Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int processMultibulkBuffer(client *c) {
    char *newline = NULL;
    int ok;
    long long ll;

    if (c->multibulklen == 0) {
        /* The client should have been reset */
        serverAssertWithInfo(c,NULL,c->argc == 0);

        /* Multi bulk length cannot be read without a \r\n */
        newline = strchr(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos,'\r');
        if (newline == NULL) {
            if (sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos > PROTO_INLINE_MAX_SIZE) {
                addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: too big mbulk count string");
                setProtocolError("too big mbulk count string",c);
            }
            return C_ERR;
        }

        /* Buffer should also contain \n */
        if (newline-(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos) > (ssize_t)(sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos-2))
            return C_ERR;

        /* We know for sure there is a whole line since newline != NULL,
         * so go ahead and find out the multi bulk length. */
        serverAssertWithInfo(c,NULL,c->querybuf[c->qb_pos] == '*');
        ok = string2ll(c->querybuf+1+c->qb_pos,newline-(c->querybuf+1+c->qb_pos),&ll);
        if (!ok || ll > 1024*1024) {
            addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid multibulk length");
            setProtocolError("invalid mbulk count",c);
            return C_ERR;
        }

        c->qb_pos = (newline-c->querybuf)+2;

        if (ll <= 0) return C_OK;

        c->multibulklen = ll;

        /* Setup argv array on client structure */
        if (c->argv) zfree(c->argv);
        c->argv = zmalloc(sizeof(robj*)*c->multibulklen);
        c->argv_len_sum = 0;
    }

    serverAssertWithInfo(c,NULL,c->multibulklen > 0);
    while(c->multibulklen) {
        /* Read bulk length if unknown */
        if (c->bulklen == -1) {
            newline = strchr(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos,'\r');
            if (newline == NULL) {
                if (sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos > PROTO_INLINE_MAX_SIZE) {
                    addReplyError(c,
                        "Protocol error: too big bulk count string");
                    setProtocolError("too big bulk count string",c);
                    return C_ERR;
                }
                break;
            }

            /* Buffer should also contain \n */
            if (newline-(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos) > (ssize_t)(sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos-2))
                break;

            if (c->querybuf[c->qb_pos] != '$') {
                addReplyErrorFormat(c,
                    "Protocol error: expected '$', got '%c'",
                    c->querybuf[c->qb_pos]);
                setProtocolError("expected $ but got something else",c);
                return C_ERR;
            }

            ok = string2ll(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos+1,newline-(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos+1),&ll);
            if (!ok || ll < 0 ||
                (!(c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER) && ll > server.proto_max_bulk_len)) {
                addReplyError(c,"Protocol error: invalid bulk length");
                setProtocolError("invalid bulk length",c);
                return C_ERR;
            }

            c->qb_pos = newline-c->querybuf+2;
            if (ll >= PROTO_MBULK_BIG_ARG) {
                /* If we are going to read a large object from network
                 * try to make it likely that it will start at c->querybuf
                 * boundary so that we can optimize object creation
                 * avoiding a large copy of data.
                 *
                 * But only when the data we have not parsed is less than
                 * or equal to ll+2. If the data length is greater than
                 * ll+2, trimming querybuf is just a waste of time, because
                 * at this time the querybuf contains not only our bulk. */
                if (sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos <= (size_t)ll+2) {
                    sdsrange(c->querybuf,c->qb_pos,-1);
                    c->qb_pos = 0;
                    /* Hint the sds library about the amount of bytes this string is
                     * going to contain. */
                    c->querybuf = sdsMakeRoomFor(c->querybuf,ll+2-sdslen(c->querybuf));
                }
            }
            c->bulklen = ll;
        }

        /* Read bulk argument */
        if (sdslen(c->querybuf)-c->qb_pos < (size_t)(c->bulklen+2)) {
            /* Not enough data (+2 == trailing \r\n) */
            break;
        } else {
            /* Optimization: if the buffer contains JUST our bulk element
             * instead of creating a new object by *copying* the sds we
             * just use the current sds string. */
            if (c->qb_pos == 0 &&
                c->bulklen >= PROTO_MBULK_BIG_ARG &&
                sdslen(c->querybuf) == (size_t)(c->bulklen+2))
            {
                c->argv[c->argc++] = createObject(OBJ_STRING,c->querybuf);
                c->argv_len_sum += c->bulklen;
                sdsIncrLen(c->querybuf,-2); /* remove CRLF */
                /* Assume that if we saw a fat argument we'll see another one
                 * likely... */
                c->querybuf = sdsnewlen(SDS_NOINIT,c->bulklen+2);
                sdsclear(c->querybuf);
            } else {
                c->argv[c->argc++] =
                    createStringObject(c->querybuf+c->qb_pos,c->bulklen);
                c->argv_len_sum += c->bulklen;
                c->qb_pos += c->bulklen+2;
            }
            c->bulklen = -1;
            c->multibulklen--;
        }
    }

    /* We're done when c->multibulk == 0 */
    if (c->multibulklen == 0) return C_OK;

    /* Still not ready to process the command */
    return C_ERR;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-770'], 'message': 'Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)

This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)'