atharvapawar/part1_dataSorted_Diversevul_llama2_dataset huggingface dataset:
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: crypto_bob2(
	struct exten *ep,	/* extension pointer */
	struct value *vp	/* value pointer */
	)
{
	RSA	*rsa;		/* GQ parameters */
	DSA_SIG	*sdsa;		/* DSA parameters */
	BN_CTX	*bctx;		/* BIGNUM context */
	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;		/* signature context */
	tstamp_t tstamp;	/* NTP timestamp */
	BIGNUM	*r, *k, *g, *y;
	u_char	*ptr;
	u_int	len;
	int	s_len;

	/*
	 * If the GQ parameters are not valid, something awful
	 * happened or we are being tormented.
	 */
	if (gqkey_info == NULL) {
		msyslog(LOG_NOTICE, "crypto_bob2: scheme unavailable");
		return (XEVNT_ID);
	}
	rsa = gqkey_info->pkey->pkey.rsa;

	/*
	 * Extract r from the challenge.
	 */
	len = ntohl(ep->vallen);
	if ((r = BN_bin2bn((u_char *)ep->pkt, len, NULL)) == NULL) {
		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "crypto_bob2: %s",
		    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
		return (XEVNT_ERR);
	}

	/*
	 * Bob rolls random k (0 < k < n), computes y = k u^r mod n and
	 * x = k^b mod n, then sends (y, hash(x)) to Alice. 
	 */
	bctx = BN_CTX_new(); k = BN_new(); g = BN_new(); y = BN_new();
	sdsa = DSA_SIG_new();
	BN_rand(k, len * 8, -1, 1);		/* k */
	BN_mod(k, k, rsa->n, bctx);
	BN_mod_exp(y, rsa->p, r, rsa->n, bctx); /* u^r mod n */
	BN_mod_mul(y, k, y, rsa->n, bctx);	/* k u^r mod n */
	sdsa->r = BN_dup(y);
	BN_mod_exp(g, k, rsa->e, rsa->n, bctx); /* k^b mod n */
	bighash(g, g);
	sdsa->s = BN_dup(g);
	BN_CTX_free(bctx);
	BN_free(r); BN_free(k); BN_free(g); BN_free(y);
#ifdef DEBUG
	if (debug > 1)
		RSA_print_fp(stdout, rsa, 0);
#endif
 
	/*
	 * Encode the values in ASN.1 and sign. The filestamp is from
	 * the local file.
	 */
	len = s_len = i2d_DSA_SIG(sdsa, NULL);
	if (s_len <= 0) {
		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "crypto_bob2: %s",
		    ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
		DSA_SIG_free(sdsa);
		return (XEVNT_ERR);
	}
	memset(vp, 0, sizeof(struct value));
	tstamp = crypto_time();
	vp->tstamp = htonl(tstamp);
	vp->fstamp = htonl(gqkey_info->fstamp);
	vp->vallen = htonl(len);
	ptr = emalloc(len);
	vp->ptr = ptr;
	i2d_DSA_SIG(sdsa, &ptr);
	DSA_SIG_free(sdsa);
	if (tstamp == 0)
		return (XEVNT_OK);

	vp->sig = emalloc(sign_siglen);
	EVP_SignInit(&ctx, sign_digest);
	EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, (u_char *)&vp->tstamp, 12);
	EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx, vp->ptr, len);
	if (EVP_SignFinal(&ctx, vp->sig, &len, sign_pkey)) {
		INSIST(len <= sign_siglen);
		vp->siglen = htonl(len);
	}
	return (XEVNT_OK);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'CVE-2014-9297'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
                   unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
    krb5_error_code retval = 0;
    char *r = NULL;
    krb5_data *data = NULL;
    krb5_int32 count = 0;
    krb5_int32 size = 2;  /* initial guess at needed space */
    char *component = NULL;

    data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
    if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }

    if (!retval) {
        r = strdup(realm);
        if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
    }

    while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
        if (count == size) {
            krb5_data *new_data = NULL;

            size *= 2;
            new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
            if (new_data) {
                data = new_data;
            } else {
                retval = ENOMEM;
            }
        }

        if (!retval) {
            data[count].length = strlen(component);
            data[count].data = strdup(component);
            if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
            count++;
        }
    }

    if (!retval) {
        princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
        princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
        princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
        princ->data = data;
        princ->length = count;
        r = NULL;    /* take ownership */
        data = NULL; /* take ownership */
    }

    if (data) {
        while (--count >= 0) {
            free(data[count].data);
        }
        free(data);
    }
    free(r);

    return retval;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-125'], 'message': 'Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]

In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
bytes and do not read past the end of the input string.  This bug
affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
krb5_build_principal_alloc_va().  krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
affected.

CVE-2015-2697:

In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
beginning with a null byte.  If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm.  Due to a bug in this
function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.

CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

ticket: 8252 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: spnego_gss_delete_sec_context(
			    OM_uint32 *minor_status,
			    gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
			    gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
	OM_uint32 ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
	spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *ctx =
		    (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t *)context_handle;

	*minor_status = 0;

	if (context_handle == NULL)
		return (GSS_S_FAILURE);

	if (*ctx == NULL)
		return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);

	/*
	 * If this is still an SPNEGO mech, release it locally.
	 */
	if ((*ctx)->magic_num == SPNEGO_MAGIC_ID) {
		(void) gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
				    &(*ctx)->ctx_handle,
				    output_token);
		(void) release_spnego_ctx(ctx);
	} else {
		ret = gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
				    context_handle,
				    output_token);
	}

	return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]

The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment.  This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs.  Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods.  Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.

CVE-2015-2695:

In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash.  This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context().  Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug.  A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]

ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: spnego_gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
		       gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
		       gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
		       gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
		       gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
		       int *conf_state,
		       gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
	OM_uint32 ret;
	ret = gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
			      context_handle,
			      input_message_buffer,
			      input_assoc_buffer,
			      output_payload_buffer,
			      conf_state,
			      qop_state);
	return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]

The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment.  This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs.  Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods.  Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.

CVE-2015-2695:

In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash.  This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context().  Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug.  A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]

ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: spnego_gss_verify_mic(
		OM_uint32 *minor_status,
		const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
		const gss_buffer_t msg_buffer,
		const gss_buffer_t token_buffer,
		gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
	OM_uint32 ret;
	ret = gss_verify_mic(minor_status,
			    context_handle,
			    msg_buffer,
			    token_buffer,
			    qop_state);
	return (ret);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-18', 'CWE-763'], 'message': 'Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]

The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment.  This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs.  Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods.  Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.

CVE-2015-2695:

In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash.  This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context().  Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug.  A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.

    CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C

[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]

ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: _PUBLIC_ size_t strlen_m_ext_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
				    const char *s, charset_t src_charset, charset_t dst_charset)
{
	size_t count = 0;

#ifdef DEVELOPER
	switch (dst_charset) {
	case CH_DOS:
	case CH_UNIX:
		smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a variable dest charset (must be UTF16* or UTF8)");
	default:
		break;
	}

	switch (src_charset) {
	case CH_UTF16LE:
	case CH_UTF16BE:
		smb_panic("cannot call strlen_m_ext() with a UTF16 src charset (must be DOS, UNIX, DISPLAY or UTF8)");
	default:
		break;
	}
#endif
	if (!s) {
		return 0;
	}

	while (*s && !(((uint8_t)*s) & 0x80)) {
		s++;
		count++;
	}

	if (!*s) {
		return count;
	}

	while (*s) {
		size_t c_size;
		codepoint_t c = next_codepoint_handle_ext(ic, s, src_charset, &c_size);
		s += c_size;

		switch (dst_charset) {
		case CH_UTF16LE:
		case CH_UTF16BE:
		case CH_UTF16MUNGED:
			if (c < 0x10000) {
				/* Unicode char fits into 16 bits. */
				count += 1;
			} else {
				/* Double-width unicode char - 32 bits. */
				count += 2;
			}
			break;
		case CH_UTF8:
			/*
			 * this only checks ranges, and does not
			 * check for invalid codepoints
			 */
			if (c < 0x80) {
				count += 1;
			} else if (c < 0x800) {
				count += 2;
			} else if (c < 0x10000) {
				count += 3;
			} else {
				count += 4;
			}
			break;
		default:
			/*
			 * non-unicode encoding:
			 * assume that each codepoint fits into
			 * one unit in the destination encoding.
			 */
			count += 1;
		}
	}

	return count;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-5330: Fix handling of unicode near string endings

Until now next_codepoint_ext() and next_codepoint_handle_ext() were
using strnlen(str, 5) to determine how much string they should try to
decode. This ended up looking past the end of the string when it was not
null terminated and the final character looked like a multi-byte encoding.
The fix is to let the caller say how long the string can be.

Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11599

Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: png_set_PLTE(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr,
    png_const_colorp palette, int num_palette)
{

   png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "PLTE");

   if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
      return;

   if (num_palette < 0 || num_palette > PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH)
   {
      if (info_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
         png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");

      else
      {
         png_warning(png_ptr, "Invalid palette length");

         return;
      }
   }

   if ((num_palette > 0 && palette == NULL) ||
      (num_palette == 0
#        ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
            && (png_ptr->mng_features_permitted & PNG_FLAG_MNG_EMPTY_PLTE) == 0
#        endif
      ))
   {
      png_error(png_ptr, "Invalid palette");
   }

   /* It may not actually be necessary to set png_ptr->palette here;
    * we do it for backward compatibility with the way the png_handle_tRNS
    * function used to do the allocation.
    *
    * 1.6.0: the above statement appears to be incorrect; something has to set
    * the palette inside png_struct on read.
    */
   png_free_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, PNG_FREE_PLTE, 0);

   /* Changed in libpng-1.2.1 to allocate PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH instead
    * of num_palette entries, in case of an invalid PNG file that has
    * too-large sample values.
    */
   png_ptr->palette = png_voidcast(png_colorp, png_calloc(png_ptr,
       PNG_MAX_PALETTE_LENGTH * (sizeof (png_color))));

   if (num_palette > 0)
      memcpy(png_ptr->palette, palette, num_palette * (sizeof (png_color)));
   info_ptr->palette = png_ptr->palette;
   info_ptr->num_palette = png_ptr->num_palette = (png_uint_16)num_palette;

   info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_PLTE;

   info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_PLTE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-120'], 'message': '[libpng16] Prevent reading over-length PLTE chunk (Cosmin Truta).'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void xmlGROW (xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
    unsigned long curEnd = ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur;
    unsigned long curBase = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;

    if (((curEnd > (unsigned long) XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT) ||
         (curBase > (unsigned long) XML_MAX_LOOKUP_LIMIT)) &&
         ((ctxt->input->buf) && (ctxt->input->buf->readcallback != (xmlInputReadCallback) xmlNop)) &&
        ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
        xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "Huge input lookup");
        ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
    }
    xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK);
    if ((ctxt->input->cur != NULL) && (*ctxt->input->cur == 0) &&
        (xmlParserInputGrow(ctxt->input, INPUT_CHUNK) <= 0))
	    xmlPopInput(ctxt);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Detect incoherency on GROW

the current pointer to the input has to be between the base and end
if not stop everything we have an internal state error.'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: bool asn1_write_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const char *s)
{
	asn1_write(data, s, strlen(s));
	return !data->has_error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-7540: lib: util: Check *every* asn1 return call and early return.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <Volker.Lendecke@SerNet.DE>

Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 19 01:29:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104

(cherry picked from commit b9d3fd4cc551df78a7b066ee8ce43bbaa3ff994a)'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: bool asn1_check_enumerated(struct asn1_data *data, int v)
{
	uint8_t b;
	if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_ENUMERATED)) return false;
	asn1_read_uint8(data, &b);
	asn1_end_tag(data);

	if (v != b)
		data->has_error = false;

	return !data->has_error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'CVE-2015-7540: lib: util: Check *every* asn1 return call and early return.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9187

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <Volker.Lendecke@SerNet.DE>

Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 19 01:29:00 CEST 2014 on sn-devel-104

(cherry picked from commit b9d3fd4cc551df78a7b066ee8ce43bbaa3ff994a)'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
	int err;
	struct dentry *upperdentry;

	err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
	if (err)
		goto out;

	upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
	if (upperdentry) {
		mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
		err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
		mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
	} else {
		err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, attr, false);
	}
	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
	return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-284', 'CWE-264'], 'message': 'ovl: fix permission checking for setattr

[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two.  Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right.  Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>'
Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static void zend_throw_or_error(int fetch_type, zend_class_entry *exception_ce, const char *format, ...) /* {{{ */
{
	va_list va;
	char *message = NULL;

	va_start(va, format);
	zend_vspprintf(&message, 0, format, va);

	if (fetch_type & ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_EXCEPTION) {
		zend_throw_error(exception_ce, message);
	} else {
		zend_error(E_ERROR, "%s", message);
	}

	efree(message);
	va_end(va);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-134'], 'message': 'Use format string'