Abstract:
The present invention provides a system and method for traffic analysis. Embodiments can be used to detect malevolent network activity such as worms, viruses, denial of service attacks, and unauthorized network routing. Upon detecting the activity, steps can then be taken to halt the spread and/or remove the malevolent network activity, thereby adding protection from such activity to the network. Other network activity of interest can also be detected.

Description:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION  
       [0001]     The present invention relates generally to computer networking and more particularly to a system and method for analyzing network traffic.  
       BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION  
       [0002]     Viruses, worms, and other types of malevolent code and malicious activities are a regular cause of disruption, delay, and downtime in the Internet and other types of networks. The Code Red virus and the Blaster worm are but two examples of malevolent code that caused enormous disruption to the Internet and the users who rely on the Internet. Common techniques to combat malevolent code include the use of virus software, patches and firewalls etc. resident at subscriber equipment. For example, virus software such as Norton Antivirus is a way to ‘disinfect’ a computer that has a worm or virus. To perform such disinfection, the virus software is updated from time-to-time with virus definitions that equip the software to identify and remove the offending code. The obvious downside to virus software is that very often, at least one infection must occur before a corresponding virus definition to combat the infection can be prepared and distributed. Another disadvantage with virus software is that the virus software actually needs to be installed on the subscriber computer, which can in and of itself impair the overall performance of the computer as the virus software occupies memory and processing time.  
         [0003]     “Patches” are also a common approach taken by operating system vendors, such as Microsoft, who offer upgrades and patches to the operating system to try and close the various security loopholes in their operating systems that render computers vulnerable to infection. Firewalls, both hardware and software based, are still a further way to try and prevent infections. One means of protection offered by firewalls is the ability to ‘stealth’ or ‘close’ certain Internet Protocol (IP) ports that are commonly used to attack a computer. However, a firewall can only reduce the likelihood of infection, and does not overcome all security loopholes present in the subscriber computers that they are intended to protect. In general, subscriber-side protection against malevolent activity tends to be reactive and only reduces the likelihood of infection, leaving room for solutions that can further reduce the likelihood of infection and/or rapid detection and isolation thereof.  
         [0004]     To address some of these shortcomings, one approach is to increase the amount of combative-activity being conducted on the portion of the Internet (or other network) belonging to the service provider (or equivalent). In general, techniques and devices are used by the service provider in an attempt to catch malevolent code before it infects a subscriber&#39;s computer, or at least before too many subscriber computer&#39;s are infected. Arbor Networks Inc., of 430 Bedford Street, Suite 160, Lexington, Mass. 02420, USA (http://www.arbornetworks.com) proposes a solution for identifying and/or eliminating “network-wide anomalies, such as DDoS attacks, worms, router attacks, instability, and policy violations”. (See http://www.arbornetworks.com) The solution includes at least one network router, through which all traffic for a particular Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) will flow. The network router in the Arbor Networks solution catalogues network traffic, and performs a degree of traffic aggregation for the purpose of analysis. In general, however, the Abor Networks solution provides limited analysis, performing a simple aggregation traffic based on the traffic source. Since fairly limited information can be gleaned from this aggregation—the network service provider is faced with the problem of performing their own, more detailed analysis. In the end, the Arbor Networks solution itself only reduces In general, subscriber-side protection against malevolent activity tends to be reactive and only reduces the likelihood of infection, leaving room for solutions that can further reduce the likelihood of infection and/or rapid detection and isolation thereof.  
       SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION  
       [0005]     It is an object of the present invention to provide a novel system and method for traffic analysis that obviates or mitigates at least one of the above-identified disadvantages of the prior art.  
         [0006]     An aspect the invention provides a system for analyzing network traffic comprising a plurality of subscriber units and a default router interconnected by a network. The network is operable to direct routed traffic to an appropriate subscriber unit and is further operable to direct unrouted traffic to the default route generator. The system also comprises an analyzer connected to the default router for determining patterns of activity within the unrouted traffic.  
         [0007]     The activity can be selected from the group consisting of worms, viruses, Trojan horses, scanners.  
         [0008]     The activity can also be a misconfiguration of a network routing table in a second network adjacent to the network. The misconfiguration can be a result of the second network routing traffic to a third network adjacent the network via the network. The misconfiguration can result in a breach of a service contract between an operator of the network and an operator of the second network, and so the system can also include a means for assessing a penalty against an operator of the second network, the penalty corresponding to the breach of contract.  
         [0009]     At least one of the patterns that can be detected is a plurality of attempts by one of the subscriber units to send unrouted traffic. The pattern can also be characterized by the fact that the attempts occur at substantially identical intervals of time.  
         [0010]     At least one of the patterns that can be detected includes a subscriber unit originating unrouted traffic from at least one predefined port and attempting to send traffic to another at least one predefined port.  
         [0011]     At least one of the patterns that can be detected is includes a subscriber unit originating traffic of a first type of protocol.  
         [0012]     The system can further comprise a honey pot connected to the analyzer for responding to the unrouted traffic. The honey pot can be operable to permit itself to be infected with a malicious code associated with the unrouted traffic. The honey pot can include a malicious code scanner for identifying the malicious code once the honey pot computer is infected.  
         [0013]     The system can further comprise a means for isolating one of the subscriber units from the network if the analyzer determines a pattern of activity associated therewith is malicious.  
         [0014]     The system can further comprise a means for notifying one of the subscriber units if the analyzer determines a pattern of activity associated therewith is malicious.  
         [0015]     The system can further comprise a means for charging a fee to a subscriber associated with the one of the subscriber units.  
         [0016]     The system can further comprise a means for providing the analyzer with updated definitions of known patterns of malicious traffic.  
         [0017]     Another aspect of the invention provides a traffic analyzer comprising an interface for connecting to a network. The network is operable to interconnect a plurality of subscriber units. The network is further operable to direct routed traffic to an appropriate subscriber unit and is further operable to direct unrouted traffic to the interface. The traffic analyzer also comprises a processing means connected to the interface. The processing means is operable to determine patterns of activity within the unrouted traffic.  
         [0018]     Another aspect of the invention provides a default router for connecting to a network that interconnects a plurality of subscriber units. The network is operable to direct routed traffic in the network to an appropriate subscriber unit. The default router is operable to instruct the network to direct unrouted traffic to the default route generator. The network further includes a routing table and the default router is operable to instruct the network to direct unrouted traffic to the default router by creating an entry in the routing table associated with the default route generator.  
         [0019]     Another aspect of the invention provides a network routing table for use in association with a network that interconnects a plurality of subscriber units. The network is operable to access the network routing table to direct routed traffic in the network to an appropriate subscriber unit. The network is further operable to access the network routing table to direct unrouted traffic in the network to a traffic analyzer.  
         [0020]     Another aspect of the invention provides a method of analyzing traffic in a network comprising the steps of: 
        receiving traffic from at least one of a plurality of subscriber units interconnected by the network;     delivering the traffic to a destination subscriber unit if the traffic is routed;     analyzing the traffic for patterns of activity in the traffic if the traffic is unrouted.        
 
         [0024]     The method can further comprise the step of assessing a penalty against an operator of the second network, the penalty corresponding to the breach of contract.  
         [0025]     The method can further comprise the step of-responding to the unrouted traffic. The method can further comprise the step of step of permitting an infection in a honey pot computer of a malicious code in associated with the unrouted traffic. The method can further comprise the step of after the permitting step, of scanning the honeypot computer to identify the malicious code.  
         [0026]     The method can further comprise the step of isolating one of the subscriber units from the network if the pattern of activity associated with the one of the subscriber units is determined to be malicious.  
         [0027]     The method can further comprise the step of notifying one of the subscriber units if the pattern of activity associated with the one of the subscriber units is determined to be malicious.  
         [0028]     The method can further comprise the step of charging a fee to a subscriber associated with the one of the subscriber units.  
         [0029]     The method can further comprise the step of providing updated definitions of known patterns of malicious traffic.  
         [0030]     The method can further comprise the step of notifying one of the subscriber units if the pattern of activity associated with the one of the subscriber units is determined to be malicious, the notifying including offering a software tool for removing code from the at least one subscriber unit that is responsible for generating such malicious activity.  
         [0031]     Another aspect of the invention provides a system comprising: 
        means for receiving network traffic from at least one subscriber unit coupled to a network; and     means for detecting an infection problem on the subscriber unit with use of the received network traffic.        
 
         [0034]     The system can further comprise means for offering to a person associated with the subscriber unit, an application to at least one of protect and destroy the infection problem if an infection problem is detected on the subscriber unit. 
     
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS  
       [0035]     The invention will now be described by way of example only, and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:  
         [0036]      FIG. 1  is a schematic representation of a system for traffic analysis in accordance with an embodiment of the invention;  
         [0037]      FIG. 2  is a flow chart depicting a method for traffic analysis in accordance with another embodiment of the invention;  
         [0038]      FIG. 3  shows the system of  FIG. 1  with a certain path of traffic therethrough;  
         [0039]      FIG. 4  shows the system of  FIG. 1  with a certain path of traffic therethrough;  
         [0040]      FIG. 5  is a schematic representation of a system for traffic analysis in accordance with another embodiment of the invention;  
         [0041]      FIG. 6  is a schematic representation of a system for traffic analysis in accordance with another embodiment of the invention;  
         [0042]      FIG. 7  shows the system of  FIG. 6  with a certain path of traffic therethrough;  
         [0043]      FIG. 8  shows the system of  FIG. 6  with a certain path of traffic therethrough when the system of  FIG. 6  is misconfigured;  
         [0044]      FIG. 9  shows the system of  FIG. 6  with a certain path of traffic therethrough when the system of  FIG. 6  is misconfigured; and,  
         [0045]      FIG. 10  is a schematic representation of a system for traffic analysis in accordance with another embodiment of the invention. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION  
       [0046]     Referring now to  FIG. 1 , a system for traffic analysis is indicated generally at  30 . System  30  comprises a plurality of subscriber units  34   1 ,  34   2  . . .  34   n  (generically referred to herein as subscriber unit(s)  34 ) that connect to a service provider network  38 , which in turn connects to the Internet  42 . Those of skill in the art should recognize that service provider network  38  is itself actually part of Internet  42 , and network  38  and Internet  42  are shown separately herein to facilitate explanation of certain features of the present embodiments, as will be explained in greater detail below.  
         [0047]     Subscriber units  34  are thus provided access to Internet  42 , and each other, via service provider network  38 . In a present embodiment, subscriber units  34  are stand-alone personal computers with modems or other types of network interfaces that allow subscriber units  34  to communicate over network  38  and Internet  42 . Subscriber units  34  can, however, be any type of computing entity, such as laptop computers, personal digital assistants, cell phones, and/or can include intranets, web servers, mail servers, etc. that connect to Internet  42  via network  38 .  
         [0048]     Subscriber units  34  are also able to access other units  46  that are connected to Internet  42  and accordingly, network  38  and Internet  42  provide a conduit through which subscriber units  34  and the other units  46  can communicate with each other. Like subscriber units  34 , units  46  can also be any type of computing entity, such as laptop computers, personal digital assistants, cell phones, and/or can include intranets, web servers, mail servers, etc. that connect to Internet  42 . Subscriber units  34  and unit  46  each have their own unique Internet Protocol (“IP”) address so that their location can be uniquely identified in Internet  42 .  
         [0049]     System  30  also includes a default router  50  which has no unique IP address in Internet  42 , and, as will be explained in greater detail below, any traffic which enters network  38  that is unrouted will be sent to default router default router  50 . Default router  50  is operable to act as a default route for any unrouted traffic in network  38 .  
         [0050]     As used herein, the term “routed traffic” refers to traffic that is destined for an IP address belonging to a computing entity (such as one of units  34  or unit  46 ) that actually exists in the global routing table of Internet  42 . In contrast, the terms “unrouted traffic” and “non-routed traffic” refer to traffic that is destined for an IP address that does not exist in the global routing table of Internet  42 , and is therefore otherwise undeliverable without the presence of default router  50 . Also as used herein, the term “Bogon space” refers to those IP addresses that are associated with unrouted traffic.  
         [0051]     Default router Default router  50 , in turn, is connected to a traffic analyzer  54 , which is operable to examine traffic sent to default router  50 , as will be explained in greater detail below.  
         [0052]     Network  38  also includes at least one router  58  associated with a routing table  62  that is accessible by subscriber units  34  to route traffic in network  38  and Internet  42  to its appropriate destination. Thus, where traffic in network  38  is routed, in that it is destined for an IP address that exists in Internet  42 , then table  62  directs that traffic to the appropriate unit  34  or unit  46 . However, where traffic within network  38  is unrouted, then table  62  directs that traffic to default router default router  50 . Table I shows an exemplary routing table  62  that can be associated with router  58 . As will be readily understood by those of skill in the art, while not shown in Table I, routing table  62  includes the other known elements of routing tables such as a next-hop address, destination prefix etc.  
                             TABLE I                           Routing Table 62                Unit Reference           Entry Number   Number   IP Address               1   34 1     111.0.34.1       2   34 2     111.0.34.2       3   34 3     111.0.34.2       4   46   111.0.46.0       5   50    0.0.0.0/0               (All other IP addresses)                  
 
         [0053]     Those of skill in the art should recognize that Entry Number  5  in Table I reflects Bogon space in Internet  42 . Entry Number 5 is essentially a default destination picked by router  58  as a last resort, in the event that none of the other entries in routing table  62  match a destination IP address. In other words, Entry Number 5 reflects all IP addresses that do not otherwise have an explicit routing entry in the global routing table of Internet  42 , and so router  58  chooses default router  50  as the default route for that particular traffic.  
         [0054]     Referring now to  FIG. 2 , a method for analyzing traffic is indicated generally at  400 . In order to assist in the explanation of the method, it will be assumed that method  400  is operated using system  30 . Furthermore, the following discussion of method  400  will lead to further understanding of system  30  and its various components. (However, it is to be understood that system  30  and/or method  400  can be varied, and need not work exactly as discussed herein in conjunction with each other, and that such variations are within the scope of the present invention.)  
         [0055]     Beginning first at step  410 , traffic is received. In system  30 , Internet traffic is received by router  58  from one of the subscriber units  34 . As will be understood by those of skill in the art, part of the information included in the traffic sent by subscriber unit  34  will include a destination IP address for that traffic. Accordingly, once step  410  is completed method  400  will advance to step  415 , at which point a determination is made as to whether the traffic received at step  410  is routed or unrouted. If the destination IP address embedded in the traffic is found in one of the Entry Numbers One—Four of Table I, then the traffic will be considered “routed”, and method  400  will then advance to step  420  and the traffic received at step  410  will be routed to the appropriate destination in the usual manner.  
         [0056]     An example helps to further explain the above cycle of steps  410 - 420 . Suppose, at step  410 , subscriber unit  34   1  sends traffic to router  58  that includes a destination IP address of 111.0.46.0. At step  415 , router  58  will determine that destination IP address of 111.0.46.0 appears in Entry Number Four of Table I, and therefore router  58  will determine that the received traffic is routed. At step  420 , router  58  will, using Table I, determine that the received traffic is destined for unit  46 , and will accordingly send the received traffic to unit  46  through Internet  42  in the usual manner. The foregoing example is represented in  FIG. 3 , which includes a dotted line “A” representing the resulting pathway of the routed traffic from subscriber unit  341 , through router  58  and to unit  46 .  
         [0057]     However, if, at step  415  it is determined that the traffic received at step  410  is not routed, then method  400  advances from step  415  to step  425 . An example helps to explain how method  400  arrives at step  425 . Suppose, at step  410 , subscriber unit  342  sends traffic to router  58  that includes a destination IP address of“111.111.111.111”. At step  415 , router  58  will determine that the destination IP address “111.111.111.111” does not appear in any of Entry Numbers One through Four of Table  1 , and therefore router  58  will determine that the received traffic is “not routed”, and will therefore rely on the default routing pathway in Entry Number Five of Table I. At step  425 , router  58  will, using Table I, determine that the received traffic is not routed, and will accordingly send the received traffic to default router default router  50 . The foregoing example is represented in  FIG. 4 , which includes a dotted line “B” representing the resulting pathway of the unrouted traffic from subscriber unit  342 , through router  58  and to default router default router  50 .  
         [0058]     When method  400  advances to step  430 , an instance of the unrouted traffic sent at step  410  is logged. When implemented in system  30 , default router  50  will pass the traffic it received at step  425  to analyzer  54 , and populate a record in a log stored in analyzer  54  that includes data about the unrouted traffic. In the present embodiment, default router  50  effects the passing of traffic to analyzer  54  by changing the Bogon IP address to an address associated with the analyzer  43 . Table II shows an example of a structure of such a log as stored in analyzer  54 .  
                                         TABLE II                           Unrouted traffic log stored in analyzer 54                        Source       Destination       Entry       Source IP   Port/   Destination IP   Port/       Number   Time   Address   Protocol   Address   Protocol               1   0:00:00   111.0.34.2   2000/   111.111.111.111   135/TCP                   TCP                  
 
         [0059]     In the present embodiment, Table II includes seven columns. Column 1, Entry Number, is simply and index of the particular entry in the log. Column 2, “Time”, is a time stamp of when a particular entry was received by unit  50 . Column 3, “Source IP Address”, is the IP address of the unit  34  from which the traffic originated. Column 4, “Source Port/Protocol” is the particular port on the source unit  34  from which the traffic originated combined with the type of protocol of the traffic being sent from “Destination IP Address” is the exact IP address that was indicated in the unrouted traffic, and therefore reflects the underlying reason the particular entry is being populated in the first place. Column 6, “Destination Port/Protocol” is the particular port to which the traffic was destined, combined with the type of protocol.  
         [0060]     Other fields not shown in Table II, can include well-known fields associated with Internet routing, including: interface index in; interface index out; next hop; number of octets in packet; Type of Service (TOS) bit; packet number (i.e. the flow of traffic between the source and destination); byte count (i.e. the amount of bytes you in the flow); autonomous system number for destination (i.e. the identity of the network in Internet  42  to which, autonomous system for source (i.e. the identity of network  38 ). Other fields that can be included in Table II will now occur to those of skill in the art.  
         [0061]     Table II is shown as including one entry resulting from the performance of step  430 , which corresponds with the unrouted traffic example shown in  FIG. 4 . In particular, Column 1, Entry Number, is populated with the value “1”, indicating that this is the first entry in the log. Column 2, “Time”, is populated with the time “0:00:00”, indicating that the event occurred at midnight. (While not included in Table II, it is contemplated that Table II would typically include a date stamp as well as a time stamp.) Column 3, “Source IP Address”, is populated with the value “111.0.34.2”, corresponding to the IP address of subscriber unit  342 , the particular unit  34  from which the unrouted traffic originated. Column 4, “Source Port/Protocol” is populated with the value “2000TCP”, indicating the traffic originated from port  2000  in TCP format from subscriber unit  342 . (Column 4 can, of course, be populated with any of variety of ports and protocols (such as UDP, ICMP) and any other port and protocol from which it is possible to originate traffic). Column 5, “Destination IP Address” is populated with the value “111.111.111.111”, the exact IP address that was indicated in the unrouted traffic. Column 6, “Destination Port/protocol” is populated with the value “TCP/135”, indicating the traffic was of the type TCP and was destined for the port number  135 . (Column 6 can, of course, be populated with any of a variety of ports and protocols (such as TCP, UDP, ICMP)and any other port to which it is possible to deliver traffic).  
         [0062]     It is to be understood that the contents and structure of Table II are just examples, and that the various components and elements of Table R will conform with commonly used standards associated with the ports, protocols etc.  
         [0063]     Next, method  400  advances from step  430  to step  435 , at which point it is determined whether a sufficient amount of data exists in the log to perform an analysis. The criteria used to make the determination at step  435  is not particularly limited, and in certain circumstances step  435  can be eliminated altogether if it is desired to configure system  30  to react to any instance of unrouted traffic. In a present embodiment, however, the criteria used to determine whether a sufficient amount of data exists in the log shown in Table II is based on predefined intervals, and in the present embodiment the interval is hourly. In other words, at the end of every hour, Table II is deemed to include enough data to perform an analysis. Where at step  435  it is determined that “no”, enough data does not exist (i.e. a one hour period has not elapsed), method  400  returns step  410  and additional traffic is received and processed as previously described. Where, at step  435 , it is determined that “yes”, enough data does exist, method  400  advances to step  440 , at which point the log is analyzed. At step  445 , any instances of suspect traffic that are found as a result of the analysis at step  440  are reported.  
         [0064]     It is to be understood that the particular sequence of steps in method  400  described herein is merely exemplary, and that the steps in method  400  (and portions thereof) are cycling on a constant basis to direct traffic through network  38  and Internet  42 . Thus, it should be understood that even as steps  425 - 445  are occurring, steps  410 - 420  can also be occurring simultaneously as router  58  continues to direct routed traffic to appropriate destinations, and unrouted traffic to default router  50 , while default router  50  and analyzer  54  continues to log and analyze unrouted traffic.  
         [0065]     Referring again now to step  440 , a variety of analytical techniques can be applied to flag suspect traffic and lead to report generation at step  445 . For example, assume that subscriber unit  342  is infected with a worm that scans IP addresses in Internet  42  for other units  34  or  46  to infect or assault with a denial of service attack. Also assume that subscriber unit  342  has been continuously connected to network  38  for over one hour. Table mi shows an example of how the traffic log in analyzer  54  will appear after such a two-hour period, as method  400  cycles.  
                                         TABLE III                           Unrouted traffic log stored in analyzer 54                        Source       Destina-       Entry       Source IP   Port/   Destination IP   tion Port/       Number   Time   Address   Protocol   Address   Protocol                1   0:00:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.111   135/TCP        2   0:01:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.112   135/TCP        3   0:02:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.113   135/TCP       .   .   .   .   .   .       .   .   .   .   .   .       .   .   .   .   .   .       61   1:00:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.161   135/TCP       62   1:01:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.162   135/TCP       63   1:02:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.163   135/TCP       .   .   .   .   .   .       .   .   .   .   .   .       .   .   .   .   .   .                  
 
         [0066]     Entry Numbers 1-60 will thus be analyzed at step  440  since a one-hour period will have elapsed. Analyzer  54  will group all entries in Table III that originate from the same Source IP Address, and search for patterns that indicate malicious activity. When performing such an analysis, analyzer  54  will note that, once a minute, over the preceding hour, subscriber unit  342  attempted to communicate with sixty different computing entities, none of which exist in Internet  42 , and having a sequence of IP Addresses incrementing by a value of one. Due to the regularity of the communication attempts, and the repeated attempts to communicate with non-existent computing entities, at step  440  analyzer  54  would thus flag the activities of subscriber unit  342  as exhibiting behaviour that could be malicious, and at step  445 , analyzer  54  would report this behaviour. The actual reporting can be delivered to any interested party, such as the service provider operating network  38  and/or the owner of subscriber unit  34   2 , and/or law enforcement agencies so that investigative and/or any necessary corrective action can be taken. If appropriate or desired, such corrective action can also include an immediate block of subscriber unit  34   2  to network  38  pending outcome of an investigation.  
         [0067]     It should now be apparent that the example discussed in relation to Table In is merely exemplary, and that a variety of other patterns and thresholds associated therewith can be used to flag malicious activity. For example, where subscriber unit  34   2  has its IP address dynamically assigned to it, and where that IP address changes over the course of the hour (or other relevant time period) during which the worm thereon attempts to infect other computing entities, the Source IP Address in the log would also change over the course that hour. Analyzer  54  can thus be configured to perform an additional step of aggregating entries that are associated with subscriber unit  34   2  by first consulting with the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (“DHCP”) server to determine all of the IP addresses that were assigned to subscriber unit  34   2  during that relevant time period. (Instead of a DCHP server, in other embodiments, another product with similar logging features can be used such as RADIUS, or Cisco Systems Tacacs). Having ascertained which entries in the log are associated with a common subscriber unit  34   2 , analyzer  54  can then proceed with the analysis.  
         [0068]     Analyzer  50  can also be provided with a set of definitions that correspond to behaviours of particular types of known malicious code. For example, where a known worm always looks for the same ports, in the same sequence on the destination computing entity, analyzer  50  can then flag that particular worm. Table IV provides an example of how such a log might appear.  
                                         TABLE IV                           Unrouted traffic log stored in analyzer 54                        Source       Destina-       Entry       Source IP   Port/   Destination IP   tion Port/       Number   Time   Address   Protocol   Address   Protocol               101   2:01:00   111.0.34.2   ICMP   111.111.111.111   ICMP       102   2:02:00   111.0.34.2   2000/TCP   111.111.111.111   135/TCP                  
 
         [0069]     Thus, in Table IV, the log shows that there was a first ICMP packet, followed by a packet originating from 2000/TCP and destined to 135/TCP. Where this particular pattern is indicative of a particular type of worm or virus, (i.e. such as the Nachi virus) then analyzer  50  can include the functionality of specifically identifying the suspected type of malicious activity originating from subscriber unit  34   2 .  
         [0070]     In general, it should now be apparent to those of skill in the art that analyzer  50  can be provided with a plurality of patterns and/or definitions that it can use when analyzing the traffic log to ascertain or otherwise flag the presence of malevolent code or other malicious activity. Other factors that can be part of a definition include: a) rates of infections of units  34  in network  38 ; destination IP scan patterns (i.e. where a particular subscriber unit  34  starts scanning [P addresses that are immediately adjacent to the IP address of that particular subscriber unit); packet frequencies; and packet size. Other factors that can be used to create definitions include any definitions that are now known or are developed in the future can be used as well. It should be further apparent that such patterns and definitions can be updated from time to time as different types of malicious activities are discovered and documented. It should also now be apparent that the NETFLOW protocol can be used by analyzer  50  (and its variants) in performing its tasks. (For more information about NETFLOW, see, for example, Center for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science (DIMACS), DIMACS Center/CoRE Building/4th Floor, Rutgers University, 96 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, N.J. 08854-8018 which maintains an ftp site for NETFLOW at ftp://dimacs.rutgers.edu/nub/netflow/).  
         [0071]     Referring now to  FIG. 5 , a system for analyzing traffic in accordance with another embodiment of the invention is indicated generally at  30   a.  System  30   a  is substantially the same as system  30 , and like elements in system  30   a  to like elements in system  30  have the same reference followed by the suffix “a”. One additional component to system  30   a  is a “honey-pot” computer  166   a.  Honey-pot computer  166   a  is intended to assist analyzer  50  with the analysis and/or diagnosis of certain types of malicious code. In particular, it is known that the Nachi virus, and others, will “ping” target machines, and await responses to those pings, before beginning their attempts at infection. As known to those of skill in the art, the Nachi virus tries to avoid infection attempts on “Bogon Space” space by first attempting to verify the presence of a target computing entity by pinging a given IP address. In this manner, the Nachi virus attempts to avoid detection. To catch these attempted Nachi virus infections, honey-pot computer  166   a  is operable to respond to an unrouted “ping” that is caught by default router  50 , and to then interact with the source subscriber unit  34  that sent the original ping. Depending on the behaviour of the source machine as it interacts with honey-pot computer  166   a  can ascertain whether the source subscriber unit  34  that is attempting to infect honey-pot computer  166   a  or is otherwise engaging in malicious activity. Honey-pot computer  166   a  can also be operable to let itself be infected, by leading the malicious code onto the next stage of infection, and in particular, can wait for a copy of the the malicious code to be planted on honey pot computer  166   a  for absolute confirmation by means of running a virus definition scan or the like once the malicious code has planted itself on honey pot computer  166   a.    
         [0072]     Referring now to  FIG. 6 , a system for analyzing traffic in accordance with another embodiment of the invention is indicated generally at  30   b.  System  30   b  is substantially the same as system  30 , and like elements in system  30   b  to like elements in system  30  have the same reference followed by the suffix “b”. System  30   b,  however, also includes at least one additional network  170   b  that is itself part of Internet  42   b.  Network  170   b  is comparable to network  38   b,  except that it is owned and operated by a different service provider than network  38   b  and the other service providers of Internet  42   b.  At least one computing unit  174   b  is connected to network  170   b,  and computing unit  174   b  is able to access Internet  42   b  via network  170   b.  Unit  174   b  is like units  34   b  and units  46   b,  and is thus any type of computing entity, such as a laptop computer, personal digital assistant, cell phone, and/or can be an intranet, web server, mail server, etc. that connects to Internet  42   b.    
         [0073]     Table V shows the contents of routing table  62   b  in system  30   b .  
                             TABLE V                           Routing Table 62b            Entry Number   Unit Reference Number   IP Address               1    34b 1     111.0.34.1       2    34b 2     111.0.34.2       3    34b 3     111.0.34.2       4    46b   111.0.46.0       5   174b   111.0.174.0       6    50b    0.0.0.0/0               (All other IP addresses)                  
 
         [0074]     It is also assumed that network  170   b  is configured (or is supposed to be configured) to only send Internet traffic through network  38   b  that is destined for subscriber units  34  that are actually a part of network  38   b.  To achieve this result, any routers and routing tables in network  170   b  are supposed to be programmed to only utilize network  38   b  if traffic is actually intended for one of subscriber units  34 —otherwise, such traffic should be delivered to Internet  42 . In other words, in the event that unit  174   b  has traffic destined for unit  46   b,  the path through which such traffic should be carried is directly from network  170   b  to Internet  42   b.    FIG. 7  illustrates this path, and includes a dotted line “C” representing the resulting pathway of the traffic from unit  174   b  to unit  46   b.  By the same token, in the event that unit  174   b  has traffic destined for unit  34   b   1 , the path through which such traffic should be carried is from network  170   b  to network  38   b.    FIG. 7  also illustrates this path, and includes a dotted line “D” representing the resulting pathway of the traffic from unit  174   b  to unit  34   b,  via network  38   b.    
         [0075]     In the event, however, that network  170   b  in relation to network  38   b  and the rest of Internet  42   b  is misconfigured (either accidentally or otherwise), in that traffic destined for unit  46   b,  is routed through network  38   b,  system  30   b  can provide a means, in certain circumstances, for detecting such misconfiguration.  FIG. 8  illustrates what happens when such a misconfiguration occurs, showing a dotted line “E” representing the resulting pathway of the traffic from unit  174   b  to default unit  46   b,  but which is sent through network  38   b  due to the misconfiguration.  
         [0076]     When method  400  is operated on system  30   b,  a detection of a misconfiguration of the type shown in  FIG. 8  can be performed when unrouted traffic originating from unit  174   b  enters network  38   b,  as a result of that misconfiguration.  FIG. 9  illustrates a path, indicated as a dotted line “F”, of communication of unrouted traffic from unit  174   b  that enters network  38   b , due to the misconfiguration, and which is sent to default router  50   b  due to the fact the traffic was unrouted. The result of this flow of unrouted traffic from unit  174   b  will cause the traffic log in analyzer  54   b  to contain an entry of the type shown in Table VI.  
                                         TABLE VI                           Unrouted traffic log stored in analyzer 54b                        Source       Destina-       Entry       Source IP   Port/   Destination IP   tion Port/       Number   Time   Address   Protocol   Address   Protocol               201   2:01:00   111.0.174.0   2000/   111.111.111.111   135/TCP                   TCP                  
 
         [0077]     Thus, when analyzer  54   b  reviews Entry Number  201 , and examines the fact that the Source IP Address of 111.0.174.0 originates from unit  174   b  of network  170   b,  analyzer  54   b  can flag the fact that such unrouted traffic should never have entered network  38   b,  and report this fact at step  445 . The reporting of such misconfiguration can be used to notify the service provider operating network  170   b  to correct the misconfiguration, and/or to assess penalties, be they financial or non-financial, against the service provider operating network  170   b,  in the event that such a misconfiguration represents a breach of contract or other arrangement between the service provider operating network  38   b  and the service provider operating network  170   b.    
         [0078]     Referring now to  FIG. 10 , a system for analyzing traffic in accordance with another embodiment of the invention is indicated generally at  30   c.  System  30   c  is substantially the same as system  30 , and like elements in system  30   c  to like elements in system  30  have the same reference followed by the suffix “c”. System  30   c,  however, also includes at least one additional network  238   c  that is itself part of Internet  42 . Network  238   c  is comparable to network  38   c,  except that it is operated by a different service provider than network  38   c  and the other service providers of Internet  42   c.  At least one computing unit  234   c  is connected to network  238   c,  and unit  234   c  is able to access Internet  42   c  via network  238   c.  Unit  234   c  is like units  34   c  and units  46   c,  and is thus any type of computing entity, such as a laptop computer, personal digital assistant, cell phone, and/or can be an intranet, web server, mail server, etc. that connects to Internet  42   c.  System  30   c  also includes a default router default router  250   c,  similar in function and operation to default router default router  50   c,  in that default router default router  250   c  is operable to process unrouted traffic within network  238   c.  By the same token, network  238   c  also includes a router  258   c  and a routing table  262   c  that behave substantially the same as router  58   c  and table  62   c  respectively. Table VII shows the contents of routing table  62   c,  while Table VIII shows the contents of routing table  262   c.   
                             TABLE VII                           Routing Table 62c            Entry Number   Unit Reference Number   IP Address               1    34c 1     111.0.34.1       2    34c 2     111.0.34.2       3    34c 3     111.0.34.2       4    46c   111.0.46.0       5   234c   111.0.234.0       6    50c   All other IP addresses                  
 
         [0079]    
       
         
               
             
               
               
               
             
           
               
                 TABLE VIII 
               
             
             
               
                   
               
               
                   
               
               
                 Routing Table 262c 
               
             
          
           
               
                 Entry Number 
                 Unit Reference Number 
                 IP Address 
               
               
                   
               
               
                 1 
                  34c 1   
                 111.0.34.1 
               
               
                 2 
                  34c 2   
                 111.0.34.2 
               
               
                 3 
                  34c 3   
                 111.0.34.2 
               
               
                 4 
                  46c 
                 111.0.46.0 
               
               
                 5 
                 234c 
                 111.0.234.0 
               
               
                 6 
                  250c 
                 All other IP addresses 
               
               
                   
               
             
          
         
       
     
         [0080]     To summarize Tables VII and VIII, unrouted traffic in network  38   c  will be sent to default router  50   c,  and unrouted traffic in network  238   c  will be sent to router  250   c.    
         [0081]     Due to the fact that default router  50   c  and analyzer  54   c  are proprietary to the service provider operating network  38   c,  network  38   c,  default router  50   c  and analyzer  54   c  will operate substantially the same as described before in relation to system  30 . However, in system  30   c,  the operator of network  238   c  configures router  250   c  to direct all unrouted traffic in network  238   c  to analyzer  54   c.  Thus, analyzer  54   c  differs from analyzer  54  in that analyzer  54   c  is operable to analyze unrouted traffic in both network  38   c  and network  238   c.  In this arrangement, the service provider operating network  238   c  need not duplicate the complexity and effort of running its own analyzer. In certain embodiments of the invention, the arrangement in system  30   c  will involve a service-fee charged by the operator of network  38   c  to the operator of network  238   c  to perform the analysis function in analyzer  54   c  for the unrouted traffic in network  238   c.    
         [0082]     While only specific combinations of the various features and components of the present invention have been discussed herein, it will be apparent to those of skill in the art that desired subsets of the disclosed features and components and/or alternative combinations of these features and components can be utilized, as desired. For example, in system  30 , subscribers owning subscriber unit  34  can be offered a subscription service to having analyzer  54  monitor whether a particular subscriber unit  34  is infected. In this variation, a particular subscriber unit  34  would agree to pay a fee to the operator of network  38  in exchange for having analyzer  54  detect and/or diagnose infections (or other types of malicious activity) originating from the particular subscriber unit  34 . The fee can be charged on a per-detected infection basis, or as a monthly fee as part of that overall fees for accessing network  38 , or according to such other criteria as may be desired. The fee could also include a charge for performing a disinfection or isolation of the infection. As another variation, in system  30 , subscribers owning subscriber unit  34  can be offered the opportunity to purchase software that will remove infections from their subscriber units  34  if method  400  (or its variants) determines that their particular subscriber unit  34  is infected. More specifically, where an actual diagnosis of the infection is made, the subscriber can be specifically offered the opportunity to purchase a specific patch (or the like) that is specifically tailored to address the diagnosed infection. Other structures for charging fees or otherwise offering such services to subscribers will now occur to those of skill in the art.  
         [0083]     As another variation, system  30  (or its variants  30   a,    30   b  or  30   c ) can include multiple routers  58 , and/or multiple default route generators  50  and/or multiple analyzers  54 , and/or multiple honeypots  30   a  as desired or needed. Similarly, it should be understood that the functionality of default router  50 , analyzer  54 , or honeypot  30   a  can be combined into a single computing device.  
         [0084]     While in the present embodiments default router  50  sends out the default route to the entire network to attract all traffic destined to the bogon space, in other embodiments it can be desired to configure default router  50  to generate a default route for a subset of bogon space to attract a subset of the unrouted traffic. This can be desirable in situations where the network operator does not want to generate a default route for all unrouted traffic, due to the congestion that could arise due to the large amount of unrouted traffic that would be routed to the default router.  
         [0085]     In a further variation, the default router could announce a legitimate and routed IP subnet assigned to the network operator using variations on the foregoing embodiments of the present invention. By doing so, and by looking at traffic destined to that subnet announced by the default router, the system can expand its view and analyzing capability to report on worms (and other activity) that exist or originate on other networks that may or may not be customers to the operator of the network to which the default router is attached, since that subnet is legitimately announced to the world as a routed space. Worms on such other networks can scan this subnet as a part of its normal operation and the traffic will be routed from any part of the world to the default router, and therefore the default router and analyzer can have a global view of the Internet.  
         [0086]     The above-described embodiments of the invention are intended to be examples of the present invention and alterations and modifications may be effected thereto, by those of skill in the art, without departing from the scope of the invention which is defined solely by the claims appended hereto.