Abstract:
A method for enabling users to securely share application information and resources by granting resource owners access to user-application combinations. It provides a means for ensuring that only approved and unaltered applications may access available resources. A connection negotiation scheme allows both ends of a communication channel to agree on a specific version of a specific application to be used to access a target resource. Once agreement is reached, a virtual private network channel may be established between approved applications and designated resources that enable channel encryption using an encryption key and a verified signature using a calculated hash value of the negotiated application.

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS  
       [0001]    This application claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/380,727, filed on May 15, 2002. 
     
    
     
       BACKGROUND OF INVENTION  
         [0002]    The invention relates generally to network security, and more specifically to secure message and file transfers across public or private networks using an application-level virtual private network. It provides a means for specifying and validating the application being used to access a remote resource over a dynamic dedicated secure conduit or tunnel that is established over existing network pathways.  
           [0003]    The need for providing and accessing information throughout small and large enterprise organizations spawned rapid a growth in intranets and extranets to satisfy these organizational communications requirements. With the rapid growth of the Internet as a public network communication medium, organizations found substantial cost savings by using the Internet as an worldwide vehicle for providing and accessing organizational information. The result was a shift from closed and protected to open and less secure, open information infrastructure. Gateways were provided to connect existing private networks to the Internet to replace many private dedicated networks providing access to disparate parts of the world. It is not unusual in today&#39;s business environment to have multiple computer workstations and servers interconnected by complex and widely dispersed communications networks. These communications networks are critical to many businesses that rely on these information networks to provide services for the day-today operation of their enterprises.  
           [0004]    With the growth of these communications networks came an increase in incidences of unauthorized access to these networks by individuals and software programs for accessing confidential information and causing disruptions or irreparable harm to these informational networks. These intrusions, oftentimes resulting in economic losses, have created a demand for means for detecting and preventing malicious and unauthorized access to these networks by users and organizations that seek to find and exploit the smallest security hole. In addition to enterprises instituting safeguards to prevent harm caused to business enterprises and individuals, the government has instituted regulations to protect the privacy of information on individuals that may be available on these information networks.  
           [0005]    The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions and financial services companies to comply with stringent privacy and security standards. The health care market has similar legislation called the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). While the details of HIPAA are still being completed, it will clearly establish uniform information security standards for health care organizations. Since the late 1980s, the government agencies have been under legislative pressure to secure networked systems. Emerging homeland defense initiatives will add additional and enforceable network security requirements to the government agencies.  
           [0006]    In response to unauthorized intrusions into informational networks, various protective measures have been implemented to eliminate or reduce intrusion incidences. Some of these measures include Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) encryption, S/MIME Email security, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 128 bit encryption, Virtual Private Network (VPN), firewalls, and vulnerability scanners. Some of these network protection schemes may work at cross-purposes to one another by inhibiting other protection schemes from operating effectively. For example, a firewall may inhibit a vulnerability scanner form assessing the intrusion vulnerability of a system protected by the firewall.  
           [0007]    Traditional VPN solutions have typically provided network-to-network secure communications, and machine-to-machine secure communications. In the former case, one network gateway can establish a secure channel to another network&#39;s gateway by employing encryption technologies and using the public Internet as a medium. This approach has the benefit of using public resources in a secure manner, but has several notable disadvantages as well. The disadvantages include: (1) all resources on one side of the connection can access all resources on the other side of the connection, unless additional (often overlooked or too restrictive) measures are taken; and (2) if one side of the connection has multiple VPN channels to other locations, all locations can potentially access each other.  
           [0008]    Although machine-to-machine VPN solutions seem to address these problems, they still have issues of their own that are often ignored due to the inability of current technologies to address them. The issues include: (1) if an intruder gains access to the one machine in the connection, she can use whatever application is available on the compromised machine to attack resources on the other side of the connection; and if the user of one machine contracts a virus or worm that corrupts his applications, that virus can spread across the VPN to attack resources on the other side of the connection.  
         SUMMARY OF INVENTION  
         [0009]    The present invention provides a solution that overcomes many of the disadvantages and issues encountered in the use of network-to-network VPN secure communications and machine-to-machine VPN secure communications. It enables users to securely share application information and resources by granting resource owners access to user-application combinations, and ensuring that only approved and unaltered applications can access the resources being made available. A process of negotiation is a necessary preamble to any secure connection attempt from an application to a resource. This negotiation allows both ends of a communication channel to agree upon an application and version of an application to be used to access a target resource. Upon agreement by both ends of the communication channel, channel encryption may be established using an encryption key and a signature verified using the hash of the negotiated application.  
           [0010]    Each application that runs on a client workstation is subject to a check upon all attempts to use an established application-level VPN channel. This check involves a query to the host operating system to determine which application has requested access and then a calculation of that application&#39;s hash. As traffic passes into the VPN channel, the discovered hash and encryption process with a provided session key is used to establish secure communication. As packets emerge on the other side of the channel, the hash of the pre-coordinated application is used as a signature to validate the connection. Therefore, if a rogue or tainted application attempts to use the channel once it has been established, the hash-encryption step will not match the hash-signature step, and communications will not be successful. An embodiment of a network that satisfies these requirements is disclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/249,668 filed on Apr. 29, 2003, and incorporated herein by reference.  
           [0011]    An embodiment of the present invention is a method for application-level virtual private networking, comprising the steps of requesting access for sending requester messages to an external resource by a requester application within a user workstation, identifying the requestor application and calculating a hash value of the requestor application by a connection manager within the user workstation, forwarding the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value by the connection manager over a network to a channel gateway, receiving the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value by a channel receiver within the channel gateway, authenticating the received requester messages using the calculated application hash value and forwarding the requester messages to the external resource, and receiving the requestor messages by the external resource. The step of requesting access for sending requestor messages to an external resource by a requestor application within a user workstation may comprise the step of requesting access for sending requestor messages to an external server application program within the channel gateway by a requester application within a user workstation, the step of forwarding the requestor messages to the external resource may comprise the step of forwarding the requester messages to an external server application program within the channel gateway, and the step of receiving the requester messages by the external resource may comprise receiving the requester messages by the external server application program within the channel gateway. The step of identifying the requestor application and calculating a hash value of the requestor application by a connection manager within the user workstation may further comprise calculating a hash value of only one specific version of one specific requestor application by a connection manager within the user workstation, and the step of authenticating the received requester messages using the calculated application hash value may comprise authenticating the received requestor messages using the calculated hash value of only the one specific version of the one specific requestor application. The step of identifying the user application may comprise querying a workstation operating system for identifying the user application. The method may further comprise preparing and forwarding response messages by the external resource to the channel receiver within the channel gateway, receiving the response messages by the channel receiver and forwarding the response messages and the calculated application hash value over the network to the connection manager within the user workstation, receiving the response messages by the connection manager, authenticating the received messages using the received calculated application hash value, and forwarding the response messages to the requestor application within the user workstation, and receiving the response messages by the requestor application within the user workstation. The step of authenticating the received response messages using the received calculated application hash value may comprise authenticating the received response messages by comparing the received calculated application hash value with an application hash value calculated by the connection manager. The step of forwarding the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value may comprise the steps of obtaining public and private keys from a PKI authority, encrypting the requestor messages using the external resource public PKI key, encrypting the application hash value and a digital signature, a user ID and a password using the requestor application PKI private key, forwarding the encrypted requestor messages, the application hash value, the digital signature, the user ID and the password by the connection manager over the network to the channel gateway, the step of receiving the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value may comprise receiving the encrypted requestor messages, application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password by the channel receiver of the channel gateway, and the step of authenticating the received requestor messages using the calculated application hash value and forwarding the requester messages to the external resource may comprise decrypting the application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password using the application requestor PKI public key, decrypting the encrypted requestor messages using the external resource PKI private key, authenticating the received requestor messages using the decrypted calculated application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password, and forwarding the decrypted requestor messages to the external resource. The step of receiving the response messages by the channel receiver and forwarding the response messages may comprise receiving the response messages by the channel receiver, encrypting the response messages using the requestor application PKI public key, encrypting the hash and remote source digital signature using the remote source PKI private key, and forwarding the encrypted response messages, the encrypted calculated application hash value and remote resource digital signature, and the requestor application user ID and password over the network to the connection manager within the user workstation, and the step of receiving the response messages by the connection manager may comprise receiving the response messages by the connection manager, decrypting the response messages using the requestor application PKI private key, decrypting the hash and remote source digital signature using the remote source PKI public key, authenticating the decrypted received response messages using the decrypted received calculated application hash value and digital signature, and forwarding the response messages to the requestor application within the user workstation. The method may further comprise the step of forwarding the calculated application hash value, a digital signature, a user ID and a password by the connection manager over the network to an access authority for connection negotiation to obtain a session key, the step of encrypting the requestor messages by the connection manager using the session key, and the step of decrypting the requester messages by the channel receiver using the session key. The method may further comprise the step of negotiating a connection and obtaining a session key from an access authority, the step of encrypting the response messages by the channel receiver using a session key, and the step of decrypting the response messages by the connection manager using the session key. A computer-readable medium may contain instructions for controlling a computer system to implement the method above.  
           [0012]    Another embodiment of the present invention is a system for application-level virtual private networking, comprising means for requesting access for sending requestor messages to an external resource by a requestor application within a user workstation, means for identifying the requestor application and calculating a hash value of the requestor application by a connection manager within the user workstation, means for forwarding the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value by the connection manager over a network to a channel gateway, means for receiving the requester messages and the calculated application hash value by a channel receiver within the channel gateway, means for authenticating the received requestor messages using the calculated application hash value and forwarding the requestor messages to the external resource, and means for receiving the requestor messages by the external resource. The external resource may be a server application program. The requester application may be one specific version of one specific application. The system may further comprise means for preparing and forwarding response messages by the external resource to the channel receiver within the channel gateway, means for receiving the response messages by the channel receiver and forwarding the response messages and the calculated application hash value over the network to the connection manager within the user workstation, means for receiving the response messages by the connection manager, authenticating the received messages using the received calculated application hash value, and forwarding the response messages to the requestor application within the user workstation, and means for receiving the response messages by the requester application within the user workstation. The means for forwarding the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value may comprise the steps of obtaining public and private keys from a PKI authority, encrypting the requestor messages using the external resource public PKI key, encrypting the application hash value and a digital signature, a user ID and a password using the requestor application PKI private key, forwarding the encrypted requestor messages, the application hash value, the digital signature, the user ID and the password by the connection manager over the network to the channel gateway, the means for receiving the requestor messages and the calculated application hash value may comprise receiving the encrypted requestor messages, application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password by the channel receiver of the channel gateway, and the means for authenticating the received requestor messages using the calculated application hash value and forwarding the requestor messages to the external resource may comprise decrypting the application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password using the application requester PKI public key, decrypting the encrypted requestor messages using the external resource PKI private key, authenticating the received requestor messages using the decrypted calculated application hash value, digital signature, user ID and password, and forwarding the decrypted requestor messages to the external resource. The means for receiving the response messages by the channel receiver and forwarding the response messages may comprise receiving the response messages by the channel receiver, encrypting the response messages using the requestor application PKI public key, encrypting the hash and remote source digital signature using the remote source PKI private key, and forwarding the encrypted response messages, the encrypted calculated application hash value and remote resource digital signature, and the requestor application user ID and password over the network to the connection manager within the user workstation, and the means for receiving the response messages by the connection manager comprises receiving the response messages by the connection manager, decrypting the response messages using the requestor application PKI private key, decrypting the hash and remote source digital signature using the remote source PKI public key, authenticating the decrypted received response messages using the decrypted received calculated application hash value and digital signature, and forwarding the response messages to the requestor application within the user workstation. The system may further comprise means for forwarding the calculated application hash value, a digital signature, a user ID and a password by the connection manager over the network to an access authority for connection negotiation to obtain a session key, means for encrypting the requestor messages by the connection manager using the session key, and means for decrypting the requestor messages by the channel receiver using the session key. The method may further comprising means for negotiating a connection and obtaining a session key from an access authority, means for encrypting the response messages by the channel receiver using a session key, and means for decrypting the response messages by the connection manager using the session key.  
           [0013]    Yet another embodiment of the present invention is a user interface method for application-level virtual private networking, comprising defining a remote resource to be accessed without connection negotiation, including selecting a remote resource to be accessed, designating a local port for accessing a virtual private network, providing an IP address of the remote resource, assigning a port number where the remote resource is available, defining a connection for the requestor application, including using an executable application program for connecting to the remote resource, selecting a remote resource designation, supplying a user ID, entering a password, and clicking an enable button for accessing the remote resource. The user interface method may further comprise defining a remote resource to be accessed with connection negotiation, including checking a box for designating negotiation required, and assigning an access authority to be used and for determining an IP address and remote resource port. 
       
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS  
       [0014]    These and other features, aspects and advantages of the present invention will become better understood with regard to the following description, appended claims, and accompanying drawings wherein:  
         [0015]    [0015]FIG. 1 shows a graphical user interface of a Connection Manager for configuring an embodiment of the present invention;  
         [0016]    [0016]FIG. 2 shows a diagram of a local User Application and a Connection Manager with a Channel Listener for accessing a requested resource according to the present invention;  
         [0017]    [0017]FIG. 3A shows a Channel Gateway on a remote server for processing incoming messages to a server application;  
         [0018]    [0018]FIG. 3B shows a Channel Gateway on a remote server for processing incoming messages to a resource external to the server;  
         [0019]    [0019]FIG. 4 shows a typical network application of users accessing a target resource;  
         [0020]    [0020]FIG. 5 shows a flow diagram of connecting to a resource that does not require negotiation; and  
         [0021]    [0021]FIG. 6 shows a flow diagram of connecting to a resource that requires negotiation. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION  
       [0022]    Turning now to FIG. 1, FIG. 1 shows a graphical user interface  100  of a Connection Manager for configuring an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 1A shows a connection window and FIG. 1B shows a resource window of the user interface  100 . When an end-user wants to use a network-aware application  110  to access a protected resource  112 , the application  110  must be configured to use resources on a local host rather than a network. For example, if access is desired to a resource oracle database  124  with a resource name Research DB  122 , an application configuration must be changed from “my-oracle_server:1521” to “localhost:1521”  150 . This configuration can be done manually, or an agent or local library that hijacks specified connections and reroutes them to localhost can handle it. A VPN channel is then configured to accept connections on “localhost:1521”  150  using a graphical user interface such as the one illustrated in FIG. 1. Once the ENABLE button  140  is pressed, the Connection Manager initiates a connection negotiation if it is required by the selected resource. The connection negotiation requires determining the selected application&#39;s hash from the operating system, packaging it with the User ID and Password entered for the connection, adding the digital signature from an attached strong authentication device of choice (such as SmartCard, iButton, etc.), and sending the combined message to a specified Access Authority  160 . The status  114  of the connection shows a state of “Negotiating” until a response is received from the Access Authority  160 . This response includes an approval notice, a session key, and a rendezvous point (IP address: port of an RVP) where the requested resource can be accessed. Once a connection has been approved, the Connection Manager opens a Listener on the local port  150  specified for the connection, and the system is ready to transfer messages.  
         [0023]    As shown in FIG. 1, the graphical user interface  100  of the Connection Manager enables a user to define a connection to a remote resource. The remote resource definition includes (1) a resource name  122  as a reference to the remote resource, (2) a local port  150  where local applications connect for access the remote resource, (3) whether negotiation is required  160  to initiate a negotiation sequence with the specified Access Authority  160  when a connection is “Enabled”  114  for this resource, (4) an Access Authority  160  that specifies a Key Authority for access to the remote resource if negotiation is required, (5) an IP address  170  where the remote resource is available (provided by a negotiation process if negotiation is required), and (6) a port number  172  where the remote resource is available (provided by a negotiation process if negotiation is required). A list of resources and resource definitions is stored on a local user file system to enable a user to recall previously defined entries. The graphical user interface  100  enables a user to define a reusable connection. This definition includes (1) a fully qualified executable for connecting to a specified resource  120 , (2) a defined resource that is added to a drop-down resource list  122 , (3) a user ID  130  to be used in a negotiation process, and (4) a password  132  for use in a negotiation process. The list of connections  122  and each connection definition is stored on a local user file system to enable a user to recall previously defined entries. Once a negotiation process is completed, signified either by approval from an Access Authority  160  or assumed in the case of no required negotiation, the Connection Manager instantiates the Channel Listener on the specified local port  150  and provides a session key from the from the Access Authority  160 .  
         [0024]    Turning to FIG. 2, FIG. 2 shows a diagram  200  of a local User Application  210  and a Connection Manager  220  with a Channel Listener  230  for accessing a requested resource according to the present invention. The purpose of the Channel Listener  230  is to calculate the hash as a signature of any application that attempts to use its resource, to encrypt all traffic and forward the traffic to the specified resource, and to verify signatures using the application hash and decrypt return traffic. FIG. 2 illustrates how local applications can use the Channel Listener  230  to access a requested resource once the Channel Listener  230  has been started. When a User Application  210  connects to the local resource  240  provided by the Connection Manager  220  and Channel Listener  230 , the Channel. Listener  230  performs a hash check of that application  250 . This involves some native functions that allow the connection routines to match file descriptors to requesting programs. Once the hash of the User Application program  210  is determined, the Channel Listener  230  uses the program&#39;s hash for use as a signature for validating a connection and uses a session key provided by an Access Authority to encrypt all messages  260 . The Channel Listener  230  then forwards the encrypted traffic to a specified resource  270 .  
         [0025]    As shown in FIG. 2, the Channel Listener  230  accepts traffic from the workstation via a loopback address (127.0.0.1)  240 . Upon receiving a connection, the Channel Listener  230  interrogates the operating system to identify the requestor of the resource. Once the requestor is known, the Channel Listener  230  calculates a hash of the requestor  250 . This hash is used as a signature and a session key is used to encrypt all traffic from the connecting application  260  as the Channel Listener  230  forwards it to the remote resource  270 . The Channel Listener  230  opens ports on a local host such that they are not accessible from external sources. Upon accepting a connection, the Channel Listener  230  must determine the requestor of the connection by any accurate means. This can include native languages and operating system dependent methods. Native methods used to fulfill this requirement are modularized such that they can be easily integrated into the Connection Manager  220 . Upon identifying a requester, the Channel Listener  230  calculates its hash as it resides on the file system. As traffic passes through the Channel Listener  230 , the Channel Listener  230  uses the session key provided by the Connection Manager  220  to encrypt the traffic. The Channel Listener  230  forwards the encrypted traffic to the external resource  270  specified in the Connection Manager  220 . The return traffic is decrypted with the same session key and verified with a signature.  
         [0026]    Turning now to FIG. 3, FIG. 3A shows a Channel Gateway  300  on a remote server for processing incoming messages to a server application and FIG. 3B shows a Channel Gateway  350  on a remote server for processing incoming messages to a resource external to the server. FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B show how the Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  on a remote server processes incoming message traffic  330 . In both cases, the connection negotiation has already occurred, as discussed above, for providing a Channel Receiver  310  with the proper application hash and session key. Similar to the Channel Listener discussed above, which encrypted the traffic with a session key and used the hash as a signature, the Channel Receiver  310  decrypts the incoming message traffic  330  in a comparable manner. The message traffic flows both ways for the users” applications to communicate effectively with the target resources. Therefore, return traffic is encrypted and decrypted such that the Channel Listener and Channel Receiver  310  switch encryption/decryption roles. When communicating  360  with a Channel Receiver  310 , an External Resource  370  performs the same message communications functions as a Server Application  320  and a Server Listener  34  communicating  334  with a Channel Receiver  310 , similar to the Communication Manager discussed above. Incoming message traffic  330  enters a Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  via a Channel receiver  310 . The Channel Receiver  310  decrypts the message traffic using a session key and verifies a signature using an application hash  332 . The Channel Receiver  310  then forwards the decrypted message traffic  334 ,  360  to a Server listener  340  connected to a Server Application  320 , or an external resource  370 .  
         [0027]    As shown in FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B, the purpose of a Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  is to provide an environment where a Channel Receiver  310  can operate. The Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  is a network appliance that serves as the server-side tunnel to the secured resource. It is the platform on which the Channel Receiver  310  runs, and may or may not be the host of the target resource, as shown in FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B. The Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  is capable of providing a Java Runtime Environment (JRE) in which the Channel Receiver  310  can execute. The Channel Gateway  300 ,  350  has sufficient processor speed and memory specification to appropriately minimize the latency caused by encryption and decryption. The purpose of the Channel Receiver  310  is to accept network traffic  330 , decrypt it using a session key and verify signature authorization using the application hash, and forward it on to the designated resource  334 ,  360 . The Channel Receiver  310  is a network-aware process that opens a service listening for traffic sent from a Connection Manager Channel Listener described above. When initiated, the Channel Receiver  310  is instantiated with a session key and application hash specifying who and what is permitted to connect. This information is used to verify authorized signatures and to decrypt the incoming message stream  330  prior to forwarding it to its ultimate destination  334 ,  360 . The Channel Receiver  310  accepts a session key, application hash, and target resource as part of its instantiation parameters. The key and hash are used to decrypt and verify signatures of all message traffic received from the sending Connection Manager Channel Listener. Decrypted traffic is forwarded to the specified target resource  334 ,  360 . Return message traffic  334 ,  360  from the target resource  320 ,  370  is encrypted with the same session key and verified with the application hash. Encrypted return message traffic  330  is forwarded back to the originating Connection Manager Channel Listener described above.  
         [0028]    Turning to FIG. 4, FIG. 4 shows a typical network application  400  of users  410 - 416  accessing a target resource  460 . It shows multiple researchers  410 ,  412 ,  414 ,  416  connecting to a centralized research database  460 . Some researchers  410 ,  412  are connected from a secure network behind a firewall  420 ,  422 . Other researchers  414 ,  416  are connected from unsecured points on the Internet. Since the target database  460  is protected by its own firewall  424 , a connection to it has been forwarded to a public connection point on the Internet. Typically, such a service would pose a high security risk because a user on the Internet would be able to connect to the database  460  through the firewall  424 . Using the present invention, traffic does not advance beyond the Channel Gateway  450  to touch the database  460 , unless an authorized user-application pair is accessing the resource  460 . As discussed above, using a Secure Message-Oriented-Middleware to send and receive the appropriate messages, user can use the Access Authority  440  for Connection Negotiation. The Channel Receiver  470  is the process or library on the Channel Gateway  450  that decrypts incoming traffic and encrypts the return traffic. A user having a qualified application, Connection Manager and Channel Listener shown in FIG. 1, such a researcher anywhere  416 , must first obtain a session key for encryption purposes from the Access Authority  440  via the rendezvous peer (RVP)  430 . Using the session key to encrypt message traffic and application hash for signature verification, the user  416  connects to the RVP  430  to the Channel Gateway  450  and Channel Receiver  470 , as shown in FIG. 3. The Channel Gateway  450  containing the Channel Receiver  470  verifies an authorized signature using the forwarded application hash and decrypts the message traffic using the session key, forwarding the message traffic to the target resource  460 . When sending message traffic from the target resource  460  to the researcher  416 , the process of signature verification and encryption is reversed, as explained above.  
         [0029]    Turning to FIG. 5, FIG. 5 shows a flow diagram  500  of connecting to a resource that does not require negotiation. The predetermined application hash has previously been provided to the Channel Listener  510 . This scenario only permits one version of one application to be used to access the protected resource. Furthermore, it does not facilitate the exchange of session keys and is thus not recommended for solutions that need more appropriate security. The end-user defines a resource using the Connection Manager  520  with information similar to this example data:  
         [0030]    [0030]         rce Name: Research Database  
         [0031]    [0031]         port: 1521  
         [0032]    [0032]         iation Required: No  
         [0033]    [0033]         s Authority: N/A  
         [0034]    [0034]         dress: 192.168.10.100  
         [0035]    [0035]         1521  
         [0036]    The end-user defines a connection using the Connection Manager  530  with information similar to this example data:  
         [0037]    [0037]         g: C:\Program Files\MyApp.exe  
         [0038]    [0038]         Research Database  
         [0039]    [0039]         erid&gt; 
         [0040]    [0040]         assword&gt; 
         [0041]    The end-user clicks the ENABLE button on the Connection Manager, and the Connection Manager immediately reports the selected connection as AVAILABLE  540 . The end-user, having configured his application to connect to localhost:1521 to match the information provided above, launches his application and the application makes a connection to the local host  550  provided by the Channel Listener. The Channel Listener interrogates the local operating system to determine the executable that has connected to the resource, and calculates a hash of that file for use as signature authentication  560 . As message traffic passes through the Channel Listener, the hash value calculated from the requestor application is used to authenticate the signature, and the Channel Listener forwards all message traffic to the specified resource  570 . The Channel Receiver accepts the connection and authenticates the traffic using the pre-coordinated application hash  580 .  
         [0042]    Turning to FIG. 6, FIG. 6 shows a flow diagram  600  of connecting to a resource that requires negotiation. The predetermined application hash has previously been provided to the Access Authority  610 . The end-user defines a resource using the Connection Manager  620  with information similar to this example data:  
         [0043]    [0043]         Name: Research Database  
         [0044]    [0044]         : 1521  
         [0045]    [0045]         Required: Yes  
         [0046]    [0046]         hority: world.usa.ThreatGuard.axess.keymaster  
         [0047]    [0047]         : N/A  
         [0048]    The end-user defines a connection using the Connection Manager  622  with information similar to this example data:  
         [0049]    [0049]         ng: C:\Program Files\MyApp.exe  
         [0050]    [0050]         Research Database  
         [0051]    [0051]         erid&gt; 
         [0052]    [0052]         passsword&gt; 
         [0053]    The end-user clicks the ENABLE button on the Connection Manager and the Connection Manager reports the status of the selected connection as NEGOTIATING  624 . The Connection Manager then calculates the hash of the specified application, pulls the user&#39;s digital signature from a local strong authentication device, packages that information with the User ID and password, and sends the message to the specified Access Authority via a Message-Oriented Middleware API  630 . The Access Authority validates the request and arranges the rendezvous  640  by generating a session key for the Listener and Receiver to share, instructing the Channel Gateway to open a forwarded tunnel from the RVP to the specified resource, instructing the Channel Receiver of the application hash and session key to use for decryption, and instructing the user&#39;s Connection Manager Channel Listener of the session key, as well as the IP address and port on the RVP has been opened by the Channel Gateway to offer the service. Upon receiving approval of the request, the Connection Manager updates the connection status from NEGOTIATING to ENABLED  650 . The end-user, having configured his application to connect to localhost:1521 to match the information provided above, launches his application and the application makes a connection to the localhost resource provided by the Channel Listener  660 . The Channel Listener interrogates the local operating system to determine the executable that has connected to the resource and calculates a hash of that file for use as signature authentication  670 . As traffic passes through the Channel Listener, it is encrypted by the Listener using the provided session key as the encryption key, and the Listener forwards all traffic to the IP address and port provided by the Access Authority  672 . The Channel Receiver accepts the connection and decrypts the traffic using the pre-coordinated application hash and session key as the decryption key  680 .  
         [0054]    Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to certain preferred embodiments, it should be apparent that modifications and adaptations to those embodiments might occur to persons skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.