Abstract:
A financial card activation and authorization system for a transaction is disclosed. An image of an account holder and his financial card is captured and used to develop an encryption key to secure the account information. Subsequent transactions are then authorized by sending an image of the purchaser&#39;s face and the financial card by comparing it to the original picture of the account holder who activated the card.

Description:
SPECIFICATION 
       [0001]    This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/091,742, filed Dec. 15, 2014, which is hereby incorporated by reference, as well as U.S. Provisional Application 62/047,663 filed on Sep. 9, 2014, which is also hereby incorporated by reference. 
     
    
     BACKGROUND 
       [0002]    Security is essential for financial transactions and the financial system in general. A massive amount of financial transactions occur electronically over an Internet. Huge numbers of point-of-sales terminals communicate electronically with financial institutions that store account information in the cloud. The presence of such a massive volume of financial transactions and financial wealth in electronic form in the cloud over the Internet naturally arouses the interest of criminal elements. There is therefore a great need for new and improved technological security systems that are user friendly to protect electronic financial transactions from security breaches in the cloud over the Internet. 
       SUMMARY 
       [0003]    A financial card activation and authorization system for a transaction is disclosed. The financial card authorization system is configured to work with any card connected with a financial account, such as a credit card, a debit card, an electronic funds transfer card, a point-of-sale card, an electronic funds gift card, or any other card coupled to financial assets. 
         [0004]    Financial transactions with the financial card are authorized utilizing an image containing both facial recognition features of a financial card account holder and a visual financial card identifier on a financial card belonging to the financial card account holder. 
         [0005]    A transaction computer system is connected to a plurality of point-of-sale devices through a global computing network such as the Internet. These point-of-sale devices are any electronic device capable of connecting to the transaction computer system through the Internet. These point-of-sale devices also have the ability to capture an image at the point-of-sale location and transmit it to the transaction computer system. These point-of-sale devices also have software configured to conduct a financial transaction with the transaction computer system. The transaction computer system maintains a financial account for the financial account holder. The financial account is coupled to the financial card, also referred to as a financial transaction card. The transaction computer system includes a selfie-cryptographic key generator and a database. 
         [0006]    The selfie-cryptographic key generator receives images from point-of-sale terminals that include both facial recognition features of a financial card account holder and a visual financial card identifier on a financial card belonging to the financial card account holder. The selfie-cryptographic generator generates a selfie-cryptographic key using both the facial recognition features and the visual financial card identifier from the image. 
         [0007]    The database contains financial card account information for the financial card account holder encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key. The financial card account information includes a financial card transaction authorization code. The financial card transaction authorization code enables the completion of a financial transaction between the financial card account holder and a merchant. 
         [0008]    The transaction computer system transmits the financial card authorization code when the selfie-cryptographic key successfully decrypts the financial card account information. During this process, the transaction computer system does not permanently store the selfie-cryptographic key but retains it for a transitory period during authorization of the financial card transaction. The transitory period ends upon completion of the transaction. Alternatively, the transitory period ends upon transmission of authorization to a point-of-service terminal. 
         [0009]    The selfie-cryptographic key generator utilizes transaction algorithms for computing facial recognition features and visual financial card identifiers and formulating them into the selfie-cryptographic key. 
         [0010]    The selfie-cryptographic key is computed by the selfie-cryptographic key generator from a single image containing both the facial recognition features of the financial account holder and the visual financial card identifier. The single image is acquired by a digital camera at a point-of-service terminal during the financial card transaction. The transaction computer system does not store the single image but for a transitory period during authorization of the financial card transaction. The transitory period ends upon completion of the transaction. Alternatively, the transitory period ends upon transmission of authorization to a point-of-service terminal. 
         [0011]    The visual financial card identifier is information printed on the financial card. The information printed on the financial card may include, but is not limited to a QPR code, a bar code, or a hologram. The financial card account information for the financial card account holder is initially encrypted with an initial cryptographic key that is not generated from facial recognition features of the financial card account holder. The financial card account information for the financial card account holder is re-encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key during a financial card activation process in which the financial card account holder takes a single activation image of their face together with the visual financial card identifier on the financial card with an authorized device. The activation image is received by the selfie-cryptographic generator to create the selfie-cryptographic key from the authorized device. 
         [0012]    The authorized device may be a mobile electronic device previously associated with the account information. The authorized device may also be a non-mobile wired device previously associated with the account information. The single activation image is not stored by the transaction computer system image but for a transitory period during activation of the financial card. The transitory period ends upon completion of said transaction. Alternatively, the transitory period ends upon transmission of authorization to a point-of-service terminal. A image analysis security module is provided to analyze the single image to ensure that it has not been altered or tampered with indicating a possibly forged single image. The selfie-cryptographic key generator generates a key from the single image only when the image analysis security module determined that the single image has not been tampered with. The transaction computer system does not permanently store the single image, but retains it for a transitory period during authorization of the financial card transaction. 
         [0013]    A financial card authorization system for a transaction is disclosed that includes a database containing encrypted account information for a financial card account holder encrypted with a selfie-cryptographic key. The selfie-cryptographic key is generated utilizing first data contained within a first single image. The first data includes both facial recognition features of the financial card account holder and a visual card identifier on a financial card associated with the account information. The system also includes a cryptographic key generator that generates a transaction-cryptographic key utilizing second data contained within a second single image. The second data includes both the visual financial card identifier on the financial card and facial recognition features of a person in possession of the financial card. Additionally, the system also includes a transaction system that applies the transaction-cryptographic key to the encrypted account information stored in the database. The transaction system transmits a transaction authorization code when the transaction-cryptographic key successfully decrypts the encrypted account information. The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the transaction-cryptographic key but retains it for a transitory period during an authorization of a financial card transaction. The cryptographic key generator generates the selfie-cryptographic key. The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the selfie-cryptographic key but retains it for a transitory period during encryption of the account information in the database. The first single image is a first digital picture of the financial card placed next to the financial card account holder&#39;s face. The second single image is a second digital picture of the financial card placed next to the face of the person in possession of the financial card. The cryptographic key generator utilizes a facial recognition module to extract facial recognition features from the first digital picture of the financial card account holder&#39;s face. The cryptographic key generator utilizes the facial recognition module to extract facial recognition features from the second digital picture of the face of the person in possession of the financial card. The visual financial card identifier is information printed on the financial card. The information printed on the financial card is a QPR code, a bar code, or a hologram. The encrypted account information for the financial card account holder is initially encrypted with an initial-cryptographic key before it is encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key. The initial-cryptographic key is generated without any facial recognition features of the financial card account holder. The encrypted account information for the financial card account holder is then re-encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key during a financial card activation process in which the financial card account holder creates the first single image utilizing an authorized device that digitally transmits the first single image to the cryptographic key generator across a communications network. The authorized device is a mobile electronic device previously associated with the account information. The authorized device may also be a non-mobile wired electronic device previously associated with the account information. 
         [0014]    The financial card authorization system may also include an image analysis security module. The cryptographic key generator generates the selfie-cryptographic key from the first single image only when it is authorized by the image analysis security module when the image analysis security module determines that the first single image has not been tampered with. The cryptographic key generator generates the transaction-cryptographic key from the second single image only when it is authorized by the image analysis security module when the image analysis security module determines that the second single image has not been tampered with. The transaction system transmits a transaction rejection code when the image analysis security module determines that the second single image has been tampered with. The transaction system transmits a transaction rejection code when the transaction-cryptographic key unsuccessfully decrypts the encrypted account information. The cryptographic key generator receives the second single image via a digital message sent over a communications network from a point-of-service terminal equipped with a digital camera. The digital camera captured the single second image. The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the first single image but retains it for a transitory period during encryption of the account information in the database. The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the second single image but retains it for a transitory period during the transaction. 
         [0015]    Further aspects of the invention will become apparent as the following description proceeds and the features of novelty which characterize this invention are pointed out with particularity in the claims annexed to and forming a part of this specification. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0016]    The novel features that are considered characteristic of the invention are set forth with particularity in the appended claims. The invention itself; however, both as to its structure and operation together with the additional objects and advantages thereof are best understood through the following description of the preferred embodiment of the present invention when read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein: 
           [0017]      FIG. 1  illustrates financial transaction card that includes a visual financial card identifier; 
           [0018]      FIG. 2  illustrates an authorized device taking a single image containing both the face of a financial card account holder and the visual financial card identifier of the financial transaction card; 
           [0019]      FIG. 3  illustrates a block diagram of an authorized device coupled to a transaction computer system through a global computer network; 
           [0020]      FIGS. 4-8  depict a process where a financial card account holder activates a financial card for use; 
           [0021]      FIG. 4  illustrates a flow chart depicting a process whereby a financial card account holder takes a single digital image of both the account holder&#39;s face and the visual identifier on the financial card with an authorized device and transmits it to the transaction computer system; 
           [0022]      FIG. 5  illustrates a flow chart depicting a process whereby a selfie-image security module performs a security scan on the single digital image; 
           [0023]      FIG. 6  illustrates a portion of the single digital image showing the facial recognition features of the financial card account holder; 
           [0024]      FIG. 7  depicts the operation of the selfie-cryptography key generator as it combines facial recognition data and financial card visual identifier data into a combined single set of data with various algorithms; 
           [0025]      FIG. 8  illustrates a flow chart depicting a process for generating a selfie-cryptographic key from the single image and using it to encrypt a financial card transaction authorization code; 
           [0026]      FIG. 9  depicts a database table stored in a database containing information of the financial card account holder including the encrypted and unencrypted financial card transaction authorization codes; 
           [0027]      FIG. 10  illustrates a block diagram of several POS terminals coupled to a transaction computer system through a global computer network; 
           [0028]      FIG. 11  illustrates a block diagram of a POS terminal including a digital camera and a communications module; 
           [0029]      FIG. 12-15  illustrates a process whereby a financial card account holder makes a transaction at a POS terminal with a financial transaction card; 
           [0030]      FIG. 12  illustrates a flowchart depicting a process whereby a POS terminal takes a single digital image containing both facial recognition data of a financial card account holder and a visual identifier of a financial transaction card; 
           [0031]      FIG. 13  illustrates a flowchart depicting a process whereby selfie-image security module performs a security scan of the single digital image; 
           [0032]      FIG. 14  illustrates a flowchart depicting a process where a selfie-cryptographic key generator creates a selfie-cryptographic key by extracting facial recognition data and other data from the visual identifier of the financial transaction card; 
           [0033]      FIG. 15  illustrates a flowchart depicting a process where the decrypted and unencrypted financial card transaction authorization codes are compared to determine whether to authorize the transaction; 
           [0034]      FIG. 16  illustrates a flow chart depicting a process for retention of the single digital image by the transaction computer system; and 
           [0035]      FIG. 17  illustrates a flow chart depicting a process for retention of the single digital image by the transaction computer system. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       [0036]    While the invention has been shown and described with reference to a particular embodiment thereof, it will be understood to those skilled in the art, that various changes in form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. 
         [0037]      FIG. 1  illustrates financial transaction card  100  that includes a visual financial card identifier  108 . Financial transaction card  100  includes an account number  102 , which in this example is a 16-digit number. Card  100  also includes a date  104  through which the card is valid. Financial transaction card  100  may also be referred to as a financial card or a card. Financial transaction card  100  includes printing showing that the account holder is Edward Pierce  106 . Financial transaction card  100  is issued by the exemplary financial institution BANCO DDT. Financial transaction card  100  may be, for example, a credit card, a debit card, an electronic funds transfer card, a point-of-sale card, an electronic funds gift card, or any other card coupled to financial assets. 
         [0038]    Financial transaction card  100  includes a visual identifier  108 . Visual identifier  108  is in this example a QR code. The use of a QR code is merely exemplary. Any visual information on financial transaction card  100  that allows for the visual identification of the account held by the account holder Edward Pierce  106  functions as visual identifier  108 . Account number  102  could function as a visual identifier  108 . The object of visual identifier  108  is to allow a digital camera to take an image of card  100  so that a computer can identify the account  102  purely from the digital image without taking any information from the magnetic stripe of card  100  through a card swipe or from manual data entry. Bar codes, holograms, or any other visual identifier that can specifically identify account number  102  through a digital image can function as visual identifier  108 . 
         [0039]      FIG. 2  illustrates an authorized device  116  taking a single image  110  containing both the face  114  of a financial card account holder  112  and the visual financial card identifier  108  of the financial transaction card  100 . When financial card account holder  112  receives a new financial card  100 , account holder  112  must first activate card  100 . In this system, the account holder  112 , identified as Edward Pierce  106 , takes a selfie-photograph  100  with the digital camera on his cell phone  116 . The selfie-photograph  100  is a single digital image  100 . The single digital image  100  includes both the face  114  of account holder  112  and visual identifier  108 . As single digital image  100  contains an image of visual identifier  108 , the account  102  of account holder  112  can be identified through single digital image  100 . In addition, as single digital image  100  contains an image of face  114  of account holder  112 , biometric facial recognition data can be extracted identifying the identity of account holder  112 . Further, as single digital image  110  includes both visual identifier  108  and facial recognition data  114  of account holder  112 , single digital image  110  shows that card  100  is in the possession of account holder  112 . Registered device  116  will encrypt single digital image  110 . Registered device  116  will then transmit the encrypted single digital image  110  to complete the process to activate card  100  via a digital message. 
         [0040]    It is contemplated that financial institutions maintain a listing of authorized or registered devices for account holders  112 . This listing of authorized or registered devices may include an account holder&#39;s cell phone  116 , personal home computer, personal tablet, work computer, or any other mobile or wired device that the account holder regularly uses. These authorized or registered devices may be identified through an electronic identifier such as a cell phone number, a mac address, an IP address, or other electronic identifier. Typically, account holder  112  will self-identify these regularly used devices with the financial institution through a mutual authentication process. 
         [0041]      FIG. 3  illustrates a block diagram of an authorized device  116  coupled to a transaction computer system  120  through a global computer network  118 . Registered device  116 , also referred to as an authorized device  116 , is in bi-directional communications with transaction computer system  120  through global computing network  118 . Similarly, transaction computer system  120  is in bidirectional communications with registered device  116  through global computing network  118 . 
         [0042]    Transaction computer system  120  is a computing system that maintains and manages the financial account  102  of account holder  112 . Transaction computing system  120  is typically maintained by a financial institution, such as a bank, credit union, savings and loan, or other financial entity. Transaction computing system  120  includes a communications module  122 . Communications module sends and receives transmissions from registered device  116  through global computing network  118 . Communications module  122  has the ability to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
         [0043]    Card  100  is initially sent to account holder  112  not activated. In order to active card  100 , account holder  112  takes a single digital image  110  with authorized device  116  of both his face  114  and visual identifier  108 . Authorized device  116  encrypts single digital image  110  and transmits it to transaction computer system  120  through global computing network  118  via a digital message. The encrypted single digital image  110  is received by communications module  122  where it is decrypted. 
         [0044]    After decrypting single digital image  110 , communications module  122  sends single digital image  110  to selfie-image security module  124 . Selfie-image security module  124  is a digital image analysis security system that performs an analysis of single digital image  110  to determine whether single digital image  110  has been tampered with. A criminal seeking to fraudulently activate a card  100  may attempt to do so through creating a fraudulent single digital image  110 . One method of creating a fraudulent digital image would be to take a picture of face  114  of account holder  112  and separately cut and paste an image of card  100  with visual identifier  108  into that photograph to create single digital image  110 . For example, the criminal may intercept card  100  in the mail and then take a photograph of account holder  112  at their place of residence or business. The criminal would then attempt to combine the photograph of account holder  112  with card  100  and send it to transaction computer system in an attempt to defraud the account holder and the financial institution. Selfie-image security module  124  analyzes single digital image  110  for any and all markers that indicate that single digital image  110  has in anyway been digitally altered. 
         [0045]    If selfie-image security module  124  determines that single digital image  110  has been digitally altered, single digital image  110  is rejected and the account  102  of card  100  is placed on a fraud freeze to prevent further activity. Selfie-image security module  124  then sends a message to communications module  122  that the single digital image  124  has been rejected. Communications module  122  then sends a communication to account holder  112  of the fraud attempt. 
         [0046]    If selfie-image security module  124  determines that single digital image  110  has not been digitally altered, selfie-image security module  124  passes single digital image onto selfie-cryptographic key generator module  126 . Selfie-cryptographic key generator module  126  produces a selfie-cryptographic key  126  from single digital image  110 . This selfie-cryptographic key is utilized to encrypt account information of account holder  112  in database  128 . Database  128  is a non-volatile storage system that may include solid-state storage, magnetic disc or tape storage, or optical storage. Once the account information of account holder  112  is encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key, both single digital image  110  and the selfie-cryptographic key are discarded. Card  100  is then activated and transaction computer system  120  send a message back to registered device  116  with communications module  122  that card  100  is activated. 
         [0047]    Discarding this image enhances the security of database  128 . If any hacker attempts to hack database  128 , they will only access encrypted information. The hacker will not be able to decode the information because transaction computer system  120  does not have the selfie-cryptographic key. The selfie-cryptographic key is created for a transitory period of time when account holder  112  sends a single digital image  110  that includes both his face  114  and visual identifier  108 . Eliminating permanent storage of selfie-cryptographic key from transaction computer system  120  enhances the security of database  128 . 
         [0048]      FIGS. 4-8  depict a process where a financial card account holder  112  activates a financial card  100  for use.  FIG. 4  illustrates a flow chart  1000  depicting a process whereby a financial card account holder  112  takes a single digital image  110  of both the account holder&#39;s face  114  and the visual identifier  108  on the financial card  100  with an authorized device  116  and transmits it to the transaction computer system  120 . The process begins with START  1002 . In step  1004 , financial card account holder  112  receives a new unactivated card  100 , typically through conventional mail through the United States Postal Service (USPS). In order to activate card  100 , in step  106  financial card account holder  112  takes a selfie-photograph with a registered computing device  116 , such as a cell phone in which both the face  114  of financial card account holder  112  and visual identifier  108  on card  100  are visible in a single digital image  110 . In step  1008 , registered computing device  116  encrypts single digital image  110  and transmits it to transaction computer system  120  through global computing network  118  via a digital message. In step  1010 , transaction computer system  120  receives single digital image  110 . Communications module  122  decrypts single digital image  110  and transfers it to selfie-image security module  124 . The process continues in step  1012  to  FIG. 5 . 
         [0049]      FIG. 5  illustrates a flow chart  1000  depicting a process whereby a selfie-image security module  124  performs a security scan on the single digital image  110 . The process continues in step  1012 . In step  1014 , selfie-image security module  124  performs a security scan of single digital image  110  to determine whether it is a single contiguous image or whether it has been digitally altered in any form. Digital alteration of single digital image  110  is a clear indication that single digital image is fraudulent. In step  1016 , selfie-image security module  124  determines whether single digital image  110  passes the security scan. If single digital image  110  does not pass the security scan, selfie-image security module  124  rejects single digital image in step  1018 . Subsequently in step  1020 , financial card account holder  112  is alerted to the fraud warning and the process ENDS in step  1022 . If selfie-image security module  124  determines that single digital image  110  has not been digitally altered, selfie-image security module  124  approves single digital image in step  1024 . Subsequently in step  1026 , single digital image  110  is transmitted to selfie-cryptographic key generator  126 . The process continues then in step  1028  in  FIG. 8 . 
         [0050]      FIG. 6  illustrates a portion of the single digital image  110  showing the facial recognition features  132  of the financial card account holder  112 . Facial recognition module  121  is utilized to extract digital facial recognition information from the face of a person in data of a digital picture. Selfie-cryptographic key generator  126  generates selfie-cryptographic key from single digital image  110  from two sources of information: facial recognition features  132  of account holder  112  and digital information extracted from visual identifier  108 . In  FIG. 6 , selfie-cryptographic key generator  126  will extract facial recognition features  132  from the face  114  of account holder  112  utilizing facial recognition module  121 . A grid  130  may be digitally placed over face  114  in order to extract facial recognition features  132 . Some facial recognition algorithms identify facial features by extracting landmarks, or features, from an image of the subject&#39;s face  114 . For example, an algorithm may analyze the relative position, size, and/or shape of the eyes, nose, cheekbones, and jaw. These features are then used to search for other images with matching features. Other algorithms normalize a gallery of face images and then compress the face data, only saving the data in the image that is useful for face recognition. A probe image is then compared with the face data. One of the earliest successful systems is based on template matching techniques applied to a set of salient facial features, providing a sort of compressed face representation. Recognition algorithms can be divided into two main approaches, geometric, which looks at distinguishing features, or photometric, which is a statistical approach that distills an image into values and compares the values with templates to eliminate variances. Popular recognition algorithms include Principal Component Analysis using eigenfaces, Linear Discriminate Analysis, Elastic Bunch Graph Matching using the Fisherface algorithm, the Hidden Markov model, the Multilinear Subspace Learning using tensor representation, and the neuronal motivated dynamic link matching. 
         [0051]      FIG. 7  depicts the operation of the selfie-cryptography key generator  126  as it combines facial recognition data  134  and financial card visual identifier data  136  into a combined single set of data  140 ,  142  or  144  with various algorithms. Summation unit  138  combines facial recognition data  134  and financial card visual identifier data  136  into a combined single set of data  140 ,  142  or  144 . One algorithm may combine facial recognition data  134  and financial card visual identifier data  136  into a combined single set of data  140  by simply appending data  136  after data  134 . Another algorithm my divide each data set  134  and  136  into two halves and then interleave the two halves to form combined data set  142 . A further algorithm may further divide each data set  134  and  136  into smaller data units and then interleave these smaller data units to form combined data set  144 . These algorithms for combine data  134  and  136  are merely exemplary. For example, the two data sets may be combined by alternating data bits into a contiguous combined single data set. Any algorithm to combine data sets  134  and  136  together into a single combined data set may be used. 
         [0052]      FIG. 8  illustrates a flow chart  1000  depicting a process for generating a selfie-cryptographic key from the single image  110  and using it to encrypt a financial card transaction authorization code. The process continues in step  1028  from  FIG. 5 . In step  1030 , selfie-cryptographic key generator  126  receives single digital image  110 . In step  1032 , selfie-cryptographic key generator extracts facial recognition data  132  and visual financial card identifier data  136  from single digital image  110 . In step  1034 , selfie-cryptographic key generator  126  then selects one of a plurality of algorithms discussed with respect to  FIG. 7  to combine the facial recognition data  134  with the visual financial card identifier data  136  into a single combined data set. Then in step  1036 , selfie-cryptographic key generator uses the single combined data set  140 ,  142  or  144  to generate the selfie-cryptographic key. Transaction computer system  120  then takes the selfie-cryptographic key and uses it to encrypt the financial account information of account holder  112  in database  128 . During this process  1000 , single digital image  110  has been temporarily stored for a transitory period of time. At this point in step  1036 , single digital image  110  is deleted from all memory or non-volatile storage within transaction computer system  120 . After step  1036 , transaction computer system  120  does not store single digital image  110  anywhere. In step  1036 , card  100  is activated and account holder  112  is notified. The process ENDS in step  1038 . 
         [0053]      FIG. 9  depicts a database table  146  stored in database  128  containing information of the financial card account holder  148 ,  150 ,  152 ,  154  and  156  including the encrypted  154  and unencrypted  156  financial card transaction authorization codes. Database  128  stores table  146 . Table  146  includes account information relevant to the financial account  102  of account holder  106 / 112 . Table  146  includes an exemplary listing of such account information such as address  150 , and account number  152 , and account holder&#39;s name  148 . Transaction computer system  120  uses selfie-cryptographic key to encrypt a financial card transaction authorization code  154 . Transaction computer system  120  keeps a record of the unencrypted financial card transaction authorization code  156 . New selfie-cryptographic keys, also referred to as transaction-cryptographic keys, are created from new single digital images  110  to unencrypt encrypted codes  154  as a part of a financial transaction. If the unencrypted encrypted code  154  matches unencrypted code  156 , then transactions are allowed to proceed. A transaction-cryptographic key is a selfie-cryptographic key in that it is generated from a selfie picture  110  of a person in possession of card  100 . However, transaction-cryptographic key is different, for purposes of reference, from selfie-cryptographic key to distinguish the key used in the card activation process from the key used in the card transaction process. 
         [0054]      FIG. 10  illustrates a block diagram of several POS terminals  158  coupled to a transaction computer system  120  through a global computer network  118 . Once account holder  112  has activated his card  100 , he will use it in commerce. In today&#39;s economy, many financial card transactions occur through card swipes in which the card account holder swipes the magnetic stripe of the card through a magnetic stripe reader. The magnetic stripe reader takes information about the account and account holder off of the magnetic stripe in order to process the transaction. In the present system, no card swipe with a magnetic stripe reader is employed. In the present system, all Point-Of-Service (POS) Terminals  158  are equipped with digital cameras  162  (shown in  FIG. 11 ). When making a purchase, account holder  112  will pull out his card  100  and hold it up to his face  114  so that digital camera  162  of POS terminal  158  can take a single digital image  110  containing both face  114  of account holder  112  and visual identifier  108  of card  100 . POS terminal  158  encrypts this single digital image  110  and transmits it to transaction computer system  120  through global computing network  118 . POS terminal  158  and transaction computer system  120  are in bidirectional communications with each other through global computing network  118 . 
         [0055]    Communications module  122  receives encrypted single digital image  110  and decrypts it. Communications module  122  then transfers single digital image  110  to selfie-image security module  124 . Selfie-image security module  124  examines single digital image  110  for any evidence of digital tampering. If single digital image  110  has been tampered with, image  110  is rejected, the transaction is regarded as fraudulent, and the transaction is subsequently blocked. If single digital image  110  is not found to be tampered with, it is transferred on to selfie-cryptographic key generator  126 . Selfie-cryptographic key generator  126  extracts facial recognition data  134  and card visual identifier data  136  from single digital image  110  to create a single combined data set that is used to generate a second selfie-cryptographic key through a hash or other method that is the same method used to create the original key used to encrypt database  128  in the card activation process. The second selfie-cryptographic key, also referred to as a transaction-cryptographic key, is used to unencrypt the encrypted financial authorization code  154 . If this unencrypted version of the encrypted authorization code  154  matches the unencrypted authorization code  156 , the transaction has been authenticated. The transaction has been authenticated because the data to create the second selfie-cryptographic key is the same data used to create the original selfie-cryptographic key used to encrypt the authorization code  154  in the first place, i.e. the facial recognition features  132  are the same and the card visual identifier  108  is the same. In other words, the single digital image  110  transmitted by the POS terminal shows that the account holder  112  is in possession of the financial card  100  and that the account holder  112  is the same person who activated card  100 . This authentication enhances the security of the financial transaction. When the transaction has been authenticated, transaction computer system  120  sends an approved message to POS terminal  158  to complete the transaction. If the person in single digital image  110  is not the account holder, then the transaction-cryptographic key will be different from the original selfie-cryptographic key. Thus, the transaction-cryptographic key will not unencrypt the encrypted financial authorization code. In such an event, the transaction system will transmit an authorization rejection code denying the transaction. 
         [0056]      FIG. 11  illustrates a block diagram of a POS terminal  158  including a digital camera  162  and a communications module  160 . Digital camera  162  takes single digital image  110  containing both visual identifier  108  of card  100  and facial recognition features  132  of account holder  112  when account holder seeks to pay for an item through POS terminal  158 . The taking of this single digital image  110  is analogous to a card swipe of a magnetic strip with current credit or debit cards. Communications module  160  encrypts this single digital image  110  and transmits it to transaction computer system  120  through global computer network  118  for authentication. Communications modules  160  subsequently receives the approved or rejected messages from transaction computer system  120  depending on whether the authentication with single digital image  110  was successful. 
         [0057]      FIG. 12-15  illustrates a process whereby a financial card possessor  112  makes a transaction at a POS terminal  158  with a financial transaction card  100 .  FIG. 12  illustrates a flowchart  2000  depicting a process whereby a POS terminal  158  takes a single digital image  110  containing both facial recognition data  132  of a financial card possessor  112  and a visual identifier  108  of a financial transaction card  100  with camera  162 . The process begins with START  2002 . In step  2004 , financial card possessor  112 , who may or may not be the actual financial account holder  112 , initiates a transaction at a POS terminal  158  to make a purchase. In step  2006 , a digital camera  162  on POS terminal  158  is triggered to take a single digital image  110  of both face  114  of financial card possessor  112  and visual identifier  108  of card  100  as shown in  FIG. 2 . In step  2008 , POS terminal  158  encrypts the single digital image  110  and transmits it to the transaction computer system  120  through global computer network  118  for authentication to authorize the transaction. In step  2010 , transaction computer system  120  receives single digital image  110  and decrypts it with communications module  122 . Once digital image  110  is decrypted, it is transferred to selfie-image security module  124 . The process continues in step  2012  in  FIG. 13 . 
         [0058]      FIG. 13  illustrates a flowchart  2000  depicting a process whereby selfie-image security module  124  performs a security scan of the single digital image  110 . In step  2014 , selfie-image security module  124  performs a security scan of single digital image  110  to determine whether the image is a single contiguous image or whether it has been digitally altered. Any digital alteration of image  110  is an indication that single digital image  110  has been tampered with and is therefore the subject of a fraudulent transaction. In step  2016 , if the digital image  110  has been altered and fails the security scan, in step  2018  the single digital image  110  is rejected. Subsequently in step  2020 , the transaction is rejected and a rejection message is transmitted back to POS terminal  158  by communications module  122 . The process then ENDS with step  2022 . If digital image  110  passes the security scan in step  2016 , single digital image  2024  is approved in step  2024 . Then in step  2026 , single digital image  110  is transmitted to the selfie-cryptographic key generator  124 . The process continues in step  2028  in  FIG. 14 . 
         [0059]      FIG. 14  illustrates a flowchart  2000  depicting a process where a selfie-cryptographic key generator  124  creates a transaction-cryptographic key by extracting facial recognition data  132  and other data from the visual identifier  108  of the financial transaction card  100 . Continuing the process in step  2028 , in step  2030 , selfie-cryptographic key generator receives single digital image  110 . In step  2034 , selfie-cryptographic key generator extracts facial recognition data  134  and visual financial card identifier data  136  from single digital image  108 . In step  2036 , selfie-cryptographic key generator selects one of a plurality of algorithms to combine the facial recognition data  134  with the card visual identifier data  136  into a combined single data set  140 ,  142  or  144 . Then in step  2038 , selfie-cryptographic key generator creates a transaction-cryptographic key. This selfie-cryptographic key is used to decrypt the authorization code  154  associated with financial card  100 . The process continues in step  2040  in  FIG. 15 . 
         [0060]      FIG. 15  illustrates a flowchart  2000  depicting a process where the decrypted  154  and unencrypted  156  financial card transaction authorization codes are compared to determine whether to authorize the transaction. In step  2042 , if this decrypted code  154  does not match the unencrypted code  156 , it shows that the facial recognition data  134  or card visual identifier data  136  does not match the original data. This difference in facial recognition data  134  is an indication that the person  112  in possession of the card  100  making the transaction is not the true financial card account holder  112  and the transaction is rejected in step  2044 . As such, the transaction is fraudulent and transaction system  120  sends a rejected message to POS terminal  158  and the account holder  112  in step  2046 . The process then ENDS in step  2048 . In step  2042 , if this decrypted code  154  matches the unencrypted code  156 , the transaction is approved in step  2050  and an approved message is sent by communications module  122  to POS terminal  158 . When the decrypted code  154  matches the unencrypted code  156 , it is proof that the facial recognition features of the person making the transaction purchase are the same as the account holder  112 , strongly indicating that it is the same person. This then shows that the account holder  112  is then in possession of card  100  and is making the purchase, thereby securely establishing the propriety of the transaction. The process then ENDS in step  2052 . 
         [0061]      FIG. 16  illustrates a flow chart  3000  depicting a process for retention of the single digital image  110  by the transaction computer system  120 . The process begins with START  3002 . In step  3004 , transaction computer system  120  receives single digital image  110  from a POS terminal  158  or an authorized device  116 . In step  3006 , transaction computer system  120  retains single digital image  110  for a transitory period of time sufficient for communications module  122  to decrypt single digital image  110 . In step  3008 , transaction computer system  120  retains single digital image  110  for a transitory period of time sufficient for selfie-image security module  124  to perform a security scan of single digital image  110 . In step  3010 , transaction computer system  120  retains single digital image  110  for a transitory period of time sufficient for the selfie-cryptographic key generator  124  to create the selfie-cryptographic key to manipulate database  128 . In step  3012 , transaction computer system deletes single digital image  110  from all memory in storage. By deleting the single digital image  110  from all memory and storage, hackers cannot gain access to digital image  110  and create selfie-cryptographic key themselves to hack the account  102  of account holder  112  except for that transitory period of time that it is within transaction computer system  120 . Transaction computer system  120  may handle accounts for millions, perhaps hundreds of millions of accounts. Hacking system  120  at any given time will only give access to a small population of single images  110  from which hackers could attempt to recreate selfie-cryptographic keys and hack the accounts. Since all digital images  110  are discarded by system  120  after use, the vast majority of digital images will not be present in system  120  when it is hacked. 
         [0062]      FIG. 17  illustrates a flow chart  4000  depicting a process for retention of the single digital image  110  by the transaction computer system  120 . The process begins with START  4002 . In step  4004 , transaction computer system  120  receives single digital image  110  from a POS terminal  158  or an authorized device  116 . In step  4006 , selfie-cryptographic key generator  124  creates the selfie-cryptographic key to manipulate database  128 . In steps  4008  and  4010 , transaction computer system  120  retains the selfie-cryptographic key for a transitory period of time sufficient for the transaction computer system  120  to encrypt or decrypt account information stored in database  128  such as the authorization code  154 . In step  4012 , transaction computer system  120  deletes the selfie-cryptographic key from all memory and storage. The process ENDS in step  4014 . By deleting the selfie-cryptographic key from all memory and storage, hackers cannot gain access to the selfie-cryptographic key to hack the account  102  of account holder  112  except for that transitory period of time that it is within transaction computer system  120 . Transaction computer system  120  may handle accounts for millions, perhaps hundreds of millions of accounts. Hacking system  120  at any given time will only give access to a small population of selfie-cryptographic keys from which hackers could hack the accounts. Since all selfie-cryptographic keys are created on an as needed transitory basis by system  120  and discarded after use, the vast majority of selfie-cryptographic keys will not be present in system  120  when it is hacked. 
         [0063]    A financial card authorization system for a transaction includes a database  128  containing encrypted account information  146  for a financial card account holder  112  encrypted with a selfie-cryptographic key. The selfie-cryptographic key is generated utilizing first data  140 ,  142 , or  144  contained within a first single image  110 . The first data  140 ,  142 , or  144  includes both facial recognition features  132  of the financial card account holder  112  and a visual card identifier  108  on a financial card  100  associated with the account information  146 . The system also includes a cryptographic key generator  126  that generates a transaction-cryptographic key utilizing second data  140 ,  142  or  144  contained within a second single image  110 . The second data  140 ,  142 , or  144  includes both the visual financial card identifier  108  on the financial card  100  and facial recognition features  132  of a person  112  in possession of the financial card  100 . Additionally, the system also includes a transaction system  120  that applies the transaction-cryptographic key to the encrypted account information  146  stored in the database  128 . The transaction system  120  transmits a transaction authorization code when the transaction-cryptographic key successfully decrypts the encrypted account information  146 . The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the transaction-cryptographic key in memory, but retains it for a transitory period during an authorization of a financial card transaction. The cryptographic key generator  126  generates the selfie-cryptographic key. The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the selfie-cryptographic key but retains it for a transitory period during encryption of the account information in the database  128 . The first single image  110  is a first digital picture of the financial card  100  placed next to the financial card account holder&#39;s face  114 . The second single image  110  is a second digital picture of the financial card placed  100  next to the face  114  of the person in possession of the financial card  100 . The cryptographic key generator  126  utilizes a facial recognition module to extract facial recognition features from the first digital picture of the financial card account holder&#39;s face. The cryptographic key generator utilizes the facial recognition module  121  to extract facial recognition features  132  from the second digital picture  110  of the face  114  of the person in possession of the financial card  100 . The visual financial card identifier  108  is information printed on the financial card  100 . The information printed on the financial card is a QR code, a bar code, or a hologram. The encrypted account information  146  for the financial card account holder  112  is initially encrypted with an initial-cryptographic key before it is encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key. The initial-cryptographic key is generated without any facial recognition features  132  of the financial card account holder  112 . The encrypted account information  146  for the financial card account holder  112  is then re-encrypted with the selfie-cryptographic key during a financial card activation process  1000  in which the financial card account holder  112  creates the first single image  110  utilizing an authorized device  116  that digitally transmits the first single image  110  to the cryptographic key generator  126  across a communications network  118 . The authorized device  116  is a mobile electronic device previously associated with the account information  146 . The authorized device  116  may also be a non-mobile wired electronic device previously associated with the account information  146 . 
         [0064]    The financial card authorization system may also include an image analysis security system  124 . The cryptographic key generator  126  generates the selfie-cryptographic key from the first single image  110  only when it is authorized by the image analysis security module  124  when the image analysis security module  124  determines that the first single image  110  has not been tampered with. The cryptographic key generator  126  generates the transaction-cryptographic key from the second single image  110  only when it is authorized by the image analysis security module  124  when the image analysis security module  124  determines that the second single image  110  has not been tampered with. The transaction system  120  transmits a transaction rejection code when the image analysis security module  124  determines that the second single image  110  has been tampered with. The transaction system  120  transmits a transaction rejection code when the transaction-cryptographic key unsuccessfully decrypts the encrypted account information  146 . The cryptographic key generator  126  receives the second single image  110  via a digital message sent over a communications network  118  from a point-of-service terminal  158  equipped with a digital camera  162 . The digital camera  162  captured the single second image  110 . The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the first single image  110  but retains it for a transitory period during encryption of the account information  146  in the database  128 . The financial card authorization system does not permanently store the second single image  110  but retains it for a transitory period during the transaction. 
         [0065]    While the invention has been shown and described with reference to a particular embodiment thereof, it will be understood to those skilled in the art, that various changes in form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.