Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
{
    int i;
    uint16_t limit;
    VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;

    if (data[0] > 3) {
        update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE);
    }

    switch (data[0]) {
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_PIXEL_FORMAT:
        if (len == 1)
            return 20;

        set_pixel_format(vs, read_u8(data, 4), read_u8(data, 5),
                         read_u8(data, 6), read_u8(data, 7),
                         read_u16(data, 8), read_u16(data, 10),
                         read_u16(data, 12), read_u8(data, 14),
                         read_u8(data, 15), read_u8(data, 16));
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_ENCODINGS:
        if (len == 1)
            return 4;

        if (len == 4) {
            limit = read_u16(data, 2);
            if (limit > 0)
                return 4 + (limit * 4);
        } else
            limit = read_u16(data, 2);

        for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
            int32_t val = read_s32(data, 4 + (i * 4));
            memcpy(data + 4 + (i * 4), &val, sizeof(val));
        }

        set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit);
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE_REQUEST:
        if (len == 1)
            return 10;

        framebuffer_update_request(vs,
                                   read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4),
                                   read_u16(data, 6), read_u16(data, 8));
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_KEY_EVENT:
        if (len == 1)
            return 8;

        key_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u32(data, 4));
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_POINTER_EVENT:
        if (len == 1)
            return 6;

        pointer_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4));
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_CUT_TEXT:
        if (len == 1)
            return 8;

        if (len == 8) {
            uint32_t dlen = read_u32(data, 4);
            if (dlen > 0)
                return 8 + dlen;
        }

        client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
        break;
    case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU:
        if (len == 1)
            return 2;

        switch (read_u8(data, 1)) {
        case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_EXT_KEY_EVENT:
            if (len == 2)
                return 12;

            ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2),
                          read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8));
            break;
        case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO:
            if (len == 2)
                return 4;

            switch (read_u16 (data, 2)) {
            case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_ENABLE:
                audio_add(vs);
                break;
            case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_DISABLE:
                audio_del(vs);
                break;
            case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_SET_FORMAT:
                if (len == 4)
                    return 10;
                switch (read_u8(data, 4)) {
                case 0: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U8; break;
                case 1: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S8; break;
                case 2: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U16; break;
                case 3: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S16; break;
                case 4: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U32; break;
                case 5: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S32; break;
                default:
                    printf("Invalid audio format %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
                    vnc_client_error(vs);
                    break;
                }
                vs->as.nchannels = read_u8(data, 5);
                if (vs->as.nchannels != 1 && vs->as.nchannels != 2) {
                    printf("Invalid audio channel coount %d\n",
                           read_u8(data, 5));
                    vnc_client_error(vs);
                    break;
                }
                vs->as.freq = read_u32(data, 6);
                break;
            default:
                printf ("Invalid audio message %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
                vnc_client_error(vs);
                break;
            }
            break;

        default:
            printf("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0));
            vnc_client_error(vs);
            break;
        }
        break;
    default:
        printf("Msg: %d\n", data[0]);
        vnc_client_error(vs);
        break;
    }

    vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
    return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-835'], 'message': 'ui/vnc: limit client_cut_text msg payload size

currently a malicious client could define a payload
size of 2^32 - 1 bytes and send up to that size of
data to the vnc server. The server would allocated
that amount of memory which could easily create an
out of memory condition.

This patch limits the payload size to 1MB max.

Please note that client_cut_text messages are currently
silently ignored.

Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>'