reliabilism, a category of theories in the philosophical discipline of epistemology, has been advanced as a theory of knowledge, both of justification and of knowledge. process reliabilism has been used as an argument against philosophical skepticism, such as the brain in a vat thought experiment.responding to skepticism process reliabilism is a form of epistemic externalism. a broadly reliabilist theory of knowledge is roughly as follows: one knows that p (p stands for any proposition--e.g., that the sky is blue) if and only if p is true, one believes that p is true, and one has arrived at the belief that p through some reliable process. a broadly reliabilist theory of justified belief can be stated as follows: one has a justified belief that p if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process. moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this has been given by alvin plantinga) for such notions as 'warranted belief' or 'epistemically rational belief'. leading proponents of reliabilist theories of knowledge and justification have included alvin goldman, marshall swain, kent bach and more recently, alvin plantinga. goldman's article "a causal theory of knowing" (journal of philosophy, v. 64 (1967), pp.&nbsp;357â372) is generally credited as being the first full treatment of the theory, though d. m. armstrong is also regarded as an important source, and (according to hugh mellor) frank ramsey was the very first to state the theory, albeit in passing. one classical or traditional analysis of 'knowledge' is justified true belief. in order to have a valid claim of knowledge for any proposition, one must be justified in believing "p" and "p" must be true. since gettierhttp://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/6/121.extract proposed his counterexamples the traditional analysis has included the further claim that knowledge must be more than justified true belief. reliabilist theories of knowledge are sometimes presented as an alternative to that theory: rather than justification, all that is required is that the belief be the product of a reliable process. but reliabilism need not be regarded as an alternative, but instead as a further explication of the traditional analysis. on this view, those who offer reliabilist theories of justification further analyze the 'justification' part of the traditional analysis of 'knowledge' in terms of reliable processes. not all reliabilists agree with such accounts of justification, but some do. ==objections==  some find reliabilism of justification objectionable be
Epistemological_theories Internalism_and_externalism Justification