid_priv(0 with null bus_id_priv pointer.

usbip-host 3-10.2: 3-10.2 is not in match_busid table...  skip!

[  367.359679] =====================================
[  367.359681] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
[  367.359683] 4.17.0-rc4+ #5 Not tainted
[  367.359685] -------------------------------------
[  367.359688] modprobe/2768 is trying to release lock (
[  367.359689]
==================================================================
[  367.359696] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x99/0x110
[  367.359699] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000058 by task modprobe/2768

[  367.359705] CPU: 4 PID: 2768 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4+ #5

Fixes: 22076557b07c ("usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors") in usb-linus
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan (Samsung OSG) <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code:   Statement_Ptr Expand::operator()(Definition_Ptr d)
  {
    Env* env = environment();
    Definition_Obj dd = SASS_MEMORY_COPY(d);
    env->local_frame()[d->name() +
                        (d->type() == Definition::MIXIN ? "[m]" : "[f]")] = dd;

    if (d->type() == Definition::FUNCTION && (
      Prelexer::calc_fn_call(d->name().c_str()) ||
      d->name() == "element"    ||
      d->name() == "expression" ||
      d->name() == "url"
    )) {
      deprecated(
        "Naming a function \"" + d->name() + "\" is disallowed and will be an error in future versions of Sass.",
        "This name conflicts with an existing CSS function with special parse rules.",
        false, d->pstate()
      );
    }

    // set the static link so we can have lexical scoping
    dd->environment(env);
    return 0;
  } ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fix segfault on empty custom properties

Originally reported in sass/sassc#225

Fixes sass/sassc#225
Spec sass/sass-spec#1249'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static size_t optsize (lua_State *L, char opt, const char **fmt) {
  switch (opt) {
    case 'B': case 'b': return sizeof(char);
    case 'H': case 'h': return sizeof(short);
    case 'L': case 'l': return sizeof(long);
    case 'T': return sizeof(size_t);
    case 'f':  return sizeof(float);
    case 'd':  return sizeof(double);
    case 'x': return 1;
    case 'c': return getnum(L, fmt, 1);
    case 'i': case 'I': {
      int sz = getnum(L, fmt, sizeof(int));
      if (sz > MAXINTSIZE)
        luaL_error(L, "integral size %d is larger than limit of %d",
                       sz, MAXINTSIZE);
      return sz;
    }
    default: return 0;  /* other cases do not need alignment */
  }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-190', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'Security: update Lua struct package for security.

During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.

Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
	if (sock->ops) {
		struct module *owner = sock->ops->owner;

		sock->ops->release(sock);
		sock->ops = NULL;
		module_put(owner);
	}

	if (rcu_dereference_protected(sock->wq, 1)->fasync_list)
		pr_err("%s: fasync list not empty!\n", __func__);

	if (!sock->file) {
		iput(SOCK_INODE(sock));
		return;
	}
	sock->file = NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()

fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().

As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().

sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.

Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
	if (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon) {
		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
		return 0;
	}
	return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-284'], 'message': 'kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions

VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.

Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void RemoteFsDevice::load()
{
    if (RemoteFsDevice::constSambaAvahiProtocol==details.url.scheme()) {
        // Start Avahi listener...
        Avahi::self();
        QUrlQuery q(details.url);
        if (q.hasQueryItem(constServiceNameQuery)) {
            details.serviceName=q.queryItemValue(constServiceNameQuery);
        }

        if (!details.serviceName.isEmpty()) {
            AvahiService *srv=Avahi::self()->getService(details.serviceName);
            if (!srv || srv->getHost().isEmpty()) {
                sub=tr("Not Available");
            } else {
                sub=tr("Available");
            }
        }
        connect(Avahi::self(), SIGNAL(serviceAdded(QString)), SLOT(serviceAdded(QString)));
        connect(Avahi::self(), SIGNAL(serviceRemoved(QString)), SLOT(serviceRemoved(QString)));
    }

    if (isConnected()) {
        setAudioFolder();
        readOpts(settingsFileName(), opts, true);
        rescan(false); // Read from cache if we have it!
    }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-22'], 'message': 'Remove internal Samba shre mounting code, this had some privilege escalation issues, and is not well tested'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code:     ~Mounter() { } ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-22'], 'message': 'Remove internal Samba shre mounting code, this had some privilege escalation issues, and is not well tested'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void Avahi::addService(int, int, const QString &name, const QString &type, const QString &domain, uint)
{
    if (isLocalDomain(domain) && !services.contains(name)) {
        AvahiService *srv=new AvahiService(name, type, domain);
        services.insert(name, srv);
        connect(srv, SIGNAL(serviceResolved(QString)), this, SIGNAL(serviceAdded(QString)));
    }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-22'], 'message': 'Remove internal Samba shre mounting code, this had some privilege escalation issues, and is not well tested'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void Mounter::startTimer()
{
    if (!timer) {
        timer=new QTimer(this);
        connect(timer, SIGNAL(timeout()), SLOT(timeout()));
    }
    timer->start(30000);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-22'], 'message': 'Remove internal Samba shre mounting code, this had some privilege escalation issues, and is not well tested'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: __ext4_xattr_check_block(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh,
			 const char *function, unsigned int line)
{
	int error = -EFSCORRUPTED;

	if (buffer_verified(bh))
		return 0;

	if (BHDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
	    BHDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1))
		goto errout;
	error = -EFSBADCRC;
	if (!ext4_xattr_block_csum_verify(inode, bh))
		goto errout;
	error = ext4_xattr_check_entries(BFIRST(bh), bh->b_data + bh->b_size,
					 bh->b_data);
errout:
	if (error)
		__ext4_error_inode(inode, function, line, 0,
				   "corrupted xattr block %llu",
				   (unsigned long long) bh->b_blocknr);
	else
		set_buffer_verified(bh);
	return error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks

If there an inode points to a block which is also some other type of
metadata block (such as a block allocation bitmap), the
buffer_verified flag can be set when it was validated as that other
metadata block type; however, it would make a really terrible external
attribute block.  The reason why we use the verified flag is to avoid
constantly reverifying the block.  However, it doesn't take much
overhead to make sure the magic number of the xattr block is correct,
and this will avoid potential crashes.

This addresses CVE-2018-10879.

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org'