Abstract:
A deception management system (DMS) to detect attackers within a network of computer resources, including a discovery tool auto-learning the network naming conventions for user names, workstation names, server names and shared folder names, and a deception deployer generating one or more decoy attack vectors in the one or more resources in the network based on the network conventions learned by the discovery tool, so that the decoy attack vectors conform with the network conventions, wherein an attack vector is an object in a first resource of the network that has a potential to lead an attacker to access or discover a second resource of the network.

Description:
CROSS REFERENCES TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a non-provisional of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/172,251, entitled SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR CREATION, DEPLOYMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF AUGMENTED ATTACKER MAP, and filed on Jun. 8, 2015 by inventors Shlomo Touboul, Hanan Levin, Stephane Roubach, Assaf Mischari, Itai Ben David, Itay Avraham, Adi Ozer, Chen Kazaz, Ofer Israeli, Olga Vingurt, Liad Gareh, Israel Grimberg, Cobby Cohen and Sharon Sultan, the contents of which are hereby incorporated herein in their entirety. 
     This application is a non-provisional of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/172,253, entitled SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR MULTI-LEVEL DECEPTION MANAGEMENT AND DECEPTION SYSTEM FOR MALICIOUS ACTIONS IN A COMPUTER NETWORK, and filed on Jun. 8, 2015 by inventors Shlomo Touboul, Hanan Levin, Stephane Roubach, Assaf Mischari, Itai Ben David, Itay Avraham, Adi Ozer, Chen Kazaz, Ofer Israeli, Olga Vingurt, Liad Gareh, Israel Grimberg, Cobby Cohen and Sharon Sultan, the contents of which are hereby incorporated herein in their entirety. 
     This application is a non-provisional of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/172,255, entitled METHODS AND SYSTEMS TO DETECT, PREDICT AND/OR PREVENT AN ATTACKER&#39;S NEXT ACTION IN A COMPROMISED NETWORK, and filed on Jun. 8, 2015 by inventors Shlomo Touboul, Hanan Levin, Stephane Roubach, Assaf Mischari, Itai Ben David, Itay Avraham, Adi Ozer, Chen Kazaz, Ofer Israeli, Olga Vingurt, Liad Gareh, Israel Grimberg, Cobby Cohen and Sharon Sultan, the contents of which are hereby incorporated herein in their entirety. 
     This application is a non-provisional of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/172,259, entitled MANAGING DYNAMIC DECEPTIVE ENVIRONMENTS, and filed on Jun. 8, 2015 by inventors Shlomo Touboul, Hanan Levin, Stephane Roubach, Assaf Mischari, Itai Ben David, Itay Avraham, Adi Ozer, Chen Kazaz, Ofer Israeli, Olga Vingurt, Liad Gareh, Israel Grimberg, Cobby Cohen and Sharon Sultan, the contents of which are hereby incorporated herein in their entirety. 
     This application is a non-provisional of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/172,261, entitled SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR AUTOMATICALLY GENERATING NETWORK ENTITY GROUPS BASED ON ATTACK PARAMETERS AND/OR ASSIGNMENT OF AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED SECURITY POLICIES, and filed on Jun. 8, 2015 by inventors Shlomo Touboul, Hanan Levin, Stephane Roubach, Assaf Mischari, Itai Ben David, Itay Avraham, Adi Ozer, Chen Kazaz, Ofer Israeli, Olga Vingurt, Liad Gareh, Israel Grimberg, Cobby Cohen and Sharon Sultan, the contents of which are hereby incorporated herein in their entirety. 
     FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention relates to cyber security, and in particular to security against attackers. 
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     Reference is made to  FIG. 1 , which is a simplified diagram of a prior art enterprise network  100  connected to an external internet  10 . Network  100  is shown generally with resources including computers  110 , servers  120 , switches and routers  130 , and mobile devices  140  such as smart phones and tablets, for ease of presentation, although it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that enterprise networks today are generally much more varied and complex and include other devices such as printers, phones and any Internet of Things objects. The various connections shown in  FIG. 1  may be direct or indirect, wired or wireless communications, or a combination of wired and wireless connections. Computers  110  and servers  120  may be physical elements or logical elements, or a mix of physical and logical elements. Computers  110  and servers  120  may be physical or virtual machines. Computers  110  and servers  120  may be local, remote or cloud-based elements, or a mix of local, remote and cloud-based elements. Computers  110  may be client workstation computers. Servers  120  may be file transfer protocol (FTP) servers, email servers, structured query language (SQL) servers, secure shell (SSH) servers, and other database and application servers. 
     Access to computers  110  and servers  120  in network  100  may optionally be governed by an access governor  150 , such as a directory service, that authorizes users to access computers  110  and servers  120  based on “credentials” and other methods of authentication. Access governor  150  may be a name directory, such as ACTIVE DIRECTORY® developed by Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Wash., for WINDOWS® environments. Background information about ACTIVE DIRECTORY® is available at Wikipedia. Other access governors for WINDOWS and non-WINDOWS environments include inter alia Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS), and Apple Filing Protocol (AFP), formerly APPLETALK®, developed by Apple Inc. of Cupertino, Calif. Background information about LDAP, RADIUS and AFP is available at Wikipedia. 
     Access governor  150  may be one or more local machine access controllers. For networks that do not include an access governor, authentication may be performed by other servers  120 . Alternatively, in lieu of access governor  150 , resources of network  100  determine their local access rights. 
     Credentials for accessing computers  110  and servers  120  include inter alia server account credentials such as &lt;address&gt; &lt;username&gt; &lt;password&gt; for an FTP server, a database server, or an SSH server. Credentials for accessing computers  110  and servers  120  also include user login credentials &lt;username&gt; &lt;password&gt;, or &lt;username&gt; &lt;ticket&gt;, where “ticket” is an authentication ticket, such as a ticket for the Kerberos authentication protocol or NTLM hash used by Microsoft Corp., or login credentials via certificates or via another implementation used today or in the future. Background information about the Kerberos protocol and LM hashes is available at Wikipedia. 
     Access governor  150  may maintain a directory of computers  110 , servers  120  and their users. Access governor  150  authorizes users and computers, assigns and enforces security policies, and installs and updates software. 
     Computers  110  may run a local or remote security service, which is an operating system process that verifies users logging in to computers, to single sign-on systems, and to credential storage systems. 
     Network  100  may include a security information and event management (SIEM) server  160 , which provides real-time analysis of security alerts generated by network hardware and applications. Background information about SIEM is available at Wikipedia. 
     Network  100  may include a domain name system (DNS) server  170 , or such other name service system, for translating domain names to IP addresses. Background information about DNS is available at Wikipedia. 
     Network  100  may include a firewall  180  located within a gateway between enterprise network  100  and external internet  10 . Firewall  180  controls incoming and outgoing traffic for network  100 . Background information about firewalls is available at Wikipedia. 
     One of the most prominent threats that organizations face is a targeted attack; i.e., an individual or group of individuals that attacks the organization for a specific purpose, such as stealing data, using data and systems, modifying data and systems, and sabotaging data and systems. Targeted attacks are carried out in multiple stages, typically including inter alia reconnaissance, penetration and lateral movement. Lateral movement involves orientation, movement and propagation, and includes establishing a foothold within the organization and expanding that foothold to additional systems within the organization. 
     In order to carry out the lateral movement stage, an attacker, whether a human being who is operating tools within the organization&#39;s network, or a tool with “learning” capabilities, learns information about the environment it is operating in, such as network topology, network devices and organization structure, learns “where can I go from my current location” and “how can I move from my current location to another location (privilege required)”, learns implemented security solutions, learns applications that he can leverage, and then operates in accordance with that data. 
     An advanced attacker may use different attack techniques to enter a corporate network and to move laterally within the network in order to obtain his resource goals. The advanced attacker may begin with a workstation, server or any other network entity to start his lateral movement. He uses different methods to enter the network, including inter alia social engineering, existing exploits and vulnerabilities, and a Trojan horse or any other malware allowing him to control a first node or nodes. 
     Once an attacker has taken control of a first node in a corporate network, he uses different advanced attack techniques for orientation and propagation and discovery of additional ways to reach other network nodes in the corporate network. Attacker movement from node to node is performed via an “attack vector”, which is an object discovered by the attacker, including inter alia an object in memory or storage of a first computer that may be used to access or discover a second computer. 
     Exemplary attack vectors include inter alia credentials of users with escalated privileges, existing shared location names stored on different servers and workstations, and details including the address and credentials of an FTP server, an email server, a database server or an SSH server. Attack vectors are often available to an attacker because a user did not log off from a workstation, did not log out of an application, or did not clear his cache. E.g., if a user contacted a help desk and gave a help desk administrator remote access to his workstation and if the help desk administrator did not properly log off from the remote access session to the user&#39;s workstation, then the help desk access credentials may still be stored in the user&#39;s local cache and available to the attacker. Similarly, if the user accessed a server, e.g., an FTP server, then the FTP account login parameters may be stored in the user&#39;s local cache or profile and available to the attacker. 
     Attack vectors enable inter alia a move from workstation A→server B based on a shared server host name and its credentials, connection to a different workstation using local admin credentials that reside on a current workstation, and connection to an FTP server using specific access credentials. 
     Whereas IT “sees” the logical and physical network topology, an attacker that lands on the first network node or nodes “sees” attack vectors that depart from that node and move laterally to other nodes. The attacker can move to such nodes and then follow “attack paths” by successively discovering attack vectors from node to node. 
     When the attacker implements such a discovery process on all nodes in the network, he will be able to “see” all attack vectors of the corporate network and generate a “complete attack map”. Before the attacker discovers all attack vectors on network nodes and completes the discovery process, he generates a “current attack map” that is currently available to him. 
     An objective of the attacker is to discover an attack path that leads him to a target network node. The target may be a bank&#39;s authorized server that is used by the corporation for ordering bank account transfers of money, it may be an FTP server that updates the image of all corporate points of sale, it may be a server or workstation that stores confidential information such as source code and secret formulas of the corporation, or it may be any other network nodes that are of value to the attacker and are his “attack goal nodes”. 
     When the attacker lands on the first node, but does not know how to reach the attack goal node, he generates a current attack map that leads to the attack goal node. 
     One method to defend against such attacks, termed “honeypots”, is to plant and monitor bait resources, with the objective that the attacker learn of their existence and then consume those bait resources, and to notify an administrator of the malicious activity. Background information about honeypots is available at Wikipedia. 
     Conventional honeypot systems operate by monitoring access to a supervised element in a computer network, the supervised element being a fake server or a fake service. Access monitoring generates many false alerts, caused by non-malicious access from automatic monitoring systems and by user mistakes. Conventional systems try to mitigate this problem by adding a level of interactivity to the honeypot, and by performing behavioral analysis of suspected malware if it has infected the honeypot itself. 
     Deception systems are used by organizations in order to deceive attackers into making detectable actions. However, attackers attempt to detect and avoid deceptions. When persistent attackers fail to progress, they try again and again until they find a successful path. They do so by elements within the environment. 
     Conventional deception systems like honeypots are flawed by being static, which allows the attacker to learn of their deceptions in ways such as the following.
         Found deceptions—if an attacker previously acted on deceptive data and was caught, he may know not to stumble upon that same deception again.   Static deceptions—enterprise environments change over time. Static deceptions that do not change with the enterprise environment stand out as being different and, as such, may indicate a deception fingerprint.   Stale deceptions—if an attacker finds a deception element that has not been active for a long time, the attacker identifies it as being deceptive and avoids it.   Unfit deceptions—if an attacker finds a deception element that does not fit the enterprise environment, or that does not conform to an enterprise convention, it may stand out as being different and, as such, may indicate a deception fingerprint.   Uniform deceptions—if an attacker finds a deception element that exists on all or most computers, it may stand out and as such, may indicate a deception fingerprint.       

     When creating and using deceptive environments used for deceiving attackers, it is important that the deceptive environment naturally fit in the enterprise network environment and change along with it. In this changing enterprise environment, static non-diversified and unchanging deceptive environments are not effective in deceiving, and hence deceptive environments need to become dynamic and to adapt to changes that occur in the enterprise environment. 
     SUMMARY 
     Embodiments of the present invention provide systems and methods for managing dynamic deceptive environments, which constantly adapt to changes that occur in the enterprise environment. 
     There is thus provided in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention a deception management system (DMS) to detect attackers within a dynamically changing network of resources, including a deployment governor dynamically designating a deception policy that includes one or more decoy attack vectors, one or more resources of a network in which the one or more decoy attack vectors are generated, and a schedule for generating the one or more decoy attack vectors in the one or more resources, wherein an attack vector is an object in a first resource that may be used to access or discover a second resource, and wherein the network of resources is dynamically changing, a deception deployer dynamically generating one or more decoy attack vectors on one or more resources in the network, in accordance with the current deception policy, a deception adaptor dynamically extracting characteristics of the network, and a deception diversifier dynamically triggering changes in the deception strategy, distribution and implementation, based on changes in the network as detected from the network characteristics extracted by the deception adaptor. 
     There is additionally provided in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention a method for detecting attackers within a dynamically changing network of resources, including repeatedly designating a current deception policy that includes one or more decoy attack vectors, one or more resources of a network in which the one or more decoy attack vectors are generated, and a schedule for generating the one or more decoy attack vectors in the one or more resources, wherein an attack vector is an object in a first resource that may be used to access or discover a second resource, and wherein the network of resources is dynamically changing, repeatedly generating one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more resources in the network, in accordance with the then current deception policy, repeatedly extracting characteristics of the network, and repeatedly triggering changes in the deception strategy, distribution and implementation, based on changes in the network as detected from the thus-extracted network characteristic. 
     There is further provided in accordance an embodiment of the present invention a method for detecting attackers within a dynamically changing network of resources, including planting a decoy attack vector in a resource in a computer network, the decoy attack vector being an object in memory or storage of the resource that may be used to access or identify a decoy server, the decoy server being a fake resource in the network, repeatedly extracting an activity log of the decoy server, and repeatedly changing the activity log so as to make the decoy server appear dynamically active with the network. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       The present invention will be more fully understood and appreciated from the following detailed description, taken in conjunction with the drawings in which: 
         FIG. 1  is a simplified diagram of a prior art enterprise network connected to an external internet; 
         FIG. 2  is a simplified diagram of an enterprise network with network surveillance, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 3  is a screenshot of a user interface for configuring Files deceptions, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 4  is a simplified diagram of a deception diversifier, which specifies levels of deception diversity to be applied across resources in the network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 5  is a screenshot of a user interface for configuring deceptions for browser history, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 6  is a simplified diagram of self-triggered deception changes, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; and 
         FIG. 7  is a simplified flowchart of a method for deception management in an enterprise network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. 
     
    
    
     For reference to the figures, the following index of elements and their numerals is provided. Similarly numbered elements represent elements of the same type, but they need not be identical elements. 
                                                 Table of elements in the figures            Element   Description                    10   Internet       100   enterprise network       110   network computers       120   network servers       130   network switches and routers       140   mobile devices       150   access governor (optional)       252   forensic alert module       160   SIEM server       170   DNS server       180   firewall       200   enterprise network with network surveillance       220   database of decoy attack vectors       230   policy database       240   decoy servers       242   forensic alert module       260   update server       300   deception management server       310   deployment governor       320   deception deployer       330   deception adaptor       340   deception diversifier       341   change profiler       343   change policy manager       345   change policy assigner       347   change policy scheduler       349   change policy deployer       350   deployment monitor       360   attack risk inspector       370   deception diversity sliders                    
Elements numbered in the 1000&#39;s are operations of flow charts.
 
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     In accordance with embodiments of the present invention, systems and methods are provided for dynamically managing deception policies for an enterprise network, which adapt to changes that occur in the network environment. 
     Reference is made to  FIG. 2 , which is a simplified diagram of an enterprise network  200  with network surveillance, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Network  200  includes a deception management server  300 , a database  220  of decoy attack vectors, a policy database  230  and decoy servers  240 . In addition, network computers  110  and servers  120  are grouped into groups G 1 , G 2 , G 3  and G 4 . 
     Database  220  stores attack vectors that fake movement and access to computers  110 , servers  120  and other resources in network  200 . Attack vectors include inter alia: 
     user names of the form &lt;username&gt; 
     user credentials of the form &lt;username&gt; &lt;password&gt; 
     user credentials of the form &lt;username&gt; &lt;hash of password&gt; 
     user credentials of the form &lt;username&gt; &lt;ticket&gt; 
     FTP server addresses of the form &lt;FTP address&gt; 
     FTP server credentials of the form &lt;FTP address&gt; &lt;username&gt; &lt;password&gt; 
     SSH server addresses of the form &lt;SSH address&gt; 
     SSH server credentials of the form &lt;SSH address&gt; &lt;username&gt; &lt;password&gt; 
     shared location addresses of the form &lt;SMB address&gt; 
     Each decoy attack vector in database  220  may point to (i) a real resource that exists within network  200 , e.g., an FTP server, (ii) a decoy resource that exists within network  200 , e.g., a decoy server  240 , or (iii) a resource that does not exist. In the latter case, when an attacker attempts to access a resource that does not exist, access governor  150  recognizes a pointer to a resource that is non-existent. Access governor  150  responds by notifying deception management server  300 , or by re-directing the pointer to a resource that does exist in order to track the attacker&#39;s moves, or both. 
     The attack vectors stored in database  220  are categorized by families, such as inter alia
     F 1 —user credentials   F 2 —files   F 3 —connections   F 4 —FTP logins   F 5 —SSH logins   F 6 —shared location names   F 7 —databases   F 8 —network devices   F 9 —URLs   F 10 —Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)   F 11 —recent commands   F 12 —scanners   F 13 —cookies   F 14 —cache   F 15 —Virtual Private Network (VPN)   F 16 —key logger   

     Credentials for a computer B that reside on a computer A provide an attack vector for an attacker from computer A to computer B. 
     Reference is made to  FIG. 3 , which is a screenshot of a user interface for configuring Files deceptions, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in  FIG. 3 , decoy attack vectors for files comprise deceptive information relating to saved credentials in local files. The decoy attack vectors tempt an attacker to access a file of decoy usernames and passwords, and to use those credentials to access network resources. The access attempt triggers an alert that exposes the attacker&#39;s activity. 
     Database  220  communicates with an update server  260 , which updates database  220  as new types of attack vectors for accessing, manipulating and hopping to computers evolve over time. Update server  260  may be a separate server, or a part of deception management server  300 . 
     Policy database  230  stores, for each group of computers, G 1 , G 2 , . . . , policies for generating decoy attack vectors on computers in that group. Each policy specifies decoy attack vectors that are generated in each group, in accordance with attack vectors stored in database  220 . For user credentials, the decoy attack vectors planted on a computer lead to another resource in the network. For attack vectors to access an FTP or other server, the decoy attack vectors planted on a computer lead to a decoy server  240 . 
     Deception management server  300  includes six primary components; namely, a deployment governor  310 , a deception deployer  320 , a deception adaptor  330 , a deception diversifier  340 , a deployment monitor  350  and an attack risk inspector  360 . Deployment governor  310  defines a deception policy. The deception policy defines different deception types, different deception combinations, response procedures, notification services, and assignments of policies to specific network nodes, network users, groups of nodes or users or both. The deception policy specifies one or more decoy attack vectors; one or more resources in network  200  in which the one or more decoy attack vectors are “planted”, i.e., generated; and a schedule for generating the one or more decoy attack vectors in the one or more resources. 
     Once policies are defined, they are stored in policy database  230  with the defined assignments. 
     Deception deployer  320  plants one or more decoy attack vectors on one or more resources in network  200 , in accordance with the deception policy specified by deployment governor  310 . Deception deployer  320  plants each decoy, based on its type, on network resources, as appropriate. Deception deployer  320  plants the decoy attack vectors in such a way that the chances of a valid user accessing the decoy attack vectors are low. Deception deployer  320  may or may not stay resident on resources. 
     Deception adaptor  330  is an environment discovery tool that auto-learns the enterprise environment, including inter alia conventions for usernames, workstation names, server names and shared folder names. Deception adaptor  330  analyzes the organization of network  200  and dynamically triggers changes in the deception policy based on changes in network  200 . Deception adaptor  330  extracts characteristics of network  200  from multiple sources, including inter alia:
         management tools, e.g., directories such as AD and LDAP;   asset management, e.g., Tivoli and HPOV;   configuration management, e.g., CMDB;   network management, e.g., Cisco Works and SDN;   user management;   tools—general and third party tools;   device management, e.g., endpoints, mobile devices, and Windows/Linux/Mac/iOS/Android servers;   applications, e.g., portal, FTP client, and database;   data, e.g., files and SharePoint.       

     Reference is made to  FIG. 4 , which is a simplified diagram of deception diversifier  340 , which specifies levels of deception diversity to be applied across resources in the network, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Deception diversifier  340  generates a current view of the network from the characteristics extracted by deception adaptor  330  and, based on changes identified in the view, generates deception policy changes, including inter alia a specification of levels of deception diversity to be applied across resources in network  200 , as shown in  FIG. 4 . The deception policy changes are provided to deception governor  310 , and then deployed by deception deployer  320 . 
       FIG. 4  shows respective options  344  and  346  for automatic and custom diversification. For the custom diversification option, the levels of diversification are set manually by an administrator of network  200 . In an alternative embodiment of the present invention, the levels of diversification are randomly set. 
     Reference is made to  FIG. 5 , which is a screenshot of a user interface for configuring deceptions for browser history, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in  FIG. 5 , decoy attack vectors relate to web hosts in a domain. The decoy attack vectors lure an attacker to attempt to access decoy web servers. The access attempt triggers an alert that exposes the attacker&#39;s activity. Sliders  370  are used to set levels of deception diversity for the decoy web servers. 
     Deception diversifier  340  responds to various change triggers extracted from the above sources. Changes in deception policy may be performed manually by an administrator, scheduled via policy governor  310 , or performed autonomously. The need for change can be triggered by the environment, or can be self-triggered. Reference is made to  FIG. 6 , which is a simplified diagram of self-triggered deception changes, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.  FIG. 6  shows an activity log of login access and data editing at a decoy resource, at a first point in time T(n). Deception adaptor  330  analyzes the activity logs and dynamically changes them as appropriate so that the decoy resource appears to an attacker as being active in enterprise network  200 . E.g.,  FIG. 6  shows that the last modified time has been changed to 2/14/15, and the last accessed time has been changed to 2/13/15. The activity log at time T(n+1) appears as shown in  FIG. 6  and, as such, the decoy resource appears to an attacker as being active. 
     Deception diversifier  340  includes five primary modules. A change profiler  341  analyzes changes in network  200  including inter alia changes in nature, entities, scope, form and naming convention. A change policy manager  343  defines deception deployment logic changes. A change policy assigner  345  defines deception deployment scope changes, such as on which network entities changes should be deployed. A change policy scheduler  347  defines deployment schedule changes. A change policy deployer  349  transmits changes to deception governor  310 . 
     Deployment monitor  350  collects information about the current deployment of decoys across the network, and presents this information to an administrator of network  200  in an interactive way whereby the administrator is able to interactively change the deployment policy via deployment governor  310 . In an embodiment of the present invention, deployment governor  310  uses deployment monitor  350  to automatically recommend changes to the administrator, so as to ensure that the enterprise always uses optimal fitted deceptions. 
     Attack risk inspector  360  inspects network  200  to search for real attack vectors that exist in network  200 , and to find elements and artifacts in network  200  that can be used by an attacker as attack vectors, including inter alia credentials and connections to FTP, SSH and RDP servers. Based on the elements and artifacts found by attack risk inspector  360 , deception governor  310  and deception diversifier  340  generate policies that resemble real attack vectors present in network  200 , thereby ensuring that the deceptions deployed by deception deployer  340  are custom-fit in type, profile and ratio, to create an optimal deceptive environment. 
     Once an attacker is detected, a “response procedure” is launched. The response procedure includes inter alia various notifications to various tools, and actions on the source node where detection of use of a decoy has occurred, such as launching a forensics collection and investigation process, and isolating, shutting down and re-imaging one or more network nodes. The response procedure collects information available on one or more nodes that may help in identifying the attacker&#39;s attack acts, intention and progress. 
     Each decoy server  240  activates a forensic alert module  242 , which alerts deception management server  300  that an attacker is accessing the decoy server via a computer  110  on the network. Access governor  150  also activates a forensic alert module  252 , which alerts deception management server  300  that an attacker is attempting to use a decoy credential. 
     Notification servers (not shown) are notified when an attacker uses a decoy. The notification servers may discover this by themselves, or by using information stored on access governor  150  and SIEM  160 . The notification servers forward notifications, or results of processing multiple notifications, to create notification time lines or other such analytics. 
     Reference is made to  FIG. 7 , which is a simplified flowchart of a method for deception management in network  200 , in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. Operations  1010 - 1040  shown in  FIG. 7  are performed repeatedly over time. At operation  1010  a deception management server, such as deception management server  300 , specifies a current deception policy that includes (i) one or more decoy attack vectors, (ii) one or more resources from network  200 , and a deployment schedule. At operation  1020  the deception management server generates the one or more decoy attack vectors in the one or more resources in network  200  in accordance with the deployment schedule. At operation  1030  the deception management server analyzes network  200  for changes in the network, and extracts current characteristics of the network. At operation  1040  the deception management server triggers changes in the deception policy based on the changes in the network characteristics identified at operation  1030 . 
     Deception management server  300  also monitors network  200  for decoy attack vectors that were improperly deployed or that were removed from one or more resources, e.g., when a machine is re-booted, and regenerates those decoy attack vectors on those resources. 
     In the foregoing specification, the invention has been described with reference to specific exemplary embodiments thereof. It will, however, be evident that various modifications and changes may be made to the specific exemplary embodiments without departing from the broader spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the specification and drawings are to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.