Abstract:
The present invention is an apparatus and a method for a safety verification system, or a safety verification management system. At railroads or construction sites, equipment, such as a piece of heavy machinery, or a locomotive engine, must be subjected to a safety protocol before authorized personnel are allowed to approach the equipment. It is essential to have independent, automatic confirmation that the safety protocol has been successfully completed. In railroad systems, a Three Step Protection Mode is often used to place a locomotive engine in safe mode. One embodiment of the present invention provides an independent, automatic verification that this safety protocol has been successfully completed and sends an audible, visual, audiovisual, or vibratory signal to remote personnel. Another embodiment tracks the relative positions of personnel and locomotives, and generates a warning when personnel are proximate to an equipment that is not in safe mode.

Description:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
       [0001]    (a) Technical Field of the Invention 
         [0002]    This invention generally relates to the field of safety verification systems, and in particular relates to an electronic signaling system that monitors safety protocols associated with an equipment, and alerts remote personnel upon the satisfactory completion of such protocols. This enables the alerted personnel to approach the equipment safely. 
         [0003]    (b) Description of the Relevant Art 
         [0004]    A considerable number of patents relate generally to safety protocols and safety verification mechanisms. 
         [0005]    In U.S. Pat. No. 4,937,795, Motegi, et al. disclose an access alarm method for the purpose of protecting personnel as they are working on vehicles. As stated in the patent, this could specifically include railroad locomotives, as well as aircraft and a number of other vehicles. With the primary embodiment disclosed by Motegi, the alarm consists of an ultrasonic signal transmitted by a receiver on the vehicle to indicate when an object has entered into a predetermined area of danger relative to the working vehicle. Motegi further discloses an apparatus for transmitting a warning comprising a supersonic wave transmitting and receiving means mounted on an object and a mechanism for determining relative position between a working vehicle and the object upon receipt of an appropriate signal. 
         [0006]    Another relevant patent is U.S. Pat. No. 5,415,369 by Hungate. The Hungate invention is a railroad signaling system which includes transceivers disposed at signals, operating at various frequencies so as to provide identification and secure communication between the locomotive and the control mechanisms, including control personnel. The primary emphasis of Hungate is improving the in-cab signaling systems and coupling the same to automatic train stop enforcement devices. In the primary embodiment disclosed, an onboard interrogator is utilized to interrogate transponders disposed between the tracks at a predetermined distance from the signal location. Hungate discloses the use of RF signal processing to achieve the requested communication. The claims of the patent are limited to RF signaling. 
         [0007]    U.S. Pat. No. 5,554,982 by Shirkey, et al. discloses a wireless train proximity alert system. This patent is directed to signaling associated with a moving train. The system includes a transceiver located on the train for transmitting a proximity signal. Shirkey notes that this signal would preferably include information about the train&#39;s speed as well as physical location. A crossing-based transceiver receives the signal from the train and transmits the boundary coordinates when the train&#39;s estimated time of arrival at the crossing is within a predetermined range. A vehicle-based receiver receives the warning zone signal and makes a comparison to the vehicle&#39;s position and speed in order to produce an appropriate alarm to aid in preventing potential accidents. 
         [0008]    U.S. Pat. No. 5,924,651 by Penza is directed to a train warning system designed to protect personnel working near a train station by providing a warning of moving vehicles. The Penza system includes a sensor for detecting the passing of a train over a track and a transmitter arranged to transmit a warning signal to a portable RF receiver carried by the personnel working in the vicinity of the tracks. The portable RF generator may serve to alert personnel to the movement of the vehicle or any number of other hazards associated with the work. The alarm may be either visual or audible. 
         [0009]    Another warning system is found in U.S. Pat. No. 6,232,887 B1 by Carson. The Carson system includes a receiver-transmitter arrangement for sending an alert signal to warn of an approaching vehicle. The Carson system further discloses an alarm system that communicates qualitative information about the approaching vehicle as well, including the speed of the vehicle and a ping signal which serves to verify communications between the receiver and the transmitter. As shown in FIG. 2 of the Carson patent, the embodiments include a vest-mounted alarm system. 
         [0010]    U.S. Pat. No. 6,650,242 B2 by Clerk, et al. discloses a proximity detection system to be used such as to transmit general alarm signals to warn people of approaching vehicles. The Clerk system has applicability in a number of settings including factory floors, and the RF-based system could easily be adapted to a railroad application. U.S. Pat. No. 5,999,091 by Wortham is directed to a trailer communication system with general applicability, and a good discussion of signal technology. U.S. Pat. No. 6,925,654 B2 by De Silva pertains to an alarm-based jacket that can be worn by riders of a motorcycle, for example, to aid in producing visual alarms for general biker safety. 
         [0011]    U.S. Pat. No. 7,167,082 B2 by Stigall claims an alarm system for generating and issuing a plurality of differing types of warning messages associated with specific types of hazards. The Stigall patent involves generating a different type of “stimulus” in differing situations. Examples given include visual alarms, flashing alarms and vibration signals. The visual stimuli may be situated on a hard hat worn by the user. The Stigall system has particular application in a wide assortment of construction applications and this could include the use by railroad workers. The process of altering the type of stimulus as a function of the differing hazards anticipated appears to be the point of novelty with Stigall. 
         [0012]    U.S. Pat. No. 7,298,258 B1 and U.S. Pat. No. 8,592,911 B1 are related patents by Hudgens, et al., both claiming a construction hard hat with particular electronic circuitry. The Hudgens patents include a mechanism whereby the warning signals generated and transmitted to hard hats worn by personnel at a construction site may be personalized to the particular employee receiving the warning. In that sense, while still functioning primarily as a warning system, the Hudgens hard hats take on some characteristics of a paging system. 
         [0013]    In addition, U.S. Pat. No. 7,515,065 B1 by Bygrave, et al. and U.S. Pat. No. 7,812,740 B2 by Mergen are also warning systems for vehicles with general applicability. In both cases, the patents are directed to alerting pedestrians or personnel within a specific vicinity of an approaching vehicular hazard. 
       SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
       [0014]    The present invention is a safety verification and management system which has immediate applicability for railroads, but which may also be used in a number of other industries with mild alteration. The purpose of the 3-step protection light (“3-spl”) is to provide an additional automated safety check that would serve to verify that human safety controls have been appropriately exercised. Specifically, one embodiment of the device enables an automatic visual and audible alarm to verify that appropriate controls of a locomotive engine have been engaged. The applicability to railroad safety is significant because the act of safely parking and controlling a locomotive requires multiple steps from different individuals. It is, of course, vital that a locomotive engine be appropriately anchored prior to routine maintenance being performed. In the standard railroad safety mechanism, a three-step protection protocol is utilized wherein the engineer takes the steps of (1) centering the reverser, (2) turning off the generator field, and (3) fully applying the independent brake. Although these steps or conditions are well known and mandatory, it is possible that human error or oversight could interfere with the execution of the three-step protection protocol. In such a situation, the oversight could be deadly. This invention is directed to providing an automated veracity check on the three-step protection protocol. 
         [0015]    One embodiment of the present invention involves a receiver mechanism that includes both a light and a speaker which are worn by the conductor and brakeman. Other embodiments may have different signaling mechanisms. The receiver mechanism may be attached to or integrated into a safety vest or hard hat worn by the crew members. A transmitter mechanism is located on the locomotive. After the three-step protection protocol is exercised, the transmitter mechanism will verify the protocol and provide a visual and audible signal to the receiver mechanism, thereby alerting the crew members that the three-step protection mode has been appropriately engaged. 
         [0016]    This invention could be highly desirable to railroad personnel as a means of further protecting railroad employees from serious injury or death. In addition, the present invention has applicability to a variety of other industrial settings wherein the actions of multiple individuals are used to control dangerous equipment. Examples of this could include the lockout tagout system typically used by utilities to de-energize power lines and power equipment. 
         [0017]    These and other features, variations and advantages which characterize this invention, will be apparent to those skilled in the art, from a reading of the following detailed description and a review of the associated drawings. 
         [0018]    Additional features and advantages of this invention will be understood from the detailed descriptions provided. This description, however, is not meant to limit the embodiments, and merely serves the purpose of describing some structural embodiments. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0019]    A better understanding of the present invention will be had upon reference to the following description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein: 
           [0020]      FIG. 1  is one embodiment of electronic circuitry for a safety verification system. 
           [0021]      FIG. 2  is a top view of components of an embodiment of a safety system in a locomotive. 
           [0022]      FIG. 3A  shows an embodiment of a receiving unit removably attached to a vest. 
           [0023]      FIG. 3B  shows an embodiment of a receiving unit removably attached to a hard hat. 
           [0024]      FIG. 4  is a flow chart illustrating one embodiment of a method for a safety verification and control system in a locomotive. 
           [0025]      FIG. 5  is one embodiment of electronic circuitry for a safety verification management system. 
           [0026]      FIG. 6  is a flow chart illustrating another embodiment of a method for an independent safety verification system in a locomotive. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS 
       [0027]    While the invention will be described in connection with certain embodiments, the description should not be construed to limit the invention to these embodiments. On the contrary, the intent is to cover all alternatives, modifications and equivalents as included within the spirit and scope of the invention. Various changes may be made to the function and arrangement of the elements described herein, without changing the scope of the invention being disclosed. It should be noted that the following description serves to teach at least one instance of how the various elements may be arranged to achieve the stated goals of this invention. 
         [0028]      FIG. 1  is a block diagram for one embodiment of a safety system  10 , showing its electronic circuitry. Equipment  20  is shown with an attached Transceiver or Transmitter Unit (“TU”)  28 . The equipment itself may comprise of a plurality of interlinked components. Each such component may be in one of two states—either engaged or disengaged. The figure shows a first component  23 , a second component  25 , and an N-th component  27 . Component  23  is connected to TU  28  via a two-way connection  23   a;  component  25  is connected to TU  28  via a two-way connection  25   a;  and component  27  is connected to TU  28  via a two-way connection  27   a.  Also shown in the figure is a collection of remote devices  30 . Such devices may consist of at least one control box  32 , and one or more remote receiving units (“RRUs”)  34 . In the embodiment shown, control box  32  is connected to TU  28  via a two-way connection  32   a;  and RRU  34  is connected to TU  28  via a one-way connection  34   a.    
         [0029]    At construction sites, or around locomotive engines, it is important to determine if an equipment, particularly, hazardous equipment, has been disengaged, so as to eliminate hazards to personnel working in or around such equipment. To make equipment  20  safe, one or more interlocking components need to be disengaged and the appropriate personnel need to be informed that equipment  20  is now disengaged and presents no hazards. In the existing art, much of this operation is manual, and the communications are not automated. This gives rise to the risk of human error, causing extremely dangerous conditions, and often resulting in serious injuries, or even fatalities. These dangerous conditions may be largely mitigated by the use of automated communication devices. In the present invention, a control box  30  communicates with TU  28  and signals TU  28  to execute one or more steps or conditions of a safety protocol. The control box may contain a processor and programming logic so as to be programmed to operate automatically. Alternatively, it may be operated manually, sometimes remotely by a remote control operator (“RCO”). TU  28  in turn communicates with a first interlocking component  23  via network  23   a,  which may be a physical or wireless network. When the first component  23  is duly engaged, it sends a signal back to TU  28  over network  23   a.  Similar communications are maintained with all the other interlocking components within the equipment that form a part of the safety protocol. Once TU  28  receives information that all components are properly engaged, it transmits a signal to control box  32  over network  32   a.  This informs the RCO that all interlocking components have been properly engaged, and the safety protocol has been successfully completed, and therefore the locomotive is in safe mode. TU  28  contains a processor and may be programmed appropriately to send multiple, simultaneous signals to one or more RRUs  34  over network  34   a.  RRU  34  relays the signal via visual, audio, audiovisual, or vibratory means. In some embodiments, RRU  34  is equipped with a visual indicator. The visual indicator is on when the locomotive is in safe mode, it flashes when the locomotive is in unsafe mode, and it is off when the locomotive safety protocol is disabled. In some other embodiments, RRU  34  may be equipped with an audible alarm. Each RRU  34  is carried by personnel working in or around equipment  20 . RRU  34  may be removably attached to an article of clothing such as a vest, a headgear or belt. Thus, all personnel wearing such an article of clothing are capable of receiving automatic confirmation that the equipment is safe for appropriate work. When the safety protocol is no longer needed (or disabled), TU  28  communicates with RRU  34 , which immediately ceases to emit its signal. When the safety protocol is violated by the disengagement of one or more interlocking components, TU  28  communicates with RRU  34 , which immediately emits a visual signal by flashing its lights, or generates an audible or vibratory alarm, thus warning personnel that it is no longer safe to work near equipment  20 . 
         [0030]      FIG. 2  is a top view of the components of a particular embodiment of a safety system in equipment  20 , which, in this case, is a locomotive. Such a system may be used, for instance, during regular switch moves. During switch moves, the conductor or brakeman will ask the Engineer to place the locomotive engine in “Three Step” Mode. This safety mode helps inform the conductor, brakeman, and other personnel that the engine will not move, while these personnel are fouling equipment. As used herein, fouling equipment means to work on, under, or under the locomotive, while inside the gauge of the rail. To place the locomotive engine in Three Step Protection mode, the engineer will first center the reverser lever  22 , turn the generator field  24  off, and fully apply the independent brake  26 . These steps or conditions may be executed in any order. Upon completion of all three steps or conditions, the engineer communicates the successful completion of this safety protocol to the conductor, brakeman, and other personnel. Such communication is often accomplished by the use of radio or hand signals, which is unreliable and subject to human error. Moreover, the engineer is unable to receive an independent confirmation of the completion of this safety protocol. In one embodiment of the present invention as shown in  FIG. 2 , a TU  28  is affixed to engine  20 . When reverser lever  22  is duly engaged, in this instance, when it is properly centered, it sends a signal back to TU  28 . Next, when the generator switch  24  is properly engaged, in this instance when it is switched off, it sends a signal back to TU  28 . Finally, when independent brake  26  is duly engaged, in this instance, when it is fully applied, it sends a signal back to TU  28 . Once TU  28  receives independent, automated, confirmation that all three components are properly engaged, it transmits a signal to the engineer. The engineer may be an RCO with a control box. This gives the engineer independent confirmation that all three steps or conditions having been properly engaged, and the safety protocol has been successfully completed. 
         [0031]    As discussed earlier with reference to  FIG. 1 , TU  28  may be programmed appropriately to send multiple, simultaneous signals to one or more RRUs  34  over network  34   a.  The signal itself may be visual, audio, audiovisual, or vibratory. Each RRU  34  may be carried by personnel working in or around equipment  20 . In some situations, RRU  34  may be removably attached to an article of clothing, including, but no limited to, a vest, a hard hat, a belt, etc. worn by the appropriate personnel. In some instances, RRU  34  may be removably attached to the appropriate personnel by using an arm band made of Velcro or other suitable material.  FIG. 3A  shows an embodiment of RRU  34  removably attached to a vest  36 .  FIG. 3B  shows an embodiment of RRU  34  removably attached to a hard hat or helmet  38 . Such a vest  36  or hard hat  38  may be worn by personnel who are working in or around hazardous equipment. In the context of railroad zones, the conductor, brakeman, and other railroad personnel may be appropriately fitted with such a vest  36 . In construction zones, authorized workers may wear a hard hat  38  fitted with RRU  34 . Each RRU  34  comprises a battery  342  and a receiver  344 . Receiver  344  receives a signal from TU  28  upon successful completion of an appropriate safety protocol. RRU  34  may emit an audible, visual, audiovisual, or vibratory signal. Thus remote personnel are automatically informed when it is safe to work around hazardous equipment. 
         [0032]    In railroad work zones, there are often multiple RCOs operating multiple locomotives. It is often difficult for an RCO to identify the particular locomotive that is being operated by the control box. This problem may be solved in some embodiments of the present invention by equipping the control box with a direction detection and display package. The control box communicates with TU  28  and the signal exchange may be analyzed by the control box to detect the source of the signal, thereby determining the direction of locomotive  20 . This direction is then displayed by an appropriate display, pointing the RCO to the locomotive that is being operated by his control box. 
         [0033]    Turning now to  FIG. 4 , a flow chart shows a method for a safety verification and control system in a locomotive. In particular, a control box communicates to the TU to initiate the Three Step Protection Mode at a step  40 . TU then communicates command to the first component, in this case, to center the reverser lever, at a step  42 . At step  44 , a logic circuit connected to the reverser lever determines whether the lever was successfully centered. An affirmative answer is communicated back to the TU at step  46 . TU then communicates to the control box that the first safety step has been successfully completed, at step  48 . Subsequently, the control box communicates to TU to execute the engagement of the second interlocking component, at step  50 . TU then communicates a command to the second component, in this case, to switch off the generator field, at a step  52 . At step  54 , a logic circuit connected to the generator determines whether the generator field was successfully switched off. An affirmative answer is communicated back to the TU at step  56 . TU then communicates to the control box that the second safety step has been successfully completed, at step  58 . Subsequently, the control box communicates to TU to execute the engagement of the third interlocking component, at step  60 . TU then communicates a command to the third component, in this case, to fully apply the independent brake, at a step  62 . At step  64 , a logic circuit connected to the brake determines whether the brake was successfully applied. An affirmative answer is communicated back to the TU at step  66 . TU then communicates to the control box that the third safety step has been successfully completed, and that the Three Step Protection Mode is now activated, at step  68 . When appropriate, TU also communicates to RRUs that the Three Step Protection Mode is now activated. 
         [0034]    If the logic circuit at any of the steps  44 ,  54 , or  64 , returns a negative answer, this information is transmitted to TU at step  70 . TU then communicates failure of the respective safety step to control box at step  72 . Subsequently, at step  74 , a logic circuit in the control box determines if the first component failed to engage. If yes, then at step  76 , the control box initiates a new command to TR to re-attempt to execute that particular safety step at  42 . If no, then at step  78 , the logic circuit in the control box determines if the second component failed to engage. If yes, then at step  80 , the control box initiates a new command to TR to re-attempt to execute that particular safety step at  52 . If no, then at step  82 , the microprocessor in the control box determines that the third component must have failed to engage. At step  84 , the control box initiates a new command to TR to re-attempt to execute that particular safety step at  62 . 
         [0035]    It should be noted that  FIG. 4  illustrates one embodiment of a method to successfully complete the appropriate safety protocol. Although the method illustrates the method as applied to a locomotive engine with three safety steps or conditions, multiple safety steps or conditions may be easily added. The steps or conditions may be executed in any desired order. Moreover, this method applies to any equipment where a plurality of components may need to be engaged prior to successful completion of a safety protocol. Additionally, the method itself may be suitably varied or modified. For instance, at any of steps  76 ,  80 , or  84 , the operator may decide to abort or disable the safety protocol. In a different embodiment, one or more of the logic circuits at steps  44 ,  54 , or  64  may communicate remotely with the respective components. These and other variations will be apparent to one skilled in the art, and are included within the scope of the present invention. 
         [0036]    Turning now to  FIG. 5 , one embodiment of electronic circuitry for safety verification management system  100  is shown. The embodiment illustrated here is a modification of the safety verification system  10  shown in  FIG. 1 , with two important additions: all the communication networks are two-way networks; and a management module  110  has been added. One embodiment of management module  110  comprises of a control system  112  and a communication system  114 , which communicate over a two-way network  118 . Both the control system  112  and the communication system  114  have processors. The management module  110  communicates with TU  28  over network  116 ; with one or more control boxes  32  over network  32   a,  and with one or more RRUs  34  over network  34   a.  Each TU, control box and RRU is equipped with geographical location software, such as a GPS system, and periodically updates its location information to management module  110  via communication system  114 . Control system  112  maintains a continually updated database of the relative positions of all personnel carrying control boxes or TRUs, and certain locomotives, in particular, those that are being actively controlled by one or more control boxes. Each control box, and one or more of the TUs and RRUs may also be equipped with a direction detection and display package. Each TU is associated with a control box and a set of RRUs. Relative positions of these objects are continually updated on the counters or displays. In some embodiments, a map of the target area may be displayed on a monitor, with real-time locations of a TU, RCO and RRUs. This allows the RCO to know for certain which locomotive engine is being controlled by the operation of a particular control box. 
         [0037]    Control system  112  may be further configured with appropriate software that monitors the relative positions of personnel such as an RCO or those carrying RRUs, so that when these personnel come within a certain predetermined radius of a locomotive engine for which a Three Step Protection Module has not been successfully completed, the control system  112  prompts communication system  114  to generate an audible, visible, audiovisual, or vibratory alarm that warns the appropriate personnel that they are proximate to a hazardous equipment in unsafe mode, a potentially dangerous situation. 
         [0038]    In addition to the modifications already discussed, the management system  100  may also carry out the functions of a safety verification system as shown in  FIG. 1 . In particular, a control box  32  communicates with TU  28  via communication system  114 , and signals TU  28  to execute one or more safety protocols. The control box  32  may be programmed to operate automatically. Alternatively, the control box may be managed by the control system  112 . Alternatively, the control box may be operated manually, sometimes remotely by a RCO. TU  28  in turn communicates with the reverser lever  22  via network  22   a , which may be a physical or wireless network. When the reverser lever  22  is centered, it sends a signal back to TU  28  over network  22   a.  Upon successful centering of the reverser lever, TU  28  communicates with management system  110 . Control system  112  then instructs TU  28  to initiate the next step. TU  28  communicates with the generator switch  24  via network  24   a,  which may be a physical or wireless network. When the generator switch  24  is switched off, it sends a signal back to TU  28  over network  24   a.  Upon successful completion of this step, TU  28  communicates with management system  110 . Control system  112  then instructs TU  28  to initiate the next step. TU  28  communicates with the independent brake  26  via network  26   a,  which may be a physical or wireless network. When the independent brake  26  is fully applied, it sends a signal back to TU  28  over network  26   a.  Once TU  28  receives information that all components are properly engaged, it transmits a signal to control system  112  over network  116  that the locomotive is in safe mode. The management system  110  then informs the RCO and RRUs that the Three Step Protection module has been successfully completed. The steps or conditions may be executed in any order. 
         [0039]    Turning now to  FIG. 6 , a flow chart shows a method for an independent safety verification system in a locomotive. The system comprises a Transceiver or Transmitter Unit (“TU”) and a Remote Receiving Unit (“RRU”). Typically, the TU is attached to the locomotive engine, but in some embodiments, the TU may be part of a remote safety management system. The RRU is carried by one or more crew members. The RRU may be removably attached to a vest, a helmet, a belt, or some other article of clothing or clothing accessories worn by the crew member. In a typical railroad locomotive worksite, a crew member requests an engineer to place a subject locomotive in safe mode, as represented by step  120 . At step  122 , the engineer places the locomotive in safe mode by initiating and completing the 3-step protection mode and sends a manual confirmation to the crew member that the locomotive engine is in safe mode. The crew member has no way to verify whether safe mode has actually been achieved. In particular, if the engineer fails to place the locomotive in safe mode and the crew member initiates work on the locomotive, an immediate zone of danger is created and the crew member is placed at considerable risk of serious injury, or even loss of life. Such an impending accident is prevented by this invention. 
         [0040]    At step  124 , the locomotive engine sends an independent status update to TU. At step  126 , TU continually monitors the state of the safety protocol. When the engine independently confirms that all three steps or conditions of the safety protocol are successfully completed, TU signals RRU at step  128  that the locomotive is in safe mode, whereupon a safety light on the RRU is turned on at step  130 . On the other hand, at step  126 , if TU determines that any of the three steps or conditions in the safety protocol is not properly completed, TU signal RRU at step  132  that the locomotive is in unsafe mode, whereupon at step  134 , the safety light on RRU flashes and an audible alarm may also begin to sound. This alerts the crew member to immediately move out of the zone of danger. At step  136 , crew member informs the engineer that the locomotive is in unsafe mode. At step  122 , engineer re-attempts to place the locomotive in three step protection mode. If during this cycle, the process reaches step  130 , then the flashing light and audible alarm on the RRU are turned off, while the safety light on the RRU is turned on. 
         [0041]    If at step  120 , the crew member no longer needs the engine to be in safe mode, then he signals that the safety protocol be disabled. The safety verification system determines if the protection mode is currently on in step  138 . If the safety mode is disabled, the process terminates. Otherwise, at step  140 , engineer disables the safety mode by releasing the locomotive from the safety protection mode. At step  142 , TU signals RRU, and at step  144 , the safety light on the RRU is turned off, and the process terminates. 
         [0042]    While many novel features have been described above, the invention is not limited to these physical embodiments. It is described and illustrated with particularity so that that those skilled in the art may understand all other embodiments that may arise due to modifications, changes in the geometry and placement of the relative components, omissions and substitutions of these embodiments that are still nonetheless within the scope of this invention.