atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int __init htab_dt_scan_pftsize(unsigned long node,
				       const char *uname, int depth,
				       void *data)
{
	char *type = of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "device_type", NULL);
	u32 *prop;

	/* We are scanning "cpu" nodes only */
	if (type == NULL || strcmp(type, "cpu") != 0)
		return 0;

	prop = (u32 *)of_get_flat_dt_prop(node, "ibm,pft-size", NULL);
	if (prop != NULL) {
		/* pft_size[0] is the NUMA CEC cookie */
		ppc64_pft_size = prop[1];
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': '[POWERPC] Allow drivers to map individual 4k pages to userspace

Some drivers have resources that they want to be able to map into
userspace that are 4k in size.  On a kernel configured with 64k pages
we currently end up mapping the 4k we want plus another 60k of
physical address space, which could contain anything.  This can
introduce security problems, for example in the case of an infiniband
adaptor where the other 60k could contain registers that some other
program is using for its communications.

This patch adds a new function, remap_4k_pfn, which drivers can use to
map a single 4k page to userspace regardless of whether the kernel is
using a 4k or a 64k page size.  Like remap_pfn_range, it would
typically be called in a driver's mmap function.  It only maps a
single 4k page, which on a 64k page kernel appears replicated 16 times
throughout a 64k page.  On a 4k page kernel it reduces to a call to
remap_pfn_range.

The way this works on a 64k kernel is that a new bit, _PAGE_4K_PFN,
gets set on the linux PTE.  This alters the way that __hash_page_4K
computes the real address to put in the HPTE.  The RPN field of the
linux PTE becomes the 4k RPN directly rather than being interpreted as
a 64k RPN.  Since the RPN field is 32 bits, this means that physical
addresses being mapped with remap_4k_pfn have to be below 2^44,
i.e. 0x100000000000.

The patch also factors out the code in arch/powerpc/mm/hash_utils_64.c
that deals with demoting a process to use 4k pages into one function
that gets called in the various different places where we need to do
that.  There were some discrepancies between exactly what was done in
the various places, such as a call to spu_flush_all_slbs in one case
but not in others.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: ieee80211_rx_frame_mgmt(struct ieee80211_device *ieee, struct sk_buff *skb,
			struct ieee80211_rx_stats *rx_stats, u16 type,
			u16 stype)
{
	if (ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER) {
		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Master mode not yet suppported.\n",
		       ieee->dev->name);
		return 0;
/*
  hostap_update_sta_ps(ieee, (struct hostap_ieee80211_hdr_4addr *)
  skb->data);*/
	}

	if (ieee->hostapd && type == WLAN_FC_TYPE_MGMT) {
		if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON &&
		    ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER) {
			struct sk_buff *skb2;
			/* Process beacon frames also in kernel driver to
			 * update STA(AP) table statistics */
			skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
			if (skb2)
				hostap_rx(skb2->dev, skb2, rx_stats);
		}

		/* send management frames to the user space daemon for
		 * processing */
		ieee->apdevstats.rx_packets++;
		ieee->apdevstats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
		prism2_rx_80211(ieee->apdev, skb, rx_stats, PRISM2_RX_MGMT);
		return 0;
	}

	if (ieee->iw_mode == IW_MODE_MASTER) {
		if (type != WLAN_FC_TYPE_MGMT && type != WLAN_FC_TYPE_CTRL) {
			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: unknown management frame "
			       "(type=0x%02x, stype=0x%02x) dropped\n",
			       skb->dev->name, type, stype);
			return -1;
		}

		hostap_rx(skb->dev, skb, rx_stats);
		return 0;
	}

	printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: hostap_rx_frame_mgmt: management frame "
	       "received in non-Host AP mode\n", skb->dev->name);
	return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': '[IEEE80211]: avoid integer underflow for runt rx frames

Reported by Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>:

> The summary is that an evil 80211 frame can crash out a victim's
> machine. It only applies to drivers using the 80211 wireless code, and
> only then to certain drivers (and even then depends on a card's
> firmware not dropping a dubious packet). I must confess I'm not
> keeping track of Linux wireless support, and the different protocol
> stacks etc.
>
> Details are as follows:
>
> ieee80211_rx() does not explicitly check that "skb->len >= hdrlen".
> There are other skb->len checks, but not enough to prevent a subtle
> off-by-two error if the frame has the IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA flag
> set.
>
> This leads to integer underflow and crash here:
>
> if (frag != 0)
>    flen -= hdrlen;
>
> (flen is subsequently used as a memcpy length parameter).

How about this?

Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int ieee80211_read_qos_info_element(struct
					   ieee80211_qos_information_element
					   *element_info, struct ieee80211_info_element
					   *info_element)
{
	int ret = 0;
	u16 size = sizeof(struct ieee80211_qos_information_element) - 2;

	if (element_info == NULL)
		return -1;
	if (info_element == NULL)
		return -1;

	if ((info_element->id == QOS_ELEMENT_ID) && (info_element->len == size)) {
		memcpy(element_info->qui, info_element->data,
		       info_element->len);
		element_info->elementID = info_element->id;
		element_info->length = info_element->len;
	} else
		ret = -1;

	if (ret == 0)
		ret = ieee80211_verify_qos_info(element_info,
						QOS_OUI_INFO_SUB_TYPE);
	return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': '[IEEE80211]: avoid integer underflow for runt rx frames

Reported by Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>:

> The summary is that an evil 80211 frame can crash out a victim's
> machine. It only applies to drivers using the 80211 wireless code, and
> only then to certain drivers (and even then depends on a card's
> firmware not dropping a dubious packet). I must confess I'm not
> keeping track of Linux wireless support, and the different protocol
> stacks etc.
>
> Details are as follows:
>
> ieee80211_rx() does not explicitly check that "skb->len >= hdrlen".
> There are other skb->len checks, but not enough to prevent a subtle
> off-by-two error if the frame has the IEEE80211_STYPE_QOS_DATA flag
> set.
>
> This leads to integer underflow and crash here:
>
> if (frag != 0)
>    flen -= hdrlen;
>
> (flen is subsequently used as a memcpy length parameter).

How about this?

Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: isdn_net_new(char *name, struct net_device *master)
{
	isdn_net_dev *netdev;

	/* Avoid creating an existing interface */
	if (isdn_net_findif(name)) {
		printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: interface %s already exists\n", name);
		return NULL;
	}
	if (name == NULL)
		return NULL;
	if (!(netdev = kzalloc(sizeof(isdn_net_dev), GFP_KERNEL))) {
		printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: Could not allocate net-device\n");
		return NULL;
	}
	netdev->dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(isdn_net_local), name, _isdn_setup);
	if (!netdev->dev) {
		printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: Could not allocate network device\n");
		kfree(netdev);
		return NULL;
	}
	netdev->local = netdev->dev->priv;
	netdev->dev->init = isdn_net_init;
	if (master) {
		/* Device shall be a slave */
		struct net_device *p = (((isdn_net_local *) master->priv)->slave);
		struct net_device *q = master;

		netdev->local->master = master;
		/* Put device at end of slave-chain */
		while (p) {
			q = p;
			p = (((isdn_net_local *) p->priv)->slave);
		}
		((isdn_net_local *) q->priv)->slave = netdev->dev;
	} else {
		/* Device shall be a master */
		/*
		 * Watchdog timer (currently) for master only.
		 */
		netdev->dev->tx_timeout = isdn_net_tx_timeout;
		netdev->dev->watchdog_timeo = ISDN_NET_TX_TIMEOUT;
		if (register_netdev(netdev->dev) != 0) {
			printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net: Could not register net-device\n");
			free_netdev(netdev->dev);
			kfree(netdev);
			return NULL;
		}
	}
	netdev->queue = netdev->local;
	spin_lock_init(&netdev->queue_lock);

	netdev->local->netdev = netdev;

	INIT_WORK(&netdev->local->tqueue, isdn_net_softint);
	spin_lock_init(&netdev->local->xmit_lock);

	/* Put into to netdev-chain */
	netdev->next = (void *) dev->netdev;
	dev->netdev = netdev;
	return netdev->dev->name;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static __inline__ void isdn_net_inc_frame_cnt(isdn_net_local *lp)
{
	atomic_inc(&lp->frame_cnt);
	if (isdn_net_device_busy(lp))
		isdn_net_device_stop_queue(lp);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: isdn_net_reset(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
	struct concap_device_ops * dops =
		( (isdn_net_local *) dev->priv ) -> dops;
	struct concap_proto * cprot =
		( (isdn_net_local *) dev->priv ) -> netdev -> cprot;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_X25
	if( cprot && cprot -> pops && dops )
		cprot -> pops -> restart ( cprot, dev, dops );
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int isdn_header_cache(const struct neighbour *neigh, struct hh_cache *hh)
{
	const struct net_device *dev = neigh->dev;
	isdn_net_local *lp = dev->priv;

	if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_ETHER)
		return eth_header_cache(neigh, hh);
	return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: isdn_net_ciscohdlck_receive(isdn_net_local *lp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	unsigned char *p;
 	u8 addr;
 	u8 ctrl;
 	u16 type;
	
	if (skb->len < 4)
		goto out_free;

	p = skb->data;
	p += get_u8 (p, &addr);
	p += get_u8 (p, &ctrl);
	p += get_u16(p, &type);
	skb_pull(skb, 4);
	
	if (addr != CISCO_ADDR_UNICAST && addr != CISCO_ADDR_BROADCAST) {
		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown Cisco addr 0x%02x\n",
		       lp->netdev->dev->name, addr);
		goto out_free;
	}
	if (ctrl != CISCO_CTRL) {
		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Unknown Cisco ctrl 0x%02x\n",
		       lp->netdev->dev->name, ctrl);
		goto out_free;
	}

	switch (type) {
	case CISCO_TYPE_SLARP:
		isdn_net_ciscohdlck_slarp_in(lp, skb);
		goto out_free;
	case CISCO_TYPE_CDP:
		if (lp->cisco_debserint)
			printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Received CDP packet. use "
				"\"no cdp enable\" on cisco.\n",
				lp->netdev->dev->name);
		goto out_free;
	default:
		/* no special cisco protocol */
		skb->protocol = htons(type);
		netif_rx(skb);
		return;
	}

 out_free:
	kfree_skb(skb);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: isdn_net_force_dial_lp(isdn_net_local * lp)
{
	if ((!(lp->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED)) && !lp->dialstate) {
		int chi;
		if (lp->phone[1]) {
			ulong flags;

			/* Grab a free ISDN-Channel */
			spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
			if ((chi = isdn_get_free_channel(
					ISDN_USAGE_NET,
					lp->l2_proto,
					lp->l3_proto,
					lp->pre_device,
					lp->pre_channel,
					lp->msn)) < 0) {
				printk(KERN_WARNING "isdn_net_force_dial: No channel for %s\n",
					lp->netdev->dev->name);
				spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
				return -EAGAIN;
			}
			lp->dialstate = 1;
			/* Connect interface with channel */
			isdn_net_bind_channel(lp, chi);
#ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP
			if (lp->p_encap == ISDN_NET_ENCAP_SYNCPPP)
				if (isdn_ppp_bind(lp) < 0) {
					isdn_net_unbind_channel(lp);
					spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
					return -EAGAIN;
				}
#endif
			/* Initiate dialing */
			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
			isdn_net_dial();
			return 0;
		} else
			return -EINVAL;
	} else
		return -EBUSY;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'isdn: avoid copying overly-long strings

Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9416

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int esp6_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	int err;
	struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
	struct crypto_aead *aead;
	struct aead_givcrypt_request *req;
	struct scatterlist *sg;
	struct scatterlist *asg;
	struct sk_buff *trailer;
	void *tmp;
	int blksize;
	int clen;
	int alen;
	int nfrags;
	u8 *iv;
	u8 *tail;
	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;

	/* skb is pure payload to encrypt */
	err = -ENOMEM;

	/* Round to block size */
	clen = skb->len;

	aead = esp->aead;
	alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);

	blksize = ALIGN(crypto_aead_blocksize(aead), 4);
	clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
	if (esp->padlen)
		clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->padlen);

	if ((err = skb_cow_data(skb, clen - skb->len + alen, &trailer)) < 0)
		goto error;
	nfrags = err;

	tmp = esp_alloc_tmp(aead, nfrags + 1);
	if (!tmp)
		goto error;

	iv = esp_tmp_iv(aead, tmp);
	req = esp_tmp_givreq(aead, iv);
	asg = esp_givreq_sg(aead, req);
	sg = asg + 1;

	/* Fill padding... */
	tail = skb_tail_pointer(trailer);
	do {
		int i;
		for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
			tail[i] = i + 1;
	} while (0);
	tail[clen-skb->len - 2] = (clen - skb->len) - 2;
	tail[clen - skb->len - 1] = *skb_mac_header(skb);
	pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len + alen);

	skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(skb));
	esph = ip_esp_hdr(skb);
	*skb_mac_header(skb) = IPPROTO_ESP;

	esph->spi = x->id.spi;
	esph->seq_no = htonl(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);

	sg_init_table(sg, nfrags);
	skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg,
		     esph->enc_data + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead) - skb->data,
		     clen + alen);
	sg_init_one(asg, esph, sizeof(*esph));

	aead_givcrypt_set_callback(req, 0, esp_output_done, skb);
	aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, clen, iv);
	aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(req, asg, sizeof(*esph));
	aead_givcrypt_set_giv(req, esph->enc_data,
			      XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.output);

	ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp = tmp;
	err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
	if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
		goto error;

	if (err == -EBUSY)
		err = NET_XMIT_DROP;

	kfree(tmp);

error:
	return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-16'], 'message': '[ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access

ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack is fed with an skb where the first
fragment ends between the end of the esp header and the end of the IV.

This bug was found by Dirk Nehring <dnehring@gmx.net> .

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,
					     struct aead_request *req)
{
	return (void *)ALIGN((unsigned long)(req + 1) +
			     crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
			     __alignof__(struct scatterlist));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-16'], 'message': '[ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access

ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack is fed with an skb where the first
fragment ends between the end of the esp header and the end of the IV.

This bug was found by Dirk Nehring <dnehring@gmx.net> .

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
{
	struct iphdr *iph;
	struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
	struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
	struct crypto_aead *aead = esp->aead;
	int alen = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
	int hlen = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + crypto_aead_ivsize(aead);
	int elen = skb->len - hlen;
	int ihl;
	u8 nexthdr[2];
	int padlen;

	kfree(ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp);

	if (unlikely(err))
		goto out;

	if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
		BUG();

	err = -EINVAL;
	padlen = nexthdr[0];
	if (padlen + 2 + alen >= elen)
		goto out;

	/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */

	iph = ip_hdr(skb);
	ihl = iph->ihl * 4;

	if (x->encap) {
		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
		struct udphdr *uh = (void *)(skb_network_header(skb) + ihl);

		/*
		 * 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
		 *    advertize the change to the keying daemon.
		 *    This is an inbound SA, so just compare
		 *    SRC ports.
		 */
		if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
		    uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
			xfrm_address_t ipaddr;

			ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
			km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);

			/* XXX: perhaps add an extra
			 * policy check here, to see
			 * if we should allow or
			 * reject a packet from a
			 * different source
			 * address/port.
			 */
		}

		/*
		 * 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
		 *    of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
		 *    perform other post-processing fixes
		 *    as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
		 *    section 3.1.2
		 */
		if (x->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT)
			skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
	}

	pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
	__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
	skb_set_transport_header(skb, -ihl);

	err = nexthdr[1];

	/* RFC4303: Drop dummy packets without any error */
	if (err == IPPROTO_NONE)
		err = -EINVAL;

out:
	return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-16'], 'message': '[ESP]: Ensure IV is in linear part of the skb to avoid BUG() due to OOB access

ESP does not account for the IV size when calling pskb_may_pull() to
ensure everything it accesses directly is within the linear part of a
potential fragment. This results in a BUG() being triggered when the
both the IPv4 and IPv6 ESP stack is fed with an skb where the first
fragment ends between the end of the esp header and the end of the IV.

This bug was found by Dirk Nehring <dnehring@gmx.net> .

Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: isdn_lock_drivers(void)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < ISDN_MAX_DRIVERS; i++) {
		if (!dev->drv[i])
			continue;
		isdn_lock_driver(dev->drv[i]);
	}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'I4L: fix isdn_ioctl memory overrun vulnerability

Fix possible memory overrun issue in the isdn ioctl code.

Found by ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>

Signed-off-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Cc: ADLAB <adlab@venustech.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'