Abstract:
Against the background of continually growing problems of product piracy, in particular due to the further expansion and liberalization of international trade, there is great demand for automated and reliable inspection of the authenticity of products. Thus, methods and systems are provided for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer by authenticating at least one RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tag allocated to the product using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol.

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a U.S. National Stage Application of International Application No. PCT/EP2010/058454 filed Jun. 16, 2010, which designates the United States of America, and claims priority to DE Patent Application No. 10 2009 039 823.6 filed Sep. 2, 2009. The contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety. 
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     This disclosure relates to a method and a system for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer by authenticating at least one RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tag assigned to the product using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol. 
     BACKGROUND 
     When inspecting incoming goods, incoming goods usually undergo an acceptance inspection, in which the product supplied is checked for quantity and quality. This is done either by random sampling or by inspecting the whole consignment of incoming goods. The same applies in principle to customs controls, in which a comparison of goods to be imported and exported is carried out with the customs declaration. 
     In the case of packs equipped with RFID tags, there is the option of carrying out an automated check with the aid of an RFID reader instead of a manual physical check. As a result thereof, it is possible to inspect a number of packs in a short time (that is, by bulk reading). 
     In the context of an automated quantity and quality check of such a kind, no distinction is made between genuine and counterfeit products, however. Against a backdrop of continually increasing problems with product piracy, and also in particular as a result of the further expansion and liberalization of international trade, an automated and reliable inspection of the authenticity of products would be extremely desirable. 
     SUMMARY 
     In one embodiment, a method is provided for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer by authenticating at least one RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tag assigned to the product, using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol. The method may include reading a product code from the RFID tag, detecting an electronic delivery note assigned thereto, generating a challenge based on a random number, transmitting the challenge wirelessly to the RFID tag, detecting a response by means of the RFID tag based on the challenge that has been transmitted and on a first secret key that is assigned to the RFID tag, verifying the response that has been established to determine an authentication result, and importing the authentication result into the electronic delivery note. 
     In a further embodiment, a digital certificate encompassing the public key is stored on the RFID tag, and the digital certificate is read and the authenticity of the digital certificate is verified. In a further embodiment, the public key can be ascertained from the electronic delivery note. 
     In another embodiment, a system for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer by authenticating at least one RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) tag assigned to the product, using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol as disclosed herein. The system may include an RFID reader with a first communications module for wireless communication with the RFID tag, the RFID-tag with an authentication module that determines an appropriate response to a challenge that has been received, and a second communications module for wireless communication with the RFID reader, and a second authentication module to generate a challenge and verify a response and an RFID middleware to provide electronic delivery notes. 
     In a further embodiment, the RFID reader is permanently connected to the RFID middleware, the electronic delivery notes are provided to the RFID reader when requested. In a further embodiment, the RFID reader is connectable to the RFID middleware, and where a connection exists, electronic delivery notes are provided to the RFID reader. In a further embodiment, the second authentication module is assigned to the RFID reader. In a further embodiment, the second authentication module is assigned to the RFID middleware. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Example embodiments will be explained in more detail below with reference to figures, in which: 
         FIG. 1  shows a schematic diagram of system components of a product inspection system according to a first example embodiment, 
         FIG. 2  shows a schematic diagram of system components of a product inspection system according to a second example embodiment, 
         FIG. 3  shows a block diagram showing functional blocks of an RFID tag according to a first example embodiment, 
         FIG. 4  shows a block diagram showing functional blocks of an RFID tag according to a second example embodiment, and 
         FIG. 5  shows an example flow diagram for a challenge response protocol for authenticity verification according to the certain embodiments. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Some embodiments provide a method for the automated inspection of products when taking delivery or during customs controls, with which method the authenticity of the products may be reliably checked. 
     For example, certain embodiments provide a method for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer authenticates at least one RFID tag assigned to the product using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol. First a product code is read off the RFID tag and an electronic delivery note assigned thereto is detected. A challenge based on a random number is subsequently generated and transmitted to the RFID tag in a wireless manner. The RFID tag detects a response on the basis of the challenge that has been transmitted and using a first secret key that is assigned to the RFID tag. The response detected is checked to determine an authentication result and the authentication result is recorded in the electronic delivery note. 
     Some embodiment include equipping RFID tags for a product with a private PKI (Private Key Infrastructure) key and irreversibly connecting the key to the product. The electronic delivery note or the electronic customs declaration contains the corresponding data set for the authentication of the RFID tag (that is, the Public Key). In this way, the authenticity of the product may be advantageously verified using cryptographic methods. 
     Advantageously, the proposed piracy protection check may be seamlessly integrated into existing business procedures. Thus, during the acceptance check, the piracy protection check may be carried out at the same time. The current delivery status for the product is shown in the merchandise management system. This information can provide additional support for a quality management process. 
     In certain embodiments, a digital certificate encompassing the public key may be stored on the RFID tag. The digital certificate may be read and the authenticity of the digital certificate verified. 
     In some embodiments, the private key and a digital certificate assigned thereto are stored on the RFID tag that is to be verified. The digital certificate may encompass the public key, additional information and a digital signature. Reading of the private key may be prevented by hardware measures. The digital certificate on the other hand can be read. Prior to verification of authenticity, it is read by an RFID reader and transmitted to a verification unit, where the authenticity of the digital certificate is verified with the aid of the digital signature. When the digital certificate has been verified, the RFID tag is checked by using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol as disclosed herein, the presence of the private key being verified with the aid of the public key, without the private key having to be read. 
     In some embodiments, the public key can be ascertained from the electronic delivery note. In this variant, the digital certificate is not stored on the RFID tag but is recorded in the electronic delivery note for each product unit. In this variant the digital certificate is not imported by the RFID tag but is taken from the electronic delivery note. 
     Some embodiments provide a system according for inspecting a product as an original product of a product producer by authenticating at least one RFID tag assigned to the product using an asymmetrical challenge response protocol as disclosed herein. The system may comprise an RFID reader with a communications module for wireless communication with the RFID tag. It may further comprises an RFID tag with an authentication module that determines an appropriate response to a challenge that has been received, and a second communications module for wireless communication with the RFID reader. Furthermore, a second authentication module may be provided to generate a challenge and verify a response. Finally, an RFID middleware provides electronic delivery notes. 
     The integration of the authenticity verification of products into the general business process leads to improved piracy protection since verification is carried out at critical points in the materials flow system. The proposed measures mean that the piracy inspection can be carried out very efficiently. Furthermore, counterfeits can be detected at an early stage and do not have to be accepted from the supplier in the first place. This creates a considerable savings potential while at the same time increasing the quality. 
       FIG. 1  shows system components of an example system according to certain embodiments. The product units  101  that are shown are located, for example, at an incoming goods inspection point or a customs clearance point. For the authenticity verification, the product units  101  are each equipped with an RFID tag  102 . The RFID tags  102  are able to communicate with an RFID reader  103 . This RFID reader  103  is permanently connected via a suitable interface to an RFID middleware  104 . The RFID middleware  104  is again connected to a piracy protection unit  105 . Moreover, the RFID middleware  104  has access to a merchandise management system  106 , via which there is access to the electronic delivery notes  107 . 
     The RFID middleware  104 , the piracy protection unit  105  and the merchandise management system  106  may be located in a secure environment. Since the RFID tags  102  are authenticated with the piracy protection unit  105 , the RFID reader  103  does not necessarily have to be authenticated with the RFID middleware  104 . The authentication of the RFID tag  102  is carried out using a challenge response authentication protocol. The merchandise management system  106  verifies the data from the electronic delivery notes against the RFID data. An indication of the presence of counterfeits or of an error in the order delivery can be generated on the RFID reader  103  or on a terminal in the merchandise management system  106 . 
     For many applications there is no permanent availability of an online connection between the RFID reader and the RFID middleware. Such a scenario is shown in  FIG. 2 . In this case, inspection of the incoming goods  201  may be carried out offline. If a connection is established again with the RFID middleware  204 , the data can be compared after a time lag. 
     In some embodiments, the electronic delivery notes are available before the products are delivered. An electronic delivery note  207  is transmitted to the RFID middleware  204  where it is buffer-stored. If an RFID reader  203  connects to the middleware  204 , the electronic delivery notes  207  that have not yet been processed are forwarded to the RFID reader  203  and stored there. 
     The RFID reader  203  now detects the incoming goods  201  offline and compares the items with the electronic delivery note. The authenticity verification of the products is achieved with the aid of an authentication method, using the RFID tag  202 . In the present embodiment, the piracy protection unit  205  is located in the RFID reader  203 . If a product unit  201  has been recognized as authentic, the data set in the electronic delivery note is digitally signed using the private key pertaining to the RFID reader. The digital signature is appended to the delivery note as an additional attribute. 
     Subsequent to the incoming goods inspection, a delivery note with additional attributes for authenticity verification and for incoming goods has been stored in the mobile RFID reader  203 . Said extended delivery note is passed on to the merchandise management system  206  when the next connection is established with the RFID middleware  204 . The incoming product is then recorded in the merchandise management system  206  and an electronic incoming goods receipt is issued, for example. 
     Two example standards that offer appropriate structures for the design of an electronic delivery note with the corresponding data fields for the additional information per product unit:
         UN/EDIFACT (United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport): here the PIA (Additional Product ID) segment pertaining to the LIN (Line Item) segment in the despatch advice (DESADV) could include, for example, the public key or the digital certificate for the authenticity verification. In the electronic customs declaration (COSDEC), too, in the context of the ATLAS automated customs clearance system, the additional cryptographic data could allow an authenticity verification when goods are imported.   OpenTrans: here, in the dispatch notification, the Remark Element for a dispatch notification item could contain the public key material or the digital certificate.       

     Two example methods for asymmetrical key management in the authenticity verification of the RFID tags are discussed below. 
     A first example embodiment is illustrated in  FIG. 3 , which shows an RFID tag with a memory  301 , an authentication module  302 , together with a private key  306  and a communications module  303 . Here the digital certificate  304  is stored in the memory  301  of the RFID tag. In addition to a product code  305 , the RFID tag consequently also stores an appropriate certificate  304  encompassing the public key, additional information and a digital signature. Reading of the private key  306  is prevented by hardware measures. The digital certificate can be read and, prior to authenticity verification, it is read by the RFID reader and transmitted to the piracy protection unit via the RFID middleware, for example. The authenticity of the digital certificate is checked in the piracy protection unit using the digital signature. When the digital certificate has been verified, the RFID tag is checked, using the asymmetrical challenge response protocol. The presence of the private key is checked with the aid of the public key, without the private key having to be read. 
     A second example embodiment is illustrated in  FIG. 4 , which shows an RFID tag with a memory  401 , an authentication module  402 , together with a private key  404  and a communications module  404 . The product code  405  is obtainable via the memory  401  of the RFID tag. 
     In this variant, the digital certificate is not stored on the RFID tag but is recorded in the electronic delivery note for each product unit. Authenticity verification functions as in the previous variant, but the difference is that the digital certificate is not imported by the RFID tag, but can be determined from the electronic delivery note. 
       FIG. 5  shows an example flow diagram for an authentication protocol between an RFID reader  501  and an RFID tag  502 , according to an example embodiment. In this embodiment, the digital certificate is stored on the RFID tag  502 . In the first step  503 , the RFID reader  501  reads the digital certificate off the RFID tag  502 . The digital certificate encompasses at least the public key and a digital signature. The RFID reader  501  verifies the digital signature and hence the digital certificate with the aid of a public signature key. If the result of the verification is negative  504 , the RFID tag is not authenticated. However, if the result of the verification is positive  505 , a challenge based on the public key is generated by the RFID reader  501  and transmitted to the RFID tag. The RFID tag  502  in turn generates a response  506  based on the challenge that has been received and on the secret key. This response is read by the RFID reader  501 . With the aid of the public key pertaining to the RFID tag  501 , the RFID reader  501  verifies the response that has been received. If the result of the verification is negative, the RFID tag  501  is not authenticated  507 . If the result of the verification is positive, the RFID tag  501  is authenticated by the RFID reader. 
     Any of the disclosed methods or systems for protection against piracy may also be used in the context of electronic customs clearance (i.e. ATLAS, the German automated tariff and local customs clearance system). In this way the distribution of counterfeit products across borders can be prevented in a targeted manner.