Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: setkey_principal3_2_svc(setkey3_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
    static generic_ret              ret;
    char                            *prime_arg;
    gss_buffer_desc                 client_name,
        service_name;
    OM_uint32                       minor_stat;
    kadm5_server_handle_t           handle;
    const char                      *errmsg = NULL;

    xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);

    if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
        goto exit_func;

    ret.api_version = handle->api_version;

    if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
        ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
        goto exit_func;
    }
    if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
        ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
        goto exit_func;
    }

    if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
        kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
                           ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
        ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal_3((void *)handle, arg->princ,
                                            arg->keepold,
                                            arg->n_ks_tuple,
                                            arg->ks_tuple,
                                            arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
    } else {
        log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
                   &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
        ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
    }

    if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
        if( ret.code != 0 )
            errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);

        log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
                 &client_name, &service_name, rqstp);

        if (errmsg != NULL)
            krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
    }

    free(prime_arg);
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
    gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
    free_server_handle(handle);
    return &ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-772', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]

In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler.  Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails.  Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails.  Discovered by Simo Sorce.

CVE-2015-8631:

In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one.  Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup'