Abstract:
A rules evaluation engine that controls user&#39;s security access to enterprise resources that have policies created for them. This engine allows real time authorization process to be performed with dynamic enrichment of the rules if necessary. Logging, alarm and administrative processes for granting or denying access to the user are also realized. The access encompasses computer and physical access to information and enterprise spaces.

Description:
PRIORITY CLAIM 
     This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/755,173 filed on Jan. 9, 2004, now allowed, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/438,972, filed on Jan. 9, 2003, which is also incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND 
     The invention relates to establishing and maintaining security access policies for enterprise resources. Historically, a trade-off exists between user function and system security. More system functionality often means lower levels of security. As feature set expanded, the overhead of administration and enforcement of security policy within the application has grown an exponentially. Additionally, the Internet has allowed commercial users to directly interact with customers. The overhead associated with maintaining permissions for individual users and customers has become a serious constraint upon the ability of companies to grow. 
     Access control decision began as a simple list of “named users” for each resource under management. When a user wanted to invoke a function, his identity was checked against the access control list (ACL) for that function. If the user was not on the list, the user&#39;s access would be denied. For very small user populations this was an acceptable way to do business. As system functionality and user community sizes began to increase, however, this proved to be a severely constrained architecture. It is not unusual to find single applications with 20 or more ACL&#39;s, each having hundreds to thousands of entries. 
     Next, access management began to form and utilize user groups. The concept is relatively simple—each user is “enrolled” in one or more groups, and the ACL&#39;s were reconfigured to grant access to groups as well as named users. This solution reduced the overhead of adding a new user to the environment, as adding a user to a group had the net effect of adding him dynamically to the ACL of all resources granting that group permissions. Unfortunately, it created some major problems that did not solve the inadequacies of the “named user” model. 
     Permissions, once granted to a user or group, were static. If the security policy for a resource was modified, every ACL and Group associated with the resource had to be reviewed and redefined to ensure that only those who met the current criteria for use were permitted access. In this situation, the list of users impacted could number in the tens of thousands. 
     Access controls have also been abstracted through several levels. The administration has been often split into multiple areas of responsibility. For example, ACL administration was generally performed by development groups responsible for the applications, while group administration typically under control of Information Security. This solution provides was an extremely convoluted process to track user access to an individual resource. Generally it is simpler to grant a user access to a new group each time he changes jobs rather than to determine the user&#39;s current permissions and modify these permissions based on his new position. 
     While official policies may exist as to who should be granted access, interpretation and enforcement are typically inconsistent. Users are assigned to groups by people who traditionally are overworked and understaffed. Additionally, as membership in an ACL or group is statically granted, systems cannot easily handle access control decisions based on dynamic data such as time, location, employee status, etc. Thus, most enterprises and their users suffer as a result. 
     One particular recent prior art solution offers an extremely broad computer based rules management system. The solution makes a decision on a proposed action of a system component without defining the component as an application. However, there exists a need for the accessing entity to be a user requesting access to a physical space, such as a building, computer room, etc. 
     SUMMARY 
     The present invention provides a system and method to establish and maintain security access policies that substantially eliminates or reduces disadvantages and problems associated with previously developed systems and methods. 
     More specifically, the present invention provides a centralized system that controls the enterprise security policy evaluation process. This system is operable to create coded policies for each of the plurality of resources. User authorization requests are received from a requesting server. A determination is then made as to which security resource access is requested. The policy associated with the resource is accessed, retrieved and analyzed to identify the data elements from the policies to evaluate. These elements are then evaluated in real time to produce a grant or a denial of authorization access for the requester, while maintaining a log of each event. 
     One important technical advantage of the present invention is that the policies of this Enterprise Resource do not need to contain executable code. The policies are captured in a representative notational format, and then stored in an XML encoded structure in a repository. The Enterprise Resource Policy definition is analyzed at evaluation time to determine the behaviors, but has no execution capability in its own right. The other clause implies that all variable information required for policy evaluation is retrieved dynamically. The Enterprise Resource Policy invention model provides for both parametric input of data (passed in with the request) and dynamic retrieval of those data items that aren&#39;t passed as an option, not mandatory. 
     Additionally, the present invention&#39;s policies are essentially stateless—each evaluation is atomic, and no state data is retained across evaluation requests. 
     The present invention&#39;s architecture precludes a direct user interface to the policy. Instead, an API interface is provided to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP maintains the interface to the user, and provides the user identity and any parametric information to the rules engine as part of the request structure. 
     The present invention provides another advantage in the fact that the Enterprise Resource Policy invention has no policy objects. The present invention&#39;s evaluations take place inside a general-purpose body of code, which analyzes and interprets the policy described in the policy definition. Additionally, the present invention does not utilize the COM model in any way. The present invention operates upon the mechanism of an embedded remote procedure call (RPC) to an external rules analysis engine to make decisions. This differs from the COM model where the COM object is actually executed within the address space and execution context of the client module, and is thus potentially vulnerable to corruption or even deliberate modification by the client module. Furthermore, the connections to external data sources have to be established from within the execution context—as such, the client module would potentially have addressability to all variable information retrieved for the evaluation of the policy. This represents a substantial advantage for the present invention and difference from prior solutions. In prior solutions, the evaluation is in an external process, one that the client module has no direct access to. However, in the present invention, the client module does not have access to the data sources or the data values themselves. This allows the security policy to be defined that bases its decisions upon data elements that the client module has no right to see. 
     Additionally, the prior art associates an action to an object, which embodies the executable code, which defines the security policy for a component. However, the present invention provides a hierarchical structure of resources to be maintained, that each may be associated with multiple action types. Policies are saved as data, within the hierarchy. In the event that no specific policy for a resource/action exists, it can “inherit” the policy from its ancestor. The prior concept of a “Trust” manager has no relevance and in fact greatly limits capabilities and scaling. 
     Current access control models are based upon the concept of “named users”, where permissions are explicitly granted and persistent. This leads to an unwieldy management process when the user population is large or changes frequently, or when the policy by which security permissions are granted must be changed. Our model eliminates these problems by discarding the persistent retention of permissions, instead deriving those permissions at access time by evaluating the current state of user and transactional attributes against a policy, expressed as a rule. The rule effectively defines a “profile” of what an authorized user should look like, rather than maintaining a pre-determined list of those who are deemed “eligible” for access. In the Internet space this is particularly appealing, as modern Internet-based applications frequently have user populations numbering in the tens of millions—traditional ACL based systems aren&#39;t capable of performing efficiently at a task of this magnitude. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       For a more complete understanding of the present invention and the advantages thereof, reference is now made to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which like reference numerals indicate like features and wherein: 
         FIG. 1  depicts a Basic Model of dynamically implementing an enterprise resource policy in accordance with the present invention; 
         FIG. 2  is a logic flow diagram providing a Dynamic Enrichment Process flowchart that depicts the rules engine used to determine whether all of the data elements required to evaluate the policy are available. 
         FIG. 3  is a diagram of the Dynamically Expandable Rules Framework that describes a process, implemented in code, by which invocation of a service can be made both enabled for parallel scaling and tolerant of failure of components in accordance with the present invention. 
         FIG. 4  depicts a Parallel Fault Tolerant Architecture that enables the enterprise security cluster to scale effectively across multiple servers and/or platforms while continuously servicing requests from the user community, even in the event of the loss of multiple servers. 
         FIG. 5A  depicts one embodiment of the process of realm start up. 
         FIG. 5B  depicts one embodiment of a client side fault tolerance wrapper. 
     
    
    
     DESCRIPTION 
     Preferred embodiments of the present invention are illustrated in the Figures, like numerals being used to refer to like and corresponding parts of the various drawings. 
     A sample architecture for the use of the enterprise security policy manager is depicted in  FIG. 1 . Here, user  10  wishes to access a secured resource from the corporate repository. User  10  establishes his electronic identity by authenticating (logging in) to the policy enforcement point  14 . 
     User  10  then makes a request of the policy enforcement point  14  to retrieve the information/service/access. Server  16  receives the request. Server  16  analyzes the request to determine which resource  12  is being accessed. To evaluate the request, policy enforcement point  14  sends a request for policy evaluation to enterprise security server  16 . This request contains both the identity of the user and the name of the resource being accessed. 
     Enterprise security server  16  uses the resource name to retrieve the policy associated with the resource. Server  16  then examines the policy to determine what additional information is needed about the user to evaluate the policy. Administrator  20  for the processes is linked through and administrative server  22  to control any or all elements. 
     Enterprise security server  16  invokes connectors  24 ,  26 , and  28  to each of the needed data sources to retrieve the information required to evaluate the policy. These data are illustrated as directory  30 , HR System database  32  and other data sources  34 . These data sources return the data items needed to enterprise security server  16 . 
     Enterprise security server  16  enriches the decision context with the information retrieved. It then evaluates the policy and reaches a decision as to whether the request should be granted. Enterprise security server  16  replies to the policy enforcement point  14  with an approval or denial of access. If approved, requested resource  12  is returned and made accessible or delivered to user  10 . 
     Event log server  36  may create a log of every transaction, which may be stored in the event log repository  38 . Any alarm events are sent to an alarm interface module  110  that disseminates them appropriately. This dissemination may include dashboard  170  for displaying and tracking multiple event scenarios mapped by the administrator. 
       FIG. 2  provides a process flow diagram that depicts Logical flow of Access Request Service. This flow diagram depicts an example of processing a user&#39;s request. In step  50 , a user established the identity by authentication. Next, a request is sent to a document server in step  52 . The document server then requests a policy evaluation in step  54 . The approval, if granted, is returned to the document server in step  56  allowing the document server to proceed. In this case, the document server may retrieve the requested document from repository in step  58 . Then this resource is returned to the requester in step  60 . 
     This model enables a great deal of new functionality in the security evaluation process. As the evaluation occurs in real time, at the moment the resource is being accessed, information that is time or condition sensitive can be utilized in the policy, as can transaction specific information such as transaction values. Also available for the inclusion into the decision context are items such as identity strength (did the user authenticate with a simple password challenge, or by a stronger method such as a thumbprint scan), the network address the request originated from (within the building, from an internal network or over the Internet), or other like context information as known to those skilled in the art. Policies can be dynamically updated at any time, as can user attributes within the identity repositories. This allows an enormous amount of flexibility in creating and managing access control policies, without incurring the old-style burdens of ACL and group membership. 
     When a policy changes, the changed policy applies to all users immediately—the next request processed will be evaluated against the new policy, and the information needed to evaluate the request will be dynamically located and retrieved. This provides an additional advantage in the form of what has come to be known as “single sign out”, in which if an employee or user is terminated, all of his abilities to access critical resources could be revoked by simply changing his employee status in the identity repository from “active” to “terminated”. Of course, this only applies if the policies for each of those critical resources were designed to require and employee status of “active” for access to be granted. 
     The ability to offer these capabilities is based upon a number of new concepts. 
     A dynamically extensible rules evaluation engine  70  is depicted in  FIG. 3 . Rules evaluation engine  70  is based upon the concept of using a process by which a policy is expressed as a rule, encoded in a machine-independent rules modeling language. The rule can be dynamically loaded from the repository  72  and evaluated upon demand within multiple execution contexts simultaneously. This provides for parallel scaling and fault tolerant capabilities. As the rules are loaded dynamically at evaluation time, rules may be created and/or changed at will, and will take effect upon the next evaluation request. 
     The concept of dynamic enrichment of the data is available within the decision context depicted in  FIG. 4 . The dynamic enrichment process involves receiving a request in Step  80 . In Step  82 , in response to the request, a policy set is loaded from depository in Step  82 . The policy set is analyzed to determine the required data elements in Step  84 . In Step  86 , metadata is consulted and data elements are grouped by connector. For each connector a determination is made in Step  88  for data for each data element within the connector. This involves determining whether or not each data element already has a value at Decision Point  90 . If it does, an evaluation is made for the next data element. If not, a determination is made a Decision Point  92  as to whether or not all required key values for this data element are present. If all the required key values for this data element are present the data element is added to the connector request in Step  94 , otherwise, a determination is made for the next data element. In Decision Point  96  a determination is made as to whether or not any more elements are required for this data connector. If additional elements are required the next data element is evaluated returning to Step  89 . Otherwise, at Decision Point  98 , a determination is made as to whether or not any more connectors remain to be processed. Additional connectors are processed as described above. Otherwise, the connectors with unresolved elements are invoked at Step  100  in order to retrieve new values. At Decision Point  102  a determination is made as to whether or not any new values were retrieved. If there were, at Decision Point  104 , a determination is made as to whether any unfilled data elements remain in which case the process is repeated until no unfilled data elements remain at process in  106 . Essentially, feature allows the rules engine to determine whether it has, on hand, all the data elements required to evaluate the policy—if the answer is no, then the rules engine has the ability, through connectors, to map to and retrieve all requisite data elements before evaluating the rule. 
     A diverse, fault tolerant architecture that enables the enterprise security cluster to scale effectively across multiple servers and/or platforms while continuously servicing requests from the user community—even in the event of the loss of multiple servers is depicted in  FIGS. 5A and 5B . 
       FIG. 5A  depicts the process of realm startup. At step  120 , the realm startup process is initiated. In step  122 , all of the configuration files are read and associated processes are initiated. These processes are all registered with the service registry in step  124  after which the monitor performs regular health checks at predetermined intervals in step  126 . If a dead process is found, the monitor deletes the registry and restarts the process in step  128 . 
       FIG. 5B  depicts client side fault tolerant wrapper logic. Here, in step  130  a client API wrapper is invoked. At decision point  132 , a determination as to whether or not local cache of handles is required for service. If it is not required for service, the service handles are retrieved in step  134 . Otherwise, a random handle is selected from the list from an available list in step  136 . Returning to retrieving service handles, decision point  138  evaluates whether or not handles were retrieved. If they were not, a return failure is made to the user in step  140 . Otherwise, we progress to step  136  where the random handles are selected from the list. In step  142 , a service call is initiated, after which at decision point  144 , a determination is made as to whether or not a communication failure is indicated. If no communication failure is indicated, the resultant is returned to the user in step  146 . Otherwise, the monitor is notified of failed service. In step  148 , it removes the dead handles from the registry and reinitiates in step  150 , after which the process returns to step  134 . 
     A content-based transactional “firewall” for HTTP/HTML traffic, which parses the HTTP transactional request headers and analyzes them to determine what the user is attempting to do. Once the resources the user is attempting to access have been identified, the enterprise security policy management engine is invoked to evaluate whether the request should be granted. This provides a non-invasive methodology for managing access to internal resources by external users. 
     The current implementation of this concept is built upon a Java infrastructure, and utilizes a number of fairly obscure features of the Java language to facilitate the service. The two most prominent of these are the concept of a dynamic class loader, and HTTP/XML RPC architecture used to manage the interaction between processes. 
     The dynamic class loader is used in the numerous components. In the rules evaluator, the class loader can be used to load the java classes needed to evaluate each rule as it is initially invoked. In the connector, the class loader is used to load the code fragments (packaged as Java classes) needed to service data requests. In the process launcher, the class loader is utilized to retrieve (from a realm-level executable repository) and load the actual service handler components of the process being started 
     HTTP/XML RPC architecture is utilized heavily within this embodiment, as it is the primary communications infrastructure used to haul inter-process requests and data exchange. It utilized by literally every process in the architecture, and provides a common ground for communications between disparate languages, components, and platforms. 
     It is important to note that while one embodiment is implemented in the Java language, the concepts that distinguish the present invention are notably not Java specific, and in no way should the claims be restricted to the Java language or the platforms on which it runs. In a procedural language such as C/C++, PL/1, etc. the same concepts could readily be implemented through the use of dynamically shared libraries or through dynamic overlay methods that are well defined and commonplace. 
     Although the present invention is described in detail, it should be understood that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made hereto without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as described by the appended claims.