Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
{
    const char *field_ptr = header_start;
    const char *header_end = header_start + hdrLen; // XXX: remove
    int warnOnError = (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser <= 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 2);

    PROF_start(HttpHeaderParse);

    assert(header_start && header_end);
    debugs(55, 7, "parsing hdr: (" << this << ")" << std::endl << getStringPrefix(header_start, hdrLen));
    ++ HttpHeaderStats[owner].parsedCount;

    char *nulpos;
    if ((nulpos = (char*)memchr(header_start, '\0', hdrLen))) {
        debugs(55, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: HTTP header contains NULL characters {" <<
               getStringPrefix(header_start, nulpos-header_start) << "}\nNULL\n{" << getStringPrefix(nulpos+1, hdrLen-(nulpos-header_start)-1));
        PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
        clean();
        return 0;
    }

    Http::ContentLengthInterpreter clen(warnOnError);
    /* common format headers are "<name>:[ws]<value>" lines delimited by <CRLF>.
     * continuation lines start with a (single) space or tab */
    while (field_ptr < header_end) {
        const char *field_start = field_ptr;
        const char *field_end;

        do {
            const char *this_line = field_ptr;
            field_ptr = (const char *)memchr(field_ptr, '\n', header_end - field_ptr);

            if (!field_ptr) {
                // missing <LF>
                PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                clean();
                return 0;
            }

            field_end = field_ptr;

            ++field_ptr;    /* Move to next line */

            if (field_end > this_line && field_end[-1] == '\r') {
                --field_end;    /* Ignore CR LF */

                if (owner == hoRequest && field_end > this_line) {
                    bool cr_only = true;
                    for (const char *p = this_line; p < field_end && cr_only; ++p) {
                        if (*p != '\r')
                            cr_only = false;
                    }
                    if (cr_only) {
                        debugs(55, DBG_IMPORTANT, "SECURITY WARNING: Rejecting HTTP request with a CR+ "
                               "header field to prevent request smuggling attacks: {" <<
                               getStringPrefix(header_start, hdrLen) << "}");
                        PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                        clean();
                        return 0;
                    }
                }
            }

            /* Barf on stray CR characters */
            if (memchr(this_line, '\r', field_end - this_line)) {
                debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: suspicious CR characters in HTTP header {" <<
                       getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "}");

                if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser) {
                    char *p = (char *) this_line;   /* XXX Warning! This destroys original header content and violates specifications somewhat */

                    while ((p = (char *)memchr(p, '\r', field_end - p)) != NULL) {
                        *p = ' ';
                        ++p;
                    }
                } else {
                    PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                    clean();
                    return 0;
                }
            }

            if (this_line + 1 == field_end && this_line > field_start) {
                debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: Blank continuation line in HTTP header {" <<
                       getStringPrefix(header_start, hdrLen) << "}");
                PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                clean();
                return 0;
            }
        } while (field_ptr < header_end && (*field_ptr == ' ' || *field_ptr == '\t'));

        if (field_start == field_end) {
            if (field_ptr < header_end) {
                debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: unparseable HTTP header field near {" <<
                       getStringPrefix(field_start, hdrLen-(field_start-header_start)) << "}");
                PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                clean();
                return 0;
            }

            break;      /* terminating blank line */
        }

        const auto e = HttpHeaderEntry::parse(field_start, field_end, owner);
        if (!e) {
            debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: unparseable HTTP header field {" <<
                   getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "}");
            debugs(55, warnOnError, " in {" << getStringPrefix(header_start, hdrLen) << "}");

            PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
            clean();
            return 0;
        }

        if (e->id == Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH && !clen.checkField(e->value)) {
            delete e;

            if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser)
                continue; // clen has printed any necessary warnings

            PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
            clean();
            return 0;
        }

        if (e->id == Http::HdrType::OTHER && stringHasWhitespace(e->name.termedBuf())) {
            debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: found whitespace in HTTP header name {" <<
                   getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "}");

            if (!Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser) {
                delete e;
                PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
                clean();
                return 0;
            }
        }

        addEntry(e);
    }

    if (clen.headerWideProblem) {
        debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: " << clen.headerWideProblem <<
               " Content-Length field values in" <<
               Raw("header", header_start, hdrLen));
    }

    if (chunked()) {
        // RFC 2616 section 4.4: ignore Content-Length with Transfer-Encoding
        // RFC 7230 section 3.3.3 #3: Transfer-Encoding overwrites Content-Length
        delById(Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH);
        // and clen state becomes irrelevant
    } else if (clen.sawBad) {
        // ensure our callers do not accidentally see bad Content-Length values
        delById(Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH);
        conflictingContentLength_ = true; // TODO: Rename to badContentLength_.
    } else if (clen.needsSanitizing) {
        // RFC 7230 section 3.3.2: MUST either reject or ... [sanitize];
        // ensure our callers see a clean Content-Length value or none at all
        delById(Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH);
        if (clen.sawGood) {
            putInt64(Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH, clen.value);
            debugs(55, 5, "sanitized Content-Length to be " << clen.value);
        }
    }

    PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
    return 1;           /* even if no fields where found, it is a valid header */
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-444'], 'message': 'Enforce token characters for field-name  (#700)

RFC 7230 defines field-name as a token. Request splitting and cache
poisoning attacks have used non-token characters to fool broken HTTP
agents behind or in front of Squid for years. This change should
significantly reduce that abuse.

If we discover exceptional situations that need special treatment, the
relaxed parser can allow them on a case-by-case basis (while being extra
careful about framing-related header fields), just like we already
tolerate some header whitespace (e.g., between the response header
field-name and colon).'