Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int get_v4l2_edid32(struct v4l2_edid *kp, struct v4l2_edid32 __user *up)
{
	u32 tmp;

	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, up, sizeof(*up)) ||
	    get_user(kp->pad, &up->pad) ||
	    get_user(kp->start_block, &up->start_block) ||
	    get_user(kp->blocks, &up->blocks) ||
	    get_user(tmp, &up->edid) ||
	    copy_from_user(kp->reserved, up->reserved, sizeof(kp->reserved)))
		return -EFAULT;
	kp->edid = (__force u8 *)compat_ptr(tmp);
	return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'media: v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c: refactor compat ioctl32 logic

The 32-bit compat v4l2 ioctl handling is implemented based on its 64-bit
equivalent. It converts 32-bit data structures into its 64-bit
equivalents and needs to provide the data to the 64-bit ioctl in user
space memory which is commonly allocated using
compat_alloc_user_space().

However, due to how that function is implemented, it can only be called
a single time for every syscall invocation.

Supposedly to avoid this limitation, the existing code uses a mix of
memory from the kernel stack and memory allocated through
compat_alloc_user_space().

Under normal circumstances, this would not work, because the 64-bit
ioctl expects all pointers to point to user space memory. As a
workaround, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is called to temporarily disable this
extra safety check and allow kernel pointers. However, this might
introduce a security vulnerability: The result of the 32-bit to 64-bit
conversion is writeable by user space because the output buffer has been
allocated via compat_alloc_user_space(). A malicious user space process
could then manipulate pointers inside this output buffer, and due to the
previous set_fs(KERNEL_DS) call, functions like get_user() or put_user()
no longer prevent kernel memory access.

The new approach is to pre-calculate the total amount of user space
memory that is needed, allocate it using compat_alloc_user_space() and
then divide up the allocated memory to accommodate all data structures
that need to be converted.

An alternative approach would have been to retain the union type karg
that they allocated on the kernel stack in do_video_ioctl(), copy all
data from user space into karg and then back to user space. However, we
decided against this approach because it does not align with other
compat syscall implementations. Instead, we tried to replicate the
get_user/put_user pairs as found in other places in the kernel:

    if (get_user(clipcount, &up->clipcount) ||
        put_user(clipcount, &kp->clipcount)) return -EFAULT;

Notes from hans.verkuil@cisco.com:

This patch was taken from:
    https://github.com/LineageOS/android_kernel_samsung_apq8084/commit/97b733953c06e4f0398ade18850f0817778255f7

Clearly nobody could be bothered to upstream this patch or at minimum
tell us :-( We only heard about this a week ago.

This patch was rebased and cleaned up. Compared to the original I
also swapped the order of the convert_in_user arguments so that they
matched copy_in_user. It was hard to review otherwise. I also replaced
the ALLOC_USER_SPACE/ALLOC_AND_GET by a normal function.

Fixes: 6b5a9492ca ("v4l: introduce string control support.")

Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Acked-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v4.15 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>'