Abstract:
A method for authenticating a trusted platform based on the Tri-element Peer Authentication (TePA). The method includes the following steps: A) a second attesting system sends the first message to a first attesting system; B) the first attesting system sends a second message to the second attesting system after receiving the first message; C) the second attesting system sends a third message to a Trusted Third Party (TTP) after receiving the second message; D) the TTP sends a fourth message to the second attesting system after receiving the third message; E) the second attesting system sends a fifth message to the first attesting system after receiving the fourth message; and F) the first attesting system performs an access control after receiving the fifth message. The method for authenticating a trusted platform based on TePA of the present invention adopts the security architecture of TePA, and improves the safety of an evaluation agreement of the trusted platform, realizes the mutual evaluation of the trusted platform between the attesting systems, and extends the application ranges.

Description:
[0001]    This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application no. 200810232093.5, filed with the Chinese Patent Office on Nov. 4, 2008 and entitled “Trustworthy Platform Verification Method Based On Tri-element Peer Authentication (TePA)”, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. 
       FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
       [0002]    The present invention relates to a trustworthy platform verification method based on tri-element Peer Authentication (TePA). 
       BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
       [0003]    The issue of network security has been challenged severely along with gradual development of computer network. Existing security solutions in the field tend to be focused on preventing the hazards from the outside firstly and then from the inside, that is, firstly preventing the hazards from a service facility and then from a terminal facility. However, trusted computing runs to the contrary by firstly ensuring security of all terminals, that is, by building a larger security system through ensuring secured components. Higher-level precaution is taken at an underlying layer of a trusted computing platform, and an enhanced protection space and scope of selections can be provided for users by preventing a soft-level attack through trustworthy hardware. 
         [0004]    A Challenger (CH) has to evaluate the trusted computing platform by a certain platform attribute to verify trustworthiness of the trusted computing platform. In trusted computing specification established by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), the Challenger CH evaluates the trusted computing platform by platform integrity, where the evaluated trusted computing platform is referred to an Attesting System (AS), and  FIG. 1  illustrates a corresponding trusted platform evaluation protocol as follows: 
         [0005]    1) The Challenger CH generates a random number N CH  and transmits a message  1 =N CH  to the Attesting System AS. 
         [0006]    2) Upon reception of the message  1 , the Attesting System AS firstly transports the random number N CH  to a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) thereof and then extracts Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS by the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the Attesting System AS, extracts the measurement logs Log AS  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS from the Store Measurement Log (SML) of the Attesting System AS using a signature [PCRs AS , N CH ] Sig  performed with a private key of an Attesting Identity Key (AIK) of the Attesting System AS on the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS and the random number N CH , and finally transmits a message  2 =PCRs AS ∥Log AS ∥[PCRs AS , N CH ] Sig  to the Challenger CH, where ∥ represents concatenation of character strings. 
         [0007]    3) Upon reception of the message  2 , the Challenger CH firstly verifies the signature against a public key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK of the Attesting System AS, the random number N CH  and the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS in the message  2  and discards the message  2  if the signature is invalid, otherwise verifies correctness of the measurement logs Log AS  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS in the message  2  against the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS in the message  2  and terminates the protocol process if it is incorrect, otherwise verifies trustworthiness of the Attesting System AS against the measurement logs Log AS  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS  of the Attesting System AS in the message  2  and reference integrity values of respective components in the measurement logs Log AS . 
         [0008]    In the foregoing trusted platform evaluation protocol, messages exchanged between the Attesting System AS and the Challenger CH are transmitted over a secure channel. As can be apparent from the trusted platform evaluation protocol illustrated in  FIG. 1 , this protocol is applicable only to unidirectional trusted platform evaluation, and the Challenger CH has to be capable of verifying the Attesting Identity Key AIK and platform integrity of the Attesting System AS, where the Challenger CH can verify the Attesting Identity Key AIK of the Attesting System AS based upon Trusted Third Party (TTP) or through Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). When Attesting Systems AS have to be mutually verified trustworthiness of opposite platform, however, if one of the Attesting Systems AS is incapable of verifying the Attesting Identity Key AIK and platform integrity of the opposite Attesting System AS, then the Attesting Identity Key AIK and platform integrity of the Attesting System AS can not be verified in the prior art. 
       SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
       [0009]    In order to address the foregoing technical problem in the prior art, the invention provides a method for verifying an Attesting Identity Key AIK and platform integrity of an Attesting System AS through a Trusted Third Party TTP, i.e., a trusted platform verification method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication (TePA). 
         [0010]    In a technical solution of the invention, the invention is a trusted platform verification method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication, wherein the method includes the steps of: 
         [0011]    A) transmitting, by a second Attesting System, a first message to a first Attesting System, wherein the first message includes a random number N AS2  generated by the second Attesting System, an Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System and a parameter list Parm PCRs-AS1  of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the second Attesting System from the first Attesting System; 
         [0012]    B) transporting, by the first Attesting System, the N AS2  to a Trusted Platform Module TPM of the first Attesting System, and then extracting corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  from the Trusted Platform Module TPM based on the parameter list Parm PCRs-AS1  of PCRs, performing a signature [N AS2 , PCRs AS1 ] Sig  on the PCRs AS1  and the N AS2  using a private key of an Attesting Identity Key AIK of the first Attesting System, extracting the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the PCRs AS1  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the first Attesting System, and transmitting a second message to the second Attesting System AS 2 , wherein the second message includes a random number N AS1  generated by the first Attesting System, an Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System and a parameter list Parm PCRs-AS2  of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the first Attesting System from the second Attesting System; 
         [0013]    C) verifying, by the second Attesting System, the signature against a public key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the first Attesting System, the N AS2  and the PCRs AS1 , and if the signature is invalid, then discarding the second message; otherwise, transmitting the N AS1  to a Trusted Platform Module TPM of the second Attesting System, extracting from the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the second Attesting System corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  against the Parm PCRs-AS2 , performing a signature [N AS1 , PCRs AS2 ] Sig  on the PCRs AS2  and the N AS1  using a private key of an Attesting Identity Key AIK of the second Attesting System, extracting the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the second Attesting System, and transmitting to a Trustworthy Third Party TTP a third message including an authentication random number N AS2-TTP  generated by the second Attesting System; 
         [0014]    D) verifying, by the Trusted Third Party TTP, validity of the Cert AIK-AS1  and the Cert AIK-AS2 , generating a verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the Cert AIK-AS1  and a verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Cert AIK-AS2 , and then verifying correctness of the Log AS1  against the PCRs AS1 , and if it is incorrect, then discarding the message; otherwise, verifying the correctness of Log AS2  against the PCRs AS2 , and if it is incorrect, then discarding the message; otherwise, evaluating trustworthiness of the first Attesting System against the Log AS1  and reference integrity values of respective components in the Log AS1  and trustworthiness of the second Attesting System against the Log AS2  and reference integrity values of respective components in the Log AS2 , generating a platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS1  and platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System and a platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  and platform remediation information Rem AS2  of the second Attesting System, calculating relevant parameters of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the second Attesting System AS 2  from the private keys and transmitting a fourth message including the relevant parameters to the AS 2 ; 
         [0015]    E) verifying, by the second Attesting System, the signature against the fourth message, and if the signature is invalid, then discarding the message; otherwise, generating a result of the AS 1  accessing the AS 2  and transmitting a fifth message to the first Attesting System AS 1 ; and 
         [0016]    F) verifying, by the AS 2 , the signature against the fifth message, and if the signature is invalid, then discarding the message; otherwise, verifying the signature in the fourth message, and if the signature is invalid, then terminating the protocol process; otherwise, performing access control against the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Cert AIK-AS2 , the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  and the result Re access  of the first Attesting System AS 1  accessing the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0017]    The list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR in the step A) is a list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR determined in the first Attesting System or a list of components determined in the first Attesting System. 
         [0018]    The list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR in the step B) is a list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR determined in the second Attesting System or a list of components determined in the second Attesting System. 
         [0019]    The messages exchanged between the first Attesting System and the second Attesting System are transported over a secure channel therebetween. 
         [0020]    The messages exchanged between the second Attesting System and the Trusted Third Party are transported over a secure channel therebetween. 
         [0021]    If the second Attesting System can not know platform configuration information of the first Attesting System, then the Log AS1  and the platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System are transported over a secure channel between the first Attesting System and the Trusted Third Party; and if the Attesting Identity Keys of the Attesting Systems are verified between the first Attesting System and the second Attesting System based upon Direct Anonymous Attestation DAA, then neither the fourth message nor the fifth message includes the Cert AIK-AS1  and the verification result Re AIK-AS1 , the Cert AIK-AS2  and the verification result Re AIK-AS2 . 
         [0022]    The invention has the following advantages: 
         [0023]    1) The trusted platform verification method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication according to the invention performs bidirectional trusted platform evaluation between the Attesting Systems, verifies the Attesting Identity Keys AIK and platform integrity of the Attesting Systems AS through a Trusted Third Party TTP to thereby extend the application scope. 
         [0024]    2) The trusted platform verification method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication according to the invention adopts security architecture of Tri-element Peer Authentication and enhances security of the trusted platform evaluation protocol. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0025]      FIG. 1  illustrates a trusted platform verification method in a TCG architecture in the prior art; and 
           [0026]      FIG. 2  illustrates a schematic diagram of the method according to the invention. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
       [0027]    Referring to  FIG. 2 , the invention particularly includes the following steps: 
         [0028]    1) A second Attesting System AS 2  transmits a first message to a first Attesting System AS 1 , wherein the first message includes a random number generated by the second Attesting System, an Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the second Attesting System and a parameter list of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the second Attesting System from the first Attesting System. 
         [0029]    Particularly, the first message (message  1 )=N AS2 ∥Cert AIK-AS2 ∥Parm PCRs-AS1 , where N AS2  is the random number generated by the second Attesting System AS 2 , Cert AIK-AS2  is the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and Parm PCRs-AS1  is the parameter list of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the second Attesting System AS 2  from the first Attesting System AS 1 , which may be a list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR determined in the first Attesting System AS 1  or a list of components determined in the first Attesting System AS 1 . 
         [0030]    2) The first Attesting System AS 1  transports the random number to its own Trusted Platform Module TPM, extracts corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  from the TPM based on the parameter list of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs, performed a signature [N AS2 , PCRs AS1 ] Sig  on the PCRs AS1  and the N AS2  using a private key of an Attesting Identity Key AIK of the AS 1 , extracts the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the PCRs AS1  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the first Attesting System AS 1 , and transmits a second message to the second Attesting System AS 2 , wherein the second message includes a random number generated by the AS 1 , the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the AS 1  and a parameter list of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the AS 1  from the AS 2 . 
         [0031]    Particularly, upon reception of the message  1 , the first Attesting System AS 1  firstly transports the random number N AS2  generated by the second Attesting System AS 2  to the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the first Attesting System AS 1 , and then extracts from the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the first Attesting System AS 1  the corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  based on the parameter list Parm PCRs-AS1  of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the second Attesting System AS 2  from the first Attesting System AS 1 , the signature [N AS2 , PCRs AS1 ] Sig  on the extracted Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the random number N AS2  generated by the second Attesting System AS 2  performed using the private key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK of the first Attesting System AS 1 , extracts the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the first Attesting System AS 1 , and finally transmits the second message (a message  2 =PCRs AS1 ∥Log AS1 ∥[N AS2 , PCRs AS1 ] Sig ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥Parm PCRs-AS2 ) to the second Attesting System AS 2 , where N AS1  is the random number generated by the first Attesting System AS 1 , Cert AIK-AS1  is an Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the first Attesting System AS 1 , and Parm PCRs-AS2  is the parameter list of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the first Attesting System AS 1  from the second Attesting System AS 2 , which may be a list of Platform Configuration Registers PCR determined in the second Attesting System AS 2  or a list of components determined in the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0032]    3) The second Attesting System verifies the signature against a public key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate, the random number N AS2  generated by the AS 2 , and the PCRs AS1 , discards the second message if the signature is invalid or otherwise transmits the N AS1  to a Trusted Platform Module TPM of the AS 2 , extracts from the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the second Attesting System AS 2  corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the AS 2  based on the parameter list Parm PCRs-AS2  of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the AS 1  from the AS 2 , performs a signature [N AS1 , PCRs AS2 ] Sig  on the PCRs AS2  and the N AS1  using a private key of an Attesting Identity Key AIK of the AS 2 , extracts the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the AS 2  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the AS 2 , and transmits to a Trusted Third Party TTP a third message including a authentication random number generated by the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0033]    Particularly, upon reception of the message  2 , the second Attesting System AS 2  firstly verifies the signature against the public key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the random number N AS2  generated by the second Attesting System AS 2  and the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  in the message  2 , discards the message  2  if the signature is invalid or otherwise transports the random number N AS1  generated by the first Attesting System AS 1  to the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and then extracts from the Trusted Platform Module TPM of the second Attesting System AS 2  the corresponding Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  based on the parameter list Parm PCRs-AS2  of Platform Configuration Register values PCRs requested by the first Attesting System AS 1  from the second Attesting System AS 2 , performs the signature [N AS1 , PCRs AS2 ] Sig  on the extracted Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  and the random number N AS1  generated by the first Attesting System AS 1  using the private key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK of the second Attesting System AS 2 , extracts the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  from the Store Measurement Log SML of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and finally transmits the third message (a message  3 ) to the Trusted Platform Party TTP, where the message  3 =N AS2-TTP ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS2 ∥PCRs AS1 ∥Log AS1 ∥PCRs AS2 ∥Log AS2  and wherein N AS2-TTP  is the authentication random number generated by the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0034]    4) The Trusted Platform Party TTP verifies validity of the Cert AIK-AS1  and the Cert AIK-AS2 , generates a verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the Cert AIK-AS1  and a verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Cert AIK-AS2 , verifies correctness of the corresponding measurement logs Log AS1  against the PCRs AS1  and discards the message if it is incorrect or otherwise verifies the correctness of the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the PCRs AS2  against the PCRs AS2  and discards the message if it is incorrect or otherwise evaluates trustworthiness of the first Attesting System AS 1  against the measurement logs Log AS1  and reference integrity values of respective components in the Log AS1  and trustworthiness of the first Attesting System AS 2  against the measurement logs Log AS2  and reference integrity values of respective components in the Log AS2 , generates a platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS1  and platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and a platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  and platform remediation information Rem AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , calculates relevant parameters of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the second Attesting System AS 2  from the private keys and transmits a fourth message including the relevant parameters to the AS 2 . 
         [0035]    Particularly, upon reception of the message  3 , the Trusted Platform Party TTP firstly verifies validity of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , generates the verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , verifies correctness of the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  in the message  3  against the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  in the message  3  and discards the message if it is incorrect or otherwise verifies correctness of the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  in the message  3  against the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  in the message  3  and discards the message if it is incorrect or otherwise evaluates trustworthiness of the first Attesting System AS 1  against the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  in the message  3  and the reference integrity values of the respective components in the measurement logs Log AS1  and the reference integrity values of the respective components in the measurement logs Log AS1  and evaluates trustworthiness of the second Attesting System AS 2  against the measurement logs Log AS2  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  in the message  3  and the reference integrity values of the respective components in the measurement logs Log AS2 , and generates the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS1  and the platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  and the platform remediation information Rem AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and next the Trusted Platform Party TTP calculates against the private keys a signature [N AS2-TTP ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥ 
         [0000]    Re AIK-AS1 ∥PCRs AS1 ∥Re PCRs-AS1 ∥Rem AS1 ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS2 ∥Re AIK-AS2 ∥PCRs AS2 ∥Re PCRs-AS2 ∥ Rem AS2 ] Sig  on the authentication random number N AS2-TTP  generated by the second Attesting System AS 2 , the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1 , the random number N AS1  generated by the first Attesting System AS 1 , the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and the platform remediation information Rem AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 , and finally transmits to the second Attesting System AS 2  the message  4 =Re AIK-AS1 ∥Re PCRs-AS1 ∥Rem AS1 ∥Re AIK-AS2 ∥Re PCRs-AS2 ∥Rem AS2 ∥[N AS2-TTP ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥Re AIK-AS1 ∥PCRs AS1 ∥Re PCRs-AS1 ∥Rem AS1 ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS2 ∥Re AIK-AS2 ∥PCRs AS2 ∥Re PCRs-AS2 ∥Rem AS2 ] Sig . 
         [0036]    5) The AS 2  verifies the signature against the fourth message and discards the message if the signature is invalid or otherwise generates a result of the AS 1  accessing the AS 2  and transmits a fifth message to the first Attesting System AS 1 . 
         [0037]    Particularly, upon reception of the message  4 , the second Attesting System AS 2  firstly verifies the signature [N AS2-TTP ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥Re AIK-AS1 ∥PCRs AS1 ∥Re PCRs-AS1 ∥ Rem AS1 ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS2 ∥Re AIK-AS2 ∥PCRs AS2 ∥Re PCRs-AS2 ∥Rem AS2 ] Sig  against a public key of the Trustworthy Platform Party TTP and discards the message if the signature is invalid or otherwise generates the result Re access  of the first Attesting System AS 1  accessing the second Attesting System AS 2 , based on the verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  in the message  4 , wherein a value of the result Re access  is Allowed/Disallowed/Isolated, and then transmits a message  5 =N AS2-TTP ∥PCRs AS2 ∥[N AS1 ∥PCRsAS 2 ] Sig ∥Re access ∥ to the first Attesting System AS 1 . 
         [0038]    6) The AS 2  verifies the signature against the fifth message and discards the message if the signature is invalid or otherwise verifies the signature in the fourth message and terminates the protocol process if the signature is invalid or otherwise performs access control against the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Cert AIK-AS2 , the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  and the result Re access  of the first Attesting System AS 1  accessing the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0039]    Particularly, upon reception of the fifth message (the message  5 ), the first Attesting System AS 1  firstly verifies the signature [N AS1 ∥PCRs AS2 ] Sig  against the public key of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  and discards the message if the signature is invalid or otherwise verifies the signature [N AS2-TTP ∥Cert AIK-AS1 ∥Re AIK-AS1 ∥PCRs AS1 ∥Re PCRs-AS1 ∥Rem AS1 ∥N AS1 ∥Cert AIK-AS2  ∥Re AIK-AS2 ∥PCRs AS2 ∥Re PCRs-AS2 ∥Rem AS2 ] Sig  in the message  4  and terminates the protocol process if the signature is invalid or otherwise performs access control against the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  and the platform integrity verification result Re PCRs-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2  in the message  4  and the result Re access  of the first Attesting System AS 1  accessing the second Attesting System AS 2 . 
         [0040]    In the foregoing trusted platform evaluation protocol based on Tri-element Peer Authentication, the messages exchanged between the first Attesting System AS 1  and the second Attesting System AS 2  are transported over a secure channel therebetween; the messages exchanged between the second Attesting System AS 2  and the Trusted Third Party TTP are transported over a secure channel therebetween; if the first Attesting System AS 1  does not wish any knowledge of the second Attesting System AS 2  about platform configuration information of the first Attesting System AS 1 , then the measurement logs Log AS1  corresponding to the Platform Configuration Register values PCRs AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the platform remediation information Rem AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  are transported over a secure channel between the first Attesting System AS 1  and the Trusted Third Party TTP; and if the Attesting Identity Keys AIK of the Attesting Systems AS are verified between the first Attesting System AS 1  and the second Attesting System AS 2  based upon Direct Anonymous Attestation DAA, then neither the message  4  nor the message  5  includes the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS1  and the verification result Re AIK-AS1  of the first Attesting System AS 1  and the Attesting Identity Key AIK certificate Cert AIK-AS2  and the verification result Re AIK-AS2  of the second Attesting System AS 2 .