atharvapawar/part1_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: horAcc8(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
	tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;

	unsigned char* cp = (unsigned char*) cp0;
	assert((cc%stride)==0);
	if (cc > stride) {
		/*
		 * Pipeline the most common cases.
		 */
		if (stride == 3)  {
			unsigned int cr = cp[0];
			unsigned int cg = cp[1];
			unsigned int cb = cp[2];
			cc -= 3;
			cp += 3;
			while (cc>0) {
				cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
				cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
				cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
				cc -= 3;
				cp += 3;
			}
		} else if (stride == 4)  {
			unsigned int cr = cp[0];
			unsigned int cg = cp[1];
			unsigned int cb = cp[2];
			unsigned int ca = cp[3];
			cc -= 4;
			cp += 4;
			while (cc>0) {
				cp[0] = (unsigned char) ((cr += cp[0]) & 0xff);
				cp[1] = (unsigned char) ((cg += cp[1]) & 0xff);
				cp[2] = (unsigned char) ((cb += cp[2]) & 0xff);
				cp[3] = (unsigned char) ((ca += cp[3]) & 0xff);
				cc -= 4;
				cp += 4;
			}
		} else  {
			cc -= stride;
			do {
				REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
					(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + *cp) & 0xff); cp++)
				cc -= stride;
			} while (cc>0);
		}
	}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': '* libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet	& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
	uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
	tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;

        TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
	horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-787'], 'message': '* libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet	& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int readContigStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf)
{
        uint8* bufp = buf;
        int32  bytes_read = 0;
        uint16 strip, nstrips   = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
        uint32 stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
        uint32 rows = 0;
        uint32 rps = TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
        tsize_t scanline_size = TIFFScanlineSize(in);

        if (scanline_size == 0) {
                TIFFError("", "TIFF scanline size is zero!");    
                return 0;
        }

        for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips; strip++) {
                bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, bufp, -1);
                rows = bytes_read / scanline_size;
                if ((strip < (nstrips - 1)) && (bytes_read != (int32)stripsize))
                        TIFFError("", "Strip %d: read %lu bytes, strip size %lu",
                                  (int)strip + 1, (unsigned long) bytes_read,
                                  (unsigned long)stripsize);

                if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore) {
                        TIFFError("", "Error reading strip %lu after %lu rows",
                                  (unsigned long) strip, (unsigned long)rows);
                        return 0;
                }
                bufp += bytes_read;
        }

        return 1;
} /* end readContigStripsIntoBuffer */ ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-190'], 'message': '* tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
	{
	EC_EXTRA_DATA *d;

	if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
		return 0;
		}
	if (dest->meth != src->meth)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
		return 0;
		}
	if (dest == src)
		return 1;
	
	EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->extra_data);

	for (d = src->extra_data; d != NULL; d = d->next)
		{
		void *t = d->dup_func(d->data);
		
		if (t == NULL)
			return 0;
		if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&dest->extra_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func, d->clear_free_func))
			return 0;
		}

	if (src->generator != NULL)
		{
		if (dest->generator == NULL)
			{
			dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest);
			if (dest->generator == NULL) return 0;
			}
		if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator)) return 0;
		}
	else
		{
		/* src->generator == NULL */
		if (dest->generator != NULL)
			{
			EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator);
			dest->generator = NULL;
			}
		}

	if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order)) return 0;
	if (!BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor)) return 0;

	dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
	dest->asn1_flag  = src->asn1_flag;
	dest->asn1_form  = src->asn1_form;

	if (src->seed)
		{
		if (dest->seed)
			OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
		dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len);
		if (dest->seed == NULL)
			return 0;
		if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len))
			return 0;
		dest->seed_len = src->seed_len;
		}
	else
		{
		if (dest->seed)
			OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
		dest->seed = NULL;
		dest->seed_len = 0;
		}
	

	return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src);
	} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-320'], 'message': 'Reserve option to use BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime in ECDSA.

Submitted by Shay Gueron, Intel Corp.
RT: 3149

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f54be179aa4cbbd944728771d7d59ed588158a12)'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
    DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
    const BIGNUM *pub_key;
    EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;

    skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
    if (skey == NULL) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return 0;
    }
    ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
    dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);

    if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
        return 0;
    }

    /* send off the data */
    DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
    *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
    s2n(*len, *p);
    BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
    *len += 2;
    EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);

    return 1;
#else
    SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
    return 0;
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: OJPEGDecode(TIFF* tif, uint8* buf, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
{
	OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
	(void)s;
	if (sp->libjpeg_jpeg_query_style==0)
	{
		if (OJPEGDecodeRaw(tif,buf,cc)==0)
			return(0);
	}
	else
	{
		if (OJPEGDecodeScanlines(tif,buf,cc)==0)
			return(0);
	}
	return(1);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-369'], 'message': '* libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedRationalArray(TIFF* tif, uint32* ndir, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 tag, uint32 count, float* value)
{
	static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedRationalArray";
	uint32* m;
	float* na;
	uint32* nb;
	uint32 nc;
	int o;
	assert(sizeof(uint32)==4);
	m=_TIFFmalloc(count*2*sizeof(uint32));
	if (m==NULL)
	{
		TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Out of memory");
		return(0);
	}
	for (na=value, nb=m, nc=0; nc<count; na++, nb+=2, nc++)
	{
		if (*na<=0.0)
		{
			nb[0]=0;
			nb[1]=1;
		}
		else if (*na==(float)(uint32)(*na))
		{
			nb[0]=(uint32)(*na);
			nb[1]=1;
		}
		else if (*na<1.0)
		{
			nb[0]=(uint32)((double)(*na)*0xFFFFFFFF);
			nb[1]=0xFFFFFFFF;
		}
		else
		{
			nb[0]=0xFFFFFFFF;
			nb[1]=(uint32)((double)0xFFFFFFFF/(*na));
		}
	}
	if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
		TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(m,count*2);
	o=TIFFWriteDirectoryTagData(tif,ndir,dir,tag,TIFF_RATIONAL,count,count*8,&m[0]);
	_TIFFfree(m);
	return(o);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': '* libtiff/tif_dir.c, tif_dirread.c, tif_dirwrite.c: implement various clampings
of double to other data types to avoid undefined behaviour if the output range
isn't big enough to hold the input value.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2643
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2642
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2646
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2647'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void endElementHandler(void *userData, const char *name)
{
    userdata_t *ud = (userdata_t *) userData;

    if (strcmp(name, "graph") == 0) {
	pop_subg();
	popString(&ud->elements);
	ud->closedElementType = TAG_GRAPH;
    } else if (strcmp(name, "node") == 0) {
	char *ele_name = topString(ud->elements);
	if (ud->closedElementType == TAG_GRAPH) {
	    Agnode_t *node = agnode(root, ele_name, 0);
	    agdelete(root, node);
	}
	popString(&ud->elements);
	Current_class = TAG_GRAPH;
	N = 0;
	ud->closedElementType = TAG_NODE;
    } else if (strcmp(name, "edge") == 0) {
	Current_class = TAG_GRAPH;
	E = 0;
	ud->closedElementType = TAG_EDGE;
	ud->edgeinverted = FALSE;
    } else if (strcmp(name, "attr") == 0) {
	char *name;
	char *value;
	char buf[SMALLBUF] = GRAPHML_COMP;
	char *dynbuf = 0;

	ud->closedElementType = TAG_NONE;
	if (ud->compositeReadState) {
	    int len = sizeof(GRAPHML_COMP) + agxblen(&ud->xml_attr_name);
	    if (len <= SMALLBUF) {
		name = buf;
	    } else {
		name = dynbuf = N_NEW(len, char);
		strcpy(name, GRAPHML_COMP);
	    }
	    strcpy(name + sizeof(GRAPHML_COMP) - 1,
		   agxbuse(&ud->xml_attr_name));
	    value = agxbuse(&ud->composite_buffer);
	    agxbclear(&ud->xml_attr_value);
	    ud->compositeReadState = FALSE;
	} else {
	    name = agxbuse(&ud->xml_attr_name);
	    value = agxbuse(&ud->xml_attr_value);
	}

	switch (ud->globalAttrType) {
	case TAG_NONE:
	    setAttr(name, value, ud);
	    break;
	case TAG_NODE:
	    setGlobalNodeAttr(G, name, value, ud);
	    break;
	case TAG_EDGE:
	    setGlobalEdgeAttr(G, name, value, ud);
	    break;
	case TAG_GRAPH:
	    setGraphAttr(G, name, value, ud);
	    break;
	}
	if (dynbuf)
	    free(dynbuf);
	ud->globalAttrType = TAG_NONE;
    } 
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'attempted fix for null pointer deference on malformed input'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
                                          CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
    CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri;
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey;
    unsigned char *ek = NULL;
    size_t eklen;
    int ret = 0;
    CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
    ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;

    if (ktri->pkey == NULL) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY);
        return 0;
    }

    ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
    if (!ktri->pctx)
        return 0;

    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0)
        goto err;

    if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
        goto err;

    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ktri->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
                          EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR);
        goto err;
    }

    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen,
                         ktri->encryptedKey->data,
                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0)
        goto err;

    ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen);

    if (ek == NULL) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
        goto err;
    }

    if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen,
                         ktri->encryptedKey->data,
                         ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) {
        CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
        goto err;
    }

    ret = 1;

    if (ec->key) {
        OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
        OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
    }

    ec->key = ek;
    ec->keylen = eklen;

 err:
    if (ktri->pctx) {
        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx);
        ktri->pctx = NULL;
    }
    if (!ret && ek)
        OPENSSL_free(ek);

    return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-327'], 'message': 'Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey

An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.

As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.

The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)

(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void Context::onDone() {
  if (wasm_->onDone_) {
    wasm_->onDone_(this, id_);
  }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': '1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)

* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Update as per offline discussion.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Add guards to other network calls.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Fix common/wasm tests.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Patch tests.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: void Context::onLog() {
  if (wasm_->onLog_) {
    wasm_->onLog_(this, id_);
  }
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': '1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)

* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Update as per offline discussion.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Add guards to other network calls.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Fix common/wasm tests.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Patch tests.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>

* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.

Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <jplevyak@gmail.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: rpa_read_buffer(pool_t pool, const unsigned char **data,
		const unsigned char *end, unsigned char **buffer)
{
	const unsigned char *p = *data;
	unsigned int len;

	if (p > end)
		return 0;

	len = *p++;
	if (p + len > end)
		return 0;

	*buffer = p_malloc(pool, len);
	memcpy(*buffer, p, len);

	*data += 1 + len;

	return len;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-125'], 'message': 'auth: mech-rpa - Fail on zero len buffer'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int setup_tests(void)
{
    ADD_ALL_TESTS(call_run_cert, OSSL_NELEM(name_fns));
    return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Add a test for GENERAL_NAME_cmp

Based on a boringssl test contributed by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int LibuvStreamWrap::DoWrite(WriteWrap* req_wrap,
                             uv_buf_t* bufs,
                             size_t count,
                             uv_stream_t* send_handle) {
  LibuvWriteWrap* w = static_cast<LibuvWriteWrap*>(req_wrap);
  int r;
  if (send_handle == nullptr) {
    r = w->Dispatch(uv_write, stream(), bufs, count, AfterUvWrite);
  } else {
    r = w->Dispatch(uv_write2,
                    stream(),
                    bufs,
                    count,
                    send_handle,
                    AfterUvWrite);
  }

  if (!r) {
    size_t bytes = 0;
    for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++)
      bytes += bufs[i].len;
    if (stream()->type == UV_TCP) {
      NODE_COUNT_NET_BYTES_SENT(bytes);
    } else if (stream()->type == UV_NAMED_PIPE) {
      NODE_COUNT_PIPE_BYTES_SENT(bytes);
    }
  }

  return r;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'src: use unique_ptr for WriteWrap

This commit attempts to avoid a use-after-free error by using unqiue_ptr
and passing a reference to it.

CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/238
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <midawson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <tniessen@tnie.de>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <rlau@redhat.com>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
    unsigned long ret = 0;
    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
    unsigned char md[16];
    char *f;

    if (ctx == NULL)
        goto err;
    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
        goto err;
    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
        goto err;
    OPENSSL_free(f);
    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
        (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
         (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
        goto err;
    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
        goto err;
    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
        ) & 0xffffffffL;
 err:
    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
    return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fix Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()

The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.

The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.

CVE-2021-23841

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void save_key_to(const char *algo, const char *name, const char *keydata)
{
	const char *error;
	struct dict_transaction_context *ctx =
		dict_transaction_begin(keys_dict);
	algo = t_str_ucase(algo);
	dict_set(ctx, t_strconcat(DICT_PATH_SHARED, "default/", algo, "/",
				  name, NULL),
		 keydata);
	if (dict_transaction_commit(&ctx, &error) < 0)
		i_error("dict_set(%s) failed: %s", name, error);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-22'], 'message': 'lib-oauth2: Ensure azp is escaped too'