Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: bool MDSDaemon::ms_verify_authorizer(Connection *con, int peer_type,
			       int protocol, bufferlist& authorizer_data, bufferlist& authorizer_reply,
			       bool& is_valid, CryptoKey& session_key)
{
  Mutex::Locker l(mds_lock);
  if (stopping) {
    return false;
  }
  if (beacon.get_want_state() == CEPH_MDS_STATE_DNE)
    return false;

  AuthAuthorizeHandler *authorize_handler = 0;
  switch (peer_type) {
  case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_MDS:
    authorize_handler = authorize_handler_cluster_registry->get_handler(protocol);
    break;
  default:
    authorize_handler = authorize_handler_service_registry->get_handler(protocol);
  }
  if (!authorize_handler) {
    dout(0) << "No AuthAuthorizeHandler found for protocol " << protocol << dendl;
    is_valid = false;
    return true;
  }

  AuthCapsInfo caps_info;
  EntityName name;
  uint64_t global_id;

  RotatingKeyRing *keys = monc->rotating_secrets.get();
  if (keys) {
    is_valid = authorize_handler->verify_authorizer(
      cct, keys,
      authorizer_data, authorizer_reply, name, global_id, caps_info,
      session_key);
  } else {
    dout(10) << __func__ << " no rotating_keys (yet), denied" << dendl;
    is_valid = false;
  }

  if (is_valid) {
    entity_name_t n(con->get_peer_type(), global_id);

    // We allow connections and assign Session instances to connections
    // even if we have not been assigned a rank, because clients with
    // "allow *" are allowed to connect and do 'tell' operations before
    // we have a rank.
    Session *s = NULL;
    if (mds_rank) {
      // If we do hold a rank, see if this is an existing client establishing
      // a new connection, rather than a new client
      s = mds_rank->sessionmap.get_session(n);
    }

    // Wire up a Session* to this connection
    // It doesn't go into a SessionMap instance until it sends an explicit
    // request to open a session (initial state of Session is `closed`)
    if (!s) {
      s = new Session;
      s->info.auth_name = name;
      s->info.inst.addr = con->get_peer_addr();
      s->info.inst.name = n;
      dout(10) << " new session " << s << " for " << s->info.inst << " con " << con << dendl;
      con->set_priv(s);
      s->connection = con;
    } else {
      dout(10) << " existing session " << s << " for " << s->info.inst << " existing con " << s->connection
	       << ", new/authorizing con " << con << dendl;
      con->set_priv(s->get());



      // Wait until we fully accept the connection before setting
      // s->connection.  In particular, if there are multiple incoming
      // connection attempts, they will all get their authorizer
      // validated, but some of them may "lose the race" and get
      // dropped.  We only want to consider the winner(s).  See
      // ms_handle_accept().  This is important for Sessions we replay
      // from the journal on recovery that don't have established
      // messenger state; we want the con from only the winning
      // connect attempt(s).  (Normal reconnects that don't follow MDS
      // recovery are reconnected to the existing con by the
      // messenger.)
    }

    if (caps_info.allow_all) {
      // Flag for auth providers that don't provide cap strings
      s->auth_caps.set_allow_all();
    } else {
      bufferlist::iterator p = caps_info.caps.begin();
      string auth_cap_str;
      try {
        ::decode(auth_cap_str, p);

        dout(10) << __func__ << ": parsing auth_cap_str='" << auth_cap_str << "'" << dendl;
        std::ostringstream errstr;
        if (!s->auth_caps.parse(g_ceph_context, auth_cap_str, &errstr)) {
          dout(1) << __func__ << ": auth cap parse error: " << errstr.str()
		  << " parsing '" << auth_cap_str << "'" << dendl;
	  clog->warn() << name << " mds cap '" << auth_cap_str
		       << "' does not parse: " << errstr.str();
          is_valid = false;
        }
      } catch (buffer::error& e) {
        // Assume legacy auth, defaults to:
        //  * permit all filesystem ops
        //  * permit no `tell` ops
        dout(1) << __func__ << ": cannot decode auth caps bl of length " << caps_info.caps.length() << dendl;
        is_valid = false;
      }
    }
  }

  return true;  // we made a decision (see is_valid)
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-287', 'CWE-284'], 'message': 'auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge

Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge.  The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.

The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit.  Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.

Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)

# Conflicts:
#	src/auth/Auth.h
#	src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
#	src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
#	src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
#	src/msg/Dispatcher.h
#	src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc

- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()'