Abstract:
A method and system for conducting an auction having at least two competing bidders is disclosed. The method includes receiving bid data from at least one bidder and providing the bid data to a bidder that meets a condition for receiving the bid data. An apparatus for determining a suggested bid value that surpasses a selected bid is also disclosed. The apparatus includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to provide a user selectable facility which, when selected establishes the value of the selected bid, calculates the suggested bid value by subtracting a predetermined minimum differential value from the selected bid value, and conveys the suggested bid value to the user.

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS  
         [0001]    Not Applicable.  
         STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH  
         [0002]    Not Applicable.  
         BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION  
         [0003]    1. Field of the Invention  
           [0004]    The disclosed invention relates generally to conducting auctions, and in particular to restricting access to market information in online electronic auctions.  
           [0005]    2. Description of the Background  
           [0006]    Procurement and selling of supplies has traditionally involved high transaction costs. Particularly, the cost of information searching regarding suppliers and sellers and their goods and services has often been prohibitively high. The introduction of electronic commerce has introduced new methods of procurement and selling that lower some of the transaction costs associated with procurement. Online procurement, or business-to-business electronic commerce, matches purchasers and suppliers so that transactions can take place electronically. The terms “purchaser” and “buyer” are used interchangeably herein to describe the party that desires to purchase goods or services in an auction. The terms “supplier” and “bidder” are used interchangeably herein to describe the party that desires to sell goods or services in the auction. Three models for online procurement are catalog, buyer-bidding auction, and supplier-bidding auction.  
           [0007]    The “catalog” model of online procurement allows customers to obtain information regarding products and services from a single supplier, i.e., single-source catalogs. Early electronic catalogs were developed by individual suppliers to help customers obtain information about products provided by the developing supplier and order those products electronically. Customers, however, were often not satisfied with such single-source catalogs but rather preferred to compare a number of competing products to facilitate a comparison of features and pricing. Thus, certain suppliers began to include competitors&#39; products on their systems. By offering competing products in one catalog, those suppliers created “electronic markets.” 
           [0008]    The electronic markets created by suppliers, however, could be biased toward the supplier offering the electronic market. Thus, unbiased electronic markets that promote competition were developed to further lower purchase prices.  
           [0009]    For standard products and services, third party market makers compiled databases of related products and services from various suppliers to provide a single market from which similar products and services may be compared and through which those goods and services may be purchased. Purchasers may, thus, access the database of such a third party market, view information and pricing information related to each desired product or service, and order the desired products and services in a single visit to the third party database.  
           [0010]    When many purchasers compete for the right to buy from one supplier, a buyer-bidding auction model is created. In a certain buyer-bidding auction, potential purchasers compete for a product or service by submitting one or more bids to a website operated by the buyer-bidding auction coordinator. After the bids have been received, the supplier may choose to accept the highest bid, thereby binding the high bidder to a contract for the sale of the product or service.  
           [0011]    The catalog and buyer-bidding auction types of electronic markets, however, do not work well in some situations. For example, if the required product is custom made for the purchaser, it is difficult for suppliers to publish a set price in advance for a catalog market. Likewise, it is difficult for purchasers to specify all of the details of the product they want to purchase in a buyer-bidding auction.  
           [0012]    Traditionally, when a company required a custom industrial product, procurement was made by a purchaser for the company who searched for potential suppliers and acquired custom price quotes from those suppliers for the needed custom product. The search process tended to be slow because suppliers had to be sought out and then negotiations had to take place. The search process also tended to be somewhat random because it often relied heavily on personal relationships between purchasers and suppliers. There were also significant costs associated with locating vendors, comparing products, negotiating, and paperwork preparation in a purchase decision. The cost of switching suppliers may also be prohibitive because of the cost of searching for other qualified suppliers. Thus, purchasers disadvantageously received price quotes from existing suppliers that were not the lowest price that could have been obtained by a more thorough supplier search. New suppliers were also placed at a disadvantage due to the difficulty and cost of marketing to purchasers who have existing suppliers.  
           [0013]    As an alternative, purchasers may use on-line auctions having prequalified bidders to save money. The assignee of the present application developed a system, wherein suppliers downwardly bid against one another to achieve the lowest market price in a supplier-bidding, auction.  
           [0014]    In a supplier-bidding auction, bid prices typically start high and move downward in a reverse-auction format as suppliers interact to establish a low price at the close of the auction. The auction marketplace is typically one-sided, i.e., one purchaser and many potential suppliers. Either goods or services may be purchased in an auction, and the goods may be of any type including, for example, office products, finished products, other products, parts, components, or materials. “Components” typically are fabricated tangible pieces or parts that are assembled into durable products. Example components include gears, bearings, appliance shelves, and door handles. “Materials” are often raw materials that may be purchased in bulk and that are further transformed into product. Example materials include corn syrup and sheet steel.  
           [0015]    Furthermore, industrial purchasers often desire to purchase more than one component at a time. They may purchase whole families of similar components or groups of components that are related to one another by, for example, the final product into which they are incorporated. As an example, a purchaser might purchase a given plastic knob in two different colors, or might purchase a nameplate in four different languages. Those parts may be so similar that it is only practical to purchase the parts from the same supplier because, for example, all of the knobs can be made using the same mold. Those items are therefore grouped into a single lot. Suppliers in industrial auctions may, therefore, be required to provide unit price quotes for all line items in a lot.  
           [0016]    The process for a supplier-bidding auction is described below with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2. FIG. 1 illustrates the functional elements and entities in a supplier-bidding auction  56 , while FIG. 2 is a diagram that identifies the tasks performed by each of the involved entities.  
           [0017]    The supplier-bidding auction model typically requires that the bidding product or service be defined by the purchaser  10 . An auction coordinator  20  may work with the purchaser  10  to prepare for and conduct an auction  56  and to define potential new supply relationships resulting from the auction  56 .  
           [0018]    In the example illustrated in FIG. 2, the purchaser  10  provides data to the coordinator  20  in the Initial Contact phase  102  of the auction  56 . The coordinator  20  then prepares a specification  50  for each desired product  52 . Once the product  52  is defined, potential suppliers  30  for the product  52  are identified. The coordinator  20  and purchaser  10  work together to compile a list of potential suppliers from suppliers already known to the purchaser  10  as well as suppliers recommended by the coordinator  20 .  
           [0019]    The purchaser  10  makes a decision regarding which potential suppliers  30  will receive invitations to the upcoming auction  56 . Suppliers  30  that accept auction invitations are then sent notices regarding the upcoming auction  56 . In certain situations, suppliers  30  may also receive software to install in preparation of participating in the auction  56 .  
           [0020]    In the RFQ phase  104  illustrated in FIG. 2, the coordinator  20  works with the purchaser  10  to prepare a Request for Quotation (“RFQ”)  54 . The coordinator  20  collects and maintains the RFQ data provided by purchaser  10 , and then publishes the RFQ  54 , and manages the published RFQ  54 . The RFQ  54  includes specifications  50  for all of the products  52  covered by the RFQ  54 . In the RFQ  54 , the purchaser  10  may aggregate products into job “lots.” The purchaser  10  may also separate unlike products into separate lots to best fit the needs of the purchaser  10  and the capabilities of suppliers  30 . Lots, therefore, may include such things as aggregations of similar parts or products that are desired to be purchased together. That type of aggregation allows suppliers  30  to bid on that portion of the business for which they are best suited.  
           [0021]    During the auction  56 , bids  58  may be placed on individual lots (and their constituent parts  52 ) within the RFQ  54 . While suppliers  30  may be required to submit actual unit prices for all line items, the competition in an auction  56  is generally based on the aggregate value bid for lots. The aggregate value bid for a lot depends upon the level and nix of line item bids and the quantity for each line item. Therefore, suppliers  30  may submit bids at the line item level, but compete on the lot level.  
           [0022]    In the Auction Administration phase  106 , the coordinator  20  coordinates the auction  56  and administers the auction setup and preparation. The coordinator  20  sends an RFQ  54  to each participating supplier  30 , and assists participating suppliers  30  to prepare for the auction  56 .  
           [0023]    In the Conduct Auction phase  108 , suppliers  30  submit bids  58  on the lots and monitor the progress of the bidding by the participating suppliers  30 . The coordinator  20  assists, observes, and administers the auction  56 .  
           [0024]    When the bidding period is over, the auction  56  enters the Administration of Auction Results phase  110 . In that phase, the coordinator  20  analyzes and administers the auction results, which are viewed by the purchaser  10 . The purchaser  10  begins to qualify the low bidding supplier  30  or suppliers  30 . The purchaser  10  generally retains the right not to award business to a low bidding supplier  30  based on final qualification results or other business concerns.  
           [0025]    In the ensuing Contract Administration phase  112 , the coordinator  20  facilitates settlements  60  awarded by the purchaser  10  to suppliers  30 . Contracts  62  are then drawn up between the purchaser  10  and suppliers  30 .  
           [0026]    The auction  56  is conducted electronically between potential suppliers  30  at their respective remote sites and the coordinator  20  at its site. As shown in FIG. 3, information is conveyed between the coordinator  20  and the suppliers  30  via a communications medium such as a network service provider  40  accessed by the participants through, for example, dial-up telephone connections using modems, or direct network connections. A computer system may be used to manage the auction  56 . The computer system may have two components: a client component and a server component. The client component may operate on a computer at the site of each potential supplier  30  or may be accessed via a supplier computer. The client component is used by suppliers  30  to make bids during the auction  56 . The bids are sent via the network service provider  40  to the site of the coordinator  20 , where they are received by the server component of the software application.  
           [0027]    The purchaser  10  may access the auction  56  through the auction coordinator  20  as illustrated in FIG. 3, or may alternately access the auction  56  through a network service provider  40 .  
           [0028]    In auctions  56 , and in particular reverse auctions, it is desirable that bidder/suppliers  30  actively participate in the auction  56  by submitting lower bids on a regular basis throughout the duration of the auction  56 . It is expected that each bidder  30  will consider factors including bids of the other bidders  30 , their own costs, and potential efficiencies that may be had that will reduce the cost to the bidder  30  such that the bidder  30  may submit a reduced bid to the purchaser  10 . In certain auctions  56 , however, it has been discovered that certain bidders  30  hold back their bids until late in the time allotted for the auction  56 . Other bidders  30  choose not to bid at all during the auction  56 . A decision not to bid during an auction  56  may be made for many reasons. One reason for not bidding occurs when the bidder  30  is not desirous of being awarded a contract in the auction  56 , but rather is gathering information, such as, for example, the price at which suppliers  30  are willing to provide goods and services. When bidders  30  hold their bids until late in the auction  56  or do not bid at all, the benefit of competitive bidding to the purchaser  10  is lost or reduced. Furthermore, purchasers  10  and bidders  30  alike may prefer to avoid providing such information to non-participants to protect the confidentiality of the auction  56 .  
           [0029]    Thus, there is a need for a system and process whereby bidders  30  are encouraged to place a bid  58 . There is a further need for a system and process whereby bidders  30  are provided with an incentive to actively participate in an auction  56  by submitting additional, progressively lower bids  58  throughout the auction  56 . There is also a need for a system and method of bidding that protects bidding confidentiality.  
         SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION  
         [0030]    In accordance with a particularly preferred form of the present invention, there is provided a method and system for conducting an auction having at least two competing bidders is disclosed. The method includes receiving bid data from at least one bidder and providing the bid data to each bidder that meets a condition for receiving the bid data.  
           [0031]    An apparatus for determining a suggested bid value that surpasses a selected bid is also disclosed. The apparatus includes a computer readable medium having stored thereon instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to provide a user selectable facility which, when selected establishes the value of the selected bid, calculates the suggested bid value by subtracting a predetermined minimum differential value from the selected bid value, and conveys the suggested bid value to the user.  
           [0032]    Thus, the present invention provides a method, apparatus and system that beneficially encourages bidders to place a bid.  
           [0033]    The present invention also provides a method, apparatus and system that beneficially provides bidders with an incentive to actively participate in an auction by submitting additional, progressively lower bids throughout the auction.  
           [0034]    In addition, the present invention also provides a method, apparatus and system that beneficially protects bidding confidentiality.  
           [0035]    Accordingly, the present invention provides solutions to the shortcomings of prior online auctions. Those of ordinary skill in the art will readily appreciate, therefore, that those and other details, features, and advantages will become further apparent in the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments. 
       
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS  
       [0036]    The accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals are employed to designate like parts or steps, are included to provide a further understanding of the invention, are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, and illustrate embodiments of the invention that together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention.  
         [0037]    In the drawings:  
         [0038]    [0038]FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of the elements and entities involved in an embodiment of an auction;  
         [0039]    [0039]FIG. 2 is a tabular illustration of the tasks performed by the entities involved in the auction of FIG. 1;  
         [0040]    [0040]FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of the communications links between the coordinator, the buyer, and the suppliers in the auction of FIG. 1;  
         [0041]    [0041]FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an auction network;  
         [0042]    [0042]FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating an information flow of the present invention;  
         [0043]    [0043]FIG. 6 is a sample purchaser screen display that may be used to practice an embodiment of the invention;  
         [0044]    [0044]FIG. 7 is a sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 6;  
         [0045]    [0045]FIG. 8 is another sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 6;  
         [0046]    [0046]FIG. 9 is a flow diagram illustrating another information flow of the present invention;  
         [0047]    [0047]FIG. 10 is a flow diagram illustrating yet another information flow of the present invention;  
         [0048]    [0048]FIG. 11 is a sample purchaser screen display that may be used to practice an embodiment of the invention;  
         [0049]    [0049]FIG. 12 is a sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 11;  
         [0050]    [0050]FIG. 13 is another sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 11;  
         [0051]    [0051]FIG. 14 is another sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 11;  
         [0052]    [0052]FIG. 15 is another sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 11; and  
         [0053]    [0053]FIG. 16 is another sample bidder screen display that may be used to practice the embodiment of the invention of FIG. 11. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION  
       [0054]    Reference will now be made in detail to the preferred embodiments of the present invention, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. It is to be understood that the Figures and descriptions of the present invention included herein illustrate and describe elements that are of particular relevance to the present invention, while eliminating, for purposes of clarity, other elements found in typical auction systems and computer networks. The present invention described below extends the operation of the inventive auction systems and methods described in greater detail in co-pending application Ser. No. 09/252,790, entitled “Method and System for Controlling Closing Times of Electronic Auctions Involving Multiple Lots” filed Feb. 19, 1999, and co-pending Application Ser. No. 09/282,157, entitled “Method and System for Conducting Electronic Auctions with Transformation Bidding” filed Mar. 31, 1999, the disclosures of which are hereby expressly incorporated in the present application.  
         [0055]    The preferred embodiments described herein utilize an online reverse auction, wherein the present invention is performed by a computer processor, as an example. In those examples, suppliers  30  bid to supply goods or services to a purchaser  10  and the purchaser  10  typically purchases the goods or services from the lowest priced qualified bidder  30 . It is to be understood, however, that the present invention may be used in other applications. The auction  56  would not necessarily have to occur online and the present invention may be performed by other than a computer processor. The present invention may also be utilized in connection with auctions other than reverse auctions. For example, the present invention may be advantageously utilized with forward auctions, wherein the party offering the highest priced qualified bid, rather than the lowest priced qualified bid, is awarded the goods or services being sold. In the case of a forward auction, the leading bid is the highest amount offered and the leading bidder  30  is the purchaser party  10  making that highest offer, while in a reverse auction, the leading bid is the lowest amount offered and the leading bidder  30  is the supplier party  30  making that lowest bid. Similarly, placing a “better bid” in a reverse auction indicates placing a lower bid, while placing a “better bid” in a forward auction indicates placing a higher bid.  
         [0056]    [0056]FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an auction network  70  of the present invention for operating an auction. The auction network  70  may be divided into three functional sections; a client access network  71 , a communications network  73 , and a data processing network  76 . The client access network  71  may, for example, include one or more client machines  72  for accessing and communicating with the communications network  73 . The communications network  73  may include one or more primary communications servers  74 , secondary communications servers  75 , and directory, login and reporting servers  90 . The data processing network  76  may include production servers  77 , training and reporting servers  80 , reporting and training databases  86 , and production databases  84 . The production servers  77  and training and reporting servers  80  are referred to collectively herein as bid servers  77  and  80 .  
         [0057]    The client machines  72  may be, for example, personal computers located at each bidder  30  and purchaser site  10  for accessing the auction  56 . The client machines  72  may access the auction  56  by, for example, connecting to a web site operated by the party hosting the auction  56 . The client machines  72  may also receive software from the communications network  73  that facilitates communications with the communications network  73 .  
         [0058]    The primary communications servers  74  are utilized to provide information to bids  58  received from the client machines  72  to the bid servers  77  and  80 , and to provide that bid information from the bid servers  77  and  80  to the client machines  72 . The primary communications servers  74  may furthermore act as a firewall to prevent direct access to the bid servers  77  and  80  by the client machines. The secondary communications servers  75  act as backups to the primary communications servers  74 . The secondary communications servers  75  will perform the communication functions normally performed by the primary communications servers  74  if a failure occurs in the primary communications servers  74 , thereby providing redundancy to the auction network  70 .  
         [0059]    The directory, login, and reporting servers  90  may perform a variety of functions that may be performed by a single server or include separate servers for the various functions. The directory, login, and reporting servers  90  may include a web server that acts as a portal for access to the auction network  70 . As such, the directory, login, and reporting servers  90  will receive login requests for access to the auction network  70  via, for example, the Internet. The directory, login, and reporting servers  90  may make access decisions as to whether a client machine  72  is permitted to access the communications network  73 . If access is permitted, the directory, login, and reporting servers  90  will direct the client machine  72  to the appropriate portion of the auction network  70 . The directory, login, and reporting servers  90 , may provide reports to client machines  72 . For example, information from prior auctions  56  which may be utilized by purchasers  10  to make a decision as to which bidder  30  will be awarded the sale and to permit the purchaser  10  to consider the way in which the auction  56  proceeded so that future auctions  56  may be refined.  
         [0060]    The production servers  77  run the bidding software that facilitates auctions  56  as they occur. The production servers  77  may communicate with client machines  72  through primary and secondary communications servers  74  and  75 . The production servers  77  may also be redundant so that if a failure occurs in the production server  77  that is being utilized in an auction event  56 , the redundant backup production server  77  may perform the functions of the failed production server  77  and, thus, prevent failure of the auction  56 .  
         [0061]    The training and reporting servers  80  operate in a manner similar to the production servers  77  and provide reports for auctions  56 . It is useful to operate test auctions  56  to test the operating systems and to train personnel and clients. Such testing may be performed on the production servers  77  or, to prevent any degradation of system operation in actual auctions  56 , one or more separate training servers may be utilized for testing and training. Reporting may also be accomplished on the production servers  77  or the report creation functions may be offloaded to one or more reporting servers  80 . The reporting servers  80  may furthermore be combined with the training servers  80 .  
         [0062]    Data related to auctions  56  may be held in one or more storage devices. The data storage devices may, for example, be a magnetic storage device, a random access memory device (RAM), or a read only memory device (ROM). The data may include pre-auction data, post auction data, and data that is related to active auctions  56 . Pre-auction data may include, for example, suppliers  30  that are permitted to bid on a particular auction  56  and the scheduled auction starting and ending times. Post auction data may include the bids and bid times received in a particular auction  56  and reports displaying that data in user friendly formats. Active auction data may include data received from the bidders  30  as the auction  56  is taking place and related data such as the rank of each bidder  30 .  
         [0063]    The “rank” of the bidders  30  is determined by comparing the lowest amount bid by each bidder  30  and ordering the bidders  30  according to those lowest bids. The bidder ranked first is the bidder  30  that has bid an amount lower than any other bidder  30  in a reverse auction. The last rank may be a rank equal to the number of bidders  30  who have submitted bids in the auction  56 , and the bidder  30  having that last rank is the bidder  30  that has submitted the highest amount in a reverse auction that is based on price only. Of course, there are many known ways to calculate rank, and any of those may be used in connection with the subject invention. The other bidders  30  are ranked between first and last according to the amounts of their lowest submitted bids. Thus, a higher, or better ranked bidder  30  in a reverse auction is a bidder  30  who has placed a comparatively lower bid, while a higher, or better ranked bidder  30  in a forward auction is a bidder  30  who has placed a comparatively higher bid. An auction  56  may alternately be based on one or more factors other than price, such as quality, delivery factors, and/or other factors that are referred to herein collectively as “total value.” Thus, rank may also be based on factors other than price, including total value and any other factor that is useful in an auction  56  setting. A bid or bid amount is a value that is submitted by each participating bidder  30  for comparison to the bids of other bidders  30 , and may likewise be based on a variety of bid factors that are considered important to the bid participants. Those factors may include, for example, price, quality, other costs such as delivery costs, or a total value. Bids may also be placed in a number of ways including, for example, absolute total value, or comparative value such as bidding in relation to an index price.  
         [0064]    Three databases, or groupings of databases, are incorporated into the auction network illustrated in FIG. 4. The production databases  84  hold data that will be used by or is received from the production servers  77 , while the reporting and training databases  86  hold data that will be used by or is received from the training and reporting servers  80 .  
         [0065]    The directory, login, and reporting servers  90  illustrated provide a web portal for the client machines  72 . The directory, login, and reporting servers  90  provide an initial contact point for the client machines  72 , access to auctions  56  in which the client machine  72  is permitted to participate, and reports relating to active and closed auctions  56 .  
         [0066]    One skilled in the art will recognize that certain components of the network described herein, while beneficial to an auction network, are not necessary components in an operational auction network. For example, the secondary communications servers  75  could be removed where the benefit of redundancy is not desired, and the primary communications servers  74  could be removed and the client machines  72  could communicate directly with the bid servers  77  and  80 .  
         [0067]    In a business-to-business online auction  56 , bidders  30  may compete openly using their identities, or anonymously wherein bidders  30  view bids  58  placed by other bidders  30  but do not know the identity of those other bidders  30 . Feedback about bidding activity is referred to as “market feedback” and includes any information or data related to the bidders  30  or their bids or interrelationships between those bids, and any other bid related information or data such as, for example, the quality of goods being sold, that is received before or during the auction  56 . Market feedback may include, for example, bids that have been placed by other bidders  30 , the rank of a participants bid in relation to the other bidders  30 , the identity of bidders  30  in relation to their bids or rank, or any subset of that information. Market feedback may also include non-pricing information such as, for example, the quality of the goods to be provided by bidders  30  and shipping costs associated with one or more bidders  30 . Providing such market feedback to bidders  30  in an auction  56  helps create real-time competitive interaction among participants in the auction  56  because, without feedback, bidders  30  would have less incentive to revise their price quotes and place additional bids to remain competitive.  
         [0068]    In a certain type of online auction  56 , which may be referred to as “full market feedback format,” all bids  58  are visible to every bidder  30 . Bids  58  are sorted from highest to lowest. Thus, each bidder  30  can assess its rank and competitive position if bidders  30  are individually identified, by comparing its current best bid  58  with other bids  58  placed in the online auction  56 .  
         [0069]    In a second type of online auction  56 , bidders  30  are provided with only their own current best bid  58  and the current market-leading bid. Bidders  30  are not aware of every bid  58  placed by other participants, but they can assess their competitive position against the current market-leading bid. In one variation of that second type of online auction  56 . bidders  30  also receive feedback about their current rank.  
         [0070]    Table 1 illustrates an example of a series of bids  58  placed by different bidders  30  participating in an online reverse auction  56 . Each row includes information related to a single bid  58  and the rows are ordered from highest bid to lowest bid. In the example illustrated in Table 1, each bidder  30  is identified anonymously. The first column lists a bidder identifier that is used in connection with all bids submitted by a particular bidder  30 . The second column lists the time the associated bid  58  was received and the third column lists the amount of bid  58 . The fourth column indicates the dollar value difference between the bid  58  and the lowest current bid  58  (“market-leading bid”) and the fifth column lists the percentage difference between the bid and the lowest current bid  58 . The sixth column indicates the current rank of each bidder  30  next to the best bid  58  submitted by each bidder  30 . Table 1 illustrates all of the bids  58  placed by every bidder  30 .  
                                                 TABLE 1                           A. All bids   Bids vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $128,000   23.62%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $122,000   22.51%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $18,000   3.32%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $17,000   3.14%       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500    $16,500   3.04%   7       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300    $16,300   3.01%   6       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700    $15,700   2.90%   5       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500    $15,500   2.86%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $10,000   1.85%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $7,000   1.29%       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800    $4,800   0.89%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400    $4,400   0.81%   4       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250    $4,250   0.78%   3       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000    $3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000       $0   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0071]    Applying the full market feedback format to the example illustrated in Table 1, each bidder  30  sees all of the information contained in Table 1 and is thus able to determine its rank and the difference between its best bid and the market-leading bid. For example, at 1:08:44 PM Bidder B can see that it is in second place, $3,000 above the market-leading bid placed by Bidder, G. Bidder F can see that it is in fourth place, $4,400 above the market-leading bid placed by Bidder G, $1,400 above Bidder B in second place, and $150 above Bidder C in third place.  
         [0072]    Each bidder  30  also receives market feedback regarding all bids  58  placed up to that time throughout the auction  56  if the full market feedback format is utilized. Thus, at 1:04:00 PM, the market-leading bid  58  is held by Bidder A, who placed a bid of $558,300 at 1:03:38 PM. That bid, and all other bids placed prior to that time are visible to all bidders, including Bidder E, who at that point in the auction  56  has not placed a bid  58 . By viewing the current market activity, Bidder E is able to formulate an appropriate first bid and submit a new market-leading, bid of $557,500 at 1:05:12 PM.  
         [0073]    The full market feedback format is particularly effective for many industrial commodities and supply markets but may be utilized in any type auction  56 . However, in certain auctions  56 , particularly those conducted in industrial and business-to-business settings, that form of market feedback generates sub-optimal results or unwanted side-effects that damage the integrity of the process. For example, in certain auctions  56 , the sponsor, which in the case of a reverse auction is typically the purchaser  10 , may not want pricing information to be disclosed to a large number of parties to minimize the likelihood that the pricing information will be released to the public. A sponsor may also wish to conceal the number of bidders that are available or participating in the auction  56 . In other auctions  56 , disingenuous participants will watch the auction  56  without bidding. Qualified bidders  30  that claim to be interested in bidding may view the entire auction  56  without ever submitting a bid. Such participants learn market pricing, information, and auction results that may have value for general business purposes beyond the scope of the particular supply opportunity up for bid. For many business-to-business auctions  56 , this is not a serious issue. For example, where the format of the auction  56  is such that bids are for aggregate “lots” of business consisting of many line items with individual unit prices, bidders  30  may compete at the lot level so that they see only aggregate or lot-level bids placed by other bidders  30  rather than the cost of each separate item being purchased. That severely limits the value of the pricing information certain bidders  30  are able to gather from watching the auction  56  because there is no way to deduce unit prices for separate items with any real accuracy. In certain other auctions  56 , the items for bid are custom-engineered components or inputs specific to a particular purchaser  10  such that the pricing information is not readily transferable or useful in other business contexts.  
         [0074]    For some auctions  56 , however, especially where the bidding format reveals unit pricing or the product is, for example, a commodity or standard item purchased by multiple purchasers  10 , allowing visibility to market pricing is a more sensitive issue for the genuine participants. In those cases, genuine bidders  30  may be discouraged from submitting the lowest price quotes they are prepared to offer due to fear that disingenuous competitors may be viewing the auction  56  and may use information learned from the auction  56  against the genuine bidders  30  in the marketplace beyond the particular supply opportunity up for bid. In extreme cases, that fear may be sufficient to discourage certain bidders  30  from participating in the auction  56 . For example, when a bidder  30  determines that the potential loss of the supply opportunity provided by the auction  56  is less damaging than the risk of damage that could occur to the entire base of business of the supplier  30  from revealing pricing information, the bidder  30  may opt not to participate in an auction  56  or not to price as aggressively in an auction  56  as the bidder  30  might otherwise. To guarantee full and aggressive participation, it is beneficial to assure bidders  30  that no bidders  30  are watching the auction  56  without actively participating themselves.  
         [0075]    In certain other auctions  56 , genuine participants may exploit market pricing learned from the auction  56 . There are circumstances where the supply industry dynamic is such that, even when all bidders  30  intend to participate, some bidders  30  will fail to participate, or will offer less aggressive quotes than they otherwise would, for fear that they will reveal critical pricing information that will “leak” into the marketplace and damage their businesses. For example, a losing bidder  30  may learn the identity of the successful bidder  30  in a particular auction  56  through industry gossip. In a subsequent competitive selling situation that losing bidder  30  may inform another purchaser  10  of the pricing that the successful bidder  30  quoted in the previous auction  56 . Thus, the winning bidder  30  is placed in an awkward position with subsequent purchasers  10  who may suspect that the successful bidder  30  had been supplying them with goods at a price higher than the bidder  30  was prepared to offer other customers. That situation may occur, for example, where (i) the bid format is structured to permit visibility to easily comparable pricing information (e.g., unit pricing); (ii) the commodity is a standard material purchased by multiple purchasers  10  (e.g., an industry standard grade of a particular chemical, such as 99% USP Food Grade Glycerin); and (iii) the industry structure is a consolidated “tight-knit” community where bidders  30  may learn the identity of the successful bidders  30  through market intelligence subsequent to the auction  56 .  
         [0076]    Another market feedback problem occurs in cases where bidders  30 , such as preferred suppliers  30  or “incumbent suppliers” (i.e., bidders  30  that are current or past suppliers  30  to the purchaser  10 ) bid significantly behind the market leading bid. In an auction  56  for an industrial component or input, for example, purchasers  10  may reserve the right to award to a non-low-bidding supplier  30 . That allows purchasers  10  to consider non-price factors, such as relationship history, service considerations, and location, that are material to establishing a supply contract with a particular bidder  30 . While the lowest bidder  30  generally enjoys a favored position with respect to receiving the award, the purchaser  10  may be prepared to trade-off a higher price for other benefits. Similarly, preferred suppliers  30  may believe that they can offer significant non-price benefits beyond the specified requirements, and may choose to bid at a premium to the market-leading bid. While that may not be an illogical bidding strategy or undesirable market dynamic, in certain situations suppliers  30  may over-estimate the premium the purchaser  10  is willing to pay for perceived non-price benefits. That may lead preferred suppliers  30  to offer significantly less aggressive price quotes than they otherwise would if they realized how little value the purchaser  10  truly places on the non-price benefits. Thus, a preferred supplier  30  may not realize its tactical en-or until the purchaser  10  awards the business to a more competitive supplier  30 . At that point, the auction  56  has closed and it is too late for the preferred supplier  30  to revise its bid to a lower value. The preferred supplier  30  will have, therefore, lost an opportunity to make a sale, and the purchaser  10  will also have lost the potential to award the sale to the preferred supplier  30  at a price within the expectation of the purchaser  10 .  
         [0077]    Another problem related to bidding behind the market occurs where incumbent suppliers  30  exploit market feedback to avoid competition. That problem may arise when a purchaser  10  selects a pricing structure, for example a fixed price or a differential price, that a non-incumbent supplier  30  must match or beat to be selected over an incumbent supplier  30 . In such a case, for example, an incumbent supplier  30  could know that the purchaser  10  favors the incumbent supplier  30  even at a price premium to the market. Because the purchaser  10  may pass over low bidders  30 , incumbent suppliers  30  can take advantage of their incumbent status. To ameliorate that disadvantage for new suppliers  30 , it is common to communicate a “reserve price” to all bidders  30  prior to the auction  56 . The reserve price represents the price at which the purchaser  10  will be willing to switch the business from the incumbent to a new source. Reserve price may be calculated in various ways including deducting the switching costs of the purchaser  10  from the “historic price” that the incumbent is currently charging the purchaser  10 . The use of such a reserve price affords new suppliers  30  an opportunity to offset the incumbent&#39;s advantage by ensuring that their bids are low enough for the purchaser  10  to recover any switching costs that Would otherwise prevent them from receiving the award.  
         [0078]    In certain embodiments, the reserve price may be permitted to fluctuate when an incumbent bids an amount lower than the historic price. In such a situation, when an incumbent lowers its bid to less than the historic price, then the effective price required for a purchaser  10  to switch to a new supplier  30  will be lower than a reserve price that was a fixed amount below the historic price. Since an incumbent may calculate the differential between reserve and historic prices when the reserve price fluctuates, and can view the low bid, the incumbent can exploit its position by bidding behind the market by an amount slightly less than the differential between the historic and reserve prices. While being a reasonable rationale for the incumbent, that situation does not allow the purchaser  10  to maximize the competitive dynamic between incumbent and potential new suppliers  30 . In addition, new suppliers  30  often perceive this situation to be unfair because they are unable to identify an incumbent when bidding is anonymous.  
         [0079]    It may thus be beneficial to reward more aggressive bidders  30  with more information about bidding activity in certain circumstances (i.e., the closer a bidder&#39;s  30  current bid is to the market-leading bid, the more information about other bids placed in the market is provided to that bidder  30 ). The present invention includes improved online auction technology that allows market feedback to be made visible to each bidder  30  according to that bidder&#39;s level  30  of participation and relative position in the market (“differential market feedback”).  
         [0080]    “Differential market feedback technology” includes a variety of feedback mechanisms that may be used to differentiate bidders  30  while “differential market feedback rules” are used to define when a bidder  30  can view market feedback and may use differential market feedback technology in that determination. An example of differential market feedback technology as it is used to measure the market position of each bidder  30  relative to all other bidders  30  involves comparing the highest bid of each bidder  30  to the current market-leading bid. Examples of differential market feedback technology as it is used to measure market position relative to fixed reference points include ranking each bidder  30 , calculating the percentage differential between the bids of two or more bidders  30 , and calculating the absolute differential between the bids of two or more bidders  30 . Market position may also be determined relative to a fixed reference point by comparing each bid to a reserve price selected by the purchaser  10  or a historic price paid by the purchaser  10  in the past.  
         [0081]    Differential market feedback rules may include consideration of factors including level of market participation and market position. Market participation can be measured, for example, by whether the bidder  30  has submitted a bid at all, or by whether the bidder  30  has submitted a bid within a pre-determined time period between current time and the last time a bid was placed by that bidder  30 . Market position can be measured, for example, relative to other bids in the auction  56  or relative to a fixed reference point. Other known methods of measuring market participation and market position are known to those skilled in the art and are intended to be encompassed by the present invention.  
         [0082]    Differential market feedback rules may also take into consideration the relative positioning of bidders  30  as determined by the differential market feedback technology. Depending on the participation and position of a bidder  30 , the bidder  30  may, for example, be provided no feedback as to the market, the rank of the bidder  30 , information regarding only bids that are greater than (worse than) the lowest bid of that bidder  30 , information regarding the next lowest bid to the best bid placed by the bidder  30 , information regarding the market-leading bid, or information regarding all bids placed.  
         [0083]    By combining feedback rules and feedback types, an auction  56  may utilize a differential market feedback format uniquely suited to the requirements of each auction  56 , wherein the differential market feedback technology dynamically adjusts the feedback visible to each bidder  30  depending on their position in the auction  56  and other factors.  
         [0084]    [0084]FIG. 5 is a flow diagram  120  illustrating an embodiment of the present invention wherein access to market feedback is restricted to those bidders  30  who have submitted at least one valid bid. This example, and other examples provided herein, assume that a computer processor is executing a set of instructions that perform the steps, however, it will be recognized by one skilled in the art that the instructions may be carried out by any known method. At  122  of the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 5, the auction  56  is commenced by accepting bids from the bidders  30 . The auction  56  normally begins at a scheduled time that has been prearranged by the auction coordinator  20 , the purchaser  10  and the bidders  30 . At  124  a bid is received from any bidder  30  participating in the auction  56 . That bid, as well as any other bid discussed herein, may be a bid that is created by a bidder  30  and submitted to the data processing network  77  from the client machine  72  by way of the communication network  53 . At  126  the processor determines which bidders  30  have submitted at least one bid and, for example, sets a flag identifying those bidders  30  as “bid participants”  
         [0085]    At  128  through  144 , an example is provided of the bid participant segment of this embodiment, wherein market feedback is provided only to those bidders  30  who have placed at least one bid and are, thus, bid participants. In that example, “n” represents the number of bidders  30  that are permitted by the auction coordinator  20  to participate in the auction  56 . At  128 , the processor checks to see whether Bidder one is a bid participant. At  130 , market feedback is provided to Bidder one if Bidder one is a bid participant and at  132 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder one if Bidder one is not a bid participant.  
         [0086]    Similarly, at  134 , the processor checks to see whether Bidder two is a bid participant. At  136 , market feedback is provided to Bidder two if Bidder two is a bid participant and at  138 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder two if Bidder two is not a bid participant. The processor will continue by considering the bid participant status of each bidder  30  and provide market feedback to only those bidders  30  who are bid participants. At  140 , the processor checks to see whether the last bidder  30  (Bidder n) is a bid participant. At  142 , market feedback is provided to Bidder n if Bidder n is a bid participant and at  144 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder n if Bidder n is not a bid participant.  
         [0087]    After the bid participant segment has been completed, the processor will determine whether the auction closing time has arrived at  146 . If the auction closing time has not arrived, the processor will return to  124  to receive additional bids. Each time a new bid is received the processor will update the bid participant status of the bidders  30  and provide market feedback to all bid participants. If the auction closing time has arrived, the auction  56  will close and no additional bids will be accepted.  
         [0088]    Additional conditions may be placed on a bidder  30  prior to permitting the bidder  30  to access market feedback. As an example of one condition, any bidder  30  that places a noncompetitive bid, (i.e., a bid in excess of a predetermined amount in a reverse auction) is not permitted to view market feedback until that bidder  30  places a competitive bid. Such a competitive bid may include a bid that is less than a predetermined amount in a reverse auction and a bid that is greater than a predetermined amount in a forward auction. Alternately or in addition, a bidder  30  who is receiving market feedback may stop receiving market feedback if an extended period of time has elapsed since that bidder  30  placed its last bid, or if the bid is determined to be invalid. Another method of assuring that each bidder  30  places at least one competitive bid, is to require each bidder to submit and commit to such a competitive bid prior to commencement of the auction  56 . The auction  56  may then begin by having the auction coordinator  20  enter those bids into the auction network  70 .  
         [0089]    FIGS.  6 - 8  illustrate sample screens that may be displayed for various participants in a particular auction  56  utilizing the rule that access to market feedback is restricted to those bidders  30  who have submitted at least one bid. FIG. 6 illustrates a sample of a screen  150  that may be displayed to the purchaser  10 . A lot listing  152  includes statistics related to three lots of parts that are being auctioned. Lot three is highlighted in the lot listing  152 , indicating that lot three is active in the rest of the screen  150 . At  154 , statistics for all three lots are displayed and at  156  additional statistics for lot three are displayed. A bid history  158 , listing bids received for lot three, is also provided because lot three is the active lot. The lot three bid history  158  is arranged from the highest bid amount to the lowest amount bid.  
         [0090]    [0090]FIG. 7 illustrates a sample of a screen  160  that may be displayed to a bidder  30  who has not submitted a valid bid for lot three during the course of the auction  56 . At  162 , statistics regarding the market, or bids placed by other bidders  30 , are provided in connection with lots one and two only. The bidder  30  is provided with a bid submission area  164 , with which a bid may be formulated and submitted. The bidder  30  is also provided with a general status area  166  and a lot specific status area  168 , that includes information related to active lot three. It will be noted that the rank and total bids statistics are blank in FIG. 7 because the bidder  30  viewing FIG. 7 has not submitted a bid for lot three. At bid history area  170 , the bid history is provided if the bidder  30  viewing screen  160  had placed a valid bid. Because the bidder  30  has not placed a bid, however, a message stating “bid history is not available until you submit a valid bid in this lot” is displayed in the bid history area  170 .  
         [0091]    [0091]FIG. 8 illustrates a sample of a screen  180  that may be displayed to a bidder  30  who has submitted a valid bid for lot three during the course of the auction  56 . At lot listing  182 , statistics regarding the market or bids placed by other bidders  30  are provided in connection with lots one and two and three because the viewing bidder  30  has placed at least one valid bid for each of those lots. At bid submission area  184 , the bidder  30  is provided an area from which a bid may be formulated and submitted. At  186 , the bidder  30  is provided with a general status area and at  188  a status area for lot three, which is active because it is selected at  162 , is provided. It will be noted that the rank and total bids fields are displayed in FIG. 8 because the bidder  30  viewing FIG. 8 has submitted a valid bid for lot three. At  190  the bid history, including the amount of every bid placed and identifier for each bidder  30  is provided.  
       EXAMPLE 1  
       [0092]    The embodiment of the invention depicted in FIGS.  5 - 8  may also be illustrated by reference to Tables 1 through 5. In that embodiment, market feedback is provided to only those participants who have placed a valid bid. That prevents disingenuous participants from watching the auction  56  to gather pricing intelligence without placing a bid themselves and forces participants to take some risk by submitting a bid before they are able to view market feedback. That embodiment also discourages bidders  30  from waiting until the last moment to place a bid because no competitive information regarding the bid is available to a bidder  30  until that bidder  30  submits its first bid.  
         [0093]    Referring to the bidding activity shown in Table 1, at 1:04:00 PM, Bidders A, B, C, and D have submitted bids into the auction  56 , while Bidders E, F and G have not. Accordingly, in the current embodiment, market feedback would only be made available to Bidders A, B, C, and D at 1:04:00 PM, and those bidders  30  would view all bids placed by all bidders  30  at that time. Thus, the information provided to Bidders A, B, C, and D at 1:04:00 PM would appear as shown in Table 2.  
                                                     TABLE 2                           1. Market Participants Only       Bids vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $112,300   20.14%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $106,300   19.06%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $2,300   0.41%   4       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $1,300   0.23%   3       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500      $800   0.14%   2       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300      $600   0.11%   1                  
 
         [0094]    Bidders E, F and G would not receive any market feedback at 1:04:00 PM. Thus, the information provided to Bidders E, F, and G at 1:04:00 PM would appear as shown in Table 3.  
                                                         TABLE 3                                   1. Market Participants Only       Bids vs. Market Lead                                        Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                          
 
         [0095]    Again referring to Table 1, at 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E placed a bid of $557,700. As soon as that bid is submitted, Bidder E receives full feedback of all bids placed in the market. In this instance, Bidder E has placed a new market-leading bid, although this is not apparent to Bidder E until after the bid has been submitted. Thus, Bidder E and Bidders A, B, C, and D would see the bid history shown in Table 4 after the 1:05:12 PM bid has been submitted and Bidder E would realize lie has submitted the market-leading bid.  
                                                     TABLE 4                           1. Market Participants Only       Bids vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $112,300   20.14%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $106,300   19.06%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $2,300   0.41%   5       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $1,300   0.23%   4       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500      $800   0.14%   3       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300      $600   0.11%   2       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0096]    In this embodiment, once a bidder  30  has placed a bid, that bidder  30  is entitled to continue to see all bid history for the remainder of the auction  56  regardless of whether they submit any additional bids. Hence, at the end of the auction  56  at 1:09:00 PM, Bidder E will view the bid history shown below in Table 5, even though Bidder E had not place any additional bids.  
                                                     TABLE 5                           1. Market Participants Only       Bids vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $128,000    23.62%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $122,000    22.51%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $18,000   3.32%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $17,000   3.14%       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $16,500   3.04%   7       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $16,300   3.01%   6       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $15,700   2.90%   5       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $15,500   2.86%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000   $10,000   1.85%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $7,000   1.29%       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800    $4,800   0.89%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400    $4,400   0.81%   4       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250    $4,250   0.78%   3       Bidder B   1:03:17 PM   $545,000    $3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0097]    It should be noted that in example one and the following examples, the term “rank” indicates rank of bidders. Alternately, rank may be based on bids such that the bid placed by Bidder C at 1:07:22 PM in Table 5 would be ranked fifth.  
       EXAMPLE 2  
       [0098]    In another embodiment, a bidder  30  will not view any market feedback unless the current best bid of that bidder  30  is within a group of “market leaders.” Whether a bid qualifies the submitting bidder  30  as a market leader may be determined in many ways including, for example, a bidder  30  may be a market leader when that bidder  30  places a bid that is within no more than a predetermined percentage behind the market-leading bid. For example, the bidder  30  may be provided with market feedback as long as the lowest bid of that bidder  30  is no more than 2% behind the market-leading bid. Alternately, a bid may be considered a market leader if the lowest bid of that bidder  30  ranks no more than a specified number of places behind the market-leading bid. For example, the bidder  30  may be provided with market feedback as long as the lowest bid of that bidder  30  is one of the top three bids. In yet another alternative, a bid may be considered a market leader if the lowest bid of that bidder  30  is within no more than a predetermined absolute value behind the market-leading bid; for example, no more than $10,000 behind the market-leading bid.  
         [0099]    In the market leader embodiments, bidders  30  may view market feedback only as long as their bid remains within the market-leading group of bids. The first time a bidder  30  submits a bid within the market-leading group, they will be able to view market feedback. Up until that point (or if a bidder  30  does not submit a bid at all), no market feedback will be provided to that bidder  30 . If, in the course of the auction  56 , a bidder  30  falls out of the market-leading group because other bidders  30  have exceeded the rank of bidder  30 , the market feedback may not be updated for that bidder  30  from the point in time at which that bidder  30  fell out of the market-leading group. That is, the market feedback will freeze at that point and will not be updated until that bidder  30  regains a market-leading position. In this example, if the bidder  30  places another bid and regains a market-leading position, the market feedback for that bidder  30  will be updated to include all bids placed to that point in time, including the bids placed while the bidder  30  was out of the market-leading group. Hence, a bidder  30  might gain, lose, and re-gain visibility to market feedback many times during the course of an auction  56  depending on the competitive interaction between all of the bidders  30 .  
         [0100]    The market leader format rewards the most aggressive bidders  30  with the most pricing information from the auction  56  and prevents non-participating or uncompetitive bidders  30  from learning pricing information. It limits the disclosure of final auction results to all but the most aggressive bidders  30 , decreasing the risk to the market leaders that valuable pricing information will “leak out” to a broader marketplace. The decision about how to define the market-leading group can be used by the auction coordinator  20  as a strategic signal to all bidders  30  about the intentions of the purchaser  10  with respect to awarding the business. E.g., defining market leaders as the top three bidders  30  might be used as a signal that the award will go to one of the top three bidders  30 . That might, in turn, drive more aggressive bidding by all bidders  30 . Even incumbents are encouraged to stay in the top three ranked bidders  30  to avoid the risk of being so far behind the leaders that the purchaser  10  can comfortably justify the switching costs of moving the business.  
         [0101]    [0101]FIG. 9 is a flow diagram  200  illustrating an embodiment of the present invention wherein access to market feedback is restricted to those bidders  30  who are market leaders. At  202  of the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 9, the auction  56  commences by accepting bids from the bidders  30 . At  204 , a bid is received from any bidder  30  participating in the auction  56 . At  206 , the processor determines which bidders  30  are market leaders based on predetermined conditions such as the differential market feedback technology and the differential market feedback rules. The processor may then set a flag identifying the market leading bidders  30  as such.  
         [0102]    At  208  through  224 , an example is provided of the bid participant segment wherein market feedback is provided only to market leading bidders  30 . In that example, “n” represents the number of bidders  30  that are permitted by the auction coordinator to participate in the auction  56 . At  208 , the processor checks to see whether Bidder one is a market leader. At  210 , market feedback is provided to Bidder one if Bidder one is a market leader and at  212 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder one if Bidder one is not a market leader.  
         [0103]    Similarly, at  214 , the processor checks to see whether Bidder two is a market leader. At  216 , market feedback is provided to Bidder two if Bidder two is a market leader and at  218 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder two if Bidder two is not a market leader. The processor will continue to consider the market leading status of each bidder  30  and provide market feedback to only those bidders  30  who are market leaders. At  220 , the processor checks to see whether the last bidder  30  (Bidder n) is a market leader. At  222 , market feedback is provided to Bidder n if Bidder n is a market leader and at  144 , market feedback is withheld from Bidder n if Bidder n is not a market leader.  
         [0104]    After the bid participant segment has been completed, the processor will determine whether the auction closing time has arrived at  226 . If the auction closing time has not arrived, the processor will return to  204  to receives any additional bids that have been received. Each time a new bid is received the processor will update the market leading status of the bidders  30  and provide market feedback to all market leaders. If the auction closing time has arrived, the auction  56  will close and no additional bids will be accepted.  
         [0105]    Consider again the sequence of bidding activity in Table 1, assuming this time that the market leader format is being used such that bidders  30  must to be within 2% of the market-leading bid to view bidding activity. At 1:04:00 PM, Bidder E does not receive any market feedback because Bidder E has not yet placed any bids. Thus, the view of the market by Bidder E at 1:04:00 PM, is as shown in Table 6.  
                                                                       TABLE 6                                       2. Market Leaders Only       Bids vs. Market Lead                    Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                        No bid history is available until a bid has been submitted.                  
 
         [0106]    At 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E places a bid of $557,700, which is a new market-leading bid. After that bid has been placed, Bidder E is provided all permitted market feedback Lip until that point including all the bidding activity that had not previously been provided to Bidder E. Bidder E would see the bid history shown in Table 7 after the 1:05:12 PM bid is received.  
                                                 TABLE 7                           2. Market               Leaders Only   Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $112,300   20.14%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $106,300   19.06%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $2,300   0.41%   5       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $1,300   0.23%   4       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500      $800   0.14%   3       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300      $600   0.11%   2       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0107]    Bidder E is in a position to continue to view all bids placed by all bidders  30  unless and until the current best bid of Bidder E falls more than 2% behind the market-leading bid. Thus, Table 8 illustrates the market feedback that is provided to Bidder E at 1:07:22 PM because at that time, the best bid of Bidder E is within 2% of the market leading bid.  
                                                 TABLE 8                           2. Market               Leaders Only   Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $123,200    22.53%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $117,200    21.43%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $13,200   2.41%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $12,200   2.23%   7       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $11,700   2.14%   6       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $11,500   2.10%   5       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $10,900   1.99%   4       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $10,700   1.96%   3       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $5,200   0.95%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $2,200   0.40%   2       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0108]    In the example illustrated in FIG. 8, Bidders C, F, and G have all bid below the original bid placed by Bidder E. Bidder E has not responded with any additional bids and so now ranks in fourth place, $10,900 behind the current low bid placed by Bidder C. The bid submitted by Bidder E, however, is only 1.99% higher than that of Bidder C who holds the market-leading bid of $546,800 at 1:07:22 PM.  
         [0109]    However, consider what occurs at 1:07:49 PM when Bidder F places a new market-leading bid of $546,400 into the auction  56 . At that point in time, Bidder E&#39;s current best bid is $11,300 or 2.07% behind the market-leading bid. Because the price differential between Bidder E and the market-leading bid is more than the 2% differential required to stay within the market-leading group of bidders  30 , Bidder E receives one final update of bid history alerting Bidder E to the fact that no further feedback will be made available to Bidder E until Bidder E submits a lower bid within 2% of the current low bid. Thus, Table 9 illustrates the market feedback that is provided to Bidder E at 1:07:49 PM because at that time, the best bid of Bidder E is no longer within 2% of the market leading bid.  
                                 TABLE 9                           2. Market Leaders Only                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid                       Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000           Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000           Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000           Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500           Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300           Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700           Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500           Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000           Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000           Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800                                  
 
         [0110]    After 1:07:49 PM, Bidder E may only view more bid history if Bidder E places a new lower bid within 2% of the market-leading bid. In this example, while the bidding continued until 1:08:44 PM, Bidder E did not re-bid at any time so Bidder E did not receive any further feedback about the market-leading bidding activity in the auction  56 .  
         [0111]    In the example illustrated in Tables 7-9, Bidder E did not receive updates about rank or the differential (in dollars or percentage) from the market leading bid after 1:07:22 PM. That prevents Bidder E from learning any more information about recent market activity. Alternative implementations of the format illustrated in Tables 7-9 could allow rank and/or differentials information to be continuously updated depending on the degree to which the auction coordinator  20  wishes to limit disclosure of market leading bidding activity to non-market leaders.  
       EXAMPLE 3  
       [0112]    We will now consider how the same auction  56  will be viewed by Bidder E if the market leader format is used such that bidders  30  had to be ranked within the top three in order to view bidding activity. Again, as shown in Table 10, at 1:04:00 PM, Bidder E would not receive any market feedback because Bidder E has not placed bid.  
                                                           TABLE 10                           3. Market Leaders                   Only       Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                    No bid history is available until a bid has been submitted.                  
 
         [0113]    At 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E places a bid of $557,700, which is a new market-leading bid such that Bidder E is ranked first. Because that rank is at least third, Bidder E is entitled to view all bid history Up until that point. Bidder E, therefore, is provided with the history shown in Table 11.  
                                                 TABLE 11                           3. Market               Leaders Only   Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $112,300   20.14%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $106,300   19.06%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $2,300   0.41%   5       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $1,300   0.23%   4       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500      $800   0.14%   3       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300      $600   0.11%   2       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0114]    At 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E is in a position to continue to view all bids placed by all bidders  30  unless and until the current best bid of Bidder E falls into fourth or worse place. Bidder E, therefore, sees the market feedback illustrated in Table 12 at 1:06:49 PM.  
                                                 TABLE 12                           3. Market               Leaders Only   Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $118,000   21.38%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $112,000   20.29%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $8,000   1.45%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $7,000   1.27%   6       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500    $6,500   1.18%   5       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $553,300    $6,300   1.14%   4       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700    $5,700   1.03%   3       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500    $5,500   1.00%   2       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000       0.00%   1                  
 
         [0115]    At 1:06:49 PM, Bidders C and F have submitted bids below that of Bidder E. Bidder E has not responded with any additional bids and so now ranks third, $5,700 behind the current low bid placed by Bidder C. Because Bidder E still ranks in the top three bidders  30 , Bidder E is able to continue to view all current market feedback.  
         [0116]    However, at 1:06:55 PM when Bidder G submits a new market-leading bid of $549,000. Bidder E&#39;s current best bid is ranked behind three other participants: Bidder G at $549,000, Bidder C at $552,000, and Bidder F at $557,500. That places Bidder E in fourth place overall and puts Bidder E outside of the market leaders as defined for this particular auction  56 . Bidder E, therefore, receives one final update of bid history alerting Bidder E to the fact that no further feedback will be made available to Bidder E until Bidder E submits a bid low enough to place E within the top three bidders  30  once again. The market feedback provided to Bidder E after the 1:06:55 PM bid by Bidder G is shown in Table 13.  
                                 TABLE 13                           3. Market Leaders Only                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid                       Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000           Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000           Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000           Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500           Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300           Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700           Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500           Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000                                  
 
         [0117]    After 1:06:49 PM when Bidder E fell to the fourth highest bidder  30 , Bidder E will no longer receive market feedback unless Bidder E places a new lower bid that raises Bidder E to at least the rank of fourth. It is noteworthy that compared to the market leader format of the previous example, which was based on a 2% differential, Bidder E lost access to market feedback earlier in the Example  3  of sequence of bidding activity because of the difference in definition of a market leader.  
       EXAMPLE 4  
       [0118]    The next example illustrates how the same auction  56  is viewed by Bidder E when the market leader format is used such that bidders  30  must be within $10,000 of the current low bid to view bidding activity. Again, at 1:04:00 PM, Bidder E does not receive any market feedback because Bidder E has not placed a bid, as shown in Table 14.  
                                                           TABLE 14                           4. Market Leaders                   Leaders Only       Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                    No bid history is available until a bid has been submitted.                  
 
         [0119]    At 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E places a bid of $557,700, which is a new market-leading bid. That entitles Bidder E to view all bid history up until that point. Bidder E would, therefore, see the bid history shown in Table 15.  
                                                     TABLE 15                           4. Market                   Leaders Only       Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $112,300   20.14%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $106,300   19.06%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000    $2,300   0.41%   5       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000    $1,300   0.23%   4       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500      $800   0.14%   3       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300      $600   0.11%   2       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0120]    Once Bidder E has placed a bid that is within $10,000 of the lowest bid, such as the market leading bid of $557,000 placed at 1:05:12 PM, Bidder E will receive market feedback related to all bids placed by all bidders  30  unless and until the current best bid of Bidder E falls more than $10,000 behind the market-leading bid. Thus, the market feedback provided to Bidder E at 1:06:55 PM is shown in Table 16.  
                                                     TABLE 16                           4. Market                   Leaders Only       Bid vs. Market Lead            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $121,000    22.04%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $115,000    20.95%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $11,000   2.00%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $10,000   1.82%   7       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500    $9,500   1.73%   6       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300    $9,300   1.69%   5       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700    $8,700   1.58%   4       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500    $8,500   1.55%   3       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0121]    At 1:06:55 PM Bidders C, F, and G have all bid below the original bid placed by Bidder E. Bidder E has not responded with any additional bids and so now ranks in fourth place, 1.58% behind the current low bid placed by Bidder G. There is, however, only a differential of $8,700 between Bidder E&#39;s current best bid of $557,700 and the market-leading bid of $549,000 submitted by Bidder G.  
         [0122]    At 1:07:22 PM, Bidder C places a new market-leading bid of $546,800 into the auction  56 . At that point in time, the current best bid of Bidder E is $10,900 or 1.99% behind the market-leading bid. $10,900 is more than the $10,000 differential required to stay within the market-leading group of bidders  30 . Accordingly, Bidder E receives one final update of bid history alerting Bidder E to the fact that no further feedback will be made available until Bidder E submits a lower bid that is within $10,000 of the current low bid, as is shown in Table 17.  
                                 TABLE 17                           4. Market Leaders Only                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid                       Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000           Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000           Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000           Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500           Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300           Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700           Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500           Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000           Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000                                  
 
         [0123]    As with the previously discussed market leader format examples, Bidder E no longer receives market feedback after the lowest bid of Bidder E falls out of the required market-leading range. Note that compared to the market leader format based on the 2% differential or the top three ranking, Bidder E drops out at a different stage in the sequence of bidding activity when the dollar differential method is utilized.  
         [0124]    After falling from the market lead based on the dollar differential between the best current bid of Bidder E and the market leading bid, Bidder E may only view more bid history if Bidder E places a new bid low enough to put Bidder E within $10,000 of the market leading bid. In the case illustrated in this example, while the bidding activity continued until 1:08:44 PM, Bidder E did not re-bid at any time and so Bidder E did not receive any further feedback about the market-leading bidding activity in the auction  56 .  
       EXAMPLE 5  
       [0125]    Market feedback may also be provided in combination such as, for example, providing a bidder  30  with the current rank of that bidder  30  and the next lowest bid. Such a format will be referred to herein as a “next horse” format. By using the next horse format, each bidder  30  may be given information regarding where it stands in the overall bidding and how much its bid must be modified to move up one place in the ranking. The bidder  30  may thus gain more information each time it places a bid that is below that of the next ranked bidder  30 . The bidder  30  is therefore encouraged to place additional bids and actively participate in the auction  56 , but is not provided with information regarding the lowest bids unless that bidder  30  places a bid that is competitive with the those lowest bids. In that way, not only are bidders  30  encouraged to participate actively in the auction  56 , but low bid information is also withheld from those bidders  30  who are not willing to participate actively and competitively in the auction  56 .  
         [0126]    Thus, in the embodiment considered in this example, the only feedback a particular subject bidder  30  will receive throughout the entire auction  56  is the rank of the current bidder  30  and the value of the bid that is one better than the best bid submitted by the bidder  30 . Also in this example, each bidder  30  must submit at least one bid before that bidder  30  will receive any market feedback.  
         [0127]    [0127]FIG. 10 is a flow diagram  300  illustrating an embodiment of the present invention utilizing the next horse format in combination with the requirement that at least one bid must be placed before any information is divulged to a bidder  30 . The example provided assumes that a computer processor is executing a set of instructions that perform the steps, however, it will be recognized by one skilled in the art that the instructions may be carried out by any known method. At  302 , the auction  56  is commenced and bids are accepted from the bidders  30 . The auction  56  normally begins at a scheduled time that is prearranged between the auction coordinator  20 , the purchaser  10  and the bidders  30 . At  304 , a bid is received from a bidder  30 . That bid may be a bid that is created by a bidder  30  and submitted to the data processing network  77  from the client machine  72  by way of the communications network  73 . At  306 , a determination is made as to whether each bidder  30  has qualified as a bid participant by submitting at least one qualified bid. At  308 , the rank of each bidder  30  is determined. At  310 , each bidder  30  that is a bid participant is provided with the appropriate market feedback which, in this example, includes information related to the best bid submitted by the subject bidder and information related to the bidder ranked one above the current bidder. After providing the appropriate market feedback to each bidder  30 , the processor will determine whether the auction closing time has arrived at  312 . If the auction closing time has not arrived, the processor will return to  304  to receive additional bids. If the auction closing time has arrived, the auction  56  will close and no additional bids will be accepted.  
         [0128]    FIGS.  11 - 16  illustrate sample screens that are displayed for various participants in a particular auction  56  utilizing the next horse format described in connection with FIG. 10. Each of screens  11 - 16  were captured during the same auction  56  after the bids depicted on FIG. 11 were submitted and before any other bids were submitted. Thus, screens  11 - 16  illustrate the market feedback that is provided to various participants in a single next horse format auction  56  during a common time period. FIG. 11 illustrates a sample of a screen  350  that is displayed to the purchaser  10 . At  352 , a lot listing is provided that contains statistics for three lots of transportation services that are being auctioned. The first lot is highlighted and is, therefore, active in other portions of the screen  350 . At  354 , statistics for all three lots are displayed and at  356 , additional statistics for lot one are displayed. A bid history  358 , containing a listing of bids received for lot one is also displayed.  
         [0129]    [0129]FIG. 12 illustrates a sample of a screen  360  that is displayed to a bidder  30  who has not submitted a valid bid for lot one during the course of the auction  56 . A lot listing  362  is provided to display market feedback related to the next lowest bid. No statistics relating to other bidders  30  are displayed for any of the three lots, indicating that a valid bid has not been placed by the viewing bidder  30 . Fields for Next Place Bid  363  and My vs. Next  365  are provided in the lot listing  362 . Those fields are necessarily different than the fields provided to the purchaser  10  in FIG. 11 or a bidder  30  in the auction  56  illustrated in FIGS.  6 - 8 , because it is important that the purchaser  10  be aware of all bids including the market leading bid and because it has been determined that bidders  30  in the example illustrated in FIGS.  11 - 16  are to be provided less market feedback than bidders  30  in the example illustrated in FIGS.  6 - 8 . Also, unlike the lot listing  162  of the screen  160  illustrated in FIG. 7, the lot listing  362  of FIG. 12 does not include a “Best Offering” field. The “Best Offering” field, which appears in FIGS. 7 and 8, may not be utilized in the embodiment illustrated in FIGS.  11 - 16  because, for example, that embodiment does not provide for bidding of different options related to each lot. Best offering is furthermore an option that may be utilized or not utilized in any of the embodiments discussed herein.  
         [0130]    A bid area  364  is provided from which a bid may be submitted. Within that bid area  364  are a number of buttons, including a disabled take next button  367  which will be discussed further hereinafter. Other buttons for submitting a bid and reloading the last bid submitted are also provided in the bid area  364 . At  366 , the bidder  30  is provided with a general status area and at  368 , a status area for the active lot is provided. Within the active lot status area  368 , the rank of the viewing bidder is not displayed in the “My Rank” field  370  because the viewing bidder has not yet submitted a valid bid for lot one. Unlike the active lot status area  168  of FIG. 7, the active lot status area  368  of FIG. 12 does not include a total bid field. That is because the total number of bids is not a piece of market feedback that is provided in the embodiment of the next horse format of this example. A bid history area  372  provides relevant bid history to the viewing bidder  30  if that viewing bidder  30  has placed a valid bid for the active lot. The viewing bidder  30  of screen  360 , however, has not placed a valid bid for the active lot and, therefore, a message stating “bid history is not available until you submit a valid bid in this lot” is displayed in the bid history area  372 .  
         [0131]    [0131]FIG. 13 illustrates a sample screen  380  that is displayed to a bidder  30  who has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one and is ranked fourth in the bidding. A lot listing  382  is provided that includes values in the “Next Place Bid” field  363  and the “My vs. Next” field  365  for lot one. Lot one is furthermore active in the remainder of the screen  380  because lot one is the highlighted lot in the lot listing  382 . Fields  363  and  365  are displayed because the bidder  30  viewing the screen  380  of FIG. 13 has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one. At  384 , the bid area is displayed and the take next button  367  is enabled as indicated by the dark lettering in the take next button  367 . At  386 , a general status area is provided for all lots currently being auctioned. An active lot status area  388  is provided and includes market feedback regarding the rank of the viewing bidder  30  with regard to lot one because that bidder  30  has placed a valid bid for lot one, which is the active lot. A historic bid listing, applicable to the viewer of screen  380 , is provided in the bid history area  390 . That bid history includes market feedback for the lowest price bid by the viewing bidder  30  and all higher bids. In keeping with the next horse format, the bid history area  390  could provide varying data. For example, market feedback related to the next better ranked bidder  30  could be provided in the bid history area  390  since market feedback related to that bidder  30  is already provided in the lot listing  382 . Alternately, market feedback related to previously submitted higher bids may or may not be provided in the bid history area  390  when using the next horse format or any other format discussed herein.  
         [0132]    [0132]FIG. 14 illustrates a sample screen  400  that is displayed to a bidder  30  who has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one and is ranked fifth in the bidding. A lot listing  402  is provided that includes values in the “Next Place Bid” field  363  and the “My vs. Next” field  365  for lot one. Lot one is furthermore active in the remainder of the screen  400  because lot one is the highlighted lot in the lot listing  402 . Fields  363  and  365  are displayed because the bidder  30  viewing the screen  400  of FIG. 14 has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one. A bid area  404  is displayed and the take next button  367  is enabled as indicated by the dark lettering in the take next button  367 . At  406 , a general status area is provided for all lots currently being auctioned. At  408 , an active lot status area is provided which includes market feedback regarding the rank of the viewing bidder with regard to lot one  30  because that bidder  30  has placed a bid for active lot one. A listing of historic bids that is applicable to the viewer of screen  400  is provided in the bid history area  410 . That bid history includes market feedback for the lowest price bid by the viewing bidder  30  and all higher bids. Thus, the bid history area  410  of FIG. 14 does not include the bid by the fourth ranked bidder that is shown in the bid history area  390  of FIG. 13 because the viewer of screen  400  has a worse ranking than the viewer of screen  380 .  
         [0133]    [0133]FIG. 15 illustrates a sample screen  420  that is displayed to a bidder  30  who has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one and is ranked second in the bidding. A lot listing  422  is provided that includes values in the “Next Place Bid” field  363  and the “My vs. Next” field  365  for lot one. Lot one is furthermore active in the remainder of the screen  420  because lot one is the highlighted lot in the lot listing  422 . Fields  363  and  365  are displayed because the bidder  30  viewing the screen  420  of FIG. 15 has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one. A bid area  404  is displayed and includes an enabled take next button  367 , as indicated by the dark lettering in the take next button  367 . A general status area  426  is provided for all lots currently being auctioned and an active lot status area  428  is provided which includes market feedback regarding the rain of the viewing bidder  30  with regard to lot one because that bidder  30  has placed a bid for active lot one. A bid history applicable to the viewer of screen  420  is provided in the bid history area  430 . That bid history, like that of the other bidders  30  who have submitted a valid bid in the active lot, includes market feedback for the lowest price bid by the viewing bidder  30  and all higher bids. Thus, the bid history area  430  of FIG. 15 includes all bids by the second and worse ranked bidders  30  and the lot listing  422  provides market information for the first place bidder.  
         [0134]    [0134]FIG. 16 illustrates a sample screen  450  that is displayed to a bidder  30  who has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one and is ranked first in the bidding. A lot listing  452  is provided that includes values in the “Next Place Bid” field  363  and the “My vs. Next” field  365  for lot one. Lot one is furthermore active in the remainder of the screen  450  because lot one is the highlighted lot in the lot listing  452 . Fields  363  and  365  are displayed because the bidder  30  viewing the screen  450  of FIG. 16 has submitted at least one valid bid for lot one. A bid area  454  is displayed and the take next button  367  is enabled as indicated by the dark lettering in the take next button  367 . At  456 , a general status area is provided for all lots currently being auctioned. At  458 , an active lot status area is provided which includes market feedback regarding the rank of the viewing bidder  30  because that bidder  30  has placed a valid bid for active lot one. A bid history applicable to the viewer of screen  450  is provided in the bid history area  460 . That bid history, like that of the other bidders  30  who have submitted a valid bid, includes market feedback for the lowest amount bid by the viewing bidder  30  and all higher bids. Thus, the bid history area  460  of FIG. 16 includes all bids submitted by all bidders  30 .  
         [0135]    Another example of market feedback that may be provided to a bidder  30  using a next horse format is as follows: after placing its first bid, a bidder  30  in third place will be informed of (i) the value of its current best bid; (ii) the fact that it is ranked third in the auction  56 ; and (iii) the value of the bid placed by the second ranked bidder  30 . Similarly, the bidder  30  in second place will know (i) the value of its current best bid; (ii) the fact that it is ranked second in the auction  56 ; and (iii) the value of the bid placed by the first ranked bidder  30 .  
         [0136]    The only way for a bidder  30  to receive market feedback concerning more competitive bids is to place a bid that improves their competitive position in the auction  56 . Consider, for example, a situation, wherein Bidder A is ranked fourth and Bidder B is ranked third. If Bidder A places a bid that is lower than the that of Bidder B, Bidder A becomes the third ranked bidder  30  and Bidder B becomes the fourth ranked bidder. Bidder A is then permitted to view the new third place bid that Bidder A just submitted, as well as the second placed bid. That format precludes all but the most aggressive bidders  30  from visibility to true market pricing. In fact, the only participants that will know the value of the first placed bid will be the first and second placed bidders  30 .  
         [0137]    The next horse format may be a particularly risky format for an incumbent bidder  30 . Without any real knowledge of how far from the bottom of the market they need to be, an incumbent is taking a substantial risk by not being in the top 1 or 2 bidders  30 .  
       EXAMPLE 6  
       [0138]    Consider again the sequence of bidding activity in Table 1, assuming this time that the auction  56  was set up to use a next horse format that provides only information regarding the best bid of that bidder  30  and the next better ranked bidder  30  and does not provide a listing of worse bids that have been placed. At 1:04:00 PM, Bidder E would not receive any market feedback because Bidder E has not yet placed any bids. Thus, Bidder E is provided with no market feedback at 1:04:00 PM as is shown in Table 18.  
                                                           TABLE 18                           5. Next Horse       Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                    No bid history is available until a bid has been submitted.                  
 
         [0139]    At 1:07:49 PM, Bidder E has placed a bid and is in fourth place behind bidders F, C and G. The full bid history (not visible to any of the bidders  30  in this example) is repeated in Table 19.  
                                                     TABLE 19                           5a. Next Horse (1:07:49)       Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $123,600    22.62%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $117,600    21.52%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $13,600   2.49%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $12,600   2.31%   7       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $12,100   2.21%   6       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $11,900   2.18%   5       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $11,300   2.07%   4       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $11,100   2.03%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $5,600   1.02%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $2,600   0.48%   3       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800     $400   0.07%   2       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   —   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0140]    In the next horse format of this example at 1:07:49 PM, Bidder E is informed that it is currently in fourth place, and that the third placed bidder  30  has placed a bid of $549,000, which is $8,700 or 1.58% lower than E&#39;s current best bid of $557,700 as is shown in Table 20.  
                                                     TABLE 20                           5a. Next Horse (Bidder E)       Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $8,700   1.58%   4       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000           3                  
 
         [0141]    At 1:07:49 PM, Bidder G is informed that it is currently in third place, and that the second ranked bidder has placed a bid of $546,800, which is $2,200 or 0.40% lower than Bidder G&#39;s current best bid of $549,000 as is shown in Table 21.  
                                                     TABLE 21                           5a. Next Horse (Bidder G)       Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000   $2,200   0.40%   3       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800           2                  
 
         [0142]    At 1:07:49 PM, Bidder C is informed that it is currently in second place, and that the first placed bidder 30 has placed a bid of $546,400, which is $400 or 0.07% lower than Bidder C&#39;s current best bid of $546,800, as is shown in Table 22.  
                                                     TABLE 22                           5a. Next Horse (Bidder C)       Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800   $400   0.07%   2       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400           1                  
 
         [0143]    At 1:07:49 PM, Bidder F is informed that it is currently in first place with a bid of $546,400, as is shown in Table 23.  
                                                     TABLE 23                           5a. Next Horse (Bidder F       Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0144]    At 1:08:02 PM, Bidder C places a new market leading bid moving Bidder C up in rank from second to first place. The full bid history (not visible to any of the bidders  30  in this example) is shown in Table 24.  
                                                     TABLE 24                           5b. Next Horse (1:08:02)       Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $123,750    22.65%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $117,750    21.56%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $13,750   2.52%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $12,750   2.33%   7       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $12,250   2.24%   6       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $12,050   2.21%   5       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $11,450   2.10%   4       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $11,250   2.06%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $5,750   1.05%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $2,750   0.50%   3       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800     $550   0.10%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400     $150   0.03%   2       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0145]    Bidder C will, therefore, see that it is ranked first at 1:08:02 PM with a bid of $546,250, as is shown in Table 25.  
                                                 TABLE 25                           5b. Next Horse (Bidder C)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250   $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0146]    Bidder F, who has been displaced from first place at 1:08:02 PM, will see that it is in second place at 1:08:02 PM, and that the bidder ranked first has placed a bid of $546,250, which is $150 or 0.03% lower than the best bid of $546,400 placed by Bidder F, as is shown in Table 26.  
                                                 TABLE 26                           5b. Next Horse (Bidder F)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $150   0.03%   2       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250           1                  
 
         [0147]    At 1:08:02 PM, Bidder G remains in third place but can see that the second placed bidder is now at $546,400, which is $2,600 or 0.48% lower than G&#39;s best bid of $549,000. Bidder G thus learns that activity between the first and second placed bidders has increased the distance between Bidder G and the market-leading bid, as is shown in Table 27.  
                                                 TABLE 27                           5b. Next Horse (Bidder G)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000   $2,600   0.48%   3       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400           2                  
 
         [0148]    Next, consider the situation at 1:08:17 PM. Bidder B (previously in seventh place) places a new market-leading bid of $545,000. Bidder B is now ranked first. The full bid history up until 1:08:17 PM (not visible to any of the bidders  30  in this example) is shown in Table 28.  
                                                 TABLE 28                           5c. Next Horse (1:08:17)   Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $125,000    22.94%           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $119,000    21.83%       Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $15,000   2.75%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $14,000   2.57%       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $13,500   2.48%   7       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $13,300   2.44%   6       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $12,700   2.33%   5       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $12,500   2.29%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000    $7,000   1.28%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $4,000   0.73%   4       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800    $1,800   0.33%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400    $1,400   0.26%   3       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250    $1,250   0.23%   2       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0149]    At 1:08:17 PM, Bidder C, who has been displaced from first place, will see that it are now in second place, and that the first placed bidder has placed a bid of $545,000, which is $1,250 or 0.23% lower than C&#39;s best bid of $546,250, as is shown in Table 29.  
                                                 TABLE 29                           5c. Next Horse (Bidder C)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250   $1,250   0.23%   2       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000           1                  
 
         [0150]    Bidder F has been displaced from second place and now ranks third. Although the ranking has changed, in all other respects F sees the same feedback. The second placed bidder  30  is at $546,250, which is $150 or 0.03% lower than Bidder F&#39;s best bid of $546,400, as is shown in Table 30.  
                                                 TABLE 30                           5c. Next Horse (Bidder F)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $150   0.03%   3       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250           2                  
 
         [0151]    At 1:08:17 PM, Bidder G faces a situation similar to that of Bidder F. Bidder G has been displaced from third place and now ranks fourth overall, but the feedback with respect to the next placed bidder is the same. The third placed bidder is at $546,400, which is $2,600 or 0.48% lower than G&#39;s best bid of $549,000, as is shown in Table 31.  
                                                 TABLE 31                           5c. Next Horse (Bidder G; 1:08:17)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000   $2,600   0.48%   4       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400           3                  
 
         [0152]    At 1:08:44 PM, Bidder G decides to lower its bid by $7,000. That places Bidder G in first place. The full bid history (not visible to any of the bidders  30  in this example) is shown in Table 32.  
                                                 TABLE 32                           5d. Next Horse (1:08:44)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $128,000    23.62%            Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $122,000    22.51%        Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $18,000   3.32%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $17,000   3.14%       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $16,500   3.04%   7       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $16,300   3.01%   6       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $15,700   2.90%   5       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $15,500   2.86%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000   $10,000   1.35%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000    $7,000   1.29%       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800    $4,800   0.89%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400    $4,400   0.81%   4       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250    $4,250   0.78%   3       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000    $3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000      $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0153]    At 1:08:44 PM, Bidder G is provided with the market feedback shown in Table 33.  
                                                 TABLE 33                           5d. Next Horse (Bidder G; 1:08:44)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000   $—   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0154]    Thus, at 1:08:44 PM Bidder B has been displaced from first place. Bidder B will, therefore, see that it is now ranked second and that the first placed bidder has placed a bid of $542,000, which is $3,000 or 0.55% lower than B&#39;s bid of $545,000. The market feedback provided to Bidder B at 1:08:44 PM is illustrated in Table 34.  
                                                                           TABLE 34                           5d. Next Horse (Bidder B; 1:08:44)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank                    Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000   $3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000           1                  
 
         [0155]    At 1:08:44 PM, Bidder C sees the same feedback as before, except that the rank of Bidder C has now slipped from second to third place. Bidder C will, however, be advised that the second placed bidder is at $545,000, which is $1,250 or 0.23% lower than the lowest bid submitted by Bidder C, which is $546,250. The market feedback provided to Bidder C at 1:08:44 PM is illustrated in Table 35.  
                                                 TABLE 35                           Next Horse (Bidder C; 1:08:44)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250   $1,250   0.23%   3       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000           2                  
 
         [0156]    At 1:08:44 PM, Bidder F would view the market feedback shown in Table 36 and the remaining bidders  30  would also be provided with market feedback according to the next horse format utilized in this example.  
                                                 TABLE 36                           5d. Next Horse (Bidder F; 1:08:44)   Bid vs. Next Horse                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   $   %   Rank               Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $150   0.03%   4       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250           3                  
 
         [0157]    Other combinations of market feedback may also be provided in connection with the next horse format. For example, as previously described, in certain embodiments of the next horse market feedback format, not only is information provided for the next better bid, information related to all worse bids is also provided.  
         [0158]    Auctions  56 , and particularly online auctions  56 , can be fast paced, requiring bidders  30  to make important decisions about whether to submit an additional bid to better that of another bidder  30 . In many auctions  56  bettering a bid placed by another bidder  30  may not be as simple as placing a bid that is one dollar less than that placed by the other bidder  30 . For example, to avoid the submission of many bids that better each other by very small amounts, purchasers  10  may require that bidders  30  place a minimum differential bid to better that of the next higher ranked bidder  30 , another higher ranked bidder  30 , or the market leading bidder  30 .  
         [0159]    Thus, for example, if Bidder A has placed a best bid of $ 52 , 000  in a reverse auction  56 , Bidder B has placed the next better ranked bid with a bid of $550,000, and the minimum differential bid required is $ 500 , then Bidder A would have to submit a bid of no more than $49,500 to move up one place in the ranking. Because bids are not always submitted in such round numbers and time allowed to calculate and place another bid, particularly near the closing of an auction  56 , can be short, it is beneficial to include in the auction  56  a facility for calculating and/or submitting the maximum amount that would place the bidder  30  at a desired rank. The present invention, therefore, may include one or more facilities for automatically calculating the maximum amount that may be bid to place a bidder  30  at a desired rank in a reverse auction. Of course, such a minimum differential may also be applied to a forward auction and a facility that adds the minimum differential to a better ranked bid would be equally applicable.  
       EXAMPLE  7   
       [0160]    In a certain embodiment of the invention, wherein the next horse format is utilized such that only the amount bid by the next better bidder  30  and current rankng is known to each bidder  30 , a “take next rank” facility may be provided in the auction software. That take next rank facility may take the form of a button that may be depressed or a selectable button that is displayed on the screen of the bidder  30 . An example of such a button is illustrated on FIGS.  12 - 16  at reference number  367  and is labeled “Take Next.” 
         [0161]    Selection of the take next rank button or a similar take higher rank button (not illustrated) may perform several functions including, for example, calculating of the maximum amount that must be bid to attain the next higher rank, and submitting that amount as a bid.  
         [0162]    Selection of the take next rank button or take higher rank button may alternately only calculate the maximum amount that must be bid to attain the next higher rank. In that format, the bidder  30  may have the amount required for the next bid provided quickly and accurately and then consider whether to place a bid equal to the calculated amount, place a bid for a lesser amount, or choose not to place a bid that moves that bidder  30  up to the next rank.  
         [0163]    A select higher rank facility may also or alternately be provided. In one embodiment, selection of the take higher rank button will calculate the maximum amount that must be bid to attain one selected higher rank. In another embodiment, the take higher rank button will calculate the maximum bid required to take all higher ranks.  
         [0164]    Referring to FIG. 12, the take next button  367  is dimmed indicating that the button is disabled and, therefore, may not be selected. The take next button  367  of FIG. 12 is disabled because the bidder  30  viewing the screen  360  of FIG. 12 has not yet submitted a valid bid for lot one which is selected in the lot listing  362 . The take next button  367  may be enabled for a bidder  30  that has not yet placed a bid, for example, to provide an amount that must be bid to overtake the lowest ranked bidder  30 . Enabling the take next button  367  for a non-participating bidder  30 , however, permits that non-participating bidder  30  to view market feedback related to the lowest bidder  30 . Thus, in the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 12, the viewing bidder  30  is not permitted to utilize the take next button  367  because the rules for that auction  56  are defined such that no market feedback is permitted to be viewed until a bidder  30  has placed a valid bid. Therefore, in the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 12, the viewing bidder  30  must place a bid prior to being permitted to utilize the take next button  367 .  
         [0165]    Referring to FIGS.  13 - 16 , the take next button  367  is displayed and enabled. In accordance with the rules that are employed in the embodiment illustrated in those Figures, the take next button  367  is enabled because the bidders  30  viewing the screens  380 ,  400 ,  420 , and  450  of those Figures are permitted to use the take next button  367  because they have submitted at least one bid for the active lot. The auction  56  displayed in FIGS.  11 - 16  is an index type auction  56  wherein the amount bid is added to a predetermined index price. Thus a bid of  10 . 00  might indicate a bid of 10.00% over the index price, while a bid of −0.30 might indicate a bid of 0.30% under the index price. Thus, the viewer of screen  380 , for example, may select the take next button by, for example using a mouse, keyboard, or touch screen. As may be seen in the lot listing  382 , the next better bid is 4.75 which is 4.25 less than the best bid submitted by the viewing bidder  30 . If, for example, the minimum differential for the auction  56  depicted on screen  380  is 0.1, then selection of the take next button  367  would provide a value of 4.65 which is equal to the value of the next better bid of 4.75 less the minimum differential of 0.10.  
       EXAMPLE 8  
       [0166]    Tables 37-41 illustrate a reserve price format of the invention that takes into consideration the setting of a reserve price as discussed hereinbefore. In that format, bidders  30  do not view any market feedback unless their current best bid is below the reserve price. That format rewards bidders  30  who have made a minimum commitment to pursue an award by bidding below the reserve price. Thus, no market feedback is made available to bidders  30  who have not submitted a bid below the reserve price threshold, thereby limiting or eliminating disclosure of price sensitive information to bidders  30  who merely watch the auction  56  without participating therein. The reserve price format, therefore, may beneficially be used to inform all participants that the reserve price is a serious threshold which bidders  30  must meet before the purchaser  10  is willing to consider an award of the business to a non-incumbent. The reserve price format also puts pressure on incumbents to at least meet the reserve price once other bidders  30  have bid below the reserve price.  
         [0167]    Referring again to the sequence of bidding activity in FIG. 1, the following example assumes that the auction  56  is taking place in the reserve price format and the reserve price is set at $555,000. At 1:06:00 PM the complete bid history (not visible to any bidder  30  in this example) is repeated below in Table 37.  
                                                                     TABLE 37                           6. Below Reserve Only (1.06:00 PM)       Bid vs Reserve   Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   Reserve   $   %   $   %   Rank               Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $555,000   $115,000   20.72%    $112,500   20 18%           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664.000   $555,000   $109,000   19.64%    $106,500   19.10%       Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $555,000   $ 5,000   0 90%   $ 2,500   0.45%   6       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $555,000   $ 4,000   0.72%   $ 1,500   0.27%   5       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $555,000   $ 3,500   0.63%   $ 1,000   0.18%   4       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $555,000   $ 3,300   0.59%   $   800   0.14%   3       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $555.000   $ 2,700   0.49%   $   200   0.04%   2       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $555,000   $ 2,500   0 45%   $  —   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0168]    Following Bidder E to illuminate the operation of the reserve price format, at 1:06:00 PM Bidder E has placed one bid of $557,700 at 1:05:12 PM. Since that bid is above the reserve price, Bidder E does not receive any feedback about the remainder of the bidding activity in the auction  56 , as shown in Table 38.  
                                                 TABLE 38                           6. Below Reserve Only (Bidder E)       Bid vs. Reserve            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   Reserve   $   %               Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,500   $555,000   $2,700   0.49%                          
 
         [0169]    As may be seen by reference to Table 1, Bidder E did not submit any further bids in the auction  56 , and so does not receive any further market feedback during the auction  56 . In contrast, at 1:06:00 PM Bidder F has submitted only one bid of $557,500. Like Bidder E, Bidder F will receive no market feedback at 1:06:00 PM because the lowest submitted bid of Bidder F is above the reserve price. Thus, at 1:06:00 PM, Bidder F would view the information provided in Table 39.  
                                                 TABLE 39                           6. Below Reserve Only (Bidder F)       Bid vs. Reserve            Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   Reserve   $   %               Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $555,000   $2,500   0.45%                          
 
         [0170]    However, unlike Bidder E, Bidder F submits a bid of $546,400 at 1:07:49 PM. That bid is below the reserve price of $555,000 and, accordingly, Bidder F sees the full bid history as shown below in Table 40 after the 1:07:49 PM bid is placed. At 1:07:49 PM, Bidder F is able to sec that it is ranked first, and also becomes aware through the market feedback that there are two other bidders  30  who are below reserve price and within $3,000 or 0.5% of the current best bid of Bidder F. Although the identity of the other participants is not visible in this example, Bidder F would also see that there are six other bidders  30  participating in the auction  56  and that a total of twelve bids have been placed thus far in the auction  56 .  
                                                                                                           TABLE 40                           6. Below Reserve Only (Bidder F)       Bid vs Reserve   Bid vs. Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   Reserve   $   %   $   %   Rank                    Bidder A   1:02.45 PM   $670,000   $555.000   $115,000   20.72%   $123,600   22.62%           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $555,000   $109,000   19.64%   $117,600   21.52%       Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $555,000   $ 5,000   0 90%   $ 13,600   2.49%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $555,000   $ 4,000   0.72%   $ 12,600   2.31%   7       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $555,000   $ 3,500   0.63%   $ 12,100   2.21%   6       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $555,000   $ 3,300   0.59%   $ 11,900   2.18%   5       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $555,000   $ 2,700   0.49%   $ 11,300   2.07%   4       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $555,000   $ 2,500   0.45%   $ 11,100   2.03%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000   $555,000   $ (3,000)   −0.54%   $ 5,600   1.02%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000   $555,000   $ (6,000)   −1.08%   $ 2,600   0.48%   3       Bidder C   1:07:22 PM   $546,800   $555,000   $ (8,200)   −1.48%   $   400   0.07%   2       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $555,000   $ (8,600)   −1 55%   $  —   0 00%   1                  
 
         [0171]    Bidder F is entitled to view the bid history, for the remainder of the auction  56  in this example, because Bidder F has submitted a bid less than the reserve price as required to see that market feedback. As may be seen by reference to Table 1, Bidder F does not submit any additional bids during the auction  56  and, thus, falls back to fourth place by the time the auction  56  ends at 1:08:44 PM. The market feedback that Bidder F will see at 1:08:44 PM is shown in Table 41.  
                                                                                                           TABLE 41                           6. Below Reserve Only (Bidder F)       Bid vs Reserve   Bid vs Market Lead                Bidder   Bid Time   Bid   Reserve   $   %   $   %   Rank                    Bidder A   1:02:45 PM   $670,000   $555,000   $115,000   20 72%   $128,000   23.62%           Bidder B   1:01:23 PM   $664,000   $555,000   $109,000   19 64%   $122,000   22 51%       Bidder C   1:01:28 PM   $560,000   $555,000   $ 5,000   0.90%   $ 18,000   3.32%       Bidder B   1:03:10 PM   $559,000   $555,000   $ 4,000   0.72%   $ 17,000   3.14%       Bidder D   1:02:50 PM   $558,500   $555,000   $ 3,500   0.63%   $ 16,500   3.04%       Bidder A   1:03:38 PM   $558,300   $555,000   $ 3,300   0.59%   $ 16,300   3.01%   6       Bidder E   1:05:12 PM   $557,700   $555,000   $ 2,700   0.49%   $ 15,700   2.90%   5       Bidder F   1:05:43 PM   $557,500   $555,000   $ 2,500   0.45%   $ 15,500   2.86%       Bidder C   1:06:49 PM   $552,000   $555,000   $ (3,000)   −0 54%   $ 10,000   1.85%       Bidder G   1:06:55 PM   $549,000   $555,000   $ (6,000)   −1.08%   $ 7,000   1.29%       Bidder C   1.07:22 PM   $546,800   $555,000   $ (8,200)   −1.48%   $ 4,800   0.89%       Bidder F   1:07:49 PM   $546,400   $555,000   $ (8,600)   −1.55%   $ 4,400   0.81%   4       Bidder C   1:08:02 PM   $546,250   $555,000   $ (8,750)   −1.58%   $ 4,250   0.78%   3       Bidder B   1:08:17 PM   $545,000   $555,000   $ (10,000)   −1 80%   $ 3,000   0.55%   2       Bidder G   1:08:44 PM   $542,000   $555,000   $ (13,000)   −2.34%   $  —   0.00%   1                  
 
         [0172]    Other differential feedback technology and differential feedback rules could also be applied to such a reserve price formatted auction  56 . For example, rather than providing no market feedback to bidders  30  that have not bid below the reserve price, the auction  56  could provide limited market feedback to those bidders  30  and full market feedback to bidders  30  who have bid below reserve. The limited feedback might include, for example, rank only or bid history of all the bids placed by bidders  30  that are above the reserve price but not any of the bids below reserve price. In the latter example, a bidder  30  who has not placed a bid below the reserve price would lose access to market feedback from those bidders  30  bidding below the reserve price until that bidder  30  also places a bid below reserve price.  
         [0173]    In another embodiment, the market leader format may be combined with the reserve price format to provide additional incentive to bidders  30  to continue bidding aggressively after they have crossed the reserve price threshold. For example, bid history might only be visible to participants who (i) have bid below reserve price; and (ii) are ranked in, for example, the top three bidders  30 .  
         [0174]    Alternatively, bid history might be visible to all bidders  30  below reserve until there are at least, for example, three bidders  30  below that have placed bids below the reserve price. Once more than three bidders  30  have bid below the reserve price in that example, only the top three bidders  30  would continue to view the full bid history.  
         [0175]    While the invention has been described in detail and with reference to specific embodiments thereof, it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope thereof. In particular, it should be noted that while the auction functions described above have been described in the context of downward pricing auctions, the auction functions can be equally applied to upward pricing auctions. Thus, it is intended that the present invention cover the modifications and variations of this invention provided they come within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.