atharvapawar/part4_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: jio_snprintf(char * str, int n, const char * format, ...)
{
	va_list args;
	int result;

	Trc_SC_snprintf_Entry();

	va_start(args, format);
#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(WIN32_IBMC)
	result = _vsnprintf( str, n, format, args );
#else
	result = vsprintf( str, format, args );
#endif
	va_end(args);

	Trc_SC_snprintf_Exit(result);

	return result;

} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Clean up jio_snprintf and jio_vfprintf

Fixes https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=543659

Signed-off-by: Peter Bain <peter_bain@ca.ibm.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: _libssh2_channel_packet_data_len(LIBSSH2_CHANNEL * channel, int stream_id)
{
    LIBSSH2_SESSION *session = channel->session;
    LIBSSH2_PACKET *read_packet;
    uint32_t read_local_id;

    read_packet = _libssh2_list_first(&session->packets);
    if(read_packet == NULL)
        return 0;

    while(read_packet) {
        read_local_id = _libssh2_ntohu32(read_packet->data + 1);

        /*
         * Either we asked for a specific extended data stream
         * (and data was available),
         * or the standard stream (and data was available),
         * or the standard stream with extended_data_merge
         * enabled and data was available
         */
        if((stream_id
             && (read_packet->data[0] == SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
             && (channel->local.id == read_local_id)
             && (stream_id == (int) _libssh2_ntohu32(read_packet->data + 5)))
            ||
            (!stream_id
             && (read_packet->data[0] == SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)
             && (channel->local.id == read_local_id))
            ||
            (!stream_id
             && (read_packet->data[0] == SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)
             && (channel->local.id == read_local_id)
             && (channel->remote.extended_data_ignore_mode
                 == LIBSSH2_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA_MERGE))) {
            return (read_packet->data_len - read_packet->data_head);
        }
        read_packet = _libssh2_list_next(&read_packet->node);
    }

    return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'Security fixes (#315)

* Bounds checks

Fixes for CVEs
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3863.html
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3856.html

* Packet length bounds check

CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3855.html

* Response length check

CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html

* Bounds check

CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3857.html

* Bounds checking

CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html

and additional data validation

* Check bounds before reading into buffers

* Bounds checking

CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html

* declare SIZE_MAX and UINT_MAX if needed'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: g_socket_client_async_connect_data_free (GSocketClientAsyncConnectData *data)
{
  g_clear_object (&data->connectable);
  g_clear_object (&data->enumerator);
  g_clear_object (&data->proxy_addr);
  g_clear_object (&data->socket);
  g_clear_object (&data->connection);
  g_slist_free_full (data->connection_attempts, connection_attempt_unref);

  g_clear_error (&data->last_error);

  g_slice_free (GSocketClientAsyncConnectData, data);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-754'], 'message': 'gsocketclient: Fix criticals

This ensures the parent GTask is kept alive as long as an enumeration
is running and trying to connect.

Closes #1646
Closes #1649'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: UsbHubReadDesc (
  IN  USB_DEVICE              *HubDev,
  OUT EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR  *HubDesc
  )
{
  EFI_STATUS              Status;

  if (HubDev->Speed == EFI_USB_SPEED_SUPER) {
    //
    // Get the super speed hub descriptor
    //
    Status = UsbHubCtrlGetSuperSpeedHubDesc (HubDev, HubDesc);
  } else {

    //
    // First get the hub descriptor length
    //
    Status = UsbHubCtrlGetHubDesc (HubDev, HubDesc, 2);

    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
      return Status;
    }

    //
    // Get the whole hub descriptor
    //
    Status = UsbHubCtrlGetHubDesc (HubDev, HubDesc, HubDesc->Length);
  }

  return Status;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'MdeModulePkg UsbBusDxe: Fix wrong buffer length used to read hub desc

REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=973

HUB descriptor has variable length.
But the code uses stack (HubDesc in UsbHubInit) with fixed length
sizeof(EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR) to hold HUB descriptor data.
It uses hard code length value (32 that is greater than
sizeof(EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR)) for SuperSpeed path, then there will
be stack overflow when IOMMU is enabled because the Unmap operation
will copy the data from device buffer to host buffer.
And it uses HubDesc->Length for none SuperSpeed path, then there will
be stack overflow when HubDesc->Length is greater than
sizeof(EFI_USB_HUB_DESCRIPTOR).

The patch updates the code to use a big enough buffer to hold the
descriptor data.
The definition EFI_USB_SUPER_SPEED_HUB_DESCRIPTOR is wrong (HubDelay
field should be UINT16 type) and no code is using it, the patch
removes it.

Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <bret.barkelew@microsoft.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bret Barkelew <bret.barkelew@microsoft.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
{
	struct task_struct *task;
	int err;

	rcu_read_lock();
	if (!vpid)
		task = current;
	else
		task = find_task_by_vpid(vpid);
	if (task)
		get_task_struct(task);
	rcu_read_unlock();

	if (!task)
		return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);

	/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
	err = -EACCES;
	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
		goto errout;

	return task;
errout:
	put_task_struct(task);
	return ERR_PTR(err);

} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-667'], 'message': 'perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race

Jann reported that the ptrace_may_access() check in
find_lively_task_by_vpid() is racy against exec().

Specifically:

  perf_event_open()		execve()

  ptrace_may_access()
				commit_creds()
  ...				if (get_dumpable() != SUID_DUMP_USER)
				  perf_event_exit_task();
  perf_install_in_context()

would result in installing a counter across the creds boundary.

Fix this by wrapping lots of perf_event_open() in cred_guard_mutex.
This should be fine as perf_event_exit_task() is already called with
cred_guard_mutex held, so all perf locks already nest inside it.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void exif_process_CME (image_info_type *image_info, char *value, size_t length)
{
	if (length>3) {
		switch(value[2]) {
			case 0:
				exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, length, value);
				break;
			case 1:
				exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_STRING, length, value);
				break;
			default:
				php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Undefined JPEG2000 comment encoding");
				break;
		}
	} else {
		exif_iif_add_tag(image_info, SECTION_COMMENT, "Comment", TAG_COMPUTED_VALUE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, 0, NULL);
		php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "JPEG2000 comment section too small");
	}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #77831 - Heap-buffer-overflow in exif_iif_add_value in EXIF'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void setup_private_mount(const char *snap_name)
{
	uid_t uid = getuid();
	gid_t gid = getgid();
	char tmpdir[MAX_BUF] = { 0 };

	// Create a 0700 base directory, this is the base dir that is
	// protected from other users.
	//
	// Under that basedir, we put a 1777 /tmp dir that is then bind
	// mounted for the applications to use
	sc_must_snprintf(tmpdir, sizeof(tmpdir), "/tmp/snap.%s_XXXXXX", snap_name);
	if (mkdtemp(tmpdir) == NULL) {
		die("cannot create temporary directory essential for private /tmp");
	}
	// now we create a 1777 /tmp inside our private dir
	mode_t old_mask = umask(0);
	char *d = sc_strdup(tmpdir);
	sc_must_snprintf(tmpdir, sizeof(tmpdir), "%s/tmp", d);
	free(d);

	if (mkdir(tmpdir, 01777) != 0) {
		die("cannot create temporary directory for private /tmp");
	}
	umask(old_mask);

	// chdir to '/' since the mount won't apply to the current directory
	char *pwd = get_current_dir_name();
	if (pwd == NULL)
		die("cannot get current working directory");
	if (chdir("/") != 0)
		die("cannot change directory to '/'");

	// MS_BIND is there from linux 2.4
	sc_do_mount(tmpdir, "/tmp", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
	// MS_PRIVATE needs linux > 2.6.11
	sc_do_mount("none", "/tmp", NULL, MS_PRIVATE, NULL);
	// do the chown after the bind mount to avoid potential shenanigans
	if (chown("/tmp/", uid, gid) < 0) {
		die("cannot change ownership of /tmp");
	}
	// chdir to original directory
	if (chdir(pwd) != 0)
		die("cannot change current working directory to the original directory");
	free(pwd);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-59', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'cmd/snap-confine: chown private /tmp parent to root.root

When snap-confine creates a private /tmp directory for a given snap it
first creates a temporary directory in /tmp/ named after the snap, along
with a random name. Inside that directory it creates a /tmp directory
with permissions appropriate for a future /tmp, namely 1777.

Up until recently the that directory was owned by the user who first
invoked snap-confine. Since the directory is reused by all the users on
the system this logic makes no sense.

This patch changes the related logic so that the private /tmp directory
is owned by root, just like the real one.

Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: con_insert_unipair(struct uni_pagedir *p, u_short unicode, u_short fontpos)
{
	int i, n;
	u16 **p1, *p2;

	p1 = p->uni_pgdir[n = unicode >> 11];
	if (!p1) {
		p1 = p->uni_pgdir[n] = kmalloc_array(32, sizeof(u16 *),
						     GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!p1) return -ENOMEM;
		for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
			p1[i] = NULL;
	}

	p2 = p1[n = (unicode >> 6) & 0x1f];
	if (!p2) {
		p2 = p1[n] = kmalloc_array(64, sizeof(u16), GFP_KERNEL);
		if (!p2) return -ENOMEM;
		memset(p2, 0xff, 64*sizeof(u16)); /* No glyphs for the characters (yet) */
	}

	p2[unicode & 0x3f] = fontpos;
	
	p->sum += (fontpos << 20) + unicode;

	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-401'], 'message': 'consolemap: Fix a memory leaking bug in drivers/tty/vt/consolemap.c

In function con_insert_unipair(), when allocation for p2 and p1[n]
fails, ENOMEM is returned, but previously allocated p1 is not freed,
remains as leaking memory. Thus we should free p1 as well when this
allocation fails.

Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: const char *get_icalcomponent_errstr(icalcomponent *ical)
{
    icalcomponent *comp;

    for (comp = icalcomponent_get_first_component(ical, ICAL_ANY_COMPONENT);
	 comp;
	 comp = icalcomponent_get_next_component(ical, ICAL_ANY_COMPONENT)) {
	icalproperty *prop;

	for (prop = icalcomponent_get_first_property(comp, ICAL_ANY_PROPERTY);
	     prop;
	     prop = icalcomponent_get_next_property(comp, ICAL_ANY_PROPERTY)) {

	    if (icalproperty_isa(prop) == ICAL_XLICERROR_PROPERTY) {
		icalparameter *param;
		const char *errstr = icalproperty_get_xlicerror(prop);

		if (!errstr) return "Unknown iCal parsing error";

		param = icalproperty_get_first_parameter(
		    prop, ICAL_XLICERRORTYPE_PARAMETER);

		if (icalparameter_get_xlicerrortype(param) ==
		    ICAL_XLICERRORTYPE_VALUEPARSEERROR) {
		    /* Check if this is an empty property error */
		    char propname[256];
		    if (sscanf(errstr,
			       "No value for %s property", propname) == 1) {
			/* Empty LOCATION is OK */
			if (!strcasecmp(propname, "LOCATION")) continue;
			if (!strcasecmp(propname, "COMMENT")) continue;
			if (!strcasecmp(propname, "DESCRIPTION")) continue;
		    }
		}
	    }
	}
    }

    return NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'HTTP: don't overrun buffer when parsing strings with sscanf()'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static bool tcp_collapse_retrans(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
	struct sk_buff *next_skb = skb_rb_next(skb);
	int next_skb_size;

	next_skb_size = next_skb->len;

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) != 1 || tcp_skb_pcount(next_skb) != 1);

	if (next_skb_size) {
		if (next_skb_size <= skb_availroom(skb))
			skb_copy_bits(next_skb, 0, skb_put(skb, next_skb_size),
				      next_skb_size);
		else if (!skb_shift(skb, next_skb, next_skb_size))
			return false;
	}
	tcp_highest_sack_replace(sk, next_skb, skb);

	/* Update sequence range on original skb. */
	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(next_skb)->end_seq;

	/* Merge over control information. This moves PSH/FIN etc. over */
	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags |= TCP_SKB_CB(next_skb)->tcp_flags;

	/* All done, get rid of second SKB and account for it so
	 * packet counting does not break.
	 */
	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked |= TCP_SKB_CB(next_skb)->sacked & TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS;
	TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = TCP_SKB_CB(next_skb)->eor;

	/* changed transmit queue under us so clear hints */
	tcp_clear_retrans_hints_partial(tp);
	if (next_skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)
		tp->retransmit_skb_hint = skb;

	tcp_adjust_pcount(sk, next_skb, tcp_skb_pcount(next_skb));

	tcp_skb_collapse_tstamp(skb, next_skb);

	tcp_rtx_queue_unlink_and_free(next_skb, sk);
	return true;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-190'], 'message': 'tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs

Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :

	BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);

This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48

An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.

This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.

Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.

CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs

Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromXbm(FILE * fd)
{
	char fline[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE];
	char iname[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE];
	char *type;
	int value;
	unsigned int width = 0, height = 0;
	int fail = 0;
	int max_bit = 0;

	gdImagePtr im;
	int bytes = 0, i;
	int bit, x = 0, y = 0;
	int ch;
	char h[8];
	unsigned int b;

	rewind(fd);
	while (fgets(fline, MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE, fd)) {
		fline[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE-1] = '\0';
		if (strlen(fline) == MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE-1) {
			return 0;
		}
		if (sscanf(fline, "#define %s %d", iname, &value) == 2) {
			if (!(type = strrchr(iname, '_'))) {
				type = iname;
			} else {
				type++;
			}

			if (!strcmp("width", type)) {
				width = (unsigned int) value;
			}
			if (!strcmp("height", type)) {
				height = (unsigned int) value;
			}
		} else {
			if ( sscanf(fline, "static unsigned char %s = {", iname) == 1
			  || sscanf(fline, "static char %s = {", iname) == 1)
			{
				max_bit = 128;
			} else if (sscanf(fline, "static unsigned short %s = {", iname) == 1
					|| sscanf(fline, "static short %s = {", iname) == 1)
			{
				max_bit = 32768;
			}
			if (max_bit) {
				bytes = (width + 7) / 8 * height;
				if (!bytes) {
					return 0;
				}
				if (!(type = strrchr(iname, '_'))) {
					type = iname;
				} else {
					type++;
				}
				if (!strcmp("bits[]", type)) {
					break;
				}
			}
 		}
	}
	if (!bytes || !max_bit) {
		return 0;
	}

	if(!(im = gdImageCreate(width, height))) {
		return 0;
	}
	gdImageColorAllocate(im, 255, 255, 255);
	gdImageColorAllocate(im, 0, 0, 0);
	h[2] = '\0';
	h[4] = '\0';
	for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) {
		while (1) {
			if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) {
				fail = 1;
				break;
			}
			if (ch == 'x') {
				break;
			}
		}
		if (fail) {
			break;
		}
		/* Get hex value */
		if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) {
			break;
		}
		h[0] = ch;
		if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) {
			break;
		}
		h[1] = ch;
		if (max_bit == 32768) {
			if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) {
				break;
			}
			h[2] = ch;
			if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) {
				break;
			}
			h[3] = ch;
		}
		sscanf(h, "%x", &b);
		for (bit = 1; bit <= max_bit; bit = bit << 1) {
			gdImageSetPixel(im, x++, y, (b & bit) ? 1 : 0);
			if (x == im->sx) {
				x = 0;
				y++;
				if (y == im->sy) {
					return im;
				}
				break;
			}
		}
	}

	php_gd_error("EOF before image was complete");
	gdImageDestroy(im);
	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-908'], 'message': 'Fix #77973: Uninitialized read in gdImageCreateFromXbm

We have to ensure that `sscanf()` does indeed read a hex value here,
and bail out otherwise.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: char *url_decode_r(char *to, char *url, size_t size) {
    char *s = url,           // source
         *d = to,            // destination
         *e = &to[size - 1]; // destination end

    while(*s && d < e) {
        if(unlikely(*s == '%')) {
            if(likely(s[1] && s[2])) {
                *d++ = from_hex(s[1]) << 4 | from_hex(s[2]);
                s += 2;
            }
        }
        else if(unlikely(*s == '+'))
            *d++ = ' ';

        else
            *d++ = *s;

        s++;
    }

    *d = '\0';

    return to;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-113', 'CWE-200', 'CWE-94', 'CWE-74'], 'message': 'fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: uint64_t hllCount(struct hllhdr *hdr, int *invalid) {
    double m = HLL_REGISTERS;
    double E;
    int j;
    int reghisto[HLL_Q+2] = {0};

    /* Compute register histogram */
    if (hdr->encoding == HLL_DENSE) {
        hllDenseRegHisto(hdr->registers,reghisto);
    } else if (hdr->encoding == HLL_SPARSE) {
        hllSparseRegHisto(hdr->registers,
                         sdslen((sds)hdr)-HLL_HDR_SIZE,invalid,reghisto);
    } else if (hdr->encoding == HLL_RAW) {
        hllRawRegHisto(hdr->registers,reghisto);
    } else {
        serverPanic("Unknown HyperLogLog encoding in hllCount()");
    }

    /* Estimate cardinality form register histogram. See:
     * "New cardinality estimation algorithms for HyperLogLog sketches"
     * Otmar Ertl, arXiv:1702.01284 */
    double z = m * hllTau((m-reghisto[HLL_Q+1])/(double)m);
    for (j = HLL_Q; j >= 1; --j) {
        z += reghisto[j];
        z *= 0.5;
    }
    z += m * hllSigma(reghisto[0]/(double)m);
    E = llroundl(HLL_ALPHA_INF*m*m/z);

    return (uint64_t) E;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'HyperLogLog: enlarge reghisto variable for safety.'