Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
    Code: static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
	{
	int n;
	unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
	unsigned char *p;
	int i;
	unsigned int mac_size;

 ssl2_read_again:
	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
		{
		n=s->handshake_func(s);
		if (n < 0) return(n);
		if (n == 0)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
			return(-1);
			}
		}

	clear_sys_error();
	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
	if (len <= 0) return(len);

	if (s->s2->ract_data_length != 0) /* read from buffer */
		{
		if (len > s->s2->ract_data_length)
			n=s->s2->ract_data_length;
		else
			n=len;

		memcpy(buf,s->s2->ract_data,(unsigned int)n);
		if (!peek)
			{
			s->s2->ract_data_length-=n;
			s->s2->ract_data+=n;
			if (s->s2->ract_data_length == 0)
				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
			}

		return(n);
		}

	/* s->s2->ract_data_length == 0
	 * 
	 * Fill the buffer, then goto ssl2_read_again.
	 */

	if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_HEADER)
		{
		if (s->first_packet)
			{
			n=read_n(s,5,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
			if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
			s->first_packet=0;
			p=s->packet;
			if (!((p[0] & 0x80) && (
				(p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) ||
				(p[2] == SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO))))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET);
				return(-1);
				}
			}
		else
			{
			n=read_n(s,2,SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER+2,0);
			if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
			}
		/* part read stuff */

		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
		p=s->packet;
		/* Do header */
		/*s->s2->padding=0;*/
		s->s2->escape=0;
		s->s2->rlength=(((unsigned int)p[0])<<8)|((unsigned int)p[1]);
		if ((p[0] & TWO_BYTE_BIT))		/* Two byte header? */
			{
			s->s2->three_byte_header=0;
			s->s2->rlength&=TWO_BYTE_MASK;	
			}
		else
			{
			s->s2->three_byte_header=1;
			s->s2->rlength&=THREE_BYTE_MASK;

			/* security >s2->escape */
			s->s2->escape=((p[0] & SEC_ESC_BIT))?1:0;
			}
		}

	if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
		{
		n=s->s2->rlength+2+s->s2->three_byte_header;
		if (n > (int)s->packet_length)
			{
			n-=s->packet_length;
			i=read_n(s,(unsigned int)n,(unsigned int)n,1);
			if (i <= 0) return(i); /* ERROR */
			}

		p= &(s->packet[2]);
		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
		if (s->s2->three_byte_header)
			s->s2->padding= *(p++);
		else	s->s2->padding=0;

		/* Data portion */
		if (s->s2->clear_text)
			{
			mac_size = 0;
			s->s2->mac_data=p;
			s->s2->ract_data=p;
			if (s->s2->padding)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
				return(-1);
				}
			}
		else
			{
			mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
			OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
			s->s2->mac_data=p;
			s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
			if (s->s2->padding + mac_size > s->s2->rlength)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
				return(-1);
				}
			}

		s->s2->ract_data_length=s->s2->rlength;
		/* added a check for length > max_size in case
		 * encryption was not turned on yet due to an error */
		if ((!s->s2->clear_text) &&
			(s->s2->rlength >= mac_size))
			{
			ssl2_enc(s,0);
			s->s2->ract_data_length-=mac_size;
			ssl2_mac(s,mac,0);
			s->s2->ract_data_length-=s->s2->padding;
			if (	(memcmp(mac,s->s2->mac_data,
				(unsigned int)mac_size) != 0) ||
				(s->s2->rlength%EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_read_ctx) != 0))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
				return(-1);
				}
			}
		INC32(s->s2->read_sequence); /* expect next number */
		/* s->s2->ract_data is now available for processing */

		/* Possibly the packet that we just read had 0 actual data bytes.
		 * (SSLeay/OpenSSL itself never sends such packets; see ssl2_write.)
		 * In this case, returning 0 would be interpreted by the caller
		 * as indicating EOF, so it's not a good idea.  Instead, we just
		 * continue reading; thus ssl2_read_internal may have to process
		 * multiple packets before it can return.
		 *
		 * [Note that using select() for blocking sockets *never* guarantees
		 * that the next SSL_read will not block -- the available
		 * data may contain incomplete packets, and except for SSL 2,
		 * renegotiation can confuse things even more.] */

		goto ssl2_read_again; /* This should really be
		                       * "return ssl2_read(s,buf,len)",
		                       * but that would allow for
		                       * denial-of-service attacks if a
		                       * C compiler is used that does not
		                       * recognize end-recursion. */
		}
	else
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_BAD_STATE);
			return(-1);
		}
	} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
    
 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Add and use a constant-time memcmp.

This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)

Conflicts:
	crypto/crypto.h
	ssl/t1_lib.c
(cherry picked from commit dc406b59f3169fe191e58906df08dce97edb727c)

Conflicts:
	crypto/crypto.h
	ssl/d1_pkt.c
	ssl/s3_pkt.c'