In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff\u2019s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor\u2019s orders to save a woman\u2019s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
", "facts_len": "501", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1", "ID": "50613", "name": "Stanley v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5014", "docket": "70-5014", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Peter Stanley, Sr.", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Joan Stanley had three children with Peter Stanley. The Stanleys never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, the State of Illinois took the children. Under Illinois law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit parents regardless of their actual fitness and their children became wards of the state. Peter appealed the decision, arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because unwed mothers were not deprived of their children without a showing that they were actually unfit parents. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley\u2019s Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual fitness as a parent was irrelevant because he and the children\u2019s mother were unmarried.
", "facts_len": "757", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2", "ID": "50623", "name": "Giglio v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-29", "docket": "70-29", "term": "1971", "first_party": "John Giglio", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio\u2019s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that it promised a key witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony against Giglio. The district court denied Giglio\u2019s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "495", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3", "ID": "50632", "name": "Reed v. Reed", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-4", "docket": "70-4", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Sally Reed", "second_party": "Cecil Reed", "facts": "The Idaho Probate Code specified that \"males must be preferred to females\" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.
", "facts_len": "378", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "4", "ID": "50643", "name": "Miller v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-73", "docket": "70-73", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Marvin Miller", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of \"adult\" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.
", "facts_len": "305", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "5", "ID": "50644", "name": "Kleindienst v. Mandel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-16", "docket": "71-16", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General of the United States; William P. Rogers, Secretary of State", "second_party": "Ernest E. Mandel, et al.", "facts": "Ernest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel\u2019s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mendel temporarily.
\nThe Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel\u2019s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel\u2019s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel\u2019s ineligibility. Mandel\u2019s address to the conference was delivered by telephone.
\nMandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States.
", "facts_len": "2282", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "6", "ID": "50655", "name": "Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-7", "docket": "70-7", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Sarno", "second_party": "Illinois Crime Investigating Commission", "facts": "The Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a \"juice loan\" or \"loan shark\" racket.
\nOn February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
\nOn March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1424", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "7", "ID": "50656", "name": "Argersinger v. Hamlin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5015", "docket": "70-5015", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Argersinger", "second_party": "Hamlin", "facts": "Jon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.
", "facts_len": "347", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "8", "ID": "50657", "name": "Eisenstadt v. Baird", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-17", "docket": "70-17", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Eisenstadt", "second_party": "Baird", "facts": "William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.
", "facts_len": "420", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "9", "ID": "50663", "name": "Gooding v. Wilson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-26", "docket": "70-26", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Gooding", "second_party": "Wilson", "facts": "A Georgia state court convicted Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that \"[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.\" On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "612", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "10", "ID": "50671", "name": "Furman v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5030", "docket": "69-5003", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Furman", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).
", "facts_len": "477", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "11", "ID": "50683", "name": "Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-75", "docket": "70-75", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Moose Lodge No. 107", "second_party": "Irvis", "facts": "K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination \"state action.\"
", "facts_len": "415", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "12", "ID": "50688", "name": "Branzburg v. Hayes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85", "docket": "70-85", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Branzburg", "second_party": "Hayes", "facts": "After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.
", "facts_len": "745", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "13", "ID": "50689", "name": "Kirby v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5061", "docket": "70-5061", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Thomas Kirby", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "William Shard reported to the Chicago police that two men stole his wallet. The wallet contained traveler\u2019s checks and his social security card, among other things. The next day, two police officers stopped Thomas Kirby and his friend, Ralph Bean. When asked for identification, Kirby produced Shard\u2019s wallet. The officers arrested Kirby and Bean and brought them to the Maxwell Street Police Station. Once there, the officers learned about Shard\u2019s robbery and sent a car to pick up Shard and bring him to the station. Without an attorney present, police asked Shard if Kirby and Bean were his robbers. Shard instantly gave a positive identification. Kirby and Bean were not indicted until almost 6 weeks later. At trial, Kirby unsuccessfully attempted to suppress Shard\u2019s identification. The jury found Kirby guilty and the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District affirmed.
", "facts_len": "897", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "14", "ID": "50692", "name": "Wisconsin v. Yoder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-110", "docket": "70-110", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Wisconsin", "second_party": "Yoder", "facts": "Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
", "facts_len": "424", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "15", "ID": "50695", "name": "Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-162", "docket": "71-162", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Board of Regents of State Colleges", "second_party": "David Roth", "facts": "David Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.
", "facts_len": "635", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "16", "ID": "50707", "name": "United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-52", "docket": "70-52", "term": "1971", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Costal Chemical Corp", "facts": "Mississippi Chemical Corp. and Costal Chemical Corp. were \u201ccooperate associations\u201d within the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Act. The associations qualified for membership in a \u201cbank for Cooperatives\u201d, which allowed them to borrow money. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 required that the associations buy Class \u201cC\u201d stocks valued at $100. The associations claimed a $99 interest deduction on their taxes for every stock purchased. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, the associations paid the deficiency and then sued for a refund. The district court found for the associations and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "17", "ID": "50709", "name": "Santobello v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-98", "docket": "70-98", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Rudolph Santobello", "second_party": "State of New York", "facts": "In 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense.
\nAfter several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello\u2019s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor\u2019s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello\u2019s crime. Despite Santobello\u2019s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the appellate court affirmed his conviction.\"
", "facts_len": "899", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "18", "ID": "50715", "name": "Morrissey v. Brewer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-5103", "docket": "71-5103", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Morrissey", "second_party": "Brewer", "facts": "On January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey\u2019s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal.
\nOn April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher\u2019s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher.
\nNeither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man\u2019s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 en banc ruling.
", "facts_len": "2281", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "19", "ID": "50719", "name": "Younger v. Gilmore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-9", "docket": "70-9", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Evelle J. Younger, et al.", "second_party": "Robert O. Gilmore, Jr., et al.", "facts": "Several indigent California state prisoners filed complaints attacking the constitutionality of the regulations which forbade California prisons from having more than twelve law books in a prison library. On January 10, 1967, the district court consolidated the multiple cases because they contained common questions of law and fact.
\nThe California prisoners moved for the convening of a three-judge district court, but their motion was denied. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's order denying a three-judge panel. On May 28, 1970, a three-judge district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the regulation limiting the number of law books in prison libraries. The defendants appealed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "796", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "20", "ID": "50721", "name": "Gravel v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-1017", "docket": "71-1017", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Gravel", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.
", "facts_len": "487", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "21", "ID": "50722", "name": "Adams v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-283", "docket": "70-283", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Frederick E. Adams", "second_party": "Robert Williams", "facts": "During the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from Williams\u2019 waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin.
\nAfter the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1336", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "22", "ID": "50723", "name": "Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-492", "docket": "71-492", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Lloyd Corp. Ltd.", "second_party": "Donald Tanner et al.", "facts": "Donald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
", "facts_len": "799", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "23", "ID": "50724", "name": "Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-87", "docket": "70-87", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Police Department of the City of Chicago", "second_party": "Mosley", "facts": "Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; the law made an exception for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting \"black discrimination.\" Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "327", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "24", "ID": "50725", "name": "Chevron Oil Company v. Huson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-11", "docket": "70-11", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Chevron Oil Company", "second_party": "Huson", "facts": "Gaines Ted Huson suffered a back injury while working on a fixed oil rig, owned by Chevron Oil Company, off the coast of Louisiana. More than two years after the injury, Huson sued Chevron for damages in United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Huson alleged that it took several months for him to realize the severity of his injury. The District Court relied on Rodrigue v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), holding that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations applied instead of the admiralty laches doctrine so Huson's claim was barred. Rodrigue held that state law, not admiralty law, applied in these situations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Huson argued that because he filed this case before the Rodrigue decision, applying its ruling would have an unfair retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Louisiana statute of limitations was inconsistent with the admiralty laches doctrine and, therefore, was not applicable.
", "facts_len": "1139", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "25", "ID": "50745", "name": "Flood v. Kuhn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-32", "docket": "71-32", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Curtis C. Flood", "second_party": "Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, et al.", "facts": "Curtis C. Flood was a professional baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League. Flood was a consistent, above-average hitter and a well-regarded outfielder, playing one full season without an error in 1966, an unusual achievement. Flood played twelve seasons for the Cardinals, participating in three World Series, and was the co-captain of the team between 1965 and 1969.
\nDespite this, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in October 1969. The Cardinals did not consult him before the trade, and management only informed him about the trade after it was finalized. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, requesting that the league make him a free agent. Kuhn denied his request, relying on baseball\u2019s \u201creserve clause,\u201d which maintained a given team\u2019s rights to a player even after that player\u2019s contract expired. Flood then filed an antitrust suit against Kuhn, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. He declined to play for the Phillies in 1970 despite a $100,000 salary offer.
\nFlood alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights laws, state statutes, the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and several federal laws. The trial court granted the defense\u2019s motion for summary judgment, relying on Federal Baseball Club v. National League and Toolson v. New York Yankees, which established a long-standing antitrust exemption for professional baseball clubs. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1656", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "26", "ID": "50742", "name": "Gelbard v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-110", "docket": "71-110", "term": "1971", "first_party": "David Gelbard", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Perry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, stating that \"a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding.\" Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances.
", "facts_len": "1403", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "27", "ID": "50749", "name": "Haines v. Kerner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5025", "docket": "70-5025", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Francis Haines", "second_party": "Otto J. Kerner, former Governor of Illinois", "facts": "Francis Haines was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days because he hit another inmate over the head with a shovel during a confrontation. Haines was 66 years old and suffered from a foot disability. He claimed his foot disability worsened due to being kept in solitary confinement, where he had to sleep on the floor with only blankets for support. Haines sued the State of Illinois and argued that the conditions of his solitary confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State of Illinois moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Haines failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the dismissal, and stated that courts can only intercede with the internal operations of state prisons under exceptional circumstances. The district court also found that Haines had failed to show that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal and determined that state penitentiaries were entitled to their own discretion when punishing inmates.
", "facts_len": "1156", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "28", "ID": "50753", "name": "Kastigar v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-117", "docket": "70-117", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Kastigar", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Kastigar cited his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in refusing to testify before a grand jury, even though prosecutors had granted him immunity from the use of his testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was found in contempt of court for failing to testify.
", "facts_len": "297", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "29", "ID": "50754", "name": "D. H. Overmyer Company, Inc., of Ohio v. Frick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5", "docket": "69-5", "term": "1971", "first_party": "D. H. Overmyer Company, Inc., of Ohio", "second_party": "Frick", "facts": "In 1966, D.H. Overmyer Co. entered into a contract with Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation of a $223,000 automatic refrigeration system for a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio. The agreement established a promissory note with monthly payment obligations. Overmyer began to fall behind on the monthly payments. Frick filed three mechanic's liens against the Toledo warehouse, and the two companies negotiated a new payment agreement in February 1967. Overmyer again fell behind on payments, and the two companies established a new note which contained a confession-of-judgment provision.
\nIn June of 1968, Overmyer stopped making monthly payments under the new note and brought a claim against Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged breaches of the original contract. The District court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any likelihood that it would prevail on the merits.
\nFrick came before the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and asked the court to enter a judgment against Overmyer for the remaining balance of the note plus interest. Overmyer did not receive notice prior to the entry of the judgment because the confession-of-judgment provision waived the issuance and service of process and confessed judgment.
\nAfter the entry of the adverse judgment, Overmyer filed several motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment due to a lack of notice. After a hearing was held, the court denied the motions. Overmyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio, asserting deprivation of due process in violation of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the subsequent appeal, and Overmyer appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1848", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "30", "ID": "50756", "name": "Barker v. Wingo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-5255", "docket": "71-5255", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Willie Mae Barker", "second_party": "John W. Wingo, Warden", "facts": "On July 20, 1958, intruders beat an elderly couple to death in Christian County, Kentucky. Shortly afterward, police arrested Silas Manning and Willie Barker for the crime. Both were indicted on September 15 and assigned counsel on September 17. Barker\u2019s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, but the state believed it had a stronger case against Manning and that Manning\u2019s testimony would be essential to convict Barker. The state obtained a series of continuances on Barker\u2019s trial, as Manning was tried five times and finally convicted in 1962. Beginning in June 1959, Barker was out of prison on bail, and did not contest the continuances. Barker\u2019s trial was set for March 19, 1963, and when the state requested further continuances, Barker unsuccessfully objected. At his trial beginning on October 9, 1963, Barker was convicted.
\nThe Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Barker sought habeas corpus relief in district court, by arguing that the long trial delay violated his right to a speedy trial, which the district court denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
", "facts_len": "1163", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "31", "ID": "50775", "name": "Dunn v. Blumstein", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-13", "docket": "70-13", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Dunn", "second_party": "Blumstein", "facts": "A Tennessee law required a one-year residence in the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently moved to Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court.
", "facts_len": "333", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "32", "ID": "50779", "name": "United States v. Generes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-28", "docket": "70-28", "term": "1971", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Allen H. Generes and Edna Generes", "facts": "In 1954, Allen Generes and his son-in-law William Kelly formed Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. Generes and Kelly each owned 44% of the stock, with the remaining 12% owned by Generes\u2019 son and another son-in-law. Generes was the president of the corporation and did not deal with the day-to-day running of the business. In addition to his position as president, he held another full-time position as the president of a savings and loan association. In 1958, Generes and Kelly signed an indemnity agreement for the corporation. In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two contracts and went deeply into debt. Generes loaned the corporation money, but it went bankrupt, and he was unable to receive reimbursement.
\nOn his 1962 tax return, Generes claimed the money the corporation lost as business bad debt and his direct loans to the corporation as nonbusiness bad debt. He filed a claim for a refund on the business bad debt. This claim was the subject of a jury trial in which the jury was asked to determine whether Generes\u2019 signing of the indemnity agreement was \u201cproximately related to his trade or business of being an employee \u201cof the corporation. The government requested a jury instruction to clarify that \u201csignificant\u201d motivation satisfies the requirement, but the court refused and instructed the jury that \u201cdominant\u201d motivation was sufficient. The jury found in favor of Generes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the significant motivation standard was acceptable.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1543", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "33", "ID": "50783", "name": "Sierra Club v. Morton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-34", "docket": "70-34", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Sierra Club", "second_party": "Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States", "facts": "The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.
", "facts_len": "1289", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "34", "ID": "50784", "name": "United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-153", "docket": "70-153", "term": "1971", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan", "facts": "Investigating three people it suspected of conspiring to destroy government property and bombing a Central Intelligence Agency office, officials used electronic surveillance to record suspects' conversations. The wiretapping was conducted without a search warrant.
", "facts_len": "272", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "35", "ID": "50786", "name": "Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5276", "docket": "70-5276", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Albert Delanor Murel, et al.", "second_party": "Baltimore City Criminal Court, et al.", "facts": "Maryland trial courts convicted Albert Murel and the other petitioners of various crimes and sentenced them to fixed terms of imprisonment. The petitioners were \u201cdefective delinquents,\u201d so each was committed to the Patuxent Institution, a mental health facility, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law.
\nThe petitioners sought a federal habeas corpus in district court. They challenged the conditions of their confinement and the procedures that led to their commitment. They also argued that Maryland's statutory standard for the commitment of \"delinquent defendants\" was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "801", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "36", "ID": "50790", "name": "Perry v. Sindermann", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-36", "docket": "70-36", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Charles R. Perry et al.", "second_party": "Robert P. Sindermann", "facts": "Robert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.
", "facts_len": "1353", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "37", "ID": "50805", "name": "Schneckloth v. Bustamonte", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-732", "docket": "71-732", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Merle R. Schneckloth", "second_party": "Robert Clyde Bustamonte", "facts": "A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, \u201cSure, go ahead.\u201d Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte\u2019s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.
", "facts_len": "1079", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "38", "ID": "50808", "name": "Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-507", "docket": "71-507", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Keyes", "second_party": "School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado", "facts": "Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well.
", "facts_len": "391", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "39", "ID": "50816", "name": "Frontiero v. Richardson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1694", "docket": "71-1694", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Sharron Frontiero", "second_party": "Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense", "facts": "Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.
", "facts_len": "452", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "40", "ID": "50821", "name": "Mahan v. Howell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-364", "docket": "71-364", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Mahan", "second_party": "Howell", "facts": "In 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4 percent, compared to the ideal 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of \"one person, one vote.\" This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard.
", "facts_len": "577", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "41", "ID": "50834", "name": "United States v. Ash", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1255", "docket": "71-1255", "term": "1972", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Charles J. Ash Jr.", "facts": "Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash\u2019s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.
", "facts_len": "857", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "42", "ID": "50844", "name": "Neil v. Biggers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-586", "docket": "71-586", "term": "1972", "first_party": "William S. Neil, Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary", "second_party": "Archie Nathaniel Biggers", "facts": "A Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer\u2019s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station \u201cshow up\u201d. The \u201cshow up\u201d was similar to a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had \u201cno doubt\u201d that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court.
\nBiggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the \u201cshow up\u201d procedure was so suggestive that it violated due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "922", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "43", "ID": "50842", "name": "In re Griffiths", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1336", "docket": "71-1336", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Fre Le Poole Griffiths", "second_party": "State Bar Examining Committee of Connecticut", "facts": "Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. She then attended Yale Law School and applied to take the Connecticut Bar in 1970. Despite the County Bar Association finding her qualified in every aspect, she was denied the chance to sit for the exam due to the fact that she was not a U.S. citizen, which Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book of 1963 required. Griffiths requested judicial relief and argued that the rule was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court of Connecticut denied her request for judicial relief and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed.
", "facts_len": "781", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "44", "ID": "50847", "name": "Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-419", "docket": "72-419", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Pittsburgh Press Company", "second_party": "Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations", "facts": "To prevent gender discrimination, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) created an ordinance that forbids newspapers to advertise employment opportunities in gender-designated column. The National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburg Press) violated the ordinance by allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns when the jobs advertised do not have occupational qualifications or exceptions. The Commission had a hearing and concluded Pittsburg Press violated the ordinance. The Pittsburg Press appealed and contended the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "773", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "45", "ID": "50877", "name": "Gottschalk v. Benson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-485", "docket": "71-485", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Gottschalk", "second_party": "Benson", "facts": "Engineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal \"decimal\" type of numbers (base 10) into true \"binary\" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time knew very little about computers.)
", "facts_len": "1128", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "46", "ID": "50900", "name": "United States v. Russell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1585", "docket": "71-1585", "term": "1972", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Russell", "facts": "At the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.
", "facts_len": "489", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "47", "ID": "50931", "name": "Gagnon v. Scarpelli", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1225", "docket": "71-1225", "term": "1972", "first_party": "John R Gagnon", "second_party": "Gerald Scarpello", "facts": "After pleading guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment, which was later reduced to probation. Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois and was supervised by the Adult Probation Department of Illinois. Shortly after, Scarpelli was caught committing burglary with an accomplice. After being informed of his Constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted to committing the felony, an admission he later claimed was made under extreme duress. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections revoked Scarpelli\u2019s probation because of the violation and imprisoned him. He was not given a hearing. Two years later, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court held that revoking Scarpelli\u2019s probation without a hearing and an attorney was a denial of his Constitutional right of due process. Gagnon, the warden of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, appealed and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. Gagnon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
", "facts_len": "1098", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "48", "ID": "50940", "name": "California v. LaRue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-36", "docket": "71-36", "term": "1972", "first_party": "California, et al.", "second_party": "Robert LaRue, et al.", "facts": "After receiving reports of the type of sexual activity occurring on the premises of licensed liquor sellers, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control promulgated a series of regulations pertaining to the conduct on such licensed premises. The appellees, a group of holders of various liquor licenses, sought discretionary review of the new regulations. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally limited freedom of expression.
", "facts_len": "470", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "49", "ID": "50941", "name": "Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-694", "docket": "72-694", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty", "second_party": "Ewald B. Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York", "facts": "New York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, 4, and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5.
", "facts_len": "861", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "50", "ID": "50944", "name": "Sugarman v. Dougall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1222", "docket": "71-1222", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Jule M. Sugarman, Administrator, New York City Human Resources Administration et al.", "second_party": "Patrick McL. Dougall et al.", "facts": "Patrick Dougall was a federally registered resident alien. He was employed by a nonprofit organization that was absorbed into the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of New York City's Human Resources Administration. He was ineligible for employment by the city under Section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law because he was a noncitizen. He was terminated for this reason alone. Dougall and other noncitizens who were terminated under Section 53 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which held the statute unconstitutional. New York appealed the decision.
", "facts_len": "638", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "51", "ID": "50946", "name": "Chambers v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-5908", "docket": "71-5908", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Leon Chambers", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "Leon Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder, in addition to confession to third parties, and was taken into custody. One month later, McDonald denied the confession and was released from custody. At trial, Chambers tried to prove McDonald admitted to the crime several times and confessed to third parties. The district court found the evidence of the confessions was inadmissible because of the voucher rule \u2013 a common-law rule that prohibits the defense from cross-examining a witness when the prosecution failed to do so \u2013 and the fact that the statements were hearsay. Chambers\u2019 appealed and argued that the district court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to admit the evidence.
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "52", "ID": "50949", "name": "Lemon v. Kurtzman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1470", "docket": "71-1470", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Lemon", "second_party": "Kurtzman", "facts": "The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional.
\nLemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.
", "facts_len": "749", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "53", "ID": "50954", "name": "United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-534", "docket": "72-534", "term": "1972", "first_party": "U.S. Department of Agriculture et al.", "second_party": "Jacinta Moreno et al.", "facts": "Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.
", "facts_len": "761", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "54", "ID": "50961", "name": "Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1051", "docket": "71-1051", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Paris Adult Theatre I", "second_party": "Slaton", "facts": "State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were \"hard core\" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "360", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "55", "ID": "50979", "name": "McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-834", "docket": "71-834", "term": "1972", "first_party": "Rosalind McClanahan", "second_party": "Arizona State Tax Commission", "facts": "Rosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review.
", "facts_len": "664", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "56", "ID": "50985", "name": "McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-490", "docket": "72-490", "term": "1972", "first_party": "McDonnell Douglas Corporation", "second_party": "Percy Green", "facts": "Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company\u2019s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green\u2019s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests.
\nGreen filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge.
", "facts_len": "1717", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "57", "ID": "50984", "name": "San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1332", "docket": "71-1332", "term": "1972", "first_party": "San Antonio Independent School District", "second_party": "Rodriguez", "facts": "In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.
", "facts_len": "621", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "58", "ID": "50993", "name": "United States v. Giordano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1057", "docket": "72-1057", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Dominic Nicholas Giordano et al.", "facts": "In October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano\u2019s pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano\u2019s motion to suppress the government\u2019s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General\u2019s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government\u2019s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision and held that the Executive Assistant\u2019s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.
", "facts_len": "1376", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "59", "ID": "50995", "name": "United States v. Nixon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-1766", "docket": "73-1766", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Richard M. Nixon, et al.", "facts": "A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming \"executive privilege,\" which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.
", "facts_len": "566", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "60", "ID": "51007", "name": "Milliken v. Bradley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-434", "docket": "73-434", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Milliken", "second_party": "Bradley", "facts": "A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.
", "facts_len": "617", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "61", "ID": "51017", "name": "United States v. Matlock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1355", "docket": "72-1355", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "William Earl Matlock", "facts": "Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman\u2019s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash.
\nAt trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.
", "facts_len": "966", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "62", "ID": "51026", "name": "Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1040", "docket": "72-1040", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Communist Party of Indiana, et al.", "second_party": "Edgar D. Whitcomb, etc., at al.", "facts": "In 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party\u2019s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "912", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "63", "ID": "51029", "name": "Wolff v. McDonnell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-679", "docket": "73-679", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Wolff", "second_party": "McDonnell", "facts": "An inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.
", "facts_len": "769", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "64", "ID": "51031", "name": "Geduldig v. Aiello", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-640", "docket": "73-640", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Geduldig, Director, Department of Human Resources Development", "second_party": "Carolyn Aiello et al.", "facts": "Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "65", "ID": "51033", "name": "United States v. Calandra", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-734", "docket": "72-734", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "John P. Calandra", "facts": "A federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra\u2019s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.
", "facts_len": "828", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "66", "ID": "51035", "name": "United States v. Richardson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-885", "docket": "72-885", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Richardson", "facts": "Richardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures.
", "facts_len": "164", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "67", "ID": "51039", "name": "Jenkins v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-557", "docket": "73-557", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Jenkins", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film \"Carnal Knowledge.\" The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.
", "facts_len": "246", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "68", "ID": "51062", "name": "Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-777", "docket": "72-777", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Cleveland Board of Education, Chesterfield County School Board, Dr. Robert F. Kelly", "second_party": "Jo Carol LaFleur, Ann Elizabeth Nelson, Susan Cohen", "facts": "Carol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old.
\nAnn Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.
\nSusan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school board denied Cohen's request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.
", "facts_len": "2138", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "69", "ID": "51071", "name": "Kahn v. Shevin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-78", "docket": "73-78", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Mel Kahn, etc.", "second_party": "Robert L. Shevin, et al.", "facts": "Since 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor\u2019s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that the gender classification had a \u201cfair and substantial relation\u201d to the purpose of the legislation.
", "facts_len": "580", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "70", "ID": "51075", "name": "Steffel v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-5581", "docket": "72-5581", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Richard Guy Steffel", "second_party": "John R. Thompson, et al.", "facts": "On October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested.
\nSteffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "71", "ID": "51081", "name": "Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-6160", "docket": "72-6160", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Mitchell", "second_party": "W. T. Grant Company", "facts": "Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it had a vendor's lien on the property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana law.
", "facts_len": "1039", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "72", "ID": "51084", "name": "Morton v. Mancari", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-362", "docket": "73-362", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al.", "second_party": "C. R. Mancari et al.", "facts": "Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "901", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "73", "ID": "51096", "name": "American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1195", "docket": "72-1195", "term": "1973", "first_party": "American Pipe and Construction Company, et al", "second_party": "State of Utah, et al", "facts": "In 1964, the federal government sued several corporations for rigging prices of concrete and steel pipes in violation of the Sherman Act. That case reached a final judgment in May 1968, when all parties agreed to terms that prevented the companies from engaging in future violations of anti-trust laws. Eleven days short of one year after this agreement, the State of Utah, on behalf of several agencies and local governments, filed a class action lawsuit against the same corporations. The lawsuit claimed that the corporations\u2019 previous price fixing schemes had directly injured the State and other plaintiffs. Six months later, the corporations successfully argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit could not be maintained as a class action because it was not impractical for the plaintiffs to each have individual representation. Eight days following this ruling, over 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts within the State of Utah immediately filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit. The court denied their motions because they had failed to argue them within the one-year time statute of limitations required under federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, that court held that, by filing lawsuit as a class action, all of the claims were adequately before the trial court before the statute of limitations was reached. However, because the judge dismissed the class action after the statute of limitations ran, the parties were unable to re-file their claims against the corporations. That court held that the trial judge could not leave the plaintiff\u2019s without recourse after the time to file the lawsuit had passed. Instead, the plaintiffs should have the eleven days that remained under the statute of limitations when the initial lawsuit was filed in order to intervene or otherwise file individual claims. The corporations appealed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1922", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "74", "ID": "51107", "name": "Davis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1454", "docket": "72-1454", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Joseph Anthony Davis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed \"acceptable for service\" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by Gutknecht. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Fox. Fox involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fox changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1928", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "75", "ID": "51114", "name": "Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-797", "docket": "73-797", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Miami Herald Publishing Company", "second_party": "Pat Tornillo", "facts": "Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.
", "facts_len": "796", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "76", "ID": "51113", "name": "Spence v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1690", "docket": "72-1690", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Harold Omond Spence", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence\u2019s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.
", "facts_len": "720", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "77", "ID": "51121", "name": "Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-617", "docket": "72-617", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Gertz", "second_party": "Robert Welch Inc.", "facts": "Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a \"Leninist\" and a \"Communist-fronter\" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.
", "facts_len": "646", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "78", "ID": "51130", "name": "Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-191", "docket": "73-191", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Village of Belle Terre, et al.", "second_party": "Bruce Boraas, et al.", "facts": "The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute\u2019s meaning of \u201cfamily\u201d was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village\u2019s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.
", "facts_len": "987", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "79", "ID": "51132", "name": "United States v. Robinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-936", "docket": "72-936", "term": "1973", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Robinson", "facts": "A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.
", "facts_len": "239", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "80", "ID": "51142", "name": "Gerstein v. Pugh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-477", "docket": "73-477", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida", "second_party": "Robert Pugh, Nathaniel Henderson, Thomas Turner, Gary Faulk on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated", "facts": "Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused\u2019s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances.
\nPugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court\u2019s prescribed procedures.
", "facts_len": "1358", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "81", "ID": "51145", "name": "Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-328", "docket": "73-328", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Harry Lehman", "second_party": "City of Shaker Heights", "facts": "Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "767", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "82", "ID": "51143", "name": "Procunier v. Martinez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1465", "docket": "72-1465", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Raymond K. Procunier, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al.", "second_party": "Robert Martinez, et al.", "facts": "Robert Martinez was a prisoner in the California State Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates.
\nMartinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed.
", "facts_len": "633", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "83", "ID": "51150", "name": "Lau v. Nichols", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-6520", "docket": "72-6520", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Kinney Kinmon Lau, et al.", "second_party": "Alan H. Nichols, et al.", "facts": "In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English.
\nLau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
\nThe district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1085", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "84", "ID": "51151", "name": "Arnett v. Kennedy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1118", "docket": "72-1118", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Arnett", "second_party": "Kennedy", "facts": "Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.
", "facts_len": "488", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "85", "ID": "51152", "name": "Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1180", "docket": "72-1180", "term": "1973", "first_party": "Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO", "second_party": "Henry M. Austin, et al.", "facts": "In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch\u2019s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading \u201cList of Scabs.\u201d After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1308", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "86", "ID": "51161", "name": "DeFunis v. Odegaard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-235", "docket": "73-235", "term": "1973", "first_party": "DeFunis", "second_party": "Odegaard", "facts": "DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.
", "facts_len": "438", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "87", "ID": "51163", "name": "Lascaris v. Shirley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1016", "docket": "73-1016", "term": "1974", "first_party": "John Lascaris, Commissioner, Dept. of Social Services of Onondaga County", "second_party": "Sylvia Shirley, Elizabeth Anderson, Jane Doe", "facts": "Respondents alleged that a section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act. The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits. The Social Security Act contained no such requirement. A three-judge district court in the Northern District of New York agreed and ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "501", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "88", "ID": "51167", "name": "Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938", "docket": "73-938", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Cox Broadcasting Corporation", "second_party": "Cohn", "facts": "Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims.
", "facts_len": "379", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "89", "ID": "51171", "name": "Colonial Pipeline Company v. Traigle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1595", "docket": "73-1595", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Colonial Pipeline Company", "second_party": "Joseph N. Triagle, Collector of Revenue of Louisiana", "facts": "Colonial Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum. Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate. Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.
", "facts_len": "640", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "90", "ID": "51170", "name": "Bigelow v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1309", "docket": "73-1309", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Bigelow", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for \"any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage.\" Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.
", "facts_len": "468", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "91", "ID": "51172", "name": "National League of Cities v. Usery", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-878", "docket": "74-878", "term": "1974", "first_party": "National League of Cities", "second_party": "Usery", "facts": "In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.
", "facts_len": "323", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "92", "ID": "51173", "name": "Murphy v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-5116", "docket": "74-5116", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Jack Roland Murphy", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "In 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the \u201cStar of India,\u201d a rare precious sapphire that was housed at the New York Museum of Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname \u201cMurph the Surf\u201d in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the \u201cWhiskey Creek Murders.\u201d Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1209", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "93", "ID": "51175", "name": "Faretta v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5772", "docket": "73-5772", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Anthony Pasquall Faretta", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta\u2019s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge\u2019s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.
", "facts_len": "692", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "94", "ID": "51192", "name": "Breed v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1995", "docket": "73-1995", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Allen F. Breed, Director of California Your Authority", "second_party": "Gary Steven Jones", "facts": "A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree.
\nJones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.
", "facts_len": "979", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "95", "ID": "51196", "name": "Maness v. Meyers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-689", "docket": "73-689", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Michael Anthony Maness", "second_party": "The Honorable James R. Meyers", "facts": "Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk\u2019s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness\u2019 client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine.
\nAnother state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.
", "facts_len": "1394", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "96", "ID": "51202", "name": "Vella v. Ford Motor Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1994", "docket": "73-1994", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Julian Vell", "second_party": "Ford Motor Company", "facts": "Julian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship. This caused damage to Vella\u2019s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance. Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable. A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury. The district court denied the ship owner\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible. The appellate court reversed.
", "facts_len": "547", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "97", "ID": "51203", "name": "United States v. Brignoni-Ponce", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-114", "docket": "74-114", "term": "1974", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce", "facts": "On March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce\u2019s car based on the fact that the occupant\u2019s appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted.
\nWhile Brignoni-Ponce\u2019s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "985", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "98", "ID": "51210", "name": "Saxbe v. Bustos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-300", "docket": "73-300", "term": "1974", "first_party": "William B. Saxbe, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee", "second_party": "Robert Bustos, et al.", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to work. The practice granted the aliens \u201cspecial immigrant\u201d status and authorized them to be \u201clawfully admitted for permanent residence\u201d even though the workers did not intend to reside in the U.S. permanently. This \u201cspecial\u201d status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.
", "facts_len": "835", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "99", "ID": "51212", "name": "Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1055", "docket": "73-1055", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Bowman Transportation, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. et al.", "facts": "These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC\u2019s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "773", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "100", "ID": "51219", "name": "United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-548", "docket": "74-548", "term": "1974", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Mississippi Tax Commission, et al.", "facts": "The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.
", "facts_len": "1066", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "101", "ID": "51225", "name": "Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1475", "docket": "73-1475", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Harris County Commissioners Court, et al.", "second_party": "Richard E. Moore, et al.", "facts": "The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others. The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.
", "facts_len": "724", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "102", "ID": "51229", "name": "American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Assn., Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-748", "docket": "73-748", "term": "1974", "first_party": "American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO, et al.", "second_party": "Mobile Steamship Association, Robert Malone", "facts": "Six maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there. The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen. Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented the loading and unloading of ships. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The courts held that the picketing did not \u201caffect commerce\u201d within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have jurisdiction. The courts also held that enjoining the picketing did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.
", "facts_len": "810", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "103", "ID": "51234", "name": "Ellis v. Dyson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-130", "docket": "73-130", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Tom E. Ellis and Robert D. Love", "second_party": "Frank M. Dyson, Alex Bickley, Scott McDonald, Hugh Jones, Wes Wise", "facts": "Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.
", "facts_len": "741", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "104", "ID": "51240", "name": "Goss v. Lopez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-898", "docket": "73-898", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Goss", "second_party": "Lopez", "facts": "Nine students at two high schools and one junior high school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The school principals did not hold hearings for the affected students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "438", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "105", "ID": "51239", "name": "Taylor v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5744", "docket": "73-5744", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Billy J. Taylor", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "Billy J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor\u2019s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women\u2019s jury service did not violate federal law.
", "facts_len": "867", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "106", "ID": "51247", "name": "Connell Constr. Company, Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1256", "docket": "73-1256", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Connell Construction Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada", "facts": "Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "634", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "107", "ID": "51244", "name": "Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1923", "docket": "73-1923", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Eastland", "second_party": "United States Servicemen's Fund", "facts": "In an effort to investigate the \"administration, operation, and enforcement\" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.
", "facts_len": "594", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "108", "ID": "51257", "name": "Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1942", "docket": "73-1942", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Richard Erznoznik", "second_party": "City of Jacksonville", "facts": "The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.
", "facts_len": "638", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "109", "ID": "51258", "name": "Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5845", "docket": "73-5845", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Catherine Jackson", "second_party": "Metropolitan Edison Company", "facts": "Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "110", "ID": "51259", "name": "Wood v. Strickland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1285", "docket": "73-1285", "term": "1974", "first_party": "John P. Wood, et al.", "second_party": "Peggy Strickland, et al.", "facts": "Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request.
\nStrickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1450", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "111", "ID": "51266", "name": "Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1892", "docket": "73-1892", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare", "second_party": "Stephen Charles Wiesenfeld, etc.", "facts": "Stephen Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married in 1970. Polatschek had worked as a teacher for the five years prior to their marriage and continued teaching after they were married. Her salary was the principle source of the couple\u2019s income, and social security contributions were regularly deducted from her salary. In 1972, Polatschek died in childbirth, which left Wiesenfeld with the care of their newborn son. Wiesenfeld applied for social security benefits for himself and his son, and was told that his son could receive them but that he could not. Social Security Act provides benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father that are available to both the children and the widow. The benefits for a deceased wife and mother, however, are only available to the children.
\nIn 1973, Wiesenfeld sued on behalf of himself and similarly situated widowers. He claimed that the relevant section of the Social Security Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex and sought summary judgment. A three-judge panel of the district court granted Wiesenfeld\u2019s motion for summary judgment
", "facts_len": "1120", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "112", "ID": "51269", "name": "Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-304", "docket": "74-304", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Richard A. Gordon, members of the Independent Investor Protection League", "second_party": "New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.
", "facts_len": "563", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "113", "ID": "51270", "name": "Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-389", "docket": "74-389", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Albemarle Paper Company, et al.", "second_party": "Joseph P. Moody, et al.", "facts": "The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant\u2019s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant \u201cpolicy, practice, custom, or usage\u201d that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay.\n
At trial, the court found that the plant\u2019s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle\u2019s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "114", "ID": "51279", "name": "Brown v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-6650", "docket": "73-6650", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Richard Brown", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus\u2019 murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder.
\nPrior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State\u2019s argument that the arrest was legal.
", "facts_len": "1003", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "115", "ID": "51278", "name": "United States v. Feola", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1123", "docket": "73-1123", "term": "1974", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ralph Feola", "facts": "On August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties.
\nAt trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents\u2019 true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.
", "facts_len": "963", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "116", "ID": "51286", "name": "Schick v. Reed", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5677", "docket": "73-5677", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Schick", "second_party": "Reed", "facts": "Schick, a master sergeant in the Army, was convicted of murder in a military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to life imprisonment without parole.
", "facts_len": "238", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "117", "ID": "51292", "name": "Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5520", "docket": "73-5520", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Margaret Mae Cantrell, et al.", "second_party": "Forest City Publishing Company, et al.", "facts": "In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell\u2019s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home.
\nMargaret Cantrell and her children sued under the \u201cfalse light\u201d theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff\u2019s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.
", "facts_len": "1204", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "118", "ID": "51296", "name": "ICC v. Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1210", "docket": "73-1210", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Interstate Commerce Commission", "second_party": "Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "673", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "119", "ID": "51300", "name": "Burns v. Alcala", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1708", "docket": "73-1708", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Kevin J. Burns, Commissioner, Dept of Social Services of Iowa, et al.", "second_party": "Linda Alcala, Jane Doe, Joan Roe, et al.", "facts": "The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act\u2019s definition of \u201cdependent children\u201d as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were \u201cdependent children\u201d, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "120", "ID": "51299", "name": "International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Manufacturing Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-765", "docket": "73-765", "term": "1974", "first_party": "International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union", "second_party": "Quality Manufacturing Company, National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.
", "facts_len": "622", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "121", "ID": "51303", "name": "O'Connor v. Donaldson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-8", "docket": "74-8", "term": "1974", "first_party": "J.B. O'Connor, M.D.", "second_party": "Kenneth Donaldson", "facts": "On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for \u201ca few weeks\u201d. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years.
\nWhen Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O\u2019Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O\u2019Connor was also Donaldson\u2019s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson\u2019s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O\u2019Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation.
\nIn February 1971, Donaldson charged O\u2019Connor and other members of the hospital\u2019s staff under \u00a7 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O\u2019Connor and Gumanis. O\u2019Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury\u2019s verdict. The court rejected O\u2019Connor\u2019s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O\u2019Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants\u2019 reasonable belief that Donaldson\u2019s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.
", "facts_len": "2269", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "122", "ID": "51310", "name": "Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc. v. Cuba", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1288", "docket": "73-1288", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc.", "second_party": "Republic of Cuba, et. al", "facts": "In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named \u201cinterventors\u201d to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an \u201cact of state\u201d so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an \u201cact of state\u201d, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.
", "facts_len": "1604", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "123", "ID": "51308", "name": "Gurley v. Rhoden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1734", "docket": "73-1734", "term": "1974", "first_party": "W. M. Gurley dba Gurley Oil Co.", "second_party": "Arny Rhoden, Chairman, Tax Commission of Mississippi", "facts": "Gurley Oil Co. owned five gas stations in Mississippi and purchased gas tax-free out of state. Gurley added both federal and state excise taxes on to the retail price of the gasoline. Mississippi imposed an additional 5% tax on the \u201cgross proceeds\u201d of all gas sales. Mississippi did not permit Gurley to deduct the state and federal excise taxes from the \u201cgross proceeds\u201d before calculating the 5% tax. Gurley paid the tax under protest, but sued for a refund. They alleged that not allowing a pretax deduction of the excise taxes was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Gurley argued that the company was just a collector of taxes paid by the consumer, so those taxes were not actually part of his gross receipts. The chancery court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.
", "facts_len": "832", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "124", "ID": "51318", "name": "United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-363", "docket": "74-363", "term": "1974", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Reliable Transfer Company, Inc.", "facts": "It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this \"rule of divided damages\" in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
\nOn a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed per curiam.
\nAbstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones
", "facts_len": "1127", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "125", "ID": "51325", "name": "Foster v. Dravo Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1773", "docket": "73-1773", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Earl R. Foster", "second_party": "Dravo Corporation", "facts": "Earl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military.
\nThe district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.
", "facts_len": "1097", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "126", "ID": "51327", "name": "Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1004", "docket": "73-1004", "term": "1974", "first_party": "Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.", "second_party": "Steve Conrad et al.", "facts": "Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical \"Hair.\" \"Hair\" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.
", "facts_len": "851", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "127", "ID": "51332", "name": "United States v. Santana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-19", "docket": "75-19", "term": "1975", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Santana", "facts": "Using marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered \"Mom Santana's\" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant.
", "facts_len": "496", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "128", "ID": "51336", "name": "Paul v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-891", "docket": "74-891", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Paul", "second_party": "Davis", "facts": "A flyer identifying \"active shoplifters\" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.
", "facts_len": "436", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "129", "ID": "51333", "name": "Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-817", "docket": "75-817", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Nebraska Press Association et al.", "second_party": "Hugh Stuart, Judge, District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska et al.", "facts": "A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.
", "facts_len": "316", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "130", "ID": "51350", "name": "Roberts v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5844", "docket": "75-5844", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Roberts", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts.
\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .
", "facts_len": "1031", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "131", "ID": "51349", "name": "Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-730", "docket": "74-730", "term": "1975", "first_party": "John C. Roemer, III, et al.", "second_party": "Board of Public Works of Maryland et al.", "facts": "A 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding \u201conly seminarian or theological degrees.\u201d The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions.
\nFour Maryland taxpayers sued to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman\u00a0\u2015 which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn\u2019t excessively entangle the state in church affairs \u2015 and determined that the statute was constitutional.
", "facts_len": "1072", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "132", "ID": "51351", "name": "Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1396", "docket": "74-1396", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Michelin Tire Corporation", "second_party": "Wages", "facts": "The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale.
", "facts_len": "552", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "133", "ID": "51355", "name": "United States v. Watson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-538", "docket": "74-538", "term": "1975", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Henry Ogle Watson", "facts": "On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1410", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "134", "ID": "51363", "name": "United States v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1179", "docket": "74-1179", "term": "1975", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Mitch Miller", "facts": "Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.
", "facts_len": "682", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "135", "ID": "51365", "name": "Time, Inc. v. Firestone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-944", "docket": "74-944", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Time, Inc.", "second_party": "Mary Alice Firestone", "facts": "Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging \u201cextreme cruelty and adultery\u201d. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone\u2019s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
", "facts_len": "634", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "136", "ID": "51368", "name": "Mathews v. Eldridge", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-204", "docket": "74-204", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Mathews", "second_party": "Eldridge", "facts": "George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing.
", "facts_len": "498", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "137", "ID": "51377", "name": "Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-895", "docket": "74-895", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Virginia State Board of Pharmacy", "second_party": "Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.", "facts": "Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.
", "facts_len": "378", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "138", "ID": "51373", "name": "Buckley v. Valeo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-436", "docket": "75-436", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Buckley", "second_party": "Valeo", "facts": "In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.
", "facts_len": "424", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "139", "ID": "51383", "name": "Bellotti v. Baird", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-73", "docket": "75-73", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Frances Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al.", "second_party": "William Baird et al.", "facts": "Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
", "facts_len": "768", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "140", "ID": "51384", "name": "Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-54", "docket": "74-54", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc.", "second_party": "Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc.", "facts": "In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick\u2019s negligence.
\nTransamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.
", "facts_len": "1450", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "141", "ID": "51395", "name": "Washington v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1492", "docket": "74-1492", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Washington", "second_party": "Davis", "facts": "After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.
", "facts_len": "422", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "142", "ID": "51397", "name": "Proffitt v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5706", "docket": "75-5706", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Proffitt", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Following his Florida conviction for first-degree murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Proffitt challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment, and Florida's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging is was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it permitted judges rather than juries to act as sole sentencing authorities.
\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .
", "facts_len": "739", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "143", "ID": "51400", "name": "Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-584", "docket": "75-584", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Federal Power Commission", "second_party": "Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation", "facts": "Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TGPL) proposed a plan for gas allocation among its customers to deal with a gas shortage. Under the plan, customers who used over the system-wide average would have to pay extra, and those who used less would receive a rebate. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) rejected the plan, stating it violated the Natural Gas Act, which prohibits discrimination among customers. The TGPL sought review of the FPC decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court directed the FPC to conduct a review of TGPL\u2019s records to determine the extent of the gas shortage. The FPC refused, arguing that the court overstepped its bounds by interfering with an independent administrative agency. The FPC also argued that the extent of the gas shortage was not material to the issues in the litigation.
", "facts_len": "866", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "144", "ID": "51416", "name": "Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-312", "docket": "75-312", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Coleman Young", "second_party": "American Mini Theatres, Inc.", "facts": "American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with \"regulated uses\" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
", "facts_len": "809", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "145", "ID": "51412", "name": "Runyon v. McCrary", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-62", "docket": "75-62", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Russell L. Runyon et al.", "second_party": "Michael McCrary et al.", "facts": "Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "515", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "146", "ID": "51419", "name": "Hampton v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-5822", "docket": "74-5822", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Charles Hampton", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Jules Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton replied that he would find a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.
", "facts_len": "1023", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "147", "ID": "51426", "name": "South Dakota v. Opperman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-76", "docket": "75-76", "term": "1975", "first_party": "South Dakota", "second_party": "Opperman", "facts": "The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "749", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "148", "ID": "51429", "name": "United States v. Martinez-Fuerte", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1560", "docket": "74-1560", "term": "1975", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Martinez-Fuerte", "facts": "Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.
", "facts_len": "238", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "149", "ID": "51445", "name": "Stone v. Powell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1055", "docket": "74-1055", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Stone", "second_party": "Powell", "facts": "Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.
", "facts_len": "346", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "150", "ID": "51448", "name": "Woodson v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5491", "docket": "75-5491", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Woodson", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Jurek v. Texas , Proffitt v. Florida , and Roberts v. Louisiana .
", "facts_len": "665", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "151", "ID": "51449", "name": "Jurek v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5394", "docket": "75-5394", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Jurek", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "After his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and \"freakish\" imposition of the death penalty.
\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Gregg v. Georgia , Proffitt v. Florida , Roberts v. Louisiana , and Woodson v. North Carolina .
", "facts_len": "697", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "152", "ID": "51461", "name": "Imbler v. Pachtman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-5435", "docket": "74-5435", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Paul Imbler", "second_party": "Richard Pachtman", "facts": "In 1961, Morris Hasson, a Los Angeles grocery store manager, was shot and killed during a robbery attempt. Paul Imbler was convicted of the murder after three eyewitnesses identified him as the gunman. After the trial, the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California and described newly discovered evidence that undermined the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. In light of the letter, Imbler challenged his incarceration in state court, where his petition was denied, and later in federal court. The federal district court found that Pachtman had knowingly used false testimony during the trial and suppressed evidence favorable to Imbler, so the district court ordered Imbler released from prison. Imbler then filed an action against Pachtman in federal court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows a party to recover damages from any person who acts \u201cunder color of state law\u201d to deprive another of a constitutional right. The district court held that Pachtman was immune for civil liability for acts done in his capacity as prosecutor and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.
", "facts_len": "1233", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "153", "ID": "51472", "name": "Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1044", "docket": "74-1044", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Massachusetts Board of Retirement", "second_party": "Murgia", "facts": "Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.
", "facts_len": "279", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "154", "ID": "51471", "name": "Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1606", "docket": "74-1606", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 et al.", "second_party": "Hortonville Education Association et al.", "facts": "Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced.
\nThe fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board\u2019s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.
", "facts_len": "1485", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "155", "ID": "51473", "name": "Michigan v. Moseley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-653", "docket": "74-653", "term": "1975", "first_party": "State of Michigan", "second_party": "Richard Bert Mosley", "facts": "On April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department\u2019s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill\u2019s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court\u2019s failure to suppress Mosley\u2019s statement was a per se violation of Mosley\u2019s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.
", "facts_len": "1512", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "156", "ID": "51491", "name": "General Electric Company v. Gilbert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1589", "docket": "74-1589", "term": "1975", "first_party": "General Electric Company", "second_party": "Martha V. Gilbert, et al.", "facts": "General Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "461", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "157", "ID": "51495", "name": "Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1023", "docket": "74-1023", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Henry W. Kerr", "second_party": "United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal.", "facts": "Seven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners\u2019 files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision to compel discovery, but the appellate court denied the petition because the prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "158", "ID": "51498", "name": "Gregg v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-6257", "docket": "74-6257", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Gregg", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a \"cruel and unusual\" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
\nThis case is one of the five \"Death Penalty Cases\" along with Jurek v. Texas , Roberts v. Louisiana , Proffitt v. Florida , and Woodson v. North Carolina .
", "facts_len": "735", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "159", "ID": "51496", "name": "Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1151", "docket": "74-1151", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, David Hall. M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D.", "second_party": "John C. Danforth, Attorney General of New Jersey; and J. Brendan Ryan, Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, Missouri", "facts": "About a year after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define \u201cviability\u201d as the \u201cstage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems\u201d; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman\u2019s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother\u2019s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions.
\nThe district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1515", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "160", "ID": "51512", "name": "Wooley v. Maynard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1453", "docket": "75-1453", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Wooley", "second_party": "Maynard", "facts": "A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto \"Live Free or Die.\" George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words \"or Die\" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence.
", "facts_len": "385", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "161", "ID": "51514", "name": "Milliken v. Bradley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-447", "docket": "76-447", "term": "1976", "first_party": "William G. Milliken, Governor of Michigan et al.", "second_party": "Ronald Bradley et al.", "facts": "In _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within the Detroit school district, and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.
", "facts_len": "562", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "162", "ID": "51521", "name": "Nixon v. Administrator of General Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1605", "docket": "75-1605", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Richard M. Nixon", "second_party": "Administrator of General Services", "facts": "Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon\u2019s California home; this agreement also specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon\u2019s discretion.
\nShortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator to take custody of Nixon\u2019s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials.
\nThe day after President Ford signed the act into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon\u2019s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon\u2019s privacy interests, 4) Nixon\u2019s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon\u2019s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.
", "facts_len": "1572", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "163", "ID": "51524", "name": "Moore v. City of East Cleveland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-6289", "docket": "75-6289", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Moore", "second_party": "City of East Cleveland", "facts": "East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of \"family\" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.
", "facts_len": "241", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "164", "ID": "51528", "name": "United States v. Antelope", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-661", "docket": "75-661", "term": "1976", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Gabriel Francis Antelope, et al.", "facts": "On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d\u2019Alene Indians\u2014William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison\u2014broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder.
\nThe defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a \u201cracially based disadvantage.\u201d
", "facts_len": "835", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "165", "ID": "51534", "name": "Bounds v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-915", "docket": "75-915", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Vernon Lee Bounds; Commission, State Department of Corrections; Stanley Blackledge, Warden, Cetral State Prison; R. L. Turner, Superintendent of Odom Correctional Institution et al.", "second_party": "Robert (Bobby) Smith, Donald W. Morgan, John Harrington et al.", "facts": "The North Carolina Department of Correction (\u201cDoC\u201d) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC\u2019s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
\nThe district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request.
\nThe plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.
", "facts_len": "1665", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "166", "ID": "51538", "name": "Oregon v. Mathiason", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-201", "docket": "76-201", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Oregon", "second_party": "Carl Mathiason", "facts": "An Oregon state police officer suspected Carl Mathiason of burglary and asked him to come to the police station for questioning. Mathiason came freely, spoke with the officer, and was not arrested at the time. He was arrested later and a trial court used evidence obtained during the questioning to convict him. Mathiason moved to suppress the evidence since he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning. The court admitted the evidence since Mathiason was not in custody during the questioning. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed since it found that Matianson was in a \"coercive environment\" when questioned and therefore deserved to hear his Miranda rights.
", "facts_len": "720", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "167", "ID": "51546", "name": "Dothard v. Rawlinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-422", "docket": "76-422", "term": "1976", "first_party": "E.C. Dothard, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Alabama", "second_party": "Dianne Rawlinson et al.", "facts": "Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in \u201ccontact positions\u201d that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "796", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "168", "ID": "51551", "name": "Poelker v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-442", "docket": "75-442", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Poelker", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.
", "facts_len": "105", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "169", "ID": "51555", "name": "City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1150", "docket": "75-1150", "term": "1976", "first_party": "City of Philadelphia et al.", "second_party": "New Jersey et al.", "facts": "A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.
", "facts_len": "430", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "170", "ID": "51556", "name": "Coker v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-5444", "docket": "75-5444", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Coker", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.
", "facts_len": "348", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "171", "ID": "51564", "name": "Bates v. State Bar of Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-316", "docket": "76-316", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Bates", "second_party": "State Bar of Arizona", "facts": "In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees.
", "facts_len": "588", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "172", "ID": "51565", "name": "Beal v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-554", "docket": "75-554", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Beal", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.
", "facts_len": "349", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "173", "ID": "51569", "name": "Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-63", "docket": "76-63", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Hunt", "second_party": "Washington State Apple Advertising Commission", "facts": "In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create \"uniformity\" to protect its citizenry from \"fraud and deception.\"
", "facts_len": "478", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "174", "ID": "51584", "name": "Hazelwood School District v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-255", "docket": "76-255", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Hazelwood School District; C. O. McDonald, Superintendent; Robert Bischof, Robert Coleman, Dorothy Smith, Charles Sweeney, Donald Mattox and Milton Strauss, Members of the Board of Education of the Hazelwood School District", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a \u201cpattern or practice\u201d of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government\u2019s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located.
", "facts_len": "946", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "175", "ID": "51587", "name": "Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-15", "docket": "76-15", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Continental T. V., Inc., et al.", "second_party": "GTE Sylvania Inc.", "facts": "In 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania\u2019s new location restrictions. When Sylvania ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near Continental\u2019s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement.
\nContinental sued in district court and alleged that Sylvania\u2019s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found that Sylvania\u2019s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co. that prohibited manufacturers from \u201crestrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.\u201d Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from Schwinn, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania\u2019s restrictions \u201chad less potential for competitive harm than\u201d other invalidated restrictions.
", "facts_len": "1699", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "176", "ID": "51599", "name": "Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-577", "docket": "76-577", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Zacchini", "second_party": "Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company", "facts": "Hugo Zacchini performed a \"human cannonball\" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a cause of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.
", "facts_len": "819", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "177", "ID": "51597", "name": "Brewer v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/74-1263", "docket": "74-1263", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Lou V. Brewer, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary", "second_party": "Robert Anthony Williams aka Anthony Erthel Williams", "facts": "Robert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother\u2019s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two \u201cskinny and white\u201d legs in it. The next day, police found Williams\u2019 abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl\u2019s family wanted to give her a \u201cChristian burial\u201d and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl\u2019s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder.
\nAt trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams\u2019 Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1768", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "178", "ID": "51602", "name": "Maher v. Roe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1440", "docket": "75-1440", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Maher", "second_party": "Roe", "facts": "In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were \"medically necessary.\" An indigent woman (\"Susan Roe\") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.
", "facts_len": "328", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "179", "ID": "51606", "name": "United States v. Lovasco", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1844", "docket": "75-1844", "term": "1976", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Eugene Lovasco", "facts": "On March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973\u2014more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "736", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "180", "ID": "51609", "name": "Whalen v. Roe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-839", "docket": "75-839", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Whalen", "second_party": "Roe", "facts": "In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age.
", "facts_len": "419", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "181", "ID": "51612", "name": "Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-29", "docket": "76-29", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Complete Auto Transit Inc.", "second_party": "Brady", "facts": "Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the \"privilege of doing business\" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce.
", "facts_len": "353", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "182", "ID": "51616", "name": "National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-1786", "docket": "76-1786", "term": "1976", "first_party": "National Socialist Party of America", "second_party": "Village of Skokie", "facts": "The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist (\"Nazi\") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with \"Jewish names\", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community.
\nCollin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions.
\nThe district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court.
", "facts_len": "2360", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "183", "ID": "51623", "name": "E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company v. Train", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-978", "docket": "75-978", "term": "1976", "first_party": "E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company et al.", "second_party": "Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al.", "facts": "In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners\u2019 arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.
", "facts_len": "1364", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "184", "ID": "51627", "name": "Ingraham v. Wright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-6527", "docket": "75-6527", "term": "1976", "first_party": "James Ingraham, Roosevelt Andrews", "second_party": "Willie J. Wright, Lemmie Deliford, Solomon Barnes, Edward L. Whigham", "facts": "On October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck.
\nOn October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James Ingraham and several other disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham\u2019s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma.
\nIngraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews\u2019 case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school\u2019s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.
", "facts_len": "2143", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "185", "ID": "51629", "name": "Califano v. Goldfarb", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-699", "docket": "75-699", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare", "second_party": "Leon Goldfarb", "facts": "Leon Goldfarb was a widower who applied for survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "705", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "186", "ID": "51648", "name": "Trimble v. Gordon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-5952", "docket": "75-5952", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Trimble", "second_party": "Gordon", "facts": "Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "495", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "187", "ID": "51656", "name": "Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-616", "docket": "75-616", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Village of Arlington Heights", "second_party": "Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation", "facts": "The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights (\"Arlington\") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari.
", "facts_len": "611", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "188", "ID": "51673", "name": "United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-104", "docket": "75-104", "term": "1976", "first_party": "United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.", "second_party": "Carey", "facts": "Congress provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District of Columbia for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent. A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a racial basis.
", "facts_len": "545", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "189", "ID": "51677", "name": "United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1687", "docket": "75-1687", "term": "1976", "first_party": "United States Trust Company of New York", "second_party": "New Jersey", "facts": "New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.
", "facts_len": "258", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "190", "ID": "51675", "name": "Ward v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-415", "docket": "76-415", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Wesley Ward", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "In 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was \u201ca shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion\u201d and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail and a $200 fine. While Ward\u2019s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation should only cover \u201cworks which depict or describe sexual conduct\u201d and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward\u2019s conviction. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1151", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "191", "ID": "51676", "name": "Dobbert v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-5306", "docket": "76-5306", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Ernest John Dobbert, Jr.", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "In the spring of 1972, Ernest Dobbert\u2019s son was found wandering outside a Holiday Inn in Jacksonville, Florida, with apparent signs of a beating. He told a circuit court judge that his injuries were the result of beatings from his father, that his brother and one of his sisters had been killed by his father, and that his other sister was kept locked in a closet at home. The judge issued a warrant for Dobbert\u2019s arrest, and Dobbert fled Jacksonville. In October 1973, Dobbert was arrested in Texas and extradited to Florida for trial. The Florida death penalty law in place when the children were killed, which gave the jury ultimate authority in deciding to impose the penalty, was found unconstitutional before Dobbert\u2019s trial. It was replaced by a new law where the jury gave an advisory recommendation, but the judge made the ultimate decision.
\nBefore his trial, Dobbert applied to the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial, arguing that applying the new death penalty law violated the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. His application was denied. Dobbert also moved for a change of venue from Duval County based on the publicity his trial was receiving. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Dobbert was convicted of the first-degree murder of his daughter, second-degree murder of his son, and the torture and abuse of his two other children. At his sentencing hearing, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge, acting under the authority granted to him by the Florida statute governing the death penalty, overruled the jury and sentenced Dobbert to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1723", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "192", "ID": "51682", "name": "Estelle v. Gamble", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-929", "docket": "75-929", "term": "1976", "first_party": "W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Ralph Gray, Medical Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, H. H. Husbands, Warden of the Walls Unit.", "second_party": "J. W. Gamble", "facts": "J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the \u201cWalls Unit.\u201d On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell.
\nThat same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in \u201cadministrative segregation\u201d -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times.
\nOn February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a pro se complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble\u2019s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble\u2019s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble\u2019s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.
", "facts_len": "2353", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "193", "ID": "51689", "name": "Manson v. Brathwaite", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-871", "docket": "75-871", "term": "1976", "first_party": "John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of the State of Connecticut", "second_party": "Nowell A. Brathwaite", "facts": "An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer\u2019s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.
", "facts_len": "880", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "194", "ID": "51690", "name": "Craig v. Boren", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-628", "docket": "75-628", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Curtis Craig and Carolyn Whitener", "second_party": "David Boren, Governor of Oklahoma", "facts": "An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of \"nonintoxicating\" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.
", "facts_len": "281", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "195", "ID": "51703", "name": "Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1278", "docket": "75-1278", "term": "1976", "first_party": "Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education", "second_party": "Fred Doyle", "facts": "Fred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers\u2019 Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher\u2019s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item.
\nOne month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle\u2019s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent\u2019s recommendations. In response to Doyle\u2019s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a \u201clack of tact in handling professional matters,\u201d and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a \u00a7 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board\u2019s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
\nWhile the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle\u2019s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board\u2019s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle\u2019s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.
", "facts_len": "1890", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "196", "ID": "51713", "name": "Stump v. Sparkman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1750", "docket": "76-1750", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Judge Harold D. Stump", "second_party": "Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman", "facts": "In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman\u2019s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.
", "facts_len": "997", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "197", "ID": "51715", "name": "First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1172", "docket": "76-1172", "term": "1977", "first_party": "First National Bank of Boston, et al.", "second_party": "Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts", "facts": "The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
", "facts_len": "683", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "198", "ID": "51717", "name": "In re Primus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-56", "docket": "77-56", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Edna Smith Primus", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Edna Smith Primus was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU\u2019s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue.
\nA few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board\u2019s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the First Amendment\u2019s protection of freedom of speech.
", "facts_len": "1365", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "199", "ID": "51718", "name": "Mincey v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-5353", "docket": "77-5353", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Rufus Junior Mincey", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey\u2019s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman\u2019s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later.
\nThe other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey\u2019s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant.
\nThe state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution\u2019s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey\u2019s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey\u2019s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey\u2019s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey\u2019s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds.
", "facts_len": "2204", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "200", "ID": "51727", "name": "Zablocki v. Redhail", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-879", "docket": "76-879", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Zablocki", "second_party": "Redhail", "facts": "Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "557", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "201", "ID": "51732", "name": "Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/75-1914", "docket": "75-1914", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Jane Monell, et al.", "second_party": "Department of Social Services of the City of New York, et al.", "facts": "The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred.
\nThe district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "785", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "202", "ID": "51729", "name": "Hicklin v. Orbeck", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-324", "docket": "77-324", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Hicklin", "second_party": "Orbeck", "facts": "In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required \"all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party\" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.
", "facts_len": "506", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "203", "ID": "51731", "name": "Bordenkircher v. Hayes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1334", "docket": "76-1334", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Bordenkircher", "second_party": "Hayes", "facts": "Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.
", "facts_len": "574", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "204", "ID": "51736", "name": "Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1450", "docket": "76-1450", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Landmark Communications Inc.", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "A Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.
", "facts_len": "515", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "205", "ID": "51734", "name": "Pennsylvania v. Mimms", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1830", "docket": "76-1830", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Commonwealth of Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Harry Mimms", "facts": "This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied.
\nOn appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an unlawful \"seizure\" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any \"objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety\" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place.
", "facts_len": "1111", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "206", "ID": "51735", "name": "Carey v. Piphus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1149", "docket": "76-1149", "term": "1977", "first_party": "John D. Carey, et al.", "second_party": "Jarius Piphus, et al.", "facts": "During school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus\u2019 Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages.
\nOn September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco\u2019s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages.
\nThe two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages.
", "facts_len": "1979", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "207", "ID": "51746", "name": "American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1121", "docket": "76-1121", "term": "1977", "first_party": "American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.", "second_party": "Writers Guild of America, West, Inc.", "facts": "During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board\u2019s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board\u2019s order.
", "facts_len": "1219", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "208", "ID": "51754", "name": "Michigan v. Tyler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1608", "docket": "76-1608", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Loren Tyler and Robert Tompkins", "facts": "On January 21, 1970, Tyler\u2019s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers.
\nThe next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the \u201corigin of all fires that occur in the Township.\u201d They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial.
\nAt trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1890", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "209", "ID": "51759", "name": "Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-10", "docket": "77-10", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Exxon Corporation et al.", "second_party": "Governor of Maryland et al.", "facts": "Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.
", "facts_len": "485", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "210", "ID": "51756", "name": "Butz v. Economou", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-709", "docket": "76-709", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Butz", "second_party": "Economou", "facts": "Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "568", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "211", "ID": "51763", "name": "Foley v. Connelie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-839", "docket": "76-839", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Foley", "second_party": "Connelie", "facts": "Edmund Foley applied for a position as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was a legally admitted resident alien, state officials refused to permit him to take the examination. New York authorities relied on a statute providing that \"no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.\"
", "facts_len": "357", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "212", "ID": "51767", "name": "Ballew v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-761", "docket": "76-761", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Ballew", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "Ballew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "205", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "213", "ID": "51775", "name": "Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1701", "docket": "76-1701", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Tennessee Valley Authority", "second_party": "Hiram G. Hill", "facts": "In 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as \u201cendangered\u201d. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its \u201ccritical habitat\u201d. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the dam would violate the ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter\u2019s critical habitat.
", "facts_len": "1028", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "214", "ID": "51778", "name": "Massachusetts v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1500", "docket": "76-1500", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Massachusetts", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1970, Congress imposed an annual registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States. The state of Massachusetts owned and utilized a helicopter for the purpose of patrolling highways and fulfilling other police duties. When Massachusetts refused to pay the tax, the federal government collected it from the state's accounts, plus interest and penalties. Massachusetts then sought a refund of the money collected.
", "facts_len": "467", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "215", "ID": "51784", "name": "Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-695", "docket": "76-695", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Board of Curators of the University of Missouri", "second_party": "Charlotte Horowitz", "facts": "Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated \u201clow satisfactory,\u201d and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.
", "facts_len": "1264", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "216", "ID": "51786", "name": "Lockett v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6997", "docket": "76-6997", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Lockett", "second_party": "Ohio", "facts": "An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.
", "facts_len": "481", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "217", "ID": "51789", "name": "Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-444", "docket": "77-444", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Penn Central Transportation Company", "second_party": "New York City", "facts": "The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as \"landmarks\" or \"landmark sites.\" Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.
", "facts_len": "304", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "218", "ID": "51793", "name": "Hutto v. Finney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1660", "docket": "76-1660", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Hutto", "second_party": "Finney", "facts": "Litigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in 1969. In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had been issued guns), a District Court called the conditions which inmates were forced to face \"a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world.\" This case involved a challenge to the practice of \"punitive isolation\" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.
", "facts_len": "585", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "219", "ID": "51790", "name": "Beth Israel Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-152", "docket": "77-152", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Beth Israel Hospital", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Beth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, held that the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.
", "facts_len": "1164", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "220", "ID": "51798", "name": "Parker v. Flook", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-642", "docket": "77-642", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Lutrelle F. Parker, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks", "second_party": "Dale R. Flook", "facts": "A catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (\u201calarm limits\u201d) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not \u201cwholly pre-empt\u201d the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.
", "facts_len": "922", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "221", "ID": "51797", "name": "Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1150", "docket": "76-1150", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Baldwin", "second_party": "Fish and Game Commission of Montana", "facts": "In its licensing system for elk-hunters, the state of Montana required nonresidents to pay a substantially higher fee than residents for a hunting permit.
", "facts_len": "162", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "222", "ID": "51800", "name": "McDaniel v. Paty", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1427", "docket": "76-1427", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Paul A. McDaniel", "second_party": "Selma Cash Paty, et al.", "facts": "Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel\u2019s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.
", "facts_len": "840", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "223", "ID": "51803", "name": "United States v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/5-orig", "docket": "5-orig", "term": "1977", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Channel Islands National Monument is a nationally designated area off the coast of California, including Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. In 1949, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation that extended the boundary of the National Monument within one nautical mile of the islands.
", "facts_len": "296", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "224", "ID": "51804", "name": "Zurcher v. Stanford Daily", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1484", "docket": "76-1484", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Zurcher", "second_party": "Stanford Daily", "facts": "In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.
", "facts_len": "692", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "225", "ID": "51811", "name": "United States v. Jacobs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1193", "docket": "76-1193", "term": "1977", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Estelle Jacobs (aka Mrs. Kramer)", "facts": "Estelle Jacobs was accused of threatening to harm a man who owed a substantial gambling debt to her employer, a collections agency. Unbeknownst to her, the phone call in which she made the threat was recorded. The Federal Bureau of Investigations contacted Jacobs and informed of her Miranda rights during questioning about the incident. About nine months later, Jacobs was called before a grand jury via a subpoena regarding the threatening statements she had previously made. She did not have an attorney present, but she was read her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. During her trial, Jacobs denied having made the phone call, the tape of the recorded phone call was played, and she was subsequently indicted. The district court dismissed the indictment and held that a witness in a trial who is a potential defendant should be informed of that potential upon taking the witness stand and is entitled to full Miranda warnings under those circumstances.
", "facts_len": "964", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "226", "ID": "51820", "name": "Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-528", "docket": "77-528", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "second_party": "Pacifica Foundation", "facts": "During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, \"Filthy Words.\" Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included \"sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some.\" The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.
", "facts_len": "514", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "227", "ID": "51823", "name": "Houchins v. KQED Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310", "docket": "76-1310", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Houchins", "second_party": "KQED Inc.", "facts": "KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media.
", "facts_len": "332", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "228", "ID": "51831", "name": "Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-25", "docket": "77-25", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Flagg Bros., Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Shirley Herriott Brooks, et al.", "facts": "On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days.
\nMs. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen\u2019s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "994", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "229", "ID": "51833", "name": "Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-747", "docket": "77-747", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Allied Structural Steel Company", "second_party": "Spannaus", "facts": "In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.
", "facts_len": "615", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "230", "ID": "51844", "name": "City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-404", "docket": "77-404", "term": "1977", "first_party": "City of Philadelphia", "second_party": "New Jersey", "facts": "A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most \"solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State.\"
", "facts_len": "162", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "231", "ID": "51849", "name": "United States Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-635", "docket": "76-635", "term": "1977", "first_party": "United States Steel Corporation", "second_party": "Multistate Tax Commission", "facts": "In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.
", "facts_len": "246", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "232", "ID": "51852", "name": "Holloway v. Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-5856", "docket": "76-5856", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Winston M. Holloway, et al.", "second_party": "State of Arkansas", "facts": "On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1005", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "233", "ID": "51853", "name": "Regents of the University of California v. Bakke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/76-811", "docket": "76-811", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Regents of the University of California", "second_party": "Allan Bakke", "facts": "Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for \"qualified\" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.
", "facts_len": "725", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "234", "ID": "51873", "name": "City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1810", "docket": "76-1810", "term": "1977", "first_party": "City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, et al.", "second_party": "Marie Manhart, et al.", "facts": "A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee\u2019s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men.
\nThe women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1149", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "235", "ID": "51874", "name": "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1607", "docket": "76-1607", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "second_party": "Samuel H. Sloan", "facts": "Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under \u00a7 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year.
\nSamuel H. Sloan owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in \"substantial\" purchases and short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under \u00a7 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "849", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "236", "ID": "51875", "name": "Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1650", "docket": "76-1650", "term": "1977", "first_party": "Albert Ohralik", "second_party": "Ohio State Bar Assn.", "facts": "In February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for a portion of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer\u2019s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik\u2019s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.
", "facts_len": "1186", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "237", "ID": "51878", "name": "Ambach v. Norwick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/76-808", "docket": "76-808", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Gordon M. Ambach", "second_party": "Susan M. W. Norwick and Tarja U. K. Dachinger", "facts": "Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as \"overbroad.\"
", "facts_len": "642", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "238", "ID": "51882", "name": "Brown v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-6673", "docket": "77-6673", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Zackary C. Brown", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation.
\nBrown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted.
", "facts_len": "1123", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "239", "ID": "51884", "name": "Herbert v. Lando", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1105", "docket": "77-1105", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Herbert", "second_party": "Lando", "facts": "Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the \"actual malice\" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program.
", "facts_len": "661", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "240", "ID": "51886", "name": "Scott v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1177", "docket": "77-1177", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Scott", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.
", "facts_len": "173", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "241", "ID": "51889", "name": "Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-482", "docket": "78-482", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "Daily Mail Publishing Company", "facts": "A West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.
", "facts_len": "165", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "242", "ID": "51888", "name": "Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-511", "docket": "78-511", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.\u2019s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, \u201cthe following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation\u201d and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store\u2019s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1250", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "243", "ID": "51897", "name": "Burch v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-90", "docket": "78-90", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Burch", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "Burch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.
", "facts_len": "195", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "244", "ID": "51902", "name": "Mackey v. Montrym", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-69", "docket": "77-69", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Mackey", "second_party": "Montrym", "facts": "After he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (\u201cDUI\u201d). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym\u2019s driver\u2019s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs\u2019 licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "802", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "245", "ID": "51912", "name": "Arkansas v. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1497", "docket": "77-1497", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Arkansas", "second_party": "Sanders", "facts": "Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.
", "facts_len": "495", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "246", "ID": "51913", "name": "Payton v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5420", "docket": "78-5420", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Payton", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "247", "ID": "51917", "name": "Green v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5944", "docket": "78-5944", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Roosevelt Green, Jr.", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "On December 12, 1976, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell Moore allegedly raped and murdered Teresa Allen outside Macon, Georgia. Green and Moore were tried separately, and each was convicted and sentenced to death. At Green's trial, the defense introduced the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified at Moore's trial. According to Pasby, Moore admitted to him that he had killed Allen alone. The trial court refused to allow Pasby's testimony, considering it to be hearsay under Georgia law. On appeal, Green argued the refusal to allow Pasby's testimony constituted a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied his claim.
", "facts_len": "700", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "248", "ID": "51916", "name": "Toll v. Moreno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-154", "docket": "77-154", "term": "1978", "first_party": "John S. Toll, President of the University of Maryland", "second_party": "Juan Carlos Moreno, et al.", "facts": "This case supplements Elkins v. Moreno, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown.
\nOn June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution.
", "facts_len": "995", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "249", "ID": "51925", "name": "Parham v. Hughes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-3", "docket": "78-3", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Parham", "second_party": "Hughes", "facts": "Curtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.
", "facts_len": "737", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "250", "ID": "51927", "name": "Orr v. Orr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1119", "docket": "77-1119", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Willam Orr", "second_party": "Lillian Orr", "facts": "William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.
", "facts_len": "517", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "251", "ID": "51930", "name": "Hutchinson v. Proxmire", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-680", "docket": "78-680", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Hutchinson", "second_party": "Proxmire", "facts": "In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the \"Golden Fleece Award of the Month.\" The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the \"nonsense\" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss.
", "facts_len": "668", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "252", "ID": "51944", "name": "Bell v. Wolfish", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1829", "docket": "77-1829", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Bell", "second_party": "Wolfish", "facts": "A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.
", "facts_len": "335", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "253", "ID": "51948", "name": "Moore v. Sims", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-6", "docket": "78-6", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Hilmar G. Moore, Raul Jimenez, Jaime Clements", "second_party": "John Pleasant Sims, Mary Carter Sims, Sabrina Marie Sims, Paul Edward Sims, Shawna Evette Sims", "facts": "The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas\u2019 child custody laws.
\nThe district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The court held that abstention under Younger v Harris was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under Younger v Harris, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "1074", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "254", "ID": "51953", "name": "Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-233", "docket": "78-233", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts", "second_party": "Feeney", "facts": "A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores.
", "facts_len": "263", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "255", "ID": "51954", "name": "Fare v. Michael C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-334", "docket": "78-334", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Kenneth F. Fare, Acting Chief Probation Officer", "second_party": "Michael C.", "facts": "Police arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966). Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder.
\nAt trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael\u2019s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.
", "facts_len": "881", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "256", "ID": "51958", "name": "Stafford v. Briggs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1546", "docket": "77-1546", "term": "1978", "first_party": "William H. Stafford, Jr., et al.", "second_party": "John Briggs, et al.", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases. For 77-1546, in 1972, U. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to cause a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents\u2019 counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia.
\nFor 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island.
", "facts_len": "2204", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "257", "ID": "51966", "name": "Harrah Independent School District v. Martin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-443", "docket": "78-443", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Harrah Independent School District, et al.", "second_party": "Mary Jane Martin", "facts": "Mary Jane Martin, a tenured teacher at Harrah Independent School District, was required to earn five college credits every three years as continuing education. Martin refused to comply with this requirement and did not receive a pay increase each year her contract was renewed. The Oklahoma legislature passed a law requiring a mandatory pay increase every year regardless of compliance with the continuing education. Looking for an alternative consequence, the school board warned Martin that they would not renew her contract the following year if she did not complete her continuing education. Martin refused, and the school board voted to terminate her for \u201cwillful neglect of duty\u201d.
\nAfter unsuccessfully attempting to obtain administrative relief, Martin sued the school district for Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the termination violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1054", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "258", "ID": "51975", "name": "Delaware v. Prouse", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1571", "docket": "77-1571", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Delaware", "second_party": "Prouse", "facts": "A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.
", "facts_len": "331", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "259", "ID": "51977", "name": "Davis v. Passman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5072", "docket": "78-5072", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Davis", "second_party": "Passman", "facts": "Davis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an \"able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker\", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement.
", "facts_len": "445", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "260", "ID": "51980", "name": "Smith v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5374", "docket": "78-5374", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Michael Lee Smith", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her.
\nIn pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.
", "facts_len": "1833", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "261", "ID": "51994", "name": "United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-432", "docket": "78-432", "term": "1978", "first_party": "United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC", "second_party": "Weber", "facts": "The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.
", "facts_len": "545", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "262", "ID": "51997", "name": "North Carolina v. Butler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-354", "docket": "78-354", "term": "1978", "first_party": "North Carolina", "second_party": "Willie Thomas Butler", "facts": "An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under Miranda v Arizona after arresting him on a federal warrant. At Butler\u2019s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an \u201cAdvice of Rights\u201d form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney. Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights.
", "facts_len": "1049", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "263", "ID": "52008", "name": "Jones v. Wolf", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-91", "docket": "78-91", "term": "1978", "first_party": "R. W. Jones, Sr., et al.", "second_party": "Charles T. Wolf et al.", "facts": "Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (\u201cPCUS\u201d). Under the PCUS\u2019s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order.
\nOn May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville\u2019s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission\u2019s inquiry.
\nThe minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville\u2019s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia\u2019s \u201cneutral principles of law\u201d approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction\u2019s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
", "facts_len": "1657", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "264", "ID": "52014", "name": "Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-201", "docket": "78-201", "term": "1978", "first_party": "John B. Greenholtz", "second_party": "Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex", "facts": "The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate\u2019s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.
", "facts_len": "1252", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "265", "ID": "52017", "name": "City of Mobile v. Bolden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1844", "docket": "77-1844", "term": "1978", "first_party": "City of Mobile", "second_party": "Bolden", "facts": "Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.
", "facts_len": "353", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "266", "ID": "52019", "name": "Duren v. Missouri", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-6067", "docket": "77-6067", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Billy Duren", "second_party": "Missouri", "facts": "A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren\u2019s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.
", "facts_len": "849", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "267", "ID": "52021", "name": "Vance v. Bradley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1254", "docket": "77-1254", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State et al.", "second_party": "Holbrook Bradley et al.", "facts": "
Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "449", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "268", "ID": "52025", "name": "New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1427", "docket": "77-1427", "term": "1978", "first_party": "New York City Transit Authority", "second_party": "Carl Beazer et al.", "facts": "Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.
", "facts_len": "762", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "269", "ID": "52028", "name": "Dunaway v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5066", "docket": "78-5066", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Irving Jerome Dunaway", "second_party": "State of New York", "facts": "On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself.
\nAt trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.
\nThe Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway\u2019s application for leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "270", "ID": "52031", "name": "Southeastern Community College v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-711", "docket": "78-711", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Southeastern Community College", "second_party": "Frances Davis", "facts": "Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.
", "facts_len": "532", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "271", "ID": "52035", "name": "Addington v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-5992", "docket": "77-5992", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Frank O\u2019Neal Addington", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Frank Addington was charged with \u201cassault by threat\u201d of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington\u2019s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the \u201cclear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.\u201d The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court\u2019s decision and reinstated the trial court\u2019s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington\u2019s due process rights.
", "facts_len": "1198", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "272", "ID": "52039", "name": "Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5414", "docket": "78-5414", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Ilya Wolston", "second_party": "Reader's Digest Association, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston\u2019s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader\u2019s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent.
\nWolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a \u201cpublic figure\u201d and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "898", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "273", "ID": "52043", "name": "Bellotti v. Baird", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-329", "docket": "78-329", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Bellotti", "second_party": "Baird", "facts": "A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure \"for good cause shown.\"
", "facts_len": "242", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "274", "ID": "52047", "name": "Gannett Company, Inc. v. DePasquale", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1301", "docket": "77-1301", "term": "1978", "first_party": "Gannett Company, Inc.", "second_party": "DePasquale", "facts": "Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an \"unabated buildup\" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.
", "facts_len": "602", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "275", "ID": "52060", "name": "United States v. Raddatz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-8", "docket": "79-8", "term": "1979", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Herman Raddatz", "facts": "Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz\u2019s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.
", "facts_len": "1130", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "276", "ID": "52078", "name": "Harris v. McRae", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-1268", "docket": "79-1268", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Harris", "second_party": "McRae", "facts": "In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the \"Hyde Amendment\" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.
", "facts_len": "571", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "277", "ID": "52079", "name": "Chiarella v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1202", "docket": "78-1202", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Chiarella", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use \"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security\" of \"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.\" Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to \"employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.\" Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.
", "facts_len": "1522", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "278", "ID": "52092", "name": "Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-243", "docket": "79-243", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Richmond Newspapers Inc.", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.
", "facts_len": "288", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "279", "ID": "52098", "name": "Diamond v. Chakrabarty", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-136", "docket": "79-136", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Diamond", "second_party": "Chakrabarty", "facts": "After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover \"any\" new and useful \"manufacture\" or \"composition of matter.\" On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "590", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "280", "ID": "52095", "name": "Crown Simpson Pulp Company v. Costle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-797", "docket": "79-797", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Crown Simpson Pulp Company, et al.", "second_party": "Douglas M. Costle", "facts": "Crown Simpson Pulp Company and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation operated two bleached craft pulp mills in California. The mills were granted permits by the California State Water Resources Control Board with variances from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for effluent discharge. The EPA, however, denied the variances. The mill companies sought review directly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Act allows direct appeal of EPA actions either \u201cissuing or denying any permit\u201d. The court of appeals dismissed the review, holding that because the State granted the permits and the EPA merely objected the variances, this case did not fall under the Act.
", "facts_len": "749", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "281", "ID": "52096", "name": "Rush v. Savchuk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-952", "docket": "78-952", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Randal Rush, et al.", "second_party": "Jeffrey Savchuk", "facts": "On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush\u2019s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.
", "facts_len": "743", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "282", "ID": "52112", "name": "United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-639", "docket": "79-639", "term": "1979", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Sioux Nation of Indians", "facts": "In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.
", "facts_len": "878", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "283", "ID": "52119", "name": "World-Wide Volkwagen Corporation v. Woodson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1078", "docket": "78-1078", "term": "1979", "first_party": "World Wide Volkswagen Corp., Seaway Volkswagen Inc.", "second_party": "The Honorable Charles Woodson, District Judge of Creek County, State of Oklahoma; Key Eloise Robinson; Eva May Robinson; Harry Robinson; George Samuel Robinson", "facts": "New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma\u2019s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.
", "facts_len": "821", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "284", "ID": "52125", "name": "Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1335", "docket": "78-1335", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Village of Schaumburg", "second_party": "Citizens for Better Environment", "facts": "The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards \"charitable purposes.\" Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.
", "facts_len": "602", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "285", "ID": "52127", "name": "Rhode Island v. Innis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1076", "docket": "78-1076", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Rhode Island", "second_party": "Innis", "facts": "After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.
", "facts_len": "663", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "286", "ID": "52135", "name": "Walter v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-67", "docket": "79-67", "term": "1979", "first_party": "William Walter", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L\u2019Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L\u2019Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films.
\nOn April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1061", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "287", "ID": "52139", "name": "Williams v. Zbaraz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-4", "docket": "79-4", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Jasper F. Williams, et al.", "second_party": "David Zbaraz, et al.", "facts": "These are three consolidated cases.
\nJasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s guarantee of equal protection.
\nInitially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1783", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "288", "ID": "52142", "name": "Snepp v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1871", "docket": "78-1871", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Snepp", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Upon accepting employment in the CIA in 1968, Snepp signed an agreement with the Agency that he would not publish any information during or after his term of employment relating to the Agency's activities without first obtaining Agency approval. Snepp published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without first submitting his manuscript to the Agency for review. A lower court denied Snepp royalties from his book for his failure to secure approval.
", "facts_len": "467", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "289", "ID": "52140", "name": "Martinez v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1268", "docket": "78-1268", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Martinez", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "737", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "290", "ID": "52147", "name": "Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles and City of Compton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1577", "docket": "78-1577", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Sears, Roebuck and Co.", "second_party": "County of Los Angeles and City of Compton", "facts": "The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears\u2019 motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "291", "ID": "52149", "name": "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-565", "docket": "79-565", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation", "second_party": "Public Service Commission of New York", "facts": "The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.
", "facts_len": "536", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "292", "ID": "52151", "name": "United States v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/5_orig", "docket": "5-orig", "term": "1979", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.
", "facts_len": "653", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "293", "ID": "52162", "name": "Reeves Inc. v. Stake", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-677", "docket": "79-677", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Reeves Inc.", "second_party": "Stake", "facts": "The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's \"hoarding\" of resources.
", "facts_len": "475", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "294", "ID": "52164", "name": "Fullilove v. Klutznick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1007", "docket": "78-1007", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Fullilove", "second_party": "Klutznick", "facts": "In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.
", "facts_len": "424", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "295", "ID": "52169", "name": "Aaron v. SEC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-66", "docket": "79-66", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Peter E. Aaron", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "While working for his father\u2019s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron\u2019s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (\u201c1934 Act\u201d), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his \u201cintentional failure\u201d to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron\u2019s conduct amounted to an intent to \u201cdeceive, manipulate, or defraud.\u201d Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.
", "facts_len": "1662", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "296", "ID": "52183", "name": "Ohio v. Roberts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-756", "docket": "78-756", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Ohio", "second_party": "Herschel Roberts", "facts": "On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts\u2019 lawyer called the Isaacs\u2019 daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts\u2019 attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts\u2019 subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute.
\nAfter being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1214", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "297", "ID": "52185", "name": "American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-1", "docket": "79-1", "term": "1979", "first_party": "American Export Lines, Inc.", "second_party": "Gilberto Alvez, Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc.", "facts": "Gilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS Export Builder, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (\u201cAELI\u201d). On October 13, 1972, while the SS Export Builder was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries.
\nAlvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI\u2019s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage.
\nThe Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (\u201cJones Act\u201d) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States\u2019 territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (\u201cDOHSA\u201d) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet allowed a decedent\u2019s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries.
\nNew York\u2019s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI\u2019s use of Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.
", "facts_len": "2172", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "298", "ID": "52186", "name": "Goldwater v. Carter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-856", "docket": "79-856", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Barry Goldwater et al.", "second_party": "James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al.", "facts": "President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan.
", "facts_len": "107", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "299", "ID": "52187", "name": "PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-289", "docket": "79-289", "term": "1979", "first_party": "PruneYard Shopping Center", "second_party": "Robins", "facts": "High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against \"publicly expressive\" activities.
", "facts_len": "345", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "300", "ID": "52190", "name": "Ybarra v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-5937", "docket": "78-5937", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Ventura E. Ybarra", "second_party": "State of Illinois", "facts": "On March 1, 1976, an Illinois Circuit Court judge authorized a warrant to search the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of the bartender Greg for heroin and other drug paraphernalia, based on information the Illinois Bureau of Investigation obtained from an informant. When officers arrived to conduct the search, they also conducted a cursory pat down for weapons on all of the patrons in the bar, pursuant to an Illinois state statute that allows officers to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant. During the pat down, an officer found and retrieved a cigarette pouch from the pocket of one of the patrons, Ventura Ybarra, that contained tin foil packets of a substance later confirmed to be heroin.
\nYbarra was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the contraband that had been seized from his person during the search at the bar. The trial court denied the motion. Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to the facts of this case because it was obvious that there was a connection between Ybarra and the premises being searched. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra\u2019s petition for appeal.
", "facts_len": "1330", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "301", "ID": "52188", "name": "Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-198", "docket": "79-198", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Supreme Court of Virginia, et al.", "second_party": "Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates alleged violations of the Bar Code.
\nIn 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code\u2019s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish.
\nOn February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code.
\nThe district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys\u2019 initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia.
", "facts_len": "2256", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "302", "ID": "52196", "name": "Rummel v. Estelle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-6386", "docket": "78-6386", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Rummel", "second_party": "Estelle", "facts": "After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.
", "facts_len": "322", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "303", "ID": "52210", "name": "Godfrey v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-6899", "docket": "78-6899", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Robert Franklin Godfrey", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "In September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey\u2019s wife told him that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law\u2019s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up.
\nGodfrey was indicted on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was \u201coutrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive battery to the victim.\u201d The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1373", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "304", "ID": "52211", "name": "Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-911", "docket": "78-911", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO", "second_party": "American Petroleum Institute", "facts": "Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.
", "facts_len": "442", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "305", "ID": "52217", "name": "Trammel v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-5705", "docket": "78-5705", "term": "1979", "first_party": "Otis Trammel, Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Otis Trammel, Jr. was indicted on federal drug charges. Before his trial, he advised the court that the Government would call his wife as a witness against him. The indictment named Mrs. Trammel as an unindicted co-conspirator and the Government granted her immunity in exchange for her testimony. Otis moved to assert a privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent her from testifying against him. The district court denied the motion, and allowed Mrs. Trammel to testify to any act she observed during the marriage and any communication made in the presence of a third party. Only confidential communications between Mr. and Mrs. Trammel remained privileged and inadmissible. Otis was tried and convicted. On appeal, Otis argued that the district court\u2019s ruling violated Hawkins v. United States where the U.S. Supreme Court held that one spouse may not testify against the other unless both consent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the Hawkins did not prevent voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity.
", "facts_len": "1137", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "306", "ID": "52233", "name": "New York v. Belton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-328", "docket": "80-328", "term": "1980", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Roger Belton", "facts": "A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car\u2019s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets.
\nAt trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.
", "facts_len": "1210", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "307", "ID": "52243", "name": "Flynt v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-420", "docket": "80-420", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Larry C. Flynt", "second_party": "State of Ohio", "facts": "In July 1976, Ohio charged petitioners, officers of Hustler Magazine, with disseminating obscene materials for their role in publishing an issue of Hustler that contained a political cartoon that Ohio deemed obscene. The trial court dismissed the charge and held that Ohio violated the petitioners\u2019 rights under the Equal Protection Clause by engaging in discriminatory prosecution. Ohio appealed to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eighth District, which reversed the trial court\u2019s decision and reinstated the charges. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and argued that Ohio\u2019s decision to prosecute Hustler, instead of other magazines that routinely published similar content, was discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that petitioners did not establish the elements for a prima facie case for unconstitutional discriminatory prosecution. To do so, petitioners had to show that they were singled out for prosecution while there were other magazines similarly situated that were not prosecuted, and that the government\u2019s decision to prosecute them was made in bad faith, based upon race, religion, or the desire to prevent their exercise of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined the petitioners had not met this burden and remanded the case to the lower courts so that the petitioners could present further evidence to meet this burden.
", "facts_len": "1396", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "308", "ID": "52253", "name": "Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1631", "docket": "79-1631", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Democratic Party of the United States", "second_party": "Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette", "facts": "The Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) required that delegates sent to its National Convention were chosen exclusively by voters affiliated with the party, but the state of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to participate in state primaries. In the primary, voters expressed their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination. Although the Wisconsin Democratic Party (State Party) selected delegates at a caucus occurring after the primary, Wisconsin law required these delegates to allot their votes at the National Convention in accord with the amount of support each candidate received in the primary. The National Party prohibited the State Party delegates from participating in the 1980 National Convention because of non-Democrat influence in the state primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the National Party must admit the delegates since Wisconsin had a \"compelling interest\" to maintain the \"open\" feature of its primary system.
", "facts_len": "1004", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "309", "ID": "52257", "name": "Chandler v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1260", "docket": "79-1260", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Chandler", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Two Miami Beach police officers were charged with burglarizing a local restaurant. Their trial gained much media attention. Local television stations televised a small portion of the trial, thanks to a recent Florida Supreme Court decision which permitted (with certain restrictions) electronic media to record judicial proceedings. Officers Chandler and Granger objected to the coverage and were found guilty as charged.
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "310", "ID": "52268", "name": "American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1429", "docket": "79-1429", "term": "1980", "first_party": "American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor", "facts": "In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the Act.
", "facts_len": "1214", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "311", "ID": "52270", "name": "Steagald v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-6777", "docket": "79-6777", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Gary Keith Steagald", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine.\n
Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "718", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "312", "ID": "52272", "name": "Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1764", "docket": "79-1764", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Texas Department of Community Affairs", "second_party": "Joyce Ann Burdine", "facts": "The Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years\u2019 experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor\u2019s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1337", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "313", "ID": "52276", "name": "Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-952", "docket": "79-952", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Eddie C. Thomas", "second_party": "Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al.", "facts": "Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a \"good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work\" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a \"personal philosophical choice\" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.
", "facts_len": "1016", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "314", "ID": "52281", "name": "United States v. Morrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-395", "docket": "79-395", "term": "1980", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Hazel Morrison", "facts": "Hazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.
", "facts_len": "951", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "315", "ID": "52293", "name": "Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1171", "docket": "79-1171", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Minnesota", "second_party": "Clover Leaf Creamery Company", "facts": "Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "327", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "316", "ID": "52288", "name": "Lassiter v. Department of Social Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-6423", "docket": "79-6423", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Abby Gail Lassiter", "second_party": "Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina", "facts": "On September 26, 1974, William L. Lassiter was born out of wedlock. On May 23, 1975, the state determined that William L. Lassiter was a neglected child in need of protection, and placed him in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. The state then placed William in foster care.
\nAbby Gail Lassiter, William\u2019s mother, was convicted of second-degree murder in July of 1976, and began serving her twenty-five to forty year sentence at the North Carolina Correctional Center for Women. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Abby\u2019s parental rights. It alleged that Abby had not contacted William since December 1975, and that she willfully left William in foster care. On August 31, 1978, the state brought Abby from prison to the hearing, which opened with a discussion of whether Abby should have more time to find legal assistance. The court concluded that she had ample opportunity to obtain counsel; Abby did not claim to be indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her.
\nA social worker from the Department testified about Abby\u2019s lack of contact with William, Abby\u2019s mother\u2019s unfitness to care for William, and William\u2019s condition. Abby cross-examined the social worker, but many of her questions were disallowed because they were arguments. She also testified on her own behalf and later cross-examined her mother, who denied saying she could not care for William, contradicting the Department\u2019s allegation. The court held that Abby willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for William\u2019s welfare, and terminated Abby\u2019s status as William\u2019s parent. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that North Carolina was not constitutionally mandated to provide Abby counsel during the hearing. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied her application for discretionary review.
", "facts_len": "1880", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "317", "ID": "52294", "name": "United States v. Will", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-983", "docket": "79-983", "term": "1980", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Will", "facts": "Congress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.
", "facts_len": "296", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "318", "ID": "52299", "name": "Rostker v. Goldberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-251", "docket": "80-251", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Rostker", "second_party": "Goldberg", "facts": "After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court.
", "facts_len": "422", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "319", "ID": "52313", "name": "Stone v. Graham", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-321", "docket": "80-321", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Stone", "second_party": "Graham", "facts": "Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.
", "facts_len": "266", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "320", "ID": "52308", "name": "Michigan v. Summers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1794", "docket": "79-1794", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Summers", "facts": "The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin\u23afnot the heroin found in the basement\u23afthat formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers\u2019 motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers\u2019 detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1467", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "321", "ID": "52320", "name": "Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1344", "docket": "79-1344", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Michael M.", "second_party": "Superior Court of Sonoma County", "facts": "Michael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of violating California's \"statutory rape\" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as \"an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years.\" The statute thus made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the constitutionality of the law.
", "facts_len": "421", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "322", "ID": "52323", "name": "Haig v. Agee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-83", "docket": "80-83", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Haig", "second_party": "Agee", "facts": "In 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign \"to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating.\" Over the next several years, Agee successfully exposed a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional authorization to do so. Agee also claimed that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
", "facts_len": "594", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "323", "ID": "52325", "name": "Diamond v. Diehr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1112", "docket": "79-1112", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Diamond", "second_party": "Diehr", "facts": "Engineers James Diehr and Theodore Lutton invented an improved press that cured rubber by controlled heating. The press contained a temperature probe which measured the temperature rise of the rubber from within the press. By repeatedly calculating the rubber cure time from this temperature measurement and comparing this computed cure time to the actual elapsed time, the computer was able to determine precisely when to open the press and eject the cured rubber, which then emerged perfectly cured. The patent examiner, viewing all computer programs as unpatentable because of the earlier Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), rejected their patent application because, he argued, the inventors had simply combined an unpatentable program with a conventional rubber curing press. An appellate court reversed the Examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney argued that the steps of continuously measuring temperature and repeatedly recalculating the rubber cure time and comparing it to the elapsed time were new steps that were worthy of patent protection.
", "facts_len": "1232", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "324", "ID": "52332", "name": "United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-870", "docket": "79-870", "term": "1980", "first_party": "United States Railroad Retirement Board", "second_party": "Gerhard H. Fritz", "facts": "In 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional \u201cwindfall\u201d benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit.
\nThe appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not \u201crationally related\u201d to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system.
", "facts_len": "1584", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "325", "ID": "52344", "name": "Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-195", "docket": "80-195", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Metromedia, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "City of San Diego et al.", "facts": "The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only \"onsite\" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.
", "facts_len": "627", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "326", "ID": "52347", "name": "Robbins v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-148", "docket": "80-148", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Jeffrey Richard Robbins", "second_party": "California", "facts": "During the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied the motion, and a jury convicted Robbins. Robbins appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in <i>Arkansas v. Sanders</i>, which established that officers could not search closed luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package\u2019s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior.
", "facts_len": "1402", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "327", "ID": "52349", "name": "Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-795", "docket": "80-795", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Heffron", "second_party": "International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.", "facts": "A Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair.
", "facts_len": "551", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "328", "ID": "52352", "name": "Dames & Moore v. Regan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-2078", "docket": "80-2078", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Dames & Moore", "second_party": "Regan", "facts": "In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "329", "ID": "52356", "name": "Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-1320", "docket": "79-1320", "term": "1980", "first_party": "Kassel", "second_party": "Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware", "facts": "An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.
", "facts_len": "182", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "330", "ID": "52370", "name": "CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/80-207", "docket": "80-207", "term": "1980", "first_party": "CBS, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "On October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (CMPC) requested time for a thirty-minute program from each of the three major television networks on behalf of President Jimmy Carter. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) refused to make the requested time available, emphasizing in part the potential disruption of regular programming. CBS offered to sell the CMPC two five-minute segments instead. The American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) each replied that it had not yet begun to sell political time for the 1980 presidential campaign. On October 29, 1979, the CMPC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charging that the networks violated their obligations under the Federal Communications Act.
\nThe Federal Communications Act of 1934, as modified by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorized the FCC to revoke broadcasting station licenses for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or failure to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. On November 26, 1979, the FCC ruled in a four-to-three vote that the networks violated the act, rejecting the networks\u2019 arguments that Congress did not intend the act to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the FCC improperly substituted its judgment for the networks\u2019 in evaluating the CMPC\u2019s request for time.
\nFollowing the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran in November 1979, the CMPC decided to postpone the broadcast of its thirty-minute program; it successfully purchased five minutes of time from CBS, and later purchased thirty minutes of time for the full program from ABC and NBC. Throughout these negotiations, however, all parties maintained their rights relating to the appeal to the FCC\u2019s decision. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the FCC\u2019s decision. It held that the act created a new, affirmative right of access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office and that the FCC had the authority to evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute.
", "facts_len": "2243", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "331", "ID": "52372", "name": "Watkins v. Sowders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1980/79-5949", "docket": "79-5949", "term": "1980", "first_party": "John Gregory Watkins", "second_party": "Dewey Sowders", "facts": "John Watkins was charged with attempting armed robbery of a liquor store in Louisville, Kentucky. He was arrested based on the identification of two witnesses. One of those witnesses identified Watkins as the gunman two days later in a lineup, and later that same day, the police took Watkins to the other witness\u2019s hospital bed where he identified Watkins as the shooter. At the trial, both witnesses identified Watkins as the shooter. Watkins, along with two other witnesses, testified he was at a pool hall at the time of the shooting. Watkins was convicted, and on appeal he argued that the trial court had a constitutional obligation to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the identification evidence was admissible, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the argument. Watkins then sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ and held that a failure to hold a pretrial hearing does not require the reversal of a conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1058", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "332", "ID": "52384", "name": "Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-848", "docket": "80-848", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Piper Aircraft Company", "second_party": "Reyno", "facts": "(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.)
\nA British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company, equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were relying upon in order to prevail.
", "facts_len": "1166", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "333", "ID": "52388", "name": "Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-406", "docket": "81-406", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Mississippi University for Women", "second_party": "Hogan", "facts": "Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States.
", "facts_len": "298", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "334", "ID": "52393", "name": "Washington v. Chrisman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-1349", "docket": "81-1349", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Washington", "second_party": "Chrisman", "facts": "In 1978, a Washington police officer stopped a student at the Washington State University after observing the student was carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. The officer asked for identification. The student, accompanied by the officer, then went into his dormitory to retrieve proof of age. After the student had entered his room, the officer noticed that the student's roommate, Chrisman, had marijuana seeds and a pipe on his desk. Chrisman was subsequently charged with the possession of marijuana and LSD.
", "facts_len": "520", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "335", "ID": "52399", "name": "Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1990", "docket": "80-1990", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense", "second_party": "Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Radamees Tirado Guevara, Environmental Quality Board", "facts": "The island of Vieques lay six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques\u2019 population of 8,000 mostly lived in two coastal towns and in a rural area outside of those two towns. Of a total area of approximately 33,000 acres, the United States Navy owned 25,231.72 acres, slightly more than 76% of the island.
\nThe Navy\u2019s installations on the eastern part of Vieques were part of a large military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. This consisted of four firing ranges; the outer range was a large area of ocean thirty-five miles to the north and twenty miles to the south of Vieques. Two separate inland areas were used for artillery training, strafing, air-to-ground bombing, and simulating close air support; no targets existed in the area between the eastern border of these areas and Punta Este, the easternmost point of Vieques. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes accidentally discharged ordnance into the navigable waters around Viques.
\nCarlos Romero-Barceleo was the governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Along with Radamees Tirado Guevara, the mayor of Vieques, and Puerto Rico\u2019s Environmental Quality Board, Romero-Barceleo sought to enjoin the United States Navy from using any part of its lands in Vieques, or in its surrounding waters, to carry out naval training operations. Plaintiffs alleged harm to all residents of Vieques and violations of numerous environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Under the FWPCA, the addition of any pollutant from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.
\nThe district court acknowledged that the release of ordnance into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants, but it refused to enjoin Navy operations, instead ordering the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It ordered the Navy to cease operations until it obtained an NPDES permit. It held that the Navy has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until it obtains a permit despite the importance of its operations to the public good.
", "facts_len": "2353", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "336", "ID": "52403", "name": "Edgar v. MITE Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1188", "docket": "80-1188", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Edgar", "second_party": "MITE Corporation", "facts": "The MITE Corp, organized under Delaware laws with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer 20 days before the offer becomes effective. During that time, the target company, but not the offeror, is free to disseminate information about the offer to the target company's shareholders. In addition, the Secretary of State could call a hearing, and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. Finally, the Secretary of State could deny registration of a takeover offer he or she found inequitable. MITE Corp. sought and won a declaratory judgment holding that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), and that it violated the Commerce Clause.
", "facts_len": "1012", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "337", "ID": "52414", "name": "Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1730", "docket": "80-1730", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Giles M. Lugar", "second_party": "Edmondson Oil Company, Inc.", "facts": "Giles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a \"writ of attachment\" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. A state trial judge cancelled the \"writ of attachment\" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those who have had their rights violated because of \"state action.\" The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no \"state action\" had occurred. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely \"state action\" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted \"under the color of state law\" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit.
", "facts_len": "1433", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "338", "ID": "52419", "name": "Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico by Pico", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-2043", "docket": "80-2043", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26", "second_party": "Pico by Pico", "facts": "The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the \"Board\"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: \"anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy.\" Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "727", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "339", "ID": "52423", "name": "Nixon v. Fitzgerald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/79-1738", "docket": "79-1738", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Nixon", "second_party": "Fitzgerald", "facts": "In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust.
", "facts_len": "424", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "340", "ID": "52428", "name": "Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-9", "docket": "81-9", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Washington", "second_party": "Seattle School District No. 1", "facts": "In 1978, a Seattle school district adopted a mandatory busing plan to integrate its schools. No court or administrative body found the district to be engaged in unlawful segregation. A statewide initiative adopted in 1978 mandated a neighborhood school policy. The policy provided for some exceptions including voluntary busing options and mandatory busing if so ordered by state or federal courts. The initiative blocked the implementation of Seattle's mandatory busing plan. School officials challenged the Washington government in federal court.
", "facts_len": "556", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "341", "ID": "52440", "name": "Eddings v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-5727", "docket": "80-5727", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Monty Lee Eddings", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "On April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father\u2019s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away.
\nAt trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings\u2019 guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings\u2019 parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother\u2019s house and his father\u2019s house and also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder.
\nThe state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge also found that Eddings\u2019 age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings\u2019 \u201cviolent background.\u201d The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings\u2019 age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
", "facts_len": "2271", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "342", "ID": "52462", "name": "Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-327", "docket": "80-327", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Valley Forge Christian College", "second_party": "Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.", "facts": "The Secretary of Defense closed the Valley Forge General Hospital in an effort to reduce the number of military installations in the country. In accordance with a congressional statute regulating the dispersal of surplus government property, part of the hospital's land was given, free-of-charge, to the Valley Forge Christian College.
", "facts_len": "343", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "343", "ID": "52461", "name": "Rogers v. Lodge", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-2100", "docket": "80-2100", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Rogers", "second_party": "Lodge", "facts": "Eight black citizens of Burke County, Georgia, challenged the at-large system of elections within the county. Although a substantial number of blacks lived within the county, no minority candidate had ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners, the chief governing body. To be elected, candidates had to receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election.
", "facts_len": "402", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "344", "ID": "52466", "name": "Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1348", "docket": "80-1348", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Florida Department of State", "second_party": "Treasure Salvors, Inc.", "facts": "Immediately after Treasure Salvors, Inc. (\"Treasure\") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division of Archives (\"Archives\") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.
", "facts_len": "943", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "345", "ID": "52468", "name": "Widmar v. Vincent", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-689", "docket": "80-689", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Gary E. Widmar", "second_party": "Clark Vincent", "facts": "Cornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events.
\nIn January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone\u2019s application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching.
\nOn December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university\u2019s Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone\u2019s members. It concluded that the university\u2019s ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment\u2019s establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students\u2019 free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri\u2019s compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the university\u2019s regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment\u2019s Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university\u2019s First Amendment obligations.
", "facts_len": "2032", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "346", "ID": "52474", "name": "Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1002", "docket": "80-1002", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County, The Commissioner of Education of the State of New York", "second_party": "Amy Rowley, by her parents Clifford and Nancy Rowley, and Clifford and Nacy Rowley in their own right", "facts": "Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy\u2019s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a \u201cfree appropriate public education\u201d to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students.
\nThe district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "996", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "347", "ID": "52490", "name": "Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-328", "docket": "81-328", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Rodriguez", "second_party": "Popular Democratic Party", "facts": "In 1981, a representative of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party (\"Party\") died in office. Searching for a replacement, the Governor of Puerto Rico held a \"by-election\" open to candidates of all parties. The Party challenged the Governor, alleging that under Puerto Rico statutes only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party could participate in the by-election. On appeal from a Superior Court judgment favoring the Party, Puerto Rico's Supreme Court modified the judgment holding that a by-election was only required if the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to name a replacement within 60 days. Before Puerto Rico's Supreme Court could deliver its decision, the Party held an election open only to its members and, then, pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, swore in a new representative. Rodriguez appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "348", "ID": "52491", "name": "Youngberg v. Romeo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1429", "docket": "80-1429", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Duane Youngberg", "second_party": "Nicholas Romeo", "facts": "Nicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. Following the death of his father, Romeo\u2019s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (\u201cPennhurst\u201d) on a permanent basis. During his time in the state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo\u2019s mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo\u2019s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo\u2019s mother claimed that his treatment violated the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo\u2019s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release).
\nAt trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo\u2019s constitutional rights if the officials had been \u201cdeliberately indifferent\u201d to Romeo\u2019s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by \u201csubstantial necessity,\u201d the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for \u201ccompelling necessity,\u201d and the access to habilitation must be \u201cacceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge.
", "facts_len": "2073", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "349", "ID": "52496", "name": "Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-611", "docket": "81-611", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Globe Newspaper Co.", "second_party": "Superior Court, County of Norfolk", "facts": "A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.
", "facts_len": "347", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "350", "ID": "52494", "name": "Engle v. Isaac", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1430", "docket": "80-1430", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Ted Engle, Superintendant, Chillicothe Correctional Institute", "second_party": "Lincoln Isaac, et al.", "facts": "In 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence \u2014 as opposed to the burden of persuasion \u2014 on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly.
\nThe respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.
", "facts_len": "1539", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "351", "ID": "52501", "name": "New York v. Ferber", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-55", "docket": "81-55", "term": "1981", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Ferber", "facts": "A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.
", "facts_len": "199", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "352", "ID": "52507", "name": "American Tobacco Company v. Patterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1199", "docket": "80-1199", "term": "1981", "first_party": "American Tobacco Company, et al.", "second_party": "John Patterson, et al.", "facts": "American Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the factories.
\nOn January 3, 1969, John Patterson and two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
\nOn remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.
", "facts_len": "1775", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "353", "ID": "52511", "name": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-202", "docket": "81-202", "term": "1981", "first_party": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People", "second_party": "Claiborne Hardware Company", "facts": "In 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and \u201cthreats\u201d to carryout the boycott.
", "facts_len": "848", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "354", "ID": "52514", "name": "Larson v. Valente", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1666", "docket": "80-1666", "term": "1981", "first_party": "John R. Larson, et al.", "second_party": "Pamela Valente, et al.", "facts": "In 1961, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which established a system of registering charitable organizations that solicit money. All organizations subject to the Act must file extensive annual reports with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Department may deny or withdraw the registration of any organization that engages in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. From 1961 until 1978, all religious organizations were exempt from the Act. In 1978, the state legislature amended the Act to include religious organizations that received more than fifty percent of their funding from solicitations of nonmembers.
\nShortly after the amendment, the Department notified the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that it must register under the Act. Pamela Valente and other members of the Church responded by suing and alleging that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Magistrate granted a preliminary injunction and held that the Act failed the second part of the Lemon Test, that the primary effect of a law must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Accepting the recommendation of the Magistrate, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the fifty percent rule violated the Establishment Clause, but held that proof of status as a religious organization was required to be exempt from the Act.
", "facts_len": "1596", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "355", "ID": "52530", "name": "Northern Pipeline Constr. Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-150", "docket": "81-150", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Northern Pipeline Constr. Company", "second_party": "Marathon Pipe Line Company", "facts": "The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created a system of bankruptcy courts as an adjunct to the federal system of district courts. This case was decided together with United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co.
", "facts_len": "210", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "356", "ID": "52531", "name": "United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-61", "docket": "81-61", "term": "1981", "first_party": "United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds", "second_party": "Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager, et al.", "facts": "A new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died. The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, although they were eligible for pensions. These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators. Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows. They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained \u201cfor the sole and exclusive benefit of employees\u2026and their families\u201d.
", "facts_len": "1049", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "357", "ID": "52532", "name": "United States v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-767", "docket": "80-767", "term": "1981", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Edwin D. Lee", "facts": "Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes. Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund. Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community\u2019s elderly and needy citizens. Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government. The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied. The court also noted that \u00a71402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "358", "ID": "52535", "name": "United States v. Ross", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-2209", "docket": "80-2209", "term": "1981", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ross", "facts": "Acting on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search.
", "facts_len": "298", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "359", "ID": "52537", "name": "INS v. Chadha", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1832", "docket": "80-1832", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Chadha", "second_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)", "facts": "In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.
", "facts_len": "547", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "360", "ID": "52540", "name": "Enmund v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/81-5321", "docket": "81-5321", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Earl Enmund", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Earl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple. Enmund was the getaway driver, who waited in the car during the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed. Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "540", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "361", "ID": "52541", "name": "United States v. MacDonald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1582", "docket": "80-1582", "term": "1981", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "MacDonald", "facts": "In May 1970, Jeffrey MacDonald, an army captain living at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (\u201cCID\u201d), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald\u2019s discharge, the U.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders.
\nMacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald\u2019s motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald\u2019s Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald\u2019s Sixth Amendment rights.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1720", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "362", "ID": "52552", "name": "Plyler v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-1538", "docket": "80-1538", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Plyler", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. This case was decided together with Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.
", "facts_len": "250", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "363", "ID": "52549", "name": "North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-986", "docket": "80-986", "term": "1981", "first_party": "North Haven Bd. of Educ.", "second_party": "Bell", "facts": "In 1972, the United States Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender and allowed the government to withhold federal funds to non-complying educational institutions. Government agencies tasked with supplying federal funding to educational institutions were authorized to create regulations to enforce Title IX. In 1975, one of these agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (\u201cHEW\u201d) passed regulations that extended the prohibition on gender discrimination to school personnel.
\nEmployees of two Connecticut school districts, North Haven and Trumbull, accused the districts of practicing gender discrimination. HEW opened investigations into both districts and eventually warned both that they were in jeopardy of losing their federal funds. Both districts filed separate suits against HEW, claiming that the regulation went beyond the authority of Title IX, which does not explicitly cover gender-based employee discrimination. In both cases, the district court found for the school districts by holding that Title IX was intended to apply to students, not employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and held that Congress had intended Title IX to apply to both students and employees.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1397", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "364", "ID": "52559", "name": "Harlow v. Fitzgerald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-945", "docket": "80-945", "term": "1981", "first_party": "Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield", "second_party": "A. Ernest Fitzgerald", "facts": "On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion.
", "facts_len": "1090", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "365", "ID": "52571", "name": "Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-2338", "docket": "81-2338", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury", "second_party": "Taxation With Representation of Washington", "facts": "Two non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in \"substantial lobbying,\" the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's \"substantial lobbying\" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an \"unconstitutional burden\" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the \"substantial lobbying\" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.
", "facts_len": "1139", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "366", "ID": "52584", "name": "City of Los Angeles v. Lyons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1064", "docket": "81-1064", "term": "1982", "first_party": "City of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Lyons", "facts": "In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.
", "facts_len": "405", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "367", "ID": "52581", "name": "United States v. Rodgers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1476", "docket": "81-1476", "term": "1982", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Rodgers", "facts": "Phillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "466", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "368", "ID": "52583", "name": "Solem v. Helm", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-492", "docket": "82-492", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Solem", "second_party": "Helm", "facts": "Helm was convicted of writing a check from a fictitious account, a crime carrying with it a five-year jail sentence. However, since this was his seventh felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under a state recidivist statute.
", "facts_len": "293", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "369", "ID": "52597", "name": "Martinez v. Bynum", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-857", "docket": "81-857", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Martinez", "second_party": "Bynum", "facts": "A Texas law permitted public school districts to deny tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents if their primary purpose of living in the district was to attend school free of charge. Roberto Morales left his family in Mexico to live with his sister, Oralia Martinez, in Texas. When the school district denied Morales' application for free admission, Martinez challenged the law in court.
", "facts_len": "419", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "370", "ID": "52603", "name": "Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1945", "docket": "81-1945", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Pacific Gas & Electric Company", "second_party": "State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission", "facts": "A California law dictated that before additional nuclear power plants could be built, the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that its provisions had been preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
", "facts_len": "336", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "371", "ID": "52623", "name": "Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1020", "docket": "81-1020", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Exxon Corporation", "second_party": "Ralph P. Eagerton Jr.", "facts": "Since 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers.
\nExxon and other oil and gas producers sued Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition violated the oil and gas producers\u2019 Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court\u2019s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1687", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "372", "ID": "52631", "name": "Marsh v. Chambers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-23", "docket": "82-23", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Marsh", "second_party": "Chambers", "facts": "Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "462", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "373", "ID": "52635", "name": "Kolender v. Lawson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1320", "docket": "81-1320", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Kolender", "second_party": "Lawson", "facts": "Lawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment when he walked in white neighborhoods. Lawson challenged the California law \"that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer.\"
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "374", "ID": "52638", "name": "United States v. Knotts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1802", "docket": "81-1802", "term": "1982", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Leroy Carlton Knotts", "facts": "Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab.
\nKnotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts\u2019 Fourth Amendment rights.
", "facts_len": "1153", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "375", "ID": "52636", "name": "Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-354", "docket": "82-354", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, et al.", "second_party": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, et al.", "facts": "In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
\nIn 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable.
\nState Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA\u2019s decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA\u2019s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not enough evidence to support the NHTSA\u2019s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective.
", "facts_len": "2058", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "376", "ID": "52652", "name": "Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-920", "docket": "81-920", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Verlinden B. V.", "second_party": "Central Bank of Nigeria", "facts": "Verlindin B.V., a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for breaching a letter of credit. Verlindin alleged that the court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity. Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank had sovereign immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
", "facts_len": "694", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "377", "ID": "52659", "name": "Lehr v. Robertson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1756", "docket": "81-1756", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Jonathan Lehr", "second_party": "Lorrain Robertson, Richard N. Robinson", "facts": "Jonathan Lehr, the biological father of Jessica M., filed a petition to vacate an order of adoption. He argued that Jessica was adopted by her mother\u2019s husband in violation of the Constitution because Lehr was never notified of the proceedings. Under New York law, Lehr was not in any of the classes of people entitled to notification of adoption proceedings. Lehr never supported the child financially, had a significant relationship with the child, or entered his name into the state\u2019s father registry. The Ulster County Family Court denied Lehr\u2019s petition and the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "637", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "378", "ID": "52670", "name": "Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1271", "docket": "81-1271", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Falls City Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Vanco Beverage, Inc.", "facts": "From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's \"meeting-competition\" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1104", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "379", "ID": "52672", "name": "Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-746", "docket": "81-746", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Akron", "second_party": "Akron Center For Reproductive Health", "facts": "In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a \"humane and sanitary manner.\" Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.
", "facts_len": "569", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "380", "ID": "52673", "name": "Michigan v. Long", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-256", "docket": "82-256", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Long", "facts": "David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution.
", "facts_len": "478", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "381", "ID": "52677", "name": "Simopoulos v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-185", "docket": "81-185", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Chris Simopoulos", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "Dr. Chris Simopoulos, a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist, performed an abortion for a 17-year-old girl at his clinic in Falls Church, Virginia. The girl was in her second trimester and did not inform her parents about the procedure, despite Dr. Simopoulos\u2019 suggestion. Dr. Simploulous was indicted under a Virginia law prohibiting second trimester abortions outside of a licensed hospital. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County convicted him without a jury and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "528", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "382", "ID": "52682", "name": "Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1687", "docket": "81-1687", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Sony Corporation of America", "second_party": "Universal City Studios, Inc.", "facts": "Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the \"Betamax\" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "383", "ID": "52686", "name": "Bob Jones University v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-3", "docket": "81-3", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Bob Jones University", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Bob Jones University was dedicated to \"fundamentalist Christian beliefs\" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.
", "facts_len": "1144", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "384", "ID": "52690", "name": "Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1839", "docket": "81-1839", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company", "second_party": "Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue", "facts": "From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a \"use tax\" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax.
", "facts_len": "550", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "385", "ID": "52695", "name": "United States v. Place", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1617", "docket": "81-1617", "term": "1982", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Raymond J. Place", "facts": "(Tom Feledy prepared this summary.)
\nA traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a \"sniff\" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio
\n, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege.
", "facts_len": "898", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "386", "ID": "52697", "name": "Mueller v. Allen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-195", "docket": "82-195", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Mueller", "second_party": "Allen", "facts": "A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.
", "facts_len": "299", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "387", "ID": "52698", "name": "Barefoot v. Estelle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-6080", "docket": "82-6080", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Thomas A. Barefoot", "second_party": "W.J. Estelle, Director, Texas Department of Corrections", "facts": "On November 14, 1978, a Texas jury in Bell County found Thomas A. Barefoot guilty of the murder of a police officer. A separate sentencing hearing was held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The prosecution called two psychiatrists to the stand who testified that Barefoot was likely to commit further acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and argued that the use of the psychiatrists to testify as to future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatric testimony cannot accurately predict future dangerousness and is likely to produce erroneous convictions. He also argued that this specific testimony was unconstitutional, as neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
\nBarefoot\u2019s execution was scheduled for September 7, 1980. A stay of execution was granted by the Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition of certiorari. The petition was denied, and Barefoot\u2019s execution was rescheduled for October 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Barefoot\u2019s application for habeas corpus, and he filed a petition for habeas corpus in district court. The district court granted a stay of execution pending action on the petition, and later denied the petition and vacated the stay of execution. The district court also issued a certificate of probable cause that would allow Barefoot to continue the appeals process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied Barefoot\u2019s petition for habeas corpus and motion for a stay of execution. Barefoot appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District for a stay of execution, pending the consideration of his appeal of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
", "facts_len": "1953", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "388", "ID": "52699", "name": "Karcher v. Daggett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-2057", "docket": "81-2057", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Karcher", "second_party": "Daggett", "facts": "Democrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. Even though the district populations differed by less than one percent from each other, they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power in the state.
", "facts_len": "330", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "389", "ID": "52705", "name": "Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-276", "docket": "82-276", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Raymond L. Dirks", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "In 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold their stock based on Dirks\u2019 information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding\u2019s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks\u2019 information, and the SEC then began investigating Dirks\u2019 role in the affair.
\nIn their investigation of Dirks\u2019 actions, the SEC found that he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1592", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "390", "ID": "52707", "name": "Connick v. Myers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251", "docket": "81-1251", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Harry Connick", "second_party": "Sheila Meyers", "facts": "Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "391", "ID": "52712", "name": "Zant v. Stephens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-89", "docket": "81-89", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Walter Zant, Warden of Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center", "second_party": "Alpha Otis O'Daniel Stephens", "facts": "A jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances. While Stephens\u2019 appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid. After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
\nOn certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid. The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand.
", "facts_len": "964", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "392", "ID": "52709", "name": "Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-896", "docket": "81-896", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Perry Education Association", "second_party": "Perry Local Educators' Association", "facts": "The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "675", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "393", "ID": "52717", "name": "Brown v. Thomson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/82-65", "docket": "82-65", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Brown", "second_party": "Thomson", "facts": "In apportioning its state legislative seats, the State of Wyoming made provisions to allocate to each county at least one state representative. With the state's total population and its sixty-four House seats, the ideal apportionment would have been 7,337 persons per representative. Given the guarantee of county representation, Niobrara County, with a population of less than half the ideal (2,924), was allocated a House seat.
", "facts_len": "437", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "394", "ID": "52724", "name": "IIllinois v. Gates", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-430", "docket": "81-430", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Lance Gates, et ux", "facts": "The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.
", "facts_len": "351", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "395", "ID": "52741", "name": "Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1370", "docket": "81-1370", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Energy Reserves Group, Inc.", "second_party": "Kansas City Power & Light Company", "facts": "The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained \"price escalator\" clauses which provided for gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the \"price escalator\" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger \"price escalator\" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.
", "facts_len": "1538", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "396", "ID": "52745", "name": "Bush v. Lucas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-469", "docket": "81-469", "term": "1982", "first_party": "Bush", "second_party": "Lucas", "facts": "Bush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments critical of the Center. Lucas, the Center s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission s (CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay. While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations.
", "facts_len": "1083", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "397", "ID": "52747", "name": "Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-141", "docket": "83-141", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Hawaii Housing Authority", "second_party": "Midkiff", "facts": "After extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act.
", "facts_len": "511", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "398", "ID": "52748", "name": "Roberts v. United States Jaycees", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-724", "docket": "83-724", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Roberts", "second_party": "United States Jaycees", "facts": "According to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.
", "facts_len": "701", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "399", "ID": "52749", "name": "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-91", "docket": "82-91", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service", "second_party": "Padungsri Phinpathya", "facts": "The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members.
\nPadrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas expired, they chose to stay without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya\u2019s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya\u2019s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later.
\nThe Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge\u2019s ruling and held that Phinpathya\u2019s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence \u201cmeaningfully interruptive\u201d of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya\u2019s intent was always to return to the US.
", "facts_len": "1563", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "400", "ID": "52761", "name": "Florida v. Meyers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-1279", "docket": "83-1279", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Meyers", "facts": "Meyers was charged with sexual battery. Police officers searched his automobile at the time of his arrest, and then impounded the vehicle at a private facility. Eight hours later, the police re-entered the facility, without a warrant, and searched the car a second time. A Florida court suppressed evidence obtained in the second search, arguing the warrantless search was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court subsequently accepted the State's petition for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "516", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "401", "ID": "52762", "name": "Koehler v. Engle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-1", "docket": "83-1", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Koehler", "second_party": "Engle", "facts": "Tilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk.
\nEngle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol.
\nOn trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police.
\nThe trial judge instructed the jury that malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is \"implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person.\" Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that \"a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts.\" He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error.
\nA unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.
", "facts_len": "3215", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "402", "ID": "52769", "name": "United States v. Yermian", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-346", "docket": "83-346", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Esmail Yermian", "facts": "In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were \u201ctrue, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.\u201d Government investigators later discovered that Yermian\u2019s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information.
\nAt his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction.
", "facts_len": "1181", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "403", "ID": "52770", "name": "National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-271", "docket": "83-271", "term": "1983", "first_party": "NCAA", "second_party": "Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al.", "facts": "In 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a \u201cminimum aggregate compensation\u201d to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan.
\nThe University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1383", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "404", "ID": "52778", "name": "Hishon v. King & Spalding", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-940", "docket": "82-940", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Elizabeth Anderson Hishon", "second_party": "King & Spalding", "facts": "In 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King & Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with \u201csatisfactory evaluations\u201d would be promoted to partner on a \u201cfair and equal basis.\u201d Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979.
\nIn November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling.
", "facts_len": "1232", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "405", "ID": "52781", "name": "Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-276", "docket": "83-276", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Selective Service System", "second_party": "Minnesota Public Interest Research Group", "facts": "Part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.
", "facts_len": "310", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "406", "ID": "52783", "name": "Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1913", "docket": "82-1913", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Garcia", "second_party": "San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority", "facts": "The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a \"traditional\" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.
", "facts_len": "551", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "407", "ID": "52785", "name": "Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1005", "docket": "82-1005", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Chevron U.S.A. Inc.", "second_party": "Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al.", "facts": "The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single \u201cbubble\u201d. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.
", "facts_len": "898", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "408", "ID": "52796", "name": "Michigan v. Clifford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-357", "docket": "82-357", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Raymond Clifford and Emma Jean Clifford", "facts": "Early in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords\u2019 insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as evidence.
\nRaymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the search.
", "facts_len": "1383", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "409", "ID": "52803", "name": "Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1795", "docket": "82-1795", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Capital Cities Cable, Inc.", "second_party": "Crisp", "facts": "In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "727", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "410", "ID": "52807", "name": "Strickland v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1554", "docket": "82-1554", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Strickland", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering \"reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances.\" It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.
", "facts_len": "1007", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "411", "ID": "52814", "name": "INS v. Lopez-Mendoza", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-491", "docket": "83-491", "term": "1983", "first_party": "INS", "second_party": "Lopez-Mendoza", "facts": "Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and \"[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing.\" The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.
", "facts_len": "1278", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "412", "ID": "52818", "name": "United States v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1349", "docket": "82-1349", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)", "facts": "The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to \"promote the safety of civil aircraft\" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct \"spot-check\" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California \"Good Samaritan\" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California \"Good Samaritan\" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1858", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "413", "ID": "52819", "name": "Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-18", "docket": "83-18", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.", "second_party": "Greenmoss Builders, Inc.", "facts": "Dun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders \"continued in business as usual.\" Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Gertz only applied to cases involving defamation by the media.
", "facts_len": "1432", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "414", "ID": "52836", "name": "New York v. Quarles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1213", "docket": "82-1213", "term": "1983", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Quarles", "facts": "After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.
", "facts_len": "381", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "415", "ID": "52838", "name": "Heckler v. Matthews", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1050", "docket": "82-1050", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Heckler", "second_party": "Matthews", "facts": "Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a \"pension offset\" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.
", "facts_len": "731", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "416", "ID": "52841", "name": "Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-945", "docket": "82-945", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Sure-Tan, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Sure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the NLRB and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them.
\nThe NLRB\u2019s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ\u2019s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for the recommendation of reinstatement.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board\u2019s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.
", "facts_len": "1651", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "417", "ID": "52842", "name": "Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1565", "docket": "82-1565", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Bacchus Imports Ltd.", "second_party": "Dias", "facts": "The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.
", "facts_len": "348", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "418", "ID": "52844", "name": "Nix v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1651", "docket": "82-1651", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Nix", "second_party": "Williams", "facts": "Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.
", "facts_len": "464", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "419", "ID": "52843", "name": "Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1246", "docket": "82-1246", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Bose Corporation", "second_party": "Consumers Union of United States, Inc.", "facts": "Bose Corporation, a loudspeaker manufacturer, brought a product disparagement action against Consumer Union for publishing a negative review of Bose products. Among other comments, Consumer Union's article mistakenly said that Bose loudspeakers caused sounds of individual musical instruments to wander \"about the room\" when they in fact merely wandered \"along the wall[s].\" Ruling in favor of Bose, the District Court found that the article's statements were factually wrong and made with \"actual malice.\" On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed as it found the lower court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Bose certiorari.
", "facts_len": "660", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "420", "ID": "52848", "name": "New Jersey v. T.L.O.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-712", "docket": "83-712", "term": "1983", "first_party": "New Jersey", "second_party": "T.L.O.", "facts": "T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools.
", "facts_len": "833", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "421", "ID": "52849", "name": "Massachusetts v. Sheppard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-963", "docket": "82-963", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Massachusetts", "second_party": "Osborne Sheppard", "facts": "Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no \"good-faith exception\" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.
", "facts_len": "1269", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "422", "ID": "52850", "name": "Berkemer v. McCarty", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-710", "docket": "83-710", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Harry J. Berkemer, Sheriff of Franklin County, Ohio", "second_party": "Richard N. McCarty", "facts": "On March 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observed Richard McCarty\u2019s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. He followed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle. Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that he would charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer free to leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.
\nWilliams then asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty responded that he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however, a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty\u2019s system. Williams resumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence of alcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williams responded, \u201cI guess, barely,\u201d to the first question, but denied that the marijuana he smoked had been treated. At no point did Williams or any other officer tell McCarty that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.
\nMcCarty was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months. McCarty moved to exclude the incriminating statements he made to Trooper Williams both on the scene of the arrest and in jail, on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The trial court denied the motion; McCarty pled \u2018no contest\u2019 and was found guilty. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the Miranda rule does not apply to misdemeanors, relying on a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed McCarty\u2019s appeal for failing to present a substantial constitutional question. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed McCarty\u2019s writ of habeas corpus, but the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals accused of misdemeanor traffic offenses prior to custodial interrogation, but did not clearly apply this rule to McCarty\u2019s statements made at the scene of his arrest.
", "facts_len": "2418", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "423", "ID": "52854", "name": "United States v. Leon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1771", "docket": "82-1771", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Alberto Leon", "facts": "The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "424", "ID": "52855", "name": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-599", "docket": "82-599", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Philip D. Farmar, et al.", "second_party": "Fred L. Engle et ux., United States", "facts": "Fred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property\u2019s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner\u2019s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner\u2019s determination, with one dissent. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that \u00a7 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property.
\nAlso in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual production during the taxable year.
\nIn the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. \u00a7 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer\u2019s average daily production so as not to exceed the taxpayer\u2019s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.
", "facts_len": "2198", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "425", "ID": "52858", "name": "United States v. Karo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-850", "docket": "83-850", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "James Karo, et al.", "facts": "Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants.
", "facts_len": "389", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "426", "ID": "52860", "name": "Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1998", "docket": "82-1998", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Clark", "second_party": "Community for Creative Non-Violence", "facts": "In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request.
", "facts_len": "413", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "427", "ID": "52861", "name": "Irving Independent School District v. Tatro", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-558", "docket": "83-558", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Irving Independent School District", "second_party": "Henri Tatro, et ex.", "facts": "Henri and Mary Tatro\u2019s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable to perform this method herself because of her age, but a layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure.
\nIn 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including \u2018related services\u2019. It only required \u2018medical services\u2019 for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber\u2019s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours.
\nIn October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys\u2019 fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys\u2019 fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a \u2018related service\u2019 under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a \u2018related service\u2019 under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a \u2018medical service\u2019 under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a \u2018related service\u2019 and ordered the defendants to modify Amber\u2019s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.
", "facts_len": "2329", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "428", "ID": "52862", "name": "Minnesota v. Murphy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-827", "docket": "82-827", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Minnesota", "second_party": "Marshall Donald Murphy", "facts": "In 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged. In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation. During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer. While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder. An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy\u2019s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting. During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he \u201cfelt like calling a lawyer\u201d but still admitted to the rape and murder. The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.
\nAt trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy\u2019s parole officer knew that Murphy\u2019s answers were likely to be incriminating.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "429", "ID": "52867", "name": "Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-912", "docket": "82-912", "term": "1983", "first_party": "League of Women Voters of California", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to \"engage in editorializing.\"
", "facts_len": "257", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "430", "ID": "52866", "name": "Grove City College v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-792", "docket": "82-792", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Grove City College", "second_party": "Bell", "facts": "Grove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a Department of Education-run program. The DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.
", "facts_len": "747", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "431", "ID": "52869", "name": "Palmore v. Sidoti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1734", "docket": "82-1734", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Palmore", "second_party": "Sidoti", "facts": "Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.
", "facts_len": "505", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "432", "ID": "52872", "name": "Waller v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-321", "docket": "83-321", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Waller", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.
", "facts_len": "536", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "433", "ID": "52870", "name": "California v. Trombetta", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-305", "docket": "83-305", "term": "1983", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Trombetta", "facts": "In 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a \u201cbreathalyzer test\u201d) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "434", "ID": "52871", "name": "Hudson v. Palmer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1630", "docket": "82-1630", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Hudson", "second_party": "Palmer", "facts": "Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a \"shakedown\" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.
", "facts_len": "399", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "435", "ID": "52873", "name": "United States v. Jacobsen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167", "docket": "82-1167", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen", "facts": "On May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute.
\nAfter they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required.
", "facts_len": "1269", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "436", "ID": "52878", "name": "McKaskle v. Wiggins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1135", "docket": "82-1135", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Dan V. McKaskle, Acting Director of the Texas Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Carl Edwin Wiggins", "facts": "On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "902", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "437", "ID": "52880", "name": "Lynch v. Donnelly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1256", "docket": "82-1256", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Lynch", "second_party": "Donnelly", "facts": "The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading \"Seasons Greetings,\" and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.
", "facts_len": "423", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "438", "ID": "52887", "name": "Schall v. Martin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1248", "docket": "82-1248", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Ellen Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice", "second_party": "Gregory Martin, et al.", "facts": "In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court\u2019s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred.
", "facts_len": "1401", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "439", "ID": "52899", "name": "Calder v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1401", "docket": "82-1401", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Ian Calder, John South", "second_party": "Shirley Jones", "facts": "Shirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction.
\nNational Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state.
\nJones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.
", "facts_len": "1771", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "440", "ID": "52904", "name": "Oliver v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-15", "docket": "82-15", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Oliver", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases involving the discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land.
\nIn the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked with a \"No Trespassing\" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields.
\nIn the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "441", "ID": "52902", "name": "United States v. Cronic", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-660", "docket": "82-660", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Harrison P. Cronic", "facts": "During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic\u2019s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government\u2019s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty on and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
\nThe Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "840", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "442", "ID": "52907", "name": "Pulliam v. Allen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1432", "docket": "82-1432", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Gladys Pulliam, Magistrate for the County of Culpeper, Virginia", "second_party": "Richmond Allen and Jesse Nicholson", "facts": "In January 1980, Richmond Allen was arrested for allegedly using abusive and insulting language, which is a Class 3 misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of $500. Gladys Pulliam, the state magistrate for Culpeper County, Virginia set bail at $250 and, when Allen was unable to make bail, Pulliam committed him to the Culpeper County Jail for 14 days. Allen was tried, found guilty, fined, and released. The trial judge reopened his case and reversed the judgment. Allen sued Pulliam in district court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief for incarcerating him while waiting for trial on non-jailable offenses.
\nJesse Nicholson was arrested four times in a two-month period for public intoxication, a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine. Like Allen, Nicholson was incarcerated for failure to make bail, and he intervened in Allen\u2019s suit as a party plaintiff.
\nThis district court held that Pulliam\u2019s practice of incarcerating persons for not making bail on non-jailable offenses violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court enjoined the practice and found Allen and Nicholson entitled to costs, including attorneys\u2019 fees. Pulliam appealed the finding regarding costs and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was granted judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the judicial immunity argument and affirmed the district court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1461", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "443", "ID": "52913", "name": "Block v. Rutherford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-317", "docket": "83-317", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Block", "second_party": "Rutherford", "facts": "Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is \"a matter of great importance\" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
", "facts_len": "1129", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "444", "ID": "52919", "name": "Heckler v. Day", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1371", "docket": "82-1371", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Heckler", "second_party": "Day", "facts": "Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the \"reasonable time\" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1046", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "445", "ID": "52924", "name": "United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1448", "docket": "82-1448", "term": "1983", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Stauffer Chemical Company", "facts": "In 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a private firm planned to inspect a plant owned by Stauffer Chemical Co. (Stauffer) in Tennessee. Before granting entry, Stauffer requested that the employees of the private firm sign an agreement promising not to disclose any trade secrets they might learn during the inspection. The employees refused, and Stauffer denied them entry. The EPA and private firm returned with a warrant to enter the premises, but Stauffer again denied them entry.
\nThe EPA began a civil contempt proceeding against Stauffer to gain entry. The district court ruled in favor of the EPA and Stauffer appealed. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the employees of the private firm did not qualify as \u201cauthorized representatives\u201d under the Clean Air Act, and therefore Stauffer was not required to grant them entry. Stauffer had used this argument before in a similar case from Wyoming, which involved the same parties. Stauffer argued that this previous case precluded the government from re-litigating this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with Stauffer and reversed.
", "facts_len": "1140", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "446", "ID": "52923", "name": "Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-485", "docket": "82-485", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Keeton", "second_party": "Hustler Magazine, Inc.", "facts": "Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the \"single publication rule,\" which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.
", "facts_len": "1405", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "447", "ID": "52926", "name": "Allen v. Wright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/81-757", "docket": "81-757", "term": "1983", "first_party": "Allen", "second_party": "Wright", "facts": "In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.
", "facts_len": "623", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "448", "ID": "52929", "name": "Wallace v. Jaffree", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-812", "docket": "83-812", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Wallace", "second_party": "Jaffree", "facts": "An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.
", "facts_len": "209", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "449", "ID": "52936", "name": "City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-468", "docket": "84-468", "term": "1984", "first_party": "City of Cleburne, Texas", "second_party": "Cleburne Living Center, Inc.", "facts": "In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit application to operate a home for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted to deny the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.
", "facts_len": "237", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "450", "ID": "52948", "name": "United States v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1750", "docket": "83-1750", "term": "1984", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "James Rual Miller", "facts": "An indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.
", "facts_len": "764", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "451", "ID": "52954", "name": "California v. Carney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-859", "docket": "83-859", "term": "1984", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Charles R. Carney", "facts": "On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney\u2019s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.\n
Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "452", "ID": "52958", "name": "Wilson v. Garcia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-2146", "docket": "83-2146", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Wilson", "second_party": "Garcia", "facts": "Gary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.
", "facts_len": "1582", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "453", "ID": "52979", "name": "Heckler v. Chaney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1878", "docket": "83-1878", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Heckler", "second_party": "Chaney", "facts": "Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.
", "facts_len": "857", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "454", "ID": "52984", "name": "Wayte v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1292", "docket": "83-1292", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Wayte", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Mr. Wayte was required by a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation.
\nThe Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either reported to the government that they were not registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act.
\nThe district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.
", "facts_len": "1320", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "455", "ID": "52982", "name": "United States v. Bagley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-48", "docket": "84-48", "term": "1984", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Hughes Anderson Bagley", "facts": "In October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government\u2019s two principal witnesses were James F. O\u2019Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (\u201cATF\u201d) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O\u2019Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O\u2019Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges.
\nIn mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, \u201cContract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.\u201d These contracts indicated that O\u2019Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, alleging that the government\u2019s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
\nThe motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley\u2019s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O\u2019Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court\u2019s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley\u2019s counsel did not seek to discredit O\u2019Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government\u2019s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination.
", "facts_len": "2312", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "456", "ID": "52986", "name": "Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1158", "docket": "83-1158", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Estate of Thornton", "second_party": "Caldor, Inc.", "facts": "Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1083", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "457", "ID": "53024", "name": "McDonald v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-476", "docket": "84-476", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Robert McDonald", "second_party": "David I. Smith", "facts": "In July 1981, David Smith sued Robert McDonald in state court. Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith\u2019s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith\u2019s complaint alleged that the letters had their intended effect\u2014he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation\u2014so he sought compensatory damages.
\nMcDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1069", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "458", "ID": "53027", "name": "Aguilar v. Felton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-237", "docket": "84-237", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Aguilar", "second_party": "Felton", "facts": "Part of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorized local institutions to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had used portions of its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.
", "facts_len": "320", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "459", "ID": "53028", "name": "Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1632", "docket": "83-1632", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.", "second_party": "Nation Enterprises", "facts": "In 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper & Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, scooped Time. Harper & Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted material was sanctioned as a fair use.
", "facts_len": "824", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "460", "ID": "53030", "name": "Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-2030", "docket": "83-2030", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Board of Education of Oklahoma City", "second_party": "National Gay Task Force", "facts": "The National Gay Task Force filed a facial constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma Statute that allowed schools to fire teachers who engage in \u201cpublic homosexual activity\u201d or \u201cpublic homosexual conduct\u201d. Public homosexual activity encompassed physical sexual acts while public homosexual conduct included advocating for or encouraging public or private homosexual activity. The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, holding that the statute did not inhibit First Amendment freedoms, and the right of privacy did not include the activities prohibited by the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed in part, holding that the part of the statute that prohibited public homosexual conduct was unconstitutionally broad and attempted to regulate speech. The court upheld that part of the statute prohibiting public homosexual activity.
", "facts_len": "885", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "461", "ID": "53034", "name": "United States v. Montoya de Hernandez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-755", "docket": "84-755", "term": "1984", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez", "facts": "Customs officials stopped Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the Los Angeles Airport, where she arrived after a flight from Bogota, Columbia. Montoya de Hernandez\u2019s passport revealed eight recent trips from Bogota to Miami or Los Angeles. After further questioning, officials detained Montoya de Hernandez under suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After 16 hours of detention where Montoya de Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom, officials obtained a court order for an x-ray and other tests. At the hospital, a doctor removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum. Over the next four days, Montoya de Hernandez passed 88 balloons filled with cocaine, totaling 528 grams. At trial, the district court admitted the cocaine into evidence and convicted Montoya de Hernandez on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Montoya de Hernandez\u2019s detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs officials did not have a \u201cclear indication\u201d that she was smuggling drugs.
", "facts_len": "1079", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "462", "ID": "53029", "name": "Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1569", "docket": "83-1569", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Mitsubishi Motors Corporation", "second_party": "Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases involving claims and counterclaims between the same parties. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese corporation that manufactures automobiles in Japan. The sales agreement provided for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association of all disputes arising out of certain articles of the agreement. A dispute did arise from slowing automobile sales. When the dispute could not be resolved, Mitsubishi sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel arbitration. Soler filed counterclaims, including Sherman Act antitrust violations. The district court ordered arbitration of all claims, holding that the international nature of the dispute required enforcement of the arbitration clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims.
", "facts_len": "979", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "463", "ID": "53039", "name": "Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-363", "docket": "84-363", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Northeast Bancorp, Inc.", "second_party": "Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System", "facts": "Certain bank holding companies located principally in either Connecticut or Massachusetts applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to obtain approval for acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies (banks) in the other state. If a bank from one state seeks to acquire a bank, or substantially all of a bank's assets, from another state, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. Section 1842(d), allows the Board to approve the acquisition only if it \"is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such [acquired] bank is located.\" Massachusetts and Connecticut have substantially similar laws allowing out-of-state banks to buy in-state banks only if the out-of-state banks (1) have their principal place of business in another New England State, and (2) the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges. Certain banks from outside of New England opposed the acquisitions, but the Board found that the Douglas Amendment did not prevent their authorization, and approved them.
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "464", "ID": "53040", "name": "School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-433", "docket": "84-433", "term": "1984", "first_party": "School Committee of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al.", "second_party": "Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al.", "facts": "Under the provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act, state and local education agencies must provide handicapped children and their parents or guardians with access to the appropriate safeguards to ensure free and appropriate public education. Such safeguards include the right of the parents and guardians to participate in the development of an individual education program (IEP) and a procedure for the review of a proposed IEP if there is disagreement.
\nIn the spring of 1979, Michael Panico, who was considered to be \u201chandicapped\u201d under the meaning of the Act, was attending Memorial School, a public school in Burlington. His continued poor performance and the school\u2019s inability to handle his needs led to a discussion between the school district and Michael\u2019s parents about what changes needed to be made to his IEP. In June of 1979, the town presented the Panicos with an IEP that called for Michael to be placed at Pine Glen School. In the meantime, the Panicos had met with specialists at the Massachusetts General Hospital who recommended that Michael\u2019s needs could best be served at the Carroll School in Lincoln, Massachusetts. The Panicos enrolled Michael at the Carroll School at their own expense.
\nThe Massachusetts Department of Education\u2019s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) held several hearings on the issue and determined that the town\u2019s proposed placement was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was most adequately equipped to meet Michael\u2019s needs. The BSEA ordered the town to pay for Michael\u2019s tuition and transportation, as well as reimburse the Panicos for money already spent. The town sought judicial review in district court under federal and state statutes. The district court granted summary judgment against the town on the state law claim and set a date for trial on the federal claim. Because the town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the Panicos and the state moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment in regards to the state law claim and held that none of the parties were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because none could show irreparable injury. On remand, the district court found in favor of the town that the proposed IEP was appropriate and that the town should not be required to compensate the Panicos. The case was transferred to a different district judge to rule on the issue of whether or not the town should be required to pay the Panicos for costs incurred while the case was pending. The district court held that the Panicos\u2019 decision to place Michael in the Carroll School without the town\u2019s consent absolved the town of financial responsibility while the case was pending and ordered the Panicos to reimburse the town. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in conducting an entirely new trial, gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and did not properly evaluate the IEP in question.
", "facts_len": "3039", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "465", "ID": "53038", "name": "Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-4", "docket": "84-4", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Williamson County Regional Planning Commission", "second_party": "Hamilton Bank of Johnson City", "facts": "Hamilton Bank of Johnson City owned of a tract of land in Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a \"taking\" under the Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the \"taking\" was only temporary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all \"economically viable\" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "466", "ID": "53048", "name": "Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-261", "docket": "84-261", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "second_party": "Gary Weintraub, Frank H. McGhee, Andrew McGhee", "facts": "The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
", "facts_len": "823", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "467", "ID": "53050", "name": "Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1362", "docket": "83-1362", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Cleveland Board of Education", "second_party": "James Loudermill", "facts": "James Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since Loudermill qualified as a \"classified civil servant\" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post-dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.
", "facts_len": "1688", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "468", "ID": "53046", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1032", "docket": "83-1032", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "National Conservative Political Action Committee", "facts": "In 1975, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) was accused by both the Democratic Party of the United States and the Federal Election Commission of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act stipulated that independent political action committees could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. This case was decided together with Democratic Party v. NCPAC.
", "facts_len": "436", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "469", "ID": "53051", "name": "Tennessee v. Garner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1035", "docket": "83-1035", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Tennessee", "second_party": "Garner", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases against different defendants involving the same incident. During a chase, police officer Elton Hymon shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hymon admitted that before he shot he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and \"figured\" he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital where he died a short time later.
\nGarner's father sued seeking damages for violations of Garner's constitutional rights. The district court entered judgment for the defendants because Tennessee law authorized Hymon's actions. The court also felt that Garner had assumed the risk of being shot by recklessly attempting to escape. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a \"seizure\" under the Fourth Amendment and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large.
", "facts_len": "1098", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "470", "ID": "53053", "name": "Ake v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-5424", "docket": "83-5424", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Glen Burton Ake", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a \u201cmaximum security facility.\u201d Six weeks after this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings.
\nAke intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake\u2019s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake\u2019s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake\u2019s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake\u2014still unable to afford a psychiatrist\u2014could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants charged with capital crimes.
", "facts_len": "1699", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "471", "ID": "53057", "name": "City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1919", "docket": "83-1919", "term": "1984", "first_party": "City of Oklahoma City", "second_party": "Rose Marie Tuttle, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Tuttle", "facts": "On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert\u2019s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who \u201cacting under color of state law\u201d deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal \u201cpolicy,\u201d but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle\u2019s estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "952", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "472", "ID": "53065", "name": "United States v. Abel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-935", "docket": "83-935", "term": "1984", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "John Clyde Abel", "facts": "In 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel\u2019s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle\u2019s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men\u2019s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang\u2019s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel\u2019s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1394", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "473", "ID": "53076", "name": "Oregon v. Elstad", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-773", "docket": "83-773", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Oregon", "second_party": "Elstad", "facts": "Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.
", "facts_len": "353", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "474", "ID": "53090", "name": "Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1466", "docket": "83-1466", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Supreme Court of New Hampshire", "second_party": "Piper", "facts": "Kathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to become a member of the bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980.
\nOn March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper\u2019s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1132", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "475", "ID": "53091", "name": "School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-990", "docket": "83-990", "term": "1984", "first_party": "School District of the City of Grand Rapids, et al.", "second_party": "Phyllis Ball, et al.", "facts": "In the 1976-1977 school year, the school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs, Shared Time and Community Education, that provided secular classes to private school students at public expense. The Shared Time program offered classes during the school day that were intended to \u201csupplement the core curriculum\u201d of the private schools. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public school teachers, and many had previously worked in private schools. The Community Education program was offered for children and adults at many different sites, but the classes at issue took place after the school day in private elementary schools. The Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, and many also held jobs at private schools. The classrooms for both programs were leased from the private schools. The vast majority of the participating private schools were religious, and there was no evidence that a public school student ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class held in a private school.
\nSix taxpayers filed suit against the school district and state officials and alleged that they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by using public funds to pay for private (and religious) education. The district court applied the Lemon test and determined that, although the aim was secular, the effect of the programs conferred benefits to religious institutions and entangled the affairs of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1560", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "476", "ID": "53094", "name": "Winston v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1334", "docket": "83-1334", "term": "1984", "first_party": "Andrew J. Winston, Sheriff, et al.", "second_party": "Rudolph Lee, Jr.", "facts": "Around 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson\u2019s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
\nThe Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1508", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "477", "ID": "53099", "name": "City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1360", "docket": "84-1360", "term": "1985", "first_party": "City of Renton", "second_party": "Playtime Theatres, Inc.", "facts": "The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of \"any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.\" Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
", "facts_len": "342", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "478", "ID": "53102", "name": "Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667", "docket": "84-1667", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Bethel School District No. 403", "second_party": "Matthew N. Fraser, a minor, and E.L. Fraser, Guardian Ad Litem", "facts": "At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which \"substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.\" Fraser was suspended from school for two days.
", "facts_len": "539", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "479", "ID": "53103", "name": "Dow Chemical Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1259", "docket": "84-1259", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Dow Chemical Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's \"expectation of privacy\" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.
", "facts_len": "661", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "480", "ID": "53118", "name": "Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1273", "docket": "84-1273", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Regents of the University of Michigan", "second_party": "Ewing", "facts": "Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board\u2019s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful.
\nIn August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing\u2019s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1144", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "481", "ID": "53119", "name": "Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1979", "docket": "84-1979", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Meritor Savings Bank, FSB", "second_party": "Vinson", "facts": "After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a \"hostile working environment\" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.
", "facts_len": "490", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "482", "ID": "53120", "name": "Batson v. Kentucky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-6263", "docket": "84-6263", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Batson", "second_party": "Kentucky", "facts": "Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.
", "facts_len": "328", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "483", "ID": "53124", "name": "Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-495", "docket": "84-495", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Thornburgh", "second_party": "American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists", "facts": "In 1982, the state of Pennsylvania enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortion. The law required the following: \"informed consent\" of the woman, the dissemination of information concerning the risks of abortion, reporting procedures, the use of certain medical techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability abortions. The initial suit was brought against Richard Thornburgh, the Governor of Pennsylvania.
", "facts_len": "477", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "484", "ID": "53131", "name": "California v. Ciraolo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1513", "docket": "84-1513", "term": "1985", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Ciraolo", "facts": "The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction.
", "facts_len": "615", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "485", "ID": "53134", "name": "Lockhart v. McCree", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1865", "docket": "84-1865", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Lockhart", "second_party": "McCree", "facts": "During the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge removed prospective jurors who stated that under no circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "419", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "486", "ID": "53147", "name": "Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5", "docket": "85-5", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air", "facts": "In April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program.
\nIn response, the Delaware Valley Citizens\u2019 Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions.
\nOn January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding.
\nThe CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys\u2019 fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys\u2019 fees that included time spent by plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania\u2019s performance under the consent decree, an award for \u201csuperior quality\u201d while opposing the state\u2019s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs\u2019 success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys\u2019 fees awarded by the district court.
", "facts_len": "2239", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "487", "ID": "53145", "name": "Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1656", "docket": "84-1656", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.
", "facts_len": "498", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "488", "ID": "53149", "name": "Murray v. Carrier", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1554", "docket": "84-1554", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Murray", "second_party": "Carrier", "facts": "Clifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected.
\nA year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second.
\nCarrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier.
", "facts_len": "1940", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "489", "ID": "53148", "name": "Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1560", "docket": "84-1560", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Press-Enterprise Co.", "second_party": "Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside", "facts": "A nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused\u2019s right to a fair trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because the transcript might prejudice the nurse\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a \u201creasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice\u201d, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.
", "facts_len": "1158", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "490", "ID": "53154", "name": "Goldman v. Weinberger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1097", "docket": "84-1097", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Goldman", "second_party": "Weinberger", "facts": "Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn \"except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.\"
", "facts_len": "338", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "491", "ID": "53152", "name": "Michigan v. Jackson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1531", "docket": "84-1531", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Robert Bernard Jackson", "facts": "Robert Bernard Jackson was charged with second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. During his arraignment, Jackson requested that the court appoint him counsel. The next day, Jackson was interrogated again before he was able to communicate with his attorney. Jackson confessed during that interrogation.
\nIn December 1978, Rudy Bladel killed three railroad employees in Michigan. Bladel was arrested shortly thereafter, the police questioned him twice but released him. Two months later, he was arrested again and agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present. During his arraignment the following day, Bladel requested counsel, and the court assigned a firm to his case. The next day, the police questioned Bladel again before the firm was able to contact him and before he was aware he had been assigned counsel. During this questioning, Bladel confessed.
\nIn both cases, the trial courts held that the confessions, which were obtained after arraignment and before the defendants were able to meet with counsel, were properly received into evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson\u2019s conviction, and he appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court consolidated Jackson and Bladel\u2019s cases and ruled that both confessions should not have been admitted into evidence.
", "facts_len": "1329", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "492", "ID": "53159", "name": "United States v. American College of Physicians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1737", "docket": "84-1737", "term": "1985", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "American College of Physicians", "facts": "The American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on \"unrelated business taxable income\" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of Physicians countered that the advertisements were \"substantially related\" to its tax-exempt purpose of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court.
\nThe Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related.
", "facts_len": "1137", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "493", "ID": "53163", "name": "Vasquez v. Hillery", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-836", "docket": "84-836", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Vasquez", "second_party": "Hillery", "facts": "In 1962, an all-white grand jury indicted Booker T. Hillery\u2014a black man\u2014for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Hillery was tried and convicted, he appealed his conviction and claimed that black potential jurors were systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hillery pursued remedy in state courts until the California Supreme Court finally denied him relief in 1978. Shortly after, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court requested and received statistical evidence regarding the probability of having an all-white grand jury in Kings County, California, where Hillery was indicted and subsequently ruled in favor of Hillery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "848", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "494", "ID": "53160", "name": "United States v. City of Fulton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1725", "docket": "84-1725", "term": "1985", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "City of Fulton", "facts": "In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would \"become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy).\" The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received \"confirmation and approval\" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented.
\nThe Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1104", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "495", "ID": "53169", "name": "Heath v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-5555", "docket": "84-5555", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Larry Gene Heath", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "In August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kidnap and murder his pregnant wife. Heath met the men in Georgia, just across the state line from the Heath residence in Alabama, led them back to the house, and left. Rebecca Heath\u2019s body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued investigations in which there was a degree of cooperation.
\nOn September 4, 1981, Georgia authorities arrested Heath, and he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. He was indicted by a grand jury in Troop County, Georgia, and pled guilty in February 10, 1982. On May 5, 1982, Heath was indicted by a grand jury in Russell County, Alabama. Prior to the trial, Heath argued that his conviction and sentencing in Georgia barred any prosecution in Alabama and that Alabama lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected both claims, and Heath was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Alabama Supreme Court.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "988", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "496", "ID": "53176", "name": "Bowers v. Hardwick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-140", "docket": "85-140", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Bowers", "second_party": "Hardwick", "facts": "Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "620", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "497", "ID": "53180", "name": "McLaughlin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5189", "docket": "85-5189", "term": "1985", "first_party": "McLaughlin", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery \"by the use of a dangerous weapon.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "674", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "498", "ID": "53208", "name": "Turner v. Murray", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-6646", "docket": "84-6646", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Turner", "second_party": "Murray", "facts": "In July 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner entered a jewelry store and killed the proprietor. Turner was disarmed, arrested, and charged with capital murder. During the jury selection process, Turner's counsel requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors if they would be biased by the fact that Turner was black while the victim was white. The judge declined to ask the question regarding racial prejudice and instead asked the prospective jurors if they thought that they would be able to be impartial and fair. Turner was convicted and sentenced to death.
\nAfter exhausting his appellate options at the state level, Turner filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Because the facts of the case \"did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might [have] infect[ed the defendant's] trial,\" the district court held that the trial judge's refusal to question potential jurors about racial prejudice was not unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1033", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "499", "ID": "53207", "name": "United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-554", "docket": "85-554", "term": "1985", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Hughes Properties, Inc.", "facts": "Hughes Properties owned a casino called Harold\u2019s Club in Reno, Nevada. This casino operated slot machines that featured \u201cprogressive\u201d jackpots. This jackpot increased as gamblers played and only paid out when the machine hit a certain combination. State gaming regulations prohibited lowering the jackpot until someone won. At the end of each fiscal year, Hughes took the year\u2019s total progressive jackpots and subtracted the amount of last year\u2019s jackpots to claim that amount as a business expense deduction. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, reasoning that until a patron won the jackpot, the liability was contingent.
\nThe IRS determined a tax deficiency amount, which Hughes paid before suing for a refund. The United States Claims Court granted summary judgment to Hughes on the ground that the jackpot amount was contingent until someone won it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the casino\u2019s liability was not contingent because state regulations barred a decrease in the amount.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "500", "ID": "53212", "name": "City of Riverside v. Rivera", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-224", "docket": "85-224", "term": "1985", "first_party": "City of Riverside", "second_party": "Rivera", "facts": "In 1975, eight Chicano individuals were attending a party that was broken up by the Riverside police using tear gas and physical force without a warrant. Subsequently, the eight individuals filed suit in Federal District Court against the city and various police officers under several federal Civil Rights Acts, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The jury found in the individuals' favor and awarded $33,350 in compensatory and punitive damages. The individuals also sought attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 in the amount of $245,456.25, based on 1,946.75 hours expended by their two attorneys at $125 per hour and 84.5 hours expended by law clerks at $25 per hour. Finding both the hours and rates reasonable, the District Court awarded the requested amount, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The appellate court found that the fee award was not excessive merely because it exceeded the amount of damages awarded by the jury.
", "facts_len": "1018", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "501", "ID": "53214", "name": "East River Steamship Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1726", "docket": "84-1726", "term": "1985", "first_party": "East River Steamship Corporation", "second_party": "Transamerica Delaval Inc.", "facts": "Transamerica Delaval Inc. designed and manufactured propulsion systems for four supertankers. The propulsion systems eventually failed due to design and manufacturing flaws. Only the propulsion systems themselves were damaged - no other part of the ship was damaged, and no one was injured.
\nEast River Steamship and the other companies that had purchased the supertankers sued Transamerica under the negligence and products-liability doctrines of tort law, a branch of law that deals with injuries not covered by contractual agreements. They sought compensation for the cost of repairing the ships as well as for the income they lost while the ships were out of service. The district court, however, granted summary judgment to Transamerica. It held that the injuries were not covered by tort law because only the propulsion systems themselves had been injured, and that the case therefore dealt with the product's warranty rather than tort law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case en banc and affirmed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "502", "ID": "53217", "name": "Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1602", "docket": "84-1602", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Anderson", "second_party": "Liberty Lobby, Inc.", "facts": "Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty), a nonprofit \"citizen's lobby\" corporation, filed a libel action against a magazine published by Jack Anderson et al. Liberty claimed that one of Anderson's articles contained false and derogatory statements about its operations. In its defense, Anderson claimed that as a public entity Liberty must show with \"convincing clarity\" that Anderson acted with actual malice - something they could not do since the article's author stated in an affidavit that he thoroughly researched and cross-checked all his information. Liberty claimed that Anderson did act with actual malice since its author depended on patently unreliable sources. Following a district court's summary judgment ruling favoring Anderson, an appellate court reversed as it held that the lower court erroneously applied actual malice standards of proof at the summary judgement phase. Anderson appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "948", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "503", "ID": "53218", "name": "Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1340", "docket": "84-1340", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Wygant", "second_party": "Jackson Board of Education", "facts": "Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing \"role models\" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.
", "facts_len": "942", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "504", "ID": "53219", "name": "Maine v. Taylor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-62", "docket": "85-62", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Maine", "second_party": "Taylor", "facts": "In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities.
", "facts_len": "250", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "505", "ID": "53223", "name": "Square D Company v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-21", "docket": "85-21", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Square D Company, et al.", "second_party": "Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The petitioners represented a group of corporations that used a group of motor carriers regulated by the Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc. (NFTB), an organization that engaged in collective ratemaking activities for shipping goods over the border between the United States and Canada. The petitioners sued the carriers and alleged that, between 1966 and 1981, the group had engaged in price fixing that violated the terms of the NFTB agreement and could not be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The petitioners argued that during those years they paid higher rates than they would have in a freely competitive market and sought treble damages on that difference, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the case based on precedent set by a previous Supreme Court decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision regarding the treble damages and remanded for further hearings to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to injunctive relief.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "506", "ID": "53229", "name": "Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1070", "docket": "84-1070", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Larry Witters", "second_party": "Washington Department of Services for the Blind", "facts": "Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School for the Blind, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law.
\nWitters applied to Washington\u2019s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington\u2019s constitution. The commission denied Witters\u2019 application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission\u2019s ruling, also citing Washington\u2019s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner.
\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment\u2019s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters\u2019 application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.
", "facts_len": "1608", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "507", "ID": "53228", "name": "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Philadelphia Gear Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1972", "docket": "84-1972", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "second_party": "Philadelphia Gear Corporation", "facts": "Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of \"deposit\" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.
", "facts_len": "1420", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "508", "ID": "53231", "name": "Moran v. Burbine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1485", "docket": "84-1485", "term": "1985", "first_party": "John Moran, Superintendent of the Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections", "second_party": "Brian K. Burbine", "facts": "Brian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine\u2019s sister called the local Public Defender\u2019s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him.
\nAt trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine\u2019s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer\u2019s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1448", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "509", "ID": "53233", "name": "Bowen v. Roy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-780", "docket": "84-780", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services; John R. Block, Secretary of Agriculture; Walter Cohen, Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare", "second_party": "Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller", "facts": "Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would \u201crob the spirit\u201d of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy\u2019s request for damages.
", "facts_len": "1163", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "510", "ID": "53242", "name": "Malley v. Briggs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1586", "docket": "84-1586", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Edward Malley and Rhode Island", "second_party": "James R. Briggs and Louisa Briggs", "facts": "In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs\u2019 residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs\u2019 arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped.
\nThe Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge\u2019s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an \u201cobjectively reasonable\u201d basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.
", "facts_len": "1590", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "511", "ID": "53241", "name": "Ford v. Wainwright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5542", "docket": "85-5542", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Ford", "second_party": "Wainwright", "facts": "In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "512", "ID": "53240", "name": "Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1903", "docket": "84-1903", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn", "second_party": "Tourism Company of Puerto Rico", "facts": "A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.
", "facts_len": "219", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "513", "ID": "53254", "name": "Thornburg v. Gingles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/83-1968", "docket": "83-1968", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina", "second_party": "Ralph Gingles et al.", "facts": "The North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a \"discriminatory effect\" and required no \"discriminatory purpose.\" Considering the \"totality of circumstances\" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six of the new districts violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "965", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "514", "ID": "53253", "name": "Davis v. Bandemer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1244", "docket": "84-1244", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Davis", "second_party": "Bandemer", "facts": "A group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.
", "facts_len": "320", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "515", "ID": "53256", "name": "New York v. P. J. Video, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-363", "docket": "85-363", "term": "1985", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "P. J. Video, Inc. et al.", "facts": "Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of \"probable-cause\" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.
", "facts_len": "1011", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "516", "ID": "53257", "name": "Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1491", "docket": "84-1491", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.", "second_party": "Hepps", "facts": "In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.
", "facts_len": "293", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "517", "ID": "53259", "name": "Firefighters v. City of Cleveland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1999", "docket": "84-1999", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Firefighters", "second_party": "City of Cleveland", "facts": "Section 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City\u2019s system for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a \u201cracial quota system\u201d (rather than competence exams or seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations.
\nDuring the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members\u2019 approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union\u2019s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "2212", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "518", "ID": "53258", "name": "Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Public Schools, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-488", "docket": "85-488", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Ohio Civil Rights Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the \u201cBiblical chain of command,\u201d which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p>
\nLinda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization\u2019s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system.
\nHoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "2162", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "519", "ID": "53263", "name": "Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/83-2004", "docket": "83-2004", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd.", "second_party": "Zenith Radio Corporation", "facts": "In 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith\u2019s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith\u2019s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1388", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "520", "ID": "53267", "name": "Bowsher v. Synar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-1377", "docket": "85-1377", "term": "1985", "first_party": "Bowsher", "second_party": "Synar", "facts": "Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.
", "facts_len": "529", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "521", "ID": "53269", "name": "McCleskey v. Kemp", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6811", "docket": "84-6811", "term": "1986", "first_party": "McCleskey", "second_party": "Kemp", "facts": "McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.
", "facts_len": "428", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "522", "ID": "53273", "name": "Anderson v. Creighton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1520", "docket": "85-1520", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Russell Anderson", "second_party": "Robert E. Creighton, Jr., et ux., et al.", "facts": "On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual\u2019s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.
", "facts_len": "1271", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "523", "ID": "53276", "name": "Colorado v. Spring", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1517", "docket": "85-1517", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Colorado", "second_party": "John Leroy Spring", "facts": "In February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder.
\nSpring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police\u2019s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the \u201cillegal fruit\u201d of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2331", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "524", "ID": "53275", "name": "Turner v. Safley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1384", "docket": "85-1384", "term": "1986", "first_party": "William R. Turner, et al.", "second_party": "Leonard Safley, et al.", "facts": "In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a \u201ccomplex prison\u201d. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley\u2019s attempts to directly contact Watson.
\nA Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so.
\nThe district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates\u2019 constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC\u2019s security concerns.
", "facts_len": "1899", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "525", "ID": "53286", "name": "United States v. Paradise", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-999", "docket": "85-999", "term": "1986", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Paradise", "facts": "In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.
", "facts_len": "290", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "526", "ID": "53287", "name": "Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-104", "docket": "86-104", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Jews for Jesus, Inc.", "facts": "The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all \"First Amendment activities\" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.
", "facts_len": "358", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "527", "ID": "53290", "name": "Colorado v. Connelly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-660", "docket": "85-660", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Colorado", "second_party": "Francis Connelly", "facts": "In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily.
", "facts_len": "474", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "528", "ID": "53291", "name": "Tanner v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-177", "docket": "86-177", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Anthony R. Tanner, William M. Conover", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing.
", "facts_len": "913", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "529", "ID": "53294", "name": "Pope v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1973", "docket": "85-1973", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Richard Pope and Charles Morrison", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks \u201cserious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.\u201d
\nOn July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois\u2019 obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1297", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "530", "ID": "53298", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-701", "docket": "85-701", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.", "facts": "On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL\u2019s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote \u2018pro-life\u2019, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL\u2019s views.
\nThe Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act\u2019s definition of \u2018expenditure\u2019 and that the flyers fell under the act\u2019s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.
\nAfter examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act\u2019s definition of \u2018expenditure\u2019 and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court\u2019s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.
", "facts_len": "1781", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "531", "ID": "53302", "name": "Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-39", "docket": "86-39", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Burlington Northern Railroad Co., et al.", "second_party": "Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, et al.", "facts": "The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads\u2019 lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.
\nThe Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners\u2019 claims.
\nWhile these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President\u2019s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.
", "facts_len": "2152", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "532", "ID": "53303", "name": "Illinois v. Krull", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-608", "docket": "85-608", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Albert Krull, George Lucas, Salvatore Mucerino", "facts": "The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.
\nKrull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull\u2019s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1176", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "533", "ID": "53307", "name": "United States v. Salerno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-87", "docket": "86-87", "term": "1986", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Salerno", "facts": "The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.
", "facts_len": "330", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "534", "ID": "53308", "name": "Bowen v. Gilliard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-509", "docket": "86-509", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Beaty Mae Gilliard, et al.", "facts": "Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family\u2019s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.
\nIn 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child\u2019s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard\u2019s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1584", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "535", "ID": "53312", "name": "Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-421", "docket": "86-421", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Board of Directors, Rotary International", "second_party": "Rotary Club of Duarte", "facts": "When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.
", "facts_len": "367", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "536", "ID": "53323", "name": "Hodel v. Irving", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-637", "docket": "85-637", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Donald P. Hodel", "second_party": "Mary Irving, et al.", "facts": "In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments.
\nMary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act.
\nIrving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1585", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "537", "ID": "53328", "name": "Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2156", "docket": "85-2156", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Shaare Tefila Congregation", "second_party": "Cobb", "facts": "After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.
", "facts_len": "380", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "538", "ID": "53333", "name": "Nollan v. California Coastal Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-133", "docket": "86-133", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Nollan", "second_party": "California Coastal Commission", "facts": "The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.
", "facts_len": "176", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "539", "ID": "53334", "name": "Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-993", "docket": "85-993", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Hobbie", "second_party": "Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida", "facts": "Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed \"for misconduct connected with her work.\" The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.
", "facts_len": "826", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "540", "ID": "53344", "name": "Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-693", "docket": "85-693", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Asahi Metal Company, Ltd.", "second_party": "Superior Court of California, Solano County", "facts": "On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding.
\nAsahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a \"stream of commerce\" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.
", "facts_len": "1342", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "541", "ID": "53345", "name": "Rankin v. McPherson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2068", "docket": "85-2068", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Rankin", "second_party": "McPherson", "facts": "Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated \"if they go for him again, I hope they get him.\" Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.
", "facts_len": "453", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "542", "ID": "53347", "name": "Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2169", "docket": "85-2169", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Saint Francis College", "second_party": "Al-Khazraji", "facts": "Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.
", "facts_len": "400", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "543", "ID": "53353", "name": "San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-270", "docket": "86-270", "term": "1986", "first_party": "San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.", "second_party": "United States Olympic Committee", "facts": "Currently unavailable.
", "facts_len": "30", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "544", "ID": "53354", "name": "Arizona v. Hicks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1027", "docket": "85-1027", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Hicks", "facts": "A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.
", "facts_len": "534", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "545", "ID": "53356", "name": "Richardson v. Marsh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1433", "docket": "85-1433", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Gloria Richardson, Warden", "second_party": "Clarissa Marsh", "facts": "Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh\u2019s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams\u2019 confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams\u2019 confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.
\nMarsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1041", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "546", "ID": "53357", "name": "United States v. Stanley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-393", "docket": "86-393", "term": "1986", "first_party": "United States, et al.", "second_party": "James B. Stanley", "facts": "In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army\u2019s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous \u201cvoluntary\u201d involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.
\nThe district court granted the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government\u2019s argument that the same exception barred Stanley\u2019s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley\u2019s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley\u2019s FTCA claim to be barred.
", "facts_len": "2398", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "547", "ID": "53360", "name": "O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1722", "docket": "85-1722", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Edward O'Lone", "second_party": "Estate of Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen", "facts": "Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey\u2019s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu\u2019ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.
\nThe two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court\u2019s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate\u2019s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1113", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "548", "ID": "53361", "name": "Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1092", "docket": "85-1092", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Keystone Bituminous Coal Association et al.", "second_party": "Debenedictis et al.", "facts": "By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to \"mining estates\" separate from the property owned on the above \"surface estates.\" The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a \"support estate\" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1041", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "549", "ID": "53362", "name": "Edwards v. Aguillard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1513", "docket": "85-1513", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Edwards", "second_party": "Aguillard", "facts": "A Louisiana law entitled the \"Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act\" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.
", "facts_len": "531", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "550", "ID": "53365", "name": "United States v. Dunn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-998", "docket": "85-998", "term": "1986", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ronald Dale Dunn", "facts": "Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn\u2019s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn\u2019s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn\u2019s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn\u2019s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.
\nAt trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was \u201cwithin the curtilage\u201d of Dunn\u2019s house, so the police officers\u2019 warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn\u2019s reasonable expectation of privacy.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "551", "ID": "53373", "name": "Tison v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/84-6075", "docket": "84-6075", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Ricky and Ramond Tison", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.
\nThe Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son\u2019s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the \u201cintent\u201d requirement for the death penalty.
", "facts_len": "1429", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "552", "ID": "53375", "name": "Puerto Rico v. Branstad", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-2116", "docket": "85-2116", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Puerto Rico", "second_party": "Branstad", "facts": "Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.
", "facts_len": "311", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "553", "ID": "53381", "name": "Griffith v. Kentucky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-5221", "docket": "85-5221", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Griffith", "second_party": "Kentucky", "facts": "This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.
", "facts_len": "519", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "554", "ID": "53383", "name": "Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1129", "docket": "85-1129", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty.", "facts": "The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.
", "facts_len": "285", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "555", "ID": "53385", "name": "Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1798", "docket": "85-1798", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Pennzoil Co.", "second_party": "Texaco Inc.", "facts": "Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion
", "facts_len": "1147", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "556", "ID": "53390", "name": "Bourjaily v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-6725", "docket": "85-6725", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Bourjaily", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a \"friend\" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.
", "facts_len": "751", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "557", "ID": "53393", "name": "South Dakota v. Dole", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-260", "docket": "86-260", "term": "1986", "first_party": "South Dakota", "second_party": "Dole", "facts": "In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.
", "facts_len": "305", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "558", "ID": "53392", "name": "California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1708", "docket": "85-1708", "term": "1986", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Cabazon Band of Mission Indians", "facts": "Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "918", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "559", "ID": "53397", "name": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1226", "docket": "85-1226", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "second_party": "Groetzinger", "facts": "Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the \u201ctrade of business\u201d of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.
", "facts_len": "810", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "560", "ID": "53403", "name": "American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-357", "docket": "86-357", "term": "1986", "first_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "second_party": "Scheiner", "facts": "One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was \"deemed\" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.
", "facts_len": "1356", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "561", "ID": "53402", "name": "Booth v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-5020", "docket": "86-5020", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Booth", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement \"describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family\" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.
", "facts_len": "492", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "562", "ID": "53406", "name": "Maryland v. Garrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-759", "docket": "85-759", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Harold Garrison", "facts": "Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and \u201cthe premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.\u201d When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland\u2019s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "777", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "563", "ID": "53407", "name": "Rock v. Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-130", "docket": "86-130", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Vickie Lorene Rock", "second_party": "Arkansas", "facts": "Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.
\nBecause an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been \u201chypnotically refreshed.\u201d She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock\u2019s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1767", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "564", "ID": "53410", "name": "Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-179", "docket": "86-179", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints", "second_party": "Amos", "facts": "Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.
", "facts_len": "1386", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "565", "ID": "53418", "name": "First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1199", "docket": "85-1199", "term": "1986", "first_party": "First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale", "second_party": "County of Los Angeles, California", "facts": "In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.
", "facts_len": "367", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "566", "ID": "53416", "name": "Griffin v. Wisconsin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/86-5324", "docket": "86-5324", "term": "1986", "first_party": "Griffin", "second_party": "Wisconsin", "facts": "Joseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department\u2019s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer\u2019s home without a warrant as long as there are \u201creasonable grounds\u201d to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer\u2019s own experience with the probationer.
\nGriffin\u2019s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin\u2019s apartment. When the police searched Griffin\u2019s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1369", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "567", "ID": "53422", "name": "O'Connor v. Ortega", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-530", "docket": "85-530", "term": "1986", "first_party": "O'Connor", "second_party": "Ortega", "facts": "In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.
", "facts_len": "463", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "568", "ID": "53424", "name": "Gray v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-5454", "docket": "85-5454", "term": "1986", "first_party": "David Randolph Gray", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "On June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik\u2019s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik\u2019s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping.
\nDuring the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor\u2019s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists.
\nThe jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray\u2019s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray\u2019s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray\u2019s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court\u2019s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.
", "facts_len": "1726", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "569", "ID": "53429", "name": "School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1986/85-1277", "docket": "85-1277", "term": "1986", "first_party": "School Board of Nassau County", "second_party": "Gene Arline", "facts": "Gene Arline could no longer teach elementary school because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. The superintendent of schools in Nassau County, Florida dismissed her after it became clear that her illness was recurrent. The school system did not grant her financial relief. Arline claimed in a federal district court that this violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits state-funded programs from denying relief to applicants solely because they are handicapped. The school conceded it dismissed her solely because of her illness, but contended that a contagious disease like tuberculosis did not qualify her as handicapped. The court ruled that the Act did not define contagious illnesses as handicaps, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It found that Arline was \"otherwise qualified\" to teach except for her illness, and ruled that this qualified her for handicapped benefits.
", "facts_len": "962", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "570", "ID": "53447", "name": "Pennell v. City of San Jose", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-753", "docket": "86-753", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Pennell", "second_party": "City of San Jose", "facts": "The City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor \"hardship to a tenant\" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.
", "facts_len": "366", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "571", "ID": "53448", "name": "Murray v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-995", "docket": "86-995", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Michael F. Murray", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana.
\nBefore the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1306", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "572", "ID": "53450", "name": "Karcher v. May", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/85-1551", "docket": "85-1551", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Karcher", "second_party": "May", "facts": "In 1982, the New Jersey Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted a statute requiring the state's public school teachers to permit students to observe a minute of silence before the start of each school day. A group of New Jersey public school teachers, students, and parents sued the New Jersey Department of Education, its Commissioner, and two township boards of education. The suit alleged that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After the named defendants and the New Jersey Attorney General refused to defend the statute, Alan J. Karcher, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, and Carmen A. Orechio, the President of the New Jersey Senate, intervened as defendants on behalf of the Legislature. The district court ruled against them and declared the \"minute-of-silence\" statute unconstitutional. Karcher and Orechio appealed the ruling in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and shortly thereafter, Karcher and Orechio lost their respective officer positions. They subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but the successors to their offices indicated to the Court that they were withdrawing the appeal on behalf of the Legislature. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of the appeal ended the controversy and that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the case, according to Article III of the Constitution. Karcher and Orechio countered that they should be permitted to continue the appeal in their capacities as legislators and representatives of the legislative body that enacted the statute. Alternatively, they argued that the Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court upon their dismissal as appellants. They contended that New Jersey law does not authorize presiding legislative officers to represent the Legislature in litigation, and they argued that their loss of presiding officer status rendered the judgment unappealable.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "2064", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "573", "ID": "53449", "name": "Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-836", "docket": "86-836", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Hazelwood School District", "second_party": "Kuhlmeier", "facts": "The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.
", "facts_len": "467", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "574", "ID": "53459", "name": "United States v. Kozminski", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-2000", "docket": "86-2000", "term": "1987", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ike Kozminski, et al.", "facts": "In 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris \u2014 who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively \u2014 were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not to contact their families or any other outsiders.
\nEventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court\u2019s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.
", "facts_len": "1688", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "575", "ID": "53462", "name": "Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-492", "docket": "86-492", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Delbert Boyle, Personal Representative of the heirs and Estate of David A. Boyle, Deceased", "second_party": "United Technologies Corporation", "facts": "Following the death of US Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer (\"Sikorsky\") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the \"military contractor defense.\" Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "492", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "576", "ID": "53465", "name": "Braswell v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-3", "docket": "87-3", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Randy Braswell", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations\u2019 books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the \u201ccollective entity doctrine\u201d, which treats corporations differently from individuals for Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell\u2019s argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the individual\u2019s alter ego. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "684", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "577", "ID": "53466", "name": "Honig v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-728", "docket": "86-728", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Bill Honig", "second_party": "John Doe and Jack Smith", "facts": "The Education of the Handicapped Act contains a provision, known as the \"stay-put\" provision, which provides that a handicapped child shall remain with his or her current educational placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal.
\nJohn Doe was a student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children. Doe had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses. On November 6, 1980, Doe was teased by a fellow student and responded by attacking the student and kicking out a school window. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. Jack Smith was another handicapped student whose disability caused behavioral problems. Smith engaged in disruptive behavior and was eventually suspended indefinitely pending a hearing. Smith brought an action in district court essentially identical to the one brought by Doe. After learning of Doe's action Smith joined Doe's suit.
\nThe handicapped students asked the district court to enter an order requiring the school to allow the students to return to their own schools. The district court granted the handicapped students' request and issued a permanent injunction, an order which prevented the school district from indefinitely suspending a student for disability-related misconduct. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The school authorities appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1746", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "578", "ID": "53468", "name": "Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1013", "docket": "86-1013", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Lyng", "second_party": "Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association", "facts": "The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.
", "facts_len": "587", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "579", "ID": "53467", "name": "Wheat v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-4", "docket": "87-4", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Mark Erick Wheat", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "For many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat\u2019s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas\u2019 plea and he was free to withdraw it.
\nOn August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale\u2019s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat\u2019s trial as a witness as well.
\nAlthough Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment\u2019s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.
", "facts_len": "2023", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "580", "ID": "53482", "name": "Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-946", "docket": "86-946", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon et al.", "second_party": "Alfred Smith", "facts": "Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related \"misconduct.\" The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.
", "facts_len": "526", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "581", "ID": "53486", "name": "Coy v. Iowa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-6757", "docket": "86-6757", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Coy", "second_party": "Iowa", "facts": "John Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "685", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "582", "ID": "53488", "name": "Doe v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1753", "docket": "86-1753", "term": "1987", "first_party": "John Doe", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury\u2019s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents.
\nThe United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe\u2019s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe\u2019s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe\u2019s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information.
\nThe district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a \u201cfishing expedition\u201d for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1308", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "583", "ID": "53495", "name": "Thompson v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-6169", "docket": "86-6169", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Thompson", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.
", "facts_len": "230", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "584", "ID": "53496", "name": "Morrison v. Olson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-1279", "docket": "87-1279", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Morrison", "second_party": "Olson", "facts": "The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an \"independent counsel\" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.
", "facts_len": "289", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "585", "ID": "53497", "name": "United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-416", "docket": "87-416", "term": "1987", "first_party": "United States Catholic Conference", "second_party": "Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.", "facts": "Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of U.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs\u2019 ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1400", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "586", "ID": "53508", "name": "California v. Greenwood", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-684", "docket": "86-684", "term": "1987", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Greenwood", "facts": "Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.
", "facts_len": "432", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "587", "ID": "53506", "name": "Schweiker v. Chilicky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1781", "docket": "86-1781", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Richard Schweiker", "second_party": "James Chilicky", "facts": "In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act\u2019s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.
", "facts_len": "1224", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "588", "ID": "53513", "name": "New York State Club Association Inc. v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1836", "docket": "86-1836", "term": "1987", "first_party": "New York State Club Association Inc.", "second_party": "City of New York", "facts": "The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not \"distinctly private.\" Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.
", "facts_len": "1002", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "589", "ID": "53512", "name": "Bowen v. Kendrick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-253", "docket": "87-253", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Bowen", "second_party": "Kendrick", "facts": "The Adolescent Family Life Act (\"AFLA\") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.
", "facts_len": "619", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "590", "ID": "53519", "name": "Mansell v. Mansell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-201", "docket": "87-201", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Gerald E. Mansell", "second_party": "Gaye M. Mansell", "facts": "Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses\u2019 Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed.
", "facts_len": "851", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "591", "ID": "53517", "name": "Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1245", "docket": "87-1245", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Texas Monthly, Inc.", "second_party": "Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas et al.", "facts": "The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.
", "facts_len": "747", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "592", "ID": "53520", "name": "Penry v. Lynaugh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-6177", "docket": "87-6177", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Penry", "second_party": "Lynaugh", "facts": "Penry, a man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's intellectual disability in imposing its sentence.
", "facts_len": "284", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "593", "ID": "53521", "name": "National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/86-1879", "docket": "86-1879", "term": "1988", "first_party": "National Treasury Employees Union", "second_party": "Von Raab", "facts": "In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information.
", "facts_len": "261", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "594", "ID": "53525", "name": "Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1346", "docket": "87-1346", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Bonito Boats, Inc.", "second_party": "Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.", "facts": "In 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a design for a fiberglass recreational boat and made a model to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was ever filed for protection. In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful to use a direct modeling process to duplicate and sell a vessel or part of a vessel. In 1984, Bonito sued Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, in the Florida district court for violating the statute. Thunder Craft successfully argued that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent laws and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court\u2019s conclusion that the Florida law interfered with federal patent laws.
", "facts_len": "877", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "595", "ID": "53529", "name": "Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1379", "docket": "87-1379", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Department of Justice", "second_party": "Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press", "facts": "CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of \"public record\" and \"interest.\" On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.
", "facts_len": "601", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "596", "ID": "53532", "name": "Brower v. Inyo County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-248", "docket": "87-248", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Georgia Brower, et al.", "second_party": "County of Inyo, et al.", "facts": "On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.
\nAfter Caldwell\u2019s death, his heirs\u2014including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate\u2014sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "686", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "597", "ID": "53537", "name": "Webster v. Reproductive Health Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-605", "docket": "88-605", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Webster", "second_party": "Reproductive Health Services", "facts": "In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that \"[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,\" and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.
", "facts_len": "598", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "598", "ID": "53541", "name": "Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1555", "docket": "87-1555", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Skinner", "second_party": "Railway Labor Executives' Association", "facts": "Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.
", "facts_len": "356", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "599", "ID": "53542", "name": "Duckworth v. Eagan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-317", "docket": "88-317", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Duckworth", "second_party": "Eagan", "facts": "When first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer \"if and when you go to court.\" The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.
", "facts_len": "475", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "600", "ID": "53547", "name": "Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-293", "docket": "88-293", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Community for Creative Non-Violence", "second_party": "Reid", "facts": "The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) made an oral agreement with James Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Washington D.C. Christmas pageant. Upon completion, delivery, and joining of the work to a base that it prepared separately, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price. Shortly thereafter, the parties filed competing copyright claims over the sculpture. Holding, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the \"Act\"), that the statue was a \"work made for hire,\" a district court ruled in favor of CCNV. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted CCNV certiorari.
", "facts_len": "698", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "601", "ID": "53546", "name": "Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-515", "docket": "88-515", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Sable Communications of California", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.
", "facts_len": "320", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "602", "ID": "53554", "name": "Martin v. Wilks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1614", "docket": "87-1614", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Martin", "second_party": "Wilks", "facts": "As a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.
", "facts_len": "733", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "603", "ID": "53566", "name": "American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-325", "docket": "88-325", "term": "1988", "first_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "second_party": "Smith", "facts": "In 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.
", "facts_len": "1038", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "604", "ID": "53580", "name": "Owens v. Okure", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-56", "docket": "87-56", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Javan Owens and Daniel G. Lessard", "second_party": "Tom U. U. Okure", "facts": "Tom Okure was arrested for disorderly conduct, and while under arrest, was beaten by the police officers Javan Owens and Daniel Lessard. He sustained multiple injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger, and claimed to have suffered great mental anguish and distress as a result of the arrest and actions of the police. Twenty-two months after the incident occurred, Okure sued the two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is one year under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The trial court denied the motion by stating that New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
", "facts_len": "901", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "605", "ID": "53588", "name": "United States v. Halper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1383", "docket": "87-1383", "term": "1988", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Halper", "facts": "Irwin Halper, the manager of a company that provided medical services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits, was charged and convicted in criminal court of submitting 65 separate false Medicare claims. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000.
\nThe United States then brought additional civil charges under the False Claims Act, which authorized it to collect $2000 for each offense in addition to attorney's fees and twice the damages sustained. In this case the actual damages were just $585, but because of the number of offenses the total penalty was more than $130,000. The District Court, however, ruled that the penalty was \"entirely unrelated\" to the government's actual damages and would therefore be a second punishment for the same offense, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The penalty was therefore limited to double the amount of actual damages and attorney's fees. The government appealed the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1014", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "606", "ID": "53589", "name": "City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/86-1088", "docket": "86-1088", "term": "1988", "first_party": "City of Canton, Ohio", "second_party": "Geraldine Harris", "facts": "Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized.
\nHarris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions.
", "facts_len": "1178", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "607", "ID": "53592", "name": "Graham v. Connor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-6571", "docket": "87-6571", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Dethorne Graham", "second_party": "M.S. Connor", "facts": "On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry\u2019s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away.
\nGraham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry\u2019s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham\u2019s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident.
\nGraham filed \u00a7 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers\u2019 \u201cgood faith\u201d efforts and whether they acted \u201cmaliciously or sadistically\u201d. He instead argued for a standard of \u201cobjective reasonableness\u201d under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as \"good faith\" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham\u2019s favor.
", "facts_len": "2643", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "608", "ID": "53597", "name": "Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1716", "docket": "87-1716", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Granfinanciera, S.A., et al.", "second_party": "Paul C. Nordberg", "facts": "In 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase & Sanborn\u2019s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later, after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1225", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "609", "ID": "53599", "name": "Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1167", "docket": "87-1167", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Price Waterhouse", "second_party": "Ann B. Hopkins", "facts": "Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff.
\nThe district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board\u2019s decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.
", "facts_len": "1107", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "610", "ID": "53600", "name": "Massachusetts v. Morash", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-32", "docket": "88-32", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Massachusetts", "second_party": "Richard N. Morash", "facts": "The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA.
", "facts_len": "892", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "611", "ID": "53604", "name": "Texas v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-155", "docket": "88-155", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Texas", "second_party": "Gregory Lee Johnson", "facts": "In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "402", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "612", "ID": "53607", "name": "DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-154", "docket": "87-154", "term": "1988", "first_party": "DeShaney", "second_party": "Winnebago County Department of Social Services", "facts": "In 1984, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney became comatose and then profoundly retarded due to traumatic head injuries inflicted by his father who physically beat him over a long period of time. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services took various steps to protect the child after receiving numerous complaints of the abuse; however, the Department did not act to remove Joshua from his father's custody. Joshua DeShaney's mother subsequently sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, alleging that the Department had deprived the child of his \"liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence.\"
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "613", "ID": "53608", "name": "Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-1", "docket": "88-1", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Consolidated Rail Corporation", "second_party": "Railway Labor Executives' Association", "facts": "On February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation (\"Conrail\") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of \"intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens\" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use.
\nThe Railway Labor Executives' Association (\"RLEA\")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act (\"RLA\"). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process.
\nDistrict court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was \"minor\" under the Railway Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was \"major\" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships.
", "facts_len": "1781", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "614", "ID": "53609", "name": "Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1945", "docket": "87-1945", "term": "1988", "first_party": "William A. Frazee", "second_party": "Illinois Dept. of Employment Security; Sally Ward, Director of the Illinois Dept. of Employment Security; Bruce W. Barnes, Chairman of the Board of Review; Kelly Services", "facts": "William A. Frazee was laid off from his job with the state of Illinois. Kelly Services, a temp agency, offered him a job at a department store working Wednesday through Sunday. Frazee \u201cas a Christian\u201d refused to work Sundays. The store did not give Frazee the job. Frazee did not claim that he was part of a particular religious sect or church or that working on Sundays violated a tenant of an established religious body. When Frazee applied for unemployment benefits, the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied his claim because he turned down a job offer. The Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit of Illinois affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the free exercise clause does not require accommodations for \u201cpersonal professed religious belief[s]\u201d.
", "facts_len": "812", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "615", "ID": "53611", "name": "Florida v. Riley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-764", "docket": "87-764", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Michael A. Riley", "facts": "Michael Riley lived in a mobile home situated on five acres of rural land in Florida. Riley owned a greenhouse that was located behind his home; from the ground, the contents of Riley\u2019s greenhouse were shielded from view by its walls and the trees on his property. In 1984, the Pasco County Sheriff\u2019s office received a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property. The investigating officer tried to see into the greenhouse from the ground but could not, so he circled in a helicopter at 400 feet and saw what he believed to be marijuana growing inside. Acting on this information, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant, searched the greenhouse, and found the marijuana. Riley was charged with possession of marijuana.
\nRiley filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted his motion and held that viewing his property from the air violated Riley\u2019s reasonable expectation of privacy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the trial court\u2019s decision and denied Riley\u2019s motion to dismiss the evidence. The appellate court also certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial court\u2019s order to suppress the evidence.
", "facts_len": "1249", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "616", "ID": "53615", "name": "Mistretta v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-7028", "docket": "87-7028", "term": "1988", "first_party": "John Mistretta", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission \"excessive legislative powers.\" This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.
", "facts_len": "614", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "617", "ID": "53620", "name": "Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-10", "docket": "88-10", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.", "second_party": "Daniel Connaughton", "facts": "Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent\u2019s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using \u201cdirty tricks\u201d and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.
\nConnaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
\nDaniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent\u2019s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using \u201cdirty tricks\u201d and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.
\nConnaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1915", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "618", "ID": "53618", "name": "Michael H. v. Gerald D.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-746", "docket": "87-746", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Michael H. et al.", "second_party": "Gerald D.", "facts": "Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D. since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid. Code 621, the child is \"presumed to be a child of the marriage\" and another man can only challenge this presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by denying him an opportunity to establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Code 621.
", "facts_len": "915", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "619", "ID": "53621", "name": "City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-998", "docket": "87-998", "term": "1988", "first_party": "City of Richmond", "second_party": "J. A. Croson Company", "facts": "In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.
", "facts_len": "330", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "620", "ID": "53624", "name": "Arizona v. Youngblood", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/86-1904", "docket": "86-1904", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Larry Youngblood", "facts": "On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David\u2019s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy\u2019s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy\u2019s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.
\nAt trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts \u201cagainst the state\u2019s interests\u201d if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.
", "facts_len": "1760", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "621", "ID": "53633", "name": "Missouri v. Jenkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-64", "docket": "88-64", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Missouri", "second_party": "Kalima Jenkins et al.", "facts": "The Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.
", "facts_len": "740", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "622", "ID": "53639", "name": "United States v. Sokolow", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1295", "docket": "87-1295", "term": "1988", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Sokolow", "facts": "Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine.
", "facts_len": "544", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "623", "ID": "53643", "name": "Stanford v. Kentucky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-5765", "docket": "87-5765", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Kevin Stanford", "second_party": "Kentucky", "facts": "At 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.
", "facts_len": "640", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "624", "ID": "53640", "name": "Florida Star v. B. J. F.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329", "docket": "87-329", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Florida Star", "second_party": "Betty Jean Freeman", "facts": "A reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman\u2019s rape, including her full name. The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim\u2019s name, from the police report. The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim\u2019s names. The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims. After the article ran, Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection. Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress. The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages. The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review.
", "facts_len": "1002", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "625", "ID": "53645", "name": "County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-2050", "docket": "87-2050", "term": "1988", "first_party": "County of Allegheny", "second_party": "American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter", "facts": "Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.
", "facts_len": "537", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "626", "ID": "53656", "name": "Ward v. Rock Against Racism", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-226", "docket": "88-226", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Ward", "second_party": "Rock Against Racism", "facts": "New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.
", "facts_len": "392", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "627", "ID": "53654", "name": "Murray v. Giarratano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/88-411", "docket": "88-411", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Murray", "second_party": "Giarratano", "facts": "The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state\u2019s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia\u2019s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia\u2019s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "783", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "628", "ID": "53658", "name": "City of Dallas v. Stanglin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1848", "docket": "87-1848", "term": "1988", "first_party": "City of Dallas, et al.", "second_party": "Charles M. Stanglin", "facts": "The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
\nThe district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.
", "facts_len": "1153", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "629", "ID": "53662", "name": "Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1387", "docket": "87-1387", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Wards Cove Packing Co. et al.", "second_party": "Frank Atonio et al.", "facts": "Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.
", "facts_len": "803", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "630", "ID": "53665", "name": "Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1020", "docket": "87-1020", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Paul Davis", "second_party": "Michigan Department of the Treasury", "facts": "Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.
", "facts_len": "542", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "631", "ID": "53673", "name": "Lewis v. Jeffers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-189", "docket": "89-189", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Samuel A. Lewis, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.", "second_party": "Jimmie Wayne Jeffers", "facts": "In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave.
\nA jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona\u2019s standard of an \u201cespecially heinous\u2026or depraved\u201d aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers\u2019 challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1822", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "632", "ID": "53674", "name": "United States v. Eichman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-1433", "docket": "89-1433", "term": "1989", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Eichman", "facts": "In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be \"commonly displayed.\" The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.
", "facts_len": "611", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "633", "ID": "53681", "name": "Illinois v. Rodriguez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-2018", "docket": "88-2018", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Edward Rodriguez", "facts": "A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as \u201cour apartment\u201d several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1064", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "634", "ID": "53682", "name": "Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1374", "docket": "88-1374", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Jimmy Swaggart Ministries", "second_party": "Board of Equalization of California", "facts": "California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order \"evangelistic crusades.\" After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization (\"Board\") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "635", "ID": "53685", "name": "Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1597", "docket": "88-1597", "term": "1989", "first_party": "BOE of Westside Community Schools", "second_party": "Mergens By and Through Mergens", "facts": "The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide \"equal access\" to student groups seeking to express \"religious, political, philosophical, or other content\" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.
", "facts_len": "841", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "636", "ID": "53689", "name": "Pennsylvania v. Muniz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-213", "docket": "89-213", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Inocencio Muniz", "facts": "On November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When the officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz\u2019s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol.
\nAt trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz\u2019s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer\u2019s reports of Muniz\u2019s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz\u2019s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review.
", "facts_len": "1876", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "637", "ID": "53694", "name": "Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1872", "docket": "88-1872", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Rutan", "second_party": "Republican Party of Illinois", "facts": "In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.
", "facts_len": "803", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "638", "ID": "53693", "name": "Illinois v. Perkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1972", "docket": "88-1972", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Perkins", "facts": "While being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate.
", "facts_len": "147", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "639", "ID": "53695", "name": "W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/87-2066", "docket": "87-2066", "term": "1989", "first_party": "W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International", "facts": "In 1981, the Republic of Nigeria was interested in building an aeromedical center at Kaduna Air Force Base. Both W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick) and Environmental Tectonics Corporation International (Environmental Tectonics) bid for the contract. Kirkpatrick established a deal with a Nigerian citizen who would attempt to ensure Kirkpatrick received the contract. In exchange, Kirkpatrick would pay two Panamanian companies owned by the Nigerian individual 20% of the contract price, which would be distributed as bribes to Nigerian officials. Kirkpatrick succeeded in obtaining the contract, and Environmental Tectonics brought the issue to the attention of the authorities. The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey brought charges against Kirkpatrick and its CEO, and both pled guilty.
\nEnvironmental Tectonics sued Kirkpatrick in district court and sought damages under anti-racketeering acts. Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint by arguing that the action was barred by state doctrine that prohibited courts from considering cases that would result in embarrassment for a sovereign nation or interfere with US foreign policy. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion in favor of Kirkpatrick. The district court held that Environmental Tectonics would have to prove that Nigerian officials accepted bribes and allowed the bribes to influence governmental decisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Kirkpatrick had not met its burden to show that the case could not proceed.
", "facts_len": "1615", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "640", "ID": "53699", "name": "Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1775", "docket": "88-1775", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Peel", "second_party": "Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois", "facts": "Gary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a \"Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy\" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from his NBTA certification.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "641", "ID": "53698", "name": "Florida v. Wells", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1835", "docket": "88-1835", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Martin Leslie Wells", "facts": "On February 11, 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped Martin Wells for speeding and smelled alcohol on his breath. Wells was arrested for driving under the influence and taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. While in custody, police told Wells that his car would be impounded, and he granted permission to the officer to open the trunk. An inventory search of the car at the impoundment revealed two marijuana cigarette butts and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the direction of a trooper, impoundment employees opened the suitcase and found a garbage bag of marijuana.
\nWells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the marijuana evidence by arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. Wells pleaded nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal on the motion to suppress. The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1068", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "642", "ID": "53703", "name": "Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-243", "docket": "89-243", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Eli Lilly and Company", "second_party": "Medtronic, Inc.", "facts": "In 1983, the predecessor-in-interest to Eli Lilly & Co. sued Medtronic, Inc. for patent infringement to enjoin Medtronic\u2019s research and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a device used to treat heart problems. Medtronic argued that the information was used to develop and submit new information under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and therefore it was exempt from the statutes governing patent infringement. The district court held that there was no such exemption and issued a permanent injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that Medtronic\u2019s actions could not be considered patent infringement if they were reasonably related to obtaining approval under the FDCA.
", "facts_len": "745", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "643", "ID": "53708", "name": "Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-44", "docket": "89-44", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Dennis Burnham", "second_party": "Superior Court of California, Marin County", "facts": "Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977. In July of 1987, they decided to separate and agreed that Mrs. Burnham would take custody of the children, move to California, and file for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. In October of 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion. Mrs. Burnham successfully demanded that Mr. Burnham respect their previous agreement and filed for divorce in California in January 1988. Later that month, Mr. Burnham was in California on business and visited his children. While there, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. Later that year, Mr. Burnham appeared before the California Superior Court and moved to quash the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction over him, as his only contacts with California were short business trips. The Superior Court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.
", "facts_len": "973", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "644", "ID": "53706", "name": "Sisson v. Ruby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-2041", "docket": "88-2041", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Everett A. Sisson", "second_party": "Burton B. Ruby, et al.", "facts": "On September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "679", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "645", "ID": "53712", "name": "Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1569", "docket": "88-1569", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Austin", "second_party": "Michigan Chamber of Commerce", "facts": "The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that \"the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption.\" The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement.
", "facts_len": "698", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "646", "ID": "53714", "name": "Idaho v. Wright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-260", "docket": "89-260", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Idaho", "second_party": "Laura Lee Wright", "facts": "Laura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright\u2019s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor.
\nDuring the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "2037", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "647", "ID": "53715", "name": "Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-805", "docket": "88-805", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Ohio", "second_party": "Akron Center for Reproductive Health", "facts": "In 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing a letter of parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would cause the minor emotional, sexual, or physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor\u2019s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1191", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "648", "ID": "53719", "name": "Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1213", "docket": "88-1213", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon", "second_party": "Alfred Smith et al.", "facts": "Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related \"misconduct.\" The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.
", "facts_len": "1192", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "649", "ID": "53734", "name": "Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-640", "docket": "89-640", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Lujan", "second_party": "National Wildlife Federation", "facts": "The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.\" NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands \"in the vicinity\" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late).
\nThe BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250.
\nOn appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits.
", "facts_len": "1361", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "650", "ID": "53732", "name": "Alabama v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-789", "docket": "89-789", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Alabama", "second_party": "Vanessa Rose White", "facts": "An anonymous caller told Montgomery, Alabama police that Vanessa Rose White had cocaine in an attach\u00e9 case in her car. The caller gave certain specific details about the car and White\u2019s future movements. Following that tip, police followed Vanessa Rose White as she drove from an apartment complex to Doby\u2019s Motel Court, where they pulled her over. When asked, White gave the officers permission to search her car and an attach\u00e9 case found in the car. Police found marijuana in the case and arrested White. During processing at the police station, officers also found 3 milligrams of cocaine in White\u2019s purse. After being charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine, White moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court denied the motion and White plead guilty. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed the motion, finding that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and search White\u2019s car. This search violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
", "facts_len": "1055", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "651", "ID": "53731", "name": "United States v. Montalvo-Murillo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-163", "docket": "89-163", "term": "1989", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo", "facts": "Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo\u2019s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo\u2019s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling and held that the government\u2019s failure to uphold the Act\u2019s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo\u2019s release.
", "facts_len": "1293", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "652", "ID": "53738", "name": "Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-453", "docket": "89-453", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Metro Broadcasting, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "This case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the \"distress sale,\" was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a \"distress sale\" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.
", "facts_len": "928", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "653", "ID": "53741", "name": "Missouri v. Jenkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1150", "docket": "88-1150", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Missouri", "second_party": "Jenkins", "facts": "In order to combat segregation in public schools in compliance with court directives, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sought to enhance the quality of schools and to attract more white students from the suburbs. The KCMSD's ability to raise taxes, however, was limited by state law. After determining that the District did not have alternative means of raising revenue for the program, federal district judge Russell G. Clark ordered an increase of local property taxes for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, but ruled that the courts should enjoin state tax laws that prevented the District from raising the necessary funds and allow the state to set tax rates.
", "facts_len": "750", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "654", "ID": "53748", "name": "Walton v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-7351", "docket": "88-7351", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Jeffrey Alan Walton", "second_party": "State of Arizona", "facts": "According to Arizona state law, after a person has been convicted of first-degree murder, there is a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the punishment will be death or life imprisonment. The court must determine whether aggravating or mitigating factors were present. The judge imposes the death sentence if one or more aggravating factors are proven to exist.
\nOn March 2, 1986, Jeffrey Alan Walton, Robert Hoover, and Sharold Ramsey went to a bar in Tucson intending to rob someone at random and steal that individual\u2019s car. The three robbed Thomas Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car that they drove into the desert. They later stopped the car, forced Powell to lie on the ground, and Walton shot him in the head. After the body was found, the coroner determined that the shot did not kill Powell, but rather that he died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia from being left in the desert. Walton was convicted of first-degree murder.
\nAt the sentencing hearing, the prosecution argued that two aggravating factors were present: the murder was committed in \u201can especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner\u201d and for the purposes of financial gain. The defense argued that mitigating factors were present in the form of Walton\u2019s history of substance abuse, possible sexual abuse as a child, and the fact that he was 20 years old at the time of the trial. The court found that the aggravating factors were present, and the judge sentenced Walton to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1553", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "655", "ID": "53752", "name": "Maryland v. Craig", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-478", "docket": "89-478", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Craig", "facts": "Sandra Ann Craig, the operator of a kindergarten and pre-school facility, was accused of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Over Craig's objections, a trial court allowed the alleged child victim to testify via one-way closed circuit television. The child testified outside the courtroom while Mrs. Craig, through electronic communication with her lawyer, could make objections. The judge and jury also viewed the testimony in the courtroom. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of serious emotional distress for the child witness. The trial court convicted Craig, but the Maryland high court reversed.
", "facts_len": "625", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "656", "ID": "53758", "name": "Horton v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-7164", "docket": "88-7164", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Terry Brice Horton", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella.
\nSergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton\u2019s home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching Horton\u2019s house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime.
\nThe evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner\u2019s request for review.
", "facts_len": "1409", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "657", "ID": "53762", "name": "Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1943", "docket": "88-1943", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Office of Personnel Management", "second_party": "Charles Richmond", "facts": "Charles Richmond worked as a welder at the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego, California until 1981, when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved his application to for a disability retirement. OPM determined that Richmond\u2019s poor eyesight prevented him from performing his job and entitled him to receive the benefits for disabled federal employees who have completed five years of service. Before 1982, an individual was ineligible for disability benefits if, in each of the two succeeding calendar years, the individual earns at least 80 percent of the current pay of the position occupied immediately prior to retirement. In 1982, this requirement was amended so that an individual becomes ineligible if he earns at least 80 percent of the pay of the previous position in any succeeding calendar year. Until 1985, Richmond worked part time and his earnings were low enough to keep him eligible for disability benefits. In 1985, he had the opportunity to earn more money, so he contacted OPM to make sure he would remain eligible. OPM provided him with the old requirements but not the new ones. Richmond subsequently accepted overtime work, earned more, and became ineligible for disability benefits. He lost six months of disability pay.
\nRichmond appealed the denial of benefits to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and argued that the fact that he received incorrect information from OPM prevented them from denying his benefits. The MSPB denied Richmond\u2019s appeal for review. Richmond appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1618", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "658", "ID": "53761", "name": "Georgia v. South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/74_orig", "docket": "74-orig", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Georgia", "second_party": "South Carolina", "facts": "The Charter of the Colony of Georgia described the Savannah River as its border with South Carolina. The Treaty of Beaufort (Treaty) further refined this boundary, which has since been disputed several times. This case was the third case since the Treaty that disputed this boundary. A Special Master was appointed to help resolve the dispute and filed two reports on the issue. This case was brought before the Supreme Court after Georgia and South Carolina filed disputes with the Special Master's reports .
", "facts_len": "517", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "659", "ID": "53766", "name": "United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1353", "docket": "88-1353", "term": "1989", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Verdugo-Urquidez", "facts": "Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen and resident of Mexico. In cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Mexican police officers apprehended and transported him to the U.S. border, where he was arrested for various narcotics-related offenses. Following his arrest, a DEA agent sought authorization to search Verdugo-Urquidez's residences for evidence. The Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police authorized the searches, but no search warrant from a U.S. magistrate was ever received. At trial, the district court granted Verdugo-Urquidez's motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
", "facts_len": "702", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "660", "ID": "53768", "name": "Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-2043", "docket": "88-2043", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Wilder", "second_party": "Virginia Hospital Association", "facts": "To qualify for federal funding under the Medicaid Act, states must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan that establishes a system by which healthcare providers will be reimbursed. Under the Boren Amendment, the reimbursement rates must be \"reasonable and adequate\" to meet the costs of efficiently operated facilities.
\nIn 1986, a group of hospitals brought sought against the state of Virginia, arguing that its reimbursement rates (which had been approved in 1982 and again in 1986 by the Secretary) were not \"reasonable and adequate.\" The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals or organizations to bring suit for the \"deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws.\" Virginia argued that the Boren Amendment had not been intended to create a an enforceable right, but simply to provide guidelines for the Secretary to follow, and that the hospitals therefore could not bring suit under 1983. The state also argued that Congress had intended to prevent private parties from bringing suit to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. The District Court disagreed, allowing the suit to proceed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1210", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "661", "ID": "53771", "name": "Grady v. Corbin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-474", "docket": "89-474", "term": "1989", "first_party": "William V. Grady, District Attorney of Dutchess County", "second_party": "Thomas J. Corbin", "facts": "Around 6:30 p.m. on October 3, 1987, Thomas Corbin drove his car across the yellow line that separated lanes of traffic and struck two oncoming cars on Route 55 near LaGrange, New York. Assistant District Attorney Thomas Dolan arrived on the scene and learned that Brenda and Daniel Dirago, the driver and passenger of one of the cars, had been injured. Later that night, Dolan learned Brenda Dirago had died in the hospital. Corbin received two misdemeanor tickets, one for driving while intoxicated and one for failing to keep to the right of the median.
\nCorbin pled guilty to both misdemeanors. The judge was unaware of the fatality the accident caused. On January 19, 1988, a grand jury indicted Corbin on charges of manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault. Corbin filed a motion to dismiss the charges by arguing double jeopardy, but the county court denied the motion. Corbin sought a writ of prohibition to prevent further prosecution, which the Appellate Division denied. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1085", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "662", "ID": "53772", "name": "Atlantic Richfield Company v. USA Petroleum Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1668", "docket": "88-1668", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Atlantic Richfield Company", "second_party": "USA Petroleum Company", "facts": "Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) is an integrated oil company that sells gasoline to consumers through its own retail stations as well as independent ARCO-brand stations. USA Petroleum (USA), a competitor of ARCO, is an independent retail marketer that purchases gasoline from major petroleum companies and resells it under its own brand name. USA sued ARCO under the Clayton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that ARCO had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with the independent ARCO-brand stations to sell gasoline at below-market prices (the Clayton Act allows private parties to bring suit when they have been harmed by anticompetitive practices that violate the Sherman Act).
\nThe District Court ruled for ARCO, finding that even if USA could prove the conspiracy, it would not be an \"antitrust injury\" to USA under the Clayton Act unless it could also prove that the pricing was predatory (that is, that it was intended to drive USA and other competitors out of business). It would be impossible to prove this, the District Court concluded, because ARCO was not dominant enough in the market to exert that sort of power.
\nA divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that it was not necessary to show predatory intent to prove an \"antitrust inquiry.\" All that was necessary was a showing that the party bringing the suit had been harmed by price fixing carried out by the party being sued.
", "facts_len": "1504", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "663", "ID": "53773", "name": "Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-700", "docket": "89-700", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Metro Broadcasting, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "In an effort to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a \"distress sale\" of their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. \"distress sold\" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "923", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "664", "ID": "53775", "name": "Osborne v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-5986", "docket": "88-5986", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Osborne", "second_party": "Ohio", "facts": "After obtaining a warrant, Ohio police searched the home of Clyde Osborne and found explicit pictures of naked, sexually aroused male adolescents. Osborne was then prosecuted and found guilty of violating an Ohio law that made the possession of child pornography illegal.
", "facts_len": "279", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "665", "ID": "53778", "name": "Maryland v. Buie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1369", "docket": "88-1369", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Jerome Edward Buie", "facts": "On February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather\u2019s Pizza in Prince George\u2019s County, Maryland. One of the men was wearing a red running suit. Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie\u2019s house under surveillance. On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement. Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding. While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence.
\nThe trial court denied Buie\u2019s motion to suppress the running suit evidence, and he was convicted. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed.
", "facts_len": "823", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "666", "ID": "53780", "name": "United States v. Kokinda", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-2031", "docket": "88-2031", "term": "1989", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Kokinda", "facts": "Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits \"soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises.\" They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1241", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "667", "ID": "53784", "name": "Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1897", "docket": "88-1897", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Michigan Department of State Police", "second_party": "Rick Sitz", "facts": "In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts.
", "facts_len": "475", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "668", "ID": "53790", "name": "Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/89-645", "docket": "89-645", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Michael Milkovich", "second_party": "Lorain Journal Co., The News Herald, J. Theodore Diadiun", "facts": "Michael Milkovich, Maple Heights High School\u2019s wrestling coach, testified at a hearing concerning a physical altercation at a recent wrestling meet. After the hearing, Theodore Diadiun published an article in the local newspaper saying that anyone at the wrestling meet \u201cknows in their heart\u201d that Milkovich lied at the hearing. Milkovich sued Diadiun and the paper for defamation, alleging that the article accused him of perjury, damaged his occupation, and constituted libel. The court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that Milkovich failed to show the article was published with actual malice. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
\nOn remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the paper, holding that the article was a constitutionally-protected opinion. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, holding that Milkovich was not a public figure and the defamatory statements were factual assertions, not constitutionally-protected opinions.
", "facts_len": "1025", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "669", "ID": "53796", "name": "University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-493", "docket": "88-493", "term": "1989", "first_party": "University of Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "Rosalie Tung was an Asian-American professor who believed that she was denied tenure because of her sex and her race. To investigate her claim, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asked the University for access to Tung's confidential peer review file. Citing the protection of academic freedom, the University refused to cooperate so as to avoid breaching the confidentiality promised to reviewers.
", "facts_len": "415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "670", "ID": "53800", "name": "Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1503", "docket": "88-1503", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Cruzan by Cruzan", "second_party": "Director, Missouri Department of Health", "facts": "In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a \"persistent vegetative state.\" She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.
", "facts_len": "462", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "671", "ID": "53799", "name": "New York v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1000", "docket": "88-1000", "term": "1989", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Bernard Harris", "facts": "On January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked Bernard Harris to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to Harris\u2019 house to take him into custody. Although the police had not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, Harris let them enter. The police officers read Harris his Miranda rights, and Harris admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested Harris and took him to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and the district attorney, despite Harris' requests to cease the interrogation.
\nThe trial court suppressed Harris\u2019 initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest.
", "facts_len": "1155", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "672", "ID": "53801", "name": "Hodgson v. Minnesota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-1125", "docket": "88-1125", "term": "1989", "first_party": "Hodgson", "second_party": "Minnesota", "facts": "Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.
", "facts_len": "452", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "673", "ID": "53805", "name": "James v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1989/88-6075", "docket": "88-6075", "term": "1989", "first_party": "James", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "James was a youth arrested for the murder of another adolescent. During his trial a witness testifying on his behalf described James's appearance on the night of the supposed crime. This description contradicted statements which James had made to police officers the day after the crime. To expose this perjured testimony, prosecutors moved to introduce James's statements into the trial even though they were obtained illegally.
", "facts_len": "437", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "674", "ID": "53812", "name": "FMC Corporation v. Holliday", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1048", "docket": "89-1048", "term": "1990", "first_party": "FMC Corporation", "second_party": "Holliday", "facts": "FMC Corporation (FMC) provided its employees with a self-funded health benefit plan (Plan). The daughter of an FMC employee, Gerald Holliday (Holliday), was seriously injured in a car accident and the Plan paid for a portion of her medical expenses. Holliday also received, in settlement of a negligence action he brought on behalf of his daughter, payment from the driver of the automobile in which his daughter was injured. FMC sought reimbursement under the terms of the Plan. Holliday obtained a declaratory judgment that Section 1720 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law - which precludes reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefit payments by a program, group contract, or other arrangement - prohibited FMC's exercise of subrogation rights. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which applies to employee welfare benefit plans such as FMC's Plan, did not preempt Section 1720.
", "facts_len": "988", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "675", "ID": "53815", "name": "Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1598", "docket": "89-1598", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Eastern Airlines, Inc.", "second_party": "Rose Marie Floyd", "facts": "On May 5, 1983, an Eastern Airlines flight departed from Miami, bound for the Bahamas. After takeoff, one of the plane\u2019s jet engines lost pressure. The flight crew shut down the failing engine and turned the plan around to return to Miami. The flight crew informed the passengers that the plane would be ditched in the Atlantic Ocean, but the crew managed to restart the engine and land the plane safely at Miami International Airport. A group of passengers, including Rose Marie Floyd, sued Eastern Airlines for mental distress caused by the incident. Eastern Airlines argued the engine failure and preparations for ditching the plane amounted to an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and also that Article 17 requires physical injury a condition of liability. The district court concluded than mental distress alone is not enough to receive compensation under Article 17. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held the language in Article 17 encompasses purely emotional distress.
", "facts_len": "1032", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "676", "ID": "53816", "name": "Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-5867", "docket": "89-5867", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Irwin", "second_party": "Department of Veterans Affairs", "facts": "Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days \"of receipt of notice of final action taken\" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1484", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "677", "ID": "53817", "name": "California v. Hodari D.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1632", "docket": "89-1632", "term": "1990", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Hodari D.", "facts": "Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word \u201cPolice\u201d on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after Hodari D. Hodari tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine.
\nAt trial, Hodari moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Hodari was \u201cseized\u201d when he saw the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state\u2019s application for review.
", "facts_len": "965", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "678", "ID": "53826", "name": "Harmelin v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-7272", "docket": "89-7272", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Harmelin", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Following his conviction under Michigan law for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, Ronald Harmelin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual, claiming it was disproportionate to the crime he committed and was statutorily mandated without consideration for the fact that he had no prior felony convictions. On appeal from an affirmance by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "495", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "679", "ID": "53827", "name": "Wilson v. Seiter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-7376", "docket": "89-7376", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Pearly L. Wilson", "second_party": "Richard Seiter et al.", "facts": "While detained at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, Pearly Wilson claimed he experienced cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wilson sought financial awards and an injunction against the prison under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He filed suit in a federal district court against two state prison officials, Richard P. Seiter and Carl Humphreys. The District Court ruled against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Wilson had to show that the prison officials had a \"culpable state of mind\" when inflicting harm upon him.
", "facts_len": "639", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "680", "ID": "53828", "name": "Chisom v. Roemer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-757", "docket": "90-757", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Chisom", "second_party": "Roemer", "facts": "The Louisiana Supreme Court had 7 judges. The First Supreme Court District elected 2 judges, and the 5 other districts elected 1 judge each. The Orleans Parish was 1 of 4 parishes in the First Supreme Court District and the majority of its registered voters were black. However, more than 75% of the other 3 parishes' registered voters were white. Ronald Chisom and the other petitioners in this case, representing New Orleans's black majority, filed an action in the District Court against Louisiana's governor, Charles E. Roemer, and state officials, arguing that the state's justice election procedure weakened the minority's voting power, allegedly violating section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment to this act prohibited any voting procedure which caused minority voters to \"have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.\" The District Court ruled against the petitioners. When the Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it sent the case back to the District Court with instructions to maintain the original ruling based partly on its claim that the 1982 amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the election of judges. The District Court maintained their original opinion, but the petitioners and the United States appealed.
", "facts_len": "1373", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "681", "ID": "53832", "name": "McNeil v. Wisconsin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-5319", "docket": "90-5319", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Paul McNeil", "second_party": "Wisconsin", "facts": "When arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.
", "facts_len": "858", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "682", "ID": "53835", "name": "Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1080", "docket": "89-1080", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools", "second_party": "Robert L. Dowell", "facts": "In 1972, a federal district court issued an injunction ordering the Board of Education of Oklahoma City to implement the \"Finger Plan,\" which bused black students to white schools. In 1977, the district court withdrew its enforcement of the plan, declaring that the Board had complied with the plan and reached \"unitary\" racial composition. In 1984, the Board passed the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP), which lessened busing in an effort to reduce travel time for black students. The group that originally protested segregation sought to restore the court-ordered desegregation, claiming that the school system again became segregated. The district court declined, but on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the injunction was never formally removed. On reconsideration, the district court again declined to restore the injunction because it found the original \"Finger Plan\" unworkable. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "965", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "683", "ID": "53837", "name": "Leathers v. Medlock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-29", "docket": "90-29", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Leathers", "second_party": "Medlock", "facts": "In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.
", "facts_len": "837", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "684", "ID": "53845", "name": "United States v. Centennial Savings Bank FSB", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1926", "docket": "89-1926", "term": "1990", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Centennial Savings Bank FSB", "facts": "Centennial Savings Bank exchanged interests in one set of mortgage loans for another set of mortgage loans of the same market value. The mortgages were worth substantially less at the time they were exchanged than they had been at the time they were acquired, however, and Centennial reported the difference as lost income on its income tax return. In a separate set of transactions, Centennial collected early withdrawal penalties from customers who withdrew their certificates of deposit before they were scheduled. Centennial reported the early withdrawal penalties as \"income from the discharge ... of indebtedness,\" meaning that it did not need to be reported as income under 26 U.S.C. 108(a)(1)(C).
\nWith regard to the exchanged mortgages, the IRS did not allow the deduction, ruling that the properties exchanged had not been \"materially different\" and that the exchange therefore did not actually produce a reportable loss. With regard to the withdrawal penalties, the IRS ruled that they had to be reported as income. Centennial took the issue to federal District Court, where a judge ruled for the IRS on the mortgage exchange issue but for Centennial on the withdrawal penalty one. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the mortgage exchange holding and upheld the withdrawal penalty holding, siding with Centennial on both issues.
", "facts_len": "1362", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "685", "ID": "53848", "name": "California v. Acevedo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1690", "docket": "89-1690", "term": "1990", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Acevedo", "facts": "California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Acevedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.
", "facts_len": "1345", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "686", "ID": "53850", "name": "Grogan v. Garner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1149", "docket": "89-1149", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Grogan", "second_party": "Garner", "facts": "Frank Garner was convicted of defrauding Coy Grogan and ordered to repay him. Garner then filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, asking the Bankruptcy Court to discharge (that is, nullify) his court-ordered repayment to Grogan. Grogan argued that the debt should not be discharged because section 523(a) of the bankruptcy code exempts obligations for money obtained by \"actual fraud.\" The Bankruptcy Court, based on portions of the fraud case, agreed and did not allow Garner to discharge the debt. The District Court affirmed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the standard of proof used in the original fraud case - the \"preponderance of the evidence\" standard - was lower than the standard of proof demanded under section 523(a) - a \"clear and convincing evidence\" standard. The Court found that most states used the \"clear and convincing\" standard in fraud cases and that Congress would have explicitly stated it if they used a different standard. Moreover, it argued that the intention of the bankruptcy code to provide a \"fresh start\" suggested that the standard most favorable to bankruptcy filers should be used (that is, the more demanding \"clear and convincing\" standard).
", "facts_len": "1213", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "687", "ID": "53847", "name": "Exxon Corporation v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-34", "docket": "90-34", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Exxon Corporation", "second_party": "Central Gulf Lines, Inc.", "facts": "For certain contract disputes within admiralty jurisdiction, an action in rem is authorized against the vessel herself, even when jurisdiction cannot be asserted over her owner or operator. To satisfy a judgment for the plaintiff, the court may order the vessel sold at public auction. Such an action is permitted those who go unpaid after furnishing a vessel with supplies essential for her continued voyaging. But maritime law long distinguished the contracts of middlemen, that is, agents or brokers procuring supplies for a vessel from other sources. Such intermediary contracts were considered ordinary agency agreements, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. The Supreme Court embraced this distinction in Minturn v. Minyard, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 477 (1854).
\nIn this case, EXXON sued a cargo ship, the William Hopper, in rem and her owner, Central Gulf Lines, in personam for the price of fuel delivered to the ship in the ports of New York and Jeddah. Exxon had a contract with Waterman Steamship Company to supply fuel for its fleet anywhere in the world. Sometimes EXXON furnished its own fuels; otherwise, EXXON procured fuels from other sellers. Among the vessels operated by Waterman was the William Hopper, leased from Central Gulf Lines. When she visited New York, Exxon supplied her with its own fuel. When she visited Jeddah, EXXON got her fuel from Arabian Marine Operating Company. EXXON paid Arabian Marine, but Waterman went bankrupt before paying EXXON. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Central Gulf agreed to pay EXXON if a court found the William Hooper liable in rem. Invoking Minturn and its progeny, the Southern District of New York agreed with Central Gulf Lines that Exxon's claim for the fuel procured in Jeddah was one of agency, and therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion.
", "facts_len": "1983", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "688", "ID": "53854", "name": "Touby v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-6282", "docket": "90-6282", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Daniel Touby, et ux.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act, which established five categories, or \u201cschedules,\u201d of substances for the purposes of regulation and prosecution. The Act grants the Attorney General the authority to add or remove substances and to move substances among the schedules. The Act also lays out specific procedures in order for the Attorney General to exercise this authority. Because the procedures lengthened the process of making any changes to the enforcement of the Act, drug manufacturers were able to develop products that took advantage of unforeseen loopholes in the Act. In 1984, Congress amended the Act to allow the Attorney General to temporarily schedule drugs, which expedited the enforcement process. The Attorney General then delegated these temporary scheduling powers to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which temporarily scheduled the designer drug \u201cEuphoria\u201d as a Schedule I substance.
\nDuring this time, the DEA executed a valid search warrant on the home of Daniel and Lyrissa Touby, where they found a fully operational Euphoria laboratory. The Toubys were indicted for manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture Euphoria. They moved for dismissal by arguing that the Controlled Substances Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and the Attorney General improperly delegated authority to the DEA. The district court denied the motion, and the Toubys were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1544", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "689", "ID": "53852", "name": "Florida v. Bostick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1717", "docket": "89-1717", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Bostick", "facts": "In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to \"leave the bus\" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "895", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "690", "ID": "53861", "name": "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1215", "docket": "89-1215", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Automobile Workers", "second_party": "Johnson Controls, Inc.", "facts": "Johnson Controls, Inc. (\"Johnson\") manufactures batteries whose assembly process entails exposure to high levels of lead. After discovering that eight of its female employees became pregnant while maintaining blood lead levels in excess of those thought safe by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Johnson barred all its female employees - except those with medically documented infertility - from engaging in tasks that require exposure to lead in access of recommended OSHA levels. Following its passage, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) challenged Johnson's fetal-protection policy as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Act). When the Appellate Court affirmed a district court decision in favor of Johnson, the UAW appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "846", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "691", "ID": "53868", "name": "Gregory v. Ashcroft", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-50", "docket": "90-50", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Gregory", "second_party": "Ashcroft", "facts": "Under Article V, Section 26, of Missouri's Constitution, state court judges must retire at the age of seventy. The two petitioners in this case, both of whom were Missouri state judges, challenged the state constitution's retirement requirement on legislative and constitutional grounds.
", "facts_len": "295", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "692", "ID": "53873", "name": "Florida v. Jimeno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-622", "docket": "90-622", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Jimeno", "facts": "A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.
", "facts_len": "742", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "693", "ID": "53875", "name": "Rust v. Sullivan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1391", "docket": "89-1391", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Rust", "second_party": "Sullivan", "facts": "The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.
", "facts_len": "322", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "694", "ID": "53893", "name": "Minnick v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-6332", "docket": "89-6332", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Robert S. Minnick", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "Robert S. Minnick and James Dyess escaped from the Clark County Jail. The next day, they broke into a mobile home to search for weapons. While in the home, the owner returned with a friend and the friend\u2019s infant son. Minnick and Dyess shot and killed the two adults and tied up two young women who arrived later. Minnick and Dyess fled to Mexico, but after a falling out, Minnick went to California alone where police arrested him on a warrant for the Mississippi murders.
\nAfter the arrest, two FBI officers came to interview Minnick at the San Diego Jail. Minnick refused, asking the officers to \u201cCome back Monday when I have a lawyer.\u201d Minnick did meet with an appointed lawyer on two or three occasions. The next Monday, the deputy sheriff of Clark County came to question Minnick. Prison officials told Minnick he \u201ccould not refuse\u201d to speak to the sheriff. The deputy sheriff advised Minnick of his rights and Minnick refused to sign a waiver form. Minnick then confessed to one of the murders, saying that Dyess forced him to shoot. At trial, Minnick moved to suppress those statements, but the court denied the motion, reasoning that Edwards v Arizona only required counsel to be made available to an accused. Minnick argued that he was entitled to have counsel present at all questioning. The jury found Minnick guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that Minnick\u2019s Fifth Amendment right to counsel was satisfied because he had met with counsel.
", "facts_len": "1555", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "695", "ID": "53891", "name": "Payne v. Tennessee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-5721", "docket": "90-5721", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Pervis Tyrone Payne", "second_party": "Tennessee", "facts": "A Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided four witnesses testifying to his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Nicholas' loss of his mother when calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.
", "facts_len": "671", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "696", "ID": "53895", "name": "Cohen v. Cowles Media Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634", "docket": "90-634", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Cohen", "second_party": "Cowles Media Company", "facts": "Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state \"promissory estoppel\" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.
", "facts_len": "840", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "697", "ID": "53902", "name": "Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1909", "docket": "89-1909", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Feist Publications, Inc.", "second_party": "Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.", "facts": "Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. is a public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Rural also publishes a telephone directory that consists of white and yellow pages. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories that cover a much larger geographic range than Rural's directories. When Rural refused to license its white pages listings to Feist, Feist extracted the listings it needed from Rural's directory without consent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The District Court granted summary judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are copyrightable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "820", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "698", "ID": "53904", "name": "Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1448", "docket": "89-1448", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Virginia Bankshares, Inc.", "second_party": "Sandberg", "facts": "First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI) began a \"freeze-out\" merger in which the First American Bank of Virginia (Bank) merged into Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), a wholly owned subsidiary of FABI. VBI already owned 85% of the Bank's shares, and would acquire the remaining 15% from the Bank's minority shareholders. The Bank's executive committee and full board approved the merger at $42 a share. The directors then solicited proxies for voting on the proposed merger at the next annual meeting. In their solicitation, the directors stated that they approved the plan because the price allowed the minority shareholders to achieve a \"high\" value for their stock. Sandberg did not give her approval of the merger and brought suit, the federal ground for which was soliciting proxies in violation of SEC Rule 14a-9, which prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find for Sandberg as long as the proxy solicitation involved material misstatements, and the proxy solicitation was an \"essential link\" in the merger process. The jury found for Sandberg, awarding her $18 a share, finding that she would have received that much more if the stock had been valued adequately.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "699", "ID": "53905", "name": "Freytag v. Commissioner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-762", "docket": "90-762", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Freytag", "second_party": "Commissioner", "facts": "Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to \"any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate,\" but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.
\nFreytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may \"vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.\" Freytag asserted that the \"Courts of Law\" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.
", "facts_len": "1768", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "700", "ID": "53906", "name": "Schad v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-5551", "docket": "90-5551", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Schad", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.
", "facts_len": "517", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "701", "ID": "53915", "name": "Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-26", "docket": "90-26", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Barnes", "second_party": "Glen Theatre Inc.", "facts": "Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear \"pasties\" and a \"G-string\" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.
", "facts_len": "309", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "702", "ID": "53918", "name": "Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1965", "docket": "89-1965", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Cottage Savings Association", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as \"substantially identical\" (because they had the same fair market value).
\nWhen Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the \"sale or disposition of [the] property.\" An exchange of property only constitutes a \"disposition\" if there is a \"material difference\" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as \"substantially identical,\" the IRS ruled, a \"disposition\" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.
", "facts_len": "1682", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "703", "ID": "53916", "name": "Arizona v. Fulminante", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-839", "docket": "89-839", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Oreste Fulminante", "facts": "Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.
", "facts_len": "1015", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "704", "ID": "53925", "name": "Riverside County v. McLaughlin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1817", "docket": "89-1817", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Riverside County", "second_party": "McLaughlin", "facts": "McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.
", "facts_len": "207", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "705", "ID": "53934", "name": "Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1799", "docket": "89-1799", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Masson", "second_party": "New Yorker Magazine, Inc.", "facts": "After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself \"the greatest analyst who ever lived.\" However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.
", "facts_len": "589", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "706", "ID": "53935", "name": "Powers v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-5011", "docket": "89-5011", "term": "1990", "first_party": "Powers", "second_party": "Ohio", "facts": "Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution\u2019s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "955", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "707", "ID": "53940", "name": "Lee v. Weisman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1014", "docket": "90-1014", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lee", "second_party": "Weisman", "facts": "In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "816", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "708", "ID": "53945", "name": "Franklin v. Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-1502", "docket": "91-1502", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Franklin", "second_party": "Massachusetts", "facts": "Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their \"homes of record.\" Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their \"homes of record\" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people \"in each State.\"
", "facts_len": "1019", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "709", "ID": "53946", "name": "Nordlinger v. Hahn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1912", "docket": "90-1912", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Nordlinger", "second_party": "Hahn", "facts": "In a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's \"acquisition value\" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long-term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.
", "facts_len": "795", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "710", "ID": "53954", "name": "Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-954", "docket": "90-954", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Rufo, Sheriff Of Suffolk County, et al.", "second_party": "Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail et al.", "facts": "After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail\u2019s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "711", "ID": "53955", "name": "Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1604", "docket": "90-1604", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Morales, Attorney General of Texas", "second_party": "Trans World Airlines, Inc.", "facts": "The pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did not follow the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1134", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "712", "ID": "53958", "name": "United States v. Fordice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1205", "docket": "90-1205", "term": "1991", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Fordice", "facts": "After 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice.
", "facts_len": "451", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "713", "ID": "53957", "name": "Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-744", "docket": "91-744", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Robert P. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania", "facts": "The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.
", "facts_len": "608", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "714", "ID": "53959", "name": "Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-970", "docket": "90-970", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lechmere, Inc.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.
", "facts_len": "519", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "715", "ID": "53971", "name": "Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1038", "docket": "90-1038", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Cipollone", "second_party": "Liggett Group, Inc.", "facts": "Rose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "358", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "716", "ID": "53974", "name": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1424", "docket": "90-1424", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lujan", "second_party": "Defenders of Wildlife", "facts": "The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.
", "facts_len": "567", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "717", "ID": "53975", "name": "Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1596", "docket": "90-1596", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al.", "second_party": "Seattle Audubon Society et al.", "facts": "Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted \u00a7318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. \u00a7318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that \u00a7318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.
", "facts_len": "1085", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "718", "ID": "53979", "name": "Riggins v. Nevada", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-8466", "docket": "90-8466", "term": "1991", "first_party": "David Riggins", "second_party": "Nevada", "facts": "On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "960", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "719", "ID": "53981", "name": "Quill Corporation v. North Dakota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-194", "docket": "91-194", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Quill Corporation", "second_party": "North Dakota by and through its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp", "facts": "Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the \"tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations\" since it had been decided.
", "facts_len": "838", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "720", "ID": "53980", "name": "Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-971", "docket": "91-971", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Two Pesos, Inc.", "second_party": "Taco Cabana, Inc.", "facts": "Taco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or \u201ctrade dress\u201d. Two Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana\u2019s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found that Taco Cabana\u2019s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.
", "facts_len": "880", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "721", "ID": "53983", "name": "New York v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-543", "docket": "91-543", "term": "1991", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.
", "facts_len": "523", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "722", "ID": "54002", "name": "Presley v. Etowah County Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-711", "docket": "90-711", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lawrence C. Presley et al.", "second_party": "Etowah County Commission et al.", "facts": "The principal focus of Alabama County Commission members is the construction and maintenance of roads. In 1987, Etowah County Commission passed the \"Common Fund Resolution\", combining all of the commission's funds into one county-wide budget and eliminating each commissioner's power over the distribution of funds allocated for his or her own road district. Newly elected black member, Commissioner Lawrence C. Presley, claimed that the changes in the distribution of authority were a form of racial discrimination and a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which permits a state government to alter practices related to voting only after receiving judicial preclearance. The Etowah County Commission had not received this preclearance, and neither had the Russell County Commission when, in 1979, its members instituted the \"Unit System.\" This system transferred full authority over Russell County roads, highways, bridges, and ferries from the commissioners to the appointed county engineer. When the first 2 black commissioners were elected in Russell County, they joined Presley in filing a suit against Etowah and Russell Counties in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The District Court determined that preclearance was unnecessary in both 2 instances, but Presley appealed.
", "facts_len": "1336", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "723", "ID": "54000", "name": "International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-155", "docket": "91-155", "term": "1991", "first_party": "International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.", "second_party": "Lee", "facts": "New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.
", "facts_len": "374", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "724", "ID": "54003", "name": "Burson v. Freeman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1056", "docket": "90-1056", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Burson", "second_party": "Freeman", "facts": "Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.
", "facts_len": "433", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "725", "ID": "54007", "name": "National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1419", "docket": "90-1419", "term": "1991", "first_party": "National Railroad Passenger Corporation", "second_party": "Boston & Maine Corporation", "facts": "Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into \"trackage rights\" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are \"required for intercity rail passenger service.\" Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property.
\nAmtrak had a \"trackage rights\" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B & M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant \"trackage rights\" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not \"required for intercity rail passenger service.\"
", "facts_len": "2110", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "726", "ID": "54012", "name": "Georgia v. McCollum", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-372", "docket": "91-372", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Georgia", "second_party": "Thomas McCollum et al.", "facts": "In 1990, white respondents, Thomas McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term \"preemptory challenge\" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision.
", "facts_len": "583", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "727", "ID": "54013", "name": "Suter v. Artist M.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1488", "docket": "90-1488", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Suter", "second_party": "Artist M.", "facts": "The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be \"in effect in all\" a state's political subdivisions and \"be mandatory upon them,\" and must state that \"reasonable efforts will be made\" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for \"deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws.\" They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1382", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "728", "ID": "54016", "name": "Morgan v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-5118", "docket": "91-5118", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Derrick Morgan", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "In the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, the trial court, not the attorneys, performed voir dire, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence.
", "facts_len": "703", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "729", "ID": "54017", "name": "Hudson v. McMillian", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-6531", "docket": "90-6531", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Hudson", "second_party": "McMillian", "facts": "Keith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the \"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.\" Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate \"significant injury\" when he claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the use of excessive force.
", "facts_len": "866", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "730", "ID": "54019", "name": "Jacobson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1124", "docket": "90-1124", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Keith Jacobson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Before the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 \u00bd years, they sent him mailings from 5 fictitious organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "685", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "731", "ID": "54018", "name": "Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-985", "docket": "90-985", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Bray", "second_party": "Alexandria Women's Health Clinic", "facts": "Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive \"any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.\" The protesters had sought to deny women their \"right to abortion\" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.
", "facts_len": "993", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "732", "ID": "54025", "name": "Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-763", "docket": "91-763", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Republic of Argentina", "second_party": "Weltover, Inc.", "facts": "In 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued \"Bonods,\" which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for acts taken \"in connection with a commercial activity\" that have \"a direct effect in the United States.\"
", "facts_len": "1075", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "733", "ID": "54028", "name": "White v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-6113", "docket": "90-6113", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Randall D. White", "second_party": "State of Illinois", "facts": "During Randall D. White\u2019s trial on charges related to a sexual assault of a 4-year-old girl, Illinois state prosecutors twice-attempted to call the child, who was by then five years old, as a witness, but each time she experienced emotional difficulty and left the stand without testifying. The trial court then allowed the admission of testimony by the girl\u2019s babysitter, mother, emergency room nurse, doctor and an investigating officer that recounted statements she made describing the crime. This testimony was allowed into evidence under state-law hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of a medical examination. The jury subsequently convicted White. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected White\u2019s claims that the introduction of the out-of-court statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the case.
", "facts_len": "1006", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "734", "ID": "54039", "name": "American National Red Cross v. S.G.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-594", "docket": "91-594", "term": "1991", "first_party": "American National Red Cross", "second_party": "S.G.", "facts": "Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to \"sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States,\" 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court.
", "facts_len": "837", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "735", "ID": "54045", "name": "Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-453", "docket": "91-453", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lucas", "second_party": "South Carolina Coast Council", "facts": "In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.
", "facts_len": "428", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "736", "ID": "54048", "name": "Freeman v. Pitts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/89-1290", "docket": "89-1290", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Robert R. Freeman et al.", "second_party": "Willie Eugene Pitts et al.", "facts": "In 1969, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years.
", "facts_len": "1182", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "737", "ID": "54049", "name": "Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-339", "docket": "91-339", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Lee", "second_party": "International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.", "facts": "The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise grounds of the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "386", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "738", "ID": "54050", "name": "Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/-767", "docket": "A-767", "term": "1991", "first_party": "James Gomez and Daniel Vasquez", "second_party": "United States District Court for the Northern District of California", "facts": "In 1979, a California state court convicted Robert Allen Harris of kidnapping and murdering two teenage boys in San Diego and sentenced him to death. On April 18, 1992, three days before his scheduled execution date, Harris and other death-row inmates filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in federal district court. The complaint alleged that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Just hours before Harris was scheduled to be executed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an order to stay the execution, and the state appealed the stay to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "654", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "739", "ID": "54051", "name": "R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-7675", "docket": "90-7675", "term": "1991", "first_party": "R.A.V.", "second_party": "City of St. Paul", "facts": "Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which \"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.\" The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "443", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "740", "ID": "54054", "name": "Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1059", "docket": "90-1059", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Simon & Schuster, Inc.", "second_party": "Members of New York State Crime Victims Board", "facts": "To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 \"Son of Sam\" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal.
", "facts_len": "466", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "741", "ID": "54058", "name": "Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-918", "docket": "90-918", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Christine Franklin", "second_party": "Gwinnett County Public Schools, William Prescott", "facts": "Andrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill\u2019s resignation the school closed its investigation.
\nFranklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failing to take action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "742", "ID": "54057", "name": "Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-538", "docket": "91-538", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Forsyth County", "second_party": "Nationalist Movement", "facts": "The Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement\u2019s free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement\u2019s permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums.
", "facts_len": "1426", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "743", "ID": "54059", "name": "Doggett v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-857", "docket": "90-857", "term": "1991", "first_party": "Marc Gilbert Doggett", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett\u2019s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence.
\nAfter being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government\u2019s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett\u2019s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate\u2019s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1510", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "744", "ID": "54060", "name": "Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1111", "docket": "91-1111", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Hartford Fire Insurance Company", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a \"boycott\" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "933", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "745", "ID": "54063", "name": "Minnesota v. Dickerson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2019", "docket": "91-2019", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Minnesota", "second_party": "Timothy Dickerson", "facts": "On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "826", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "746", "ID": "54067", "name": "Deal v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-8199", "docket": "91-8199", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Deal", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence \"in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection.\" The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "773", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "747", "ID": "54070", "name": "United States v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2003", "docket": "91-2003", "term": "1992", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "California and California State Board of Equalization", "facts": "From 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "748", "ID": "54072", "name": "Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1600", "docket": "91-1600", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Hazen Paper Co., Robert Hazen, Thomas N. Hazen", "second_party": "Walter F. Biggins", "facts": "Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins\u2019 pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and \u201cwillfully\u201d violated the ADEA. The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages. The district court judge granted Hazen\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a \u201creckless disregard\u201d for the matter.
", "facts_len": "955", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "749", "ID": "54073", "name": "Heller v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-351", "docket": "92-351", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources", "second_party": "Doe, By His Mother And Next Friend, Doe, et al.", "facts": "A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.
", "facts_len": "453", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "750", "ID": "54074", "name": "Godinez v. Moran", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-725", "docket": "92-725", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Salvador Godinez, Warden", "second_party": "Richard Allan Moran", "facts": "Richard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran\u2019s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders.
\nAfter sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran\u2019s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a \u201creasoned choice\u201d among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice.
", "facts_len": "1414", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "751", "ID": "54076", "name": "Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-94", "docket": "92-94", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Zobrest", "second_party": "Catalina Foothills School District", "facts": "James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "972", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "752", "ID": "54078", "name": "Graham v. Collins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7580", "docket": "91-7580", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Gary Graham", "second_party": "James A. Collins, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division", "facts": "On May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
\nGraham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court\u2019s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel\u2019s decision
", "facts_len": "782", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "753", "ID": "54086", "name": "Withrow v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1030", "docket": "91-1030", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Withrow", "second_party": "Williams", "facts": "During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted.
\nWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "754", "ID": "54087", "name": "Shaw v. Reno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-357", "docket": "92-357", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Shaw", "second_party": "Reno", "facts": "The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "755", "ID": "54091", "name": "Moreau v. Klevenhagen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-1", "docket": "92-1", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Lynwood Moreau", "second_party": "Johnny Klevenhagen, Sheriff of Harris County, Texas", "facts": "The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allows public employers to give employees compensatory time off instead of overtime pay in some situations. The employees of the Harris County Sheriff\u2019s Department had a union representative who dealt with workers' compensation and filing grievances, but Texas law prohibited collective bargaining agreements. Each employee had an individual employment agreement with the Sheriff\u2019s Department. These agreements provided that employees would receive 1 \u00bd hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.
\nLynwood Moreau, president of the union, sued the Sheriff\u2019s Department for giving compensatory time instead of overtime pay. He argued that where there is a designated union representative, the FLSA requires a collective bargaining agreement to authorize this kind of compensation. The Sheriff\u2019s Department argued that, because Texas prohibited collective bargaining agreements, there was no properly designated union representative, and the individual employment agreements were effective. The district court ruled in favor of the Sheriff\u2019s Office and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1177", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "756", "ID": "54094", "name": "Wisconsin v. Mitchell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-515", "docket": "92-515", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Wisconsin", "second_party": "Mitchell", "facts": "On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.
", "facts_len": "517", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "757", "ID": "54098", "name": "Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2024", "docket": "91-2024", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Lamb's Chapel", "second_party": "Center Moriches Union Free School District", "facts": "A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.
", "facts_len": "472", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "758", "ID": "54104", "name": "Herrera v. Collins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7328", "docket": "91-7328", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Leonel Torres Herrera", "second_party": "James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division", "facts": "On September 29, 1981, Officers Enrique Carrisalez and David Rucker were shot within several minutes of each other in a rural part of Texas along the Mexico border known as \u201cthe Valley.\u201d Enrique Hernandez, who was riding along in Officer Carrisalez\u2019s squad car, was an eyewitness to Carrisalez\u2019s shooting. The shootings led to a massive hunt for the killer across the Valley. The police arrested Leonel Herrera on October 4, 1981 near Edinburg and took him to the police station. During a heated exchange, Herrera struck a police officer and was restrained. When defense counsel arrived several hours later, Herrera was badly beaten, unconscious, and partly paralyzed; he was subsequently transported to a hospital emergency room. Officer Carrisalez died soon thereafter.
\nThe police discovered evidence at the scene of arrest implicating Herrera in both murders. The car pulled over by Carrisalez was registered in the name of Herrera\u2019s live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had a set of keys to that car when he was arrested. The police found drops of Type A blood on jeans recovered from a laundry room and in Herrera\u2019s wallet. They also found a letter in Herrera\u2019s pocket with Herrera\u2019s fingerprints; the letter contained apparent confessions to both murders. Hernandez could not specifically identify Herrera from an array of six photographs, but later identified him as the shooter when presented with a mug shot. Herrera was convicted of the murder of Officer Carrisalez, and pleaded guilty to the murder of Trooper Rucker.
\nHerrera filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming actual innocence and alleging that various Valley police officials were involved in the drug trade and were working with the person actually responsible for the murders, Raul Herrera. The trial court denied relief. Herrera filed another petition, presenting the affidavit of Raul Herrera\u2019s son that he witnessed the killings and that Herrera did not commit them. The district court dismissed most of Herrera\u2019s claims, but granted a stay of execution as to his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay of execution, agreeing with Texas that innocence was irrelevant to Herrera\u2019s petition.
", "facts_len": "2272", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "759", "ID": "54105", "name": "Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-10", "docket": "91-10", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Spectrum Sports Inc. and Kenneth B. Leighton", "second_party": "Shirley and Larry McQuillan, dba Sorboturf Enterprises", "facts": "Shirley and Larry McQuillan were the southwest distributors for products made with sorbothane, a patented elastic polymer. They had an agreement with the manufacturer to be one of five regional distributors. Gradually, the manufacturer began to take away the McQuillan\u2019s right to distribute certain types of products, eventually revoking their rights altogether. The manufacturer only allowed one national distributor, Spectrum Sports, Inc., which was co-owned by the president of the manufacturer\u2019s son. When the McQuillan\u2019s business failed, they sued Spectrum for violations of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of the interstate commerce.
\nThe district court instructed the jury to infer specific intent and dangerous probability of monopolization if they found that Spectrum engaged in predatory conduct. The jury found Spectrum guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was enough evidence to show specific intent and a dangerous probability of monopolization even if the jury only considered Spectrum\u2019s predatory conduct.
", "facts_len": "1181", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "760", "ID": "54109", "name": "Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-948", "docket": "91-948", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.", "second_party": "City of Hialeah", "facts": "The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
", "facts_len": "573", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "761", "ID": "54110", "name": "Brecht v. Abrahamson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7358", "docket": "91-7358", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Todd A. Brecht", "second_party": "Gordon A. Abrahamson, Superintendent, Dodge Correctional Institution", "facts": "Todd Brecht was charged with murder for shooting his brother-in-law. During his trial, he testified that the shooting was an accident. In addition to presenting other evidence, the prosecution pointed out his silence (both prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings and after) in an attempt to discredit his testimony. Brecht was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.
\nBrecht appealed, claiming that the prosecution's reference to his post-Miranda silence violated his right to due process according to Doyle v. Ohio. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reinstated it. They found that the mention of post-Miranda silence was impermissible under Doyle, but was also harmless error according to the \"beyond a reasonable doubt\" standard from Chapman v. California.
\nBrecht sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court upheld his Doyle claim and found that the violation was not harmless error under Chapman. Brecht's conviction was thus overturned again, only to be reinstated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
\nThe Seventh Circuit held that Chapman was not the appropriate standard under which to review Doyle error in federal habeas petitions. Rather than adhering to the Chapman standard, the court applied the Kotteakos v. United States test, which requires that the Doyle error have a \"substantial and injurious effect\" on the jury's verdict. Brecht's Doyle claim did not meet this standard, and the Seventh Circuit denied the writ.
", "facts_len": "1677", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "762", "ID": "54113", "name": "Helling v. McKinney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1958", "docket": "91-1958", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Helling", "second_party": "McKinney", "facts": "William McKinney, a Nevada state prisoner, sued his warden and several other prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unhealthy levels of second-hand smoke. McKinney shared a cell with a man who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. He claimed that his health - both current and future - was being harmed by the smoke, and that the prison officials were \"deliberately indifferent\" to the risk in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294. After a federal magistrate ruled that he did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a smoke-free environment and that he had failed to prove any \"serious medical needs,\" the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that he should have been given another opportunity to prove that the smoke levels were sufficient to constitute an unreasonable danger to his future health.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "763", "ID": "54126", "name": "Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1721", "docket": "91-1721", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America", "second_party": "City of Jacksonville, Florida, et al.", "facts": "In 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance.
", "facts_len": "971", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "764", "ID": "54129", "name": "Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-603", "docket": "92-603", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "second_party": "Beach Communications, Inc.", "facts": "Section 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving \"only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way.\" When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings.
", "facts_len": "1210", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "765", "ID": "54131", "name": "Austin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-6073", "docket": "92-6073", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Richard Lyle Austin", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Richard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota\u2019s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin\u2019s mobile home and auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment\u2019s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin\u2019s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "766", "ID": "54134", "name": "Cardinal Chemical Company v. Morton International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-114", "docket": "92-114", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Cardinal Chemical Company", "second_party": "Morton International, Inc.", "facts": "Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical (\"Cardinal\") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International (\"Morton\") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "742", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "767", "ID": "54136", "name": "Smith v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-8674", "docket": "91-8674", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a \"machinegun\", if a defendant \"during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm.\" A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.
", "facts_len": "935", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "768", "ID": "54145", "name": "United States v. Dixon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1231", "docket": "91-1231", "term": "1992", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Alvin J. Dixon and Michael Foster", "facts": "Alvin J. Dixon was arrested on second-degree murder charges and released on bond with an order not to commit any criminal offense. Violation of the order would result in prosecution for contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Dixon guilty of contempt. Dixon moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment for cocaine possession, arguing that it violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. The Superior Court granted the motion.
\nMichael Foster\u2019s wife obtained a civil protection order requiring that he not \u201cmolest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse\u201d her, or he would face prosecution for contempt of court. Foster\u2019s wife later moved to have him held in contempt for threatening her. Foster was found guilty of contempt on two occasions, but acquitted on three others. Foster was later indicted on several counts of assault arising out of those same threats. He moved to have the charges dismissed arguing that it violated double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases, holding that the subsequent prosecutions were barred by Grady v. Corbin, which held that subsequent prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause if the two prosecutions require proof of the same \u201cessential element.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1484", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "769", "ID": "54162", "name": "Johnson v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-5653", "docket": "92-5653", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr.", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr., who was 19, shot Jack Huddleston in the course of a convenience store robbery by telling Huddleston to get on the ground and then shooting Huddleston in the back of the neck. A few weeks later, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted murder. At that time he confessed to the murder of Jack Huddleston.
\nJohnson was tried and convicted of capital murder. After a jury determined that he was guilty, a separate proceeding was held to determine whether Johnson would be sentenced to death or to life in prison. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute, the court instructed the jury to determine two special issues, whether Johnson caused the death of Jack Huddleston intentionally and whether Johnson was likely to constitute a continuing threat to society. Under Texas law, if the jury answered yes to both questions Johnson would be sentenced to death. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence. However, the jury was given no special instruction to consider Johnson's youth. A unanimous jury found that the answer to both special issues was yes, and the trial court sentenced Johnson to death.
\nJohnson appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Johnson later filed a motion for rehearing arguing that the special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of Johnson's youth. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument concluding that the jury was able to express a reasoned and moral response to Johnson's mitigating evidence. Johnson then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1676", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "770", "ID": "54163", "name": "Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-344", "docket": "92-344", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration And Naturalization Service, et al.", "second_party": "Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al.", "facts": "According to Executive Order No. 12807 signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, the Coast Guard was required to force the return of all passengers discovered illegally traveling by sea from Haiti to the United States before reaching its borders without determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitians detained at Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York delay the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council's request, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "936", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "771", "ID": "54168", "name": "Alexander v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1526", "docket": "91-1526", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Ferris Alexander", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Ferris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000.
\nAlexander appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material amounted to 'prior restraint' on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and therefore violated his First Amendment rights. He also claimed that the seizure of his business violated his Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on the First Amendment claim, and declined to review the Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that no sentence less severe than life imprisonment without parole could justify an Eighth Amendment review.
", "facts_len": "1091", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "772", "ID": "54175", "name": "Nixon v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-740", "docket": "91-740", "term": "1992", "first_party": "Nixon", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that \"the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.\" The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute.
", "facts_len": "692", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "773", "ID": "54179", "name": "Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1292", "docket": "92-1292", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Campbell", "second_party": "Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.", "facts": "Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song \"Pretty Woman\" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's \"Oh, Pretty Woman.\" The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.
", "facts_len": "443", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "774", "ID": "54180", "name": "Board of Education or Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-517", "docket": "93-517", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Board of Education or Kiryas Joel Village School District", "second_party": "Grumet", "facts": "In 1989, the New York legislature passed a school districting law that intentionally drew its boundaries in accordance with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim who practice a strict form of Judaism. Shortly before the new district commenced operations, the taxpayers and the association of state school boards embarked on a lawsuit claiming that the statute created a school district that limited access only to residents of Kiryas Joel.
", "facts_len": "493", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "775", "ID": "54186", "name": "Florence County School District Four v. Carter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/91-1523", "docket": "91-1523", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Florence County School District Four", "second_party": "Carter", "facts": "After Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending.
\nWhen state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, claiming the school district had failed to provide a \"free appropriate public education\" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA and therefore did not meet the \"appropriate\" standard. Because of it was not \"appropriate,\" the school district argued, reimbursement was not required.
\nThe District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.
", "facts_len": "1131", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "776", "ID": "54187", "name": "National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-780", "docket": "92-780", "term": "1993", "first_party": "National Organization for Women, Inc.", "second_party": "Scheidler", "facts": "The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a \"racketeering enterprise\" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "739", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "777", "ID": "54188", "name": "Albright v. Oliver", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-833", "docket": "92-833", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Albright", "second_party": "Oliver et al.", "facts": "Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.
\nAlbright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.
", "facts_len": "907", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "778", "ID": "54195", "name": "Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-70", "docket": "93-70", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "Department of Environmental Quality of The State of Oregon et al.", "facts": "In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies \u2014Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) \u2014 disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "788", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "779", "ID": "54198", "name": "Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1956", "docket": "92-1956", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Consolidated Rail Corporation", "second_party": "Gottshall", "facts": "Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were \"genuine and severe.\" The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.
\nConrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.
", "facts_len": "1292", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "780", "ID": "54205", "name": "C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1402", "docket": "92-1402", "term": "1993", "first_party": "C & A Carbone, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Town of Clarkstown", "facts": "A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 \"tipping fee\" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a \"flow control ordinance.\" The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "781", "ID": "54207", "name": "Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1168", "docket": "92-1168", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Harris", "second_party": "Forklift Systems, Inc.", "facts": "Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an \"abusive work environment\" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a \"close case\" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "731", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "782", "ID": "54208", "name": "United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1812", "docket": "92-1812", "term": "1993", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Alvarez-Sanchez", "facts": "Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.
", "facts_len": "757", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "783", "ID": "54206", "name": "BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1370", "docket": "92-1370", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Bfp", "second_party": "Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association, et al.", "facts": "BFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive \"reasonably equivalent value\" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed \"reasonably equivalent value\" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1061", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "784", "ID": "54209", "name": "Central Bank of Denver , N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , N. A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-854", "docket": "92-854", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Central Bank of Denver , N. A.", "second_party": "First Interstate Bank Of Denver, N. A., et al.", "facts": "In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds\u2019 outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds.
\nFirst Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "956", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "785", "ID": "54211", "name": "Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-397", "docket": "93-397", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Associated Industries of Missouri", "second_party": "Lohman", "facts": "Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide \"use tax,\" the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.
", "facts_len": "447", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "786", "ID": "54221", "name": "Beecham v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-445", "docket": "93-445", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Lenard Ray Beecham", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause (\"Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...\") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's \"choice of law clause,\" which states that \"What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.\" They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.
\nThe District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to \"any conviction,\" it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.
", "facts_len": "1211", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "787", "ID": "54231", "name": "Farmer v. Brennan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-7247", "docket": "92-7247", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Dee Farmer", "second_party": "Edward Brennan, Warden", "facts": "Dee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual. Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer\u2019s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns.
\nFarmer was transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy. Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer. Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner. This violated Farmer\u2019s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1190", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "788", "ID": "54239", "name": "Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1750", "docket": "92-1750", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Fogerty", "second_party": "Fantasy, Inc.", "facts": "After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: \"the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.\" On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "630", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "789", "ID": "54241", "name": "Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-405", "docket": "93-405", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Digital Equipment Corporation", "second_party": "Desktop Direct, Inc.", "facts": "After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the \"right not to go to trial\" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.
", "facts_len": "949", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "790", "ID": "54243", "name": "Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-639", "docket": "93-639", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Ibanez", "second_party": "Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy", "facts": "Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards\u2014a private organization\u2014to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of \"false, deceptive, and misleading\" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed.
", "facts_len": "911", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "791", "ID": "54245", "name": "Stansbury v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-5770", "docket": "93-5770", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Robert Edward Stansbury", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Robert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl. Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion. After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation. At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements. Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him. The court refused to suppress Stansbury\u2019s statements made prior to the warning. Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1021", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "792", "ID": "54249", "name": "Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Oberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-644", "docket": "93-644", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Honda Motor Company, Ltd.", "second_party": "Oberg", "facts": "Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.
", "facts_len": "330", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "793", "ID": "54253", "name": "ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1550", "docket": "92-1550", "term": "1993", "first_party": "ABF Freight Systems, Inc.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.
\nABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.
", "facts_len": "759", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "794", "ID": "54257", "name": "United States v. Granderson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1662", "docket": "92-1662", "term": "1993", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Granderson", "facts": "Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, \"the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence.\" The district court interpreted the phrase \"original sentence\" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.
\nThe 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing \"lenity,\" the court agreed with Granderson that \"original sentence\" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.
", "facts_len": "1021", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "795", "ID": "54263", "name": "West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-141", "docket": "93-141", "term": "1993", "first_party": "West Lynn Creamery, Inc.", "second_party": "Healy", "facts": "On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "796", "ID": "54265", "name": "Davis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1949", "docket": "92-1949", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Robert L. Davis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis. Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned. Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, \u201cMaybe I should talk to a lawyer.\u201d The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, \u201cNo, I don\u2019t want a lawyer.\u201d Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, \u201cI think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.\u201d At this point questioning ceased.
\nAt trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement for life and dishonorable discharge. Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in Edwards v. Arizona, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he \u201cmaybe\u201d should talk to a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Davis\u2019 statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis\u2019 wishes before continuing questioning.
", "facts_len": "1392", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "797", "ID": "54264", "name": "Simmons v. South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-9059", "docket": "92-9059", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Jonathan Dale Simmons", "second_party": "South Carolina", "facts": "In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution\u2019s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of \u201clife imprisonment\u201d in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge\u2019s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons\u2019 request.
", "facts_len": "1217", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "798", "ID": "54267", "name": "Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-44", "docket": "93-44", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.
", "facts_len": "389", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "799", "ID": "54268", "name": "Heck v. Humphrey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-6188", "docket": "93-6188", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Roy Heck", "second_party": "James Humphrey, Dearborn County Prosecutor, et al.", "facts": "Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife in Indiana state court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He filed an action in federal district court claiming that the prosecution engaged in an \u201cunlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation\u201d before his arrest and knowingly destroyed favorable evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983, but did not seek a release from custody. The district court dismissed the action. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Heck\u2019s petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck\u2019s damages action, stating that the action challenged the legality of the conviction, so Heck must exhaust all state remedies before seeking \u00a71983 relief like he would under the habeas corpus statute.
", "facts_len": "948", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "800", "ID": "54269", "name": "Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-880", "docket": "93-880", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Madsen et al.", "second_party": "Women's Health Center, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.
", "facts_len": "944", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "801", "ID": "54273", "name": "City of Ladue v. Gilleo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1856", "docket": "92-1856", "term": "1993", "first_party": "City of Ladue", "second_party": "Gilleo", "facts": "Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.
", "facts_len": "566", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "802", "ID": "54271", "name": "Barclay's Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1384", "docket": "92-1384", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Barclay's Bank, PLC", "second_party": "Franchise Tax Bd. of California", "facts": "California used a \"worldwide combined reporting\" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a \"reasonable approximation\" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.
\nThe California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the \"worldwide combined reporting\" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The \"worldwide combined reporting\" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)
", "facts_len": "2036", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "803", "ID": "54279", "name": "American Dredging Company v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/91-1950", "docket": "91-1950", "term": "1993", "first_party": "American Dredging Company", "second_party": "Miller", "facts": "Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.
\nAmerican Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of \"forum non conveniens,\" which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of \"forum non conveniens\" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.
", "facts_len": "1133", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "804", "ID": "54282", "name": "Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-859", "docket": "94-859", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al.", "second_party": "Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al.", "facts": "The Endangered Species Act requires that no person \"take\" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as \"harass, harm, pursue,\" \"wound,\" or \"kill.\" The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes \"harm\" as including \"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.\" Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.
\nThe Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, \"harm\" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.
", "facts_len": "774", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "805", "ID": "54280", "name": "J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1239", "docket": "92-1239", "term": "1993", "first_party": "J.E.B.", "second_party": "Alabama ex rel T.B.", "facts": "Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.
", "facts_len": "332", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "806", "ID": "54283", "name": "Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1631", "docket": "93-1631", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Rubin", "second_party": "Coors Brewing Company", "facts": "Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act\u2019s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment\u2019s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent \u201cstrength wars\u201d among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.
\nThe district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.
", "facts_len": "1025", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "807", "ID": "54285", "name": "Ryder v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-431", "docket": "94-431", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Ryder", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.
", "facts_len": "809", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "808", "ID": "54289", "name": "Metropolitan Stevedore Company v. Rambo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-820", "docket": "94-820", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Metropolitan Stevedore Company", "second_party": "Rambo", "facts": "John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.
", "facts_len": "827", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "809", "ID": "54288", "name": "Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1121", "docket": "93-1121", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Ed Plaut et al.", "second_party": "Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "810", "ID": "54290", "name": "Asgrow Seed Company v. Winterboer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/92-2038", "docket": "92-2038", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Asgrow Seed Company", "second_party": "Winterboer et al., Dba Deebees", "facts": "Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for \"other than reproductive purposes.\" The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.
", "facts_len": "1128", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "811", "ID": "54297", "name": "First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-560", "docket": "94-560", "term": "1994", "first_party": "First Options of Chicago, Inc.", "second_party": "Kaplan", "facts": "After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.
", "facts_len": "1294", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "812", "ID": "54299", "name": "Miller v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-631", "docket": "94-631", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Miller", "second_party": "Johnson", "facts": "Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a \"geographic monstrosity\" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, \"the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community.\"
", "facts_len": "817", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "813", "ID": "54302", "name": "United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-723", "docket": "93-723", "term": "1994", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "X-Citement Video, Inc.", "facts": "The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.
", "facts_len": "623", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "814", "ID": "54306", "name": "American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1286", "docket": "93-1286", "term": "1994", "first_party": "American Airlines, Inc.", "second_party": "Wolens", "facts": "In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from \"enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services.\" The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "943", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "815", "ID": "54307", "name": "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe\u00f1a", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1841", "docket": "93-1841", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Adarand Constructors, Inc.", "second_party": "Pe\u00f1a", "facts": "Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by \"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.\" [The clause declared that \"the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities....\" Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.
", "facts_len": "956", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "816", "ID": "54315", "name": "United States v. National Treasury Employees Union", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1170", "docket": "93-1170", "term": "1994", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "National Treasury Employees Union", "facts": "The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "727", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "817", "ID": "54317", "name": "United States v. Aguilar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-270", "docket": "94-270", "term": "1994", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Robert P. Aguilar", "facts": "In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman\u2019s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.
", "facts_len": "1087", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "818", "ID": "54320", "name": "Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-329", "docket": "94-329", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Rosenberger", "second_party": "Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia", "facts": "Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it \"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,\" as prohibited by University guidelines.
", "facts_len": "449", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "819", "ID": "54324", "name": "Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-749", "docket": "94-749", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Hurley", "second_party": "Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.", "facts": "In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.
", "facts_len": "699", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "820", "ID": "54326", "name": "Wilson v. Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-5707", "docket": "94-5707", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Wilson", "second_party": "Arkansas", "facts": "In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to \"knock and announce\" before entering.
", "facts_len": "619", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "821", "ID": "54328", "name": "Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-762", "docket": "93-762", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Jerome B. Graubart Inc.", "second_party": "Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company", "facts": "The city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "873", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "822", "ID": "54331", "name": "United States v. Lopez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1260", "docket": "93-1260", "term": "1994", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Lopez", "facts": "Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids \"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone.\" Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.
", "facts_len": "598", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "823", "ID": "54330", "name": "Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1001", "docket": "93-1001", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.", "second_party": "Dobson", "facts": "In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime \"Termite Protection Plan\" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "824", "ID": "54333", "name": "Arizona v. Evans", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1660", "docket": "93-1660", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Isaac Evans", "facts": "In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans\u2019 arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.
\nThe Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.
", "facts_len": "1185", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "825", "ID": "54336", "name": "City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-23", "docket": "94-23", "term": "1994", "first_party": "City of Edmonds", "second_party": "Oxford House, Inc.", "facts": "In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as \"persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons.\" Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1034", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "826", "ID": "54343", "name": "McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-986", "docket": "93-986", "term": "1994", "first_party": "McIntyre", "second_party": "Ohio Elections Commission", "facts": "On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of \"Concerned Parents and Tax Payers.\" Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.
", "facts_len": "544", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "827", "ID": "54346", "name": "Tome v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-6892", "docket": "93-6892", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Matthew Wayne Tome", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child\u2019s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness\u2019 testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of \u201crecent fabrication or improper influence of motive.\u201d Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.
", "facts_len": "1297", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "828", "ID": "54353", "name": "Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-590", "docket": "94-590", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Vernonia School District 47J", "second_party": "Acton", "facts": "An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.
", "facts_len": "544", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "829", "ID": "54354", "name": "Shalala v. Whitecotton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-372", "docket": "94-372", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Margaret Whitecotton, et al.", "facts": "On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function.
\nIn order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret\u2019s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1053", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "830", "ID": "54355", "name": "Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-780", "docket": "94-780", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.", "second_party": "Pinette", "facts": "In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.
", "facts_len": "465", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "831", "ID": "54357", "name": "Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-788", "docket": "94-788", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Milwaukee", "second_party": "Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.", "facts": "After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.
", "facts_len": "1084", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "832", "ID": "54359", "name": "Reynoldsville Casket Company v. Hyde", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-3", "docket": "94-3", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al.", "second_party": "Hyde", "facts": "A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied Bendix and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that Bendix could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.
", "facts_len": "930", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "833", "ID": "54360", "name": "Johnson v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-455", "docket": "94-455", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "Jones", "facts": "Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "834", "ID": "54362", "name": "Kyles v. Whitley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-7927", "docket": "93-7927", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Curtis Lee Kyles", "second_party": "John P. Whitley", "facts": "Curtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann\u2019s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing Brady v. Maryland, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "805", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "835", "ID": "54366", "name": "Wilton v. Seven Falls Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-562", "docket": "94-562", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Wilton", "second_party": "Seven Falls Company", "facts": "London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.
", "facts_len": "953", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "836", "ID": "54369", "name": "U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1456", "docket": "93-1456", "term": "1994", "first_party": "U. S. Term Limits, Inc.", "second_party": "Ray Thornton", "facts": "On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The \"Term Limitation Amendment,\" in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.
", "facts_len": "623", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "837", "ID": "54371", "name": "Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-226", "docket": "94-226", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Florida Bar", "second_party": "Went For It Inc.", "facts": "Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.
", "facts_len": "343", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "838", "ID": "54373", "name": "Brown v. Gardner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1128", "docket": "93-1128", "term": "1994", "first_party": "Brown", "second_party": "Gardner", "facts": "Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
", "facts_len": "820", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "839", "ID": "54375", "name": "North Star Steel Company v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-834", "docket": "94-834", "term": "1994", "first_party": "North Star Steel Company", "second_party": "Thomas", "facts": "The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.
", "facts_len": "1155", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "840", "ID": "54378", "name": "Lockheed Corporation v. Spink", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-809", "docket": "95-809", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lockheed Corporation", "second_party": "Spink", "facts": "Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "841", "ID": "54379", "name": "O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-354", "docket": "95-354", "term": "1995", "first_party": "O'Connor", "second_party": "Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation", "facts": "James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.
", "facts_len": "548", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "842", "ID": "54380", "name": "Jaffee v. Redmond", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-266", "docket": "95-266", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Jaffee", "second_party": "Redmond", "facts": "Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
", "facts_len": "950", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "843", "ID": "54383", "name": "Carlisle v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9247", "docket": "94-9247", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Carlisle", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that \"[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.\" In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.
", "facts_len": "853", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "844", "ID": "54384", "name": "United States v. Armstrong", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-157", "docket": "95-157", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Armstrong", "facts": "Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of \"conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same.\" The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "845", "ID": "54381", "name": "Lewis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6465", "docket": "95-6465", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lewis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.
", "facts_len": "1177", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "846", "ID": "54382", "name": "Shaw v. Hunt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-923", "docket": "94-923", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Shaw", "second_party": "Hunt", "facts": "Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "605", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "847", "ID": "54385", "name": "Wisconsin v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1614", "docket": "94-1614", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Wisconsin", "second_party": "City of New York", "facts": "Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an \"actual enumeration\" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.
", "facts_len": "714", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "848", "ID": "54387", "name": "United States v. International Business Machines Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-591", "docket": "95-591", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "International Business Machines Corporation", "facts": "Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that \"[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.\" The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "545", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "849", "ID": "54388", "name": "Neal v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9088", "docket": "94-9088", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Neal", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of \"a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount\" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.
", "facts_len": "1579", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "850", "ID": "54386", "name": "Holly Farms Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-210", "docket": "95-210", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Holly Farms Corporation", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as \"live-haul\" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.
", "facts_len": "1066", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "851", "ID": "54390", "name": "Lewis v. Casey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1511", "docket": "94-1511", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lewis", "second_party": "Casey", "facts": "Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that \"the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.\" The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.
", "facts_len": "958", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "852", "ID": "54391", "name": "BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-896", "docket": "94-896", "term": "1995", "first_party": "BMW of North America, Inc.", "second_party": "Gore", "facts": "After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "856", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "853", "ID": "54392", "name": "Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1654", "docket": "94-1654", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas", "second_party": "Umbehr", "facts": "Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "654", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "854", "ID": "54395", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-947", "docket": "94-947", "term": "1995", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term \"employee\" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.
", "facts_len": "1139", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "855", "ID": "54393", "name": "United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1893", "docket": "94-1893", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States et al.", "second_party": "Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia et al. 516 U.S. 415", "facts": "To prevent \"local media monopolies,\" Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.
\nChesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that \"video programming\" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a \"content-neutral\" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not \"narrowly tailored\" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open \"ample alternative channels for communication\" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "856", "ID": "54394", "name": "Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-559", "docket": "95-559", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Doctor's Associates Inc.", "second_party": "Casarotto", "facts": "Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that \"[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration\" be \"typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.\" DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration \"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.\" The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.
", "facts_len": "1340", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "857", "ID": "54396", "name": "Lane v. Pe\u00f1a", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-365", "docket": "95-365", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lane", "second_party": "Pe\u00f1a", "facts": "The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred \"any program or activity under any executive agency\" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.
", "facts_len": "590", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "858", "ID": "54397", "name": "Felker v. Turpin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-8836", "docket": "95-8836", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Felker", "second_party": "Turpin", "facts": "Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the \"Act\"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "610", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "859", "ID": "54399", "name": "United States v. Ursery", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-345", "docket": "95-345", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ursery", "facts": "Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "507", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "860", "ID": "54403", "name": "Tuggle v. Netherland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6016", "docket": "95-6016", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Tuggle", "second_party": "Netherland", "facts": "Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but upheld the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid.
", "facts_len": "1013", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "861", "ID": "54405", "name": "United States v. Noland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-323", "docket": "95-323", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Noland", "facts": "The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "527", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "862", "ID": "54408", "name": "United States v. Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-325", "docket": "95-325", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT", "facts": "The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent \"tax\" on any \"accumulated funding deficiency\" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an \"excise tax\" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "863", "ID": "54404", "name": "Lonchar v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5015", "docket": "95-5015", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lonchar", "second_party": "Thomas", "facts": "Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed \"next friend\" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an \"eleventh hour\" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.
", "facts_len": "1162", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "864", "ID": "54407", "name": "Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-12", "docket": "94-12", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Seminole Tribe of Florida", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.
", "facts_len": "739", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "865", "ID": "54409", "name": "Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-719", "docket": "95-719", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Gasperini", "second_party": "Center for Humanities Inc.", "facts": "William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted \"industry standard\" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award \"deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.\" Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, \"the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.\" Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict \"materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation.\" The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.
", "facts_len": "1349", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "866", "ID": "54410", "name": "Hercules Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-818", "docket": "94-818", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Hercules Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During the 1960s, the United States government contracted with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.
", "facts_len": "951", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "867", "ID": "54411", "name": "Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1530", "docket": "94-1530", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Things Remembered, Inc.", "second_party": "Petrarca", "facts": "Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "805", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "868", "ID": "54412", "name": "Lawrence v. Chater", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9323", "docket": "94-9323", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lawrence", "second_party": "Chater", "facts": "Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which requires paternity to be decided by state law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration.
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "869", "ID": "54415", "name": "Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-2003", "docket": "94-2003", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Lotus Development Corporation", "second_party": "Borland International, Inc.", "facts": "Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed users to write \"macros,\" which designate a certain series of commands to be executed with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called \"Key Reader.\" Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material.
\nAfter the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command menu hierarchy was a \"method of operation\" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).
", "facts_len": "1139", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "870", "ID": "54414", "name": "Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1175", "docket": "94-1175", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Bank One Chicago, N.A.", "second_party": "Midwest Bank & Trust Company", "facts": "The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a \"person other than [a] depository institution\" sues a \"depository institution,\" or when a depositor sues a bank.
", "facts_len": "1071", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "871", "ID": "54416", "name": "Henderson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-232", "docket": "95-232", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Henderson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint \"forthwith,\" or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because \"forthwith\" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "928", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "872", "ID": "54418", "name": "Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Hiles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6", "docket": "95-6", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Norfolk & Western Railway Company", "second_party": "Hiles", "facts": "Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with \"couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles.\" The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1187", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "873", "ID": "54419", "name": "Gray v. Netherland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6510", "docket": "95-6510", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Gray", "second_party": "Netherland", "facts": "Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.
", "facts_len": "1355", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "874", "ID": "54421", "name": "Pennsylvania v. Labron", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1691", "docket": "95-1691", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Edwin Labron", "facts": "This is the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. Without a warrant, but with probable cause, the police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the police did not obtain a warrant, but probable cause existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.
", "facts_len": "1073", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "875", "ID": "54420", "name": "Ornelas v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5257", "docket": "95-5257", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Ornelas", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons.
", "facts_len": "497", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "876", "ID": "54422", "name": "Leavitt v. Jane L.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1242", "docket": "95-1242", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Leavitt, Governor of Utah", "second_party": "Jane L.", "facts": "A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.
", "facts_len": "664", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "877", "ID": "54424", "name": "Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-26", "docket": "95-26", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Markman", "second_party": "Westview Instruments, Inc.", "facts": "Herbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can \"maintain an inventory total\" and \"detect and localize spurious additions to inventory.\" Westview Instruments, Inc.'s product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track \"inventory\" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.
", "facts_len": "1144", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "878", "ID": "54423", "name": "Rutledge v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-8769", "docket": "94-8769", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Rutledge", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.
", "facts_len": "477", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "879", "ID": "54426", "name": "Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-668", "docket": "95-668", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Auciello Iron Works, Inc.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "The day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.
", "facts_len": "740", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "880", "ID": "54425", "name": "Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-489", "docket": "95-489", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the \"Party Expenditure Provision\" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party \"expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate.\" The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC.
", "facts_len": "1140", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "881", "ID": "54427", "name": "Romer v. Evans", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1039", "docket": "94-1039", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Romer", "second_party": "Evans", "facts": "Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their \"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.\" Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.
", "facts_len": "485", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "882", "ID": "54429", "name": "Bush v. Vera", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-805", "docket": "94-805", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Bush", "second_party": "Vera", "facts": "Following the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional congressional districts. Following the redistricting, registered voters challenged the plans as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The case moved to the Supreme Court on appeal.
", "facts_len": "318", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "883", "ID": "54431", "name": "Robinson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-7448", "docket": "94-7448", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Robinson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who \"uses or carries a firearm\" both \"during and in relation to\" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting \"use\" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an \"accessibility and proximity\" test.
", "facts_len": "904", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "884", "ID": "54432", "name": "United States v. Winstar Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-865", "docket": "95-865", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Winstar Corporation", "facts": "During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged thrifts in good standing and outside investors to take over ailing thrifts in supervisory mergers. The Board agreed to permit acquiring entities to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets as an intangible asset referred to as supervisory goodwill and to count such goodwill and certain capital credits toward the capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations. Subsequently, Congress's passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) forbade thrifts from counting goodwill and capital credits in computing the required reserves. Three thrifts, created through supervisory mergers who consequently ran into financial troubles, each filed suit against the United States for breach of contract. Agreeing with the thrifts, the District Court granted each summary judgment. The court rejected Government's arguments that surrenders of sovereign authority, such as the promise to refrain from regulatory changes, must appear in unmistakable terms in a contract in order to be enforceable and that a public and general sovereign act, such as FIRREA's alteration of capital reserve requirements, could not trigger contractual liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1364", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "885", "ID": "54433", "name": "United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-340", "docket": "95-340", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United Food & Commercial Workers", "second_party": "Brown Group, Inc.", "facts": "The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that \"[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof.\" Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.
", "facts_len": "1278", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "886", "ID": "54434", "name": "Brown v. Pro Football Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-388", "docket": "95-388", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Brown", "second_party": "Pro Football Inc.", "facts": "After their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a \"developmental squad\" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.
", "facts_len": "705", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "887", "ID": "54435", "name": "44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1140", "docket": "94-1140", "term": "1995", "first_party": "44 Liquormart Inc.", "second_party": "Rhode Island", "facts": "Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "554", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "888", "ID": "54437", "name": "Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-203", "docket": "94-203", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Morse", "second_party": "Republican Party of Virginia", "facts": "In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims.
", "facts_len": "878", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "889", "ID": "54436", "name": "Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1239", "docket": "94-1239", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Fulton Corporation", "second_party": "Faulkner", "facts": "After North Carolina levied an \"intangibles tax\" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.
", "facts_len": "851", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "890", "ID": "54438", "name": "Koon v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1664", "docket": "94-1664", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Koon", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.
", "facts_len": "1242", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "891", "ID": "54440", "name": "Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-244", "docket": "95-244", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Quackenbush", "second_party": "Allstate Insurance Company", "facts": "The California Insurance Commissioner filed a state court action against Allstate Insurance Co. seeking damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements in an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission Insurance companies. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought to remand the case to state court, arguing that the court should abstain from hearing the case, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations. The District Court agreed, concluded that an abstention was appropriate, and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining the appealability of the District Court's remand order, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action because a Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions.
", "facts_len": "1108", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "892", "ID": "54439", "name": "Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1361", "docket": "94-1361", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Zicherman", "second_party": "Korean Air Lines Company", "facts": "In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "893", "ID": "54441", "name": "Behrens v. Pelletier", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1244", "docket": "94-1244", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Behrens", "second_party": "Pelletier", "facts": "After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable \"final\" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1167", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "894", "ID": "54442", "name": "Peacock v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1453", "docket": "94-1453", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Peacock", "second_party": "Thomas", "facts": "In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.
", "facts_len": "851", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "895", "ID": "54443", "name": "Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-83", "docket": "95-83", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Meghrig", "second_party": "KFC Western, Inc.", "facts": "Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an \"imminent and substantial endangerment\" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for \"equitable restitution\" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an \"imminent and substantial endangerment\" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "896", "ID": "54445", "name": "Varity Corporation v. Howe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1471", "docket": "94-1471", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Varity Corporation", "second_party": "Howe", "facts": "Charles Howe and others used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equipment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Varity Corporation. These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA protected plan that Massey- Ferguson administered itself. When certain divisions in Massey-Ferguson stared losing money, Varity decided to transfer them to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey Combines. Varity also persuaded the employees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans, conveying the message that employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred. Ultimately, the employees lost their nonpension benefits. The employees filed an action under ERISA, claim that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits. The District Court found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through deliberate deception, which gave the employees to right to relief, including the reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1222", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "897", "ID": "54447", "name": "Montana v. Egelhoff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-566", "docket": "95-566", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Montana", "second_party": "Egelhoff", "facts": "James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.
", "facts_len": "592", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "898", "ID": "54448", "name": "Whren v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5841", "docket": "95-5841", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Whren", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "927", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "899", "ID": "54449", "name": "United States v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1941", "docket": "94-1941", "term": "1995", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer \"substantively comparable\" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "952", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "900", "ID": "54450", "name": "Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-860", "docket": "95-860", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Smiley", "second_party": "Citibank (South Dakota), N. A.", "facts": "Barbara Smiley, a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to charge its loan customers \"interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located,\" pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted \"interest,\" the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "907", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "901", "ID": "54452", "name": "O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-191", "docket": "95-191", "term": "1995", "first_party": "O'Hare Truck Service, Inc.", "second_party": "City of Northlake", "facts": "O'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "873", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "902", "ID": "54454", "name": "Degen v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-173", "docket": "95-173", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Degen", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Brian Degen was indicted in 1989 for distributing marijuana, laundering money, and related crimes. On the same day the district court unsealed the indictment, it also unsealed a civil forfeiture complaint for properties allegedly worth $5.5 million and purchased with proceeds of Degen's drug sales or used to facilitate the sales. Degen is a citizen of both the U.S. and Switzerland, and in 1988 he and his family moved to Switzerland. He has not returned to the U.S. to face criminal charges and by treaty the Swiss are not obliged to extradite their nationals to the U.S. While residing in Switzerland, Degen filed an answer in the civil case, claiming that the forfeiture was barred by the statute of limitations and was an unlawful retroactive application of forfeiture laws. The district court did not consider his arguments. Instead, it entered summary judgment against him, holding that he was not entitled to be heard in the civil action because he remained outside the country, unamenable to criminal prosecution. On appeal, the government argued that the district court's inherent powers authorized it to strike Degen's claims under the \"fugitive disentitlement doctrine.\"
", "facts_len": "1191", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "903", "ID": "54453", "name": "Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. v. Calhoun", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1387", "docket": "94-1387", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.", "second_party": "Calhoun", "facts": "In 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun died in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a Yamaha jet ski. Natalie's parents, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful-death and survival statutes, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha. Yamaha argued that, because Natalie died on navigable waters, state remedies could not be applied, and that federal, judge-declared maritime law controlled to the exclusion of state law. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the District Court held that the federal maritime wrongful-death action excluded state law remedies, but that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable. Both sides ask for an appeal. After granting the interlocutory review petition, the appellate panel held that state remedies remain applicable in accident cases of this type and have not been displaced by the federal maritime wrongful-death action.
", "facts_len": "938", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "904", "ID": "54455", "name": "Bennis v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-8729", "docket": "94-8729", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Bennis", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "545", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "905", "ID": "54459", "name": "Loving v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1966", "docket": "94-1966", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Loving", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A general court-martial found Dwight J. Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The court-martial sentenced Loving to death based on the aggravating factors that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery and that he had committed a second murder. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. In affirming, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces rejected Loving's contention that the President lacked the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases that enabled the court-martial to sentence him to death. Loving claimed that the separation-of-powers principle prevented the President from promulgating the Executive Order.
", "facts_len": "850", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "906", "ID": "54456", "name": "Exxon Company, U.S.A. v. Sorec, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-129", "docket": "95-129", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Exxon Company, U.S.A.", "second_party": "Sorec, Inc.", "facts": "An Exxon oil tanker, the Houston, broke free from a mooring facility under control of the respondents, Sofec, Inc. Exxon filed a complaint alleging negligence and breach of warranty in federal district court. Sofec, Inc. filed a successful motion to bifurcate the trial. The trial court considered whether the conduct of the ship's captain, Coyne, was the \"superceding and sole proximate cause of the loss of the ship\" after the ship had broken free of the moorings in order to determine if the tanker would have been lost despite Coyne's actions. The cause of the ship's release from the moorings became a secondary issue. The court found Coyne negligent, which was the primary cause of the Houston's grounding and subsequent loss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Exxon petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "840", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "907", "ID": "54458", "name": "Melendez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5661", "docket": "95-5661", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Melendez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "402", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "908", "ID": "54457", "name": "Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-754", "docket": "95-754", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Medtronic Inc.", "second_party": "Lohr", "facts": "The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) provides for \"the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use,\" and classifies such devices based on their level of risk. Class III devices pose the greatest risk and, thus, are subject to a rigorous premarket approval (PMA) process. However, two statutory exceptions to this process exist. Because Medtronic, Inc.'s pacemaker is a Class III device found substantially equivalent to a pre-existing device, it can avoid the PMA process. In 1990, Lora Lohr's Medtronic pacemaker failed, allegedly according to a defect. Lohr and her spouse filed a Florida state-court suit, alleging both negligence and strict-liability claims. Medtronic removed the case to federal district court. The court then dismissed the case as pre-empted by 21 USC section 360k(a), which provides that \"no State...may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the Act].\" Reversing and affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not pre-empted, but that their negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were. (This case was decided together with 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc.)
", "facts_len": "1500", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "909", "ID": "54461", "name": "Wood v. Bartholomew", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1419", "docket": "94-1419", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Wood", "second_party": "Bartholomew", "facts": "Dwayne Bartholomew was convicted in a Washington state court of murder during a robbery. Bartholomew admitted the robbery, but claimed the victim was killed accidentally. At trial, Bartholomew's brother Rodney testified that Bartholomew had told them of his robbery plans and his intent to leave no witnesses. The prosecution never disclosed that Rodney's responses to questions about the robbery and murder weapon, during a pretrial polygraph examination, indicated deception. Bartholomew filed for federal habeas, claiming that because the polygraph results were material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, which provides that under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a state prosecutor is required to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused, the prosecution's failure to disclose them justified setting aside the conviction. The District Court denied the writ. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the polygraph results, although inadmissible under Washington law, were material under Brady because they may have given Bartholomew's counsel known of the results a stronger reason to investigate Rodney's story.
", "facts_len": "1164", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "910", "ID": "54463", "name": "Richards v. Jefferson County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-386", "docket": "95-386", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Richards", "second_party": "Jefferson County", "facts": "Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.
", "facts_len": "836", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "911", "ID": "54462", "name": "Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-124", "docket": "95-124", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict \"patently offensive\" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.
", "facts_len": "712", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "912", "ID": "54466", "name": "Cooper v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5207", "docket": "95-5207", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Cooper", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "998", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "913", "ID": "54467", "name": "Commissioner v. Lundy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1785", "docket": "94-1785", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Commissioner", "second_party": "Lundy", "facts": "During 1987, Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than what the Lundys owed in taxes that year, but they did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the following 2 1/2 years. In 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency for 1987. Subsequently, the Lundys filed their joint 1987 tax return, which claimed a refund of their overpaid taxes. Lundy also filed a petition in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the claimed deficiency and a refund. The Commissioner contended that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to award Lundy a refund, arguing that if a taxpayer does not file a tax return before the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, the Tax Court can only award the taxpayer a refund of taxes paid within two years prior to the date the notice of deficiency was mailed. The Tax Court agreed, finding also that 2-year \"look-back\" period applies. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the applicable look-back period in these circumstances is three years and that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to award a refund.
", "facts_len": "1252", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "914", "ID": "54465", "name": "Matsushita Elec. Industrial Company v. Epstein", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1809", "docket": "94-1809", "term": "1995", "first_party": "Matsushita Elec. Industrial Company", "second_party": "Epstein", "facts": "In 1990, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. made a tender offer for the common stock of MCA, Inc., a Delaware corporation, which resulted in Matsushita's acquisition of MCA. Subsequently, two lawsuits followed. First, a class action filed in Delaware, alleged that, among other things, Matsushita and MCA conspired violating Delaware law. The second suit, filed in federal court, alleged that Matsushita's tender offer violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission Rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts in such suits. After Matsushita won the federal case, and while it was on appeal, the parties to the state action reached a settlement. The class-action settlement stated that class members who did not opt out of the class would waive all claims in connection with the tender offer, including those asserted in the federal action. As members of both state and federal plaintiff classes, who neither opted out of the settlement class nor appeared to contest the settlement or the representation of the class, pursued the federal appeal, Matsushita argued that the Delaware judgment was a bar to further prosecution under the Full Faith and Credit Act.
", "facts_len": "1251", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "915", "ID": "54468", "name": "Clinton v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1853", "docket": "95-1853", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Clinton", "second_party": "Jones", "facts": "Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several \"abhorrent\" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a \"functional equivalent\" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.
", "facts_len": "972", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "916", "ID": "54470", "name": "Young v. Fordice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-2031", "docket": "95-2031", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Young", "second_party": "Fordice", "facts": "In 1995, Mississippi attempted to simplify voter registration in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). A \"Provisional Plan\" for registration replaced the \"Old System,\" mandating that, among other things, driver's license applications could double as voter registration forms for state and federal elections. As required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the U.S. Attorney General pre-cleared the Provisional Plan, confirming that it did not discriminate against minority voters. Mississippi abandoned the pre-cleared Provisional Plan in favor of a composite \"New System,\" which used the Old System for state elections and both the Provisional Plan and Old System for federal elections. Mississippi assumed that the Attorney General's pre-clearance of the Provisional Plan extended to the New System. Thomas Young, a Mississippi citizen, filed suit against Governor Kirk Fordice, alleging a violation of the VRA. A three-judge District Court ruled in favor of Mississippi.
", "facts_len": "1015", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "917", "ID": "54471", "name": "Lawyer v. Department of Justice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-2024", "docket": "95-2024", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lawyer", "second_party": "Department of Justice", "facts": "Based on the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature adopted a reapportionment plan for State Senate and House districts. After the Justice Department refused to preclear the plan and it appeared as if the Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker would not convene a session, the Florida Supreme Court revised the redistricting plan itself. In 1995, C. Martin Lawyer, III, and other residents filed suit against state and federal parties, alleging that his district, Senate District 21, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The District permitted the State Senate and House of Representatives to intervene and ultimately, all the parties, but Lawyer, agreed to a settlement that revised District 21 under a new plan. The District Court rejected Lawyer's argument that the court had to find the original reapportionment plan unconstitutional, because race seemingly determined District 21's contours, before the settlement could be approved. The court approved the settlement.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "918", "ID": "54472", "name": "Department of State v. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1521", "docket": "95-1521", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Department of State", "second_party": "Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc.", "facts": "Prior to 1989, Hong Kong automatically granted Vietnamese immigrants temporary refuge. Due to increasing immigration rates from Vietnam, Hong Kong revoked the privilege in 1989 and began requiring that Vietnamese immigrants prove refugee status or be \"screened-out\" (advised to leave Hong Kong).
\nThe United States consulate continued to process visas for \"screened-out\" applicants until 1993, when the State Department specifically instructed the consulate to buttress Hong Kong's immigration policy by sending \"screened-out\" applicants back to Vietnam. Two applicants claimed that the department had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by denying visas to a class of applicants on the basis of their nationality and place of residence (8 U.S.C. 1152(a)). A district court held that the case was moot and granted summary judgment to the State Department.
\nLegal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, Inc. (LAVAS) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the decision and mandated that the foreign consulate continue to process the visa applications. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court and consolidated with Le v. United States Dept. of State.
", "facts_len": "1249", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "919", "ID": "54473", "name": "Young v. Harper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1598", "docket": "95-1598", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Young", "second_party": "Harper", "facts": "Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.
", "facts_len": "1349", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "920", "ID": "54474", "name": "Ohio v. Robinette", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-891", "docket": "95-891", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Ohio", "second_party": "Robinette", "facts": "After stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered \"no\" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari.
", "facts_len": "526", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "921", "ID": "54475", "name": "Boggs v. Boggs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-79", "docket": "96-79", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Boggs", "second_party": "Boggs", "facts": "Isaac Boggs married Sandra Boggs, the petitioner, after the death of Dorothy, his previous wife. When Isaac retired in 1985, he received various benefits from his employer's retirement plans, including a lump sum savings plan distribution, shares of stock from the company's employee stock ownership plan, and a monthly annuity payment. In 1989, following Issac's death a dispute over ownership of the benefits arose between Sandra and Issac's sons, Thomas F., Harry M., and David B. Boggs. The sons' claim is based on Dorothy's purported testamentary transfer to them, under Louisiana law, of a portion of her community property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits. Sandra contested the validity of that transfer, arguing that the sons' claim is pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Federal District Court disagreed and granted summary judgment against Sandra. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "922", "ID": "54476", "name": "Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1184", "docket": "95-1184", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Glickman", "second_party": "Wileman Brothers & Elliot", "facts": "In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "827", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "923", "ID": "54480", "name": "Saratoga Fishing Company v. J. M. Martinac & Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1764", "docket": "95-1764", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Saratoga Fishing Company", "second_party": "J. M. Martinac & Company", "facts": "J. M. Martinac & Co. built the fishing vessel M/V Saratoga. Martinac installed a hydraulic system designed by Marco Seattle Inc. in the Saratoga. The initial user, Joseph Madruga, bought the ship new and added extra equipment. Madruga then sold the Saratoga to Saratoga Fishing Co., the subsequent user. Saratoga Fishing used the ship until it caught fire and sank. Saratoga Fishing then filed an admiralty tort suit against Martinac and Marco. Precedent stated that an admiralty tort plaintiff cannot recover damages for the physical damage that a defective product caused to the \"product itself,\" but can recover damages for physical damage that the product caused to \"other property.\" The District Court found that the hydraulic system had been defectively designed and awarded Saratoga Fishing damages, including damages for the loss of the equipment added by Madruga. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the added equipment was part of the ship when it was resold to Saratoga Fishing and, therefore, was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm.
", "facts_len": "1087", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "924", "ID": "54479", "name": "Raines v. Byrd", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1671", "docket": "96-1671", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Raines", "second_party": "Byrd", "facts": "Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "445", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "925", "ID": "54481", "name": "Gilbert v. Homar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-651", "docket": "96-651", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al.", "second_party": "Hamar", "facts": "Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.
", "facts_len": "807", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "926", "ID": "54483", "name": "United States v. Jose", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-2082", "docket": "95-2082", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jose", "facts": "In a proceeding to enforce two IRS summonses issued to Laddie Jose, as trustee for the Jose Business Trust and Jose Family Trust, the U.S. and an IRS agent represented that the documents sought were for a civil investigation. Ultimately, the District Court ordered enforcement of the summonses, requiring the IRS to give Jose five days' notice before transferring summoned information from its Examination Division to any other IRS office. The IRS appealed, challenging the District Court's authority to impose such a restriction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as not ripe because the record did not indicate that the Examination Division had attempted to disclose the documents to any other IRS division; therefore, the five-day notice requirement had not been triggered.
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "927", "ID": "54486", "name": "O'Dell v. Netherland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-6867", "docket": "96-6867", "term": "1996", "first_party": "O'Dell", "second_party": "Netherland", "facts": "At the penalty phase of Joseph Roger O'Dell's state trial on capital murder, rape, and sodomy charges, the government presented evidence that he had been convicted of numerous other offenses. The court, subsequently, denied O'Dell's request for a jury instruction that he was ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. After the jury determined that O'Dell presented a future danger, he was sentenced to death. The District Court, in granting O'Dell habeas relief, found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, which requires that a capital defendant be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness, was not a \"new rule\" and, thus, entitled O'Dell to resentencing.
", "facts_len": "801", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "928", "ID": "54482", "name": "Adams v. Robertson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1873", "docket": "95-1873", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Adams", "second_party": "Robertson", "facts": "In 1992, Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. Guy E. Adams and other petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The court's opinion only addressed state law issues and did not answer whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.
", "facts_len": "1168", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "929", "ID": "54484", "name": "United States v. Brockamp", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1225", "docket": "95-1225", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Brockamp", "facts": "Stanley B. McGill, whose estate is administrated by Marion Brockamp, paid the Internal Revenue Service money he did not owe. McGill, or his representative, submitted an administrative refund claim several years past the end of the applicable filing period set forth in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. McGill asked the court to extend the statutory period for an \"equitable\" reason, namely that he had a mental disability that caused the delay. Although such a reason is not mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code, the Court of Appeals read the statute as if it contained an implied \"equitable tolling\" exception, which the court found justified, and therefore permitted the actions to proceed.
", "facts_len": "704", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "930", "ID": "54485", "name": "Printz v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1478", "docket": "95-1478", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Printz", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required \"local chief law enforcement officers\" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.
", "facts_len": "896", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "931", "ID": "54487", "name": "Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-974", "docket": "95-974", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Arizonans for Official English", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "Maria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of the state constitution, which declare English \"the official language of the State,\" and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "932", "ID": "54489", "name": "Arkansas v. Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1918", "docket": "95-1918", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Arkansas", "second_party": "Farm Credit Services of Central Arkansas", "facts": "The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal \"district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.\" In Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Act does not limit the power of federal courts if the U.S. sues to protect itself or its instrumentalities from state taxation. Four Production Credit Associations (PCA's), federally chartered corporate financial institutions organized by farmers primarily to make loans to farmers, sued, seeing a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting Arkansas from levying sales and income taxes against them. The PCA's argued that they constituted instrumentalities of the U.S. and that they were not subject to the Act's provisions. The District Court granted the PCA's summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "972", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "933", "ID": "54488", "name": "Maryland v. Wilson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1268", "docket": "95-1268", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Wilson", "facts": "After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.
", "facts_len": "527", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "934", "ID": "54490", "name": "Lopez v. Monterey County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1201", "docket": "95-1201", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lopez", "second_party": "Monterey County", "facts": "Because Monterey County, California is a jurisdiction covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it must obtain federal preclearance of any voting practice different from its practices on November 1, 1968. Between 1972 and 1983, the County merged its nine separate and independent inferior court districts into a single, countywide municipal court served by judges whom County residents elected at large. In 1991, five Hispanic voters, who resided in the County, sued, alleging that the County had violated section 5 by failing to obtain federal preclearance of its judicial district consolidation ordinances. The County did not submit its ordinances after a three-judge District Court ruled against it. Rather, the County began to work with the voters to develop a new judicial election plan. Ultimately, the District Court ordered the County to conduct judicial elections under an at-large, countywide election plan.
", "facts_len": "938", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "935", "ID": "54491", "name": "Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/94-1988", "docket": "94-1988", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.", "second_party": "Town of Harrison", "facts": "Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.
", "facts_len": "707", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "936", "ID": "54492", "name": "Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-992", "docket": "95-992", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "761", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "937", "ID": "54495", "name": "Metropolitan Stevedore Company v. Rambo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-272", "docket": "96-272", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Metropolitan Stevedore Company", "second_party": "Rambo", "facts": "John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan then filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits because of his increased earnings. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA only authorizes disability award modifications if there has been a change in an employee's physical condition. Later the appellate court reversed another order discontinuing compensation.
", "facts_len": "862", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "938", "ID": "54494", "name": "Strate v. A-1 Contractors", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1872", "docket": "95-1872", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Strate", "second_party": "A-1 Contractors", "facts": "Vehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
", "facts_len": "1557", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "939", "ID": "54493", "name": "Johnson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-203", "docket": "96-203", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes \"knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration\" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect \"substantial rights\" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.
", "facts_len": "1227", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "940", "ID": "54496", "name": "Lynce v. Mathis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-7452", "docket": "95-7452", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lynce", "second_party": "Mathis", "facts": "Beginning in 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing the award of early release credits to prison inmates when the state prison population exceeded predetermined levels. In 1986, Kenneth Lynce received a 22-year prison sentence on a charge of attempted murder. In 1992, he was released based on the determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days, including 1,860 days of \"provisional credits\" awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Lynce was re-arrested and returned to custody shortly thereafter when the attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder and attempted murder. Lynce filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution. The District Court rejected Lynce's argument dismissing the petition on the ground that the sole purpose of these credits was to alleviate prison overcrowding. The Court of Appeals denied a certificate of probable cause.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "941", "ID": "54497", "name": "Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1608", "docket": "95-1608", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Timmons", "second_party": "Twin Cities Area New Party", "facts": "Under Minnesota law, candidates for political office are prohibited from appearing on more than one party's ballot. When the Twin Cities Area New Party, a chapter of the national New Party, nominated someone for state representative who was already another political party's candidate, Minnesota election officials declined its petition. When the New Party challenged Minnesota's election laws the District Court upheld their constitutionality, but was reversed by the state's Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "540", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "942", "ID": "54503", "name": "Foreman v. Dallas County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-987", "docket": "96-987", "term": "1996", "first_party": "B. C. Foreman et al.", "second_party": "Dallas County, Texas et al.", "facts": "In 1972, Texas became a covered jurisdiction for purposes of section 5 of Voting Rights Act of 1965. By statute, Texas authorizes counties to appoint election judges, who supervise voting at the polls on election days. In 1983 and several times thereafter, Dallas County changed procedures for selecting election judges. Each of the new methods used party-affiliation formulas. In 1996, various parties brought suit in Federal District Court against the county, claiming that section 5 required the changes to be precleared by the U.S. Department of Justice. The District Court concluded that preclearance was not required, as the county had simply exercised its discretion under a state statute to adjust the procedure for appointing election judges. The court also noted that Department's preclearance of a 1985 submission from the state operated to preclear the county's use of partisan considerations in selecting election judges.
", "facts_len": "942", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "943", "ID": "54499", "name": "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Yueh-Shaio Yang", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-938", "docket": "95-938", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service", "second_party": "Yueh-Shaio Yang", "facts": "Yueh-Shaio Yang and his wife, former Taiwan residents, executed elaborate fraudulent schemes to gain entry to the United States and, later, to obtain Yang's citizenship. While Yang's naturalization application was pending, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) learned of his unlawful entry and issued an order to show cause why he should not be deported at the time of entry. Yang conceded that he was deportable and filed a request for a waiver of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act with the Attorney General. An Immigration Judge denied Yang's request. In affirming, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Yang was statutorily eligible for a waiver, but denied it as a matter of discretion. In vacating, the Court of Appeals held that the Board had abused its discretion by considering the adverse factors of Yang's participation in his wife's fraudulent entry and, secondly, his fraudulent naturalization application. The court reasoned that Yang's actions in his wife's fraudulent entry were \"inextricably intertwined\" with his own efforts to secure entry and must be considered part of the initial fraud, while his application must be considered an \"extension\" of that initial fraud.
", "facts_len": "1232", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "944", "ID": "54498", "name": "Harbor Tug & Barge Company v. Papai", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1621", "docket": "95-1621", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Harbor Tug & Barge Company", "second_party": "Papai", "facts": "John Papai was injured while painting the housing structure of the tug Pt. Barrow. The Pt. Barrow is operated by Harbor Tug & Barge Co., which hired Papai to do the work, which involved no sailing with the vessel. Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve previous occasions in the two months before his injury, receiving those jobs through the Inland Boatman's Union hiring hall, which had provided Papai with short term jobs with various vessels for about two years. Most of Papai's jobs were deckhand work, which Papai said involved manning the lines on and off board vessels while they dock or undock. Papai sued Harbor Tug, claiming negligence under the Jones Act, which serves to protect seamen or workers who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea. The District Court granted Harbor Tug summary judgment upon finding that Papai did not enjoy seaman status under the Jones Act. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial Papai's seaman status and his corresponding Jones Act claim. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry was not whether Papai had a permanent connection with the vessel, but whether his relationship with a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels was substantial in duration and nature, and found that this required consideration of his employment's total circumstances. Moreover, the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that Papai satisfied this test, for if the type of work a maritime worker customarily performs would entitle him to seaman status if performed for a single employer, he should not be deprived of that status simply because the industry operates under a daily assignment, rather than a permanent employment system.
", "facts_len": "1722", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "945", "ID": "54501", "name": "Abrams v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1425", "docket": "95-1425", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Abrams", "second_party": "Johnson", "facts": "Following a suit by Georgia residents challenging the constitutionality of a legislative redistricting plan (Miller v. Johnson, 515 US 900), and seeking an injunction against its further use, a District Court found the plan unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed - holding that race was a predominant factor in the plan's creation - and remanded it for redrafting. Shortly thereafter the composition of another of the plan's districts was challenged in a District Court which, after unsuccessfully deferring the matter to Georgia's Legislature for redrafting, drew its own plan creating one black-majority district in place of the proposed three. After the 1996 elections were held under the court's new plan, Abrams and several other voters challenged its constitutionality. Again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "845", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "946", "ID": "54504", "name": "Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-270", "docket": "96-270", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Amchem Products, Inc.", "second_party": "Windsor", "facts": "The volume and complexity of asbestos litigation led the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to transfer all asbestos claims filed in federal courts, but not yet on trial, to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. After this consolidation, counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant manufacturers reached a partial global settlement: a class consisting of all individuals with potential asbestos claims who had not yet filed lawsuits would be certified pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(3) (FRCP) for purposes of settlement only. The proposed settlement created an administrative structure which provided set compensation for certain asbestos-related diseases. The District Court approved the plan, and certified the proposed class. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the lower court's order, finding that the requirements of class certification had not been met. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that while a class may be certified for the sole purpose of settlement, the certification requirements of FRCP 23 must still be met as though the case were going to trial. In this instance, the class failed to demonstrate that common issues predominated over other questions, FRCP 23(b)(3), or that the named plaintiffs would \"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.\"
", "facts_len": "1334", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "947", "ID": "54505", "name": "Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1100", "docket": "95-1100", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty.", "second_party": "Brown", "facts": "Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.
", "facts_len": "939", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "948", "ID": "54502", "name": "Lindh v. Murphy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-6298", "docket": "96-6298", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lindh", "second_party": "Murphy", "facts": "Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.
", "facts_len": "746", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "949", "ID": "54506", "name": "Robinson v. Shell Oil Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1376", "docket": "95-1376", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Robinson", "second_party": "Shell Oil Company", "facts": "Charles T. Robinson, Sr., was fired by Shell Oil Co. Thereafter, Robinson filed an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a job with another company, which contacted Shell for an employment reference. Robinson, claiming that Shell gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the EEOC charge, then filed suit under Title VII, which makes it unlawful \"for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment\" who have availed themselves of Title VII's protections. The District Court dismissed the suit. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the term \"employees\" in Title VII refers only to current employees and therefore petitioner's claim was not justicible under Title VII.
", "facts_len": "905", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "950", "ID": "54510", "name": "Reno v. ACLU", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-511", "docket": "96-511", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Reno", "second_party": "ACLU", "facts": "Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of \"obscene or indecent\" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes \"sexual or excretory activities or organs\" in a manner deemed \"offensive\" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.
", "facts_len": "726", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "951", "ID": "54508", "name": "Chandler v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-126", "docket": "96-126", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Walker L. Chandler", "second_party": "Zell D. Miller", "facts": "Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "496", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "952", "ID": "54509", "name": "Edmond v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-262", "docket": "96-262", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Edmond", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, formerly the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, hears appeals from the decisions of courts martial, and its decisions are subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals' judges may be officers or civilians. During the time in dispute, two civilian members sat on the court. The General Counsel of the Department of Transportation originally assigned both civilian judges to the court. Afterwards the Secretary of Transportation issued a memorandum adopting the General Counsel's assignments as appointments of his own. Jon E. Edmond and others were convicted while one or both civilian judges participated on the court. Subsequently, their convictions were upheld on appeal. Edmond and others argued that the civilian judges' appointments were invalid due to the Appointments Clause, which holds \"principle officers\" must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
", "facts_len": "1071", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "953", "ID": "54511", "name": "Richards v. Wisconsin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-5955", "docket": "96-5955", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Richards", "second_party": "Wisconsin", "facts": "Police in Madison, Wisconsin, suspected Steiney Richards of drug possession, but failed to receive a magistrate's authorization for a \"no-knock\" entry into his hotel room. Instead, they obtained a conventional search warrant requiring them to knock on Richards' door and identify themselves as officers prior to resorting to forcible entry. After arriving on the scene, an officer knocked on Richards' door identifying himself as a hotel custodian. When Richards opened the door, he saw a uniformed officer and quickly slammed it shut. The officers broke through the door, grabbed Richards while trying to escape, and found cocaine and cash in his bathroom. At trial, Richards challenged the constitutionality of the officer's search but was denied. On appeal, Wisconsin's Supreme Court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "845", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "954", "ID": "54513", "name": "United States v. Watts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1906", "docket": "95-1906", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Watts", "facts": "After police discovered cocaine base in his kitchen and two loaded guns in his bedroom, a jury convicted Vernon Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute. The jury acquitted Watts of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense and sentenced him accordingly. In a similar case, authorities videotaped Cheryl Putra selling cocaine to a government informant. A jury convicted Putra of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine, but acquitted her of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five ounces of cocaine on a separate occasion. By a preponderance of the evidence, the District Court, afterwards, found that Putra had indeed been involved in the second transaction and sentenced her accordingly. Reversing both cases, separate Courts of Appeals held that sentencing courts could not consider the conduct of the defendants' underlying charges of which they had been acquitted.
", "facts_len": "1104", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "955", "ID": "54512", "name": "United States v. Gonzales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1605", "docket": "95-1605", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Gonzales", "facts": "Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.
", "facts_len": "582", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "956", "ID": "54514", "name": "Bennett v. Spear", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-813", "docket": "95-813", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Bennett", "second_party": "Spear", "facts": "When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "867", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "957", "ID": "54515", "name": "Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1455", "docket": "95-1455", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Reno", "second_party": "Bossier Parish School Board", "facts": "The Bossier Parrish School Board is subject to the preclearance requirements of ?5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, the Board must obtain the approval of either the Attorney General or the District Court before implementing any changes to a voting \"qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.\" Based on the 1990 census, the Board redrew its 12 single member districts, adopting the redistricting plan that the Attorney General had precleared for use in elections of the parish's governing body. The Board rejected a plan proposed by the NAACP, which would have created two majority black districts. The Attorney General then objected to the preclearance, finding that the NAACP plan demonstrated that black residents were sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in two districts and that the Board's plan unnecessarily limited the opportunity for minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, thereby diluting their voting strength in violation of ?2 of the Act. Subsequently, the Attorney General withheld preclearance to prevent a violation of ?2 of the Act. The Board filed an action with the District Court. A three-judge panel granted the Board's preclearance request. The court rejected the contentions that a voting change's failure to satisfy ?2 of the Act constituted an independent reason to deny preclearance under ?5 and that a court must consider evidence of a ?2 violation as evidence of a discriminatory purpose under ?5.
", "facts_len": "1516", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "958", "ID": "54516", "name": "United States v. LaBonte", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1726", "docket": "95-1726", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "LaBonte", "facts": "28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to \"assure\" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence \"at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of\" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.
", "facts_len": "1007", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "959", "ID": "54520", "name": "Washington v. Glucksberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-110", "docket": "96-110", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Washington", "second_party": "Glucksberg", "facts": "Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit challenging the state of Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who \"knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide.\" Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari.
", "facts_len": "693", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "960", "ID": "54519", "name": "Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-663", "docket": "96-663", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Klehr", "second_party": "A. O. Smith Corp. et al.", "facts": "Marvin Klehr purchased inadequate cattle feed containers from A. O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (Harvestore) in 1974. Over a long period of time, the containers damaged Klehr's cattle feed. In 1993, Klehr filed a civil claim against Harvestore under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). The District Court dismissed Klehr's suit, ruling that the four-year time limit for bringing a civil RICO suit had expired. Klehr claimed that he was not at fault for failing to discover the injury within four years, because Harvestore purposely designed the containers to conceal their inadequacy.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court. The Eighth Circuit held that Klehr should have discovered the pattern of racketeering activity much earlier. Since the statute of limitations began from the time Klehr could reasonably be expected to have discovered the pattern, Klehr was out of time. The Eighth Circuit's \"pattern of activity\" rule contradicted the Third Circuit's \"last predicate act\" rule, which allows a plaintiff to recover damages accumulated since the first injury as long as the last RICO violation (\"last predicate act\") happened within four years of the lawsuit.
", "facts_len": "1251", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "961", "ID": "54517", "name": "Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1402", "docket": "95-1402", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Commissioner", "second_party": "Estate of Hubert", "facts": "The executors of Otis C. Hubert's substantial estate filed a federal estate tax return about a year after his death. Subsequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability caused by the estate's asserted entitlement to marital and charitable deductions. While the estate's redetermination petition was pending in the Tax Court, the interested parties settled on the use of the estate's assets. The agreement divided the estate's principal, assumed to be worth $26 million, equally between marital trusts and a charitable trust. It also provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or the income of the assets. The estate paid about $500,000 of its nearly $2 million of administration expenses from principal and the rest from income. It then recalculated its tax liability, reducing the marital and charitable deductions by the amount of principal, but not the amount of income, used to pay the expenses. The Commissioner concluded that using income for expenses required a dollar for dollar reduction of the deductions. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that no reduction was required by reason of the executors' power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1361", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "962", "ID": "54522", "name": "Lambert v. Wicklund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-858", "docket": "96-858", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lambert", "second_party": "Wicklund", "facts": "In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would be in the minor's best interests, ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion.
", "facts_len": "1010", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "963", "ID": "54521", "name": "City of Boerne v. Flores", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-2074", "docket": "95-2074", "term": "1996", "first_party": "City of Boerne", "second_party": "Flores", "facts": "The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "637", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "964", "ID": "54523", "name": "Johnson v. Fankell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-292", "docket": "96-292", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "Fankell", "facts": "Kristine L. Fankell filed an action for damages in Idaho State Court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by Marian Johnson, and other officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary, deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court dismissed Johnson and others' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right.
", "facts_len": "627", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "965", "ID": "54524", "name": "De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1594", "docket": "95-1594", "term": "1996", "first_party": "De Buono", "second_party": "NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund", "facts": "New York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA) imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient services at diagnostic and treatment centers. The NYSA ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, which administers a plan subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), owns and operates New York treatment centers for longshore workers, retirees and their dependents. The Fund's trustees discontinued paying the New York tax and filed to enjoin the state from making future assessments and to obtain a refund. Lawyers for the Fund alleged that the HFA is preempted by the ERISA, as it applies to hospitals run by it. The District Court ruled that the HFA is not preempted because it is a tax of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the HFA directly reduces the amount of Fund assets that would otherwise be available to provide plan members with benefits, and could cause the plan to limit its benefits or to charge plan members higher fees; therefore, the HFA was preempted by the ERISA.
", "facts_len": "1079", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "966", "ID": "54526", "name": "General Motors Corporation v. Tracy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1232", "docket": "95-1232", "term": "1996", "first_party": "General Motors Corporation", "second_party": "Tracy", "facts": "The State of Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a \"natural gas company.\" Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities, known as local distribution companies or LDC's, satisfy the definition. Other producers and independent marketers, according to the State Supreme Court, generally do not. During the period in question, General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out-of-state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's, making it subject to the Ohio tax. In front of the State Supreme Court, GMC argued that denying a tax exemption to sales by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. After an initial conclusion, the court held that GMC lacked standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge. The court then dismissed the equal protection claim as buried in GMC's Commerce Clause argument.
", "facts_len": "1002", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "967", "ID": "54525", "name": "Babbitt v. Youpee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1595", "docket": "95-1595", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Babbitt", "second_party": "Youpee", "facts": "A late nineteenth century congressional Indian land program resulted in the extreme fractionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act to reduce the fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act--the \"escheat\" provision--prohibited the descent of fractional interests that constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. The interests described in Section 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the original version of Section 207 on the ground that it was a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Congress then amended Section 207. which looks back five years instead of one year to determine the income produced from a small interest. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to the respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reservations. An administrative law judge found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within amended Section 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. The respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended Section 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The respondents then filed a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that amended Section 207 violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1878", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "968", "ID": "54528", "name": "California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-789", "docket": "95-789", "term": "1996", "first_party": "California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement", "second_party": "Dillingham Construction, N.A.", "facts": "California requires public works project contractors to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale, but allows payment of a lower wage to participants in state approved apprenticeship programs. Dillingham Construction subcontracted some of the work on its state contract to respondent Arceo, doing business as Sound Systems Media (SSM). SSM entered a collective bargaining agreement with Dillingham that included an apprenticeship wage scale and provided for affiliation with an apprenticeship committee that ran an unapproved program. SSM used that committee for its apprentices, to whom it paid the apprentice wage. The California Division of Apprenticeship Standards (the Division) issued a notice of noncompliance to both Dillingham and SSM, charging that paying the apprentice wage, rather than the prevailing journeyman wage, to apprentices from an unapproved program violated the state's prevailing wage law. Dillingham sued to prevent the Division from interfering with payment under the subcontract. Dillingham alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted enforcement of the state law. The District Court ruled in favor of the Division. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship program was an \"employee welfare benefit plan\" under the ERISA, and that the state law \"relate[d] to\" the plan and was therefore superseded by it.
", "facts_len": "1419", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "969", "ID": "54527", "name": "Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1181", "docket": "95-1181", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Dunn", "second_party": "Commodity Futures Trading Commission", "facts": "The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought an action against William C. Dunn and Delta Consultants, Inc. claiming that they had solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme involving transactions in foreign currency options in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and CFTC regulations. Dunn and Delta Consultants allegedly engaged in the transactions by contracting directly with international banks, rather than using a regulated exchange or board of trade. This is known as \"off exchange\" trading. Dunn, Delta Consultants, and their customers suffered heavy losses. The District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of Dunn and Delta Consultants' property. The court rejecting their defense that the transactions were exempt from the CEA under the \"Treasury Amendment,\" which excepts \"transactions in foreign currency\" unless they involve a sale \"for future delivery\" \"conducted on a board of trade.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "992", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "970", "ID": "54529", "name": "Richardson v. McKnight", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-318", "docket": "96-318", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Richardson", "second_party": "McKnight", "facts": "Ronnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central Correctional Center (SCCC), filed suit, under 42 USC section 1983, against two prison guards after he was placed in extremely tight physical restraints. Previously, the SCCC's management had been privatized by the State. Ultimately, the prison guards, Darryl Richardson and John Walker, asserted a qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the action. The District Court denied the motion, finding that, since a private prison management firm employed them, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "601", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "971", "ID": "54531", "name": "Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-491", "docket": "96-491", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Inter-Modal Rail Employees Assn.", "second_party": "Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company", "facts": "Employees of Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc. (SFTS), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. (ATSF), were entitled to pension, health and welfare benefits under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. These benefit plans were subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 1990, ATSF awarded the work performed by SFTS to In Terminal Services (ITS), and terminated those SFTS employees unwilling to continue work with ITS. The benefit plan offered by ITS was less favorable than the SFTS plan, and SFTS employees brought suit under, alleging that they had been discharged \"for the purpose of interfering with the attainment\" of rights to which they would have \"become entitled under [their SFTS] plan.\" ERISA Section 510. After the District Court dismissed the Section 510 claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees' pension claims because Section 510 prevented interference with vested rights, but dismissed the employees' welfare benefit claims because such benefits did not vest.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "972", "ID": "54530", "name": "Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company v. Buckley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-320", "docket": "96-320", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company", "second_party": "Buckley", "facts": "Michael Buckley was exposed to insulation dust containing asbestos while employed as a pipefitter by Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. Buckley feared he would develop cancer, of which periodic medical check ups have revealed no evidence of an asbestos related disease. Buckley filed suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which permits a railroad worker to recover for an \"injury . . . resulting from\" his employer's \"negligence.\" He sought damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress and to cover the cost of future check ups. The District Court dismissed Buckley's case because since there had been no \"physical impact\" from his exposure, the FELA did not permit recovery for his emotional injury. Buckley's medical monitoring claim was not discussed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that that his contact with the insulation dust was considered a physical impact that, when present, permits a FELA plaintiff to recover for accompanying emotional distress. Furthermore, Buckley could recover the costs of check ups made necessary by the exposure.
", "facts_len": "1090", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "973", "ID": "54533", "name": "United States v. Lanier", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1717", "docket": "95-1717", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Lanier", "facts": "David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for \"lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage.\" The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation \"fundamentally similar.\" The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the \"clearly established\" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.
", "facts_len": "1247", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "974", "ID": "54532", "name": "Regents of University of California v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1694", "docket": "95-1694", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Regents of University of California", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "John Doe sued the University of California alleging that it had agreed to employ him at a laboratory it operated pursuant to a contract with the federal Department of Energy (DOE), and that it had wrongfully breached its agreement upon determining that he could not obtain a required security clearance. The university argued that it was immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mr. Doe asserted that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to the case because any damages awarded would be paid by the DOE. The District Court held that the university was an arm of the state and therefore the Eleventh Amendment prohibited Mr. Doe from maintaining his breach-of-contract claim in federal court. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision citing the university's agreement with the DOE, under which the department was liable for any judgments rendered against the university, not the state.
", "facts_len": "905", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "975", "ID": "54534", "name": "Blessing v. Freestone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1441", "docket": "95-1441", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Blessing", "second_party": "Freestone", "facts": "Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve \"substantial compliance\" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.
", "facts_len": "1591", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "976", "ID": "54535", "name": "Agostini v. Felton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-552", "docket": "96-552", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Agostini", "second_party": "Felton", "facts": "This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "504", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "977", "ID": "54536", "name": "United States v. Alaska", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/84_orig", "docket": "84-orig", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Alaska", "facts": "The United States disputed the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska's Arctic Coast. The Alaska Statehood Act expressly provided that the federal Submerged Lands Act (Act) applies to Alaska. The Act entitles Alaska to submerged lands beneath tidal and inland navigable waters and submerged lands extending three miles seaward of the State's coastline. The United States claimed a right to submerged lands along the Alaska's Arctic Coast for mineral leasing. Alaska, in a counterclaim, sought to quiet its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, formerly known as the Arctic National Wildlife Range.
", "facts_len": "715", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "978", "ID": "54537", "name": "Grimmett v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1723", "docket": "95-1723", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Grimmett", "second_party": "Brown", "facts": "In a divorce settlement, Joanne Siragusa forfeited her entitlement to one-half of her ex-husband's ownership share in Heart Institute of Nevada (HIN) in exchange for monthly payments. In 1987, ex-husband Vincent Siragusa defaulted on the monthly payments, declared bankruptcy, and relinquished his ownership share in HIN by reorganizing HIN into Cardiology Associates of Nevada. Joanne alleged that Vincent had filed bankruptcy in order to evade monthly payments and subsequently reorganized his company in order to undo her collateral in HIN. In 1994, Joanne sought a three-fold reimbursement for damages caused by Vincent's fraudulent actions in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO). Tom Grimmett, the original trustee for the divorce settlement, prosecuted on behalf of Joanne. Patricia Brown, the consultant responsible for reorganizing HIN, defended Vincent.
\nThe District Court dismissed Joanne's suit because it was based on actions that started in 1987. (RICO claims expire after four years.) Grimmett argued that the time limit should not have begun until Joanne discovered Vincent's \"pattern\" of fraud in 1990. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Joanne's first court action against Vincent in 1989 signified the beginning of the time limit and thus her claim had expired. Grimmett appealed to the Supreme Court, citing disagreements among Circuit Courts as to when the four-year time limit began.
", "facts_len": "1493", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "979", "ID": "54539", "name": "McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-542", "docket": "96-542", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Mcmillian", "second_party": "Monroe County, Alabama", "facts": "A Monroe County court sentenced Walter McMillian to death for murder. Later evidence, suppressed by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate, exonerated McMillian after six years on Alabama's death row. McMillian sued Monroe County, claiming that Tate's actions were unconstitutional. McMillian argued that under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a county is liable for the actions of its sheriffs that constitute county policy. A District Court decided that Monroe County was not liable for Tate's actions because the county had no authority over law enforcement.
\nMcMillian appealed, claiming that since the county employed Tate, the county should be liable for Tate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Monroe County. The Eleventh Circuit held that though Tate was employed by Monroe County, he acted under the authority of the state.
", "facts_len": "864", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "980", "ID": "54538", "name": "M. L. B. v. S. L. J.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-853", "docket": "95-853", "term": "1996", "first_party": "M. L. B.", "second_party": "S. L. J.", "facts": "In 1994, a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated M.L.B.'s parental rights to her two minor children. M.L.B. filed a timely appeal from the termination decree, but Mississippi law conditioned her right to appeal on prepayment of record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36. Because she lacked the funds, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application on the ground that, under its precedent, there is no right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil appeals. In front of the U.S. Supreme Court, M.L.B. argued that a State may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees.
", "facts_len": "822", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "981", "ID": "54540", "name": "Auer v. Robbins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-897", "docket": "95-897", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Auer", "second_party": "Robbins", "facts": "Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were \"bona fide executive, administrative, or professional\" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a \"salary basis,\" which requires that the \"compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.\" Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the \"quality or quantity\" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.
", "facts_len": "1092", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "982", "ID": "54541", "name": "United States v. Wells", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1228", "docket": "95-1228", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Wells", "facts": "Jerry E. Wells and Kenneth R. Steele were charged with knowingly making false and \"material\" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's request, that withholding a \"material fact\" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. Subsequently, the jury treated Wells and Steele's statements as material and convicted them. The U.S. Supreme Court then decided that materiality was a question for the jury to decide. On appeal, Wells and Steele argued that materiality was an element of knowingly making false and \"material\" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law and it was a question for the jury to decide. The Government then argued materiality was not an element of the crime, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge had dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with Wells and Steele, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "983", "ID": "54542", "name": "Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-259", "docket": "95-259", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Walters", "second_party": "Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.", "facts": "In 1990, Darlene Walters was fired by Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. (Metropolitan). Soon thereafter, Walters filed an employment discrimination charge against Metropolitan under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC sued Metropolitan alleging that the firing violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not an \"employer\" covered by Title VII because, at the time of the alleged retaliation, it was not \"a person . . . who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.\" The parties stipulated that Metropolitan failed to satisfy the 15-employee threshold in 1989; that, during most of 1990, it had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll on each working day; and that, during 1990, there were only nine weeks in which it was actually compensating 15 or more employees on each working day. The District Court dismissed the case. It reasoned that employees may be counted for Title VII purposes only on days on which they actually performed work or were being compensated despite their absence as opposed to any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1418", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "984", "ID": "54543", "name": "Vacco v. Quill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1858", "docket": "95-1858", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Vacco", "second_party": "Quill", "facts": "Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.
", "facts_len": "578", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "985", "ID": "54544", "name": "Pounders v. Watson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1383", "docket": "96-1383", "term": "1996", "first_party": "William R. Pounders, Judge", "second_party": "Penelope Watson", "facts": "A California trial judge convicted attorney Penelope Watson of summary contempt for her conduct in court. After the judge had stated repeatedly not to discuss punishment, Watson asked her client whether he was facing the death penalty and whether he was facing life without possibility of parole. The judge found that Watson had willfully refused to comply with his order not to discuss punishment and that Watson's questions had permanently prejudiced the jury in favor of her client. On appeal, Watson argued that her due process rights were violated because she did not have notice of the prohibited conduct and because the trial judge could not have known without a hearing whether her conduct was willful. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, in reversing, concluded that Watson had not engaged in a pattern of repeated violations that had pervaded the courtroom and threatened the dignity of the court.
", "facts_len": "913", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "986", "ID": "54545", "name": "Bracy v. Gramley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-6133", "docket": "96-6133", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Bracy", "second_party": "Gramley", "facts": "During Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he had \"fixed\" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion. Bract contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's allegations contained insufficient specificity or good cause. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that Bracy had not shown \"good cause\" for discovery to prove his claim.
", "facts_len": "774", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "987", "ID": "54549", "name": "California v. Roy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-2025", "docket": "95-2025", "term": "1996", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Roy", "facts": "A California court convicted Kenneth Roy of robbery and first-degree murder. The State argued that Roy, in coming to the aid of a confederate who was committing the robbery, helped with the murder. The jury had been instructed that it could convict if Roy, with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful purpose, had helped the confederate. The State Supreme Court later held an identical instruction erroneous because it did not require the jury to find that a defendant had the knowledge and intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the confederate's crime. The State Court of Appeal affirmed Roy's conviction, finding that the error was harmless. On federal habeas review, the Federal District Court also found the error harmless, reasoning that no rational juror could have found that Roy knew the confederate's purpose and helped him but also did not intend to help him. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals applied a special harmless-error standard and held that the omission of the instruction's intent part is harmless only if a review of the assistance and knowledge facts found by the jury establishes that the jury necessarily found the omitted intent element.
", "facts_len": "1204", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "988", "ID": "54548", "name": "Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-243", "docket": "96-243", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Suitum", "second_party": "Tahoe Regional Planning Agency", "facts": "Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to \"Transferable Development Rights\" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite \"final decision\" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.
", "facts_len": "880", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "989", "ID": "54546", "name": "Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1263", "docket": "95-1263", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Caterpillar Inc.", "second_party": "Lewis", "facts": "Asserting state law claims, Lewis, a Kentucky native, brought suit in Kentucky state court, for injuries sustained in a construction accident, against Caterpillar Inc. (Caterpillar), a Delaware corporation, and Whayne Supply Company (Whayne), a Kentucky corporation. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual), a Massachusetts corporation, later intervened in the case as a plaintiff. Less than a year after filing his complaint Lewis entered into a settlement with Whayne. Caterpillar immediately moved to remove the action to federal court, arguing that the settlement between Lewis and Whayne meant that there was complete diversity. Lewis protested that complete diversity was not present because Liberty Mutual had not yet settled with Whayne, so that both Whayne and Lewis were still party to the lawsuit. The District Court denied Lewis' motion to remand, erroneously concluding that complete diversity was present. Five months before the trial, Liberty Mutual and Whayne reached a settlement and the District Court dismissed Whayne from the case. Complete diversity was present for the remainder of the case, including trial and judgment in favor of Caterpillar. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment, holding that the lower court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal because there was not complete diversity, and should have remanded the case to state court.
", "facts_len": "1448", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "990", "ID": "54547", "name": "Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-454", "docket": "96-454", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Associates Commercial Corp.", "second_party": "Rash", "facts": "In 1992, Elray Rash filed a repayment plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Associates Commercial Corporation (ACC) was listed in the bankruptcy petition as a creditor holding a secured claim because it held a valid loan and lien on Rash's tractor truck. Ultimately to gain confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan and retain the truck, Rash invoked the \"cram-down\" provision of the Code. The cram-down provision allows a debtor to keep collateral over the objection of the creditor and requires the debtor to provide the creditor with payments that will total the present value of the collateral. At an evidentiary hearing, ACC maintained, under the \"replacement-value\" standard, that Rash would have to pay approximately $41,000 for a similar truck. Under the \"foreclosure-value\" standard, Rash maintained that the proper valuation was the net amount ACC would realize upon foreclosure and sale of the collateral, or approximately $31,875. The Bankruptcy Court adopted Rash's valuation figure and approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1082", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "991", "ID": "54550", "name": "Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-728", "docket": "95-728", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Hilton Davis Chemical Company", "facts": "Warner Jenkinson Co. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. both manufacture dyes from which impurities must be removed. Davis's \"'746 patent,\" which was issued in 1985, discloses an improved purification process involving the \"ultrafiltration\" of dye through a porous membrane at pH levels between 6.0 and 9.0. In 1986, Jenkinson developed its own ultrafiltration process, which operated at a pH level of 5.0. Davis sued for infringement of the '746 patent. Davis's suit relied solely on the \"doctrine of equivalents,\" under which a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is an \"equivalence\" between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Jenkinson argued that the Patent Act of 1952 had supplanted the doctrine. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Jenkinson after a jury had found that Jenkinson had infringed upon the '746 patent. The en banc Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of equivalents continues to exist and that the jury had substantial evidence from which to conclude that petitioner's process was not substantially different from the process disclosed in the '746 patent.
", "facts_len": "1283", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "992", "ID": "54551", "name": "Kansas v. Hendricks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1649", "docket": "95-1649", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Hendricks", "facts": "As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in \"predatory acts of sexual violence\" brought on by \"mental abnormality\" or \"personality disorder[s].\" On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.
", "facts_len": "745", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "993", "ID": "54552", "name": "United States v. O'Hagan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-842", "docket": "96-842", "term": "1996", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "O'Hagan", "facts": "The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) found James O'Hagan, a partner at Dorsey and Whitney law firm (Dorsey), guilty of 57 counts of fraud for profiting from stock options in Pillsbury Company based on nonpublic information he misappropriated for his personal benefit. O'Hagan knew that Dorsey's client, Grand Metropolitan PLC, was considering placing a tender offer (a public offer to pay shareholders a premium for their stock at a specified time) to acquire a majority share in Pillsbury Company. O'Hagan bought a large number of stock options without telling his firm and later sold his options for a $4.3 million profit.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's convictions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Eighth Circuit applied the Act only to security-traders who wrongfully use confidential information pertaining to their own companies. The Circuit Court ruled that the SEC had exceeded the rule-making authority granted to it by the Act by making it a fraudulent action to trade securities on exclusive non-public foreknowledge of a tender offer.
", "facts_len": "1120", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "994", "ID": "54555", "name": "Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-713", "docket": "96-713", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Bibles", "second_party": "Oregon Natural Desert Association", "facts": "The Oregon Natural Desert Association filed a request with the Oregon Bureau of Land Management in order to obtain the names and addresses of people who received a newsletter that provided information about the Bureau's activities and plans affecting the Oregon desert. Invoking Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Bureau refused to release any portion of the list. Exemption 6 exempts from disclosure files \"similar\" to personnel and medical files. Subsequently, the association filed an action in District Court under the FOIA to obtain the list. The court ordered the release. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that there was a substantial public interest in knowing to whom the government was directing information and providing those persons with additional information from other sources that did not share the Bureau's views.
", "facts_len": "868", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "995", "ID": "54554", "name": "Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/94-1474", "docket": "94-1474", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Idaho", "second_party": "Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho", "facts": "The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims.
", "facts_len": "1509", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "996", "ID": "54557", "name": "Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Continental Insurance Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1033", "docket": "96-1033", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners", "second_party": "Continental Insurance Company", "facts": "Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners, an association of condominium owners, sued Continental Insurance Company in Maryland state court, seeking to compel it to pay a judgment the association had obtained against an insured condominium developer. The company removed the case to federal court. As a matter of Maryland law, the case involved the extent of the developer's coverage under a general liability insurance policy. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the company. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the appellate court denied a petition for rehearing. Later, the association's counsel learned of a recent decision by Maryland's highest court in another case that also involved liability insurance coverage. The association brought this decision to the Court of Appeals' attention in a motion to stay or recall the court's mandate. The appellate court denied the motion.
", "facts_len": "935", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "997", "ID": "54556", "name": "Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-928", "docket": "95-928", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Atherton", "second_party": "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "facts": "City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal) lost a significant amount of its clients' money because of negligent investing by employee John Atherton. The client, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), sued Atherton under state law for \"gross negligence,\" \"simple negligence,\" and \"breach of fiduciary duty.\" A three-judge District Court held that Atherton could only be sued for gross negligence, because the more lenient \"gross negligence\" standard for negligent conduct set by federal statutory law annulled stricter standards set by state law. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, and held that federal statutes only ensured a minimum standard of \"gross negligence.\" The stricter state standards still applied.
\nOn appeal to the Supreme Court, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), petitioning on behalf of RTC, argued that federal common law should set a uniform standard of negligent conduct for all employees at federally chartered banks. According to FDIC, allowing state statutes to regulate federally chartered banks would contradict the federal charter system's purpose of upholding federal common law. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which law applied to Atherton: state law, federal common law, or federal statutory law.
", "facts_len": "1289", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "998", "ID": "54559", "name": "O'Gilvie v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-966", "docket": "95-966", "term": "1996", "first_party": "O'Gilvie", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "After her death from toxic shock syndrome, Betty O'Gilvie's husband and two children received a jury award of $1,525,000 actual damages and $10 million punitive damages in a tort suit based on Kansas law against the maker of the product that caused Betty's death. The O'Gilvie's paid income tax on the portion of the award that represented punitive damages, but then sought a refund. Subsequently, Betty O'Gilvie's husband sued the Government for a refund and the Government sued the O'Gilvie children to recover the refund it had made earlier. In finding for the O'Gilvies, the District Court found that 26 USC section 104(a)(2), as read in 1988, excluded from gross income the \"amount of any damages received... on account of personal injuries or sickness.\" The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "798", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "999", "ID": "54561", "name": "Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1081", "docket": "95-1081", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.", "second_party": "Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs", "facts": "After being exposed to asbestos while working for Ingalls Shipbuilding as a shipfitter, Jefferson Yates filed a claim for disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). While Ingalls and Yates settled, Yates also sued the manufacturers and suppliers of the asbestos products that were allegedly present in his workplace when he contracted asbestosis. Yates also settled with some of the manufacturers and suppliers he sued, each of whom required releases from Yates and his wife. Ingalls did not approve of any releases. When Yates died, his wife then filed for benefits under the LHWCA, which provides, \"If the person entitled to compensation... enters into a settlement with a third person... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person... would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable for compensation only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer before the settlement is executed.\" Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed that at the time Mrs. Yates executed the predeath settlements, she was not a \"person entitled to compensation\" because her husband was still alive, thus her right to death benefits had not yet vested.
", "facts_len": "1239", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1000", "ID": "54560", "name": "Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1065", "docket": "95-1065", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Schenck", "second_party": "Pro-Choice Network of Western New York", "facts": "This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating \"fixed buffer zones\" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created \"floating buffer zones\" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the \"buffer zones\" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.
", "facts_len": "822", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1001", "ID": "54563", "name": "Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States ex rel. Schumer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1340", "docket": "95-1340", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Hughes Aircraft Company", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Schumer", "facts": "In 1989, William J. Schumer filed an action against Hughes Aircraft Co. under the False Claims Act (FCA), specifically under the qui tam provision which allows suits by private parties on behalf of the United States against anyone submitting a false claim to the government. Schumer alleged that Hughes had submitted false claims related to two Air Force radar projects between 1982 and 1984. Hughes moved to dismiss the case claiming that the 1986 amendment to the FCA that Schumer had filed under was not retroactive and that the alleged conduct precluded the suit because the government already had the information on which the suit was based. The motion was dismissed; however, the District Court ruled in favor of Hughes based on the merits of the case. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected Hughes, finding that the FCA should be applied retroactively to suits pre-1986. The appellate court also found that, because no public disclosure of information possessed by the Government had been made, the action was not barred under the 1986 version of the Act.
", "facts_len": "1073", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1002", "ID": "54562", "name": "Lambrix v. Singletary", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-5658", "docket": "96-5658", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Lambrix", "second_party": "Singletary", "facts": "In the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a \"weighing\" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the \"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\" aggravator. The Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a \"new rule\" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.
", "facts_len": "1637", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1003", "ID": "54564", "name": "Edwards v. Balisok", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-1352", "docket": "95-1352", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Edwards et al.", "second_party": "Balisok", "facts": "Jerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.
", "facts_len": "885", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1004", "ID": "54566", "name": "Mazurek v. Armstrong", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/96-1104", "docket": "96-1104", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General", "second_party": "James H. Armstrong et al.", "facts": "In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.
", "facts_len": "907", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1005", "ID": "54565", "name": "Old Chief v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1996/95-6556", "docket": "95-6556", "term": "1996", "first_party": "Old Chief", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Johnny Lynn Old Chief was involved in a disturbance involving gunfire. Subsequently, Old Chief was charged with violating federal law, 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of a firearm by anyone with a prior felony conviction. The earlier crime that was charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury. Old Chief moved for an order requiring the Government to refrain from revealing the name and nature of his prior assault conviction, which, he argued, would unfairly tax the jury's capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence, on current charges of assault, possession, and violence with a firearm. Old Chief offered to stipulate, or concede, to the fact of the prior conviction without releasing its name or nature. The Government refused to join the stipulation. The Government argued it had the right to present its own evidence of the prior conviction. The District Court ruled in favor of the Government. In affirming the conviction, the Court of Appeals found that the Government was entitled to introduce probative evidence to prove the prior offense regardless of the stipulation offer.
", "facts_len": "1246", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1006", "ID": "54567", "name": "Lachance v. Erickson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1395", "docket": "96-1395", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Lachance", "second_party": "Erickson", "facts": "Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.
", "facts_len": "942", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1007", "ID": "54570", "name": "Miller v. Albright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1060", "docket": "96-1060", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Miller", "second_party": "Albright", "facts": "Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, in 1970, to a Filipino national woman and an American soldier. Her parents were never married. In 1992, after the State Department rejected her first application for U.S. citizenship, Miller reapplied when a Texas court granted her father's petition for a paternity decree declaring him her father. When the State Department rejected her citizenship application again, claiming that 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a) required foreign born illegitimate children of American fathers to be legitimated before age 18, Miller challenged the refusal. She claimed that since Section 1409(c) established at birth the citizenship of an illegitimate foreign-born child whose mother was an American citizen, the State Department's refusal to do the same under Section 1409(a), when the father is an American citizen, was unconstitutional. On appeal from an appellate court's decision to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court granted Miller certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1011", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1008", "ID": "54569", "name": "Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anzaresearch International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1470", "docket": "96-1470", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Quality King Distributors, Inc.", "second_party": "L'Anzaresearch International, Inc.", "facts": "L'anza Research International, Inc., a California based manufacturer and seller of hair care products, has copyrighted the labels that are affixed to its products. Compared to domestic markets, the price of L'anza products in foreign markets is substantially lower. L'anza's distributor in the United Kingdom arranged for the sale of L'anza products, affixed with copyrighted labels, to a distributor in Malta. The Malta distributor then sold the products to Quality King Distributors, Inc., who imported the products back to the U.S. and sold them at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers. In its suit, L'anza alleged that Quality King violated L'anza's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act of 1976 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the U.S. Rejecting Quality King's defense based on the \"first sale\" doctrine, the District Court ruled in favor of L'anza. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "927", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1009", "ID": "54568", "name": "Oubre v. Entergy Operations Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1291", "docket": "96-1291", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Oubre", "second_party": "Entergy Operations Inc.", "facts": "In 1994, Dolores Oubre, a scheduler at a power plant run by Entergy Operations, Inc., was given the option of either improving her job performance or accepting a voluntary arrangement for her severance. Accepting a severance package, Oubre signed a release of all claims against Entergy. Entergy failed to comply with several requirements for a release under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as set forth in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). After receiving all of her severance pay, Oubre filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Oubre then sued Entergy, alleging constructive discharge on the basis of her age in violation of the ADEA and state law. Entergy argued that Oubre had ratified the defective release by failing to return the $6,258 in severance she had received. The District Court entered summary judgment for Entergy. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "949", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1010", "ID": "54572", "name": "Crawford-El v. Britton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-827", "docket": "96-827", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Crawford-El", "second_party": "Britton", "facts": "Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that \"Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....\" Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.
", "facts_len": "1176", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1011", "ID": "54574", "name": "South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1581", "docket": "96-1581", "term": "1997", "first_party": "South Dakota", "second_party": "Yankton Sioux Tribe", "facts": "An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing \"shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty.\" In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1024", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1012", "ID": "54571", "name": "Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1370", "docket": "96-1370", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Fidelity Financial Services, Inc.", "second_party": "Fink", "facts": "After purchasing a car, Diane Beasley gave Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note for the purchase price. The car secured the note. 21 days later, Fidelity mailed Beasley the application to perfect its security interest under Missouri law. After Beasley filed for bankruptcy, Richard V. Fink, the trustee of Beasley's bankruptcy estate, moved to set aside Fidelity's security interest on the ground that the lien was a voidable preference under federal law. 11 USC section 547(c)(3)(B) prohibits the avoidance of a security interest for a loan used to acquire property if, among other things, the security interest is \"perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.\" Fink argued that this \"enabling loan\" exception was inapposite because Fidelity had not perfected its interest within the 20-day period. Affirming the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, the Court of Appeals held a transfer to be perfected when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1013", "ID": "54573", "name": "Rogers v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1279", "docket": "96-1279", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Rogers", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "After searching his truck, Florida police arrested and charged George Rogers with knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm and a silencer. Rogers admitted during his arrest and trial that he knew he was in possession of a silencer. Nonetheless, he requested the District Court to instruct the jury to define the Government's burden of establishing \"knowing possession\" as proof that he deliberately possessed an item that he not only knew to be a \"firearm,\" but that he knew such possession was illegal. Following the court's refusal of his instruction request, Rogers was convicted. On appeal from the Eleventh Circuit's decision to affirm the lower court's ruling, the Supreme Court granted Rogers certiorari.
", "facts_len": "723", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1014", "ID": "54577", "name": "Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-370", "docket": "96-370", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund", "second_party": "Ferbar Corporation of California, Inc.", "facts": "The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) requires employers who withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans to pay a \"withdrawal liability,\" which is dischargeable with an arranged series of periodic payments. The Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund (Fund) is a multiemployer pension plan for laundry workers. The Ferbar Corporation contributed to the Fund, but ultimately ceased doing so. Subsequently, the Fund's trustees demanded payment of Ferbar's withdrawal liability. The trustees decided to allow Ferbar to satisfy its obligation by making monthly payments. However, Ferbar never made a payment. Ultimately, the District Court granted Ferbar summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court noted that the trustees had filed suit eight days too late. This was the date Ferbar was to make its first payment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year period began to run on the date Ferbar withdrew from the Fund, in March 1985. Under this view, the trustees commenced suit nearly two years too late.
", "facts_len": "1091", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1015", "ID": "54575", "name": "Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-42", "docket": "97-42", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Eastern Enterprises", "second_party": "Apfel", "facts": "Currently unknown.
", "facts_len": "26", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1016", "ID": "54576", "name": "California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1400", "docket": "96-1400", "term": "1997", "first_party": "California", "second_party": "Deep Sea Research, Inc.", "facts": "After several expeditions, Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR) located the wreck of the S.S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo which sank off the California coast in 1865. When DSR sought rights to the wreck and her cargo, under Article III, Section 2, federal admiralty jurisdiction, California challenged DSR claiming that it had title to the wreck under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA). The ASA requires the federal government to transfer title over \"abandoned shipwrecks\" to the states in whose submerged lands the wrecks are found. California also noted that under Section 6313 of its own public code, title to all abandoned shipwrecks found off its coast vests in the state. In light of its claims to the Brother Jonathan, California claimed that DSR's federal title action violated its rights under the Eleventh Amendment, even though it lacked possession of the wreck.
", "facts_len": "885", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1017", "ID": "54580", "name": "Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-174", "docket": "97-174", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Cass County", "second_party": "Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians", "facts": "In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of \"taxation\" in the proviso expressed \"unmistakably clear\" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.
", "facts_len": "1087", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1018", "ID": "54579", "name": "Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-634", "docket": "97-634", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Pennsylvania Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Yeskey", "facts": "After being sentenced to 18 to 36 months in prison, Ronald Yeskey was recommended as a candidate for a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders. Successful completion of the Boot Camp could have resulted in Yeskey's early parole after just six months. When the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections discovered Yeskey's medical history of hypertension, he was denied admission to the Boot Camp. Yeskey challenged the refusal as discriminatory. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "568", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1019", "ID": "54578", "name": "Gray v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8653", "docket": "96-8653", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Gray", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "In 1993, the State of Maryland tried Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray jointly for the murder of Stacy Williams. The State entered Bell's confession into evidence at trial. According to the trial judge's order, the police detective who read the confession said the word \"deleted\" or \"deletion\" whenever Gray's name appeared. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the detective if Bell's confession led to Gray's arrest. The detective answered that it did. Ultimately, Gray testified and Bell did not. When instructing the jury, the trial judge specified that the confession was evidence only against Bell. The jury convicted both Bell and Gray. Setting aside Gray's conviction, Maryland's intermediate appellate court applied Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, in which the Court held that, despite a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the confession as evidence only against the confessing codefendant, the introduction of such a confession at a joint trial violates the nonconfessing defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. Maryland's highest court reinstated the conviction.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1020", "ID": "54581", "name": "Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-581", "docket": "97-581", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole", "second_party": "Scott", "facts": "In granting Keith M. Scott parole, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the \"Board\"), stipulated that he refrain from owning or possessing weapons. When officers learned that Scott may be in possession of weapons, they searched his home and found a bow and arrow and some firearms. Despite objecting at his parole violation hearing that the search was unconstitutional, the seized weapons were admitted as evidence and Scott was ultimately recommitted. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed Scott's challenge to the search and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained the decision. The Supreme Court granted the Board certiorari.
", "facts_len": "669", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1021", "ID": "54582", "name": "Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-569", "docket": "97-569", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Burlington Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Ellerth", "facts": "After working for Burlington Industries for 15 months, Kimberly B. Ellerth quit because she allegedly suffered sexual harassment by her supervisor - Ted Slowik. Despite her refusals of Slowik's advances Ellerth did not suffer any tangible retaliation and was, in fact, promoted once. Moreover, while she remained silent about Slowik's conduct despite her knowledge of Burlington's policy against sexual harassment, Ellerth challenged Burlington claiming that the company forced her constructive discharge.
", "facts_len": "513", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1022", "ID": "54584", "name": "Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-795", "docket": "96-795", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining-unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an \"objective reasonable doubt\" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.
", "facts_len": "1108", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1023", "ID": "54583", "name": "Jefferson v. City of Tarrant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-957", "docket": "96-957", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Jefferson, Individually And As Administrator Of The Estate Of Jefferson, Deceased, et al.", "second_party": "City of Tarrant", "facts": "Alberta Jefferson, an African American woman, died as a result of a fire in her home in the city of Tarrant, Alabama. Her survivors filed multiple complaints against Tarrant City: two under state law and two under federal law. The state law complaints alleged wrongful death and the common-law tort of outrage, while the two federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleged that Ms. Jefferson's death was the direct result of indifference and racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The City claimed that the complaints were governed by Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, which the Alabama Supreme Court had interpreted to provide only for punitive damages. The City then argued that it could not be sued under Section 1983 because the Supreme Court had ruled that Section 1983 plaintiffs are not entitled to sue a municipality for punitive damages.
\nThe state court ruled in favor of Jefferson, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back to the state court after determining that the state Act did in fact govern the claims. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the federal complaints. The City contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the Alabama Supreme Court's order because the case was not yet final.
", "facts_len": "1321", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1024", "ID": "54585", "name": "Faragher v. City of Boca Raton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-282", "docket": "97-282", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Faragher", "second_party": "City of Boca Raton", "facts": "After resigning as a lifeguard, Beth Ann Faragher brought an action against the City of Boca Raton and her immediate supervisors, alleging that the supervisors had created a sexually hostile atmosphere by touching, remarking, and commenting. Faragher asserted that this conduct constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court concluded that Faragher's supervisors' conduct was sufficiently serious to alter the conditions of her employment and constitute an abusive working environment. The court then held that the city could be held liable. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that Faragher's supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct, that knowledge of the harassment could not be imputed to the City, and that the City could not be held liable for negligence in failing to prevent it.
", "facts_len": "931", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1025", "ID": "54586", "name": "United States v. United State Shoe Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-372", "docket": "97-372", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "United State Shoe Corporation", "facts": "The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that \"No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.\" The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "995", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1026", "ID": "54587", "name": "Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1925", "docket": "96-1925", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Caterpillar, Inc.", "second_party": "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America", "facts": "United Auto Workers and Caterpillar, Inc. were involved in a working agreement that provided for employees of Caterpillar, Inc. to devote part of their time to processing employee grievances on behalf of the union, while still maintaining full-time employment status and benefits. This agreement was eventually expanded to allow employees to continue receiving benefits from Caterpillar while working full time for the union. In 1991, Caterpillar refused to continue paying benefits to workers who were not directly providing services for the company. The union filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) asserting that Caterpillar was engaging in unfair labor practices. Caterpillar claimed that the benefit payments violated section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both the NLRB and the District Court found that the payments did in fact violate Section 302 of the LMRA.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled for the union. The Third Circuit found that Congress had not intended the LMRA to ban the type of payments at issue. Then-Judge Samuel Alito dissented, arguing that the payments were illegal under the plain meaning of the legislation.
", "facts_len": "1228", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1027", "ID": "54589", "name": "State Oil Company v. Khan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-871", "docket": "96-871", "term": "1997", "first_party": "State Oil Company", "second_party": "Khan et al.", "facts": "Barkat U. Khan and his corporation contracted with State Oil to lease and run a gas station. Under the agreement, State Oil set a maximum profit margin for gasoline and required Khan to return any excess profits to State Oil. Khan fell behind in lease payments and was evicted. Khan then sued State Oil claiming that State Oil had engaged in price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which disallows restrictions on trade. State Oil claimed that in setting profit margins, they had not prevented Kahn from setting prices and therefore were not guilty of price fixing.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of Kahn based on the logic of Albrecht v. Herald Co. in which the Supreme Court ruled that some restrictions on trade, such as price-fixing, always have such negative effects coupled with such little competitive benefit that these restrictions are always unlawful.
", "facts_len": "949", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1028", "ID": "54590", "name": "Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1829", "docket": "96-1829", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Montana", "second_party": "Crow Tribe of Indians", "facts": "In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1231", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1029", "ID": "54592", "name": "Foster v. Love", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-670", "docket": "96-670", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Foster", "second_party": "Love", "facts": "The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that \"the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.\" 2 USC sections 1 and 7 provide that the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in an even-numbered year is established as the date for federal congressional and presidential elections. In 1975, Louisiana adopted an \"open primary,\" which occurs before the uniform federal election day and in which all candidates appear on the ballot and all voters may vote. If a candidate for a given office receives a majority at the open primary, that candidate is elected and no further act is done on federal election day to fill that office. Louisiana voters challenged the open primary is a violation of federal law. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that Louisiana's system squarely \"conflicts with the federal statutes that establish a uniform federal election day.\"
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1030", "ID": "54591", "name": "Calderone v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-215", "docket": "97-215", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Calderone", "second_party": "Thompson", "facts": "In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.
", "facts_len": "807", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1031", "ID": "54594", "name": "American Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-679", "docket": "97-679", "term": "1997", "first_party": "American Telephone & Telegraph Company", "second_party": "Central Office Telephone, Inc.", "facts": "Under the Communications Act of 1934, AT&T must file \"tariffs\" containing all its charges for interstate services and all \"classifications, practices and regulations affecting such charges\" with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Under section 203(c) of the Act, a common carrier, such as AT&T, may not \"extend to any person any privileges or facilities in such communication, or employ or enforce any classifications, regulations, or practices affecting such charges, except as specified in such [tariff].\"In 1989, AT&T sold Central Office Telephone, Inc. its Software Defined Network, a long-distance service. Subsequently, Central Office experienced problems with the service and withdrew from the contract. Central Office sued AT&T in Federal District Court, asserting state-law claims for breach of contract and for tortious interference with contractual relations for failure to deliver various service, provisioning, and billing options in addition to those set forth in the tariff. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's damages award.
", "facts_len": "1089", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1032", "ID": "54593", "name": "Baker v. General Motors Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-653", "docket": "96-653", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Baker", "second_party": "General Motors Corp.", "facts": "After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "943", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Interstate Relations"}, {"": "1033", "ID": "54595", "name": "Muscarello v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1654", "docket": "96-1654", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Muscarello", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who \"uses or carries a firearm\" \"during and in relation to\" a \"drug trafficking crime\" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his \"carrying\" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word \"carries.\" In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).
", "facts_len": "689", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1034", "ID": "54597", "name": "Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1482", "docket": "96-1482", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Lexecon, Inc.", "second_party": "Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach", "facts": "Lexecon Inc. was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. Under 28 USC section 1407(a), the lawsuit was transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District of Arizona. Section 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact \"to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,\" but provides that the Panel \"shall\" remand any such action to the original district \"at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.\" After claims against it were dismissed, Lexecon brought suit against Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach and others (Milberg) in the class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. Ultimately, the Panel, under section 1407(a), ordered the case transferred to the District of Arizona. Afterwards, Lexecon moved for the Arizona District Court to remand the case to Illinois. Milberg filed a countermotion requesting the Arizona District Court to invoke section 1404(a) to \"transfer\" the case to itself for trial.Ultimately, the court assigned the case to itself and the Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment.
", "facts_len": "1141", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1035", "ID": "54598", "name": "Monge v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-6146", "docket": "97-6146", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Monge", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Angel Jaime Monge was convicted on three counts of violating California's drug laws, all felonies. Under California's \"three-strikes\" law a convicted felon with one prior felony conviction will have his prison term doubled. The state sought to have Monge's sentence enhanced based on a previous assault conviction and the resulting prison term. Subsequently the California trial court doubled his sentence and added a one-year enhancement for the prior prison term. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the sentence enhancement because the prior conviction allegations were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a retrial to substantiate the allegations would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though applicable in the capital sentencing context, does not extend to noncapital sentencing proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1009", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1036", "ID": "54596", "name": "County of Sacramento v. Lewis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1337", "docket": "96-1337", "term": "1997", "first_party": "County of Sacramento", "second_party": "Lewis", "facts": "Philip Lewis was a passenger on a motorcycle that was involved in a high-speed police chase. The chase ended when the motorcycle's driver lost control and tipped the bike over, hurling both riders to the pavement. James Smith, one of two pursuing Sacramento county sheriff's deputies, was unable to stop his car in time and skidded into Philip, causing fatal injuries. Philip's parents, Teri and Thomas Lewis, accused Smith and the Sacramento county police department of deliberate and reckless conduct which ultimately deprived their son of his due process right to life and his protection against unconstitutional seizure. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court decision favoring Smith, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "760", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1037", "ID": "54600", "name": "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1577", "docket": "96-1577", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Alaska", "second_party": "Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government", "facts": "In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not \"Indian country,\" the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1069", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1038", "ID": "54601", "name": "Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-568", "docket": "96-568", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Oncale", "second_party": "Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.", "facts": "Joseph Oncale, a male, filed a complaint against his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., alleging that he was sexually harassed by co-workers, in their workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VII\"). On appeal from a decision supporting a district court's ruling against Oncale, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "369", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1039", "ID": "54602", "name": "United States v. Ramirez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1469", "docket": "96-1469", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ramirez", "facts": "While in route to testify, Alan Shelby, a dangerous prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences, escaped custody. An ATF Agent, based on an informant's information, observed a person resembling Shelby at Hernan Ramirez's home in Boring, Oregon. Subsequently, the Government obtained a \"no-knock\" warrant to enter and search the home. Executing the warrant, officers broke a single window in Ramirez's home. Awakened, Ramirez fired a pistol into the garage ceiling. After being arrested, because of a stash of weapons in his garage, Ramirez was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms. Shelby was not found. Granting Ramirez's motion to suppress evidence regarding his possession of the weapons, the District Court found that the officers had violated the Fourth Amendment because there were \"insufficient exigent circumstances\" to justify the police officer's destruction of property in their execution of the warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1000", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1040", "ID": "54603", "name": "Swidler & Berlin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1192", "docket": "97-1192", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Swidler & Berlin", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During the 1993 investigation of the White House Travel Office (\"Travelgate\"), Deputy White House Counsel Vincent W. Foster, Jr., met with an attorney from Swidler & Berlin's law firm named James Hamilton. Nine days later, Foster committed suicide. During a subsequent investigation into the legalities of Travelgate, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Hamilton's notes about his meeting with Foster. When Swidler & Berlin challenged Starr's subpoena as a violation of the attorney-client privilege, a district court agreed. On appeal from an appellate court reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "632", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1041", "ID": "54599", "name": "Hohn v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8986", "docket": "96-8986", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Hohn", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Arnold Hohn was convicted, among other things, of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Two years after his conviction became final, the Supreme Court decided that the term \"use\" in 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) required active employment of the firearm. Hohn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his Section 942(c)(1) conviction on the ground that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove use of a firearm. While his motion was pending before the district court, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires a Section 2255 petitioner to obtain a certificate of appealability from a circuit justice or judge before he can appeal the denial of a Section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. Section 2253(c)(1). The district court denied Hohn's petition and he appealed. The court of appeals treated the notice of appeal as an application for a certificate of appealability, and a three-judge panel declined to issue a certificate. Hohn then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the denial of the certificate, seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).
", "facts_len": "1247", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1042", "ID": "54606", "name": "Bragdon v. Abbott", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-156", "docket": "97-156", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bragdon", "second_party": "Abbott", "facts": "During a visit to her dentist's office, in order to fill a cavity, Sidney Abbott disclosed that although she did not manifest any obvious symptoms she carried the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). When her dentist, Randon Bragdon, refused to treat her in his office, offering to conduct any necessary work at a hospital for no extra charge other than use of the facilities, Abbott challenged his policy as discriminatory. After both a federal trial and an appeals court ruled in Abbott's favor, Bragdon appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "563", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1043", "ID": "54604", "name": "Bousley v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8516", "docket": "96-8516", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bousley", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1990, Kenneth Eugene Bousley pleaded guilty to \"using\" a firearm \"during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,\" in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Ultimately, Bousley sough habeas relief, claiming his guilty plea lacked a factual basis because a connection between the firearms, located in the bedroom, and the location where the drug trafficking occurred, in the garage, was not shown in either the evidence or the plea. Dismissing the petition, the District Court found that a factual basis for the plea existed because the guns were in close proximity to the drugs and were readily accessible. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Bousley's argument, among others, that his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was misinformed about the elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense.
", "facts_len": "830", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1044", "ID": "54605", "name": "United States v. Beggerly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-731", "docket": "97-731", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Beggerly", "facts": "In 1979, the United States sued Chris W. Beggerly and the Beggerly family to quiet title to Horn Island, located within the state of Mississippi, for a federal park. The Government argued that Beggerly did not have clear title because the Government had never patented the disputed land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1982, a settlement quieted title in the Government's favor. However, in 1994, with new evidence, Beggerly sued, seeking to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under the Quiet Title Act and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as an \"independent action.\" The appellate court then vacated the settlement agreement and instructed the District Court to quiet title in Beggerly's favor.
", "facts_len": "900", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1045", "ID": "54610", "name": "Kalina v. Fletcher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-792", "docket": "96-792", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Kalina", "second_party": "Fletcher", "facts": "Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a \"Certification for Determination of Probable Cause.\" Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had \"never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property,\" and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1085", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1046", "ID": "54611", "name": "Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1578", "docket": "96-1578", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Phillips", "second_party": "Washington Legal Foundation", "facts": "Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing \"NOW\" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the \"Foundation\") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.
", "facts_len": "756", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1047", "ID": "54608", "name": "Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, Avco Corp v.United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-463", "docket": "97-463", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Textron Lycoming", "second_party": "United Automobile Workers", "facts": "Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division and the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and its Local 187 are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that required Textron to notify the Union before entering into any agreement to \"subcontract out\" work that would otherwise be performed by Union members. In 1994, Textron announced plans to subcontract out work that would have caused approximately one-half of the Union members to lose their jobs. Subsequently, the Union filed suit, alleging that Textron had fraudulently induced the Union to sign the collective-bargaining agreement. The complaint invoked section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which confers federal subject matter jurisdiction over \"suits for violation of contracts\" between an employer and a labor organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the cause of action alleged did not come within section 301(a). The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1048", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1048", "ID": "54609", "name": "Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-779", "docket": "96-779", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Arkansas Educational Television Commission", "second_party": "Forbes", "facts": "During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "536", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1049", "ID": "54612", "name": "Steel Company v. Citizens for Better Environment", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-643", "docket": "96-643", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Steel Company", "second_party": "Citizens for Better Environment", "facts": "In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic-and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.
", "facts_len": "925", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1050", "ID": "54613", "name": "United States v. Scheffer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1133", "docket": "96-1133", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Scheffer", "facts": "While defending himself before a military court martial on, among other things, substance abuse charges, airman Edward G. Scheffer sought to introduce his polygraph examination results. The results indicated there was \"no deception\" in Scheffer's denial that he used drugs while enlisted. Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707 (\"Rule 707\"), prohibiting the use of polygraph results in court-martial proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "791", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1051", "ID": "54614", "name": "Bryan v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8422", "docket": "96-8422", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bryan", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from \"willfully\" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts \"willfully\" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.
", "facts_len": "955", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1052", "ID": "54615", "name": "Bates v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7185", "docket": "96-7185", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bates", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of \"knowingly and willfully misapplying\" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his \"intent to injure or defraud the United States.\" Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.
", "facts_len": "1034", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1053", "ID": "54616", "name": "Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1769", "docket": "96-1769", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Ohio Adult Parole Authority", "second_party": "Woodard", "facts": "After Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination as to what that process should be.
", "facts_len": "859", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1054", "ID": "54621", "name": "Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-663", "docket": "97-663", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Newsweek, Inc.", "second_party": "Florida Department of Revenue", "facts": "In 1988, a Florida statutory provision exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from sales tax. In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found the classification invalid under the First Amendment. Subsequently, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of the sales tax that it had paid between 1988 and 1990. The Florida Department of Revenue denied the refund. Newsweek then filed suit alleging that Florida's failure to accord the magazine retroactive relief was a violation of due process. Ultimately, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because Florida law permits prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement, without suffering onerous penalties.
", "facts_len": "863", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1055", "ID": "54620", "name": "Spencer v. Kemna", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7171", "docket": "96-7171", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Spencer", "second_party": "Kemna", "facts": "In 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "675", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1056", "ID": "54618", "name": "Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-300", "docket": "97-300", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Stewart", "second_party": "Martinez-Villareal", "facts": "Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.
", "facts_len": "1224", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1057", "ID": "54619", "name": "Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-16", "docket": "97-16", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.", "second_party": "Sierra Club", "facts": "Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was \"ripe for review,\" there was no need to wait \"until a site-specific action occurs,\" held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.
", "facts_len": "980", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1058", "ID": "54623", "name": "Forney v. Apfel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-5737", "docket": "97-5737", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Forney", "second_party": "Apfel", "facts": "Sandra K. Forney applied for Social Security disability benefits. A Social Security Judge determined Forney was minimally disabled, but that she was not disabled enough to qualify for benefits. Consequently she was denied her disability claim. The Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied Forney's request for review. Forney then sought judicial review in federal District Court. The District Court found that the final determination was inadequately supported by the evidence and remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. Forney appealed the remand order to the Court of Appeals. She contended that the agency's denial of benefits should be reversed outright. The Court of Appeals did not hear her claim, however, for it decided that Forney did not have the legal right to appeal.
", "facts_len": "819", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1059", "ID": "54622", "name": "Clinton v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1374", "docket": "97-1374", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Clinton", "second_party": "City of New York", "facts": "This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act (\"Act\"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "1060", "ID": "54624", "name": "Edwards v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8732", "docket": "96-8732", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Edwards", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for \"conspiring\" to \"possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances,\" the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of \"cocaine or cocaine base (crack).\" After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word \"or\" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.
", "facts_len": "1020", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1061", "ID": "54625", "name": "Salinas v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-738", "docket": "96-738", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Salinas", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "746", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1062", "ID": "54628", "name": "Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1971", "docket": "96-1971", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Rivet", "second_party": "Regions Bank of Louisiana", "facts": "In 1983, a partnership mortgaged its interest in the Louisiana equivalent of a leasehold estate on a parcel of real property in New Orleans to Regions Bank of Louisiana. The partnership then granted a second mortgage to Mary Anna Rivet, Minna Ree Winer, Edmond G. Miranne, and Edmond G. Miranne, Jr. Later, the partnership filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the estate to the Bank, which sold the property. Rivet filed suit in Louisiana state court, alleging that the transfer of the property without satisfying their rights under the second mortgage violated state law. The Bank removed the action to federal court, contending that federal-question jurisdiction existed because the prior Bankruptcy Court orders extinguished Rivet's rights. Denying Rivet's motion to remand, the District Court granted the Bank summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that removal is proper where a plaintiff's state cause of action is completely precluded by a prior federal judgment on a federal question.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1063", "ID": "54626", "name": "City of Monroe v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-122", "docket": "97-122", "term": "1997", "first_party": "City of Monroe", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Monroe, Georgia is covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires the preclearance of certain voting changes. Prior to 1966, the Monroe city charter did not specify whether a majority vote or a plurality vote was needed to win a mayoral election. In practice, the city changed in 1966 from using a plurality-voting requirement to using a majority-voting requirement. The United States brought suit against the city, claiming that it had not sought preclearance of the change, as required by section 5 and sought to enjoin such majority voting and to require the city to return to plurality voting. The District Court, in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States, expressed the view that the change to majority voting had not been precleared in accordance with section 5.
", "facts_len": "816", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1064", "ID": "54627", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. Akins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1590", "docket": "96-1590", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "Akins", "facts": "The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in \"contributions\" or which make more than $1,000 in \"expenditures\" in a year \"for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.\" Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a \"communication\" by a \"membership organization or corporation\" \"to its members\" as long as the organization is not \"organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election.\" A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.
", "facts_len": "1109", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1065", "ID": "54629", "name": "Caron v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-6270", "docket": "97-6270", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Caron", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, \"unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.\" In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s \"unless clause\" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1060", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1066", "ID": "54630", "name": "Ricci v. Arlington Heights", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-501", "docket": "97-501", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Ricci", "second_party": "Arlington Heights", "facts": "Randall Ricci owns Rudeway Enterprises, a telemarketing business. After the Arlington Heights police department determined that Ricci lacked the required business license and that one of Ricci's employees had an outstanding warrant, officers went to Rudeway Enterprises to arrest the employee. While arresting the employee, the officers also searched Ricci's business papers without a warrant. Subsequently, Ricci was arrested for violating Section 9-201 of the Village of Arlington Heights Code of Ordinances, which makes it unlawful to operate a business without a license. Ultimately, Ricci filed a claim that the officers violated his civil rights by subjecting him to a full custodial arrest for committing a fine-only offense. The District Court dismissed the claim. Finding the arrest reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court of Appeals rejected Ricci's argument that a full custodial arrest for violation of a fine-only ordinance is constitutionally permissible only if the violation involves a breach of the peace.
", "facts_len": "1042", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1067", "ID": "54631", "name": "Dooley v. Korean Airlines Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-704", "docket": "97-704", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Dooley", "second_party": "Korean Airlines Company", "facts": "In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed. Representatives of three of the passengers (petitioners) sued KAL for damages for their decedents' pre-death pain and suffering. While their suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co. In Zicherman, the Court held that the Warsaw Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm and that the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) supplies the applicable U.S. law where an airplane crashes on the high seas. DOHSA allows certain relatives of a decedent to sue for their own pecuniary losses, but does not authorize recovery for the decedent's pre-death pain and suffering. Subsequently, the District Court granted KAL's motion to dismiss petitioners' nonpecuniary damages claims on the ground that DOHSA does not permit recovery for such damages. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that general maritime law provides a survival action for pain and suffering damages.
", "facts_len": "1133", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1068", "ID": "54634", "name": "Breard v. Greene", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-8214", "docket": "97-8214", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Breard", "second_party": "Greene", "facts": "In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of the attempted rape and capital murder of Ruth Dickie. Breard was scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1996. Ultimately, Breard filed a motion for habeas relief in Federal District Court, alleging that arresting authorities violated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations when they failed to inform him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate. The court concluded that Breard had procedurally default this claim by failing to raise it in state court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In 1996, Paraguayan officials brought suit alleging that Virginia officials had violated their rights under the Vienna Convention by failing to inform Breard of his treaty rights and the Paraguayan consulate of Breard's situation. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "963", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1069", "ID": "54632", "name": "City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-910", "docket": "96-910", "term": "1997", "first_party": "City of Chicago", "second_party": "International College of Surgeons", "facts": "In 1989, following the Chicago Landmarks Commission's preliminary determination that two of the International College of Surgeons and the United States Section of the International College of Surgeons' (ICS) buildings qualified for protection under the city's Landmarks Ordinance, the city enacted a Designation Ordinance creating a landmark district that included the buildings. After ICS applied for and was denied a permit to demolish all but the facades of the buildings, it sought judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging the ordinances and the manner in which the Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State Constitutions. Chicago removed the case to federal district court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision in favor of the city, ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing state law claims for on-the-record review of local administrative action.
", "facts_len": "1018", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1070", "ID": "54633", "name": "Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-5310", "docket": "97-5310", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Beach", "second_party": "Ocwen Federal Bank", "facts": "David and Linda Beach refinanced their Florida house in 1986 with a loan from Great Western Bank. In 1991, they stopped making mortgage payments. In 1992, Great Western began foreclosure proceedings. While the Beach's acknowledged their default, they alleged that the bank's failure to make disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act gave them the right under federal law to rescind the mortgage agreement. The Florida trial court rejected that defense, holding that any right to rescind had expired in 1989 under federal law which provides that the right of rescission shall expire three years after the loan closes. The state's intermediate appellate court affirmed, as did the Florida Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "716", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1071", "ID": "54637", "name": "Lewis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7151", "docket": "96-7151", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Lewis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that \"whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment,\" Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.
", "facts_len": "988", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1072", "ID": "54635", "name": "Hopkins v. Reeves", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1693", "docket": "96-1693", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Hopkins", "second_party": "Reeves", "facts": "Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.
", "facts_len": "1144", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1073", "ID": "54636", "name": "General Electric Company v. Joiner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-188", "docket": "96-188", "term": "1997", "first_party": "General Electric Company", "second_party": "Joiner", "facts": "In 1992, Robert Joiner, after being diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer, sued General Electric Co. in Georgia state court, alleging that his disease was promoted by workplace exposure to chemical \"PCBs\" and their derivatives, including polychlorinated dibenzofurans (furans) and polychlorinated dibenzodioxins (dioxins). Ultimately, Joiner provided the District Court with expert witnesses' depositions that testified that PCBs, furans, and dioxins can promote cancer and that this was the likely cause of his cancer. The court granted GE summary judgment, reasoning that there was no genuine issue as to whether Joiner had been exposed to furans and dioxins and that his experts' testimony had failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of Joiner's expert witnesses. The appellate court applied a stringent standard of review to reach its conclusion.
", "facts_len": "1005", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1074", "ID": "54638", "name": "United States v. Cabrales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-643", "docket": "97-643", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Cabrales", "facts": "An indictment returned in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri charged Vickie S. Cabrales with various charges of money laundering. The incident alleged that Cabrales deposited $40,000 with the AmSouth Bank of Florida, of which she later withdrew $38,000. The money was traceable to illegal cocaine sales in Missouri. Cabrales moved to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Because the money-laundering activity occurred entirely in Florida, the court dismissed two of the three counts against Cabrales. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that Article III, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 required that a person be tried where the charged offense was committed. The court also noted that laundering alleged in the indictment occurred entirely in Florida and that the Government did not assert that Cabrales transported the money from Missouri to Florida.
", "facts_len": "948", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1075", "ID": "54639", "name": "Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-461", "docket": "97-461", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Wisconsin Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Schacht", "facts": "In 1996, Keith Schacht filed a state-court suit against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and several of its employees (defendants), in their \"personal\" and in their \"official\" capacity, alleging that his dismissal violated the Federal Constitution and federal civil rights laws. After removing the case to federal court, the defendants asserted that the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claims against the Department and its employees in their official capacity. The District Court granted the individual defendants summary judgment on the \"personal capacity\" claims and dismissed the claims against the Department and the individual defendants in their \"official capacity.\" On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the removal had been improper because the presence of even one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar deprives the federal courts of removal jurisdiction over the entire case.
", "facts_len": "944", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1076", "ID": "54640", "name": "Calderon v. Ashmus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-391", "docket": "97-391", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Calderon", "second_party": "Ashmus", "facts": "Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "903", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1077", "ID": "54641", "name": "Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1866", "docket": "96-1866", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Gebser", "second_party": "Lago Vista Independent School District", "facts": "Alida Star Gebser, a high school student in the Lago Vista Independent School District (\"Lago Vista\"), had a secret sexual affair with one of her teachers. At the time, Lago Vista had no official procedure for reporting sexual harassment nor any formal anti-harassment policy, as required by federal law. One day, after the two were discovered having sex, the teacher was arrested and fired. Claiming she was harassed in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (the \"Amendments\"), providing that no person \"be subjected to discrimination\" under any federally funded education program or activity, Gebser sought damages against Lago Vista. On appeal from a decision affirming a district court's ruling in favor of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court granted Gebser certiorari.
", "facts_len": "795", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1078", "ID": "54644", "name": "Regions Hospital v. Shalala", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1375", "docket": "96-1375", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Regions Hospital", "second_party": "Shalala", "facts": "Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount \"recognized as reasonable\" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's \"reaudit\" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible \"retroactive rule.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1177", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1079", "ID": "54643", "name": "Buchanan v. Angelone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-8400", "docket": "96-8400", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Buchanan", "second_party": "Angelone", "facts": "Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, \"then you may fix the punishment...at death,\" but \"if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment.\" Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.
", "facts_len": "813", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1080", "ID": "54645", "name": "Trest v. Cain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-7901", "docket": "96-7901", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Trest", "second_party": "Cain", "facts": "Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a \"procedural default.\" The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the \"procedural default\" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.
", "facts_len": "799", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1081", "ID": "54646", "name": "Campbell v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1584", "docket": "96-1584", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Campbell", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "erry Campbell, a white man, was indicted for second-degree murder by a grand jury in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Campbell moved to quash the indictment by citing a long history of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons in Evangeline Parish. No African-American had served as a foreperson for the past 16 years despite the fact twenty percent of the registered voters were black. Campbell claimed such practices violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. A Louisiana trial judge denied Campbell's challenge, holding that he lacked standing as a white man complaining about the exclusion of African-Americans from serving as forepersons. The Louisiana Court of Appeal overruled the trial judge and decided Campbell had standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal.
", "facts_len": "852", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1082", "ID": "54650", "name": "New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-1217", "docket": "97-1217", "term": "1997", "first_party": "New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz", "second_party": "Reed", "facts": "The Extradition Act implements the Constitution's extradition clause and provides for the extradition from one state of a fugitive from justice when a demand for the fugitive's extradition is made by another state. Manuel Ortiz, a parolee from the Ohio correctional system, fled to New Mexico after Ohio prison officials told him that they planned to revoke his parole status. The governor of New Mexico issued a warrant directing Ortiz's return upon Ohio's demand. Ortiz then sought habeas corpus relief in New Mexico. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief. The court expressed the view that Ortiz was a refugee from injustice and that the New Mexico constitution, which guarantees the right of seeking and obtaining safety, prevailed over the state's duty under the extradition clause.
", "facts_len": "842", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1083", "ID": "54648", "name": "Hudson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-976", "docket": "96-976", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Hudson et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Hudson was chairman of the First National Bank of Tipton and the First National Bank of Hammon. Hudson used his position to regain bank stock he had used as collateral on defaulted loans through a series of bank loans to other parties. Upon investigation the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) found that the loans were made in violation of several banking statues and regulations. The OCC fined and debarred Hudson for the violations. Later, he faced criminal indictment in federal District Court for violations tied to those same events. Hudson objected, arguing that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
\nThe U. S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit eventually found for the Government in light of United States v. Halper on the grounds that the original proceedings were civil in nature and not so disproportional to the proven damages to the Government as to qualify as a form of criminal punishment.
", "facts_len": "984", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1084", "ID": "54649", "name": "United States v. Balsys", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-873", "docket": "97-873", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Balsys", "facts": "Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena enforcement petition, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.
", "facts_len": "532", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1085", "ID": "54651", "name": "Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1037", "docket": "96-1037", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma", "second_party": "Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.", "facts": "The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct.
", "facts_len": "874", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1086", "ID": "54652", "name": "Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1462", "docket": "96-1462", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Lunding", "second_party": "New York Tax Appeals Tribunal", "facts": "New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.
", "facts_len": "953", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1087", "ID": "54654", "name": "Texas v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-29", "docket": "97-29", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Texas", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1088", "ID": "54653", "name": "National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-371", "docket": "97-371", "term": "1997", "first_party": "National Endowment for the Arts", "second_party": "Finley", "facts": "The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: \"artistic and cultural significance,\" with emphasis on \"creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence,\" and the encouragement of \"public education and appreciation of the arts.\" In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider \"artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.\" After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1015", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1089", "ID": "54655", "name": "United States v. Estate of Romani", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1613", "docket": "96-1613", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Estate of Romani", "facts": "Both a judgment lien and federal tax liens encumbered the real property of Francis Romani's Pennsylvania estate, worth $53,001, following his death. The estate's administrator sought a county court's permission to transfer the property to the judgment creditor. The Government objected to the conveyance, arguing that 31 USC section 3713(a), which provides that a Government claim \"shall be paid first\" when a decedent's estate cannot pay all of its debts, prioritized its payment. Nevertheless, the court authorized the conveyance. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The court concluded that Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Government's preference and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens.
", "facts_len": "757", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1090", "ID": "54657", "name": "Kawaauhau v. Geiger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-115", "docket": "97-115", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Kawaauhau", "second_party": "Geiger", "facts": "In 1983, Margaret Kawaauhau sought treatment from Dr. Paul Geiger for a foot injury. Later, Geiger cancelled Kawaauhau's transfer, by other physicians, to an infectious disease specialist. Ultimately, Kawaauhau required that her right leg be amputated below the knee. In the subsequently malpractice suit, a jury awarded Kawaauhau approximately $355,000 in damages. Geiger, who carried no malpractice insurance, ultimately filed for bankruptcy. Kawaauhau requested the Bankruptcy Court to hold the malpractice judgment nondischargeable under 11 USC section 523(a)(6), which provides that a \"discharge [in bankruptcy]... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt... for willful and malicious injury... to another.\" The court held the debt nondischargeable. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that section 523(a)(6)'s exemption from discharge is confined to debts for an intentional tort, so that a debt for malpractice remains dischargeable because it is based on negligent or reckless conduct.
", "facts_len": "1047", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1091", "ID": "54656", "name": "National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-843", "docket": "96-843", "term": "1997", "first_party": "National Credit Union Administration", "second_party": "First National Bank & Trust Company", "facts": "Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that \"federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.\" The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1342", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1092", "ID": "54658", "name": "United States v. Bajakajian", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1487", "docket": "96-1487", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Bajakajian", "facts": "During a routine check of departing international flight passengers, customs officers discovered $357,144 on the person of Hosep Bajakajian. In addition to charging him, under 31 U.S.C. Section 5316, of attempting to leave the United States with an unreported sum in excess of $10,000 cash, the government also sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 under 18 U.S.C. Section 982 providing that the deliberate violation of Section 5316 shall result in the forfeiture of \"any property involved in such an offense.\" After having its forfeiture claim rejected in both a district court and the Ninth Circuit, as excessively unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.
", "facts_len": "698", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1093", "ID": "54660", "name": "Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-428", "docket": "97-428", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Air Line Pilots Association", "second_party": "Miller", "facts": "The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an \"agency shop\" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.
", "facts_len": "1005", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1094", "ID": "54659", "name": "Cohen v. de la Cruz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1923", "docket": "96-1923", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Cohen", "second_party": "de la Cruz", "facts": "After the local rent control administrator ordered Edward S. Cohen to refund $31,382.50 in excessive rents he had charged Hilda de la Cruz and other tenants, Cohen sought to discharge his debts under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The tenants filed an adversary proceeding, arguing that the debt Cohen owed to them was nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, which excepts from discharge \"any debt ... for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... actual fraud.\" The tenants also sought treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. The Bankruptcy Court ruled in their favor, finding that Cohen had committed \"actual fraud\" within the meaning of ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code and that his conduct violated the New Jersey law. The court, therefore, awarded the tenants treble damages totaling $94,147.50, plus attorney's fees and costs. The District Court affirmed, as did the Court of Appeals, which held that debts resulting from fraud are nondischargeable under ?523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, and that the award of treble damages (plus attorney's fees and costs) in this case was therefore nondischargeable.
", "facts_len": "1227", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1095", "ID": "54661", "name": "New Jersey v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/120_orig", "docket": "120-orig", "term": "1997", "first_party": "New Jersey", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Under an 1834 compact between New York and New Jersey, Ellis Island was deemed part of New York. It was later determined, by the Supreme Court, that New Jersey would have sovereign rights over all submerged lands on its side of the Hudson River. During the time Ellis Island was used to receive immigrants, the Federal Government filled around the island adding some 24.5 acres to its original size over 42 years. When immigration was diverted from Ellis Island in 1954, New York and New Jersey asserted rival sovereignty claims over the Island's filled portions. New Jersey finally invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to solve the matter once and for all time.
", "facts_len": "683", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1096", "ID": "54663", "name": "Brogan v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1579", "docket": "96-1579", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Brogan", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered \"no.\" Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.
", "facts_len": "635", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1097", "ID": "54662", "name": "United States v. Bestfoods", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-454", "docket": "97-454", "term": "1997", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Bestfoods", "facts": "The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, \"any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility.\" The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had \"owned or operated\" the facility.
", "facts_len": "873", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1098", "ID": "54664", "name": "Almendarez-Torres v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-6839", "docket": "96-6839", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Almendarez-Torres", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "8 USC section 1326(a) makes it a crime, punishable by up to two years in prison, for a deported alien to return to the United States without special permission. In 1998, Congress added subsection (b)(2), which authorizes a maximum prison term of 20 years for \"any alien described\" in subsection (a), if the initial \"deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.\" In 1995, Hugo Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating section 1326. Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Almendarez- Torres to 85 months' imprisonment. The court rejected his argument that, because his indictment failed to mention his aggravated felony convictions, the court could not sentence him to more than the maximum sentence authorized by section 1326(a). In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(2) is a penalty provision which permits the imposition of a higher sentence when the unlawfully returning alien also has a record of prior convictions.
", "facts_len": "993", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1099", "ID": "54666", "name": "Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1768", "docket": "96-1768", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Feltner", "second_party": "Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.", "facts": "In 1991, Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., terminated agreements licensing several television series, including \"Who's the Boss,\" \"Silver Spoons,\" \"Hart to Hart,\" and \"T. J. Hooker,\" to three television stations owned by C. Elvin Feltner after the stations' royalty payments became delinquent. Columbia sued Feltner after his stations continued to broadcast the programs for copyright infringement. After winning partial summary judgment as to liability on its copyright infringement claims, Columbia attempted to recover statutory damages under section 504(c) of the Copyright Act. The District Court denied Feltner's request for a jury trial and awarded Columbia statutory damages following a bench trial. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that neither section 504(c) nor the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on statutory damages.
", "facts_len": "866", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1100", "ID": "54669", "name": "Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-147", "docket": "97-147", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "The Internal Revenue Code allowed property and casualty insurers to fully deduct \"loss reserves,\" or unpaid losses. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 altered the deduction formula. Under the Act, increases in loss reserves that constitute \"reserve strengthening,\" or additions to the loss reserve, were excepted from a one time tax benefit because it would result in a tax deficiency. Treasury regulation and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue interpreted the law to say that any increase in loss reserves constituted reserve strengthening. The Commissioner then determined Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company had engaged in reserve strengthening. The Tax Court disagreed with the government's interpretation. It held reserve strengthening referred only to increases resulting from computational methods. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held reserve strengthening to encompass any increase in loss reserves.
", "facts_len": "923", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1101", "ID": "54667", "name": "Bogan v. Scott-Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/96-1569", "docket": "96-1569", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Bogan", "second_party": "Scott-Harris", "facts": "Janet Scott-Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, the city's mayor, Daniel Bogan, the vice president of the city counsel, Marilyn Roderick, and others, alleging that the elimination of the city department in which Scott-Harris was the sole employee was motivated by a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. The jury found the city, Bogan and Roderick liable on the First Amendment claim. The First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city, but affirmed the judgments against Bogan and Roderick. The court held that although Bogan and Roderick had absolute immunity from civil liability for their performance of legitimate legislative activities, their conduct in voting for and signing the ordinance that eliminated Scott-Harris's office was motivated by considerations relating to a particular individual and was therefore administrative rather than legislative in nature.
", "facts_len": "979", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1102", "ID": "54668", "name": "Geissal v. Moore Medical Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1997/97-689", "docket": "97-689", "term": "1997", "first_party": "Geissal", "second_party": "Moore Medical Corporation", "facts": "The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to permit a beneficiary of an employer's group health plan to elect continuing coverage when he might otherwise lose that benefit because of a \"qualifying event,\" such as the termination of employment. In 1993, when Moore Medical Corporation fired James Geissal, it told him that COBRA gave him the right to elect continuing coverage under Moore's health plan. Later, Moore informed Geissal that he was not entitled to COBRA benefits because he was already covered by a group plan through his wife's employer. Geissal then filed suit against Moore, alleging that Moore was violating CORBA by renouncing an obligation to provide continuing coverage. Ultimately, a Magistrate Judge concluded that an employee with coverage under another group health plan on the date he elects COBRA coverage is ineligible for COBRA coverage under 29 USC section 1162(2)(D)(i), which allows an employer to cancel such coverage as of \"the date on which the qualified beneficiary first becomes, after the date of the election... covered under any other group health plan.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1217", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1103", "ID": "54670", "name": "Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1130", "docket": "97-1130", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Pfaff", "second_party": "Wells Electronics, Inc.", "facts": "In 1980, Wayne K. Pfaff developed a new type of computer chip socket for Texas Instruments (TI). In early April 1981, TI confirmed they would order and use Pfaff's socket. No actual socket was made until July 1981. Pfaff applied for a patent in April 1982. A patent was not granted on Pfaff's socket until 1985. After the patent was issued, Pfaff sued Wells Electronics, who had developed a competing socket, for patent infringement. Pfaff claimed that Wells' socket infringed upon six of his patent's claims. The District Court held that Wells' socket violated three of Pfaff's patent claims. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Pfaff had sold the socket to TI more than a year before he applied for a patent. Thus, Wells' socket did not infringe on Pfaff's under the Patent Act of 1952, which states that no one can patent an invention that has been on sale for more than one year before filing a patent application.
", "facts_len": "930", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1104", "ID": "54671", "name": "O'Sullivan v. Boerckel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-2048", "docket": "97-2048", "term": "1998", "first_party": "O'Sullivan", "second_party": "Boerckel", "facts": "After Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court.
", "facts_len": "1365", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1105", "ID": "54672", "name": "Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-531", "docket": "98-531", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board", "second_party": "College Savings Bank", "facts": "Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "797", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1106", "ID": "54673", "name": "Hughes Aircraft Company v. Jacobson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1287", "docket": "97-1287", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Hughes Aircraft Company", "second_party": "Jacobson", "facts": "Stanley I. Jacobson and other retired employees of Hughes Aircraft Company were beneficiaries of Hughes Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan. Jacobson and the others claimed in their class-action lawsuit that Hughes violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal pension protection law, when it amended the plan twice in response to a $1.2 billion dollar surplus. ERISA requires that some of the surplus be distributed to cover employees when a pension plan is terminated. Hughes' first amendment to the plan established an early retirement program that provided significant additional retirement benefits to certain eligible active employees. The second amendment disallowed new participants from contributing to the plan. Jacobson and others argued that Hughes had terminated one plan and started another by stopping its pension plan contributions. Thus, the company had used the plan's surplus to benefit new employees at the expense of the retirees. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court by finding that the early retirement program and noncontributory benefit structure were prohibited by the ERISA.
", "facts_len": "1225", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1107", "ID": "54678", "name": "United States v. Haggar Apparel Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-2044", "docket": "97-2044", "term": "1998", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Haggar Apparel Company", "facts": "The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1453", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1108", "ID": "54675", "name": "Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1536", "docket": "97-1536", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Arizona Department of Revenue", "second_party": "Blaze Construction Company", "facts": "Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.
", "facts_len": "810", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1109", "ID": "54676", "name": "Jefferson County v. Acker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-10", "docket": "98-10", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Jefferson County", "second_party": "Acker", "facts": "Two U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.
", "facts_len": "1270", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1110", "ID": "54682", "name": "Maryland v. Dyson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-1062", "docket": "98-1062", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Dyson", "facts": "Acting on a tip from a confidential informant and a subsequent investigation, sheriff's deputies stopped and searched Kevin Dyson's automobile. The deputies found 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Dyson was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. In reversing, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be not only probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile, but also a separate finding of an exigency which precluded the police from obtaining a warrant. Although there was abundant probable cause, the court concluded that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant.
", "facts_len": "910", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1111", "ID": "54680", "name": "Clinton v. Goldsmith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-347", "docket": "98-347", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Clinton", "second_party": "Goldsmith", "facts": "James T. Goldsmith, an Air Force major, defied an order from a superior officer to inform his sex partners that he was infected with HIV and to take measures to block any transfer of bodily fluids during sexual intercourse. Goldsmith was convicted by general court-martial under several counts and sentenced to six years' confinement and partial forfeiture of salary. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Goldsmith sought no review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and his conviction became final. Subsequently, the Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was taking action to drop him from the rolls under a newly enacted statute. Goldsmith then petitioned the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief under the All Writs Act, which authorizes courts established by Congress to \"issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,\" to redress the unrelated alleged interruption of his HIV medication during his incarceration, but did not immediately contest his removal from the Air Force rolls. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to act. On appeal to the CAAF from this determination, Goldsmith first asserted the claim that the Air Force's action to drop him violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitution. He argued that the statute had been enacted after the date of his court-martial conviction and that the action would inflict successive punishment based on the same conduct underlying his first conviction. The CAAF granted his petition for extraordinary relief to redress the interruption of his HIV medication and relied on the All Writs Act in enjoining the President and other officials from dropping Goldsmith from the Air Force rolls.
", "facts_len": "1821", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1112", "ID": "54683", "name": "No. 97-53 Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-53", "docket": "97-53", "term": "1998", "first_party": "No. 97-53 Roberts", "second_party": "Galen of Virginia, Inc.", "facts": "Wanda Johnson was run over by a truck in May 1992 and was rushed to the Humana Hospital-University of Louisville, Kentucky, now Galen of Virginia, Inc. After about six weeks at Galen, during which time Johnson's health remained in a volatile state, Galen's agents arranged for her transfer to the Crestview Health Care Facility in Indiana. Johnson was transferred to Crestview in July, and upon arrival her condition deteriorated significantly. Johnson was taken to the Midwest Medical Center where she remained for many months and incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of her deterioration. Jane Roberts, Johnson's guardian, then filed a federal action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), alleging violations of Section 1395dd(b) of the Act. Section 1395dd of the Act places obligations of screening and stabilization upon hospitals and emergency rooms that receive patients suffering from an \"emergency medical condition.\" The District Court granted summary judgment for Galen on the ground that Roberts had failed to show that \"either the medical opinion that Johnson was stable or the decision to authorize her transfer was caused by an improper motive.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that in order to state a claim in an EMTALA suit alleging a violation of Section 1395dd(b)'s stabilization requirement, a plaintiff must show that the hospital's inappropriate stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient.
", "facts_len": "1540", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1113", "ID": "54686", "name": "Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-889", "docket": "97-889", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Wright", "second_party": "Universal Maritime Service Corporation", "facts": "Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1177", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1114", "ID": "54681", "name": "AT&T Corporation v. Iowa Utilities Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-826", "docket": "97-826", "term": "1998", "first_party": "AT&T Corporation", "second_party": "Iowa Utilities Board", "facts": "The 1996 Telecommunications Act (Act) fundamentally altered local telephone markets by ending the monopolies traditionally given to local exchange carriers (LECs) by states and subjecting LECs to a host of duties meant to facilitate market entry. Among these was the imposition of an obligation on incumbent LECs to share their networks with competitors. Following the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) issuance of regulations implementing the Act's guidelines, AT&T challenged their constitutionality on behalf of itself and other existing phone service providers.
", "facts_len": "584", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1115", "ID": "54684", "name": "California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1625", "docket": "97-1625", "term": "1998", "first_party": "California Dental Association", "second_party": "Federal Trade Commission", "facts": "The California Dental Association (CDA), a nonprofit association of local dental societies, provides its members with insurance and financing arrangements, and engages in lobbying, litigation, marketing, and public relations for members' benefit. Members agree to abide by the CDA's Code of Ethics, which prohibits false or misleading advertising. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging that the CDA's guidelines restricted two types of truthful, non-deceptive advertising: price advertising and advertising relating to the quality of dental services and therefore had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the FTC had jurisdiction over the CDA and found a violation of section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC adopted most of the ALJ's factual findings and held that the price advertising, as well as the non-price, restrictions were violations of the Sherman and FTC Acts under an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis. In affirming, the Court of Appeals sustain the FTC's jurisdiction and concluded that an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was proper in this case.
", "facts_len": "1183", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1116", "ID": "54687", "name": "El Paso Natural Gas Company v. Neztsosie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-6", "docket": "98-6", "term": "1998", "first_party": "El Paso Natural Gas Company", "second_party": "Neztsosie", "facts": "In 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of \"public liability\" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1117", "ID": "54685", "name": "Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1252", "docket": "97-1252", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Reno", "second_party": "American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee", "facts": "Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), were marked for deportation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The PFLP is characterized by the government as an international terrorist and communist organization. The resident aliens filed suit alleging the Attorney General and other federal parties had targeted them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group, in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Initially, the District Court enjoined the deportation proceedings. During the case, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The IIRIRA restricts judicial review of the Attorney General's \"decision or action\" to \"commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.\" Reno then filed motions arguing that the IIRIRA deprived the courts of jurisdiction over the aliens' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision on the merits.
", "facts_len": "1226", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1118", "ID": "54688", "name": "South Central Bell Telephone Company v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-2045", "docket": "97-2045", "term": "1998", "first_party": "South Central Bell Telephone Company", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1322", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1119", "ID": "54689", "name": "Hanlon v. Berger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1927", "docket": "97-1927", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Hanlon", "second_party": "Berger", "facts": "In 1993, a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of Paul and Erma Berger's Montana ranch for evidence of the taking of wildlife in violation of federal law. Later, a multiple-vehicle caravan consisting of government agents and a crew of photographers and reporters from CNN proceeded to the ranch. In executing the warrant, the federal officers allowed the media crew to accompany and observe them. Subsequently, the Berger's filed suit, asserting that the officials, special agents of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and an assistant United States attorney, had violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court concluded that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, as no clearly established law protecting individuals from the commercial recording of a search of their premises existed at the time. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "901", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1120", "ID": "54690", "name": "Strickler v. Greene", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-5864", "docket": "98-5864", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Strickler", "second_party": "Greene", "facts": "The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory materials in the police files, consisting of notes taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.
", "facts_len": "1872", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1121", "ID": "54695", "name": "Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-231", "docket": "98-231", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A.", "second_party": "Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.", "facts": "Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., an investment fund, purchased approximately $75 million in unsecured notes (Notes) from Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A., (GMD) a Mexican holding company involved in a tool road construction program sponsored by the Government of Mexico. Four GMD subsidiaries guaranteed the Notes. After GMD fell into financial trouble and missed an interest payment on the Notes, Alliance accelerated the Notes' principal amount and filed suit for the amount due in Federal District Court. Alliance requested a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from transferring its assets alleging that GMD was at risk of insolvency, or already insolvent, that it was preferring its Mexican creditors by its planned allocation to them of its most valuable assets, and that these actions would frustrate any judgment that Alliance could obtain. Alliance sought monetary damages and no lien or equitable interest was claimed. The District Court issued the preliminary injunction and ordered GMD to post a $50,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1059", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1122", "ID": "54697", "name": "Humana Inc. v. Forsyth", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-303", "docket": "97-303", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Humana Inc.", "second_party": "Forsyth", "facts": "Mary Forsyth, the beneficiary of a group health insurance policy issued by Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., received medical care at a hospital owned by Humana Inc. Humana Insurance agreed to pay 80 percent of Forsyth's hospital charges over a designated deductible. Forsyth bore responsibility for the remaining 20 percent of the charges. Forsyth complained that the hospital gave Human Insurance large discounts on their portion of the hospital charges. Thus, Humana Insurance paid the hospital significantly less than the actual 80 percent of the original bill and, in turn, Forsyth paid significantly more than her 20 percent of the hospital charges. Forsyth alleged that Humana Insurance and Humana Inc. had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through fraudulent activity. The District Court ruled in favor of Humana, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which prevents acts of Congress from encroaching on state insurance law unless the act specifically relates to insurance. The Court of Appeals reversed and adopted a \"direct conflict\" test for determining when a federal law \"invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]\" a state insurance law. Under such a test, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Forsyth's suit because the Act does not preclude application of a federal statute prohibiting acts that are also prohibited under state insurance laws. The Act and Nevada law only provided for different damages to be collected.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1123", "ID": "54692", "name": "Minnesota v. Carter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1147", "docket": "97-1147", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Minnesota", "second_party": "Carter", "facts": "Wayne Thomas Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson were arrested after a police officer observed them through a window bagging cocaine in Thompson's apartment. During the trial in Minnesota state court, the defendants moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence. They argued the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Subsequently, they were all convicted on state drug charges. The Minnesota trial court held that because they were not overnight social guests they were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the court held that the officer's window-based observation was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the state intermediate appellate court held Carter did not have standing for an objection to the officer's action because his use of the apartment for drug purposes removed any legitimate expectation of privacy. The court also affirmed Johns' conviction . The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search. Minnesota sought a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1242", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1124", "ID": "54696", "name": "College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-149", "docket": "98-149", "term": "1998", "first_party": "College Savings Bank", "second_party": "Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board", "facts": "This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1292", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1125", "ID": "54700", "name": "Conn v. Gabbert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1802", "docket": "97-1802", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Conn", "second_party": "Gabbert", "facts": "Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol Najera, prosecutors in the retrial of the Menendez brothers, learned that Lyle Menendez had written a letter to Traci Baker, in which he may have instructed her to testify falsely at the first trial. After being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury and to produce any correspondence that she had received from Menendez, Baker responded that she had given all of Menendez's letters to her attorney, Paul L. Gabbert. When Baker appeared as directed before the grand jury, accompanied by Gabbert, Conn directed police to secure a warrant to search Gabbert for the letter. While Gabbert was being searched, Najera called Baker before the grand jury for questioning. Gabbert brought suit against the prosecutors contending that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession without unreasonable government interference was violated when the prosecutors executed a search warrant at the same time his client was testifying before the grand jury. The Federal District Court granted Conn and Najera summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals held that Conn and Najera were not entitled to qualified immunity on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claim because their actions were not objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Gabbert had a right to practice his profession without undue and unreasonable government interference.
", "facts_len": "1463", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1126", "ID": "54698", "name": "Wyoming v. Houghton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-184", "docket": "98-184", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Wyoming", "second_party": "Houghton", "facts": "After pulling Sandra Houghton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Houghton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Houghton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari.
", "facts_len": "572", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1127", "ID": "54701", "name": "Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-843", "docket": "97-843", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Davis", "second_party": "Monroe County Board of Education", "facts": "Aurelia Davis sued the Monroe County Board of Education (the \"Board\"), on behalf of her fifth grade daughter LaShonda, alleging that school officials failed to prevent Lashonda's suffering sexual harassment at the hands of another student. Davis claimed that the school's complacency created an abusive environment that deprived her daughter of educational benefits promised her under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). On appeal from successive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Davis certiorari.
", "facts_len": "573", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1128", "ID": "54702", "name": "Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1489", "docket": "97-1489", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc.", "second_party": "Shalala", "facts": "Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that \"new and material\" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1748", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1129", "ID": "54704", "name": "Alden v. Maine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-436", "docket": "98-436", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Alden", "second_party": "Maine", "facts": "A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.
", "facts_len": "751", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1130", "ID": "54703", "name": "Mitchell v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-7541", "docket": "97-7541", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Mitchell", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Amanda Mitchell and others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Mitchell was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Mitchell pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count during her sentencing hearing. Before accepting her plea, the District Court told Mitchell that she faced a mandatory minimum of 1 year in prison for distributing cocaine and a 10-year minimum for conspiracy if the government could show the required 5 kilograms. The court also explained to Mitchell that by pleading guilty she would be waiving her right \"at trial to remain silent.\" At Mitchell's sentencing hearing, the District Court found, after hearing testimony that included some of Mitchell's codefendants, that Mitchell's alleged drug sales of 1 1/2 to 2 ounces of cocaine twice a week for year and a half put her over the 5-kilogram threshold. Mitchell did not testify to rebut the Government's evidence about drug quantity; however, her counsel argued the quantity of cocaine attributable to her for sentencing purposes. The District Court ruled that as a consequence of Mitchell's guilty plea, she had no right to remain silent about her crime's details; found that the codefendants' testimony put her over the 5-kilogram threshold, thus mandating the 10-year minimum; and noted that her failure to testify was a factor in persuading the court to rely on the codefendants' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1560", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1131", "ID": "54705", "name": "Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1704", "docket": "97-1704", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Ortiz", "second_party": "Fibreboard Corporation", "facts": "After decades of litigation, Fibreboard Corporation and a group of plaintiffs' lawyers reached a \"Global Settlement Agreement\" of its asbestos personal-injury liability. Subsequently, a group of named plaintiffs filed the present action in Federal District Court, seeking certification for settlement purposes of a mandatory class that comprised three certain groups. Intervening objectors argued that the absence of a \"limited fund\" precluded Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that \"an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of... (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.\" The court ruled that both the disputed insurance asset liquidated by the global settlement, and, alternatively, the sum of the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage, as measured by the insurance funds' settlement value, were relevant \"limited funds.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed both the class certification and the adequacy of the settlement. The appellate court approved the class certification, under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), on a limited fund rationale based on the threat to other class members' ability to receive full payment from the manufacturer's limited assets.
", "facts_len": "1599", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1132", "ID": "54706", "name": "Lopez v. Monterey County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1396", "docket": "97-1396", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Lopez", "second_party": "Monterey County", "facts": "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires designated states and political subdivisions to obtain federal pre-clearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. Hispanic voters, residing in Monterey County, California, filed suit in federal court claiming the county had failed to obtain the required pre-clearance for a series of ordinances changing the method for electing county judges. A three-judge District Court ultimately dismissed the case because the section of the Voting Rights Act that requires pre-clearance did not cover California. Moreover, California had passed legislation requiring the voting changes forged by Monterey County.
", "facts_len": "664", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1133", "ID": "54707", "name": "Lilly v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-5881", "docket": "98-5881", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Lilly", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker were arrested after stealing liquor and guns and abducting Alex DeFilippis, who was later shot and killed. Under police questioning, Mark admitted stealing liquor, but claimed that Benjamin and Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis. When Virginia called Mark as a witness at Benjamin's subsequent criminal trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted his statements to the police as declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest. The court overruled Benjamin's objections that the statements were not against Mark's penal interest because they shifted responsibility for the crimes to Barker and Benjamin, and that their admission would violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Subsequently, Benjamin was convicted of the DeFilippis murder and other crimes. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's statements fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. The court also held that the statements were reliable because Mark knew that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes and because the statements were independently corroborated by other evidence at trial.
", "facts_len": "1336", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1134", "ID": "54709", "name": "Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-591", "docket": "98-591", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Albertsons Inc.", "second_party": "Kirkingburg", "facts": "Before starting his job as a truck driver for Albertsons Inc., Hallie Kirkingburg underwent an eye examination during which he was erroneously certified as meeting basic Department of Transportation (DOT) visual standards. Two years later, in 1992, the error of Kirkingburg's earlier diagnosis was discovered during a routine physical examination. Kinrkingburg was told that he had to obtain a DOT waiver if he wanted to continue driving. Before he could do so, however, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet minimum visual requirements and refused to rehire him even after he obtained the waiver. Kirkingburg challenged his dismissal under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On appeal from an adverse Ninth Circuit Court ruling reversing a favorable district court finding, the Supreme Court granted Albertsons certiorari.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1135", "ID": "54708", "name": "Kolstad v. American Dental Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-208", "docket": "98-208", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Kolstad", "second_party": "American Dental Association", "facts": "Carole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, when it promoted a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based on a showing that the ADA acted with \"malice\" and \"reckless indifference\" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.
", "facts_len": "479", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1136", "ID": "54710", "name": "Mosley v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-7213", "docket": "97-7213", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Mosley", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1995, Sylvester Mosley was arrested after robbing two banks in eleven days. At the first bank, Mosley displayed a \"HOLD UP\" sign and asked the teller \"Can I have all your money?\" At the second bank, Mosley told the teller \"This is a holdup, open your bottom draw and give me all your big bills.\" Because he merely asked for the money, Mosley asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Mosley argued that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC 2113(a), requires that the robber take the money \"by force or violence, or intimidation.\" The court denied the motion, finding that Mosley had intimated the tellers. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that larceny could not be considered a lesser offense of robbery because an element of larceny is intent and intent is not contained in the robbery definition.
", "facts_len": "902", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1137", "ID": "54711", "name": "UNUM Life Insurance Company of America v. Ward", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1868", "docket": "97-1868", "term": "1998", "first_party": "UNUM Life Insurance Company of America", "second_party": "Ward", "facts": "UNUM Life Insurance Company of America (UNUM) issued a long-term group disability policy to Management Analysis Company (MAC) as an insured welfare benefit plan governed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The policy provides that proof of claims must be furnished to UNUM within one year and 180 days after the onset of disability. John E. Ward, a California MAC employee, became permanently disabled in May 1992. Ward informed MAC of his disability in late February or early March 1993. UNUM received proof of Ward's claim on April 11, 1994. Ward was notified that his claim was denied as untimely because his notice was late under the terms of the policy. Ward then filed suit under ERISA's civil enforcement provision to recover the disability benefits provided by the plan. Ward argued that, under California's common-law agency rule, an employer administering an insured group health plan should be deemed to act as the insurance company's agent; therefore, his notice of permanent disability to MAC, in late February or early March 1993, sufficed to supply timely notice to UNUM. The District Court rejected Ward's argument and ruled in favor of UNUM, citing ERISA's preemption clause, which states that ERISA provisions \"shall supersede ... State laws\" to the extent that those laws \"relate to any employee benefit plan.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that Ward might prevail under California's \"notice-prejudice\" rule, under which an insurer cannot avoid liability although the proof of claim is untimely, unless the insurer shows it suffered actual prejudice from the delay.
", "facts_len": "1628", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1138", "ID": "54713", "name": "Martin v. Hadix", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-262", "docket": "98-262", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Martin", "second_party": "Hadix", "facts": "Everett Hadix and other prisoners in the Michigan prison system filed a class action lawsuit against prison officials claiming that the conditions of their confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thereafter, Hadix and the officials entered into a consent decree to remedy the situation. In 1987, the District Court ruled that Hadix was entitled to attorney's fees for post-judgment monitoring of compliance with the decrees. The court established specific market rates for awarding fees. By April 26, 1996, the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the market rate was $150 per hour. The PLRA limited the size of fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits to a maximum hourly rate of $112.50. When first presented with the issue, the District Court concluded that the PLRA cap did not limit attorney's fees for services performed in these cases prior to, but that were still unpaid by, the PLRA's effective date. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Next, fee requests were filed with the District Court for services performed during a period encompassing work performed both before and after the PLRA's effective date. The District Court reiterated its earlier conclusion. The Court of Appeals held that the PLRA's fee limitation does not apply to cases pending on the enactment date because if it did, it would have an impermissible retroactive effect, regardless of when the work was performed.
", "facts_len": "1484", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1139", "ID": "54712", "name": "United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1139", "docket": "97-1139", "term": "1998", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Rodriguez-Moreno", "facts": "Jacinto Rodriguez-Moreno and others were hired by a drug distributor to find a drug dealer who stole cocaine from the distributor while holding captive the botched deal's middleman, Ephrain Avendano. In pursuit of the dealer, Rodriguez-Moreno took Avendano from Texas to New Jersey to New York to Maryland. In Maryland, Rodriguez-Moreno took possession of a revolver and threatened to kill Avendano. However, Avendano escaped and called the police. Rodriguez-Moreno was then arrested. Rodriguez-Moreno was charged in a federal District Court with, among kidnapping and other violations, using and carrying a firearm in relation to Avendano's kidnapping, in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm \"during and in relation to any crime of violence.\" Rodriguez-Moreno moved to dismiss the firearm count for lack of venue. Rodriguez-Moreno argued that the only place where the Government had proved he had actually used a gun was Maryland and, therefore, venue was proper only in Maryland. The court denied the motion and a jury found Rodriguez-Moreno guilty of the count. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied a \"verb test,\" under which a violation of section 924(c)(1) is committed only in the district where a defendant \"uses\" or \"carries\" a firearm. Thus, the New Jersey court venue for the firearm count was improper.
", "facts_len": "1375", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1140", "ID": "54715", "name": "Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-405", "docket": "98-405", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Reno", "second_party": "Bossier Parish School Board", "facts": "Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on 1995 prohibits Bossier Parish, Louisiana from enacting any change in a \"voting qualification[,] prerequisite[,] standard, practice, or procedure\" without first obtaining preclearance from either the Attorney General or the District Court. Following the 1990 census, the District Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance to redistrict. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, vacated the court's judgment and remanded for the court to question whether the section 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent. The District Court again granted preclearance. The court found that there was no evidence of discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The court left open the question of whether section 5 prohibits preclearance of a plan enacted with such a purpose.
", "facts_len": "874", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1141", "ID": "54716", "name": "Central State Univ. v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-1071", "docket": "98-1071", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Central State Univ.", "second_party": "American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter", "facts": "To increase the amount of time that public university professors spend teaching, Ohio enacted Ohio Rev. Code Ann. section 3345.45. Central State University adopted a workload policy pursuant to section 3345.45. The university then notified its professors that it would not bargain over the issue of faculty workload. The professors' collective-bargaining agent filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that section 3345.45 created a class of public employees not entitled to bargain regarding their workload and that this classification violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. In response, the state argued that achieving equal workloads was necessary to recapture the decline in teaching and that collective bargaining produced variation in workloads. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the professors and found that no evidence linked collective bargaining to the decline in faculty time devoted to undergraduate teaching.
", "facts_len": "1004", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1142", "ID": "54722", "name": "Haddle v. Garrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1472", "docket": "97-1472", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Haddle", "second_party": "Garrison", "facts": "Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had \"injured [him] in his person or property\" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "887", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1143", "ID": "54718", "name": "Jones v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-6203", "docket": "97-6203", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Jones", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.
", "facts_len": "1267", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1144", "ID": "54719", "name": "Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-830", "docket": "98-830", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Amoco Production Company", "second_party": "Southern Ute Indian Tribe", "facts": "Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term \"coal\" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term \"coal\" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.
", "facts_len": "1330", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1145", "ID": "54720", "name": "Florida v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-223", "docket": "98-223", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "White", "facts": "Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the \"fruit of the poisonous tree.\" After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.
", "facts_len": "1388", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1146", "ID": "54723", "name": "United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-131", "docket": "98-131", "term": "1998", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Sun-Diamond Growers of California", "facts": "Sun-Diamond Growers of California (Sun-Diamond), an agricultural trade association, was charged with violating a federal statute that prohibited the giving of anything valuable to a present, past, or future official \"for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.\" Sun-Diamond's indictment alleged that it gave illegal gratuities to former Agriculture Secretary Michael Espy while he was considering two matters in which Sun-Diamond had a vested interest. The indictment, however, did not claim a connection between the gratuities in question and either of the matters under Espy's review. Based on this lack of connectivity, Sun-Diamond challenged its indictment but lost in district court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved part of the district court decision and the government appealed. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "910", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1147", "ID": "54724", "name": "Olmstead v. L. C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-536", "docket": "98-536", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Olmstead", "second_party": "L. C.", "facts": "Jonathan Zimring, on the consolidated behalf of two female patients with mental disabilities, challenged Tommy Olmstead, the Commissioner of Georgia's Department of Human Resources, for the Georgia Regional Hospital's (GRH) decision to keep the two women in psychiatric isolation. Zimring argued that under Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the women had to be moved to the most communally integrated setting possible. Defending GRH's decision, Olmstead argued that although the women were medically cleared for a more integrated treatment setting, financial constraints and the need to fundamentally alter treatment programs prevented this from happening.
", "facts_len": "690", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1148", "ID": "54725", "name": "City of West Covina v. Perkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1230", "docket": "97-1230", "term": "1998", "first_party": "City of West Covina", "second_party": "Perkins", "facts": "Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.
", "facts_len": "977", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1149", "ID": "54729", "name": "Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1709", "docket": "97-1709", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Kumho Tire Company, Ltd.", "second_party": "Carmichael", "facts": "In 1993, the right rear tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out and the vehicle overturned. One passenger died in the accident and several others were severely injured. Subsequently, the Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the Kumho Tire Company and others, claiming that the tire was defective. A significant part of the Carmichaels' case turned on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an expert in tire failure analysis. Carlson intended to testify to support the Carmichaels' conclusion that a defect in the tire's manufacture or design caused the blow out. To support this conclusion, Carlson used a methodology that was partly disputed. Kumho moved to exclude Carlson's testimony on the ground that his methodology failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: \"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact..., a witness qualified as an expert...may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.\" The Federal District Court granted the motion, excluded Carlson's testimony, and entered summary judgment for Kumho. The court found that Carlson's methodology was insufficiently reliable. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that a federal trial judge's \"gatekeeping\" obligations under the Federal Rules of Evidence were limited to scientific context, and not Carlson's testimony, which the court characterized as skill-or experience-based.
", "facts_len": "1442", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1150", "ID": "54726", "name": "American Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-2000", "docket": "97-2000", "term": "1998", "first_party": "American Manufacturers' Mutual Insurance Company", "second_party": "Sullivan", "facts": "Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's \"reasonable\" and \"necessary\" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.
", "facts_len": "850", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1151", "ID": "54733", "name": "Calderon v. Coleman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-437", "docket": "98-437", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Calderon", "second_party": "Coleman", "facts": "During the penalty phase of Russell Coleman's trial, the trial judge gave the jury a \"Briggs instruction,\" explaining the Governor's commutation power. The trial judge then instructed the jury that it was not to consider the Governor's power in reaching its verdict. Ultimately, Coleman sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District Court found that, because the Governor may not commute the sentence of a prisoner who, like Coleman, is a twice-convicted felon without the approval of four judges of the California Supreme Court, the Briggs instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by \"giving the jury inaccurate information and potentially diverting its attention from the mitigation evidence presented.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the giving of the instruction was constitutional error.
", "facts_len": "843", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1152", "ID": "54731", "name": "Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-470", "docket": "98-470", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Ruhrgas AG", "second_party": "Marathon Oil Company", "facts": "In 1976, Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge) and Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN). Following the acquisition, Norge assigned its license to produce gas from the North Sea's Heimdal Field to MPCN, which then contracted to sell 70 percent of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including Ruhrgas AG. MPCN's sales agreement with Ruhrgas and the other European buyers provided that disputes would be settled by arbitration in Sweden. In 1995, Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge sued Ruhrgas in Texas state court, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. Ruhrgas removed the case to the District Court, asserting three bases for federal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the parties. Marathon moved to remand the case to the state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, or lack of authority over the category of claim in the suit. The District Court granted Ruhrgas' motion. Noting that Texas' long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the court addressed the constitutional question and concluded that Ruhrgas' contacts with Texas were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals held that, in removed cases, district courts must decide issues of subject-matter jurisdiction first, reaching issues of personal jurisdiction only if subject-matter jurisdiction is found to exist.
", "facts_len": "1774", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1153", "ID": "54728", "name": "Hunt v. Cromartie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-85", "docket": "98-85", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Hunt", "second_party": "Cromartie", "facts": "Following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Hunt (517 US 899), declaring North Carolina's 12th district to have been unconstitutionally drawn, the state made a new districting plan in 1997. Acting on behalf of other residents, Martin Cromartie again challenged the new make-up of the 12th district as the product of racial gerrymandering. However, even before an evidentiary hearing, a three-judge District Court granted Cromartie summary judgment. Hunt appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.
", "facts_len": "522", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1154", "ID": "54730", "name": "Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-930", "docket": "97-930", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Buckley", "second_party": "American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.", "facts": "Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as \"volunteer\" or \"paid,\" and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.
", "facts_len": "1098", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1155", "ID": "54732", "name": "National Federation of Federal Employees , Local 1309 v. Department of Interior", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1184", "docket": "97-1184", "term": "1998", "first_party": "National Federation of Federal Employees , Local 1309", "second_party": "Department of Interior", "facts": "The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.
", "facts_len": "916", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1156", "ID": "54734", "name": "Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1056", "docket": "97-1056", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Marquez", "second_party": "Screen Actors Guild, Inc.", "facts": "Naomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the \"union security clause\" of the agreement that requires union \"membership\" as a condition for employment. The clause stated one must be a member \"in good standing.\" Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
", "facts_len": "1235", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1157", "ID": "54735", "name": "California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Felzen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1732", "docket": "97-1732", "term": "1998", "first_party": "California Public Employees' Retirement System", "second_party": "Felzen", "facts": "Shareholders sought to appeal from a federal District Court settlement of a stockholder derivative suit. The suit arose out of claims that managers conspired with rival sellers thereby exposing the corporation to criminal and treble-damages liability. The Court of Appeals held that shareholders who had not intervened and were not parties to the derivate action could not appeal an unsatisfactory settlement. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "474", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1158", "ID": "54736", "name": "Peguero v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-9217", "docket": "97-9217", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Peguero", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1000", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1159", "ID": "54737", "name": "Dickinson v. Zurko", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-377", "docket": "98-377", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Dickinson", "second_party": "Zurko", "facts": "Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a \"clearly erroneous\" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1320", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1160", "ID": "54738", "name": "Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Partnership", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1418", "docket": "97-1418", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Bank of America", "second_party": "203 North LaSalle Partnership", "facts": "Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association issued a $93 million loan to 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal asset, part of a Chicago office building. When the debtor defaulted on the loan, the bank began foreclosure. LaSalle filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's purposed reorganization plan called for only previous equity holders to contribute new capital in exchange for the debtor's entire ownership of the reorganized entity. The Bank of America objected. The bank's objection prevented confirmation of the plan. LaSalle resorted to a judicial \"cramdown\" process for imposing the plan on Bank of America. The cramdown process requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the creditors so a judge will authorize it. Bank of America argued the plan violated the cramdown's \"absolute priority rule,\" which prevents debtor's equity holders from receiving ownership when claims will not be paid in full and, thus, the plan should have been denied. Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Court approved the plan. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1230", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1161", "ID": "54739", "name": "Saenz v. Roe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-97", "docket": "98-97", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Saenz", "second_party": "Roe", "facts": "Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.
", "facts_len": "670", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1162", "ID": "54740", "name": "West v. Gibson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-238", "docket": "98-238", "term": "1998", "first_party": "West", "second_party": "Gibson", "facts": "In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.
", "facts_len": "1388", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1163", "ID": "54742", "name": "Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-404", "docket": "98-404", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Department of Commerce", "second_party": "United States House of Representatives", "facts": "Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "788", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "1164", "ID": "54743", "name": "Jones v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-9361", "docket": "97-9361", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Jones", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1079", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1165", "ID": "54744", "name": "Knowles v. Iowa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-7597", "docket": "97-7597", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Knowles", "second_party": "Iowa", "facts": "After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a \"pot pipe\" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.
", "facts_len": "532", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1166", "ID": "54748", "name": "Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1754", "docket": "97-1754", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Immigration & Naturalization Service", "second_party": "Aguirre-Aguirre", "facts": "While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit \"serious nonpolitical crimes\" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1082", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1167", "ID": "54745", "name": "Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1992", "docket": "97-1992", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Murphy", "second_party": "United Parcel Service, Inc.", "facts": "At the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.
", "facts_len": "568", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1168", "ID": "54746", "name": "Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1642", "docket": "97-1642", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Department of the Army", "second_party": "Blue Fox, Inc.", "facts": "Verdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a \"services contract,\" and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an \"equitable lien\" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.
", "facts_len": "1049", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1169", "ID": "54749", "name": "Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/96-1793", "docket": "96-1793", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Cedar Rapids Community School Dist.", "second_party": "Garret F.", "facts": "Garret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, requires a wheelchair and is dependent upon a ventilator. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide \"school health services,\" which are provided by a \"qualified school nurse or other qualified person,\" but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved to be considered anything but medical in nature.
", "facts_len": "961", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1170", "ID": "54751", "name": "Richardson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-8629", "docket": "97-8629", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Richardson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in \"continuing criminal enterprise (CCE),\" which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a \"continuing series of violations.\" Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some \"continuing series of violations\" but also that the he committed each of the individual \"violations\" necessary to make up that \"continuing series.\" In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.
", "facts_len": "1208", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1171", "ID": "54753", "name": "El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-475", "docket": "97-475", "term": "1998", "first_party": "El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.", "second_party": "Tsui Yuan Tseng", "facts": "In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.
", "facts_len": "1346", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1172", "ID": "54750", "name": "City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1235", "docket": "97-1235", "term": "1998", "first_party": "City of Monterey", "second_party": "Del Monte Dunes at Monterey", "facts": "Del Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.
", "facts_len": "1406", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1173", "ID": "54752", "name": "Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1909", "docket": "97-1909", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Murphy Brothers, Inc.", "second_party": "Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.", "facts": "On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a \"courtesy copy\" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice \"shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint].\" Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words \"receipt...or otherwise.\"
", "facts_len": "1579", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1174", "ID": "54756", "name": "Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1008", "docket": "97-1008", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Cleveland", "second_party": "Policy Management Systems Corporation", "facts": "While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.
", "facts_len": "710", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1175", "ID": "54754", "name": "Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1337", "docket": "97-1337", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Minnesota", "second_party": "Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians", "facts": "Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the \"equal footing doctrine.\"
", "facts_len": "1035", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1176", "ID": "54755", "name": "Holloway Aka Ali v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-7164", "docket": "97-7164", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Holloway Aka Ali", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as \"tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation\" \"with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.\" Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a \"hard time.\" The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.
", "facts_len": "978", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1177", "ID": "54757", "name": "Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-387", "docket": "98-387", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.
", "facts_len": "404", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1178", "ID": "54758", "name": "Chicago v. Morales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1121", "docket": "97-1121", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Chicago", "second_party": "Morales", "facts": "Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits \"criminal street gang members\" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.
", "facts_len": "1023", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1179", "ID": "54759", "name": "NCAA v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-84", "docket": "98-84", "term": "1998", "first_party": "NCAA", "second_party": "Smith", "facts": "The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in \"any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.\" The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that \"the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds.\" The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds.
", "facts_len": "1769", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1180", "ID": "54761", "name": "Cunningham v. Hamilton County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-727", "docket": "98-727", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Cunningham", "second_party": "Hamilton County", "facts": "Teresa L. Cunningham, an attorney representing a plaintiff, was served with a request for interrogatories and documents with responses due within 30 days after service. Cunningham failed to comply with those discovery orders, and a Magistrate Judge granted Hamilton County's motion for sanctions against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's order for sanctions. The court also disqualified Cunningham as counsel. Although the District Court proceedings were ongoing, Cunningham immediately appealed the order affirming the sanctions award. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because federal appellate court jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to appeals from \"final decisions of the district courts.\" The court also held that the sanctions order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which provides that certain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, because Cunningham's appeal was not completely separate from the merits of the case.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1181", "ID": "54760", "name": "National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-369", "docket": "98-369", "term": "1998", "first_party": "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "second_party": "Federal Labor Relations Authority", "facts": "After enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted \"by a representative of the agency\" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a \"representative\" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.
", "facts_len": "1444", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1182", "ID": "54764", "name": "Stewart v. LaGrand", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/98-1412", "docket": "98-1412", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Stewart", "second_party": "LaGrand", "facts": "After they were sentenced to death in Arizona, Walter LaGrand and Karl LaGrand filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Among other things, Walter's petition claimed that execution by lethal gas constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the claim unripe until and unless Walter chose gas as his method of execution and denied his petition. Under Arizona law, lethal injection is the default form of execution. Separately, as part of its ultimate order, the Court of Appeals stayed Karl's execution and enjoined Arizona from executing anyone by means of lethal gas. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals ultimately denied Walter a stay of execution but restrained and enjoined the Arizona from executing him by means of lethal gas.
", "facts_len": "804", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1183", "ID": "54766", "name": "Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1943", "docket": "97-1943", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Sutton", "second_party": "United Air Lines, Inc.", "facts": "Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (the Suttons) are identical twins who suffer from acute visual myopia. They brought suit against United Airlines (United) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section12101 et seq., after United failed to hire them as commercial airline pilots because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100. Although each sister suffered from severe myopia, their vision was correctable with glasses and both sisters were able to function normally in their daily lives. The Suttons claimed that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA either because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A), they suffered from a physical impairment that \"substantially limits . . . major life activities,\" or because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(C), they were regarded as having such an impairment. The district court granted United's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the Suttons' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
", "facts_len": "1005", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1184", "ID": "54763", "name": "Neder v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/97-1985", "docket": "97-1985", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Neder", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error \"'did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\" The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.
", "facts_len": "1302", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1185", "ID": "54765", "name": "Nynex Corporation v. Discon, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1998/96-1570", "docket": "96-1570", "term": "1998", "first_party": "Nynex Corporation", "second_party": "Discon, Inc.", "facts": "Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.
", "facts_len": "1182", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1186", "ID": "54767", "name": "Carter v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5716", "docket": "99-5716", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Carter", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes \"[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank.\" Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes \"[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank,\" with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1276", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1187", "ID": "54769", "name": "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-312", "docket": "99-312", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Norfolk Southern Railway Company", "second_party": "Shanklin", "facts": "In 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre-emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation had installed the signs for the purpose of providing \"minimum protection,\" no individualized determination of adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program.
", "facts_len": "1663", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1188", "ID": "54771", "name": "Drye v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1101", "docket": "98-1101", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Drye", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1994, Irma Drye died, leaving a $233,000 estate. The sole heir to the estate under Arkansas law was Rohn Drye, Jr., her son. Drye owed the Federal Government approximately $325,000 in unpaid tax assessments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had valid tax liens against all of Drye's \"property and rights to property\" under federal law, 26 USC section 6321. Several months after Drye was appointed the administrator of his mother's estate, he disclaimed his interest in the estate, which then passed under state law to his daughter. Arkansas law provides that the disavowing heir's creditors may not reach property thus disclaimed. Drye's daughter then proceeded to use the estate's proceeds to establish a family trust (Trust), of which she and her parents are the beneficiaries. Under state law the Trust was shielded from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's beneficiaries. After Drye revealed his beneficial interest in the Trust to the IRS, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien against the Trust. Ultimately, the District Court ruled in favor of the Government and its lien. In affirming, the Court of Appeals interpreted precedent to mean that state law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right or interest, but federal law determines whether that right or interest constitutes \"property\" or \"rights to property\" under section 6321, thus subjecting it to federal tax liens.
", "facts_len": "1437", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1189", "ID": "54768", "name": "Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-678", "docket": "98-678", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Los Angeles Police Department", "second_party": "United Reporting Publishing Corp.", "facts": "The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the \"JAILMAIL\" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.
", "facts_len": "1601", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1190", "ID": "54772", "name": "Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1152", "docket": "98-1152", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Food and Drug Administration", "second_party": "Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation", "facts": "The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate, among other items, \"drugs\" and \"devices.\" In 1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, concluding that, under the FDCA, nicotine is a \"drug\" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are \"devices\" that deliver nicotine to the body. Accordingly, the FDA promulgated regulations governing tobacco products' promotion, labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, filed suit challenging the FDA's regulations. Brown moved for summary judgement on the ground that the FDA lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed, or without manufacturer claims of therapeutic benefit. The District Court ruled that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco as a device, but that the agency had overstepped its authority in attempting to restrict tobacco advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. The court found that the FDA's definition of tobacco as a device was flawed because the agency could not prove that the impact of tobacco products on the body was \"intended\" under the act.
", "facts_len": "1350", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1191", "ID": "54774", "name": "Fischer v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-116", "docket": "99-116", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Fischer", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Jeffrey Fischer, while president and part owner of Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC), arranged for QMC to receive a $1.2 million loan from West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal agency that operates two hospitals, which participate in and receive funding from the federal Medicare program. To get the loan, Fischer pledged QMC's accounts receivables and offered a $1 million letter of credit. After a 1994 audit of WHVA raised questions about the QMC loan, Fischer was indicted for federal bribery, including defrauding an organization which \"receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.\" A jury convicted him and the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment, imposed a term of supervised release, and ordered the payment of restitution. On appeal, Fischer argued that the Government failed to prove WHVA, as the organization affected by his wrongdoing, received \"benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program,\" as required by the federal bribery statute. In rejecting that argument and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals held that funds received by an organization constitute \"benefits\" within the statute's meaning if the source of the funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid or assistance to participating organizations.
", "facts_len": "1341", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1192", "ID": "54776", "name": "Carmell v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-7540", "docket": "98-7540", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Carmell", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Scott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.
", "facts_len": "1320", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1193", "ID": "54775", "name": "Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-62", "docket": "99-62", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Santa Fe Independent School District", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether \"invocations\" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1194", "ID": "54777", "name": "Roe v. Flores-Ortega", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1441", "docket": "98-1441", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Roe", "second_party": "Flores-Ortega", "facts": "Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words \"bring appeal papers.\" Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.
", "facts_len": "1012", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1195", "ID": "54779", "name": "Baral v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1667", "docket": "98-1667", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Baral", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "David H. Baral made two remittances to the Internal Revenue Service towards his 1988 income tax, which was due on April 15, 1989. The first was a standard withholding from Baral's wages throughout 1988 by his employer. The second was an estimated income tax remitted in January 1989 by Baral himself. Baral received an extension until August 15, but did not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, Baral claimed a $1,175 overpayment and asked the IRS to apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The IRS denied the requested credit citing 26 U. S. C. Section 6511, which states that \"the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return.\" According to the IRS, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, and therefore he faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral commenced suit for a refund in the Federal District Court, which granted the IRS summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that both remittances were paid on April 15, 1989.
", "facts_len": "1267", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1196", "ID": "54773", "name": "Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Harbert Construction Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1960", "docket": "98-1960", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc.", "second_party": "Harbert Construction Company", "facts": "In 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because \"[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court,\" and it entered judgment for Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was limited to the Alabama court.
", "facts_len": "1343", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1197", "ID": "54781", "name": "Pegram v. Herdrich", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1949", "docket": "98-1949", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Pegram", "second_party": "Herdrich", "facts": "In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1381", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1198", "ID": "54782", "name": "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-295", "docket": "99-295", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Adarand Constructors, Inc.", "second_party": "Slater", "facts": "In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I)(512 U.S. 200 (1995)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) use of race-based measures is subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the District Court held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause required by the Small Business Act, which rewards prime contractors for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, and its race-based presumption, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored (Adarand II). After Adarand II, Colorado altered its disadvantaged business enterprise status certification procedure. Under the new procedures, Adarand Constructors, Inc. requested and received disadvantaged-business status from the Colorado DOT (CDOT). Upon learning that CDOT had given Adarand disadvantaged-business status, the Court of Appeals held that Adarand's cause of action was moot and vacated the District Court's judgment in Adarand II.
", "facts_len": "968", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1199", "ID": "54783", "name": "Prunty v. Brooks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5316", "docket": "99-5316", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Prunty", "second_party": "Brooks", "facts": "Pro se petitioner Robert E. Prunty sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In April 1999, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Prunty in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial, Prunty had filed eight petitions for certiorari, all of which were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "455", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1200", "ID": "54784", "name": "Antonelli v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-9933", "docket": "98-9933", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Antonelli", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Pro se petitioner Michael C. Antonelli sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to two petitions for certiorari. In 1993, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Antonelli in forma pauperis status with respect to two petitions for certiorari. Before the two Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli had filed 34 petitions for certiorari and 2 petitions for extraordinary writs. After the two Rule 39.8 denials, Antonelli filed 17 petitions for certiorari. All 55 of Antonelli's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "618", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1201", "ID": "54785", "name": "Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-387", "docket": "99-387", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Raleigh", "second_party": "Illinois Dept. of Revenue", "facts": "In 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns and making payments, and who \"willfully\" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty \"equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the corporation.\" There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.
", "facts_len": "1375", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1202", "ID": "54786", "name": "Judd v. United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Tex.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5260", "docket": "99-5260", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Judd", "second_party": "United States Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Tex.", "facts": "Pro se petitioner Keith Russell Judd sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In May 1995, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Judd in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. Before the 39.8 denial, Judd had filed six petitions for certiorari. After the 39.8 denial, Judd filed four petitions for certiorari. All eleven of Judd's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "552", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1203", "ID": "54787", "name": "Boy Scouts of America v. Dale", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-699", "docket": "99-699", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Boy Scouts of America", "second_party": "Dale", "facts": "The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.
", "facts_len": "1698", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1204", "ID": "54789", "name": "Smith v. Robbins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1037", "docket": "98-1037", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "Robbins", "facts": "A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.
", "facts_len": "1148", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1205", "ID": "54788", "name": "Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-244", "docket": "99-244", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative cause of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring.
", "facts_len": "1729", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1206", "ID": "54790", "name": "California Democratic Party v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-401", "docket": "99-401", "term": "1999", "first_party": "California Democratic Party", "second_party": "Jones", "facts": "In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1276", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1207", "ID": "54792", "name": "Free v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-391", "docket": "99-391", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Free", "second_party": "Abbott Laboratories Inc.", "facts": "Robin Free and Renee Free, consumers of infant formula, sued Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson & Company (collectively Abbott), under Louisiana's antitrust laws alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. After Abbott successfully removed the case to federal court, the District Court granted the Frees' motion to remand, holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction and that it had diversity jurisdiction only over the named plaintiffs' claims, not over the other class members. Ultimately concluding that federal jurisdiction extended to the case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs because it had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims.
", "facts_len": "790", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1208", "ID": "54793", "name": "Rice v. Cayetano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-818", "docket": "98-818", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Rice", "second_party": "Cayetano", "facts": "The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, \"native Hawaiians,\" defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and \"Hawaiians,\" defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only \"Hawaiians\" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a \"Hawaiian\" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii \"may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be.\"
", "facts_len": "1532", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1209", "ID": "54791", "name": "Hill v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1856", "docket": "98-1856", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Hill", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to \"knowingly approach\" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass \"a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person....\" Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.
", "facts_len": "1395", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1210", "ID": "54794", "name": "Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1828", "docket": "98-1828", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Vermont Agency of Natural Resources", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Stevens", "facts": "Jonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action \"in the name of the [Federal] Government,\" against \"any person\" who \"knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment.\" The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a \"person\" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1055", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1211", "ID": "54795", "name": "Garner v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-137", "docket": "99-137", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Garner", "second_party": "Jones", "facts": "While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.
", "facts_len": "1474", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1212", "ID": "54797", "name": "Jones v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5739", "docket": "99-5739", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Jones", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to \"maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.\" The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "748", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1213", "ID": "54796", "name": "Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-7809", "docket": "98-7809", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Martinez", "second_party": "Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.", "facts": "Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: \"There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees.\"
", "facts_len": "1056", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1214", "ID": "54799", "name": "Brancato v. Gunn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-9913", "docket": "98-9913", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Brancato", "second_party": "Gunn", "facts": "Pro se petitioner Donald H. Brancato sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In June 1999, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Brancato in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial, Brancato had filed six petitions for certiorari. All seven of Brancato's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "488", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1215", "ID": "54800", "name": "Public Lands Council v. Babbitt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1991", "docket": "98-1991", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Public Lands Council", "second_party": "Babbitt", "facts": "The Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to \"settlers, residents, and other stock owners.\" When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of \"grazing preference,\" permitted those who were not \"engaged in the livestock business\" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.
", "facts_len": "1170", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1216", "ID": "54798", "name": "Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1109", "docket": "98-1109", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Shalala", "second_party": "Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.", "facts": "The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. (Council), an association of nursing homes participating in Medicare, sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, challenging the validity of various Medicare regulations establishing sanctions and remedies for nursing homes found guilty of violating minimum health and safety standards. The Council alleged that certain terms in the new regulations were unconstitutionally vague, that the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause, and that the regulations' legislative rules that were not promulgated consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Council invoked the Federal District Court's federal-question jurisdiction, which states that \"district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,\" to rule on its claims. The District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that set of special statutory provisions under the Medicare Act create a separate, virtually exclusive, system of administrative and judicial review for such claims. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1299", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1217", "ID": "54801", "name": "Apprendi v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-478", "docket": "99-478", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Apprendi", "second_party": "New Jersey", "facts": "Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1115", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1218", "ID": "54804", "name": "Rotella v. Wood", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-896", "docket": "98-896", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Rotella", "second_party": "Wood", "facts": "Mark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal \"to conduct\" an \"enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\" A \"pattern\" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern of racketeering activity.
", "facts_len": "1452", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1219", "ID": "54806", "name": "Florida v. J. L.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1993", "docket": "98-1993", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "J. L.", "facts": "On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence.
", "facts_len": "713", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1220", "ID": "54805", "name": "Beck v. Prupis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1480", "docket": "98-1480", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Beck", "second_party": "Prupis", "facts": "Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.
", "facts_len": "932", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1221", "ID": "54802", "name": "Stenberg v. Carhart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-830", "docket": "99-830", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Stenberg", "second_party": "Carhart", "facts": "A Nebraska law prohibited any \"partial birth abortion\" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined \"partial birth abortion\" as a procedure in which the doctor \"partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child,\" and defined the latter phrase to mean \"intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child.\" Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1222", "ID": "54803", "name": "Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-150", "docket": "99-150", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Wal-Mart Stores Inc.", "second_party": "Samara Bros. Inc.", "facts": "Samara Brothers, Inc. designs and manufactures a line of children's clothing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., contracted with a supplier, Judy-Philippine, Inc. (JPI), to manufacture outfits based on photographs of Samara garments and to be offered under Wal-Mart's house label, \"Small Steps.\" When JPI manufactured the clothes, it copied sixteen of Samara's garments with some small modifications to produce the line of clothes required under its contract with Wal-Mart. After discovering that Wal-Mart and other retailers were selling the so-called knockoffs, Samara brought an action for infringement of unregistered trade dress under section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946. The jury found for Samara and awarded the company more than $1 million in damages. Wal-Mart then renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Samara's clothing designs could be legally protected as distinctive trade dress for purposes of section 43(a). The District Court denied the motion and awarded Samara relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and concluded that \"copyrights depicting familiar objects, such as the hearts, daisies, and strawberries in Samara's copyrights are entitled to very narrow protection. It is only the virtually identical copying...which will result in a successful claim of infringement of familiar objects.\"
", "facts_len": "1422", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1223", "ID": "54807", "name": "Reno v. Condon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1464", "docket": "98-1464", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Reno", "second_party": "Condon", "facts": "State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism.
", "facts_len": "1286", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1224", "ID": "54808", "name": "Weisgram v. Marley Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-161", "docket": "99-161", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Weisgram", "second_party": "Marley Company", "facts": "Bonnie Weisgram died of carbon monoxide poisoning during a fire in her home. Chad Weisgram, her son, brought a diversity suit in federal District Court, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging that a defective heater, manufactured by Marley Company and used by Bonnie Weisgram, cause both the fire and her death. At trial, Weisgram introduced the testimony of three supposed experts to prove the alleged heater defect and its causal connection to the fire. Marley's objection that the testimony was unreliable, and therefore inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, was overruled by the District Court. After Weisgram's evidence was introduced, Marley again unsuccessfully moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Weisgram had failed to meet his burden of proof on the issues of defect and causation. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Weisgram. Afterwards, Marley, once again, requested judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, Marley requested a new trial. The court denied the motions and entered judgment for Weisgram. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Marley's motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted because the testimony of Weisgram's expert witnesses, the sole evidence supporting the product defect charge, was speculative and not shown to be scientifically sound. The appeals court did not order a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1441", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1225", "ID": "54809", "name": "Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-963", "docket": "98-963", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Nixon", "second_party": "Shrink Missouri Government PAC", "facts": "In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.
", "facts_len": "1514", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1226", "ID": "54810", "name": "Mitchell v. Helms", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1648", "docket": "98-1648", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Mitchell", "second_party": "Helms", "facts": "Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement \"secular, neutral, and nonideological\" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1171", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1227", "ID": "54814", "name": "Flippo v. West Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-8770", "docket": "98-8770", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Flippo", "second_party": "West Virginia", "facts": "In 1996, James Michael Flippo called 911 to report that he and his wife had been attacked while camping in a West Virginia state park. Inside Flippo's cabin, officer's found his wife, with fatal head wounds. During their search, officers found and opened a closed briefcase, in which they discovered various photographs and negatives that allegedly incriminated Flippo. After he was indicted for murder, Flippo moved to suppress the photographs and negatives on the grounds that the police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment had justified the search and seizure. The Circuit Court denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers, having secured the homicide crime scene for investigative purposes, had been within the law to conduct a thorough investigation and examination of anything and everything found within the crime scene area. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied discretionary review.
", "facts_len": "1006", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1228", "ID": "54813", "name": "United States v. Hubbell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-166", "docket": "99-166", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Hubbell", "facts": "In 1994, Webster Hubbell, in a plea agreement, promised to provide the Independent Counsel with information about matters relating to the Whitewater investigation. Subsequently, the Independent Counsel served Hubbell with a subpoena calling for such information, and Hubbell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to state whether he had the documents the Independent Counsel demanded. After being granted immunity, pursuant to 18 USC section 6003 (a), Hubbell produced the desired documents. The Independent Counsel then used those documents to indict Hubbell on tax and fraud charges. The District Court dismissed the indictment because the evidence that would be used against Hubbell was derived either directly or indirectly from his immunized act of producing those documents. Vacating that decision, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to determine the scope of the Government's knowledge of Hubbell's financial affairs on the day the subpoena was issued. The court determined that if the Government could not demonstrate with reasonable particularity that there existed a prior awareness of the contents of the documents and that those documents were in Hubbell's possession, then the indictment was tainted. After acknowledging he could not meet this standard, the Independent Counsel entered into a conditional plea agreement providing for the dismissal of the indictment, unless the Supreme Court's disposition of the case made it reasonably likely that Hubbell's immunity would not pose a significant bar to his prosecution.
", "facts_len": "1594", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1229", "ID": "54817", "name": "Bond v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-9349", "docket": "98-9349", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Bond", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "While checking the immigration status of passengers on a bus in Texas, Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space. When Agent Cantu squeezed a canvas bag above Steven Dewayne Bond, Agent Cantu noticed that it contained a \"brick-like\" object. After Bond admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, Agent Cantu discovered a \"brick\" of methamphetamine. Bond was indicted on federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search of his bag, when squeezing it, in alleged violation of the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The District Court denied the motion and subsequently found Bond guilty. On appeal, Bond conceded that other passengers had access to his bag, but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag (by squeezing)in a way that other passengers would not, thus constituting an unreasonable search. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Court of Appeals held that Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1167", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1230", "ID": "54812", "name": "Miller v. French", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-224", "docket": "99-224", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Miller", "second_party": "French", "facts": "In 1975, inmates at the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed a class action lawsuit, which ultimately led the District Court to issue an injunction to remedy Eighth Amendment violations regarding conditions of confinement. In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. The PLRA provides that a motion to terminate such relief \"shall operate as a stay\" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, the State of Indiana filed a motion to terminate the remedial order against the correctional facility. Under the PLRA, the motion stayed the court's original remedial order. The prisoners of Pendleton moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA violated due process and the separation of powers doctrine. The District Court enjoined the stay. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that the provision precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but concluded that the statute was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.
", "facts_len": "1253", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1231", "ID": "54819", "name": "United States v. Morrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5", "docket": "99-5", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Morrison", "facts": "In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be \"excessive.\" Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1445", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1232", "ID": "54820", "name": "Portuondo v. Agard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1170", "docket": "98-1170", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Portuondo", "second_party": "Agard", "facts": "Ray Agard was tried in New York on sodomy, assault, and weapons counts. Ultimately, Agard's trial turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of Agard. The prosecutor challenged Agard's credibility. During summation, the prosecutor remarked, \"[h]e gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses before he testifies,\" and \"[t]hat gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it?\" The prosecutor alleged that Agard had tailored his testimony to fit evidence that he heard from witnesses through the course of the trial. The trial court rejected Agard's objection that these comments violated his right to be present at trial. After exhausting his state appeals, Agard petitioned for federal habeas corpus, claiming that the prosecutor's comments violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to be present at trial and confront his accusers, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied his petition. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1233", "ID": "54815", "name": "New York v. Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1299", "docket": "98-1299", "term": "1999", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Hill", "facts": "The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact to establish procedures for resolution of one state's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another state. Under the Compact Clause, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. In order to resolve outstanding murder and robbery charges against Michael Hill, an Ohio prisoner, the State of New York lodged a detainer against him under the IAD. Hill filed a request for disposition of the detainer, pursuant to IAD Article III, and was returned to New York. Article III provides that, upon such a request, that the prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days. Thereafter, Hill's counsel agreed to a trial date outside the 180-day period. Subsequently, Hill moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. The trial court denied Hill's motion, concluding that his defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of Hill's IAD rights. After his conviction and subsequent appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss. In reversing, the state Court of Appeals ordered that Hill's indictment be dismissed because his counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive his IAD speedy trial rights.
", "facts_len": "1363", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1234", "ID": "54811", "name": "Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-791", "docket": "98-791", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Kimel", "second_party": "Florida Board of Regents", "facts": "The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer \"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age.\" In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
", "facts_len": "1787", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1235", "ID": "54816", "name": "Troxel v. Granville", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-138", "docket": "99-138", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Troxel", "second_party": "Granville", "facts": "During Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits \"any person\" to petition for visitation rights \"at any time\" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.
", "facts_len": "1195", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1236", "ID": "54818", "name": "Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1811", "docket": "98-1811", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Geier", "second_party": "American Honda Motor Company, Inc.", "facts": "The Department of Transportation, under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 208, which required auto manufacturers to equip some of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints. To comply with FMVSS 208, Honda installed manual seat belts and a warning light, instead of a driver-side airbag, for the 1987 Honda Accord. Alexis Geier suffered severe head and facial injuries in an accident while driving a 1987 Honda Accord that did not have a driver-side airbag. Geier and her parents sought damages under District of Columbia tort law, claiming that American Honda Motor Company was negligent in not equiping the Accord with a driver's side airbag. The District Court ruled in favor of Honda, finding that Geier's claims were expressly pre-empted by the Act because a jury verdict in Geier's favor \"might establish a safety standard that was not identical to Standard 208.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because Geier's state tort claims posed an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of FMVSS 208, those claims conflicted with that standard and that the Act consequently pre-empted the lawsuit.
", "facts_len": "1221", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1237", "ID": "54821", "name": "Johnson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5153", "docket": "99-5153", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1212", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1238", "ID": "54822", "name": "Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-579", "docket": "99-579", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Harris Trust & Savings Bank", "second_party": "Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.", "facts": "Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) bars a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in certain prohibited transactions with a \"party in interest.\" Such a party encompasses entities that a fiduciary might be inclined to favor at the expense of the plan's beneficiaries. After the Ameritech Pension Trust (APT), an ERISA pension plan, allegedly entered into a transaction prohibited by ERISA with Salomon Smith Barney Inc., APT's fiduciaries sued Salomon under section 502(a)(3), which authorizes a fiduciary to bring a civil action to obtain appropriate equitable relief.\" Salomon arguing that section 502(a)(3) only authorizes a suit against the fiduciary who caused the plan to enter the prohibited transaction. Ultimately, the District Court held that ERISA provides a private cause of action against nonfiduciaries who participate in a prohibited transaction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the authority to sue under section 502(a)(3) does not extend to a suit against a nonfiduciary \"party in interest\" to a transaction barred by section 406(a).
", "facts_len": "1143", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1239", "ID": "54823", "name": "Hartford Underwriters Ins. Company v. Union Planters Bank, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-409", "docket": "99-409", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Hartford Underwriters Ins. Company", "second_party": "Union Planters Bank, N.A.", "facts": "Hen House Interstate, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the reorganization attempt, Hen House obtained workers' compensation insurance from Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company. Hen House repeatedly failed to make the monthly premium payments required by the policy. Ultimately, Hen House's reorganization failed and the court converted the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and appointed a trustee. Hartford, learning of the bankruptcy proceedings, sought to recover its premiums as an administrative expense. Recognizing that the estate lacked unencumbered funds to pay the premiums, Hartford attempted to charge the premiums to Union Planters Bank, the secured creditor for all of the property of Hen House, by filing a claim with the Bankruptcy Court under 11 USC Section 506(c). The Bankruptcy Court ruled in favor of Hartford and the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals granted a rehearing en banc and reversed, on the ground that an administrative claimant could not invoke section 506(c).
", "facts_len": "1099", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1240", "ID": "54826", "name": "Dempsey v. Martin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5283", "docket": "99-5283", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Dempsey", "second_party": "Martin", "facts": "Pro se petitioner John B. Dempsey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for certiorari. In October 1992, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Dempsey in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for certiorari. Before the 39.8 denial Dempsey had filed eleven petitions for certiorari and one petition for an extraordinary writ. After the 39.8 denial, Dempsey filed five petitions for certiorari. All eighteen of Dempsey's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "601", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1241", "ID": "54825", "name": "Weeks v. Angelone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5746", "docket": "99-5746", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Weeks", "second_party": "Angelone", "facts": "Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was found guilty of capital murder in the death of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos. During the penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances. Weeks' defense presented 10 witnesses in mitigation. During deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed Weeks guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. In responding, the trial judge only referred the jury to their instructions, which stated: \"If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment...at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment.\" The defense counsel objected, arguing for the judge to instruct the jury it could find one or both of the aggravating circumstances and still impose a life sentence. In finding one of the aggravating circumstances and after considering the evidence in mitigation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict fixing Weeks' punishment at death. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Weeks' presented 47 assignments of error, of which his assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The court affirmed Weeks' conviction and sentence. Weeks' petition for federal habeas relief was ultimately denied.
", "facts_len": "1684", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1242", "ID": "54829", "name": "Arizona v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/8_orig", "docket": "8-orig", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "California", "facts": "In 1952, Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment.
", "facts_len": "1614", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1243", "ID": "54824", "name": "Gutierrez v. Ada", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-51", "docket": "99-51", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Gutierrez", "second_party": "Ada", "facts": "The Organic Act of Guam provides that that \"if no [slate of] candidates [for Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Guam] receives a majority of the votes cast in any election...a runoff election shall be held.\" The Election Commission certified that the Democratic slate of Carl T.C. Gutierrez for governor and Madeleine Z. Bordallo for lieutenant governor had defeated the Republican slate, Joseph F. Ada and Felix P. Camacho. Gutierrez and Bordallo had received a majority of the votes cast for gubernatorial slates in the 1998 Guam general election, but did not receive a majority of the total number of ballots that voters cast due to voters selecting write-in candidates, people voting for both slates, and blank ballots. The opposing Republican slate sought a writ of mandamus ordering a runoff election. According to Ada and Camacho, the phrase \"in any election\" means the majority as measured by the votes cast in the entire election, not simply in the race for governor. Gutierrez responded that \"votes cast\" meant actual votes cast for governor and lieutenant governor, rather than ballots in which the governor's contest is left blank. The District Court issued the writ and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, interpreting the statutory phrase \"majority of the votes cast in any election\" to require that a slate receive a majority of the total number of ballots cast in the general election.
", "facts_len": "1416", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1244", "ID": "54827", "name": "Edwards v. Carpenter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-2060", "docket": "98-2060", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Edwards", "second_party": "Carpenter", "facts": "Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "1568", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1245", "ID": "54828", "name": "United States v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1696", "docket": "98-1696", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Johnson", "facts": "Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.
", "facts_len": "940", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1246", "ID": "54830", "name": "Texas v. Lesage", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1111", "docket": "98-1111", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Texas", "second_party": "Lesage", "facts": "Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, was denied admission to the University of Texas Ph.D. program in counseling psychology for the 1996-1997 academic year. Subsequently, Lesage filed suit, alleging that by establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process the university had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and various federal civil rights statutes. The university did not dispute that it considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The university argued that Lesage was unqualified for admission. Granting the university summary judgment, the District Court concluded that considerations of race had no effect on the Lesage's rejection. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the stage of review during which Lesage's application was eliminated was in some way race conscious.
", "facts_len": "995", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1247", "ID": "54831", "name": "Sims v. Apfel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-9537", "docket": "98-9537", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Sims", "second_party": "Apfel", "facts": "After a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a \"disability.\" Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council.
", "facts_len": "921", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1248", "ID": "54833", "name": "United States v. Locke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1701", "docket": "98-1701", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Locke", "facts": "In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the State of Washington created the Office of Marine Safety, which was directed to establish standards to provide the \"best achievable protection\" (BAP) from oil spill damage. The agency promulgated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko), a trade association of tanker operators, filed suit against the state and local officials responsible for enforcing the BAP regulations. Intertanko argued that Washington's BAP standards had entered an area occupied by the federal government and imposed unique requirements in an area where national uniformity was mandated. Further, Intertanko argued that if every political subdivision were to promulgate such maritime regulations, the goal of national governments to develop effective international environmental and safety would be undermined. The District Court upheld Washington's regulations. Thereafter, the Federal Government intervened on Intertanko's behalf, contending that the District Court's ruling failed to give sufficient weight to the substantial foreign affairs interests of the Federal Government. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1242", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1249", "ID": "54836", "name": "United States v. Martinez-Salazar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1255", "docket": "98-1255", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Martinez-Salazar", "facts": "Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.
", "facts_len": "1385", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1250", "ID": "54834", "name": "Christensen v. Harris County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1167", "docket": "98-1167", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Christensen", "second_party": "Harris County", "facts": "The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.
", "facts_len": "1269", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1251", "ID": "54835", "name": "Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-474", "docket": "99-474", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Crosby", "second_party": "National Foreign Trade Council", "facts": "In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' \"restricted trade\" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.
", "facts_len": "1112", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1252", "ID": "54837", "name": "Williams v. Taylor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-6615", "docket": "99-6615", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Williams", "second_party": "Taylor", "facts": "Michael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show \"actual innocence.\" In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing.
", "facts_len": "1093", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1253", "ID": "54838", "name": "Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-2043", "docket": "98-2043", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Hunt-Wesson, Inc.", "second_party": "Franchise Tax Board of California", "facts": "California's \"unitary business\" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.
", "facts_len": "798", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1254", "ID": "54839", "name": "Village of Willowbrook v. Olechon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1288", "docket": "98-1288", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Village of Willowbrook", "second_party": "Olechon", "facts": "Grace Olech asked the Village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. The Village conditioned the connection on Olech's granting of a 33-foot easement. Olech refused, claiming that the Village only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking access to the water supply. Olech sued the Village claiming that the Village's demand of an additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can allege an equal protection violation by asserting that state action was motivated solely by a \"spiteful effort to 'get' him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.\"
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1255", "ID": "54840", "name": "Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-536", "docket": "99-536", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Reeves", "second_party": "Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.", "facts": "Roger Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were supervisors in different Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. departments. Reeves' duties included making sure workers under his supervision were on time and at work and logging such data. Reeves' department was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45, who was responsible for reviewing Reeves' work. Caldwell informed the company's director of manufacturing, Powe Chesnut, that production in Revees' department was down because employees were often absent, coming in late, and leaving early. Chesnut ordered an audit, which revealed numerous timekeeping errors and misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut recommended that Reeves and Caldwell be fired and, subsequently, their employment was terminated. Reeves filed suit, alleging that he had been terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial, Sanderson contended that Reeves was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to demonstrate that this explanation was a pretext for age discrimination and introduced evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance of employees under his supervision and that Chesnut had demonstrated age-related animosity when dealing with him. Ultimately, the case went to a jury, which returned a verdict for Reeves. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Reeves had not presented sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of age-based discrimination.
", "facts_len": "1539", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1256", "ID": "54841", "name": "Ohler v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-9828", "docket": "98-9828", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Ohler", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.
", "facts_len": "1213", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1257", "ID": "54848", "name": "In re Bauer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5440", "docket": "99-5440", "term": "1999", "first_party": "In re Bauer", "second_party": "", "facts": "Pro se petitioner Frederick W. Bauer sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Supreme Court under Rule 39 with respect to a petition for mandamus. In October 1993, the Court had invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Bauer in forma pauperis status with respect to a petition for an extraordinary writ. Before the 39.8 denial, Bauer had filed three petitions for certiorari and five petitions for extraordinary writs. After the 39.8 denial, Bauer filed two petitions for certiorari. All eleven of Bauer's previous petitions were deemed frivolous by the Court and denied without recorded dissent.
", "facts_len": "602", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1258", "ID": "54842", "name": "Illinois v. Wardlow", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1036", "docket": "98-1036", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Wardlow", "facts": "Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested Wardlow after discovering that he was carrying handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, Wardlow claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to \"specific reasonable inferences\" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to \"go on one's way.\"
", "facts_len": "1198", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1259", "ID": "54845", "name": "Slack v. McDaniel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-6322", "docket": "98-6322", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Slack", "second_party": "McDaniel", "facts": "Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1182", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1260", "ID": "54843", "name": "Arizona v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/8_orig", "docket": "8-orig", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "California", "facts": "In 1952, Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to resolve a dispute with California over the extent of each state's right to use water from the Colorado River. The United States intervened, seeking water rights on behalf of five Indian reservations. Culminating in Arizona I, the Court held that the United States had reserved water rights for the five reservations. In a 1964 decree, the Court specified the water entitlements for the parties and the reservations, but held that the water rights for the reservations would be subject to adjustment in the event that the reservations' disputed boundaries were finally determined. Thereafter in Arizona II, the Court concluded that the reservations' boundaries had yet to be determined. Ultimately, the Quechan Tribe (Tribe) of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation and the United States entered an agreement returning land encompassing some 25,000 acres of disputed boundary lands not attributed to that reservation in earlier litigation. In 1983, the Court of Claims consented to the settlement. The Tribe and the United States then filed claims seeking increased water rights for the Fort Yuma Reservation. In 1989, the Court granted the motion of Arizona, California, and two municipal water districts (State parties) to reopen the 1964 decree to determine whether the Fort Yuma Reservation was entitled to claim additional boundary lands and, if so, additional water rights. The State parties asserted that the Fort Yuma claims of the Tribe and the United States were precluded by Arizona I and by the Claims Court consent judgment.
", "facts_len": "1614", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1261", "ID": "54847", "name": "Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-502", "docket": "99-502", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Nelson", "second_party": "Adams USA, Inc.", "facts": "The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1262", "ID": "54844", "name": "City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1161", "docket": "98-1161", "term": "1999", "first_party": "City of Erie", "second_party": "Pap's A.M.", "facts": "\"Kandyland,\" operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a \"state of nudity,\" To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, \"pasties\" and a \"G-string.\" Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to \"impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance.\" Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.
", "facts_len": "1365", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1263", "ID": "54849", "name": "Williams v. Taylor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-8384", "docket": "98-8384", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Williams", "second_party": "Taylor", "facts": "After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision \"was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1264", "ID": "54850", "name": "Dickerson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-5525", "docket": "99-5525", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Dickerson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that \"a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.\" The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that \"Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court.\"
", "facts_len": "1534", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1265", "ID": "54854", "name": "Castillo v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-658", "docket": "99-658", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Castillo", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: \"Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years.\" During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as \"machinegun\" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1338", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1266", "ID": "54851", "name": "Ramdass v. Angelone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-7000", "docket": "99-7000", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Ramdass", "second_party": "Angelone", "facts": "A Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.
", "facts_len": "1994", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1267", "ID": "54852", "name": "Board of Regents , University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1189", "docket": "98-1189", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Board of Regents , University of Wisconsin System", "second_party": "Southworth", "facts": "The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was \"not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights.\"
", "facts_len": "1391", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1268", "ID": "54853", "name": "Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-822", "docket": "98-822", "term": "1999", "first_party": "Friends of the Earth, Inc.", "second_party": "Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.", "facts": "After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.
", "facts_len": "1706", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1269", "ID": "54855", "name": "United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-1682", "docket": "98-1682", "term": "1999", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.", "facts": "In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels \"primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming,\" either to \"fully scramble or otherwise fully block\" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the \"safe-harbor\" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from \"signal bleed,\" or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.
", "facts_len": "1099", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1270", "ID": "54857", "name": "Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2035", "docket": "99-2035", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Cooper Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.", "facts": "Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., manufactures a multifunction pocket tool, the Pocket Survival Tool (PST). In 1996, Cooper Industries, Inc. used photographs of a modified PST to introduce a competing tool, the ToolZall. The photographs were used in posters, packaging, and advertising materials. Subsequently, Leatherman filed an action asserting claims of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising under the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). Ultimately, a trial jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The District Court then entered judgment, rejecting Cooper's argument that the punitive damages were grossly excessive. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, using an \"abuse of discretion\" standard, concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce the award.
", "facts_len": "882", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1271", "ID": "54856", "name": "United States v. Mead Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1434", "docket": "99-1434", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Mead Corporation", "facts": "Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, the United States Customs Service is authorized to classify and fix the rate of duty on imports under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the Secretary's regulations, any port-of-entry Customs office and the Customs Headquarters Office may issue \"ruling letters\" setting tariff classifications for particular imports. The Mead Corporation's imported \"day planners,\" were classified as duty-free until the Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying them as bound diaries subject to tariff. Subsequently, Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade. The court granted the Government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that ruling letters should not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest level of deference, because they are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act, do not carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers's rights and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference at all to the ruling letter at issue.
", "facts_len": "1159", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1272", "ID": "54858", "name": "Lopez v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-7504", "docket": "99-7504", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Lopez", "second_party": "Davis", "facts": "Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by \"the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.\" In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1056", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1273", "ID": "54859", "name": "Egelhoff v. Egelhoff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1529", "docket": "99-1529", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Egelhoff", "second_party": "Egelhoff", "facts": "David A. Egelhoff designated his wife, Donna Rae Egelhoff, as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and a pension plan provided by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Two months after the Egelhoffs divorced, Mr. Egelhoff died. His children then sued Donna Rae to recover the insurance proceeds and the pension plan benefits. The children relied on a Washington state statue that provides that the designation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset - defined to include a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan - is revoked automatically upon divorce. Subsequently, the proceeds would pass to the children as Mr. Egelhoff's statutory heirs under state law. Under ERISA, the state trial courts granted Donna Rae summary judgment. In reversing, the Washington Court of Appeals found that the statute was not pre-empted by ERISA. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court held that the statute does not \"refer to\" ERISA plans to an extent that would require pre-emption.
", "facts_len": "1056", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1274", "ID": "54860", "name": "Artuz v. Bennett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1238", "docket": "99-1238", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Artuz", "second_party": "Bennett", "facts": "In 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a \"properly filed\" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.
", "facts_len": "1384", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1275", "ID": "54861", "name": "C. & L. Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-292", "docket": "00-292", "term": "2000", "first_party": "C. & L. Enterprises, Inc.", "second_party": "Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma", "facts": "The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Tribe, entered into a contract with C & L Enterprises, Inc., for the installation of a roof on a Tribe-owned building in Oklahoma. The property rests outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held in trust by the Federal Government for the Tribe. The contract contains clauses requiring disputes arising out of the contract to be decided by arbitration and a choice-of-law clause that reads: \"The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located.\" Thus, Oklahoma law governed the contract. After the contract was executed, but before performance commenced, the Tribe retained another company to install the roof. C & L then submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The arbitrator awarded C & L a monetary award. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the Tribe was immune from suit. The court noted that the contract seemed to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the contract, but concluded that the Tribe had not waived its suit immunity with the requisite clarity.
", "facts_len": "1170", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1276", "ID": "54862", "name": "Ferguson v. City of Charleston", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-936", "docket": "99-936", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Ferguson", "second_party": "City of Charleston", "facts": "After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.
", "facts_len": "914", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1277", "ID": "54863", "name": "Hunt v. Cromartie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1864", "docket": "99-1864", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Hunt", "second_party": "Cromartie", "facts": "In Shaw v. Hunt, the U.S Supreme Court found that North Carolina's legislature violated the Constitution by using race as the predominant factor in drawing its Twelfth Congressional District's 1992 boundaries. In 1997, after the State redrew those boundaries, the District Court found that the new boundaries had also been created with dominating racial considerations. In reversing, the Court found, in Hunt v. Cromartie, that the evidence was insufficient to show an unconstitutional race-based objective. On remand, the District Court again found that North Carolina's legislature had used race driven criteria in drawing the 1997 boundaries based on the district's shape, its splitting of towns and counties, and its heavily African-American voting population. The court newly found that the legislature had drawn the boundaries to collect precincts with a high racial, rather than political, identification. (Argued and decided with 99-1865, Smallwood v. Cromartie.)
", "facts_len": "979", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1278", "ID": "54864", "name": "Daniels v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-9136", "docket": "99-9136", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Daniels", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "688", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1279", "ID": "54866", "name": "Calcano-Martinez v. INS", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-1011", "docket": "00-1011", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Calcano-Martinez et al.", "second_party": "INS", "facts": "The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) expressly precludes courts of appeals from exercising \"jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against any alien who is removable by reason of \"a conviction for certain criminal offenses, including any aggravated felony.\" Deboris Calcano-Martinez, Sergio Madrid, and Fazila Khan are all lawful permanent residents of the United States subject to administratively final orders of removal because they were convicted of aggravated felonies. Each filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals and a habeas corpus petition in the District Court to challenge the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that they were ineligible to apply for a discretionary waiver of deportation under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court also held that they could pursue their claims in a District Court habeas action.
", "facts_len": "1013", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1280", "ID": "54867", "name": "United States v. United Foods, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-276", "docket": "00-276", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "United Foods, Inc.", "facts": "The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.
", "facts_len": "877", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1281", "ID": "54865", "name": "Fiore v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1999/98-942", "docket": "98-942", "term": "1999", "first_party": "William Fiore", "second_party": "Gregory White, Warden, et al.", "facts": "William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a \"valid permit\" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests.
\nFiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. .The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that it would require a retroactive application of a new rule of law.
\nFollowing oral argument, a unanimous court in an opinion by Justice Stephen J. Breyer certified the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date when Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that \"the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case.\"
\nThe Pennsylvania Supreme Court replied that the decision \"did not announce a new rule of law,\" but \"merely clarified the plain language of the statute.\" The U.S. Supreme Court then took up the pending constitutional question.
", "facts_len": "2294", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1282", "ID": "54868", "name": "Kansas v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/105_orig", "docket": "105-orig", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "In 1949, Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact. Article IV-D provided that future development of the river basin could not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability to other users of the river's waters. In 1986, Kansas filed suit alleging that Colorado had violated the Compact. Ultimately, the Special Master found that post-Compact increases in groundwater well pumping in Colorado had materially depleted the waters in violation of Article IV-D. The Special Master, in his second report, recommended that damages be awarded to Kansas. In his third report, the Special Master recommended that such damages be measured by Kansas' losses attributable to Compact violations since 1950, be paid in money not water, and include prejudgment interest from 1969 to the date of judgment. Colorado filed four objections to the third report, Kansas filed one, and the United States submitted that all objections should be overruled.
", "facts_len": "951", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1283", "ID": "54869", "name": "City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1680", "docket": "99-1680", "term": "2000", "first_party": "City News & Novelty, Inc.", "second_party": "City of Waukesha", "facts": "The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin requires sellers of sexually explicit materials to obtain and annually renew adult business licenses. City News and Novelty, Inc. (City News), owned and operated an adult-oriented shop in Waukesha. City News had first obtained a license in 1989. In 1995, City News applied for a renewal of its license. Waukesha's Common Council denied the application. The Council found that City News had violated Waukesha ordinances by permitting minors to loiter on the premises, failing to maintain an unobstructed view of booths in the store, and allowing patrons to engage in sexual activity inside the booths. Waukesha's refusal to renew City News's license was upheld in administrative proceedings and on judicial review in the state courts. Among other questions raised in its petition for certiorari, City News asked the Court to \"resolve...whether the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany [an adult business] licensing scheme means a prompt judicial determination or simply the right to promptly file for judicial review.\"
", "facts_len": "1076", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1284", "ID": "54871", "name": "Cleveland v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-804", "docket": "99-804", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Cleveland", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as \"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations.\" The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of \"property.\" The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1508", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1285", "ID": "54870", "name": "Alexander v. Sandoval", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1908", "docket": "99-1908", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Alexander", "second_party": "Sandoval", "facts": "Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation.
", "facts_len": "1124", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1286", "ID": "54872", "name": "Zadvydas v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-7791", "docket": "99-7791", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Zadvydas", "second_party": "Davis", "facts": "After a final removal order is entered, an alien ordered removed is held in custody during a 90-day removal period. If the alien is not removed in those 90 days, the post-removal-period detention statute authorizes further detention or supervised release. After being ordered deported based on is criminal record, efforts to deport Kestutis Zadvydas failed. When he remained in custody after the removal period expired, Zadvydas filed a habeas action. In granting the writ, the District Court reasoned that his confinement would be permanent and thus violate the Constitution. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Zadvydas' detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not impossible. Conversely, in ordering Kim Ho Ma's release, the District Court held that the Constitution forbids post-removal-period detention unless there is a realistic chance that an alien will be removed, and that no such chance existed here because Cambodia has no repatriation treaty with the United States. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that detention was not authorized for more than a reasonable time beyond the 90-day period.
", "facts_len": "1173", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1287", "ID": "54877", "name": "Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1379", "docket": "99-1379", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Circuit City Stores, Inc.", "second_party": "Adams", "facts": "In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a \"contract of employment,\" and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes \"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" from the Act's coverage.
", "facts_len": "1022", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1288", "ID": "54874", "name": "Department of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1871", "docket": "99-1871", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Department of Interior", "second_party": "Klamath Water Users Protective Association", "facts": "The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure \"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.\" The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.
", "facts_len": "1795", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1289", "ID": "54875", "name": "Buckman Company v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/98-1768", "docket": "98-1768", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Buckman Company", "second_party": "Plaintiffs' Legal Committee", "facts": "The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) regulate medical devices. Under the MDA, Class III devices \"present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury\" and thus require the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) strictest regulation. In 1985, after a previously failed attempt, the AcroMed Corporation sought approval for its orthopedic bone screw device, a Class III device, for use in spinal surgery with the assistance of Buckman Company, a regulatory consultant to medical device manufacturers. The FDA also denied the second application. On the third attempt, instead of trying to show the bone screw device was \"substantially equivalent\" to similar devices already on the market and thus as safe and effective, AcroMed and Buckman split the device into its component parts, renamed them, and altered the intended use of the parts. Thus, the FDA approved the component devices for long bone surgery. Subsequently, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has directed over 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices to the Federal District Court. Many actions claim, under state tort law, that AcroMed and Buckman made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance, which injured the plaintiffs. The District Court dismissed the fraud claims as pre-empted by the MDA. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1497", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1290", "ID": "54873", "name": "Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1240", "docket": "99-1240", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Board of Trustees of University of Alabama", "second_party": "Garrett", "facts": "After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama in Birmingham, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from \"discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.\" The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1291", "ID": "54876", "name": "Cook v. Gralike", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-929", "docket": "99-929", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Cook", "second_party": "Gralike", "facts": "In the wake of U.S Term Limits v. Thornton, Missouri voters adopted an amendment to Article VIII of their State Constitution, which \"instructs\" each Member of Missouri's congressional delegation \"to use all of his or her delegated powers to pass the Congressional Term Limits Amendment\" set forth in section 16 of the Article. The Article also directs the Missouri Secretary of State to determine whether a statement reflecting a candidate's position on term limits should be placed by his or her name on the general election ballot. Don Gralike, a non-incumbent House of Representatives candidate, brought suit to enjoin the Secretary from implementing the Article. The District Court, granting Gralike summary judgment, found that Article VIII infringed upon the Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the Federal Constitution by creating additional qualifications for Congress and that the Article burdened a candidate's First Amendment right to speak freely on the issue of term limits. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1029", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1292", "ID": "54880", "name": "Sinkfield v. Kelley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-132", "docket": "00-132", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Darryl Sinkfield", "second_party": "Peggy C. Kelley", "facts": "With the acknowledged purpose of maximizing the number of majority-minority districts -- i.e., districts in which a majority of voters belong to a minority group -- Alabama implemented a redistricting plan for its state legislative districts. White Alabama voters, who are residents of various majority-white districts (the appellees), brought suit in District Court challenging their own districts as the products of racial gerrymandering in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, a three-judge court held that seven of the challenged majority-white districts were the product of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering and enjoined their use in any election. The judicial panel found that the group had standing on the ground that injury-in-fact could be conclusively presumed from the mere fact of residence in a gerrymandered district, independent of the plaintiff's subjective assessment of harm, because of the bizarre shapes of their districts. On direct appeal, Alabama state officials and a group of African-American voters argued that the appellees lacked standing to maintain the suit.
", "facts_len": "1146", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1293", "ID": "54878", "name": "Booth v. Churner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1964", "docket": "99-1964", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Booth", "second_party": "Churner", "facts": "The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust \"such administrative remedies as are available\" before suing over prison conditions. Timothy Booth, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Pennsylvania, initiated a suit in District Court, claiming that corrections officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in various ways. Booth sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. At the time of Booth's suit, Pennsylvania provided an administrative grievance and appeals system, which addressed Booth's complaints but had no provision for recovery of money damages. After the prison authority denied his administrative grievance, Booth did not seek administrative review. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Booth's argument that the exhaustion requirement was inapplicable because the administrative process could not award him the monetary relief he sought (At this point, Booth was only seeking money).
", "facts_len": "1122", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1294", "ID": "54879", "name": "Seling v. Young", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1185", "docket": "99-1185", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Seling", "second_party": "Young", "facts": "Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of \"sexually violent predators,\" or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive \"as applied\" to Young.
", "facts_len": "1077", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1295", "ID": "54883", "name": "Clark County School District v. Breeden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-866", "docket": "00-866", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Clark County School District", "second_party": "Breeden", "facts": "Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful \"for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees...because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].\" Shirley Breeden alleged that, during a review of job applicant files in 1994, a male co-worker's vocal reaction to an applicant's psychological evaluation report constituted sexual harassment. Moreover, Breeden alleged that she suffered from adverse employment actions for complaining about the about the alleged harassment. Breeden claimed she was transferred about a month later to a job with less supervisory authority. In 1997, Breeden filed a retaliation claim against Clark County School District. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school district. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1011", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1296", "ID": "54881", "name": "Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-836", "docket": "00-836", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Bush", "second_party": "Palm Beach County Canvassing Board", "facts": "The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1000", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1297", "ID": "54884", "name": "Duncan v. Walker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-121", "docket": "00-121", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Duncan", "second_party": "Walker", "facts": "28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the \"time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.\" In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was an application for \"other collateral review\" that tolled the limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.
", "facts_len": "980", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1298", "ID": "54885", "name": "New York Times Company, Inc. v. Tasini", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-201", "docket": "00-201", "term": "2000", "first_party": "New York Times Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Tasini", "facts": "Various freelance authors wrote articles for various print publishers. The publishers treated the authors as independent contractors under contracts. The publishers each licensed rights to copy and sell articles to LEXIS/NEXIS, owner and operator of a computerized database containing articles in text-only format. NEXIS does not reproduce the print publication's formatting. The authors filed suit alleging that their copyrights were infringed when the print publishers placed their articles in the electronic publishers' databases, such as LEXIS/NEXIS. In response, the print and electronic publishers raised the privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by section 201(c) of the Copyright Act. In granting the publishers summary judgment, the District Court held that the electronic databases reproduced and distributed the authors' works, under section 201(c), \"as part of...[a] revision of that collective work\" to which the authors had first contributed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the databases were not among the collective works covered by section 201(c), and specifically, were not \"revisions\" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared.
", "facts_len": "1197", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1299", "ID": "54886", "name": "Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1884", "docket": "99-1884", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Lackawanna County District Attorney", "second_party": "Coss", "facts": "In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.
", "facts_len": "1094", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1300", "ID": "54887", "name": "Florida v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-391", "docket": "00-391", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Thomas", "facts": "While officers were investigating marijuana sales at Florida home, Robert Thomas drove up to the house. An officer asked Thomas for his name and driver license. Thomas was arrested when a search on his license revealed an outstanding warrant. After taking Thomas inside the house, the officer searched Thomas' car and found methamphetamine. Subsequently, the trial court granted Thomas' motion to suppress. In reversing, the appellate found the search valid under New York v. Belton. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme Court established a \"bright-line\" rule permitting an officer who has made a lawful custodial arrest of a car's occupant to search the car's passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest. In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court held Belton did not apply because it is limited to situations where the officer initiates contact with a vehicle's occupant while that person remains in the vehicle.
", "facts_len": "944", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1301", "ID": "54889", "name": "Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1178", "docket": "99-1178", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County", "second_party": "United States Army Corps of Engineers", "facts": "The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into \"navigable waters.\" Under the CWA, \"navigable waters\" are defined as \"the waters of the United States\" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1302", "ID": "54888", "name": "United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-203", "docket": "00-203", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Cleveland Indians Baseball Company", "facts": "Under a grievance settlement agreement, the Cleveland Indians Baseball Company owed 8 players backpay for wages due in 1986 and 14 players backpay for wages due in 1987. The Company paid all of the back wages in 1994. No award recipient was a Company employee in that year. The Company also paid its share of employment taxes on the back wages according to 1994 tax rates and wage bases. The payments were subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and taxes on wages to fund unemployment benefits under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). Both tax rates and the amount of the wages subject to tax have risen over time. After the Internal Revenue Service denied the Company's claims for a refund of the payments, the Company initiated suit in Federal District Court. The court, bound by precedent, ordered the Government to refund FICA and FUTA taxes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "951", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1303", "ID": "54890", "name": "Lorillard Tobacco Company v. Reilly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-596", "docket": "00-596", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Lorillard Tobacco Company", "second_party": "Thomas F. Reilly", "facts": "The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.
", "facts_len": "1172", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1304", "ID": "54892", "name": "Becker v. Montgomery", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-6374", "docket": "00-6374", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Becker", "second_party": "Montgomery", "facts": "Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled \"Counsel for Appellant\" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.
", "facts_len": "917", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1305", "ID": "54891", "name": "District of Columbia v. Tri County Industries, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1953", "docket": "99-1953", "term": "2000", "first_party": "District of Columbia", "second_party": "Tri County Industries, Inc.", "facts": "Using a 1993 building permit issued by the District of Columbia, Tri County Industries, Inc. spent nearly $600,000 readying a site for a \"soil remediation\" facility, which would decontaminate soil tainted by hazardous wastes. After protests and a dispute over whether the company was violating its permit by storing contaminated soil on the site, the city issued a stop-work order. Tri County filed suit against the District of Columbia for suspending its building permit on the facility claiming its due process rights had been violated. Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstated a 1998 jury's $5 million award. The appellate court rule that the District Court should have conducted a \"more searching inquiry\" than it had to preserve the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases. The appellate court normally applies a \"abuse of discretion\" standard. Under the \"more searching inquiry,\" the appellate court discounted the reasons the district judge had cited in ordering a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1041", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1306", "ID": "54893", "name": "Shaw v. Murphy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1613", "docket": "99-1613", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Shaw", "second_party": "Murphy", "facts": "While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.
", "facts_len": "898", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1307", "ID": "54895", "name": "PGA TOUR, Inc. v. Martin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-24", "docket": "00-24", "term": "2000", "first_party": "PGA TOUR, Inc.", "second_party": "Martin", "facts": "Casey Martin has a degenerative circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses. His disorder constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). When Martin made a request to use a golf cart for the duration of the qualification tournament onto the professional tours sponsored by PGA Tour, Inc., PGA refused. Martin then filed suit under Title III of the ADA, which requires an entity operating \"public accommodations\" to make \"reasonable modifications\" in its policies \"when... necessary to afford such...accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such...accommodations.\" Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against PGA, requiring it to allow Martin to use a cart. The court found that the purpose of the PGA's walking rule was to insert fatigue into the skill of shot-making, and that Martin suffered significant fatigue due to his disability, even with the use of a cart. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that golf courses are places of public accommodation during professional tournaments and that permitting Martin to use a cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of those tournaments.
", "facts_len": "1302", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1308", "ID": "54894", "name": "Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-152", "docket": "00-152", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Lujan", "second_party": "G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.", "facts": "The California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.
", "facts_len": "1275", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1309", "ID": "54896", "name": "Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-901", "docket": "99-901", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Brentwood Academy", "second_party": "Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn.", "facts": "The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing \"undue influence\" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.
", "facts_len": "858", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1310", "ID": "54897", "name": "United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-151", "docket": "00-151", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop", "facts": "Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.
", "facts_len": "987", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1311", "ID": "54898", "name": "Alabama v. Bozeman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-492", "docket": "00-492", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Alabama", "second_party": "Bozeman", "facts": "The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his \"original place of imprisonment\" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been \"returned to the original place of imprisonment\" (the federal prison) \"prior to\" \"trial\" on state charges being \"had.\" Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.
", "facts_len": "1360", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1312", "ID": "54900", "name": "Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. v. Shirley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-454", "docket": "00-454", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Atkinson Trading Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Shirley", "facts": "Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a \"consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax].\"
", "facts_len": "1014", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1313", "ID": "54899", "name": "Texas v. Cobb", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1702", "docket": "99-1702", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Texas", "second_party": "Cobb", "facts": "In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.
", "facts_len": "961", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1314", "ID": "54903", "name": "Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-1210", "docket": "00-1210", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Major League Baseball Players Association", "second_party": "Garvey", "facts": "After the Major League Baseball Players Association filed grievances against the Major League Baseball Clubs, arbitrators found that the Clubs had colluded in the market for free-agent services in violation of the industry's collective bargaining agreement. To cover damages, the Association and Clubs entered into an agreement, which provided funds and framework to resolve individual player's claims. Steve Garvey, a first baseman, submitted a claim alleging that the San Diego Padres did not extend his contract to the 1988 and 1989 seasons due to collusion. Under the framework, the Association denied Garvey's claim. Agreeing, the arbitrator determined that Garvey did not receive a contract extension due to collusion and found that Garvey had not shown a specific offer of extension. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's denial of Garvey's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award. The appellate court, under the Labor Management Relations Act, directed the arbitration panel to enter an award for Garvey because it concluded from the arbitration proceedings that an offer was made to Garvey and that it was withdrawn due to collision.
", "facts_len": "1175", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1315", "ID": "54901", "name": "Shafer v. S. Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-5250", "docket": "00-5250", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Shafer", "second_party": "S. Carolina", "facts": "Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole exists.
", "facts_len": "1305", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1316", "ID": "54902", "name": "Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama v. Randolph", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1235", "docket": "99-1235", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Green Tree Financial Corporation-Alabama", "second_party": "Randolph", "facts": "Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama. Randolph's financing agreement with Green Tree required that she buy insurance against default and provided that disputes under the contract would be resolved by binding arbitration. Randolph sued Green Tree, alleging that it violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) by failing to disclose the insurance requirement as a finance charge and that it violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes of action. The District Court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration and denied her request for reconsideration, which stated that she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, therefore, would have to forgo her claims. The Court of Appeals, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which allows appeals from \"a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title,\" held that it had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the court concluded that because the agreement was silent with respect to payment of arbitration expenses, it was unenforceable.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1317", "ID": "54904", "name": "United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-157", "docket": "00-157", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United Dominion Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a taxpayer may carry back its \"product liability loss\" up to 10 years in order to offset prior years' income. United Dominion Industries, Inc. predecessor in interest, AMCA International Corporation, was the parent of an affiliated group filing consolidated returns for the years 1983 through 1986. AMCA calculated its product liability loss (PPL) on a consolidated basis, or a \"single-entity\" approach. The government's \"separate-member\" approach would have prohibited 5 of AMCA's 26 members from contributing to the group's total PPL. In 1986 and 1987, AMCA petitioned the Internal Revenue Service for a refund based on its PPL calculations. Ultimately, the District Court applied AMCA's single-entity approach, concluding that if the affiliated group's consolidated return reflects consolidated net operating losses in excess of the group's aggregate product liability expenses, the total of those expenses is a PLL that may be carried back. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied the separate-member approach.
", "facts_len": "1066", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1318", "ID": "54905", "name": "TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1571", "docket": "99-1571", "term": "2000", "first_party": "TrafFix Devices Inc.", "second_party": "Marketing Displays Inc.", "facts": "Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) held utility patents for a \"dual-spring design\" mechanism that keeps temporary road and other outdoor signs upright in wind. After the patents expired, TrafFix Devices, Inc. began marketing sign stands with a dual-spring mechanism copied from MDI's design. MDI brought suit under the Trademark Act of 1964 for, among other things, trade dress infringement. MDA claimed that its sign stands were recognizable to buyers and users because the patented design was visible. In granting summary judgement for TrafFix, the District Court concluded that MDI had not established a \"secondary meaning,\" or that consumers did not associate the look of the dual-spring design with MDI. The court also found that there could be no trade dress protection for the design because it was functional. In reversing, the Court of Appeals suggested that the District Court committed legal error by looking only to the dual-spring design when evaluating MDI's trade dress because a competitor had to find some way to hide the design or otherwise set it apart from MDI's and noted the issue whether an expired utility patent forecloses the possibility of trade dress protection in the product's design.
", "facts_len": "1218", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1319", "ID": "54907", "name": "Bush v. Gore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-949", "docket": "00-949", "term": "2000", "first_party": "George W. Bush", "second_party": "Albert Gore", "facts": "Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all \"under-votes\" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.
", "facts_len": "939", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1320", "ID": "54906", "name": "Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1257", "docket": "99-1257", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Whitman", "second_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "facts": "Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which \"air quality criteria\" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no \"intelligible principle\" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.
", "facts_len": "1168", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1321", "ID": "54909", "name": "Tyler v. Cain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-5961", "docket": "00-5961", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Tyler", "second_party": "Cain", "facts": "Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant \"shows\" that the \"claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.\" The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he \"could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.\"
", "facts_len": "1266", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1322", "ID": "54908", "name": "New Hampshire v. Maine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/130_orig", "docket": "130-orig", "term": "2000", "first_party": "New Hampshire", "second_party": "Maine", "facts": "In 1977, a dispute between New Hampshire and Maine over lobster fishing rights resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court entering a consent judgment setting the precise location of the States' \"lateral marine boundary,\" or the boundary in the marine waters off the coast. Utilizing a 1740 decree of King George II, the States agreed that the decree's words \"Middle of the River\" referred to the middle of the Piscataqua River's main navigable channel. Ultimately, the 1997 consent judgment defined \"Middle of the River\" as \"the middle of the main channel of navigation of the Piscataqua River.\" The consent judgment did not fix the inland Piscataqua River boundary. In 2000, New Hampshire brought an original action against Maine, claiming that the inland river boundary runs along the Maine shore and that the entire Piscataqua River and all of Portsmouth Harbor belong to New Hampshire. In response, Maine filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 1740 boundary determination by King George II and the 1977 consent judgment barred the complaint.
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1323", "ID": "54910", "name": "Saucier v. Katz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1977", "docket": "99-1977", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Saucier", "second_party": "Katz", "facts": "Donald Saucier, a military police officer, arrested Elliot Katz, who was protesting during a speech by Vice President Gore at the Presidio Army Base in San Francisco. Katz filed suit against Saucier alleging that Saucier had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in arresting him. Rejecting Saucier's motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the District Court held that the immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits. In affirming, the Court of Appeals made a two-part qualified immunity inquiry. After finding that the law governing Saucier's conduct was clearly established when the incident occurred, the court moved to determined whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that his conduct was lawful. The court then reasoned that this step and the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim were identical because both concern the objective reasonableness of the officer's conduct in light of the circumstances the officer faced at the scene. Subsequently, the court found that summary judgment based on qualified immunity was inappropriate.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1324", "ID": "54911", "name": "Nevada v. Hicks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1994", "docket": "99-1994", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Nevada", "second_party": "Hicks", "facts": "Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.
", "facts_len": "992", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1325", "ID": "54913", "name": "Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-763", "docket": "00-763", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Pollard", "second_party": "E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company", "facts": "Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ultimately, the Federal District Court found that Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The court awarded her $300,000 in compensatory damages, the maximum permitted under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for such damages. The court then noted that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard. On appeal, Pollard argued that \"front pay,\" the money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not an element of compensatory damages, but a replacement for the remedy of reinstatement in situations in which reinstatement would be inappropriate. Rejecting Pollard, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "957", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1326", "ID": "54912", "name": "Director of Revenue of Missouri v. CoBank ACB", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1792", "docket": "99-1792", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Director of Revenue of Missouri", "second_party": "CoBank ACB", "facts": "The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt.
", "facts_len": "942", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1327", "ID": "54917", "name": "Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1331", "docket": "99-1331", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Lewis", "second_party": "Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.", "facts": "In 1998, James F. Lewis, a deckhand aboard the M/V Karen Michelle owned by Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., claimed that he was injured when he tripped over a wire on the boat. Lewis then sued Lewis & Clark in Illinois County Court, for personal injuries claiming negligence under the Jones Act. Lewis & Clark had already filed a complaint for exoneration from, or limitation of, liability in the District Court under the Limitation of Liability Act (Act). Subsequently, the court approved a surety bond of $450,000, representing Lewis & Clark's interest in the vessel, ordered that any claim related to the incident be filed with the court within a specified period, and enjoined the filing or prosecution of any suits related to the incident. The injunction prevented Lewis from litigating his personal injury claims in state court and he moved to dissolve it. The District Court noted that federal courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a vessel owner is entitled to limited liability, but also recognized that the statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime suits to federal courts saves to suitors \"all other remedies to which they are other wise entitled.\" Ultimately, the court dissolved the injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1307", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1328", "ID": "54915", "name": "Kyllo v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-8508", "docket": "99-8508", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Kyllo", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager \"did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life,\" only \"amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall.\"
", "facts_len": "1151", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1329", "ID": "54914", "name": "Buford v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-9073", "docket": "99-9073", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Buford", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all \"related\" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were \"related\" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.
", "facts_len": "1017", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1330", "ID": "54916", "name": "Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-603", "docket": "99-603", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Legal Services Corporation", "second_party": "Velazquez", "facts": "The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1331", "ID": "54918", "name": "City of Indianapolis v. Edmond", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1030", "docket": "99-1030", "term": "2000", "first_party": "City of Indianapolis", "second_party": "Edmond", "facts": "In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "893", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1332", "ID": "54921", "name": "Rogers v. Tennessee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-6218", "docket": "99-6218", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Rogers", "second_party": "Tennessee", "facts": "Wilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law \"year and a day rule,\" under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.
", "facts_len": "867", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1333", "ID": "54919", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-191", "docket": "00-191", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee", "facts": "The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of \"contribution\" includes \"expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.\" The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to \"an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate.\" In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1164", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1334", "ID": "54920", "name": "Central Green Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-859", "docket": "99-859", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Central Green Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Madera Canal, a federal facility leased to the Madera Irrigation District (MID), flows through Central Green Co.'s 1,000 acres of pistachio orchards in California. Central Green filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States and the MID alleging that their negligence in the canal's design, construction, and maintenance caused subsurface flooding resulting in damage to the orchards and increased operating costs. The Federal Government moved for judgment on the pleadings based on immunity granted by the Flood Control Act of 1928, which states that \"no liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.\" The complaint was then dismissed because the canal was a part of the Friant Division of the Central Valley Project, whose purpose was flood control. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that although the canal serves no flood control purpose, immunity is attached solely because it is a branch of the larger project.
", "facts_len": "1044", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1335", "ID": "54923", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1815", "docket": "99-1815", "term": "2000", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.", "facts": "In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were \"supervisors\" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be \"supervisors\" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise \"independent judgment\" in \"responsibly...directing\" other employees \"in the interest of the employer.\" At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use \"independent judgment\" under the NLRA when they exercise \"ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards.\" Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of \"independent judgment\" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.
", "facts_len": "1460", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1336", "ID": "54922", "name": "The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-347", "docket": "00-347", "term": "2000", "first_party": "The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd.", "second_party": "United International Holdings", "facts": "In return for United International Holdings, Inc.'s assistance in preparing its application, contracts, system, and financing for a cable television system in Hong Kong, Wharf Holdings Ltd. orally granted United an option to buy 10% of stock in the system. The parties never reduced the agreement to writing. Ultimately, Wharf refused to allow United to exercise its option. United then sued Wharf in Federal District Court, claiming that Wharf violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits using \"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.\" Wharf's internal documents, which suggested that Wharf never intended to carry out its promise, supported United's claim. A jury found in United's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "818", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1337", "ID": "54926", "name": "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-767", "docket": "00-767", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service", "second_party": "St. Cyr", "facts": "On March 8, 1996, Enrico St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in a Connecticut court to a charge of selling a controlled substance. That conviction made him deportable. Before the effective dates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was interpreted to give the Attorney General broad discretion to waive deportation of resident aliens. The AEDPA and IIRIRA restricted the class of aliens depending on section 212(c) for relief. St. Cyr's removal proceedings commenced after AEDPA's and IIRIRA's effective dates. Subsequently, the Attorney General claimed that the AEDPA and IIRIRA withdrew his authority to grant St. Cyr a waiver. The District Court accepted St. Cyr's habeas corpus application and agreed that the new restrictions do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1088", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1338", "ID": "54924", "name": "Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1848", "docket": "99-1848", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc.", "second_party": "West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources", "facts": "Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. operates care homes that provide assisted living to their residents. Buckhannon filed an inspection by the West Virginia fire marshal's office because some residents were incapable of \"self-preservation.\" Buckhannon brought suit against the State and others arguing that the \"self-preservation\" requirement violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Afterwards the state legislature eliminated the requirement and the District Court dismissed the case as moot. Buckhannon then requested attorney's fees as the \"prevailing party\" under the FHAA and ADA. Buckhannon based its claim on the \"catalyst theory,\" which posits that a plaintiff is a \"prevailing party\" if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "956", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1339", "ID": "54925", "name": "Palazzolo v. Rhode Island", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2047", "docket": "99-2047", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Palazzolo", "second_party": "Rhode Island", "facts": "Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected \"coastal wetlands,\" on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of \"all economically beneficial use\" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.
", "facts_len": "1122", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1340", "ID": "54927", "name": "Glover v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-8576", "docket": "99-8576", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Glover", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1493", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1341", "ID": "54928", "name": "Penry v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-6677", "docket": "00-6677", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Penry", "second_party": "Johnson", "facts": "In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed.
", "facts_len": "1372", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1342", "ID": "54929", "name": "Ohio v. Reiner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-1028", "docket": "00-1028", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Ohio", "second_party": "Reiner", "facts": "Matthew Reiner was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex. The defense planned to argue that Susan Batt, the family's babysitter, was the culpable party. The trial court granted Batt transactional immunity from prosecution, at the state's request, after she informed the court she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ultimately, Batt denied any involvement in the death. Reiner was convicted. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that \"Susan Batt's [trial] testimony did not incriminate her because she denied any involvement in the abuse. Thus, she did not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege.\" The court noted that the defense's theory of Batt's guilt was not grounds for a grant of immunity, \"when the witness continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct.\" The court also found that the wrongful grant of immunity prejudiced Reiner, because it effectively told the jury that Batt did not cause Alex's injuries.
", "facts_len": "1072", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1343", "ID": "54930", "name": "Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1038", "docket": "99-1038", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Eastern Associated Coal Corporation", "second_party": "United Mine Workers of America, District 17", "facts": "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. and the United Mine Workers of America are parties to a collective-bargaining agreement with arbitration provisions. Under the agreement, in order for Eastern to discharge an employee, it must prove it has \"just cause,\" or the arbitrator will order the employee reinstated. The arbitrator's decision is final. With this framework in place, James Smith worked for Eastern as a truck driver subject to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring random drug testing of workers engaged in \"safety-sensitive\" tasks. After Smith tested positive for marijuana use twice, Eastern sought to discharge him. Each time the union went to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Smith's positive drug test did not amount to \"just cause\" for discharge and reinstated him conditionally. After the second occurrence, Eastern filed suit to vacate the arbitrator's award. The District Court ordered the award's enforcement, holding that Smith's conditional reinstatement did not violate the strong regulation-based public policy against drug use by workers who perform safety-sensitive functions. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1163", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1344", "ID": "54931", "name": "Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1551", "docket": "99-1551", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Semtek International, Inc.", "second_party": "Lockheed Martin Corporation", "facts": "Semtek International filed a complaint against Lockheed Martin Corporation in California state court, alleging breach of contract and various business torts. Based on diversity of citizenship, Lockheed Martin moved the case to the District Court. In the District Court, Lockheed Martin successfully moved to dismiss Semtek's claims, as they were barred by California's 2-year statute of limitations. The dismissal was upheld on appeal. Semtek then filed suit in the State Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging the same causes of action. The suit was not time barred under Maryland's 3-year statute of limitations. The court dismissed the case under res judicata. In affirming, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the California federal court's dismissal barred the Maryland complaint because the res judicata effect of federal diversity judgments is prescribed by federal law, under which the earlier dismissal was on the merits and claim-preclusive.
", "facts_len": "985", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1345", "ID": "54932", "name": "Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-549", "docket": "00-549", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd.", "second_party": "King", "facts": "Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it \"unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.\" The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a \"person\" and a distinct \"enterprise,\" the affairs of which that \"person\" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a \"person,\" distinct from the \"enterprise,\" who allegedly improperly conducted the \"enterprise's affairs.\"
", "facts_len": "933", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1346", "ID": "54933", "name": "Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2071", "docket": "99-2071", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Tuan Anh Nguyen", "second_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service", "facts": "In 1969, Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam to Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. At age six, Nguyen became a lawful permanent United States resident. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. Subsequently, the Immigration and and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen. After the Immigration Judge ordered Nguyen, Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court. Dismissing Nguyen's appeal, the Board of Immigration of Appeals rejected Nguyen's citizenship claim because he had not complied with 8 USC section 1409(a)'s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected Nguyen and Boulais argument that section 1409(a) violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1347", "ID": "54934", "name": "Norfolk Shipbuilding Drydock Corporation v. Garris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-346", "docket": "00-346", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Norfolk Shipbuilding Drydock Corporation", "second_party": "Garris", "facts": "Christopher Garris' mother filed a complaint in Federal District Court alleging that her son died as the result of injuries he sustained while sandblasting aboard the USNS Maj. Stephen W. Pless. Because the vessel was berthed in the navigable waters of the United States, Garris invoked federal admiralty jurisdiction and sought damages under general maritime law. Garris asserted that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a federal claim. The court stated that no cause of action exists, under general maritime law, for death resulting from negligence. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that although the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet recognized a maritime cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the action was made appropriate by principles contained in precedent.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1348", "ID": "54935", "name": "Good News Club v. Milford Central School", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-2036", "docket": "99-2036", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Good News Club", "second_party": "Milford Central School", "facts": "Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was \"quintessentially religious\", and the activities \"fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'\" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
", "facts_len": "1219", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1349", "ID": "54936", "name": "Illinois v. McArthur", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1132", "docket": "99-1132", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "McArthur", "facts": "In 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her to her trailer, where she lived with her husband, Charles McArthur, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her belongings. While at the trailer, Tera alerted the officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer Richard Skidis, that her husband had marijuana hidden under the couch. Love then asked Charles for permission to search the trailer. Permission was denied and Love sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant. Love told Charles he could not reenter his trailer, unless a police officer accompanied him. Afterwards, Love stood just inside the door to observe Charles when he went into the trailer. About two hours later, a search warrant was obtained. Subsequently, a search of the trailer transpired and officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana. Charles McArthur was arrested. At trial, McArthur moved to suppress the drug paraphernalia and marijuana on the ground that they were the \"fruit\" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to \"have destroyed the marijuana.\" The trial court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the state's petition for leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1334", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1350", "ID": "54937", "name": "Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1295", "docket": "99-1295", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Gitlitz", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "In 1991, P. D. W. & A., Inc., an insolvent corporation taxed under Subchapter S, excluded its entire discharge of indebtedness amount from its gross income. David Gitlitz and other shareholders were assessed tax deficiencies because they used the untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. Ultimately, the Tax Court held that Gitlitz and others could not use an S corporation's untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their basis in corporate stock. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase their basis. In so holding, the court assumed that the excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to passthrough to shareholders.
", "facts_len": "905", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1351", "ID": "54938", "name": "Atwater v. City of Lago Vista", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1408", "docket": "99-1408", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Atwater", "second_party": "City of Lago Vista", "facts": "Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1352", "ID": "54939", "name": "Idaho v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-189", "docket": "00-189", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Idaho", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1873, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe agreed to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that U.S. negotiators agreed to set apart for the tribe's exclusive use. The reservation included part of the St. Joe River and virtually all of the Lake Coeur d'Alene. President Grant set the land aside in an 1873 Executive Order. In 1891, Congress ratified agreements in which the Tribe agreed to cede its rights to all land except that within the Executive Order reservation, and the Government promised to compensate the Tribe and agreed to hold the land forever as Indian land and the Tribe agreed to cede the reservation's northern portion, including two-thirds of the lake, for compensation. The United States initiated an action against Idaho to quiet title in the United States, in trust for the Tribe, to the submerged lands within the current reservation. The District Court quieted title in the United States as trustee, and the Tribe as beneficiary, to the bed and banks of the lake and the river within the reservation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1114", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1353", "ID": "54942", "name": "Arkansas v. Sullivan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/00-262", "docket": "00-262", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Arkansas", "second_party": "Sullivan", "facts": "In 1998, Officer Joe Taylor of the Conway, Arkansas, Police Department stopped Kenneth Andrew Sullivan for traffic violations. When Officer Taylor saw Sullivan's license, he realized that he was aware of narcotics intelligence regarding him. Sullivan was then arrested. Afterwards Officer Taylor conducted an inventory search of Sullivan's vehicle and discovered methamphetamine as well as items of drug paraphernalia. Ultimately, Sullivan was charged with various state-law drug offenses, unlawful possession of a weapon, and speeding. Sullivan moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that his arrest was merely a \"pretext and sham to search\" him and, therefore, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court granted the motion and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. In petitioning for rehearing, the State argued that the court had erred by taking into account Office Taylor's subjective motivation using Whren v. United States, which makes \"the ulterior motives of police officers...irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop.\" The court rejected the argument and denied the petition.
", "facts_len": "1166", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1354", "ID": "54941", "name": "Bartnicki v. Vopper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1687", "docket": "99-1687", "term": "2000", "first_party": "Bartnicki", "second_party": "Vopper", "facts": "An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing \"no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech.\" Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.
", "facts_len": "947", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1355", "ID": "54944", "name": "Chickasaw Nation v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-507", "docket": "00-507", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Chickasaw Nation", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions \"(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes\" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.
", "facts_len": "818", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1356", "ID": "54940", "name": "United States v. Hatter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2000/99-1978", "docket": "99-1978", "term": "2000", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Hatter", "facts": "In 1982, when Congress extended Medicare to federal employees, then-sitting federal judges began to have Medicare taxes withheld from their salaries. In 1983, Congress then required federal judges to participate in Social Security, except for those who contributed to a \"covered\" retirement program. A \"covered\" program was defined to include any retirement system to which an employee had to contribute, which did not encompass the noncontributory pension system for federal judges, whose financial obligations and payroll deductions therefore had to increase. A group of federal judges, who were appointed before 1983, filed suit arguing that the 1983 law violated the Constitution's Compensation Clause, which guarantees federal judges a \"Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.\" Ultimately, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a 1984 judicial salary increase cured any violation. In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that the Compensation Clause prevented the government from collecting Medicare and Social Security taxes from the judges and that the violation was not cured by the 1984 pay increase.
", "facts_len": "1157", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1357", "ID": "54945", "name": "Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-835", "docket": "01-835", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil", "second_party": "American Tobacco Company, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil (Sao Paulo) sued American Tobacco Company (American Tobacco) in Louisiana state court and argued that American Tobacco knowingly did not disclose information regarding the dangers of using tobacco products. Sao Paulo sought compensation for federal funds spent on medical care for tobacco-related illnesses. The case was moved to federal court, where Judge Carl J. Barbier presided over it. American Tobacco filed a motion requesting that Judge Barbier be removed from the case because he had been involved in a former case against American Tobacco and would not be able to impartially decide the case. Nine years earlier, the Louisiana Trial Lawyers Association had filed a brief in a case against American Tobacco that listed Judge Barbier as the president of the organization; however, Judge Barbier had retired six months prior and had not participated in the filing. Judge Barbier declined to remove himself from the case because he had not been involved in the previous case or any other tobacco-related cases and had no knowledge of the case at issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that, because Judge Barbier\u2019s name was listed on the earlier brief, a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality.
", "facts_len": "1311", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1358", "ID": "54946", "name": "Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1853", "docket": "00-1853", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Swierkiewicz", "second_party": "Sorema N.A.", "facts": "Akos Swierkiewicz, a 53-year-old native of Hungary, began working for Sorema N. A., a reinsurance company principally owned and controlled by a French parent corporation, in 1989. Six years later, the Chief Executive Officer, a French national, demoted Swierkiewicz from the position of senior vice president and chief underwriting officer to a marketing and services position with fewer responsibilities. A younger French national was promoted to Swierkiewicz's old position. Swierkiewicz filed suit, alleging that he had been fired on account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In dismissing the case, the District Court found that Swierkiewicz had not adequately alleged a prima facie case, in that he had not adequately alleged circumstances that support an inference of discrimination. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent requiring an employment discrimination complaint to allege facts constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792.
", "facts_len": "1167", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1359", "ID": "54948", "name": "US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1250", "docket": "00-1250", "term": "2001", "first_party": "US Airways, Inc.", "second_party": "Barnett", "facts": "In 1990, Robert Barnett injured his back while working in a cargo-handling position at US Airways. Invoking his seniority rights, Barnett transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom. Subsequently, Barnett's new position became open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways' seniority system and, ultimately, he lost his job. Barnett then filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against \"an individual with a disability\" who with \"reasonable accommodation\" can perform a job's essential functions unless the employer \"can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.\" In granting US Airways summary judgment, the District Court found that altering a seniority system would result in an \"undue hardship\" to both US Airways and its nondisabled employees. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.
", "facts_len": "1189", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1360", "ID": "54947", "name": "Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1089", "docket": "00-1089", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.", "second_party": "Williams", "facts": "In 1997, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. terminated Ella Williams, citing her poor attendance record. Subsequently, claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, Williams sued Toyota for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Granting Toyota summary judgment, the District Court held that Williams's impairment did not qualify as a disability under the ADA because it had not substantially limited any major life activity and that there was no evidence that Williams had had a record of a substantially limiting impairment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the impairments substantially limited Williams in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Because her ailments prevented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time, the appellate court concluded that Williams demonstrated that her manual disability involved a class of manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work.
", "facts_len": "1263", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1361", "ID": "54949", "name": "Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-927", "docket": "00-927", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Chao", "second_party": "Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.", "facts": "In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an \"inspected vessel\" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a \"workplace\" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a \"workplace\" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.
", "facts_len": "1356", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1362", "ID": "54950", "name": "Thompson v. Western States Medical Center", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-344", "docket": "01-344", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Thompson", "second_party": "Western States Medical Center", "facts": "The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts \"compounded drugs,\" or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.
", "facts_len": "1203", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1363", "ID": "54952", "name": "Adams v. Florida Power Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-584", "docket": "01-584", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Adams", "second_party": "Florida Power Corp.", "facts": "The Florida Power Corporation (FPC) operated as a publicly-regulated electric utility monopoly until 1992, when Congress opened the industry to competition through the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, FPR terminated Wanda Adams and others during a series of reorganizations the company stated were necessary to maintain its competitiveness. Members of the Adams class sued FPC, claiming that FPC discriminated against them because of their age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In 1996, the District Court conditionally certified a class of former FPC employees claiming age discrimination. In 1999, the court decertified the class and ruled as a matter of law that a disparate impact theory of liability is not available to plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADEA.
", "facts_len": "830", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1364", "ID": "54951", "name": "Dusenbery v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6567", "docket": "00-6567", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Dusenbery", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "979", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1365", "ID": "54954", "name": "Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1406", "docket": "00-1406", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Chevron U.S.A., Inc.", "second_party": "Echazabal", "facts": "Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1366", "ID": "54958", "name": "BE & K Construction Company v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-518", "docket": "01-518", "term": "2001", "first_party": "BE & K Construction Company", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K's claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K of committing an unfair labor practice.
", "facts_len": "1170", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1367", "ID": "54953", "name": "Zelman v. Simmons-Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1751", "docket": "00-1751", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Zelman", "second_party": "Simmons-Harris", "facts": "Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "966", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1368", "ID": "54959", "name": "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zandford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-147", "docket": "01-147", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "second_party": "Zandford", "facts": "In 1987, Charles Zandford, a securities broker, persuaded William Wood to open a joint investment account for himself and his mentally retarded daughter. The Woods gave Zandford discretion to manage the account and a general power of attorney to engage in securities transactions without their prior approval. After Wood died, all of the money that he had invested was gone. Subsequently, Zandford was indicted on federal wire fraud charges for selling securities in the Woods' account and making personal use of the proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also filed a civil complaint, alleging that Zandford had violated section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud the Woods and misappropriating their securities without their knowledge or consent. After Zandford's conviction in the criminal case, the District Court granted the SEC summary judgment in the civil case. In reversing, the Court of Appeals directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint, holding that neither the criminal conviction nor the allegations in the complaint established that Zandford's fraud was in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
", "facts_len": "1226", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1369", "ID": "54957", "name": "Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1770", "docket": "00-1770", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Department of Housing and Urban Development", "second_party": "Rucker", "facts": "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each \"public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.\" Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to \"assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises.\" After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the \"innocent\" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1370", "ID": "54962", "name": "Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-332", "docket": "01-332", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty.", "second_party": "Earls", "facts": "The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.
", "facts_len": "853", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1371", "ID": "54961", "name": "Gisbrecht v. Barnhart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-131", "docket": "01-131", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Gisbrecht", "second_party": "Barnhart", "facts": "Under 42 USC section 406(b), an attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may be awarded a reasonable fee not in excess of 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimant, payable out of the amount of the past-due benefits. After three individuals prevailed on their claims for Social Security disability benefits and successfully sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, their attorneys were to collect 25 percent of all past-due benefits recovered from each claimant, pursuant to contingent-fee agreements. In each case, the District Court declined to give effect to the attorney-client fee agreement, instead employing a \"lodestar\" method, under which the number of hours reasonably devoted to each case was multiplied by the reasonable hourly fee. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "863", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1372", "ID": "54960", "name": "Christopher v. Harbury", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-394", "docket": "01-394", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Christopher", "second_party": "Harbury", "facts": "Jennifer Harbury, a United States citizen, is the widow of Efrain Bamaca- Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader. Harbury alleged that Government officials intentionally deceived her in concealing information that her husband had been executed by Guatemalan army officers paid by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Harbury also alleged that this deception denied her access to the courts by leaving her without information, or reason to seek information, with which she could have brought a lawsuit that might have saved her husband's life. Harbury filed suit, listing 28 causes of action, for the violation of her constitutional right of access to courts. With respect to the access-to-courts counts, the District Court held that Harbury had not stated a valid cause of action. Given that she had not filed a prior suit, the court reasoned that she could only guess how the alleged cover-up might have prejudiced her rights to bring a separate action and that the defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dismissal of one of Harbury's claims for denial of access to courts.
", "facts_len": "1134", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1373", "ID": "54963", "name": "Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services v. Blumer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-952", "docket": "00-952", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services", "second_party": "Blumer", "facts": "The spousal impoverishment provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) permit a spouse living at home to reserve certain income and assets to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs he or she will have when the other spouse is institutionalized, usually in a nursing home, and becomes eligible for Medicaid. The MCCA's resource allocation rules provide that, in determining the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid eligibility, a portion of the couple's resources, called the \"community spouse resource allowance\" (CSRA), shall be reserved for the benefit of the community spouse. The MCCA allows an increase in the standard allowance if either spouse shows, at a state-administered hearing, that the community spouse will not be able to maintain the statutorily defined minimum level of income on which to live after the institutionalized spouse gains Medicaid eligibility. In 1996, after entering a Wisconsin nursing home, Irene Blumer applied for Medicaid through her husband Burnett and ultimately sought a higher CSRA. Under the \"income-first\" method for determining whether the community spouse is entitled to a higher CSRA, which Wisconsin uses, the State considers first whether potential income transfers from the institutionalized spouse will suffice to enable the community spouse to meet monthly needs once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid. Subsequently, an examiner denied Blumer's request. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State's income-first statute conflicted with the MCCA, which, the appeals court held, unambiguously mandates the resources-first method.
", "facts_len": "1689", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1374", "ID": "54964", "name": "Kelly v. South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-9280", "docket": "00-9280", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Kelly", "second_party": "South Carolina", "facts": "After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a \"butcher,\" \"bloody,\" and \"dangerous.\" Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when \"a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'\" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.
", "facts_len": "1314", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1375", "ID": "54965", "name": "Harris v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-10666", "docket": "00-10666", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Harris", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "William Harris, who sold illegal narcotics at his pawnshop with an unconcealed semiautomatic pistol at his side, was convicted for violating 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), which provides that a person who in relation to a drug trafficking crime uses or carries a firearm \"shall, in addition to the punishment for such crime...if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to...not less than 7 years.\" When his presentence report recommended that he receive the 7-year minimum sentence, Harris objected, arguing that brandishing was an element of a separate statutory offense for which he was not indicted or convicted. The District Court found that Harris had brandished the gun and sentenced him to seven years in prison. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a statute that increased the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory maximum, foreclosed his argument that if brandishing is a sentencing factor, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466.
", "facts_len": "1095", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1376", "ID": "54966", "name": "Alabama v. Shelton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1214", "docket": "00-1214", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Alabama", "second_party": "Shelton", "facts": "Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, \"that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period.\" The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
", "facts_len": "982", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1377", "ID": "54970", "name": "United States v. Cotton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-687", "docket": "01-687", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Cotton", "facts": "A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that \"other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\" In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.
", "facts_len": "1292", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1378", "ID": "54967", "name": "McKune v. Lile", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1187", "docket": "00-1187", "term": "2001", "first_party": "McKune", "second_party": "Lile", "facts": "A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an \"Admission of Responsibility\" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1379", "ID": "54968", "name": "Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-46", "docket": "01-46", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Federal Maritime Commission", "second_party": "South Carolina State Ports Authority", "facts": "South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.
", "facts_len": "1186", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1380", "ID": "54969", "name": "Mickens v. Taylor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-9285", "docket": "00-9285", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Mickens", "second_party": "Taylor", "facts": "A Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect.
", "facts_len": "992", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1381", "ID": "54973", "name": "Stewart v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-339", "docket": "01-339", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Terry L. Stewart, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Robert Douglas Smith", "facts": "Robert Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Smith filed a series of petitions for state postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Superior Court denied Smith's claims, finding them waived under Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) because he failed to raise them in his previous Rule 32 petitions. The court rejected Smith's argument that his failure to raise these claims was also due to ineffective assistance because his prior appellate and Rule 32 counsel, who are members of the Arizona Public Defender's office, refused to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims because his trial counsel was also a member of the Public Defender's office. The Federal District Court held that Smith's claim was barred by the lower court's procedural ruling. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedural default was not independent of federal law and thus did not bar federal review of the merits of Smith's claim. The appellate court reasoned that Arizona Rule 32.2(a)(3) applies a different standard for waiver depending on whether the claim asserted in a Rule 32 petition was of sufficient constitutional magnitude and that determination whether a claim is of sufficient magnitude required consideration of the merits of the claim.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1382", "ID": "54974", "name": "United States v. Bass", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-1471", "docket": "01-1471", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "John Bass", "facts": "In 1998, John Bass, a black man, was charged with two counts of homicide with a firearm in federal court, and the government filed notice of the intent to pursue the death penalty. Bass moved to dismiss the death penalty notice, and he filed a discovery request for information regarding the government\u2019s death penalty charging practices and statistics by arguing that the government\u2019s capital charging practices were racially motivated. The district court granted Bass\u2019 motion for discovery and, after the government informed the court that it would not comply with the order, dismissed the death penalty notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision to grant Bass\u2019 motion.
", "facts_len": "731", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1383", "ID": "54972", "name": "Thomas v. Chicago Park District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1249", "docket": "00-1249", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Thomas", "second_party": "Chicago Park District", "facts": "The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "947", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1384", "ID": "54971", "name": "Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1021", "docket": "00-1021", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Rush Prudential HMO, Inc.", "second_party": "Moran", "facts": "Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., a health maintenance organization that provides medical services for employee welfare benefits plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), denied Debra Moran's request to have surgery by an unaffiliated specialist. Under the Illinois HMO Act (Act), which provides that \"in the event that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary,\" the HMO \"shall provide\" the service, Moran made a written demand for an independent medical review of her claim. After Rush refused her demand, Moran sued in state court to compel compliance with the Act. The court ordered the review, which found the treatment necessary. While the suit was pending, Moran had the surgery and amended her complaint to seek reimbursement. Rush removed the case to federal court, arguing that the amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found Moran's reimbursement claim preempted by ERISA so as to place the case in federal court, but it concluded that the Act was not preempted as a state law that \"relates to\" an employee benefit plan because it also \"regulates insurance\" under ERISA's saving clause.
", "facts_len": "1221", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1385", "ID": "54975", "name": "Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-730", "docket": "00-730", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Adarand Constructors, Inc.", "second_party": "Mineta", "facts": "In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, held that strict scrutiny governs whether race-based classifications violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Adarand I). The Court then remanded the case for a determination whether the race-based components of the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program could withstand this standard of review. Ultimately, the Court remanded Adarand for a second time for a determination on the merits consistent with Adarand I. When the Court of Appeals held, that by virtue of a new regulatory framework under which the DOT's state and local DBE program now operated, that program passed constitutional muster, the Court again certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the strict scrutiny standard announced in Adarand I.
", "facts_len": "915", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1386", "ID": "54976", "name": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1823", "docket": "99-1823", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "second_party": "Waffle House, Inc.", "facts": "Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.
", "facts_len": "1169", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1387", "ID": "54977", "name": "Horn v. Banks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-1385", "docket": "01-1385", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Horn", "second_party": "Banks", "facts": "George Banks was convicted of 12 counts of first-degree murder. After Banks' direct appeal was denied, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors unanimously to agree that a particular mitigating circumstance exists before they are permitted to consider that circumstance in their sentencing determination. Under this new case law, Mills argued that the jurors in his trial were instructed improperly. Custodial officials argued that the law was not applicable retroactively on habeas corpus review. Ultimately, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rule on retroactivity, the Federal Court of Appeals concluded that the State Supreme Court had unreasonably applied federal law in evaluating Banks' claim that his penalty phase jury instructions and verdict forms were improper under Mills without evaluating retroactivity.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1388", "ID": "54978", "name": "Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1786", "docket": "99-1786", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Company", "second_party": "Knudson", "facts": "In 1992, a car accident rendered Janette Knudson a quadriplegic. At that time, Knudson was covered by the Health and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Earth Systems, Inc. (the Plan), which covered $411,157.11 of her medical expenses, most of which were paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. The Plan contains a reimbursement provision, which gives it the right to recover from a beneficiary any payment for benefits paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party. After Knudson filed a state-court tort action to recover from the manufacturer of her car and others, she negotiated a settlement that earmarked $13,828.70 to satisfy Great-West's reimbursement claim. Great-West then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce the Plan's reimbursement provision by requiring Knudson to pay the Plan $411,157.11 of any proceeds recovered from third parties. The District Court granted Knudson summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that that judicially decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third party is not equitable relief authorized by ERISA.
", "facts_len": "1223", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1389", "ID": "54979", "name": "Carey v. Saffold", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-301", "docket": "01-301", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Carey", "second_party": "Saffold", "facts": "The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits.
", "facts_len": "1321", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1390", "ID": "54980", "name": "Porter v. Nussle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-853", "docket": "00-853", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Porter", "second_party": "Nussle", "facts": "In 1999, Ronald Nussle, an inmate at the Cheshire Correctional Institution in Connecticut, filed a federal action under 42 USC section 1983, charging that certain correction officers had subjected him to a sustained pattern of harassment and intimidation and had singled him out for a severe beating in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In doing so, Nussle did not file a grievance under the applicable Connecticut Department of Correction procedures. Based on the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that PLRA directs that \"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983...or any other Federal law, by a prisoner...until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for a claim of the kind Nussle asserted. Citing legislative history, the appellate court found that the phrase \"prisons conditions\" covers only conditions affecting prisoners generally, not single incidents that immediately affect only particular prisoners.
", "facts_len": "1138", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1391", "ID": "54981", "name": "TRW Inc. v. Andrews", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1045", "docket": "00-1045", "term": "2001", "first_party": "TRW Inc.", "second_party": "Andrews", "facts": "In 1993, while at a doctor's office in California, Adelaide Andrews filled out a form listing her name, Social Security number, and other basic information. An office receptionist named Andrea Andrews copied the data and later moved to Las Vegas, where she attempted to open credit accounts using Adelaide's Social Security number and her own last name and address. Thereafter, TRW Inc. furnished copies of Adelaide's credit report to companies from which Andrea sought credit. In 1996, Adelaide filed suit, alleging that TRW had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to verify predisclosure of her credit report to third parties. TRW moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the FCRA's statute of limitations had expired on Adelaide's claims stemming from TRW's first two disclosures because both occurred more than two years before she brought suit. Adelaide countered that the limitations period on those claims did not commence until she discovered the disclosures. The District Court held the two claims time-barred. In reversing, the Court of Appeals applied what it considered to be a general federal rule that a statute of limitations starts running when a party knows or has reason to know she was injured, unless Congress expressly legislates otherwise.
", "facts_len": "1298", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1392", "ID": "54983", "name": "Ring v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-488", "docket": "01-488", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Ring", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1393", "ID": "54982", "name": "Barnhart v. Walton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1937", "docket": "00-1937", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Barnhart", "second_party": "Walton", "facts": "The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an \"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.\" After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his \"inability\" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies \"impairment\" not \"inability,\" that no similar duration requirement relates to an \"inability,\" and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his \"inability\" would have been \"expected\" to last 12 months.
", "facts_len": "1298", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1394", "ID": "54985", "name": "Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1595", "docket": "00-1595", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. hired Jose Castro on the basis of documents appearing to verify his authorization to work in the United States. After Castro engaged in union-organizing activities, Hoffman laid him off. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the layoff violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and ordered backpay for Castro. At a compliance hearing, Castor testified before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that he was born in Mexico, that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, this country, and that he gained employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate that was not his. The ALJ found that Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility, precluded Castro's award. In reversing, the Board noted that the most effective way to further the immigration policies embodied in IRCA is to provide the NLRA's protections and remedies to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
", "facts_len": "1200", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1395", "ID": "54986", "name": "Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1307", "docket": "00-1307", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Barnhart", "second_party": "Sigmon Coal Company, Inc.", "facts": "The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 restructured the system for providing private health care benefits to coal industry retirees by merging two previous benefits plans into the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. The fund is financed by annual premiums assessed against signatory coal operators, or those who signed any agreement requiring contributions to the plans that were merged into the Fund. If the signatory is no longer in business, the Act assigns liability for beneficiaries to a defined group of \"related persons\" based on the Commissioner of Social Security assignments. Shortly after Jericol Mining Co. was formed in 1973 as Irdell Mining, Inc., Irdell purchased the coal mining operating assets of Shackleford Coal Co., which was a signatory to a coal wage agreement while it was in business. Between 1993 and 1997, the Commissioner assigned responsibility for 86 retired miners to Jericol, determining that as a successor in interest to Shackleford, Jericol qualified as a related person. All of these retirees had worked for Shackleford, but none of them had actually worked for Jericol. Jericol filed suit against the Commissioner. The District Court granted Jericol summary judgment, concluding that the Act's classification regime does not provide for the liability of successors of defunct signatory operators. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that Jericol was not a related person to Shackleford and thus could not be held responsible for Shackleford's miners.
", "facts_len": "1537", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1396", "ID": "54987", "name": "Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-408", "docket": "01-408", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Holmes Group, Inc.", "second_party": "Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.", "facts": "Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., is a manufacturer of patented fans and heaters. In 1992, Vornado sued Duracraft Corp., claiming that Duracraft's use of a spiral grill design in its fans infringed Vornado's trade dress. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Vornado had no protectible trade-dress rights in the grill design. Later, Vornado filed a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission, claiming that Holmes Group, Inc.'s sale of fans and heaters with a spiral grill design infringed Vornado's trade dress. Subsequently, Holmes filed a federal-court action, seeking a declaratory judgment that its products did not infringe Vornado's trade dress and an injunction restraining Vornado from accusing it of such infringement. In response, Vornado asserted a compulsory patent-infringement counterclaim. The District Court ruled in Holmes's favor. Vornado appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, notwithstanding Holmes's challenge to its jurisdiction, vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case.
", "facts_len": "1070", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1397", "ID": "54988", "name": "Kansas v. Crane", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-957", "docket": "00-957", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Crane", "facts": "In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- \"mental abnormality or personality disorder\" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding.
", "facts_len": "940", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1398", "ID": "54990", "name": "United States v. Fior D'Italia, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-463", "docket": "01-463", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Fior D'Italia, Inc.", "facts": "Employers must pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes, calculated as a percentage of the wages, including tips, that their employees receive. In 1991 and 1992, Fior D'Italia restaurant paid FICA taxes based on the tip amount its employees reported, but the reports also showed that the tips listed on customers' credit card slips far exceeded the reported amount. The IRS made a compliance check and assessed additional FICA taxes using an \"aggregate estimation\" method, under which it examined the credit card slips; found the average percentage tip paid by those customers; assumed that cash-paying customers paid at same rate; calculated total tips by multiplying the tip rates by Fior D'Italia's total receipts; subtracted the tips already reported; applied the FICA tax rate to the remainder; and assessed additional taxes owed. Fior D'Italia filed a refund suit, claiming that the tax statutes did not authorize the IRS to use the aggregate estimation method. The District Court ruled for Fior D'Italia, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1399", "ID": "54992", "name": "United States v. Arvizu", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1519", "docket": "00-1519", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Arvizu", "facts": "In 1998, Ralph Arvizu was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop Arvizu, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. Arvizu was charged with possession with intent to distribute. Arvizu moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one.
", "facts_len": "1344", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1400", "ID": "54989", "name": "Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1543", "docket": "00-1543", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Festo Corporation", "second_party": "Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Company", "facts": "Festo Corporation owns two patents for an improved magnetic rodless cylinder, a piston-driven device that relies on magnets to move objects in a conveying system. When the patent examiner rejected the initial application for the first patent because of defects in description, the application was amended to add the new limitations that the device would contain a pair of one-way sealing rings and that its outer sleeve would be made of a magnetizable material. The second patent was also amended during a reexamination proceeding to add the sealing rings limitation. After Festo began selling its device, SMC entered the market with a similar device that uses one two-way sealing ring and a nonmagnetizable sleeve. Festo filed suit, claiming that SMC's device is so similar that it infringes Festo's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Rejecting SMC's argument that the prosecution history, or the public record of the patent proceedings, estopped Festo from saying that SMC's device was similar, the District Court ruled in Festo's favor. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the prosecution history estoppel applied, ruling that estoppel arises from any amendment that narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act. The Court of Appeals also held that, when estoppel applies, it bars any claim of equivalence for the element that was amended.
", "facts_len": "1374", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1401", "ID": "54991", "name": "JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-651", "docket": "01-651", "term": "2001", "first_party": "JPMorgan Chase Bank", "second_party": "Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.", "facts": "Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is \"between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state,\" and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking.
", "facts_len": "985", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1402", "ID": "54994", "name": "Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1293", "docket": "00-1293", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Ashcroft", "second_party": "American Civil Liberties Union", "facts": "Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only \"material that is harmful to minors.\" Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply \"contemporary community standards\" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.
", "facts_len": "956", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1403", "ID": "54993", "name": "Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1167", "docket": "00-1167", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.", "second_party": "Tahoe Regional Planning Agency", "facts": "The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.
", "facts_len": "917", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1404", "ID": "54996", "name": "National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1614", "docket": "00-1614", "term": "2001", "first_party": "National Railroad Passenger Corporation", "second_party": "Morgan", "facts": "Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff shall file an employment discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) either 180 or 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Abner Morgan filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging that he had been subjected to discrete discriminatory and retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work environment throughout his employment. The EEOC issued a \"Notice of Right to Sue.\" While some of the allegedly discriminatory acts occurred within 300 days of the time that Morgan filed his EEOC charge, many took place prior to that period. The District Court granted Amtrak summary judgment in part, holding that the company could not be liable for conduct occurring outside of the 300-day filing period. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may sue on claims that would ordinarily be time-barred so long as they either are sufficiently related to incidents that fall within the statutory period or are part of a systematic policy or practice of discrimination that took place, at least in part, within the period.
", "facts_len": "1248", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1405", "ID": "54999", "name": "Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-860", "docket": "00-860", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Correctional Services Corporation", "second_party": "Malesko", "facts": "In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.
", "facts_len": "1273", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1406", "ID": "54998", "name": "Atkins v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-8452", "docket": "00-8452", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Atkins", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally disabled (or \"mentally retarded\" in the vernacular of the day). The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.
", "facts_len": "795", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1407", "ID": "55001", "name": "United States v. Knights", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1260", "docket": "00-1260", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Knights", "facts": "A California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. The probation order included the following condition: that Knights would \"submit his...person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.\" In the aftermath of arson at the site of a Pacific Gas and Electric (PGE) power transformer, a sheriff's detective, with reasonable suspicion, searched Knights's apartment. Based in part on items recovered, including a PGE padlock, a federal grand jury indicted Knights for conspiracy to commit arson, for possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition. In granting Knights's motion to suppress, the District Court held that, although the detective had reasonable suspicion to believe that Knights was involved with incendiary materials, the search was for \"investigatory\" rather than \"probationary\" purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1082", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1408", "ID": "55000", "name": "Owasso Independent School District No. I-011 v. Falvo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1073", "docket": "00-1073", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Owasso Independent School District No. I-011", "second_party": "Falvo", "facts": "Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' \"education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)\" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as \"records, files, documents, and other materials\" containing information directly related to a student, which \"are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.\" Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not \"education records.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are \"education records,\" such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.
", "facts_len": "1287", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1409", "ID": "55003", "name": "New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-568", "docket": "00-568", "term": "2001", "first_party": "New York", "second_party": "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "facts": "In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over \"the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce\" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination \"with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction.\" Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.
", "facts_len": "1567", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1410", "ID": "55002", "name": "Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6029", "docket": "00-6029", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Ragsdale", "second_party": "Wolverine World Wide, Inc.", "facts": "The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave \"and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement,\" that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1152", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1411", "ID": "55006", "name": "United States v. Drayton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-631", "docket": "01-631", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Drayton", "facts": "Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused.
", "facts_len": "1355", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1412", "ID": "55004", "name": "Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-795", "docket": "00-795", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Ashcroft", "second_party": "Free Speech Coalition", "facts": "The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits \"any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture\" that \"is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,\" and any sexually explicit image that is \"advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression\" it depicts \"a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.\" The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the \"appears to be\" and \"conveys the impression\" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
", "facts_len": "1046", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1413", "ID": "55005", "name": "National Cable and Telecommunications Association v. Gulf Power Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-832", "docket": "00-832", "term": "2001", "first_party": "National Cable and Telecommunications Association", "second_party": "Gulf Power Company", "facts": "The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes \"any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way.\" After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.
", "facts_len": "930", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1414", "ID": "55007", "name": "Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-511", "docket": "00-511", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Verizon Communications, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 entitles new companies seeking to enter local telephone service markets to lease elements of the incumbent carriers' local exchange networks and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prescribe methods for state utility commissions to use in setting rates for the sharing of those elements. The FCC provided for the rates to be set based upon the forward-looking economic cost of an element as the sum of the total element long-run incremental cost of the element (TELRIC) and a reasonable allocation of forward-looking common costs incurred in providing a group of elements that cannot be attributed directly to individual elements and specified that the TELRIC should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration. FCC regulations also contain combination rules, requiring an incumbent to perform the functions necessary to combine network elements for an entrant, unless the combination is not technically feasible. In five separate cases, a range of parties challenged the FCC regulations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that the use of the TELRIC methodology was foreclosed because the Act plainly required rates based on the actual cost of providing the network element and invalidated certain combination rules.
", "facts_len": "1381", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1415", "ID": "55008", "name": "City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-799", "docket": "00-799", "term": "2001", "first_party": "City of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Alameda Books, Inc.", "facts": "Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.
", "facts_len": "1199", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1416", "ID": "55010", "name": "J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/99-1996", "docket": "99-1996", "term": "2001", "first_party": "J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc.", "second_party": "Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.", "facts": "Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. holds 17 utility patents issued under 35 USC section 101 that cover the manufacture, use, sale, and offer for sale of its hybrid corn seed products. Pioneer sells its patented hybrid seeds under a limited label license that allows only the production of grain and/or forage. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., doing business as Farm Advantage, Inc., bought patented seeds from Pioneer in bags bearing the license agreement and then resold the bags. Subsequently, Pioneer filed a patent infringement suit. In response, Farm Advantage filed a patent invalidity counterclaim, arguing that sexually reproducing plants, such as Pioneer's corn plants, are not patentable subject matter within section 101. Farm Advantage maintained that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) and the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) set forth the exclusive statutory means for protecting plant life. The District Court granted Pioneer summary judgment. The court held that section 101 clearly covers plant life and that in enacting the PPA and the PVPA, Congress neither expressly nor implicitly removed plants from section 101's subject matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1417", "ID": "55009", "name": "City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-419", "docket": "01-419", "term": "2001", "first_party": "City of Columbus", "second_party": "Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc.", "facts": "Pursuant to 49 USC section 14501(c)(2)(A), federal preemption prescriptions relating to motor carriers \"shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.\" Columbus, Ohio, extensively regulates the operation of tow trucks seeking to pick up vehicles within city limits. Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., a tow-truck operator and a trade association of such operators, sought to enjoin enforcement of the City's tow-truck regulations on the ground that they were preempted. The District Court granted Ours Garage summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals relied on precedent that section 14501(c)(1)'s preemption rule explicitly applies to \"a State [or] political subdivision of a State,\" while the exception for safety regulations, section 14501(c)(2)(A), refers only to the \"authority of a State.\" The appellate court also noted that precedent determined that the contrast in statutory language indicated that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to States alone.
", "facts_len": "1039", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1418", "ID": "55014", "name": "Utah v. Evans", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-714", "docket": "01-714", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Utah", "second_party": "Evans", "facts": "In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used \"hot-deck imputation\" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of \"the statistical method known as 'sampling,'\" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an \"actual Enumeration be made.\" Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.
", "facts_len": "1199", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1419", "ID": "55013", "name": "Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1737", "docket": "00-1737", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc.", "second_party": "Village of Stratton", "facts": "The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1420", "ID": "55015", "name": "Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-298", "docket": "01-298", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Lapides", "second_party": "Board of Regents of University System of Georgia", "facts": "Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.
", "facts_len": "978", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1421", "ID": "55016", "name": "Gonzaga University v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-679", "docket": "01-679", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Gonzaga University", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.
", "facts_len": "1130", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1422", "ID": "55017", "name": "United States v. Craft", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1831", "docket": "00-1831", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Craft", "facts": "When Don Craft failed to pay federal income tax liabilities for the failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986, a federal tax lien attached to \"all [of his] property and rights to property,\" pursuant to 26 USC section 6321. After the notice of the lien was filed, Dan and his wife Sandra L. Craft jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer to her his interest in a piece of real property in Michigan that they owned as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agreed to release the lien and allow the Crafts to sell the property with half the net proceeds to be held in escrow pending determination of the Government's interest in the property. After Sandra brought an action to quiet title to the escrowed proceeds, the Government claimed that its lien had attached to the husband's interest in the tenancy by the entirety. The District Court granted the Government summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, however, held that no lien attached because the husband had no separate interest in the entireties property under Michigan law.
", "facts_len": "1121", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1423", "ID": "55018", "name": "United States v. Ruiz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-595", "docket": "01-595", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ruiz", "facts": "After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her a \"fast track\" plea bargain in which she would waive indictment, trial, and an appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence recommendation. The prosecutors' offer requires that the defendant waive the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as information supporting any affirmative defense she raises if the case goes to trial. When Ruiz rejected the waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their offer, indicted her for unlawful drug possession, and she pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same reduced sentence that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the plea bargain. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it. In vacating the sentence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to certain impeachment information.
", "facts_len": "1020", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1424", "ID": "55020", "name": "Young v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1567", "docket": "00-1567", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Young", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Cornelius and Suzanne Young failed to include payment with their 1992 income tax return, which was due and filed on October 15, 1993. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed a tax liability against them. After filing a Chapter 13 petition, the Youngs ultimately filed a Chapter 7 petition and were granted a discharge, meaning that Youngs had no assets available to satisfy unsecured creditors, including the IRS. If the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a claim for certain taxes for which the return was due within three years before the individual taxpayer files a bankruptcy petition, its claim enjoys eighth priority under 11 USC section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 523(a)(1)(A). When the IRS subsequently demanded that they pay the tax debt, the Youngs asked the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the Chapter 7 case and declare the debt discharged under section 523(a)(1)(A), claiming that it fell outside section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s \"three-year lookback period\" because it pertained to a tax return due more than three years before their Chapter 7 filing. The District Court held that the \"lookback period\" is tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition and concluded that the 1992 debt had not been discharged when the Youngs were granted a discharge under Chapter 7. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1379", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1425", "ID": "55019", "name": "Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1531", "docket": "00-1531", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Verizon Maryland, Inc.", "second_party": "Public Service Commission of Maryland", "facts": "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.
", "facts_len": "1412", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1426", "ID": "55022", "name": "Barnes v. Gorman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-682", "docket": "01-682", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Barnes", "second_party": "Gorman", "facts": "Jeffrey Gorman is a paraplegic. After being arrested, he was transported to a Kansas City police station in a van that was not equipped to accommodate the disabled. Gorman was removed from his wheelchair and seatbelted to a bench in the van. During the ride, Gorman fell to the floor, suffering serious injuries that left him unable to work full time. Gorman sued certain Kansas police officials for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of persons with spinal cord injuries. A jury awarded him compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court vacated as to punitive damages, holding that they are unavailable in private suits brought under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found punitive damages available under a general rule that absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief for violation of a federal right.
", "facts_len": "1131", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1427", "ID": "55024", "name": "United States v. Vonn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-973", "docket": "00-973", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Vonn", "facts": "Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures \"which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded\" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions.
", "facts_len": "1315", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1428", "ID": "55023", "name": "Devlin v. Scardelletti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-417", "docket": "01-417", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Devlin", "second_party": "Scardelletti", "facts": "Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union, participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living increase (COLA). In 1997, the Plan's trustees eliminated the COLA because the Plan could not support such a large benefits increase. The trustees also filed a class action in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1997 elimination was binding on all Plan members or that the 1991 COLA was void. After the District Court conditionally certified a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and the trustees asked the court to approve their settlement with the class representatives, Devlin moved to intervene. The court denied his motion as untimely. The court then heard objections to the settlement, including those advanced by Devlin, and approved the settlement. In affirming the District Court's denial of Devlins's intervention, the Court of Appeals held that, because Devlin was not a named class representative and because he had been properly denied the right to intervene, he lacked standing to challenge the settlement.
", "facts_len": "1201", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1429", "ID": "55025", "name": "United States Postal Service v. Gregory", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-758", "docket": "00-758", "term": "2001", "first_party": "United States Postal Service", "second_party": "Gregory", "facts": "Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.
", "facts_len": "1101", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1430", "ID": "55027", "name": "Edelman v. Lynchburg College", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1072", "docket": "00-1072", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Edelman", "second_party": "Lynchburg College", "facts": "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that a charge of employment discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) \"within [a specified number of] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.\" An EEOC regulation permits an otherwise timely filer to verify a charge after the time for filing has expired. In November 1997, Leonard Edelman faxed a letter to the EEOC, claiming that Lynchburg College had subjected him to gender-based, national origin, and religious discrimination after it denied him tenure. The EEOC informed Edelman of the 300-day time limit and sent him a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which he returned 313 days after he was denied tenure. The District Court dismissed the Title VII complaint, finding that the letter was not a charge under Title VII because neither Edelman nor the EEOC treated it as one. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that because a charge requires verification and must be filed within the limitations period, it follows that a charge must be verified within that period.
", "facts_len": "1097", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1431", "ID": "55026", "name": "Bell v. Cone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-400", "docket": "01-400", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "second_party": "Gary Bradford Cone", "facts": "Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be \"contrary to\" or involve \"an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing.
", "facts_len": "1319", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1432", "ID": "55028", "name": "Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-1514", "docket": "00-1514", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Raygor", "second_party": "Regents of University of Minnesota", "facts": "In 1996, Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed complaints in Federal District Court against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, stemming from an alleged incident in which the university attempted to compel them to accept early retirement. They refused. Subsequently, their jobs were reclassified to reduce their salaries. The complaints alleged a federal cause of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and a state law discrimination action under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which purports to toll the limitations period for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The District Court ultimately dismissed their cases on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Before the dismissal, Raygor and Goodrich refilled their state law claims in state court. The university contended that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll the limitations period on those claims because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court held the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute unconstitutional when applied to claims against nonconsenting state defendants, such as the university.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1433", "ID": "55029", "name": "Lee v. Kemna", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/00-6933", "docket": "00-6933", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Lee", "second_party": "Kemna", "facts": "While on trial for first-degree murder, Remon Lee planned an alibi defense. His mother, stepfather, and sister were to voluntarily testify that he was in California at the time of the murder. The day the defense was to begin its case, the three could not be found. Lee's counsel moved for an overnight continuance to gain time to find the witnesses. The trial judge denied the motion. Subsequently, no alibi witnesses testified, the jury found Lee guilty, and he was sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole. The Missouri Court of Appeals eventually disposed of the case on state procedural grounds. The appeals court held that the denial of the continuance motion was proper because Lee's counsel had failed to comply with Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.09, which requires that such motions be in writing and accompanied by an affidavit, and with Rule 24.10, which sets out the showings a movant must make to gain a continuance grounded on witnesses' absence. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled that federal review of Lee's claim, that the refusal to grant his continuance motion deprived him of his federal due process right to a defense, was unavailable because the state court's rejection of that claim rested on state-law grounds, independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.
", "facts_len": "1347", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1434", "ID": "55030", "name": "Ewing v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-6978", "docket": "01-6978", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Gary Ewing", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "1142", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1435", "ID": "55031", "name": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1289", "docket": "01-1289", "term": "2002", "first_party": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company", "second_party": "Campbell", "facts": "Although investigators concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability and took the case to trial. State Farm assured the Campbells that they would represent their interests. After losing in court, the Campbells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In the first part of the trial, the jury found State Farm's decision not to settle unreasonable. In the second part, the trial court denied State Farm's renewed motion to exclude dissimilar out-of-state conduct evidence, ruling such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages. The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $1 million and $25 million respectively. The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.
", "facts_len": "1109", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1436", "ID": "55032", "name": "Entergy Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-299", "docket": "02-299", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Entergy Louisiana, Inc.", "second_party": "Louisiana Public Service Commission", "facts": "\u00a0
\nSeveral Louisiana cotton gins sued Entergy, an electric utility company, because it had over-billed them for electricity between 1988 and 1994. The gins claimed that Entergy had failed to notify them of a lower rate that would have saved them more than $2 million over the six-year period. Louisiana law requires that utility companies notify customers when they are eligible for a lower rate. Furthermore, the gins claimed that Entergy had discriminated against them by notifying several other gins in the state of the lower rate. Deferring to the decision of the Louisiana Public Service Commission, the state's utility regulatory agency, a state district court ruled against Entergy. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the decision on appeal.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "776", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1437", "ID": "55033", "name": "Kaupp v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-5636", "docket": "02-5636", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Robert Kaupp", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "In January 1999, a 14-year-old girl disappeared. The police discovered that she had been having a sexual relationship with her 19-year-old half-brother, who had been with Robert Kaupp on the day of the girl\u2019s disappearance. The police questioned the girl\u2019s half-brother and Kaupp at police headquarters and allowed Kaupp to leave. The half-brother later confessed to stabbing the missing girl and implicated Kaupp in the crime. The police failed to obtain a warrant to question Kaupp, but they went to his home in the middle of the night and were given permission to enter by Kaupp\u2019s father. Police officers awakened Kaupp and said, \u201cWe need to go and talk,\u201d and Kaupp responded, \u201cOkay.\u201d Wearing only his pajamas and no shoes, Kaupp was handcuffed and taken for questioning. There is no evidence that Kaupp was told he could decline to go with the officers for questioning. Kaupp was read his Miranda rights at the police station and, after being informed of the half-brother\u2019s confession, admitted to some involvement in the crime. At trial, Kaupp moved to suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest. The motion was denied, and Kaupp was convicted of murder and sentenced to 55 years in prison. The Texas Court of Appeals confirmed the district court\u2019s conviction and held that no arrest had occurred until after Kaupp\u2019s confession because Kaupp\u2019s statement indicated that he consented to going with the officers. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review.
", "facts_len": "1502", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1438", "ID": "55035", "name": "Nike, Inc. v. Kasky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-575", "docket": "02-575", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Nike, Inc.", "second_party": "Marc Kasky", "facts": "Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made \"false statements and/or material omissions of fact\" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.
", "facts_len": "912", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1439", "ID": "55034", "name": "Demore v. Kim", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1491", "docket": "01-1491", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Demore", "second_party": "Kim", "facts": "Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.
", "facts_len": "973", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1440", "ID": "55037", "name": "Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-337", "docket": "02-337", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Breuer", "second_party": "Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc.", "facts": "Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court \"unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress.\" Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "752", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1441", "ID": "55036", "name": "Pierce County v. Guillen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1229", "docket": "01-1229", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Pierce County", "second_party": "Guillen", "facts": "The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials \"compiled or collected\" for purposes of the program \"shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding.\" In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1442", "ID": "55038", "name": "Clay v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1500", "docket": "01-1500", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Clay", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one-year time limitation that runs from \"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.\" The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "975", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1443", "ID": "55039", "name": "Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-270", "docket": "01-270", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Yellow Transportation, Inc.", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Before 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that \"will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991.\" In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991.
", "facts_len": "1450", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1444", "ID": "55041", "name": "Virginia v. Black", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1107", "docket": "01-1107", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Virginia", "second_party": "Black", "facts": "Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony \"for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place,\" and specifies that \"any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.\" At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required \"intent to intimidate\" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.
", "facts_len": "1150", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1445", "ID": "55042", "name": "Archer v. Warner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1418", "docket": "01-1418", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Archer", "second_party": "Warner", "facts": "In 1991, Leonard and Arlene Warner sold the Warner Manufacturing Company to Elliott and Carol Archer. Subsequently, the Archers sued the Warners for fraud connected with the sale. In settling the lawsuit, the Archers executed releases except for obligations under a $100,000 promissory note and then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. After the Warners failed to make the first payment on the promissory note, the Archers sued in state court. The Warners filed for bankruptcy, and the Bankruptcy Court ordered liquidation under Chapter 7. The Archers then brought a claim asking the Bankruptcy Court to find the $100,000 debt nondischargeable and to order the Warners to pay the sum. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy \"to the extent\" it is \"for money...obtained by...false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.\" The Bankruptcy Court denied the Archers' claim. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1446", "ID": "55040", "name": "Gratz v. Bollinger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-516", "docket": "02-516", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Jennifer Gratz", "second_party": "Lee Bollinger et al.", "facts": "The University of Michigan\u2019s Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its evaluative process, such as high school grades, standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also considers race and admits virtually every qualified applicant from certain groups determined to be \u201cunderrepresented minorities.\u201d Beginning in 1998, the OUA used a point system in which students were awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999, the University established an Admissions Review Committee to provide an additional level of consideration.
\nIn 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both applied for admission to the University of Michigan\u2019 College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and told that, although they were qualified, they were not competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first review. In October 1997, Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the admission procedure discriminated against certain racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the respondents had shown that a racially and ethnically diverse student body produced significant academic benefits but that the admission policies of 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted to \u201cholding seats\u201d for certain minority groups. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for 1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the University\u2019s admission policies in that case. The petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower court, to resolve the issue.
", "facts_len": "2210", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1447", "ID": "55044", "name": "United States v. Bean", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-704", "docket": "01-704", "term": "2002", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Bean", "facts": "After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1448", "ID": "55043", "name": "Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-653", "docket": "01-653", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "second_party": "Nextwave Personal Communications, Inc.", "facts": "After the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services licenses to NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Nextwave filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the FCC. The FCC asserted that NextWave's licenses had been canceled automatically when the company missed its first payment-deadline and announced that NextWave's licenses were available for auction. Ultimately, when the FCC denied NextWave's petition for reconsideration of the license cancellation, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit held that the cancellation violated 11 USC section 525(a), which provides that a \"governmental unit may not...revoke...a license...to...a debtor...solely because such...debtor...has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case.\" (Together with No. 01-657, Arctic Slope Regional Corp. et al. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc. et al.)
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1449", "ID": "55045", "name": "Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-306", "docket": "02-306", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Beneficial National Bank", "second_party": "Marie Anderson et al.", "facts": "Several H&R Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.
", "facts_len": "640", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1450", "ID": "55046", "name": "Virginia v. Hicks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-371", "docket": "02-371", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Virginia", "second_party": "Kevin Lamont Hicks", "facts": "The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking \"a legitimate business or social purpose\" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "955", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1451", "ID": "55050", "name": "Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/00-1471", "docket": "00-1471", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc.", "second_party": "Miller", "facts": "Kentucky's two \"Any Willing Provider\" (AWP) statutes prohibit \"[a] health insurer [from] discriminating against any provider who is...willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established by the?insurer,\" and require a \"health benefit plan that includes chiropractic benefits [to]...permit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms [and] conditions?of the?plan to serve as a participating primary chiropractic provider.\" Certain health maintenance organizations (HMOs) filed suit asserting that Kentucky's AWP laws are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which preempts all state laws \"insofar as they?relate to any employee benefit plan,\" but saves from preemption state \"laws...which regulate insurance.\" The District Court concluded that although both AWP statutes \"relate to\" employee benefit plans each law \"regulates insurance\" and is therefore saved from preemption. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "984", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1452", "ID": "55048", "name": "Meyer v. Holley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1120", "docket": "01-1120", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Meyer", "second_party": "Holley", "facts": "The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed \"officer/broker,\" claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a \"designated officer/broker.\" In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.
", "facts_len": "879", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1453", "ID": "55047", "name": "Sell v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-5664", "docket": "02-5664", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Sell", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial.
", "facts_len": "1021", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1454", "ID": "55049", "name": "Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C. v. Wells", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1435", "docket": "01-1435", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P. C.", "second_party": "Wells", "facts": "Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician-shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.
", "facts_len": "964", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1455", "ID": "55052", "name": "Early v. Packer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1765", "docket": "01-1765", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Richard E. Early, Warden, et al.", "second_party": "William Packer", "facts": "William Packer was convicted in a California state court for second-degree murder and attempted murder. During jury deliberations, a juror requested dismissal on two separate occasions. In order to avoid having to restart deliberations with a replacement juror, the judge asked the juror to continue. After further conversations between the judge and the juror in question as well as the foreperson of the jury, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of California, Packer argued that the state trial judge had coerced the jury\u2019s verdict in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and held that, as long as the judge only encouraged further deliberations and did not coerce a certain verdict, there was no violation of due process.
\nPacker petitioned for habeas relief from the federal district court, which denied his petition. The US. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s ruling and held that the state appellate court failed to properly apply federal law and that the judge was impermissibly coercive, which affected the jury\u2019s guilty verdict.
", "facts_len": "1187", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1456", "ID": "55051", "name": "Chavez v. Martinez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1444", "docket": "01-1444", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Chavez", "second_party": "Martinez", "facts": "Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.
", "facts_len": "874", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1457", "ID": "55054", "name": "Miller-El v. Cockrell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-7662", "docket": "01-7662", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Miller-El", "second_party": "Cockrell", "facts": "When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
", "facts_len": "931", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1458", "ID": "55053", "name": "National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-196", "docket": "02-196", "term": "2002", "first_party": "National Park Hospitality Assn.", "second_party": "Dept. of the Interior", "facts": "The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.
", "facts_len": "865", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1459", "ID": "55056", "name": "Abdur'Rahman v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-9094", "docket": "01-9094", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman", "second_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "facts": "In 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges. In state post-conviction proceedings, Abdur'Rahman presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Presenting all of his claims to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman was denied leave to appeal, and then he only presented some of his claims, on which he ultimately lost, to the federal District Court. While Abdur'Rahman's certiorari petition was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Rule 39, which expressly states that Tennessee litigants do not need to seek discretionary review from the court in order to exhaust their claims. Abdur'Rahman then filed a federal motion for relief of judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-presenting claims that the district court had previously determined to be unexhausted and procedurally barred. The District Court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second, or successive, habeas corpus petition and denied relief. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied all of Abdur'Rahman's motions.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1460", "ID": "55059", "name": "Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-271", "docket": "02-271", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Dow Chemical Company", "second_party": "Stephenson", "facts": "In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.
", "facts_len": "749", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1461", "ID": "55055", "name": "Grutter v. Bollinger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-241", "docket": "02-241", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Grutter", "second_party": "Bollinger", "facts": "In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a \"compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body.\" The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's \"critical mass\" was the functional equivalent of a quota.
", "facts_len": "1063", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1462", "ID": "55061", "name": "Borden Ranch Partnership v. Army Corps of Engineers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1243", "docket": "01-1243", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Borden Ranch Partnership", "second_party": "Army Corps of Engineers", "facts": "In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to \"deep rip\" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.
", "facts_len": "761", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1463", "ID": "55062", "name": "Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1325", "docket": "01-1325", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Brown", "second_party": "Legal Foundation of Washington", "facts": "Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.
", "facts_len": "1029", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1464", "ID": "55058", "name": "United States v. American Library Assn., Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-361", "docket": "02-361", "term": "2002", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "American Library Assn., Inc.", "facts": "Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "495", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1465", "ID": "55060", "name": "Nguyen v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-10873", "docket": "01-10873", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Khanh Phuong Nguyen", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1466", "ID": "55063", "name": "Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1015", "docket": "01-1015", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Moseley", "second_party": "V Secret Catalogue, Inc.", "facts": "V Secret Catalogue, Inc., the affiliated corporations that own the Victoria's Secret trademarks, filed suit, alleging that the name Victor's Little Secret contributed to \"the dilution of famous marks\" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The law defines \"dilution\" as \"the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.\" The District Court granted V Secret summary judgment on the FTDA claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that V Secret's mark was distinctive and that the evidence established dilution even though no actual harm had been proved.
", "facts_len": "618", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1467", "ID": "55064", "name": "Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-428", "docket": "02-428", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Dastar Corporation", "second_party": "Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation", "facts": "Doubleday published the WWII book, Crusade in Europe, registered the work's copyright, and granted exclusive television rights to Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the book's copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television series, leaving the series in the public domain. In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights. In 1995, Dastar Corporation released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television series. Fox filed suit, alleged that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted \"reverse passing off\" in violation of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted Fox summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, because Dastar copied substantially the Crusade series, labeled it with a different name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had committed a \"bodily appropriation\" of Fox's series, which was sufficient to establish reverse passing off.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1468", "ID": "55067", "name": "Roell v. Withrow", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-69", "docket": "02-69", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Roell", "second_party": "Withrow", "facts": "The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct \"any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case\" with \"the consent of the parties.\" When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.
", "facts_len": "999", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1469", "ID": "55066", "name": "Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1572", "docket": "01-1572", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Cook County", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Chandler", "facts": "Under the False Claims Act (FCA), \"any person\" who \"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval\" is liable to the federal government. A private person may bring a qui tam action \"in the name of the Government\" under the FCA. After the National Institute of Drug Abuse gave Cook County Hospital a $5 million research grant, Janet Chandler, who ran the study for a nonprofit research institute affiliated with the hospital, filed a qui tam action, claiming that Cook County and the institute had submitted false statements to obtain grant funds. Based on precedent, which held that States are not \"persons\" subject to FCA qui tam actions, the District Court granted the County's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "849", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1470", "ID": "55065", "name": "Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-950", "docket": "01-950", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Hillside Dairy, Inc.", "second_party": "Lyons", "facts": "California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.
", "facts_len": "1029", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1471", "ID": "55071", "name": "Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Ventura", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-29", "docket": "02-29", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Immigration and Naturalization Service", "second_party": "Fredy Orlando Ventura", "facts": "Fredy Orlando Ventura illegally entered the United States in 1993. In 1998, an immigration judge heard Orlando Ventura\u2019s request for asylum in the United States; he claimed that his political views made him a target for guerilla armies in Guatemala. The judge denied Orlando Ventura\u2019s request, despite recognizing that Orlando Ventura\u2019s fears of prosecution may be legitimate, because the political climate in Guatemala had drastically changed since Orlando Ventura had arrived in the United States and therefore he was no longer in danger. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the judgment of the immigration judge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was \u201ccompelled\u201d by Orlando Ventura\u2019s testimony to reverse the lower court\u2019s decision and subsequently denied remand to the BIA.
", "facts_len": "815", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1472", "ID": "55070", "name": "Bunkley v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-8636", "docket": "02-8636", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Clyde Timothy Bunkley", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "In 1989, Clyde Timothy Bunkley was convicted of burglary in the first degree because he was armed with a \u201cdangerous weapon\u201d at the time of the burglary. The \u201cdangerous weapon\u201d was a pocketknife with a 2.5-3 inch blade. In 1997, the state court interpreted the \u201ccommon pocketknife\u201d exception to the definition of \u201cweapon\u201d as a blade of 3.75 inches or shorter. Bunkley filed a motion for state post-conviction relief based on the state court\u2019s 1997 decision and argued that his pocketknife could not have been considered a \u201cweapon.\u201d The trial court rejected the defendant\u2019s motion for relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed and found the \u201ccommon pocketknife\u201d exception did not apply retroactively because the 1997 decision was merely an \u201cevolutionary refinement,\u201d not a \u201cmajor constitutional change,\u201d and therefore did not apply retroactively.
", "facts_len": "893", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1473", "ID": "55069", "name": "Boeing Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1209", "docket": "01-1209", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Boeing Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1971, Congress enacted tax provisions providing special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a \"domestic international sales corporation\" (DISC). Regarding research and development (R&D) expenses, Treasury Regulation 26 CFR section 1.861-8(e)(3) provides what must be treated as a cost when calculating combined taxable income (CTI), and how those costs should be allocated among different products and apportioned between the DISC and its parent. Under this regulation, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing's company sponsored R&D costs for 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing its taxable profits on export sales. Subsequently, Boeing filed suit, arguing that it had an unqualified right to allocate its company sponsored R&D expenses to specific products and to exclude any allocated R&D from being treated as a cost of another product. In granting Boeing summary judgment, the District Court found section 1.861-8(e)(3) invalid due to a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1255", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1474", "ID": "55068", "name": "Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-705", "docket": "01-705", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Barnhart", "second_party": "Peabody Coal Company", "facts": "Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security \"shall, before October 1, 1993,\" assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "841", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1475", "ID": "55072", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-403", "docket": "02-403", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "Beaumont", "facts": "In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "552", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1476", "ID": "55073", "name": "Stogner v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1757", "docket": "01-1757", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Stogner", "second_party": "California", "facts": "In 1993, California enacted a new criminal statute of limitations permitting prosecution for sex-related child abuse where the prior limitations period has expired if the prosecution is begun within one year of a victim's report to police. In 1998, Marion Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse committed between 1955 and 1973. Without the new statute allowing revival of the State's cause of action, California could not have prosecuted Stogner. Stogner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the California Court of Appeal reversed. The trial court denied Stogner's subsequent dismissal motion, in which he argued that his prosecution violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
", "facts_len": "857", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1477", "ID": "55076", "name": "Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1118", "docket": "01-1118", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Scheidler", "second_party": "National Organization for Women, Inc.", "facts": "The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through \"a pattern of racketeering activity\" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted \"property\" that was \"obtained\" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)
", "facts_len": "913", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1478", "ID": "55074", "name": "Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-695", "docket": "02-695", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Michael Fitzgerald, Treasurer of Iowa", "second_party": "Racing Association of Central Iowa", "facts": "A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.
", "facts_len": "619", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1479", "ID": "55075", "name": "Price v. Vincent", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-524", "docket": "02-524", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Price", "second_party": "Vincent", "facts": "During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1030", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1480", "ID": "55080", "name": "Los Angeles v. David", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-1212", "docket": "02-1212", "term": "2002", "first_party": "City of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Edwin David", "facts": "On August 13, 1998, Edwin David\u2019s car was towed because he was improperly parked in a spot where parking was prohibited. He claimed he could not see the \u201cno parking\u201d sign because there were trees blocking it from view. David paid the fees to recover his car, but he also submitted a request for a hearing to challenge the ticket and recover his money. The hearing was held 27 days after the car was towed, and David\u2019s claim was dismissed. David then sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and claimed that the 27-day wait for the hearing denied him due process under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the Due Process Clause required that the city hold a hearing at least within five days.
", "facts_len": "857", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1481", "ID": "55077", "name": "United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1067", "docket": "01-1067", "term": "2002", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "White Mt. Apache Tribe", "facts": "Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.
", "facts_len": "917", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1482", "ID": "55078", "name": "Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-258", "docket": "02-258", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Susan Jinks", "second_party": "Richland County, South Carolnia", "facts": "If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.
", "facts_len": "969", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1483", "ID": "55081", "name": "Eldred v. Ashcroft", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-618", "docket": "01-618", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Eldred", "second_party": "Ashcroft", "facts": "Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, \"Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings.\" In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's \"limited Times\" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.
", "facts_len": "837", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1484", "ID": "55085", "name": "American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-722", "docket": "02-722", "term": "2002", "first_party": "American Insurance Ass'n", "second_party": "Garamendi", "facts": "In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1485", "ID": "55082", "name": "Ford Motor Company v. Romo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-1097", "docket": "02-1097", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Ford Motor Company", "second_party": "Ramon Romo", "facts": "When Romo's Ford Bronco swerved to avoid another vehicle, it rolled over, killing three of the Romo family and injuring three more. A California jury found that the rollover was caused by a dangerous flaw in the design of the Bronco, which Ford had willfully ignored. The jury awarded Romo $5 million in compensatory damages (which are intended to compensate the plaintiff for a loss) and $290 million in punitive damages (which are intended to punish the defendant for wrongdoing.) Ford argued that the very large award of punitive damages was excessive. Nevertheless, the California Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, comparing the level of Ford's negligence to involuntary manslaughter. After the California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, Ford appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the punitive damages awarded by the jury were so excessive as to be prohibited by the Constitution's Due Process Clause.
", "facts_len": "960", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1486", "ID": "55083", "name": "Medical Board of California v. Hason", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-479", "docket": "02-479", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Medical Board of California", "second_party": "Hason", "facts": "The California Medical Board denied Hason a license to practice medicine because of his mental illness. Hason sued in federal district court, alleging that his rights were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the suit, holding that his claims were barred by the 11th Amendment's guarantee of sovereign immunity, which prohibits a private party from suing a non-consenting state or its agencies in federal court. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Congress abrogated 11th Amendment sovereign immunity by enacting Title II of the ADA \"and thus states and their agencies may be sued pursuant to Title II.\"
", "facts_len": "682", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - moot", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1487", "ID": "55086", "name": "Woodford v. Visciotti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-137", "docket": "02-137", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Jeanne Woodford, Warden", "second_party": "John Louis Visciotti", "facts": "On November 8, 1982, John Louis Visciotti and his co-worker attempted to rob two fellow employees while driving together to a party. Visciotti asked the driver to stop the car in a remote area, pulled out a gun, and demanded the victims\u2019 wallets. Because the victims had little money in their wallets, Visciotti located the money in the car and then shot the victims. Visciotti was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and robbery. The jury recommended the death penalty since the homicide took place during a robbery with a deadly weapon.
\nVisciotti petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the California Supreme Court and claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court denied the petition and held that, although Visciotti received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial, the jury was not prejudiced. The state court interpreted the Supreme Court\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel precedent as requiring the defendant to show that, more likely than not, the outcome of the trial would have been different had it not been for the ineffective assistance of counsel. Visciotti then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which granted the petition and determined that Visciotti had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1421", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1488", "ID": "55087", "name": "Lockyer v. Andrade", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1127", "docket": "01-1127", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Lockyer", "second_party": "Andrade", "facts": "Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "711", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1489", "ID": "55088", "name": "PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-215", "docket": "02-215", "term": "2002", "first_party": "PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.", "second_party": "Book", "facts": "A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "586", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1490", "ID": "55089", "name": "Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-42", "docket": "02-42", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Franchise Tax Board of California", "second_party": "Gilbert P. Hyatt et al.", "facts": "Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.
", "facts_len": "1083", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Interstate Relations"}, {"": "1491", "ID": "55090", "name": "Wiggins v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-311", "docket": "02-311", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Wiggins", "second_party": "Smith", "facts": "Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.
", "facts_len": "680", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1492", "ID": "55094", "name": "Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-469", "docket": "02-469", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Black & Decker Disability Plan", "second_party": "Nord", "facts": "With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "853", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1493", "ID": "55095", "name": "Massaro v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1559", "docket": "01-1559", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Massaro", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "973", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1494", "ID": "55096", "name": "Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-706", "docket": "01-706", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Sprietsma", "second_party": "Mercury Marine", "facts": "Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.
", "facts_len": "464", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1495", "ID": "55092", "name": "United States v. Navajo Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1375", "docket": "01-1375", "term": "2002", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Navajo Nation", "facts": "The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that \"the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes.\"
", "facts_len": "1745", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1496", "ID": "55097", "name": "Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1806", "docket": "01-1806", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Illinois ex rel. Madigan", "second_party": "Telemarketing Associates, Inc.", "facts": "VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1003", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1497", "ID": "55098", "name": "Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-7574", "docket": "01-7574", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Sattazahn", "second_party": "Pennsylvania", "facts": "When David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.
", "facts_len": "741", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1498", "ID": "55099", "name": "Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-963", "docket": "01-963", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Norfolk & Western Railway Company", "second_party": "Ayers", "facts": "Six employees of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted asbestosis, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals denied discretionary review.
", "facts_len": "418", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1499", "ID": "55093", "name": "United States v. Jimenez Recio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1184", "docket": "01-1184", "term": "2002", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jimenez Recio", "facts": "In 1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada and seized the illegal drugs that it was carrying. With the help of the truck drivers, the police set up a sting. Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza came for the truck and were subsequently arrested. A jury convicted Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza of conspiracy, but the trial judge ordered a new trial under Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent that held a conspiracy terminates when \"'there is affirmative evidence of...defeat of the object of the conspiracy.'\" In other words, the federal government could not prosecute the drug conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the government seized the drugs. The new jury convicted the two men once again. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence presented at the second trial was insufficient to show that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza had joined the conspiracy before the drug seizure.
", "facts_len": "936", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1500", "ID": "55102", "name": "Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1231", "docket": "01-1231", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Connecticut Department of Public Safety", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "Connecticut's \"Megan's Law\" requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and requires the Department to post a sex offender registry containing registrants' names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on the Internet. John Doe, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed suit, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing.
", "facts_len": "668", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1501", "ID": "55100", "name": "Georgia v. Ashcroft", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-182", "docket": "02-182", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Georgia", "second_party": "John Ashcroft, Attorney General", "facts": "Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.
", "facts_len": "531", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1502", "ID": "55103", "name": "Woodford v. Garceau", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1862", "docket": "01-1862", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Woodford", "second_party": "Garceau", "facts": "In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.
", "facts_len": "786", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1503", "ID": "55105", "name": "Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-679", "docket": "02-679", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Desert Palace, Inc.", "second_party": "Costa", "facts": "Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.
", "facts_len": "781", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1504", "ID": "55106", "name": "Washington State Department of Health and Human Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1420", "docket": "01-1420", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Washington State Department of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Guardianship Estate of Keffeler", "facts": "The State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the \"anti-attachment\" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from \"execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.\" The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision.
", "facts_len": "897", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1505", "ID": "55104", "name": "Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1368", "docket": "01-1368", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Nevada Department of Human Resources", "second_party": "Hibbs", "facts": "William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a \"serious health condition\" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action \"against any employer\" that \"interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of\" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "901", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1506", "ID": "55108", "name": "Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-281", "docket": "02-281", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Inyo County, California", "second_party": "Paiute-Shoshone Indians", "facts": "During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.
", "facts_len": "498", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1507", "ID": "55107", "name": "Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-188", "docket": "01-188", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America", "second_party": "Walsh", "facts": "In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the \"Maine Rx\" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "946", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1508", "ID": "55110", "name": "Lawrence v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-102", "docket": "02-102", "term": "2002", "first_party": "John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.
", "facts_len": "682", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1509", "ID": "55109", "name": "Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-634", "docket": "02-634", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Green Tree Financial Corp.", "second_party": "Lynn W. Bazzle et al.", "facts": "In an attempt to solve a contract dispute, Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation. After they filed the suit, the Bazzles learned that other Green Tree customers were dealing with the same sort of dispute. As a result, they asked for and received permission to file a class action suit. However, Green Tree contracts had a clause requiring that any contract disputes be settled by an arbitrator. Green Tree asked the court to revoke the class certification because the Federal Arbitration Act, it argued, did not permit class-wide arbitration. Instead, the arbitration would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that, unless specifically banned in the contract, class-wide arbitration could be permitted by the courts.
", "facts_len": "820", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1510", "ID": "55111", "name": "Dole Food Company v. Patrickson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-593", "docket": "01-593", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Dole Food Company", "second_party": "Patrickson", "facts": "In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.
", "facts_len": "930", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1511", "ID": "55112", "name": "Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-1295", "docket": "02-1295", "term": "2002", "first_party": "The Citizens Bank", "second_party": "Alafabco, Inc. et al.", "facts": "Citizens Bank (Citizens) and Alafabco Inc. (Alafabco) had multiple business dealings with each other spanning over a decade. In 1998, Alafabco bid on a construction job based on a contract it had with Citizens to finance the project. When Citizens did not finance the project, Alafabco used existing funds meant to repay the debts it owed to Citizens to fund the project and subsequently defaulted on its loan payments to Citizens. Citizens and Alafabco composed two different debt-restructuring agreements, both of which included arbitration clauses that stated that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) would apply. Alafabco sued Citizens in Alabama state court for breach of contract and claimed that it had incurred detrimental debt because of Citizens\u2019 breach. Citizens invoked the arbitration clause, and the state court ordered the parties to submit to arbitration pursuant to their agreement. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and held that, because the debt-restructuring agreements did not substantially involve interstate commerce, the FAA did not apply to the parties\u2019 disputes.
", "facts_len": "1099", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1512", "ID": "55114", "name": "Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-800", "docket": "01-800", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Howsam", "second_party": "Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.", "facts": "According to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s standard client agreement, Karen Howsam chose to arbitrate her dispute with the company before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure section 10304 states that no dispute \"shall be eligible for submission...where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute.\" Dean Witter filed suit, asking the Federal District Court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. The court dismissed the action, stating that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the NASD rule. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the rule's application presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability and the presumption is that a court will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.
", "facts_len": "873", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1513", "ID": "55113", "name": "Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-757", "docket": "01-757", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.", "second_party": "Henson", "facts": "Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.
", "facts_len": "842", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1514", "ID": "55115", "name": "Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-896", "docket": "01-896", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Ford Motor Co.", "second_party": "McCauley", "facts": "When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.
", "facts_len": "807", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1515", "ID": "55117", "name": "Overton v. Bazzetta", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-94", "docket": "02-94", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Overton", "second_party": "Bazzetta", "facts": "In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.
", "facts_len": "553", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1516", "ID": "55116", "name": "Smith v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-729", "docket": "01-729", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "Doe", "facts": "Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it. Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.
", "facts_len": "850", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1517", "ID": "55121", "name": "Arizona v. Gant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1019", "docket": "02-1019", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Rodney J. Gant", "facts": "Arizona police went to the home of Rodney Gant in search of drugs and to arrest him for failing to appear in court. When they arrived at the house, Gant was not there (though two other people were in his home, one of whom was in possession of a crack pipe) but while the police were still at the house Gant pulled into the driveway. While Gant was still in his car, an officer shined a flashlight into the vehicle, but the police made no other contact with him until he stepped out of the car. After he was out of the car, the police searched it and found drugs and a handgun. Gant was arrested and charged with possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
\nBefore trial, Gant asked the judge to rule the evidence found in the car unconstitutional because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement under New York v. Belton (1981). Gant was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison.
\nGant appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling the search unconstitutional. The court found that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. The court ruled that these justifications did not apply in Gant's case because he had left the vehicle voluntarily without being stopped by police or asked to get out of the car. The search of the vehicle was therefore not directly connected to the arrest and, without that justification, clearly violated the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1774", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1518", "ID": "55118", "name": "City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1269", "docket": "01-1269", "term": "2002", "first_party": "City of Cuyahoga Falls", "second_party": "Buckeye Community Hope", "facts": "After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.
", "facts_len": "964", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1519", "ID": "55122", "name": "Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-5554", "docket": "03-5554", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Larry D. Hiibel", "second_party": "Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al.", "facts": "Larry Hiibel was arrested and convicted in Nevada state court for failing to identify himself to a police officer who was investigating an assault. Nevada, and many other states, has a law that requires a person to tell an officer his name if asked. Hiibel challenged the conviction, claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The state intermediate court and Supreme Court rejected his argument in affirming the conviction.
", "facts_len": "533", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1520", "ID": "55123", "name": "Illinois v. Lidster", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1060", "docket": "02-1060", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Robert S. Lidster", "facts": "Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover \"ordinary criminal wrongdoing.\" The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "486", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1521", "ID": "55124", "name": "Banks v. Dretke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-8286", "docket": "02-8286", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Delma Banks, Jr.", "second_party": "Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Delma Banks, Jr. was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court in 1980. Sixteen years later Banks learned that one of the witnesses against him, Robert Farr, was a paid informant (a fact not stated during the trial). Charles Cook, another witness against Banks, claimed that he had made up much of his testimony in order to get other criminal charges against him dropped as part of a plea agreement.
\nIn Brady v. Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process is violated if prosecutors suppress evidence favorable to a defendant that relates to guilt or punishment. Pointing to Brady and evidence the prosecution suppressed information on its ties to the two witnesses, Banks sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to overturn his conviction and get a new trial. The district court granted habeas relief with respect to Banks' death sentence based on the state's failure to disclose Farr's informant status. However the district court refused to reverse the guilt verdict, rejecting Banks' Brady claim relating to Cook's testimony and Banks' argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) allowed the claim to be treated as if it were raised earlier.
\nThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to grant Banks relief as to his death sentence based on his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony. The Court held that Banks first had to press his claims in state court. The Court upheld the district court's rejection of Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1646", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1522", "ID": "55126", "name": "Republic of Austria v. Altmann", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-13", "docket": "03-13", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Republic of Austria, et al.", "second_party": "Maria V. Altmann", "facts": "Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving \"rights to property taken in violation of international law.\" Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively (that is, to actions taken before it was passed) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity.
\nThe district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1008", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1523", "ID": "55125", "name": "United States v. Lara", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-107", "docket": "03-107", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Billy Jo Lara", "facts": "Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
\nA tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
\nA panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1524", "ID": "55128", "name": "Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-358", "docket": "03-358", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Department of Transportation, et al.", "second_party": "Public Citizen, et al.", "facts": "In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers.
\nWhen the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.
", "facts_len": "1870", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1525", "ID": "55127", "name": "Barnhart v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-763", "docket": "02-763", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security", "second_party": "Pauline Thomas", "facts": "After a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, it said, she was still able to perform the duties of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that \"a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.\"
", "facts_len": "882", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1526", "ID": "55130", "name": "Illinois v. Fisher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-374", "docket": "03-374", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Fisher", "facts": "Gregory Fisher was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine in 1988. He filed a motion for discovery, asking that the white powdery substance he had had in his possession be made available as evidence at trial so that he could have it independently tested in an attempt to disprove the four tests conducted by police showing that it was cocaine. The state agreed to make the substance available at a future date.
\nThe defendant was released on bond, but in July of 1989 he failed to appear in court. He remained a fugitive for 10 years, during which time the police destroyed the substance in keeping with the standard practice of destroying old evidence. When Fisher was captured and brought to trial again in 1999, he claimed that the state had violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights by destroying evidence that could possibly have proved his innocence after he had filed a motion for discovery. The trial court denied his motion, holding that the police had acted in \"good faith\" in accordance with Arizona v. Youngblood. Fisher was subsequently convicted. The Illinois Appellate Court overturned the conviction, however, holding that the case was different from Youngblood because Fisher had filed a discovery motion. The state Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "1307", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1527", "ID": "55131", "name": "Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-572", "docket": "02-572", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Intel Corporation", "second_party": "Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.", "facts": "Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed a complaint against Intel with the European Commission, alleging that Intel was using its size to unfairly dominate the computer microprocessor market. Complaints filed with the European Commission are first reviewed by the commission's directorate general, which does fact-finding to decide whether or not to pursue the complaint. AMD asked the directorate to review documents containing some of Intel's trade secrets from a separate American court case involving Intel. The directorate declined.
\nBecause European law did not provide a way for AMD to gain access to the documents, AMD filed suit against Intel in United States federal district court seeking access to the documents so that it could use them to support its complaint. The suit was filed under Title 28, Section 1782 of U.S. Code, which allows (but does not require) federal district courts to give \"interested persons\" access to material for proceedings before \"foreign or international tribunal(s).\" AMD argued that, though the directorate was only a fact-finding body, the case could eventually be appealed to a trial court and was therefore covered under section 1782. Further, it argued that the directorate's unwillingness to demand the documents was irrelevant. Intel, on the other hand, argued that the directorate was not a \"foreign or international tribunal\" and that the federal district court therefore did not have the authority to compel Intel to release the documents. It also argued that the directorate's unwillingness to compel production of the documents should preclude U.S. action.
\nThe district court sided with Intel, ruling that the directorate's investigation was not a foreign tribunal and that the court therefore could not give AMD access to the documents. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed the decision. After the case was accepted for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Commission filed a brief in the case supporting Intel's position that the directorate was not a foreign tribunal.
", "facts_len": "2073", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1528", "ID": "55132", "name": "Tennard v. Dretke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-10038", "docket": "02-10038", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Robert James Tennard", "second_party": "Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Robert Tennard was convicted of murder. During the sentencing phase, he presented evidence that he had an IQ of 67. The instructions given to the jury by the judge when it was considering whether to apply the death penalty, however, did not account for this - they instructed they jury to determine whether the crime was committed deliberately and whether Tennard posed a future risk. Under\u00a0Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, those instructions are not enough to allow the jury to weigh a defendant's mental retardation in his favor. After he was sentenced to death, Tennard filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the sentence, given the shortcomings of the jury instructions, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The district court rejected the petition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Tennard had no shown that his mental retardation was constitutionally relevant. To be constitutionally relevant, Tennard's retardation would have had to be responsible for his crime, and Tennard had not shown that this was the case.
\nAfter the Supreme Court decided, in\u00a0Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its holding. It affirmed the decision on the grounds that execution was only unconstitutional if the defendant could show that his mental retardation had actually caused the crime; being mentally retarded in and of itself did not exempt someone from the death penalty.
", "facts_len": "1586", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1529", "ID": "55129", "name": "Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-475", "docket": "03-475", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, et al.", "second_party": "United States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al.", "facts": "In January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's meetings.
\nCheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused.
\nThe government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The government then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1588", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1530", "ID": "55133", "name": "Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1624", "docket": "02-1624", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Elk Grove Unified School District and David W. Gordon, Superintendent", "second_party": "Michael A. Newdow, et al.", "facts": "Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words \"under God\" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words \"under God\" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.
\nThe district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing \"to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter.\" The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words \"under God\" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.
", "facts_len": "1089", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1531", "ID": "55134", "name": "Frew v. Hawkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-628", "docket": "02-628", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Linda Frew, on Behalf of Her Daughter, Carla Frew, et al.", "second_party": "Albert Hawkins, Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, et al.", "facts": "In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent decree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.
", "facts_len": "981", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1532", "ID": "55136", "name": "Lamie v. United States Trustee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-693", "docket": "02-693", "term": "2003", "first_party": "John M. Lamie", "second_party": "United States Trustee", "facts": "In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Congress created a list of people that corporations could pay while going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy attorney for the corporation was not included in that list. John Lamie, a bankruptcy attorney, challenged the law, arguing that the omission of bankruptcy attorneys from the list was accidental. The bankruptcy court that heard the case ruled that the omission was not inadvertent. Nevertheless, it awarded Lamie the fees in question because money intended to pay them had been set aside in a retainer before the corporation entered Chapter 7 proceedings. A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision to pay Lamie, holding that the retainer was not separate from the corporation's other funds. On the issue of whether the omission of the bankruptcy attorney from the list of acceptable payees, the panel affirmed the lower court's decision.
", "facts_len": "932", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1533", "ID": "55137", "name": "City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1609", "docket": "02-1609", "term": "2003", "first_party": "City of Littleton, Colorado", "second_party": "Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Company, dba Christal's", "facts": "Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for \"prompt judicial determination.\"
\nThe federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1534", "ID": "55135", "name": "Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-891", "docket": "02-891", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Central Laborers' Pension Fund", "second_party": "Thomas E. Heinz, et al.", "facts": "Thomas Heinz worked as a construction worker for 20 years, then retired. Upon retirement, he began to receive pension payments from the Central Laborers' Pension Plan. He continued to receive the pension after he took another job as a supervisor in the construction industry. The pension plan had a list of occupations that a recipient could not work in while receiving pension payments, but construction supervisors were not included. After two years, however, Central Laborers' Pension amended the list of prohibited professions to include construction supervisors. As a result, Heinz stopped receiving his pension payment. He and Richard Schmitt, a friend who was in the same situation, filed suit in federal district court. They claimed that the amendment, because it was passed after they had already started receiving the benefits, violated the \"anti-cutback\" provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. ERISA states that amendments to a pension plan may not decrease the \"accrued benefit of a participant.\" Because the amendment barred them from receiving payments that they were otherwise eligible for, Heinz and Schmitt claimed that it had reduced their \"accrued benefit.\" Central Laborers' Pension, however, argued that the men were still eligible to receive the same pension, they just could not receive it while working as construction supervisors. Because the value of the plan itself had not been changed, only the stipulations for receiving it, the pension plan managers argued that the amendment did not violate ERISA.
\nThe federal district court sided with the pension plan. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reversed the decision, writing that \"an amendment placing materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit 'reduces' the benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit payment.\"
", "facts_len": "1910", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1535", "ID": "55139", "name": "Locke v. Davey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1315", "docket": "02-1315", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.", "second_party": "Joshua Davey", "facts": "The Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to cause belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid.
\nJoshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in U.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the U.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated.
", "facts_len": "863", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1536", "ID": "55138", "name": "United States v. Patane", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1183", "docket": "02-1183", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Samuel Francis Patane", "facts": "Samuel Patane was arrested at his home for calling his ex-girlfriend in violation of a restraining order. During the arrest, police officers began reading Patane his Miranda rights. Patane told the officers that he knew his rights. The officers then stopped reading them, at which point Patane told police that he had a gun in his house. They searched the house with his permission and found the gun. As an ex-felon, Patane was not permitted to possess a gun and was prosecuted for possession.
\nDuring the trial on gun possession charges, Patane argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself because there was not probable cause to arrest him and because the gun had been found as a result of an un-Mirandized confession.
\nThe district court initially ruled that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that it was therefore unconstitutional. A 10th Circuit Court of Appeals panel disagreed, holding that Patane's ex-girlfriend had given police probable cause for the arrest. However, the panel held that gun could not be used as evidence because it had been found as the result of an un-Mirandized (and therefore unconstitutional) confession. The government appealed, arguing that physical evidence found as the result of un-Mirandized testimony could be used in court, despite the fact that the testimony itself was inadmissible.
", "facts_len": "1473", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1537", "ID": "55141", "name": "Sabri v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-44", "docket": "03-44", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Basim Omar Sabri", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Basim Omar Sabri, a Minneapolis landlord and developer, tried to bribe a Minneapolis City Council member who sat on the board of an organization that dispersed funding for economic revitalization of city neighborhoods. Some of the funds dispersed by the organization were federal funds.
\nSabri was charged in federal court with bribery. He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the section of United States Code that he was charged under was unconstitutional. He claimed that Congress could only regulate the dispersal of federal funds; because the statute did not require the prosecutors to show that the bribery had affected any federal funds, only that it had affected an organization that received federal funds, he argued that it was outside of Congress's power to legislate. The district court sided with Sabri and dismissed the charges.
\nOn appeal, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. It found that, because federal funds were often mixed with other funds by organizations that distributed them, it would be difficult for prosecutors to prove that the funds affected by an attempted bribe were federal funds. As a result, the government would have to regulate all bribes to organizations that dispersed federal funds in order to meaningfully protect federal funds. Because Congress had authority under the necessary and proper clause and the spending clause (both found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution) to ensure that government funds were not misspent, the bribery statute was therefore constitutional.
", "facts_len": "1563", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1538", "ID": "55140", "name": "Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-95", "docket": "03-95", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Pennsylvania State Police", "second_party": "Nancy Drew Suders", "facts": "Nancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic.
\nSuders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a \"tangible employment action\" that substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense.
", "facts_len": "1368", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1539", "ID": "55142", "name": "Middleton v. McNeil", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-1028", "docket": "03-1028", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Middleton", "second_party": "McNeil", "facts": "Sally Marie McNeil was convicted of the murder of her husband. She appealed her conviction, claiming that the trial judge had given the jury improper instructions when it was deciding whether to convict her of murder or voluntary manslaughter (the last four words of the instruction, not included in the model jury instruction provided with the criminal statute, might have led the jury to misunderstand the meaning of voluntary manslaughter). The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that the jury instruction had been wrong, but found that, taken as a whole, the instruction did not make it reasonably likely that the jury would misunderstood the meaning of voluntary manslaughter, especially given the closing statements of the prosecutor, which provided the correct definition of the law.
\nMcNeil then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court rejected her claim, but a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.
", "facts_len": "971", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1540", "ID": "55144", "name": "Pliler v. Ford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-221", "docket": "03-221", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden", "second_party": "Richard Herman Ford", "facts": "Richard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re-file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the first option, but when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims under the first option.
", "facts_len": "1338", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1541", "ID": "55146", "name": "Groh v. Ramirez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-811", "docket": "02-811", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Jeff Groh", "second_party": "Joseph R. Ramirez, et al.", "facts": "Jeff Groh, a special agent for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, applied for a search warrant to search the Ramirez ranch for illegal weapons. On the warrant, Groh mistakenly omitted the exact items sought (though he correctly listed the items on the application itself). A federal magistrate issued the warrant.
\nThe Ramirezes later sued Groh and the law enforcement officers involved in the search in federal court for violating their Fourth Amendment rights. They argued that the incorrectly completed warrant violated the Fourth Amendment requirement that any items searched for be described in the warrant.
\nThe district court ruled that no constitutional violation took place. The officers, the court held, retained \"qualified immunity\" - meaning they are legally immune while doing their jobs unless they violate a \"clearly established\" constitutional right.
\nA Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. The court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and that Groh is not immune to lawsuit because he was personally responsible for using the warrant.
", "facts_len": "1120", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1542", "ID": "55145", "name": "United States v. Flores-Montano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1794", "docket": "02-1794", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Manuel Flores-Montano", "facts": "When Manuel Flores-Montano approached the U.S.-Mexico border, U.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug-sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank.
\nFlores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Flores-Montano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non-routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case).
\nRelying on U.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, a case decided by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 (with similar circumstances), the district court agreed that the search was non-routine and thus required reasonable suspicion. The government, the court held, failed to prove that reasonable suspicion prompted its search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1543", "ID": "55143", "name": "Tennessee v. Lane", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1667", "docket": "02-1667", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Tennessee", "second_party": "George Lane, et al.", "facts": "George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to \"services, programs, or activities\" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.
\nTennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited\u00a0Alabama v. Garrett\u00a0(2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.
\nThe district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in\u00a0Garrett\u00a0did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.
", "facts_len": "1857", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1544", "ID": "55148", "name": "Beard v. Banks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1603", "docket": "02-1603", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.", "second_party": "George E. Banks", "facts": "In 1982, George Banks was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania for the murder of 13 people. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Banks unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Reversing the district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found Banks's death sentence unconstitutional. The court held that jury instructions during sentencing led jurors to believe they could not vote against the death penalty unless they all agreed on mitigating evidence (that is, evidence that would have inclined them to vote against the death penalty). This, the court reasoned, violated the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mills v. Maryland (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision (in part) and remanded it. Pointing to its opinion in Teague v. Lane (1989) and the fact that Mills was decided after Banks's conviction, the Court reasoned that the appeals court did not consider whether Mills could be \"retroactively\" applied. The Third Circuit Court - reviewing its ruling - did not change its original opinion. It found that \"Mills did not announce a new rule of constitutional law for retroactivity purposes\" and that Banks's death sentence was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1228", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1545", "ID": "55147", "name": "Raytheon Company v. Hernandez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-749", "docket": "02-749", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Raytheon Company", "second_party": "Joel Hernandez", "facts": "In 1991, Joel Hernandez tested positive for cocaine use in a drug test administered by his employer. As a result of the incident, he was forced to resign. In 1994, he reapplied for a job from the company. His application was rejected. Hernandez claimed that the company was discriminating against him because of his drug and alcohol addiction (though at the time he reapplied he had been sober for two years) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court sided with the company, dismissing the case before it ever went to trial. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, however, holding that Raytheon's decision not to rehire Hernandez because of an incident related to his past addiction could constitute discrimination under the act.
", "facts_len": "797", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1546", "ID": "55149", "name": "Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1606", "docket": "02-1606", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation", "second_party": "Pamela L. Hood", "facts": "Pamela Hood had an outstanding debt to the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, a loan-granting institution established by the state, when she filed for bankruptcy. The state objected to her request that the debt be forgiven (\"discharged\" in the terms of bankruptcy law) by the federal bankruptcy court, arguing that to discharge the debt would violate the state's sovereign immunity (that is, its right not to be sued). Hood countered that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow student loan debts to be discharged if the bankruptcy filer can demonstrate that they will suffer \"undue hardship\" if the debt is not forgiven, and that this congressional permission is a constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity because it falls under the power granted to Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution).
\nThe bankruptcy court sided with Hood, finding that Congress had acted constitutionally in waiving the states' sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, as did a normal panel of the Sixth Circuit.
", "facts_len": "1102", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1547", "ID": "55151", "name": "Till et ux. v. SCS Credit Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1016", "docket": "02-1016", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Till", "second_party": "SCS Credit Corp.", "facts": "Lee Till owed $4,000 in payments on his truck when he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 13 debtor must promise each creditor future payments \"not less than the [claim's] allowed amount.\" When a repayment plan includes a series of payments (installments), as Till's did, the installments must equal the \"total present value\" of the amount owed. Till proposed that he make monthly payments on the truck to SCS Credit with a 9.5 percent yearly interest rate, which was slightly higher than the average loan rate to make up for the increased risk that Till would fail to make a payment (because he had already declared bankruptcy once). SCS, however, argued that it was entitled to 21 percent interest because that was how much it would have made if it had foreclosed on the loan, taken the truck, sold it, and reinvested the proceeds. SCS argued that this 21 percent plan was necessary to ensure that the payments were equal to the \"total present value\" or \"not less than the [claim's] allowed amount.\" The bankruptcy court ruled for Till. The district court reversed, imposing SCS's 21 percent rate. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel modified that approach slightly, ruling that the 21 percent rate was probably correct but that the parties could introduce evidence that a higher or lower rate should apply.
", "facts_len": "1364", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1548", "ID": "55153", "name": "Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinco, LLP", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-682", "docket": "02-682", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Verizon Communications Inc.", "second_party": "Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP", "facts": "Curtis Trinko was an AT&T customer but received service on lines owned by Verizon, which AT&T was permitted to use for a fee under the anti-monopoly 1996 Telecommunications Act. Trinko claimed that Verizon discriminated against AT&T customers by providing them worse service than it provided to its own customers. He claimed that this violated both the Telecommunications Act and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which prohibits monopolies from aggressively defending their monopoly position in the market. A federal district court ruled that Trinko had no grounds to sue because he was not a direct customer of Verizon. A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reinstated the charges leveled under the Sherman Act.
", "facts_len": "744", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1549", "ID": "55152", "name": "Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1205", "docket": "02-1205", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated", "second_party": "R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company", "facts": "In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed.
\nJones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply.
\nA federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1550", "ID": "55155", "name": "Hamdi v. Rumsfeld", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-6696", "docket": "03-6696", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi, as Next Friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi", "second_party": "Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.", "facts": "In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an \"enemy combatant,\" and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi\u2019s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi\u2019s \u201cnext friend,\u201d in an attempt to have Hamdi\u2019s detention declared unconstitutional. The district court granted Hamdi\u2019s petition, and appointed the Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, Jr., as counsel for the petitioners. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States \"enemy combatants\" and thus restrict their access to the court system.
\nThe district court refused to answer the question of whether the declaration of \"enemy combatant\" was sufficient to justify his detention without review of materials and criteria used in making the determination. It ordered the government to produce these materials for a review by the court. Not wanting to produce these materials, the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because \"the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not.\" The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's \"enemy combatant\" determination.
", "facts_len": "1853", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1551", "ID": "55156", "name": "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Edwards", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1196", "docket": "02-1196", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "second_party": "Charles E. Edwards", "facts": "Charles Edwards founded a company that sold pay telephones and then leased them back from the purchasers for a fixed monthly fee. After Edwards filed for bankruptcy, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued him for selling securities (considering the telephones to be investments on the part of the purchasers and therefore securities) in violation of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
\nA federal district court froze Edwards' assets in a preliminary injunction. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's injunction for lack of jurisdiction. The SEC, the court reasoned, failed to show that Edwards' selling pay telephones was an \"investment contract\" under federal securities laws. In defining \"investment contract,\" the court used the Supreme Court's ruling in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. (1946), that a financial interest is an \"investment contract\" if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others. The 11th Circuit ruled that the SEC could not meet the test's third part because the purchasers received a fixed fee that was guaranteed by contract and therefore not dependant on Edwards' success.
", "facts_len": "1287", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1552", "ID": "55158", "name": "Baldwin v. Reese", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-964", "docket": "02-964", "term": "2003", "first_party": "George H. Baldwin", "second_party": "Michael Reese", "facts": "A state trial court sentenced Reese to 33 years in prison. An appellate court lowered the sentence to 24 years. In another appeal to a state appellate court, Reese argued his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated at trial and on appeal. The appellate court refused to reverse Reese's sentence. Reese appealed to the state supreme court and failed.
\nReese appealed to a U.S. District Court. Ruling against Reese, the Court held that Reese did clearly say to the state supreme court his claims were federal. Federal law requires state prisoners to \"fairly present\" federal constitutional claims in each state court before appealing to federal courts. A federal appellate court reversed, ruling that the state supreme court had had the opportunity to read the state appellate court decision - had the court done this, it would have understood Reese's claims were federal.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1553", "ID": "55160", "name": "South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-626", "docket": "02-626", "term": "2003", "first_party": "South Florida Water Management District", "second_party": "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, et al.", "facts": "The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the \"addition of any pollutant... from any point source\" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it was not actually adding pollutants to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from one body of water to another, less polluted, body.
\nThe district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, \"conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source.\"
", "facts_len": "975", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1554", "ID": "55159", "name": "Yarborough v. Gentry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1597", "docket": "02-1597", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Yarborough", "second_party": "Gentry", "facts": "A jury convicted Gentry in state court for stabbing his girlfriend. Gentry appealed, arguing his lawyer's closing argument deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. While Gentry's appeal lost in state courts, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Gentry's conviction.
", "facts_len": "330", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1555", "ID": "55157", "name": "Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1845", "docket": "02-1845", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Aetna Health Inc., fka Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc. and Aetna U.S. Healthcare of North Texas Inc.", "second_party": "Ruby R. Calad, et al.", "facts": "Juan Davila sued his HMO in state court because it had refused to provide certain procedures, and the refusal led to certain injuries. He brought the suit under a Texas law that requires HMOs \"to exercise ordinary care\" for their patients. The HMO asked that the case be moved to federal court, arguing that the case should be governed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) rather than the Texas law, because ERISA is a federal law the takes precedence over any state laws dealing with the same subject matter. Davila objected, arguing that the case did not fall under ERISA and should be heard in state court. The federal district court sided with the HMO, finding that ERISA prohibits individuals from filing state suits against HMOs when they refuse to pay for a particular treatment. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.
", "facts_len": "872", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1556", "ID": "55162", "name": "Olympic Airways v. Husain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1348", "docket": "02-1348", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Olympic Airways", "second_party": "Rubina Husain, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Abid M. Hanson, Deceased, et al.", "facts": "Abid Hanson was allergic to second-hand smoke. On an Olympic Airways flight, he and his wife, Rubina Husain, sat in non-smoking seats. However, because the seats were close to the smoking section, Mrs. Husain requested she and her husband be moved. Her request was denied twice, even after the smoke began bothering Hanson. Hanson died during the flight. Husain filed suit in California federal district court. She sought damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which allows damages recovery for international air travelers for accidents on airplanes. The district court agreed that Hanson's death was an \"accident\" as defined by the convention and awarded Husain $1.4 million. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "739", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1557", "ID": "55161", "name": "F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-724", "docket": "03-724", "term": "2003", "first_party": "F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, et al.", "second_party": "Empagran S.A., et al.", "facts": "Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), the Sherman Act (which regulates monopolies and attempts to unfairly raise prices) does not apply to foreign commerce unless that commerce significantly harms domestic commerce, American imports, or American exporters. In this case, several companies that purchase and resell vitamins sued several vitamin manufacturers for illegal attempts to raise prices, both within the United States and in foreign countries. The manufacturers asked the district judge to dismiss several of the vitamin purchasers from the case because they only did business in other countries and, the manufacturers argued, could therefore not bring claims under the Sherman Act. The purchasers countered that the foreign price-fixing attempts were linked to the domestic attempts and could therefore be heard under the exception to the FTAIA. The district court sided with the manufacturers. On appeal, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the price fixing schemes were independent of each other but that Congress' intent had been to prevent price-fixing both at home and abroad, and that even the foreign claims could therefore be brought under the exception to the FTAIA.
", "facts_len": "1247", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1558", "ID": "55164", "name": "Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-101", "docket": "03-101", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.", "second_party": "Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al.", "facts": "The federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as \"Wilderness Study Areas\" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land \"so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness.\"
\nThe Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a \"hard look,\" as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations.
\nThe district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a \"hard look\" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy.
", "facts_len": "1518", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1559", "ID": "55163", "name": "Yarborough v. Alvarado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1684", "docket": "02-1684", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Michael Yarborough, Warden", "second_party": "Michael Alvarado", "facts": "Police interviewed Michael Alvarado, 17, without his parents at a police station about his involvement in a crime. Police neither arrested nor Mirandized Alvarado. During the interview, Alvarado confessed involvement. Based, in part, on these statements, Alvarado was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted robbery. After failed appeals in the California courts, Alvarado unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court in California. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Recognizing the \"in custody\" standard to be whether a reasonable person would feel free to end interrogation, the appeals court held that a juvenile is more likely to feel he is in custody. Because Alvarado was \"in custody,\" the Fifth Amendment required that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) be read to him.
", "facts_len": "838", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1560", "ID": "55167", "name": "Scarborough v. Principi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1657", "docket": "02-1657", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Randall C. Scarborough", "second_party": "Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs", "facts": "Randall Scarborough won a case against the Department of Veterans Affairs. He then applied for attorney's fees to the U.S. Veterans' Court under the federal Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Under the EAJA, the government must pay attorney's fees to anyone who wins against the federal government in litigation unless the government can show that its position was \"substantially justified.\" However, Scarborough's attorney submitted an incomplete application, neglecting to assert that the government's position was not substantially justified. Though he amended and resubmitted it, he did so after the 30-day filing deadline. The Veterans' Court dismissed the application for \"lack of subject matter jurisdiction\" - that is, because it was not filed in its complete form within the 30-day deadline. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "864", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1561", "ID": "55168", "name": "Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1689", "docket": "02-1689", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Grupo Dataflux", "second_party": "Atlas Global Group, L.P., et al.", "facts": "Atlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had \"diversity jurisdiction\" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican \"citizen\" at the time of filing because of the citizenship of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision.
", "facts_len": "1273", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1562", "ID": "55165", "name": "Rumsfeld v. Padilla", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-1027", "docket": "03-1027", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense", "second_party": "Jose Padilla and Donna R. Newman, as Next Friend of Jose Padilla", "facts": "Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after returning from Pakistan in 2002. He was initially detained as a material witness in the government's investigation of the al Qaeda terrorist network, but was later declared an \"enemy combatant\" by the Department of Defense, meaning that he could be held in prison indefinitely without access to an attorney or to the courts. The FBI claimed that he was returning to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism.
\nDonna Newman, who had represented him while he was being held as a material witness, filed a petition for habeas corpus on his behalf. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Newman had standing to file the petition despite the fact that Padilla had been moved to a military brig in South Carolina. However, the court also found that the Department of Defense, under the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and the statutory authorization provided by Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, had the power to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant. The district judge rejected Newman's argument that the detention was prohibited by the federal Non-Detention Act, which states that no \"citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.\"
\nOn appeal, a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court's \"enemy combatant\" ruling. The panel found that the Authorization for Use of Military force did not meet the requirement of the Non-Detention Act and that the President could not, therefore, declare American citizens captured outside a combat zone as enemy combatants.
", "facts_len": "1748", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1563", "ID": "55166", "name": "Missouri v. Seibert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1371", "docket": "02-1371", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Missouri", "second_party": "Patrice Seibert", "facts": "Patrice Seibert was convicted of second degree murder for the death of 17 -year-old Donald Rector, who died in a fire set in the mobile home where he lived with Seibert. Several days after the fire, Seibert was interrogated by a police officer. The officer initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get a confession from her first. Once she had confessed, the officer took a short break from questioning, then read her her Miranda rights and resumed questioning her after she waived those rights. He prompted her to restate the confession that she had made earlier. Based on this second, Mirandized confession, Seibert was convicted.
\nShe appealed, charging that the officer's intentional use of an un-Mirandized interrogation to get the initial confession made the later confession, though it occurred after she had waived her Miranda rights, inadmissable. The prosecution cited Oregon v. Elstad to argue that an initial, un-Mirandized confession did not make a defendant incapable of voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights and confessing later.
\nThe Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with Seibert, overturning the conviction.
", "facts_len": "1155", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1564", "ID": "55170", "name": "Rasul v. Bush", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-334", "docket": "03-334", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, et al.", "second_party": "George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.", "facts": "Two Australians and 12 Kuwaitis were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The captives were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains \"ultimate sovereignty\").
\nThe district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1138", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1565", "ID": "55169", "name": "Muhammad v. Close", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-9065", "docket": "02-9065", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Shakur Muhammad, aka John E. Mease", "second_party": "Mark Close", "facts": "Prison officials sentenced Muhammad, a state prisoner, to seven days of special detention and 30 days of restricted privileges for insolence toward Close, a prison guard. Muhammad filed suit with a magistrate judge under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking $10,000 in damages. Muhammad alleged Close had charged him with threatening behavior in retaliation for other proceedings against Close. Muhammad did not challenge his insolence conviction or punishment. The magistrate judge ruled that Muhammad lacked evidence proving Close acted in retaliation. The U.S. District Court agreed.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling for a different reason, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey (1994). In Heck the Court held that when a prisoner seeks damages in a case that questions his sentence, the prisoner must first have successfully challenged the sentence itself or the conviction itself. The Court of Appeals held that because Muhammad's damages case questioned his sentence, he must first successfully appeal the sentence itself. Going further the Court of Appeals held that Heck applies to all challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1203", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1566", "ID": "55172", "name": "Maryland v. Pringle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-809", "docket": "02-809", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Joseph Jermaine Pringle", "facts": "A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front-seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.
", "facts_len": "662", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1567", "ID": "55173", "name": "Johnson v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-6539", "docket": "03-6539", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Jay Shawn Johnson", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Jay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a \"strong likelihood\" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show \"strong likelihood\" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.
\nJohnson appealed and argued that the \"strong likelihood\" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference\" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same.
", "facts_len": "1015", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1568", "ID": "55174", "name": "Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-658", "docket": "02-658", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation", "second_party": "Environmental Protection Agency, et al.", "facts": "Under the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the \"best available control technology\" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use \"Low NOx\" technology on all its generators, not just the new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided with the EPA.
", "facts_len": "918", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1569", "ID": "55171", "name": "Kontrick v. Ryan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-819", "docket": "02-819", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Andrew J. Kontrick", "second_party": "Robert A. Ryan", "facts": "Andrew Kontrick filed for bankruptcy after he and his partner, Robert Ryan, dissolved their plastic surgery practice. Ryan notified the court that Kontrick owed him money before the 60-day filing deadline set by Bankruptcy Rule 4004. More than three months later (after the deadline for filing had passed) Ryan filed an amended complaint charging that Kontrick was diverting paychecks into his wife's account so that he wouldn't have to pay Ryan. Ryan's attorneys claimed that they were not making a new claim - the diversion had been alluded to in other court documents - but that they were merely refocusing the judge's attention. Furthermore, they argued that the deadline for filing could be - and had been - waived by the judge. Kontrick's attorneys, on the other hand, argued that the amended complaint was a new filing and that the deadlines for filing could not be waived. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ryan. The district court and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed, holding that the deadline was subject to waiver.
", "facts_len": "1053", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1570", "ID": "55175", "name": "Engine Manufacturers' Association v. South Coast Air Quality Management District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1343", "docket": "02-1343", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Engine Manufacturers Association and Western States Petroleum Association", "second_party": "South Coast Air Quality Management District, et al.", "facts": "The Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) sued the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) - established under the California Health and Safety Code - in federal district court. The EMA alleged that the Clean Air Act (CAA) preempted SCAQMD's \"fleet rules\" - rules that required new commercial vehicles to meet specific emissions standards - and that the rules were therefore illegal. The EMA pointed to section 209 of the act, which prohibits states from enforcing \"any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.\" Reasoning that the regulations affected the standards at which engines could be sold, not the standards to which they must be manufactured, and finding that Congress's purpose was to protect manufactures from \"having to build engines in compliance with a multiplicity of standards,\" the district court ruled that the CAA did not preempt California's fleet rules. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "971", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1571", "ID": "55176", "name": "Hibbs v. Winn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1809", "docket": "02-1809", "term": "2003", "first_party": "J. Elliott Hibbs, Director, Arizona Department of Revenue", "second_party": "Kathleen M. Winn, et al.", "facts": "Several Arizona residents challenged in federal district court an Arizona statute that allows tax credits for money spent toward parochial schools. They alleged that the statute violates the religious establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.
\nThe district court dismissed the case and ruled that it lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: First, the federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits federal district courts from ruling on the \"assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.\" And second, the court pointed to the comity doctrine - that is, the deference that federal courts should generally give to state tax laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that neither the TIA nor comity place the case outside federal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the TIA was inapplicable because invalidating a tax credit would not harm Arizona's ability to raise revenue.
", "facts_len": "1015", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1572", "ID": "55178", "name": "United States v. Galletti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1389", "docket": "02-1389", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Abel C. Galletti, et al.", "facts": "Abel Galletti and his wife, along with another couple, the Briguglios, formed a business partnership. The partnership underpaid its federal employment taxes, and the IRS assessed the unpaid taxes against the partnership (meaning the partnership would be forced to pay the taxes). According to the Internal Revenue Code, if a tax debt is assessed within three years after the return was filed, the government has 10 additional years to collected the money.
\nMore than three years later, the Gallettis and the Briguglios separately filed for bankruptcy. The IRS made a claim in bankruptcy court against the two couples for the taxes assessed against the partnership. The couples objected, arguing that because the partners themselves had not been separately assessed, the statute of limitations had not been extended to the partners.
\nThe bankruptcy court ruled against the IRS, holding that the IRS must assess tax claims against individual partners, not just the partnership, in order to later collect on those claims from the individuals. The district court and a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1149", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1573", "ID": "55177", "name": "Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-857", "docket": "02-857", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Household Credit Services, Inc. and MBNA America Bank, N.A.", "second_party": "Sharon R. Pfennig", "facts": "Sharon Pfennig went over her $2000 credit limit. The company that issued Pfennig her credit card, Household Credit Services, Inc., charged her a fee of $29 for each month that her balance remained over $2000. This fee was listed in the \"Purchases\" category on her monthly statement rather than as a \"finance charge.\" Under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), any charges \"incident to the extension of credit\" must be listed separately as \"finance charges.\"
\nHousehold Credit Services chose not to list the over-limit fee as a \"finance charge,\" however, based on the Federal Reserve Board's definition of the term, which explicitly excludes \"charges ... for exceeding a credit limit.\" Pfenning countered that the Board's definition was an unreasonable interpretation of TILA's plain language and should therefore be disregarded.
\nThe district court sided with Household Credit Services, finding that the the Federal Reserve Board had properly exercised its authority under TILA to define the term, that the definition was a reasonable interpretation of TILA, and that the credit company was therefore justified in relying on its definition. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "1201", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1574", "ID": "55180", "name": "Holland v. Jackson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-1200", "docket": "03-1200", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Flora Holland, Warden", "second_party": "Jessie L. Jackson", "facts": "Jessie L. Jackson was sentenced to life in prison in Tennessee in 1987 for the murder of James Crawley. Jackson sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective and had failed to conduct an adequate investigation. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as a violation of the Sixth Amendment based on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Strickland v. Washington, the accused must show a lack of reasonably effective counsel and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result at trial would have been different. The state court denied relief and determined that Jackson\u2019s counsel was not deficient and that, regardless, he had not suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel\u2019s performance.
\nJackson then sought federal habeas relief, and the district court confirmed the state court\u2019s denial of relief. Despite finding that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel and a reasonable likelihood of prejudice, the district court held that a federal court can only grant relief if the state court\u2019s determination was contrary to established federal law, which was not the case here. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Jackson was entitled to relief because the state court unreasonably applied the Strickland test and the state court\u2019s opinion was contrary to the established Strickland precedent in that it applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than a reasonable-probability standard.
", "facts_len": "1565", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1575", "ID": "55181", "name": "National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-954", "docket": "02-954", "term": "2003", "first_party": "National Archives and Records Administration", "second_party": "Allan J. Favish, et al.", "facts": "Vincent Foster, a high-ranking White House lawyer involved in the investigation of possible fraud by the Clinton family in the Whitewater real estate venture, was found dead in a Virginia park. Two government investigations subsequently found that the death had been a suicide. Allan Favish questioned the findings of the government investigations, claiming that they were part of a government cover-up of murder. Under the Freedom of Information Act, Favish requested access to 150 photos of Foster's body in the park and during the autopsy. He later reduced his request to 129 photos.
\nThe government initially denied him access to all the photos, but eventually gave him access to 118 of them. It withheld the rest, arguing that the privacy interest of Foster's family members in relation to Foster's death trumped the public interest served by providing Favish access to the photos. The government stated that the photos were very graphic and that releasing them would upset the family. Favish countered by arguing that the family did not have a relevant privacy interest; the only person whose privacy interests would be violated by the release of the photos was Foster, Favish argued, and Foster's death had rendered him incapable of exercising that interest.
\nAfter a series of appeals in which a Ninth Circuit panel held that the Foster family's right to privacy was relevant to the case but that the district court must look at the specific photos in order to weigh the privacy rights against Favish's right to access government information, the Ninth Circuit eventually decided that Favish should be given access to all but four of the photos. The government, joined by the Foster family, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1762", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1576", "ID": "55179", "name": "United States v. Banks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-473", "docket": "02-473", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Lashawn Lowell Banks", "facts": "On July 15, 1998 police officers, with a warrant, knocked on the door of suspected drug dealer Lashawn Banks. They waited between 15 and 20 seconds, and when Banks did not come to the door they smashed it open with a battering ram. Banks was arrested but, before his trial, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his apartment because, he claimed, the forced entry had been unlawful. When the request was denied, he pled guilty, but eventually attempted to retract his guilty plea on the advice of a new attorney. The new attorney, Randall Roske, argued that the search was unconstitutional because officers did not wait long enough before breaking down the door, and had no evidence that waiting longer would have had negative consequences. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the search unconstitutional and suppressing the evidence found during it.
", "facts_len": "884", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1577", "ID": "55183", "name": "Vieth v. Jubelirer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1580", "docket": "02-1580", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Robert C. Jubelirer, President of the Pennsylvania Senate, et al.", "second_party": "Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey", "facts": "After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association.
\nThe district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed.
\nHowever, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1393", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1578", "ID": "55182", "name": "Thornton v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-5165", "docket": "03-5165", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Marcus Thornton", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun.
\nThornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the \"search incident to arrest\" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area \"within his immediate control\").
\nA Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers.
", "facts_len": "1386", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1579", "ID": "55184", "name": "BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1593", "docket": "02-1593", "term": "2003", "first_party": "BedRoc Limited, LLC, and Western Elite, Inc.", "second_party": "United States, et al.", "facts": "BedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized the issuance of patents to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that patents reserve to the United States \"all the coal and other valuable minerals\" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in U.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's \"valuable minerals\" provision did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1080", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1580", "ID": "55187", "name": "Fellers v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-6320", "docket": "02-6320", "term": "2003", "first_party": "John J. Fellers", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "After a grand jury indicted Fellers, police arrested him at home. Fellers made incriminating statements during the arrest. Police officially interrogated Fellers at county jail and told him of his Miranda rights. Fellers signed a waiver of these rights and restated incriminating statements he had made at home. Fellers later argued that, when he was arrested in his home without a lawyer, police \"deliberately elicited\" incriminating statements. Pointing to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fellers argued it would be unconstitutional to admit at trial his incriminating statements made in jail, because these were the \"fruits\" of comments made at home without a lawyer.
\nFellers was convicted in federal district court. A federal appellate court affirmed the conviction and ruled that officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel either at home or in the jailhouse.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1581", "ID": "55185", "name": "Blakely v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1632", "docket": "02-1632", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr.", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds \"substantial and compelling reasons\" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an \"exceptional\" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with \"deliberate cruelty.\"
\nBlakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review.
", "facts_len": "781", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1582", "ID": "55186", "name": "Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1238", "docket": "02-1238", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., fka Southwestern Bell Telephone Company", "second_party": "Missouri Municipal League, et al.", "facts": "The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed federal preemption of state and local regulations \"prohibiting the ability of any entity\" to provide telecommunications services. Based on this act, a group of local governments in Missouri (the Missouri Municipal League) asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to nullify a state law that prevented municipalities from providing telecommunications services. Missouri argued that municipal governments were not separate entities but merely subsections of the state government and that the state could therefore restrict their authority. The FCC agreed with the state, refusing to nullify the law.
\nThe Municipal League appealed, and an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision. The panel held the words \"any entity\" were intentionally broad and that a proper understanding of them would include municipal governments. The state could therefore not regulate attempts by municipalities to provide telecommunications services. The FCC, along with the state of Missouri and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1136", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1583", "ID": "55188", "name": "Iowa v. Tovar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1541", "docket": "02-1541", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Iowa", "second_party": "Felipe Edgardo Tovar", "facts": "Felipe E. Tovar was charged with drunk-driving in Iowa three times in four years. Tovar pleaded guilty both times and waived his right to an attorney the first time. The third time, because Iowa law increases sentencing for successive drunk-driving, Tovar faced up to five years in prison. Tovar argued that his first conviction was an invalid waiver of his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should not increase his third sentence. The waiver was invalid, Tovar argued, because the judge did not warn him of the consequences of entering a guilty plea without an attorney. The Iowa district court rejected Tovar's argument and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.
", "facts_len": "732", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1584", "ID": "55189", "name": "Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-218", "docket": "03-218", "term": "2003", "first_party": "John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General", "second_party": "American Civil Liberties Union, et al.", "facts": "Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used \"community standards\" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most \"puritanical\" communities from being displayed in more \"tolerant\" ones.
\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the \"community standards\" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation.
\nThe Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the \"strict scrutiny\" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally \"overbroad\" - that is, it applied to too much protected material.
", "facts_len": "1463", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1585", "ID": "55190", "name": "General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. v. Cline", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1080", "docket": "02-1080", "term": "2003", "first_party": "General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.", "second_party": "Dennis Cline, et al.", "facts": "General Dynamics Land Systems renegotiated its union contract to provide full health care benefits only to retirees who were more than 50 years old by a July 1, 1997, deadline. Union member Dennis Cline fell two years short of 50 at the time of the deadline and was excluded permanently from receiving health benefits.
\nCline - along with 196 other 40-to 49-year-old employees - filed suit against General Dynamics under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). ADEA protects workers over 40 from age discrimination. Since the contract excluded workers between the ages of 40 and 49, Cline alleged that providing benefits only to retirees 50 and up was illegal age discrimination.
\nA U.S. district court in Ohio rejected Cline's claims. The court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize claims for \"reverse discrimination\" or preferential treatment for older people within the same over-40 class. Cline appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that General Dynamics was guilty of plain age discrimination, since the ADEA protects all persons over 40 from age discrimination by their employers.
", "facts_len": "1174", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1586", "ID": "55191", "name": "Dretke v. Haley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1824", "docket": "02-1824", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "second_party": "Michael Wayne Haley", "facts": "Haley was convicted in Texas state courts of a felony theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (extending his sentence). After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley filed a state habeas application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings.
\nHaley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent.
\nThe district court held that Haley showed he was \"actually innocent\" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception applies only to cases involving capital offenses.
", "facts_len": "1634", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1587", "ID": "55192", "name": "Crawford v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-9410", "docket": "02-9410", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Michael D. Crawford", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault.
\nCrawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that \"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\" The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the admission of out-of-court testimony against a defendant if that testimony was reliable.
", "facts_len": "912", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1588", "ID": "55194", "name": "Nelson v. Campbell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-6821", "docket": "03-6821", "term": "2003", "first_party": "David L. Nelson", "second_party": "Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003.
\nNelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out.
\nThe federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal.
", "facts_len": "1998", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1589", "ID": "55193", "name": "United States v. Dominguez Benitez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-167", "docket": "03-167", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Carlos Dominguez Benitez", "facts": "Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a \"plain error\" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a \"plain error\" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1590", "ID": "55195", "name": "Mitchell v. Esparza", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1369", "docket": "02-1369", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Mitchell", "second_party": "Esparza", "facts": "Gregory Esparza murdered a store clerk during a robbery in Ohio. He was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder. He appealed the death sentence, arguing that the prosecutors had failed to charge him as the \"principle offender\" in the murder and that he was therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Ohio law. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that, because Esparza had been the only person charged in the crime, it would have been redundant (and therefore unnecessary) to charge him as the \"principle offender.\"
\nEsparza then filed a second appeal before the Court of Appeals, this time arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his first appeal. He specifically cited his attorney's failure to argue that the state had violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by not following the \"letter of the law\" in its sentencing. The court again rejected Esparza's argument, referring back to its first decision and holding that the prosecutor's error had been harmless and was therefore not grounds for overturning the sentence. The defense attorney's failure to raise Eighth Amendment objections to the prosecutor's error, therefore, was also harmless.
\nEsparza then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In response, Ohio argued that the Ohio Appeals Court's decision had not violated \"clearly established Federal law\" and that the district court therefore could not overturn the sentence. The court sided with Esparza, however, holding that the state's failure to follow its sentencing laws violated the Eighth Amendment. The attorney's failure to raise the Eighth Amendment claim in the first appeal, therefore, was not harmless and could serve as grounds for overturning the sentence. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the federal district court's opinion.
", "facts_len": "1981", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1591", "ID": "55197", "name": "United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA), Limited", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1290", "docket": "02-1290", "term": "2003", "first_party": "United States Postal Service", "second_party": "Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., et al.", "facts": "When the U.S. Postal Service ended its mail-sack contract with Flamingo Industries, Flamingo sued in U.S. district court. Flamingo claimed the Postal Service declared a \"fake emergency in the supply of mail sacks\" so it could give no-bid contracts to cheaper foreign manufacturers without allowing U.S. companies to compete for them. Flamingo claimed this violated federal antitrust laws (among other charges). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim reasoning that the federal government is protected by sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the antitrust immunity count. It ruled that the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act waived the Postal Service's sovereign immunity and that it could be sued under federal antitrust laws as a \"person.\"
", "facts_len": "784", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1592", "ID": "55198", "name": "Schriro v. Summerlin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-526", "docket": "03-526", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Warren Wesley Summerlin", "facts": "Warren Summerlin killed a loan collector with a hatchet in 1982 and was subsequently convicted of murder. He was sentenced to death by a state trial judge because of the heinous nature of the crime and his previous criminal history. He appealed the sentence, arguing that his attorney's romantic relationship with the prosecutor and the trial judge's proven use of marijuana had prevented him from receiving a fair trial, but the Arizona state courts rejected his appeals.
\nIn June 2002, however, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona. The decision found that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial meant that only juries, not judges, could sentence someone to death. The Ring decision gave Summerlin new hope. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the decision changed the substance of the law rather than just the procedure used to apply it, and that it should therefore be applied retroactively. The state countered that the change dealt only with who did the actual sentencing, not with the burden of proof, and was therefore only procedural. Because procedural changes are not applied retroactively under the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Teague v. Lane, the state argued that Summerlin's sentence should be upheld. A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding instead with Summerlin and ordering the state to reopen his trial for re-sentencing.
", "facts_len": "1409", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1593", "ID": "55199", "name": "Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/03-339", "docket": "03-339", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Jose Francisco Sosa", "second_party": "Humberto Alvarez-Machain, et al.", "facts": "A U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent was kidnapped and murdered by a Mexican drug cartel in 1985. After an investigation, the DEA concluded that Humberto Alvarez-Machain had participated in the murder. A warrant for his arrest was issued by a federal district court. The DEA, however, was unable to convince Mexico to extradite Alvarez-Machain, so they hired several Mexican nationals to capture him and bring him back to the United States. His subsequent trial went all the way to the Supreme Court, which found that the government could try a person who had been forcibly abducted, but that the abduction itself might violate international and provide grounds for a civil suit. When the case went back to the district court for trial, Alvarez-Machain was found not guilty for lack of evidence.
\nAlvarez-Machain then filed a group of civil suits in federal court against the United States and the Mexican nationals who had captured him under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which allows the federal government to be sued on tort claims, and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which permits suits against foreign citizens in American courts. The government argued that the FTCA applied only to claims arising from actions that took place in the United States and therefore did not cover Alvarez-Machain's case because the arrest took place in Mexico. Further, the government and the Mexican nationals argued that the ATS gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear tort claims against foreign citizens, but did not allow private individuals to bring those suits.
\nThe federal district court disagreed with the government's contention that the FCTA claim did not apply, finding that plan to capture Alvarez-Machain was developed on U.S. soil and therefore covered. However, the court then ruled that the DEA had acted lawfully when they arrested Alvarez-Machain and was therefore not liable. On the ATS claims, the court rejected the argument that private individuals could not bring suit under the Act. The court found that Jose Francisco Sosa, one of the Mexican nationals who kidnapped Alvarez- Machain, had violated international law and was therefore liable under the ATS.
\nOn appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court's FTCA decision, ruling that the DEA could not authorize a citizen's arrest of Alvarez-Machain in another country and was therefore liable. The appeals court did, however, affirm the lower court's finding on the ATS claim, upholding the judgment against Sosa.
", "facts_len": "2549", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1594", "ID": "55200", "name": "Doe v. Chao", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1377", "docket": "02-1377", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Buck Doe", "second_party": "Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Labor", "facts": "Seven coal miners sued the Department of Labor, claiming that the department had violated the federal Privacy Act and the right to privacy found in the federal Constitution by releasing their social security numbers (SSNs). The Privacy Act stated that any \"person entitled to recovery\" in a suit against the government for a violation of privacy would be awarded \"actual damages sustained by the individual... but in no case... [would the damages awarded be] less than the sum of $1000\" and attorney fees.
\nThe miners argued that all they needed to prove in order to receive the $1000 minimum award was that the government had violated their privacy by releasing their SSNs; they did not need to prove that they had suffered actual damages. They maintained that the inclusion of \"actual damages\" in the act was only intended to limit the size of judgments awarded against the government, not to require proof of actual damage. The government argued that the act required the miners to prove that they had been harmed by the government's violation of their privacy.
\nThe district court ruled in favor of the government. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1196", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1595", "ID": "55201", "name": "Raymond B. Yates, M. D., P. C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-458", "docket": "02-458", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, and Raymond B. Yates, Trustee", "second_party": "William T. Hendon, Trustee", "facts": "Raymond Yates owned a corporation with a profit sharing/pension plan. Yates borrowed money from the plan at a set interest. After he had repaid the loan to his profit sharing/pension plan, Yates' creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. They asked the bankruptcy court to set aside the repayment (interest included) and give it to the creditors.
\nYates argued that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the interest from the profit sharing/pension plan could not be seized (except for loans to participants). The bankruptcy court disagreed and granted Yates' creditors' requests. The court reasoned that as the sole owner of the business, Yates was an employer under ERISA, not a \"participant.\" The plan's prohibition on interest seizure therefore did not apply. A federal district court and a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel both affirmed.
", "facts_len": "903", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1596", "ID": "55202", "name": "Castro v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-6683", "docket": "02-6683", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Hernan O'Ryan Castro", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Hernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re-characterization of Castro's appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1597", "ID": "55203", "name": "Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1164", "docket": "03-1164", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.", "second_party": "Livestock Marketing Association; Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association", "facts": "The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The USDA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the USDA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.
", "facts_len": "894", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1598", "ID": "55204", "name": "Tory v. Cochran", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1488", "docket": "03-1488", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Ulysses Tory, et al.", "second_party": "Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.", "facts": "Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.
", "facts_len": "477", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1599", "ID": "55205", "name": "Van Orden v. Perry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1500", "docket": "03-1500", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Thomas Van Orden", "second_party": "Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al.", "facts": "Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws \"respecting an establishment of religion.\" The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.
", "facts_len": "602", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1600", "ID": "55207", "name": "Leocal v. Ashcroft", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-583", "docket": "03-583", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Josue Leocal", "second_party": "John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.", "facts": "A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
", "facts_len": "496", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1601", "ID": "55206", "name": "Johnson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9685", "docket": "03-9685", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Robert Johnson, Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was \"the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.\" Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable \"facts supporting the claim\" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.
", "facts_len": "840", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1602", "ID": "55208", "name": "Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1192", "docket": "02-1192", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Cooper Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Aviall Services, Inc.", "facts": "Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.
", "facts_len": "741", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1603", "ID": "55210", "name": "Pace v. DiGuglielmo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9627", "docket": "03-9627", "term": "2004", "first_party": "John A. Pace", "second_party": "David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.", "facts": "In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post-conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while \"a properly filed\" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.
", "facts_len": "700", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1604", "ID": "55211", "name": "Smith v. Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-8661", "docket": "03-8661", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Melvin T. Smith", "second_party": "Massachusetts", "facts": "Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury.
\nSmith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding.
", "facts_len": "988", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1605", "ID": "55209", "name": "Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-814", "docket": "03-814", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Willard Stewart", "second_party": "Dutra Construction Company", "facts": "Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a \"vessel in navigation\" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "421", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1606", "ID": "55213", "name": "Mayle v. Felix", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-563", "docket": "04-563", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Deneice A. Mayle, Warden", "second_party": "Jacoby Lee Felix", "facts": "A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's \"conduct, transaction or occurrence.\" Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same \"conduct, transaction, or occurrence.\" The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.
", "facts_len": "1339", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1607", "ID": "55212", "name": "Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1160", "docket": "03-1160", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Azel P. Smith, et al.", "second_party": "City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.", "facts": "Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a \"disparate impact\" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.
", "facts_len": "802", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1608", "ID": "55214", "name": "Medell\u00edn v. Dretke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5928", "docket": "04-5928", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Jose Ernesto Medellin", "second_party": "Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.
", "facts_len": "1448", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1609", "ID": "55215", "name": "Halbert v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-10198", "docket": "03-10198", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Antonio Dwayne Halbert", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.
", "facts_len": "730", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1610", "ID": "55220", "name": "Pasquantino v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-725", "docket": "03-725", "term": "2004", "first_party": "David B. Pasquantino, Carl J. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for \"any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses.\" The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.
", "facts_len": "649", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1611", "ID": "55216", "name": "Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1696", "docket": "03-1696", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc., and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Saudi Basic Industries Corporation", "facts": "Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "854", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1612", "ID": "55218", "name": "Johnson v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-636", "docket": "03-636", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Garrison S. Johnson", "second_party": "California, et al.", "facts": "California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a \"strict scrutiny\" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were \"reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld,\" the appellate court wrote.
", "facts_len": "729", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1613", "ID": "55219", "name": "Illinois v. Caballes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-923", "docket": "03-923", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Illinois", "second_party": "Roy I. Caballes", "facts": "During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, \"unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.\"
", "facts_len": "584", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1614", "ID": "55221", "name": "Bell v. Cone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-394", "docket": "04-394", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Bell", "second_party": "Cone", "facts": "In 1984 a Tennessee court sentenced Cone to death for murder. The jury had found four aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the murder was \"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\" Cone's state appeals were unsuccessful. A federal district court then rejected Cone's habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Bell v. Cone (2002). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again reversed Cone's sentence on the ground that the \"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\" aggravator was unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "607", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1615", "ID": "55224", "name": "Brosseau v. Haugen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1261", "docket": "03-1261", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Brosseau", "second_party": "Haugen", "facts": "Brosseau, a police officer in Washington state, shot Haugen in the back as he tried to flee in his vehicle from the police. Haugen sued Brosseau in federal district court, alleging Brosseau used excessive force in shooting him and violated his constitutional rights. The district court ruled for Brosseau, finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "389", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1616", "ID": "55223", "name": "San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-340", "docket": "04-340", "term": "2004", "first_party": "San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.", "second_party": "City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.", "facts": "The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of \"issue preclusion\"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.
", "facts_len": "765", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1617", "ID": "55225", "name": "KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-409", "docket": "03-409", "term": "2004", "first_party": "KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.", "second_party": "Lasting Impression I, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term \"micro colors.\" Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the \"classic fair use defense\" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.
", "facts_len": "639", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1618", "ID": "55229", "name": "United States v. Booker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-104", "docket": "04-104", "term": "2004", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Freddie J. Booker", "facts": "In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.
\nFollowing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.
\nIn another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.
", "facts_len": "939", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1619", "ID": "55227", "name": "Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-603", "docket": "04-603", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.", "second_party": "Darue Engineering & Manufacturing", "facts": "The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "564", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1620", "ID": "55228", "name": "Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-377", "docket": "03-377", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.", "second_party": "Nigh", "facts": "Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property.
", "facts_len": "518", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1621", "ID": "55230", "name": "Orff v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1566", "docket": "03-1566", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Francis A. Orff, et al.", "second_party": "United States, et al.", "facts": "The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties \"to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit\" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.
", "facts_len": "952", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1622", "ID": "55233", "name": "Wilkinson v. Austin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-495", "docket": "04-495", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.", "second_party": "Charles E. Austin, et al.", "facts": "When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the \"New Policy,\" which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.
", "facts_len": "957", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1623", "ID": "55231", "name": "Tenet v. Doe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1395", "docket": "03-1395", "term": "2004", "first_party": "George J. Tenet, Individually, Porter J. Goss, Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and United States", "second_party": "John Doe, et ux.", "facts": "Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.
", "facts_len": "1068", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1624", "ID": "55234", "name": "Bell v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-514", "docket": "04-514", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "second_party": "Gregory Thompson", "facts": "A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.
", "facts_len": "1551", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1625", "ID": "55232", "name": "Gonzales v. Raich", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1454", "docket": "03-1454", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.", "second_party": "Angel McClary Raich, et al.", "facts": "In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.
\nThe medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not \"substantially affect\" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.
", "facts_len": "1128", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1626", "ID": "55235", "name": "City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1601", "docket": "03-1601", "term": "2004", "first_party": "City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.", "second_party": "Mark J. Abrams", "facts": "Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.
\nThe district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a \"comprehensive remedial scheme,\" Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.
", "facts_len": "1094", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1627", "ID": "55236", "name": "City of San Diego v. Roe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1669", "docket": "03-1669", "term": "2004", "first_party": "City of San Diego, California", "second_party": "John Roe", "facts": "John Roe, a San Diego police officer, was fired for selling a video on eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform and masturbating. He then sued the city in federal district court and alleged his firing violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court ruled against the officer; the Ninth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "350", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1628", "ID": "55237", "name": "Clingman v. Beaver", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-37", "docket": "04-37", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.", "second_party": "Andrea L. Beaver, et al.", "facts": "Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "551", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1629", "ID": "55238", "name": "Deck v. Missouri", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5293", "docket": "04-5293", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Carman L. Deck", "second_party": "Missouri", "facts": "After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.
", "facts_len": "313", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1630", "ID": "55242", "name": "Smith v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5323", "docket": "04-5323", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Before the Texas jury in Smith's murder trial reached its sentence, the judge issued a \"nullification instruction.\" The judge told the jury to consider mitigating evidence when filling out the verdict form. That form consisted of two \"yes\" or \"no\" questions: whether Smith acted deliberately and whether he posed a future danger. The judge told jurors that even if they believed the state had proved that the answer to both questions was \"yes,\" jurors should answer \"no\" to at least one of them if they believed the death sentence should not be imposed because of the mitigating evidence. The jury answered \"yes\" to both questions and sentenced Smith to death. Smith lost his appeal in state court.
", "facts_len": "706", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1631", "ID": "55239", "name": "MGM Studios v. Grokster", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-480", "docket": "04-480", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Grokster, Ltd., et al.", "facts": "Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "947", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1632", "ID": "55240", "name": "Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-163", "docket": "04-163", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.", "second_party": "Chevron U.S.A. Inc.", "facts": "Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is \"a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.\" The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "838", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1633", "ID": "55241", "name": "Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex Rel. Wilson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-169", "docket": "04-169", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.", "second_party": "United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson", "facts": "The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for \"making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.\" A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.
", "facts_len": "1393", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1634", "ID": "55243", "name": "Gonzalez v. Crosby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-6432", "docket": "04-6432", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Aurelio O. Gonzalez", "second_party": "James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections", "facts": "In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1635", "ID": "55244", "name": "Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-388", "docket": "03-388", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Dennis Bates, et al.", "second_party": "Dow Agrosciences LLC", "facts": "A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.
", "facts_len": "519", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1636", "ID": "55246", "name": "Dodd v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5286", "docket": "04-5286", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Michael Donald Dodd", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins \"on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.\" The 11th Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "953", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1637", "ID": "55245", "name": "Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-184", "docket": "03-184", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.
", "facts_len": "1047", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1638", "ID": "55247", "name": "Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-368", "docket": "04-368", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Arthur Andersen LLP", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to \"knowingly...corruptly persuade another person\" to \"withold\" or \"alter\" documents in an \"offical proceeding.\" The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a \"corrupt persuasion\" conviction - specifically, that a \"consciousness of wrongdoing\" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "673", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1639", "ID": "55248", "name": "City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-855", "docket": "03-855", "term": "2004", "first_party": "City of Sherrill, New York", "second_party": "Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.", "facts": "In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1640", "ID": "55249", "name": "Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1672", "docket": "02-1672", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Roderick Jackson", "second_party": "Birmingham Board of Education", "facts": "Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a \"private right of action\" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.
", "facts_len": "667", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1641", "ID": "55250", "name": "Kelo v. New London", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-108", "docket": "04-108", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Susette Kelo, et al.", "second_party": "City of New London, Connecticut, et al.", "facts": "New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.
", "facts_len": "649", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1642", "ID": "55251", "name": "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James N. Kirby, Proprietary Limited", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1028", "docket": "02-1028", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Norfolk Southern Railway Company", "second_party": "James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., dba Kirby Engineering, and Allianz Australia Insurance Limited", "facts": "James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama.
\nThe train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.
", "facts_len": "1163", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1643", "ID": "55252", "name": "Castle Rock v. Gonzales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-278", "docket": "04-278", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Town of Castle Rock, Colorado", "second_party": "Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales", "facts": "Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: \"No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...\" The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a \"protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order,\" which the police had violated.
", "facts_len": "1532", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1644", "ID": "55253", "name": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-892", "docket": "03-892", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "second_party": "Sigitas J. Banaitis", "facts": "Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.
", "facts_len": "654", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1645", "ID": "55257", "name": "Muehler v. Mena", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1423", "docket": "03-1423", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Darin L. Muehler, et al.", "second_party": "Iris Mena", "facts": "Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "662", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1646", "ID": "55255", "name": "Johnson v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-6964", "docket": "04-6964", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Jay Shawn Johnson", "second_party": "California", "facts": "NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a \"strong likelihood\" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show \"strong likelihood\" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.
\nJohnson appealed and argued that the \"strong likelihood\" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference\" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.
", "facts_len": "1245", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1647", "ID": "55256", "name": "Rhines v. Weber", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9046", "docket": "03-9046", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Charles Russell Rhines", "second_party": "Douglas Weber, Warden", "facts": "A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.
", "facts_len": "842", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1648", "ID": "55254", "name": "Granholm v. Heald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1116", "docket": "03-1116", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan et al.", "second_party": "Eleanor Heald et al.", "facts": "Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's \"dormant\" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.
", "facts_len": "1013", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1649", "ID": "55258", "name": "American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1230", "docket": "03-1230", "term": "2004", "first_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc. and USF Holland, Inc.", "second_party": "Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.", "facts": "Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the \"dormant\" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.
", "facts_len": "567", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1650", "ID": "55260", "name": "Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1388", "docket": "03-1388", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Douglas Spector, et al.", "second_party": "Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.", "facts": "A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.
", "facts_len": "527", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1651", "ID": "55259", "name": "Rousey v. Jacoway", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1407", "docket": "03-1407", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Richard Gerald Rousey, et ux.", "second_party": "Jill R. Jacoway", "facts": "Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: \"a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract.\" The exemption had to be \"on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor....\" The Rouseys said an IRA was a \"similar plan or contract.\" The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a \"similar plan or contract.\" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are \"similar plans or contracts,\" the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be \"on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.\" The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.
", "facts_len": "885", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1652", "ID": "55261", "name": "Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-932", "docket": "03-932", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Michael Broudo, et al.", "facts": "Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove \"loss causation\" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.
", "facts_len": "706", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1653", "ID": "55264", "name": "Bradshaw v. Stumpf", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-637", "docket": "04-637", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Margaret Bradshaw, Warden", "second_party": "John David Stumpf", "facts": "In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "910", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1654", "ID": "55262", "name": "Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-70", "docket": "04-70", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Exxon Mobil Corporation", "second_party": "Allapattah Services, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction. In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.
", "facts_len": "1524", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1655", "ID": "55265", "name": "Whitfield v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1293", "docket": "03-1293", "term": "2004", "first_party": "David Whitfield", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an \"overt act\" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.
", "facts_len": "464", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1656", "ID": "55263", "name": "Shepard v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9168", "docket": "03-9168", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Reginald Shepard", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more \"violent felony\" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed \"burglary\" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant \"generic burglary\" of a \"building or other structure.\" However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.
", "facts_len": "1194", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1657", "ID": "55267", "name": "Small v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-750", "docket": "03-750", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Gary Sherwood Small", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person \"convicted in any court\" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term \"convicted in any court\" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.
", "facts_len": "526", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1658", "ID": "55266", "name": "Roper v. Simmons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-633", "docket": "03-633", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center", "second_party": "Christopher Simmons", "facts": "Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or \"mentally retarded\" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.
\nUsing the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.
\nOn appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at \"evolving standards\" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.
", "facts_len": "1802", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1659", "ID": "55269", "name": "Florida v. Nixon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-931", "docket": "03-931", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Joe Elton Nixon", "facts": "A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was \"per se ineffective.\"
", "facts_len": "549", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1660", "ID": "55268", "name": "Devenpeck v. Alford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-710", "docket": "03-710", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Gerald Devenpeck, et al.", "second_party": "Jerome Anthony Alford", "facts": "Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.
\nAlford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.
\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's \"closely related offense doctrine.\"
", "facts_len": "1683", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1661", "ID": "55271", "name": "Cutter v. Wilkinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9877", "docket": "03-9877", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Jon B. Cutter, et al.", "second_party": "Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.", "facts": "The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a \"compelling government interest.\" Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their \"nonmainstream\" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws \"respecting an establishment of religion\"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "742", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1662", "ID": "55270", "name": "McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1693", "docket": "03-1693", "term": "2004", "first_party": "McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.", "second_party": "American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.", "facts": "The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws \"respecting an establishment of religion.\" The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.
", "facts_len": "478", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1663", "ID": "55272", "name": "Brown v. Payton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1039", "docket": "03-1039", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Jill L. Brown, Warden", "second_party": "William Charles Payton", "facts": "A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a \"catch-all factor\" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.
", "facts_len": "1210", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1664", "ID": "55273", "name": "Rompilla v. Beard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-5462", "docket": "04-5462", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Ronald Rompilla", "second_party": "Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections", "facts": "A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1083", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1665", "ID": "55274", "name": "National Cable & Telecommunications Assocation v. Brand X Internet Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/04-277", "docket": "04-277", "term": "2004", "first_party": "National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.", "second_party": "Brand X Internet Services, et al.", "facts": "Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of \"telecommunications service\" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a \"telecommunications service.\"
", "facts_len": "379", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1666", "ID": "55276", "name": "Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1234", "docket": "03-1234", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.", "facts": "A Michigan law imposed an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck that operated entirely in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies sought unsuccesfully to have Michigan courts invalidate the law. The companies claimed that the federal law that had created the Single State Registration System (SSRS) preempted and prohibited such state fees. Under the federal law a trucking company could obtain a permit applicable in every state by registering once in a single state. While the initial state could demand a fee equal to the sum of its individual state fee, the law prohibited a state from imposing an additional \"state registration requirement.\"
", "facts_len": "692", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1667", "ID": "55275", "name": "Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/02-1472", "docket": "02-1472", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation", "second_party": "Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "facts": "The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund \"contract support costs\" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.
", "facts_len": "1189", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1668", "ID": "55280", "name": "Howell, aka Cox v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9560", "docket": "03-9560", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Marlon Howell, aka Marlon Cox", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.
", "facts_len": "470", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1669", "ID": "55278", "name": "Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1237", "docket": "03-1237", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Merck KGaA", "second_party": "Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., et al.", "facts": "Integra Lifesciences sued Merck for supplying an Integra patented compound to other drug companies for use in preclinical research. In response, Merck claimed its actions were allowed under the federal law that said it was not an act of patent infringement to use or import a patented invention into the United States, if the invention was used only in ways related to the development and submission of information under a federal drug law (such as the law governing submission of data to the FDA). The district court ruled against Merck and awarded Integra damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment but ordered a modification of damages.
", "facts_len": "655", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1670", "ID": "55277", "name": "Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-674", "docket": "03-674", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Keyse G. Jama", "second_party": "Immigration and Customs Enforcement", "facts": "A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law.
", "facts_len": "672", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1671", "ID": "55279", "name": "Kowalski v. Tesmer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-407", "docket": "03-407", "term": "2004", "first_party": "John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.", "second_party": "John C. Tesmer, et al.", "facts": "A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.
", "facts_len": "1038", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1672", "ID": "55281", "name": "Clark v. Martinez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-878", "docket": "03-878", "term": "2004", "first_party": "A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.", "second_party": "Sergio Martinez", "facts": "The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.
\nBenitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.
\nWhile separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.
\nThe U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.
", "facts_len": "861", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1673", "ID": "55285", "name": "Salinas v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-8400", "docket": "05-8400", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jeffrey Jerome Salinas", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Jeffrey Jerome Salinas was charged with bank robbery in federal district court. The district court treated Salinas\u2019 two prior robbery convictions as unrelated. But because he had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance, he was treated as a career offender for sentencing purposes, which meant that his sentence was increased in accordance with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling and held that the district court properly treated Salinas\u2019 prior robbery convictions as unrelated and that his conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance was a \u201ccontrolled substance offense\u201d within the meaning of \"career offender\" for sentencing purposes.
", "facts_len": "760", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1674", "ID": "55282", "name": "Alaska v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/128-orig", "docket": "128-orig", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Alaska", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Alaska and the United States disputed ownership of two areas of submerged lands - enclaves under the Alexander Archipelago, which are more than three miles from the coast of Alaska or any island, and lands beneath the inland waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska claimed the archipelago waters under the Submerged Lands Act, which entitled states to submerged lands three miles seaward of their coastline and to land beneath inland navigable waters. The dispute over the submerged lands under Glacier Bay centered on the United States' claim that, at the time Alaska gained statehood, those lands were intended for a national monument. A Special Master appointed to deal with the conflict, recommended to the U.S. Supreme Court that the Court side with the United States with respect to both areas. Alaska appealed that decision.
", "facts_len": "829", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1675", "ID": "55284", "name": "Wilkinson v. Dotson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-287", "docket": "03-287", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.", "second_party": "William Dwight Dotson, et al.", "facts": "Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.
", "facts_len": "761", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1676", "ID": "55283", "name": "Miller-El v. Dretke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-9659", "docket": "03-9659", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Thomas Joe Miller-El", "second_party": "Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
\nMiller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.
", "facts_len": "1531", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1677", "ID": "55286", "name": "Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-259", "docket": "05-259", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company", "second_party": "Sheila White", "facts": "Sheila White was the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way Department of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad's Tennessee Yard. After she complained of harassment by her supervisor, White was moved from duties as a forklift operator to less desirable duties as a track laborer, though her job classification remained the same. She was also suspended for 37 days without pay, but was eventually reinstated and given full back pay.
\nWhite filed suit in federal court, where a jury rejected her claims of sex discrimination but awarded her damages of $43,000 after finding that she had been retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, Burlington Northern argued that White had not suffered \"adverse employment action,\" and therefore could not bring the suit, because she had not been fired, demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the suspension without pay - even if back pay was eventually awarded - was an \"adverse employment action,\" as was the change of responsibilities within the same job category.
", "facts_len": "1158", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1678", "ID": "55287", "name": "Eberhart v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-9949", "docket": "04-9949", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Ivan Eberhart", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Ivan Eberhart was convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine. He filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or for a new trial on the last day available for post-trial motions. Eberhart claimed that a flaw in the transcript published to the jury provided the basis for his motion. Six months later, he filed a \u201csupplemental memorandum\u201d alleging two additional grounds for his motion: the admission of potential hearsay testimony into evidence, and the district court\u2019s failure to give a \u201cbuyer-seller instruction\u201d to the jury. The district court granted Eberhart\u2019s motion for a new trial. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which states that a motion for a new trial that is not based on new evidence must be filed within seven days of the verdict. Because Eberhart filed after the seven-day deadline, a new trial could not be granted.
", "facts_len": "1002", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1679", "ID": "55288", "name": "S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1527", "docket": "04-1527", "term": "2005", "first_party": "S.D. Warren Company", "second_party": "Maine Board of Environmental Protection et al.", "facts": "S.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of \"any activity\" \"which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters.\" When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a \"discharge.\" Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a \"discharge\" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "877", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1680", "ID": "55289", "name": "DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1704", "docket": "04-1704", "term": "2005", "first_party": "DaimlerChrysler Corp.", "second_party": "Charlotte Cuno, et al.", "facts": "As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.
", "facts_len": "666", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1681", "ID": "55290", "name": "Schriro v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1475", "docket": "04-1475", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Robert Douglas Smith", "facts": "In 1982, Robert Douglas Smith was sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault in an Arizona state court. Smith filed a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus in district court that was denied. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, which stated that a mentally retarded person cannot be executed, Smith appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that he was mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed. The appellate court held that the issue of whether or not Smith was mentally retarded had to be decided by a jury.
", "facts_len": "609", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1682", "ID": "55293", "name": "IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/03-1238", "docket": "03-1238", "term": "2005", "first_party": "IBP, Inc.", "second_party": "Gabriel Alvarez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.", "facts": "In two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.
", "facts_len": "507", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1683", "ID": "55292", "name": "Hill v. McDonough", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-8794", "docket": "05-8794", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Clarence E. Hill", "second_party": "James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "727", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1684", "ID": "55296", "name": "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1371", "docket": "04-1371", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.", "second_party": "Shadi Dabit", "facts": "Shadi Dabit, formerly a stockbroker at Merrill Lynch, brought a class action suit against his former employer alleging that the company had defrauded brokers by deceptively inflating stock prices, causing the brokers to hold onto stocks they would otherwise have sold. Dabit's class action was filed in the U.S. District Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction, but was based on Oklahoma state law.
\nIn response to perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in securities litigation, Congress had passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which placed restrictions on federal securities fraud class actions. When plaintiffs began avoiding the law by bringing the suits in state courts instead of federal courts, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which pre-empts federal class action securities fraud claims brought under state law that allege misrepresentation \"in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.\"
\nMerrill Lynch argued that Dabit's suit was pre-empted by SLUSA and therefore could not be brought under state law. Dabit countered that the suit alleged misrepresentation concerning only the holding of stocks, and therefore was beyond the scope of SLUSA. The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Merrill Lynch, finding the language of SLUSA broad enough to include suits such as Dabit's. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that suits by holders of stocks are distinct from suits by sellers and purchasers and that SLUSA was meant to pre-empt only the latter.
", "facts_len": "1624", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1685", "ID": "55294", "name": "Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1264", "docket": "04-1264", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.", "second_party": "John Cardegna et al.", "facts": "John Cardegna signed a contract for a loan from Buckeye Check Cashing. The contract contained a clause in which Cardegna agreed to resolve any controversies over the loan through arbitration. Cardegna later sued Buckeye, claiming that the conditions for the loan stipulated by the contract were illegal. Buckeye filed a motion in Florida district court to have the case resolved by arbitration, as required by the contract. Cardegna countered that the contract as a whole was illegal and that the arbitration clause was therefore not enforceable. The court agreed and ruled for Cardegna.
\nOn appeal, the state appeals court reversed, holding that the Federal Arbirtration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, allows arbitration clauses to be enforced even if they are part of otherwise invalid contracts. The appeals court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appeals court's use of Prima Paint, however, because the contract in that case had been merely voidable, while the contract in Cardegna's case was actually illegal. The Florida Supreme Court therefore reversed, ruling in favor of Cardegna.
", "facts_len": "1248", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1686", "ID": "55295", "name": "Texaco Inc. v. Dagher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-805", "docket": "04-805", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Texaco Inc.", "second_party": "Fouad N. Dagher et al.", "facts": "In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to stop competing for the U.S. oil market. The two companies formed a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, which would manage the refining and marketing of gasoline in the western United States. The joint venture was charged with setting prices for Texaco and Shell gasoline, which would be sold under the original brand names. When Equilon set the same price for both brands, Dagher and other service station owners sued under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that Equilon was engaging in illegal price-fixing. The dispute turned on whether Equilon's actions fell under the Sherman Act's per se rule against price-fixing, under which all such instances of price-fixing by joint ventures would be illegal without regard to the specific harm caused in any particular case. The District Court granted summary judgment for Texaco, holding that the per se rule did not apply to the price-setting engaged in by Equilon. The District Judge reasoned that all enterprises, including joint ventures, must eventually set prices for their products. Therefore Equilon was merely engaged in a normal business practice, not the type of unreasonable, anticompetitive price-fixing that would run afoul of the Supreme Court's non-literal interpretation of the Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Equilon's actions constituted price-fixing under the Sherman Act's per se rule and therefore could not be legal.
", "facts_len": "1485", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1687", "ID": "55297", "name": "Will v. Hallock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1332", "docket": "04-1332", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Richard Will et al.", "second_party": "Susan Hallock et al.", "facts": "U.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal.
", "facts_len": "1583", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1688", "ID": "55299", "name": "eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-130", "docket": "05-130", "term": "2005", "first_party": "eBay Inc. et al.", "second_party": "MercExchange, L.L.C.", "facts": "MercExchange patented a design for an online marketplace in which a single company provides the trustworthy framework within which buyers and sellers can negotiate for goods. After negotiations with eBay and Half.com to license the patent failed, MercExchange brought suit in federal district court alleging patent violation under the Patent Act. The jury sided with MercExchange, ruling that its patent had been violated, but the district court judge refused to issue a permanent injunction. The injunction would have forced eBay and Half.com to stop using the contested framework, but the judge applied the traditional four-part test to determine whether an injunction was necessary and found that it was not. That decision was reversed, however, by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied a \"general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringements absent exceptional circumstances.\"
", "facts_len": "957", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1689", "ID": "55302", "name": "Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1244", "docket": "04-1244", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Joseph Scheidler et al.", "second_party": "National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not \"obtain\" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that \"Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated.\" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of \"violence-only\" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)
", "facts_len": "1151", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1690", "ID": "55301", "name": "Youngblood v. West Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-6997", "docket": "05-6997", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Denver A. Youngblood, Jr.", "second_party": "West Virginia", "facts": "Denver A. Youngblood, Jr. was indicted on charges relating to the alleged abduction and sexual assault of three young women. The prosecution\u2019s case rested largely on the testimony of the young women and evidence consistent with their claims. The jury convicted Youngblood of sexual assault, brandishing a firearm, wanton endangerment involving a firearm, and indecent exposure. After being sentenced, Youngblood moved to set aside the verdict and argued that there was new and exculpatory evidence in the form of a note from two of the young women that supported Youngblood\u2019s consensual-sex defense to the sexual assault charge. The note had allegedly been shown to a state trooper who was investigating the incident, but he had refused to accept possession of it and requested that it be destroyed. Youngblood claimed that the suppression of this evidence constituted a violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, which held that a constitutional violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial by holding that the note was only impeachment, not exculpatory, evidence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed by holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a new trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals did not reach a decision on the merits of the alleged Brady violation.
", "facts_len": "1429", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1691", "ID": "55298", "name": "Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1186", "docket": "04-1186", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Wachovia Bank, National Association", "second_party": "Daniel G. Schmidt, III, et al.", "facts": "Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are \"deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.\" The Circuit Court interpreted \"located\" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both \"located\" and \"established\" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is \"established\" in the state where its main office is located, and \"located\" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was \"located\" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1477", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1692", "ID": "55300", "name": "Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-944", "docket": "04-944", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jenifer Arbaugh", "second_party": "Y & H Corporation, dba The Moonlight Cafe", "facts": "Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "622", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1693", "ID": "55303", "name": "Dolan v. Postal Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-848", "docket": "04-848", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Barbara Dolan", "second_party": "United States Postal Service et al.", "facts": "Barbara Dolan tripped over mail left on her porch by a mailman, injuring herself. She sued the Postal Service under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), arguing that her injuries were due to the mailman's negligence. The government, claiming that its sovereign immunity had not been waived in this particular case, moved to have the case dismissed. The FTCA, while waiving federal sovereign immunity for most incidents that could arise under it, has an exception for the \"negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.\" Dolan argued that this exception referred only to mail that was lost or damaged by the Postal Service, not to people injured by the placement of the mail, but the district court disagreed. The case was dismissed, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
", "facts_len": "814", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1694", "ID": "55305", "name": "United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-352", "docket": "05-352", "term": "2005", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez", "facts": "Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.
", "facts_len": "862", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1695", "ID": "55304", "name": "Central Va. Community College v. Katz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-885", "docket": "04-885", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Central Virginia Community College et al.", "second_party": "Bernard Katz, Liquidating Supervisor for Wallace's Bookstores, Inc.", "facts": "Katz, the court-appointed liquidating supervisor of the bankrupt estate of a bookstore, filed a suit to collect debts owed to the bookstore by Central Virginia Community College and several other schools operated by the state of Virginia. Katz also petitioned to prevent the schools from filing claims to collect money from the bookstore because of its bankruptcy status. The colleges argued that they could not be sued by Katz because of state sovereign immunity (which holds that a state must consent in order to be sued). The bankruptcy court disagreed, however, finding that Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution (Article I Section 8) was sufficient to allow them to waive states' sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.
", "facts_len": "763", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1696", "ID": "55306", "name": "Samson v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-9728", "docket": "04-9728", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Donald Curtis Samson", "second_party": "California", "facts": "A police officer stopped and searched Samson on the street in San Bruno, California. The officer had no warrant and later admitted he had stopped Samson only because he knew him to be on parole. The officer found that Samson was in possession of methamphetamines. Samson was arrested and charged with drug possession in state court. At trial Samson argued the drugs were inadmissible as evidence, because the search had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court declined to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "554", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1697", "ID": "55309", "name": "Kane v. Garcia Espitia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1538", "docket": "04-1538", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Anthony Kane, Warden", "second_party": "Joe Garcia Espitia", "facts": "Joe Garcia Espitia chose to represent himself in his trial on charges of carjacking and was convicted. Garcia Espitia was repeatedly denied law library access to prepare for trial, but he received four hours of access during trial just before closing arguments. He sought federal habeas relief, but the district court denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the lack of pretrial access to law books violated Garcia Espitia\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself as established in Faretta v. California.
", "facts_len": "577", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1698", "ID": "55308", "name": "Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-597", "docket": "04-597", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.", "second_party": "Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dba ConAgra Refrigerated Foods", "facts": "When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute.
", "facts_len": "1799", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1699", "ID": "55307", "name": "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-184", "docket": "05-184", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Salim Ahmed Hamdan", "second_party": "Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.", "facts": "Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant.
\nA few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "923", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1700", "ID": "55310", "name": "Dixon v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-7053", "docket": "05-7053", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Keshia Cherie Ashford Dixon", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Keshia Dixon was arrested for illegally purchasing firearms. At her trial, Dixon raised a duress defense, claiming that her boyfriend abused her and that she feared he would harm or kill her or her daughters if she did not buy the firearms. Upon being convicted, Dixon appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that she should not bear the evidentiary burden of proving her duress claim. The Circuit Court rejected Dixon's argument, noting that the circuit's previous cases had clearly established that the duress defense requires the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of evidence. This ruling conflicted with a ruling on a similar case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dixon appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the narrow question of the burden of proof.
", "facts_len": "814", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1701", "ID": "55311", "name": "Oregon v. Guzek", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-928", "docket": "04-928", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Oregon", "second_party": "Randy Lee Guzek", "facts": "A jury found Randy Lee Guzek guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the death sentence. Guzek was sentenced to death again, and the Oregon Supreme Court again threw out the death sentence. When Guzek was sentenced to death a third time, the Oregon Supreme Court again overturned his sentence and also considered his complaint that he had not been allowed to present testimony about his alibi at the sentencing phase of the trial. Oregon law requires that evidence of innocence, such as an alibi, be presented during the trial, not during the sentencing hearing. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted Guzek's argument that he had a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce the alibi testimony at his sentencing proceeding. Oregon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was reasonable to restrict the introduction of evidence of innocence to the guilt phase of the trial.
", "facts_len": "978", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1702", "ID": "55312", "name": "Lockhart v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-881", "docket": "04-881", "term": "2005", "first_party": "James Lockhart", "second_party": "United States et al.", "facts": "In 2002 the U.S. began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "381", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1703", "ID": "55313", "name": "Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-631", "docket": "04-631", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue", "second_party": "Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation", "facts": "The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off-reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue.
", "facts_len": "1069", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1704", "ID": "55315", "name": "Randall v. Sorrell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1528", "docket": "04-1528", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Neil Randall et al.", "second_party": "William H. Sorrell et al.", "facts": "In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were \"narrowly tailored\" to the state's interests.
", "facts_len": "1560", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1705", "ID": "55314", "name": "Whitman v. Dept. of Transportation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1131", "docket": "04-1131", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Terry L. Whitman", "second_party": "Department of Transportation et al.", "facts": "Terry Whitman works as an air traffic assistant for the Federal Aviation Administration (which is part of the Department of Transportation). Federal law requires that FAA employees who perform \"safety-sensitive functions\" submit to random drug tests. Whitman brought suit in federal district court, claiming that the FAA was testing him for substance abuse three times more often than other people holding similar positions. The disproportionate testing, he argued, violated his \"First Amendment right to privacy\" as well as his statutory rights, because the testing was not truly random.
\nThe district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Civil Service Reform Act requires complaint's like Whitman's to be decided through the arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement between the FAA and the National Association of Government Employees. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "933", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1706", "ID": "55318", "name": "Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-260", "docket": "05-260", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Joel Sereboff et ux.", "second_party": "Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.", "facts": "Mr. and Mrs. Sereboff held a health insurance policy with Mid Atlantic Medical Services that was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). If a beneficiary is injured, Mid Atlantic pays for all covered medical expenses. However, the plan also has a provision that requires the beneficiaries to reimburse Mid Atlantic when an injury has been caused by a third party and the beneficiary receives compensation from that third party. In this case, the Sereboffs were injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. After they settled their suit against that third party, Mid Atlantic filed suit in federal district court under section 502(a)(3) of ERISA to recover the money it had spent on medical expenses. 502(a)(3) provides that a health insurer may bring suit \"to obtain ... appropriate equitable relief ... to enforce ... the terms of the plan.\" The Sereboff's objected, arguing that the sort of reimbursement provision at issue in this case was not \"equitable\" because the Sereboffs had not had the funds in their possession when they agreed to the plan. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, siding with Mid Atlantic.
", "facts_len": "1208", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1707", "ID": "55317", "name": "Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-128", "docket": "05-128", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Howard Delivery Service, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Zurich American Insurance Co.", "facts": "Under West Virginia law, employers are required to either participate in a state-run workers' compensation fund or demonstrate that they are financially capable of covering any workers' compensation claims that may arise. Howard Delivery service, a West Virginia freight carrier, chose to fulfill its obligation by purchasing insurance from Zurich American Insurance Company. In January of 2002, however, the company cancelled its policy (still owing thousands of dollars in unpaid premiums) and filed for bankruptcy.
\nZurich filed for special status as a creditor, arguing that the money owed to them consisted of \"contributions to an employee benefit plan arising from services rendered,\" and that under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code they should therefore be given priority in recovering the premiums. The bankruptcy court rejected Zurich's claims, however, finding that the provision did not apply to the workers compensation insurance premiums because they were not wage-substitute-type benefits for which the company could bargain (because Howard was required by law to have some form of insurance). A federal district court affirmed the decision, but a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that contributions to an employee benefit plan did not need to be voluntary to meet the Chapter 11 definition.
", "facts_len": "1358", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1708", "ID": "55319", "name": "Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-433", "docket": "04-433", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Joseph Anza, et al.", "second_party": "Ideal Steel Supply Corp.", "facts": "Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, \"[a]ny person injured in his business or property\" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue.
\nThe federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.
", "facts_len": "900", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1709", "ID": "55320", "name": "Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1581", "docket": "04-1581", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are \"grassroots lobbying advertisements\" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all \"as-applied\" challenges to BCRA. The U.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion.
", "facts_len": "904", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1710", "ID": "55323", "name": "Gonzales v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-552", "docket": "05-552", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "second_party": "Michelle Thomas et al.", "facts": "A South African family sought asylum in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which grants asylum to those who cannot return to another country because of \u201cpersecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.\u201d Their application for asylum claimed that they feared persecution if they returned to South Africa because of their (1) political opinions and (2) \u201cmembership in a particular social group,\u201d which they argued included both their race and their kinship with a particular well-known white South African. The immigration judge denied their application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that association with a particular family may fall within the scope of the \u201cparticular social group\u201d language in the INA.
", "facts_len": "937", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1711", "ID": "55322", "name": "Garcetti v. Ceballos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-473", "docket": "04-473", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Gil Garcetti et al.", "second_party": "Richard Ceballos", "facts": "Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1017", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1712", "ID": "55321", "name": "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-465", "docket": "05-465", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Mohawk Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Shirley Williams et al.", "facts": "A group of current and former employees of Mohawk Industries brought suit against Mohawk in federal district court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They claimed that Mohawk had conspired with third-party employment recruiters to bring illegal immigrants into Georgia to work for the company, and that the resulting competition for jobs hurt the legal workers. Mohawk asked the court to dismiss the case because, it argued, the plaintiffs had not shown that there were two distinct entities involved in the illegal activity as required under RICO. The only parties involved were the Mohawk corporation and the third-party recruiters, which were acting as its \"agents.\" Mohawk argued that, because the recruiters were working on behalf of the corporation rather than in cooperation with (but distinct from) it, they should not be considered separate entities. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the recruiters and the corporation were distinct and that RICO could therefore apply.
", "facts_len": "1048", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1713", "ID": "55325", "name": "Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-698", "docket": "04-698", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Brian Schaffer, a minor, by his parents and next friends, Jocelyn and Martin Schaffer, et ux, et al.", "second_party": "Jerry Weast, Superintendent, Montgomery County Public Schools, et al.", "facts": "The parents of Brian Schaffer, a disabled child, sued their public school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Schaffer's parents claimed the Individualized Education Program that the school system devised for their son, and which IDEA required for each disabled student, was inadequate. The district court ruled for the Schaffers, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the school system. Because IDEA was silent on whether the parents or the school system bear the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held, the general rule that the party initiating the suit bears that burden should be applied.
", "facts_len": "706", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1714", "ID": "55324", "name": "Gonzales v. Oregon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-623", "docket": "04-623", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.", "second_party": "Oregon et al.", "facts": "In 1994 Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act, the first state law authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. Attorney General John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that physician-assisted suicide violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Ashcroft threatened to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who took part in the practice. Oregon sued Ashcroft in federal district court. That court and, later the Ninth Circuit, held Ashcroft''s directive illegal. The courts held that the CSA did not authorize the attorney general to regulate physician-assisted suicide, which was the sort of medical matter historically entrusted to the states.
", "facts_len": "718", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1715", "ID": "55326", "name": "Rapanos v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1034", "docket": "04-1034", "term": "2005", "first_party": "John A. Rapanos et ux. et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into \"navigable waters,\" which the Act defines as \"the waters of the United States.\" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as \"adjacent wetlands\" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as \"waters of the United States.\" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the \"hydrological connection\" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as \"waters of the United States\" under the Act.
\nThe Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into \"navigable waters,\" which the Act defines as \"the waters of the United States.\" Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the \"waters of the United States.\" The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are \"adjacent\" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a \"significant nexus\" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as \"waters of the United States\" for purposes of the CWA.
", "facts_len": "2984", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1716", "ID": "55328", "name": "Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1140", "docket": "04-1140", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Gerald T. Martin et ux.", "second_party": "Franklin Capital Corporation, et al.", "facts": "The Martins filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant companies in New Mexico state court in 1996, alleging illegal conduct with regard to auto financing and insurance contracts the parties had entered into. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1332 and 1441. The Martins did not object or seek remand until over a year later, when they argued that their claims did not meet the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, agreeing with defendants' arguments that the punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and monetary relief for the named plaintiffs at issue in the case each exceeded the $50,000 threshold. The Martins requested that the district court certify its order denying remand so that they could seek interlocutory review, and the court denied their motion. The plaintiffs next requested that the district court grant judgment against them so that they could appeal the decision regarding jurisdiction, and the court granted their request.
\nThe plaintiffs then appealed to the 10th Circuit, and in a 2001 ruling, the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling, rejecting the arguments that the amounts sought by the plaintiffs satisfied the diversity jurisdiction requirement. The court remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court.
\nBack in district court, the Martins moved for attorney's fees and expenses under \u00a7 1447(c), which provides for judicial discretion to make such an award in cases of improper removal. The district court denied this request on the grounds that the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal at the time. The Martins again appealed to the 10th Circuit.
\nThe appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, explaining that the district court had applied the proper standard under 10th Circuit precedent, stating that even in cases where removal was later found to be improper, if it was deemed to be objectively reasonable at the time, the court had discretion to deny an award of attorney's fees and expenses under \u00a7 1447(c); other circuits had employed a different standard. The appellate court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that the removal had an objectively legitimate basis at the time it occurred.
", "facts_len": "2376", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1717", "ID": "55327", "name": "Maryland v. Blake", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-373", "docket": "04-373", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Leeander Jerome Blake", "facts": "Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included \"DEATH\" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake \"I bet you want to talk now, huh!\" The detective then said \"No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now.\" A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.
", "facts_len": "1761", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1718", "ID": "55329", "name": "House v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-8990", "docket": "04-8990", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Paul Gregory House", "second_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "facts": "Paul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to show that it was \"more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence,\" the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not sufficient to warrant a habeas petition.
", "facts_len": "614", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1719", "ID": "55330", "name": "Day v. McDonough", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1324", "docket": "04-1324", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Patrick Day", "second_party": "James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections", "facts": "Patrick Day was convicted of murder in state court. After a long delay, he filed a petition for federal review, arguing that his counsel was inadequate. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within a one-year time limit. Day's petition was late, but the state of Florida failed to notice the untimeliness of the petition and instead addressed only the merits of Day's argument. Later a Federal Magistrate Judge did notice Day's failure to meet the deadline, and recommended to the District Court that the petition be dismissed. Day argued that by responding to the petition without disputing the timeliness, the state had forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense. The District Court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Day appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the District Court had acted unfairly when it ruled against him based on an argument that the state had not made. The Circuit Court rejected Day's argument and affirmed the District Court, ruling that the state's erroneous concession of the timeliness of the petition did not prevent the court from dismissing it.
", "facts_len": "1180", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1720", "ID": "55332", "name": "Evans v. Chavis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-721", "docket": "04-721", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Mike Evans, Acting Warden", "second_party": "Reginald Chavis", "facts": "After Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation.
\nHaving exhausted his state-court remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been \"pending\" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district court was timely under the AEDPA.
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1721", "ID": "55334", "name": "Bank of China v. NBM L.L.C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/03-1559", "docket": "03-1559", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Bank of China, New York Branch", "second_party": "NBM L.L.C., et al.", "facts": "Bank of China alleged that John Chou and Sherry Liu attempted to defraud the bank by borrowing large sums of money and misrepresenting them as debts owed by the bank to various independent businesses. Bank of China alleged that those businesses, such as NBM LLC, were actually just fronts set up for Chou and Liu's scheme. In addition to criminal charges, a civil suit was commenced against Chou, Liu, NBM LLC and other involved businesses, and Patrick Young, a bank employee accused of assisting with the fraudulent transactions. A jury found the defendants guilty of various charges, including mail fraud and wire fraud in violation of the conspiracy provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and it awarded the Bank large compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, NBM argued that the District Court should have instructed the jury that in order to find a violation of RICO, they needed to determine that the Bank was justified in believing NBM's misrepresentations. In common-law fraud cases, this is known as \"reasonable reliance.\" Bank of China argued that the RICO statute does not require a demonstration of reasonable reliance, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals accepted NBM's argument and reversed the jury verdict. The Circuit Court faulted the District Court for instructing the jury that the Bank could have been defrauded in violation of RICO even if some bank officials (such as Young) had known the true nature of the misrepresented sums. Instead, the Circuit Court said, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether Bank of China was justifiably misled by the misrepresentations.
", "facts_len": "1660", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1722", "ID": "55333", "name": "Jones v. Flowers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1477", "docket": "04-1477", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Gary Kent Jones", "second_party": "Linda K. Flowers et al.", "facts": "In 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returned as \"unclaimed\" (because Jones was not living at the house and no one was present to sign for its receipt) and the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sold the property in a private sale to Linda Flowers.
\nJones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.
", "facts_len": "1007", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1723", "ID": "55335", "name": "Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-607", "docket": "04-607", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, dba LabCorp", "second_party": "Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In the 1980s, research scientists at University Patents, Inc. (UPI) discovered that high levels of the amino acid homocysteine in the body are correlated with dangerously low levels of two B vitamins. UPI filed for a patent, seeking to license both the method of testing for the amino acid, and the correlation of the amino acid levels with B vitamin levels. UPI's successor licensed Metabolite Laboratories, which in 1992 sub-licensed the patent to Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp). When in 1998 LabCorp started using another company's test and stopped paying Metabolite royalties, Metabolite sued. A jury found LabCorp guilty of patent infringement and breach of contract and awarded damages to Metabolite. In an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, LabCorp argued that the patent was invalid. Natural phenomena themselves are not patentable, but new applications of them normally are. LabCorp argued that Metabolite had impermissibly patented a relationship that already existed in nature. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, however, ruling that Metabolite could patent its discovery of the correlation and that any association of homocysteine levels with B vitamin deficiency could constitute patent infringement. LabCorp appealed its case to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1329", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1724", "ID": "55337", "name": "Kansas v. Marsh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1170", "docket": "04-1170", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Michael Lee Marsh, II", "facts": "Michael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a \"tie-breaker.\" The ruled in Kleypas that \"fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue.\" The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1725", "ID": "55336", "name": "Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-593", "docket": "04-593", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "John McDonald", "facts": "John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.
", "facts_len": "830", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1726", "ID": "55338", "name": "Clark v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-5966", "docket": "05-5966", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Eric Michael Clark", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "Eric Clark shot and killed a police officer during a traffic stop. At trial in Arizona state court, Clark, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who believed his town had been taken over by aliens, introduced expert evidence about his mental state. He wanted to use this evidence not only to prove that he was insane (a claim on which he bore the burden of proof) but also to show that he could not form the criminal intent that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge, however, ruled that Arizona law confined the use of the expert evidence to his insanity claim and did not permit him to use it to show he could not form the necessary criminal intent. The court ruled that he had not sufficiently proved his insanity defense, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "880", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1727", "ID": "55339", "name": "Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-409", "docket": "05-409", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Carl Kircher et al.", "second_party": "Putnam Funds Trust et al.", "facts": "The Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation \"in connection with the purchase or sale\" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.
", "facts_len": "1309", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1728", "ID": "55340", "name": "Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1618", "docket": "04-1618", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Northern Insurance Company of New York", "second_party": "Chatham County, Georgia", "facts": "James Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to local governments, but only to states and \"arms of the state.\" Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a \"residual immunity.\"
", "facts_len": "817", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1729", "ID": "55341", "name": "Holmes v. South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1327", "docket": "04-1327", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Bobby Lee Holmes", "second_party": "South Carolina", "facts": "Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes.
\nUnder South Carolina law, defendants \"seeking to present evidence of third-party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence.\" Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence.
", "facts_len": "679", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1730", "ID": "55346", "name": "Georgia v. Randolph", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1067", "docket": "04-1067", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Georgia", "second_party": "Scott Fitz Randolph", "facts": "Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents.
", "facts_len": "687", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1731", "ID": "55344", "name": "United States v. Grubbs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1414", "docket": "04-1414", "term": "2005", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jeffrey Grubbs", "facts": "On federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an \"anticipatory warrant,\" something valid only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1732", "ID": "55345", "name": "Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-905", "docket": "04-905", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Volvo Trucks North America, Inc.", "second_party": "Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.", "facts": "Reeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - \"competed at the same functional level.\" Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA.
", "facts_len": "1133", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1733", "ID": "55342", "name": "Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1152", "docket": "04-1152", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.", "second_party": "Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.
", "facts_len": "811", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1734", "ID": "55343", "name": "Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1506", "docket": "04-1506", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al.", "second_party": "Heidi Ahlborn", "facts": "Heidi Ahlborn was injured and permanently disabled in a car accident. She received Medicaid payments totaling $215,645 through the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to pay for her medical treatment. In order to be eligible for the Medicaid payments, Arkansas law required Ahlborn to give the ADHS the \"right to any settlement, judgment, or award\" she might receive because of the accident, up to the amount Medicaid had paid for her treatment.
\nSeveral years after the accident, Ahlborn received $550,000 in a settlement with the parties liable for her injuries. The sum covered her medical treatment as well as pain and suffering, lost earnings, and her lost earning potential in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement was earmarked for her medical treatment, however. When the ADHS demanded that she repay the full $215,645, therefore, Ahlborn refused, and the issue went to a federal district court in Arkansas. The judge sided with the ADHS, ruling that it was not unreasonable for Arkansas to require Ahlborn to agree to repay them fully from any settlement she might receive in order to be eligible, even if the portion specifically allocated for medical treatment was less than the amount demanded by Medicaid.
\nAn 8th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, however, finding that seizing money from her settlement that had not been earmarked for medical treatment would violate federal Medicaid regulations, which forbid state governments from seizing the property of Medicaid recipients in order to recover money spent on treatment. The panel therefore ordered that Ahlborn repay just $35,581 to the ADHS.
", "facts_len": "1650", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1735", "ID": "55349", "name": "Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1144", "docket": "04-1144", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire", "second_party": "Planned Parenthood of Northern New England et al.", "facts": "After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the \"undue burden\" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.
\nThe federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1350", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1736", "ID": "55348", "name": "Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-18", "docket": "05-18", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Arlington Central School District Board of Education", "second_party": "Pearl Murphy, et vir.", "facts": "Using the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murphy's parents brought legal action to require the Arlington Central School District to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to \"award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs\" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, expert fees can only be reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees.
", "facts_len": "1150", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1737", "ID": "55347", "name": "League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-204", "docket": "05-204", "term": "2005", "first_party": "League of United Latin American Citizens et al.", "second_party": "Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, et al.", "facts": "In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.
\nThe case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.
\nThe three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.
", "facts_len": "1076", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1738", "ID": "55355", "name": "Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-379", "docket": "05-379", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Anthony Ash et al.", "second_party": "Tyson Foods, Inc.", "facts": "Ash, an African American and an employee at a Tyson Foods poultry plant, was passed over for a promotion and sued the company for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A jury found for Ash and awarded damages, but the District Court granted Tyson's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and ordered a new trial. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's order, finding that the evidence presented by Ash was insufficient to support the damages awarded. Tyson claimed that Ash had been passed over for a more qualified employee, and in response Ash introduced evidence of his own superior qualifications in order to show that Tyson's reason was merely a pretext. The Circuit Court held that Ash's evidence did not meet the standard for establishing pretext: the disparity in qualifications needed to be \"so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.\" In the course of its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit also held that the Tyson plant manager's use of the word \"boy\" to refer to Ash was not evidence of racial animus, because it was never coupled with racial classifications.
", "facts_len": "1169", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1739", "ID": "55354", "name": "Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1329", "docket": "04-1329", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Illinois Tool Works Inc. et al.", "second_party": "Independent Ink, Inc.", "facts": "Independent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a customer's agreement to use another product (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist.
", "facts_len": "1033", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1740", "ID": "55352", "name": "Marshall v. Marshall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1544", "docket": "04-1544", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Vickie Lynn Marshall", "second_party": "E. Pierce Marshall", "facts": "Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created \"probate exception\" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court.
", "facts_len": "1320", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1741", "ID": "55351", "name": "Washington v. Recuenco", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-83", "docket": "05-83", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Washington", "second_party": "Arturo R. Recuenco", "facts": "Arturo Recuenco was convicted of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife \"with a deadly weapon.\" The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been involved, even though the jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless.
", "facts_len": "829", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1742", "ID": "55353", "name": "Brown v. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-980", "docket": "04-980", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jill L. Brown, Warden", "second_party": "Ronald L. Sanders", "facts": "A California trial court sentenced Sanders to death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence.
", "facts_len": "798", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1743", "ID": "55356", "name": "Beard v. Banks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1739", "docket": "04-1739", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Ronald Banks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated", "facts": "Pennsylvania houses \"incorrigible, recalcitrant\" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.
", "facts_len": "1162", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1744", "ID": "55358", "name": "Lance v. Dennis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-555", "docket": "05-555", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Keith Lance, et al.", "second_party": "Gigi Dennis, Colorado Secretary of State", "facts": "When the Colorado legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan in 2000, the state courts created one at the request of a group of voters. The legislature succeeded in passing a redistricting plan in 2003. The state attorney general brought suit in the Colorado State Supreme Court to require the secretary of state to use the court-ordered plan, and the Colorado General Assembly defended its own plan. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the legislature's plan violated Article V of the State Constitution. A group of citizens including Keith Lance brought another suit in federal court alleging that Article V of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Supreme Court's Rooker-Feldman doctrine, no federal court except the Supreme Court may hear appeals from state courts. The District Court held that since Lance was in privity with the General Assembly - that is, their claims were similar enough to constitute a mutual interest - Lance's suit was in effect an appeal of the General Assembly's loss in state court. Therefore, the District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and declined to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "1276", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1745", "ID": "55357", "name": "Brigham City v. Stuart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-502", "docket": "05-502", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Brigham City, Utah", "second_party": "Charles W. Stuart, et al.", "facts": "Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the \"emergency aid doctrine\" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man.
", "facts_len": "1176", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1746", "ID": "55361", "name": "Gonzales v. O Centro Esp\u00edrita Beneficente Uni\u00e3o do Vegetal", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1084", "docket": "04-1084", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.", "second_party": "O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal et al.", "facts": "O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca.
\nThe district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to \"narrowly tailor\" its prohibition of the drug.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1747", "ID": "55360", "name": "Hartman v. Moore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1495", "docket": "04-1495", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Michael Hartman, Frank Kormann, Pierce McIntosh, Norman Robbins, and Robert Edwards", "second_party": "William G. Moore, Jr.", "facts": "William Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable cause to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable cause, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation.
", "facts_len": "683", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1748", "ID": "55363", "name": "Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-712", "docket": "04-712", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Lincoln Property Company et al.", "second_party": "Christophe Roche et ux.", "facts": "Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.
", "facts_len": "948", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1749", "ID": "55362", "name": "Woodford v. Ngo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-416", "docket": "05-416", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jeanne S. Woodford et al.", "second_party": "Viet Mike Ngo", "facts": "Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were \"exhausted\" because they were no longer available to him.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1750", "ID": "55364", "name": "Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-10566", "docket": "04-10566", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Moises Sanchez-Llamas", "second_party": "Oregon", "facts": "Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, any person detained in a foreign country has the right to notify the consulate of his home country of his detention.
\nMoises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, was arrested for his role in a shootout with the police. He was given a Miranda warning, but not informed of his right under Article 36 to notify his consulate. After Sanchez-Llamas made incriminating statements to the police, he was charged with attempted murder. Sanchez-Llamas moved to dismiss the charge. He argued that he had a right under Article 36 which had been violated, and that his confession should consequently be inadmissible as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court both affirmed, holding that the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights, but only rights of countries.
\nMario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was arrested for murdering a man with a baseball bat. He was not informed that Article 36 would allow him to notify his consulate of his arrest. At trial, Bustillo's counsel brought witnesses testifying that another man had committed the crime. Nevertheless, Bustillo was convicted of first-degree murder, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Bustillo then filed a petition for review in state habeas court. He argued for the first time that his conviction should be thrown out because his Article 36 right to notify his consulate had been violated. The state habeas court denied the petition. The court ruled that the petition was \"procedurally barred\" under state law because he had failed to raise the issue at trial. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.
", "facts_len": "1742", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1751", "ID": "55365", "name": "Hudson v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1360", "docket": "04-1360", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Booker T. Hudson, Jr.", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Booker T. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment \"knock and announce\" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found.
", "facts_len": "654", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1752", "ID": "55366", "name": "United States v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1203", "docket": "04-1203", "term": "2005", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Georgia et al.", "facts": "Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.
\nBefore the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.
", "facts_len": "674", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1753", "ID": "55367", "name": "Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-200", "docket": "05-200", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield", "second_party": "Denise F. McVeigh, as Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. McVeigh", "facts": "In accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).
\nEmpire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1209", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1754", "ID": "55368", "name": "Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1376", "docket": "04-1376", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Humberto Fernandez-Vargas", "second_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "facts": "Humberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until 2001, when he married a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the \"reinstatement statute\") of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no \"protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status.\"
", "facts_len": "1382", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1755", "ID": "55369", "name": "Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1095", "docket": "04-1095", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran", "second_party": "Dariush Elahi", "facts": "Dariush Elahi sued in federal court claiming that the Islamic Republic of Iran had murdered his brother, and he won $300 million in damages. When Iran's Ministry of Defense won an arbitration award against a third party, Elahi sued to claim the award as part of the damages due to him. The Ministry objected, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) granted its property immunity from such claims. The District Court ruled for Elahi on the grounds that the Ministry had waived its immunity when it sued to enforce its award against the third party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District Court's reasoning, but it also ruled for Elahi, pointing to a provision of the FSIA that excepts from immunity the property of any \"agency or instrumentality\" of a foreign government if the agency is \"engaged in commercial activity in the United States.\" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception covers any foreign state as long as it is \"engaged in commercial activity in the United States.\"
", "facts_len": "1040", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1756", "ID": "55370", "name": "Davis v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-5224", "docket": "05-5224", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Adrian Martell Davis", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not \"testimonial\" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford.
", "facts_len": "684", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1757", "ID": "55372", "name": "Dye v. Hofbauer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-8384", "docket": "04-8384", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Paul Allen Dye", "second_party": "Gerald Hofbauer, Warden", "facts": "On August 29, 1982, Glenda Collins and Donna Bartels were shot in the Forbidden Wheels Motorcycle Club. After several witnesses testified against him in exchange for immunity, Paul Allen Dye was convicted of first- and second-degree murder for the shootings. Dye contended that he was innocent and that one of the witnesses who had testified against him was the shooter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.
\nDye petitioned for federal habeas relief and argued that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially held that there was flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and therefore reversed the district court\u2019s ruling. The respondent moved for a panel rehearing, but before the rehearing occurred, one of the justices on the original panel retired. In its second opinion, the appellate court affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling and determined that Dye\u2019s prosecutorial misconduct claim was too vague and was not presented as a violation of a federal right to the state court because the state court\u2019s opinion did not mention it.
", "facts_len": "1246", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1758", "ID": "55374", "name": "Zedner v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-5992", "docket": "05-5992", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Jacob Zedner", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not count toward this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the \"ends of justice\" served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act.
", "facts_len": "1216", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1759", "ID": "55373", "name": "United States v. Olson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-759", "docket": "04-759", "term": "2005", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Joseph Olson et al.", "facts": "Injured workers sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the U.S. when the federal government, if a private person in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred.
", "facts_len": "832", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1760", "ID": "55375", "name": "Rice v. Collins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-52", "docket": "04-52", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Bertram Rice, Warden, et al.", "second_party": "Steven Martell Collins", "facts": "At Collins' state-court drug trial, he alleged that the prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding of fact unless it is an \"unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.\" Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly.
", "facts_len": "1143", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1761", "ID": "55377", "name": "Erickson v. Pardus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-7317", "docket": "06-7317", "term": "2006", "first_party": "William Erickson", "second_party": "Barry J. Pardus, et al.", "facts": "William Erickson was diagnosed with Hepatitis C while imprisoned at Limon Correctional Facility in Limon, Colorado. He was prescribed medication to be administered via injection. One of the syringes he used for injection went missing from the medical center of the correctional facility and was later found in a communal trash can. Erickson was accused of stealing the syringe and utilizing it for illegal drug use, after which he was denied further treatment. Erickson sued prison medical officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and argued that the refusal of medical treatment violated his Eighth Amendment rights because he was suffering liver damage and threat of death by not being treated for Hepatitis C. The trial court dismissed Erickson\u2019s suit on the grounds that he could not prove he was suffering substantial harm because he was being denied medical treatment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "930", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1762", "ID": "55376", "name": "Bradshaw v. Richey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-101", "docket": "05-101", "term": "2005", "first_party": "Margaret Bradshaw, Warden", "second_party": "Kenneth T. Richey", "facts": "Kenneth T. Richey attempted to kill his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend by setting fire to his ex-girlfriend\u2019s apartment. The ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend escaped, but the neighbor\u2019s two-year-old child was killed in the fire. Richey was convicted of aggravated felony murder and sentenced to death on the theory of transferred intent. On direct appeal with new counsel, his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.
\nRichey sought state post-conviction relief but was denied by both the state trial court and the state appellate court. He then petitioned for federal habeas relief, but the federal district court denied his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that under Ohio law, the theory of transferred intent cannot be applied to aggravated felony murder, and Richey received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel\u2019s mishandling of the arson expert and expert testimony.
", "facts_len": "981", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1763", "ID": "55378", "name": "Los Angeles County v. Rettele", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-605", "docket": "06-605", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Los Angeles County et al.", "second_party": "Max Rettele et al.", "facts": "The Los Angeles County Sheriff\u2019s Department obtained a warrant to search a residence connected with a fraud and identity-theft crime ring. Unbeknownst to the police, the residence had been sold three months prior to the search, and there was no longer a suspect living there. The suspect the police thought lived in the residence for which the warrant was obtained was African American. When the police arrived at the house to conduct the search, the family living there was Caucasian. Max Rettele and his girlfriend were ordered out of bed and detained while the police secured the premises, but the police realized their mistake and quickly left. Rettele sued Los Angeles County for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The trial court held that the police were not liable for violating Rettele\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court\u2019s decision and held that, since the race of Rettele and his girlfriend did not match the race of the suspect identified in the search warrant, the police violated Rettele\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights.
", "facts_len": "1151", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1764", "ID": "55380", "name": "Fry v. Pliler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-5247", "docket": "06-5247", "term": "2006", "first_party": "John Francis Fry", "second_party": "Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden", "facts": "After extraordinarily long deliberations, a jury convicted John Fry of two counts of first degree murder. Near the end of the trial, the defense attempted to bring a witness who would testify that her cousin rather than Fry had committed the murders. The trial judge refused to let the witness testify. After exhausting his state court appeals, Fry petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
\nThe District Court held that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude the witness, but it ruled that the decision was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the judge's decision met the test for harmless error in Brecht v. Abrahamson . Under the Brecht test, evidence is held to be harmless unless it has a \"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.\" Fry argued that the standard for harmless error in habeas cases should instead be the one defined in Chapman v. California . The Chapman test requires the state to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
", "facts_len": "1213", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1765", "ID": "55382", "name": "Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-593", "docket": "06-593", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "Evelyn Coke", "facts": "Long Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a \"home healthcare attendant\" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in \"companionship services.\" The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in \"companionship services\" who are \"employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services.\"
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference (\"strong deference\") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled \"Interpretations.\" Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was \"unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme,\" and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference (\"weak deference\") either.
", "facts_len": "1388", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1766", "ID": "55381", "name": "Schriro v. Landrigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1575", "docket": "05-1575", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Jeffrey Timothy Landrigan, aka Billy Patrick Wayne Hill", "facts": "Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, and the witnesses were never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence.
\nAfter state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective.
", "facts_len": "1169", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1767", "ID": "55384", "name": "Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-102", "docket": "06-102", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Sinochem International Co. Ltd.", "second_party": "Malaysia International Shipping Corporation", "facts": "Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of \"forum non conveniens,\" which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.
", "facts_len": "1089", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1768", "ID": "55383", "name": "James v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-9264", "docket": "05-9264", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Alphonso James, Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When Alphonso James was convicted of firearm possession after having been convicted of a felony, the government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A \"violent felony\" under the ACCA includes burglary and \"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.\" James had previously been convicted once for attempted burglary and twice for drug trafficking, so the government argued that he had the necessary three \"countable\" convictions for the increased sentence. James argued that one of his drug-related convictions did not count as a serious drug offense, and that attempted burglary did not count as a violent felony. A federal District Court held that attempted burglary was a violent felony, but also that James's drug offense was not serious. Therefore, James had only two countable offenses and could not be sentenced under the ACCA.
\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that James's drug-trafficking offense was serious. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that attempted burglary counted as a violent felony, a ruling that put it at odds with other Circuits. The Circuit Court ruled that attempted burglary is a violent felony because it presents as much risk of violence as a successful burglary.
", "facts_len": "1485", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1769", "ID": "55385", "name": "Purcell v. Gonzalez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-532", "docket": "06-532", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Helen Purcell, Maricopa County Recorder, et al.", "second_party": "Maria M. Gonzalez et al.", "facts": "In 2002, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required a photo ID for voter registration. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC) notified Arizona\u2019s Secretary of State that Proposition 200 conflicted with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) regarding the need for photo ID as proof of citizenship for mailed voter registration forms. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs \u2014 Arizona residents, Indian tribes, and community organizations \u2014 filed a restraining order to prevent the state of Arizona from enforcing the new rules for voter registration. The petition for a restraining order was denied by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that it should grant an emergency injunction based on the fact that elections were about to begin. The appellate court granted the injunction to stop the enforcement of Proposition 200.
", "facts_len": "905", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1770", "ID": "55386", "name": "Cunningham v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-6551", "docket": "05-6551", "term": "2006", "first_party": "John Cunningham", "second_party": "California", "facts": "John Cunningham, a former police officer, was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of his young son. Under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the trial judge can choose between three possible sentences for a given crime: a minimum, medium, and maximum sentence. Judges normally hand down the medium sentence unless there are special circumstances. In Cunningham's case, the judge found six aggravating factors, and sentenced him to the maximum 16-year sentence. However, in determining some of the aggravating factors the judge relied on evidence not considered by the jury.
\nCunningham appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge's discretion was a violation of Cunningham's right to a trial by jury. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court had ruled that for the right to a jury trial to be effective, any fact which increases a sentence \"beyond the prescribed statutory maximum\" must be proved before the jury. Cunningham argued that the judge can consider only factors determined by the jury when deciding which sentence to impose.
\nA California Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the sentence, ruling that the judge had merely handed down the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute. The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "1343", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1771", "ID": "55387", "name": "National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-340", "docket": "06-340", "term": "2006", "first_party": "National Association of Home Builders et al.", "second_party": "Defenders of Wildlife et al.", "facts": "The Clean Water Act (CWA) instructs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to turn over pollution permitting authority to a state if the state's proposal meets nine listed criteria. When Arizona issued such a proposal, the EPA regional office raised the concern that the transfer might violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which prohibits agencies from taking actions that might jeopardize endangered species. In accordance with the ESA, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The FWS's opinion was that the ESA was inapplicable because the agency had no authority to consider any additional factors beyond the nine CWA criteria (none of which concerned endangered species). On the advice of the FWS, the EPA approved the transfer.
\nThe Defenders of Wildlife challenged the transfer, arguing that the ESA imposed an authoritative, independent requirement on the EPA's decision to approve the transfer. The agency countered the ESA was not an independent source of authority. Rather, the ESA imposes requirements only on the discretionary decisions of federal agencies. Since its decision was non-discretionary under the CWA, the agency argued, the ESA did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with Defenders of Wildlife and invalidated the transfer. The Ninth Circuit found the FWS opinion legally flawed and the EPA's reliance on it \"arbitrary and capricious.\" It noted that the EPA's decision was inconsistent with previous transfers of permitting authority, in which the impact on endangered species was considered.
", "facts_len": "1609", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1772", "ID": "55388", "name": "Lawrence v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-8820", "docket": "05-8820", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Gary Lawrence", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Gary Lawrence was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Lawrence appealed his conviction, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. After exhausting his state-court appeals, Lawrence filed a petition for certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to review the decisions of the Florida courts. Later, Lawrence petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which would allow his appeal to be heard in federal court.
\nThe federal District Court rejected Lawrence's habeas petition, because he had exceeded the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The AEDPA gives defendants one year to submit habeas petitions, but that does not include any time that the petitioner has a \"properly filed application\" pending for \"State post-conviction or other collateral review.\" In Lawrence's case, whether or not he had exceeded the one-year time limit depended on whether or not the time spent waiting for the Supreme Court to process his pending certiorari petition counted toward the time limit. Federal Circuit Courts have disagreed on this question.
\nIn his appeal, Lawrence argued that time spent on Supreme Court certiorari petitions, like time spent on state-court appeals, was not countable toward the one-year statute of limitations. Lawrence also made an alternative argument that the incompetence of his state-appointed counsel, as well as the disagreement among federal courts on the statute of limitations question, constituted \"extraordinary circumstances.\" If the Court were to find that the delay was due to extraordinary circumstances beyond the defendant's control, it could set aside the time limit under the doctrine of \"equitable tolling.\"
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court and rejected Lawrence's petition. The Circuit Court ruled that Lawrence had failed to demonstrate how his lawyer's actions or the confusion over the statute of limitations caused him to miss the deadline. The Circuit Court acknowledged that the statute of limitations had been in dispute, but it followed Circuit precedent that said time spent waiting for a pending Supreme Court certiorari petition did count toward the AEDPA's one-year time limit.
", "facts_len": "2269", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1773", "ID": "55390", "name": "Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1120", "docket": "05-1120", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Massachusetts et al.", "second_party": "Environmental Protection Agency et al.", "facts": "Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these \"greenhouse gases\" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate \"any air pollutant\" that can \"reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.\"
\nEPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on \"the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it.\" Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.
", "facts_len": "948", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1774", "ID": "55389", "name": "Ayers v. Belmontes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-493", "docket": "05-493", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Robert L. Ayers, Jr., Acting Warden", "second_party": "Fernando Belmontes", "facts": "In 1981, Fernando Belmontes Jr. was convicted of the first-degree murder of Steacy McConnell. During the sentencing phase of the trial, prosecutors sought the death penalty. Belmontes's defense lawyers argued for a life term in prison, and presented evidence of his history as a victim of abuse and poverty as well as his capacity for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. Before sentencing, the California trial judge instructed the jury to consider 11 possible mitigating factors, labeled (a) through (k), which jurors are required by California law to consider. The judge read factor (k), a catch-all factor, verbatim from the statute, telling jurors to consider \"[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.\"
\nAfter the jury sentenced Belmontes to death, he appealed to the California Supreme Court, arguing that the jury had misunderstood the ambiguous factor (k) instruction to mean that they should not consider non-crime-related mitigating factors. Since the Supreme Court has ruled that jurors must consider all mitigating evidence offered by a defendant in a capital case, this would render the conviction unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court upheld the conviction, relying on Boyde v. California, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that factor (k) is constitutional unless there is a \"reasonable likelihood\" that jurors misunderstood it. Belmondes appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where his death sentence was finally overturned in 2003. The Circuit Court ruled that jurors had been confused by the factor (k) instruction, which caused them to fail to consider the mitigating evidence of Belmondes's capacity for rehabilitation.
\nAfter the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, the Circuit Court reaffirmed its decision in 2005. The Circuit Court held that the verbatim or \"unadorned\" reading of the factor (k) instruction would have misled a reasonable juror. The Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutional sufficiency of factor (k), as well as the possible retroactive applicability of the Circuit Court's holding.
", "facts_len": "2214", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1775", "ID": "55391", "name": "Davenport v. Washington Education Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1589", "docket": "05-1589", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Gary Davenport et al.", "second_party": "Washington Education Association", "facts": "In some states, public sector labor unions are allowed to collect fees from non-union members. The Supreme Court has ruled that unions may use these fees for political purposes, but only if the non-union member does not object. Washington state also has a \"paycheck protection\" law, RCW 42.17.760, which requires unions to obtain specific permission from non-members before using their fees for political activity. Davenport, a non-union teacher, sued the Washington Education Association (WEA) teacher's union for violating the law.
\nWEA appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing that Washington's requirement that unions get prior permission was an unconstitutional burden on the unions' First Amendment right to associate for political purposes. Davenport countered that his own First Amendment rights were being violated when his fees went to political causes he did not agree with. The state Court of Appeals ruled in favor of WEA.
\nOn appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the burden must lie on the nonmember to assert his rights and object to the political fees.
", "facts_len": "1122", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1776", "ID": "55393", "name": "Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-157", "docket": "06-157", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jay F. Hein, Director, White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, et al.", "second_party": "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Shortly after taking office, President Bush created by executive order the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, a program aimed at allowing religious charitable organizations to compete alongside non-religious ones for federal funding. Another executive order instructed various executive departments to hold conferences promoting the Faith-Based Initiative. The Freedom from Religion Foundation sued, alleging that the conferences favored religious organizations over non-religious ones and thereby violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The government argued that there was no \"Case or Controversy\" as required by Article III of the Constitution. According to the government, the Foundation had no standing to sue, because the Foundation had not been harmed in any way by the conferences. The fact that an individual pays taxes to the federal government is not normally enough to give the individual standing to challenge a federal program, but the Foundation noted that exceptions have been made for Establishment Clause challenges (see Flast v. Cohen and Bowen v. Kendrick ).
\nThe District Court ruled that the Foundation lacked standing to sue. The court held that the exceptions only covered challenges to specific congressional expenditures, not executive-branch actions funded by the general funds allotted to the executive departments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, ruling that any taxpayer has standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against an executive-branch program, whether funded by a specific congressional grant or by a discretionary use of a general appropriation.
", "facts_len": "1688", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1777", "ID": "55394", "name": "Roper v. Weaver", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-313", "docket": "06-313", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Don Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center", "second_party": "William Weaver", "facts": "William Weaver was convicted of the first degree murder of a prospective witness in a drug trial. During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor gave a closing statement arguing for a death sentence. In the course of the statement, the prosecutor said: \"You've got to think beyond William Weaver [...] This is society's worst nightmare\" and \"Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's your duty [...] it's right to kill him [Weaver] now.\" The jury sentenced Weaver to death. Weaver appealed in state court, arguing that the prosecutor's statements had inflamed and prejudiced the jury.
\nThe Missouri state courts denied the appeal, but a federal District Court granted habeas corpus. The District Court overturned the sentence, ruling that the \"unfairly inflammatory\" closing statement had violated Weaver's right to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state cited the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which states that federal courts shall not grant a prisoner's habeas petition unless the state court's decision was \"contrary to [...] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" The Eighth Circuit had cited some Supreme Court cases pertaining to prejudicial closing statements in the guilt phase of the trial, but the state argued that the federal courts should not have granted habeas relief, because the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue of closing statements in the penalty phase.
", "facts_len": "1611", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1778", "ID": "55396", "name": "Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-85", "docket": "05-85", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Powerex Corp.", "second_party": "Reliant Energy Services, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The state of California suffered an energy crisis in 2001. Citizens filed suit against energy company Reliant Energy Services et al (Reliant) for conspiring to fix energy price levels. Reliant filed cross-claims against multiple energy companies and regulatory agencies involved in the price fixing, including the Canadian company Powerex Corporation. PowerEx exported surplus Canadian hydropower on behalf of its owner, the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro). Since BC Hydro was a governmental corporation and Powerex was its subsidiary, both argued that they were entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (FSIA). FSIA defines a foreign sovereign as an \"organ of a foreign state\" (28 U.S.C. Section 1603(b)). Reliant claimed that the two companies were exempt from FSIA sovereign immunity because their commercial activity had a \"direct effect\" on California energy markets.
\nA District Court ruled that BC Hydro was a foreign sovereign, but PowerEx was not. The District Court issued a remand order sending the case back to state court. Powerex appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it operated for the \"public interest\" as an instrumentality of the government. The Ninth Circuit held that PowerEx was not a \"foreign sovereign\" because BC Hydro, not the Canadian government, owned PowerEx's shares.
", "facts_len": "1409", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1779", "ID": "55398", "name": "BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-341", "docket": "06-341", "term": "2006", "first_party": "BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los Angeles fired African-American employee Stephen Peters. Human Resources Manager Pat Edgar decided to fire Peters in part because of a report of insubordination filed against Peters by his immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claimed that Peters was a victim of invidious discrimination because Grado, an Hispanic, treated non-African American employees less harshly. EEOC filed suit against BCI on behalf of Stephens under Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination against employees. Though a District Court concluded that Grado was racially biased, it dismissed the case because the evidence failed to prove that Edgar's decision to fire Stephens was sufficiently affected by Grado's discriminatory bias.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that a jury should determine whether or not Grado's bias affected Edgar's decision to fire Stephens, and it sent the case to trial. The Tenth Circuit cited the subordinate bias theory of liability, which holds a company liable for a discriminatory firing even if the employee who made the actual decision to fire was not the employee harboring racial bias.
", "facts_len": "1270", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1780", "ID": "55400", "name": "Rita v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-5754", "docket": "06-5754", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Victor A. Rita", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Victor Rita received a thirty-three month sentence from a trial judge after a jury convicted him of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Though the sentence fell within the range prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and under the statutory maximum, Rita appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He argued that the judge should not have sentenced him without explicitly considering factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that might justify imposing a lesser sentence. The government argued that the judge could presume the sentence reasonable if it fell within the guidelines, even without an explicit analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in U.S. v. Booker that sentencing judges could only treat the guidelines as advisory, not as mandatory. The Fourth Circuit accepted the government's arguments and ruled that a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences did not violate Booker.
", "facts_len": "1024", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1781", "ID": "55397", "name": "Sole v. Wyner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-531", "docket": "06-531", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Michael W. Sole, Secretary, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.", "second_party": "T.A. Wyner et al.", "facts": "Florida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference and awarded Wyner and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a \"prevailing party,\" and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the \"prevailing party\" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a \"mistake of the law,\" because the case was dismissed upon further review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the \"prevailing party.\"
", "facts_len": "1159", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1782", "ID": "55399", "name": "Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-996", "docket": "05-996", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Robert Louis Marrama", "second_party": "Citizens Bank of Massachusetts et al.", "facts": "Robert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion.
\nThe bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, \"The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]\" Citizens Bank countered that the word \"may\" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy system could be abused if debtors were able to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.
", "facts_len": "1398", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1783", "ID": "55401", "name": "Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v. Brentwood Academy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-427", "docket": "06-427", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association", "second_party": "Brentwood Academy", "facts": "Brentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties.
\nOn appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the \"police power\" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a \"government regulator.\" The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.
", "facts_len": "1319", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1784", "ID": "55402", "name": "United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-562", "docket": "06-562", "term": "2006", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Atlantic Research Corporation", "facts": "Atlantic Research Corp. (Atlantic) built rocket motors for the United States government at an Arkansas facility. When residue from burnt rocket fuel contaminated the site, Atlantic voluntarily cleaned up the contamination and later sought cost recovery from the government under Section 107(a) and Section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Some Courts of Appeals had interpreted Section 107(a) as implicitly allowing a party responsible for contamination to compel other partly-responsible parties to contribute to the clean-up. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 added Section 113(f), which makes explicit the right to sue for contribution.
\nWhile Atlantic was negotiating with the government, the Supreme Court ruled in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. that a party cannot bring a Section 113(f) claim for contribution unless it is already the subject of a Section 107(a) contamination action. Atlantic filed a new claim for contribution under Section 107(a), but a district court denied the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had previously ruled that a liable party must use Section 113(f), not Section 107(a), to file a contribution claim. Atlantic argued that failure to meet the requirements of Section 113(f) did not foreclose the implied Section 107(a) right to sue other partly-responsible parties for contribution.
", "facts_len": "1467", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1785", "ID": "55404", "name": "MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-608", "docket": "05-608", "term": "2006", "first_party": "MedImmune, Inc.", "second_party": "Genentech, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Genentech held the patent for \"Cabilly I\", a process for using cell cultures to manufacture human antibodies. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech under which MedImmune paid royalties to Genentech in return for the use of the patent. Later, Genentech also obtained the patent to \"Cabilly II,\" a continuation of the Cabilly I process. Under the licensing agreement, MedImmune became a licensee for Cabilly II as well. Genentech informed MedImmune that it would have to pay royalties on one of its most lucrative products, Synagis, which uses the Cabilly II process. MedImmune sued Genentech, claiming that the patent was invalid and unenforceable. However, MedImmune kept paying the royalties.
\nA federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not present a controversy. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to \"cases or controversies.\" This is implemented in the Declaratory Judgment Act, which requires that a suit involve an \"actual controversy.\" Genentech argued that since MedImmune was still paying royalties on the patent, there was no controversy. MedImmune countered that though it was indeed still paying royalties on the patent it claimed was invalid, it was paying \"under protest.\" It would be unreasonable, MedImmune argued, for the company to be required to break its contractual obligations by stopping royalty payments before suing. This might jeopardize MedImmune's legal rights to one of its best-selling products.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled for Genentech and upheld the District Court, holding that the suit presented no actual controversy.
", "facts_len": "1669", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1786", "ID": "55405", "name": "Rockwell International Corp. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1272", "docket": "05-1272", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Rockwell International Corp. et al.", "second_party": "United States and United States ex rel James S. Stone", "facts": "Stone sued his employer, nuclear weapons plant operator Rockwell International, under the False Claims Act (FCA). He took advantage of the FCA's \"qui tam\" provision, which allows an individual to sue on behalf of the government. Stone alleged that Rockwell had made false claims about the environmental safety of \"pondcrete,\" a mixture of cement and sludge used for nuclear waste storage. In a qui tam action under the FCA, the person bringing the suit must be the \"original source\" of the information on which his claim is based. Rockwell argued that Stone was not an original source because he did not have \"direct and independent knowledge\" of the information at issue in the suit, as required by the FCA.
\nThe District Court ruled that Stone qualified as an original source, and a divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the question of how much and what kind of knowledge an FCA qui tam plaintiff must have.
", "facts_len": "994", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1787", "ID": "55406", "name": "Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-480", "docket": "06-480", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.", "second_party": "PSKS, Inc., dba Kay's Kloset . . . Kay's Shoes", "facts": "Leegin Creative Leather Products, a manufacturer of women's accessories, entered into vertical minimum price agreements with its retailers. The agreements required the retailers to charge no less than certain minimum prices for Leegin products. According to Leegin, the price minimums were intended to encourage competition among retailers in customer service and product promotion. When one retailer, PSKS, discounted Leegin products below the minimum, Leegin dropped the retailer. PSKS sued, arguing that Leegin was violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive price fixing. Under the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., mandatory minimum price agreements are per se illegal under the Act - that is, they are automatically illegal regardless of the circumstances.
\nLeegin argued that this rule was based on outdated economics. It contended that a better legal analysis would be the \"rule of reason,\" under which price minimums would be held illegal only in cases where they could be shown to be anticompetitive. Both the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments. The courts felt compelled to follow the Supreme Court's rule in the Dr. Miles case, under which Leegin's practices were illegal regardless of the economic arguments put forward by the company.
", "facts_len": "1412", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1788", "ID": "55407", "name": "Scott v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1631", "docket": "05-1631", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Timothy Scott", "second_party": "Victor Harris", "facts": "After a police officer attempted to pull him over for speeding, Victor Harris fled in his vehicle, initiating a high-speed car chase. Attempting to end the chase, Deputy Timothy Scott rammed Harris's vehicle with his police cruiser. Harris crashed and was rendered a quadriplegic. Harris sued Scott in federal District Court, alleging that Scott had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Scott claimed qualified immunity as a government official acting in his official capacity, but the District Court rejected the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
\nIn order to show that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity, a plaintiff is required to prove that the official violated a clearly established constitutional right. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Scott's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because there was no imminent threat - Harris remained in control of his vehicle and the roads were relatively empty - Scott's use of deadly force was unconstitutional. Although no Appellate Court had ruled on the specific question of the use of deadly force in a high-speed chase, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the limits on deadly force were \"clearly established.\"
", "facts_len": "1300", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1789", "ID": "55408", "name": "Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-134", "docket": "06-134", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations et al.", "second_party": "City of New York, New York", "facts": "Foreign countries can own buildings surrounding the United Nations in New York City tax-free if the buildings are used exclusively for diplomatic purposes. The City filed lawsuits against the Indian and Mongolian consulates in a District Court for failing to pay taxes on properties used for non-diplomatic purposes. The two consulates argued that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) granted them immunity from suit. The District Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the FSIA's \"immovable property\" exception, which removes immunity from foreign countries when \"rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue.\" The two countries argued that \"rights\" denoted a narrow set of property laws and did not extend to tax matters. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "843", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1790", "ID": "55412", "name": "Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-969", "docket": "06-969", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Federal Election Commission", "second_party": "Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.", "facts": "Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the \"as applied\" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate \"express advocacy\" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were \"issue ads\" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were \"sham issue ads,\" which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election.
\nA three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights.
", "facts_len": "2115", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1791", "ID": "55409", "name": "Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1056", "docket": "05-1056", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Microsoft Corporation", "second_party": "AT&T Corporation", "facts": "AT&T owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if it \"supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.\" Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software code is intangible and cannot not be considered a \"component\" of an invention and 2) no software had been \"supplied\" from the U.S. because the copies were made overseas.
\nThe District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the U.S.-originated software code was \"supplied\" from the United States.
", "facts_len": "1113", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1792", "ID": "55411", "name": "Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-381", "docket": "05-381", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Weyerhaeuser Company", "second_party": "Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Company, Inc.", "facts": "Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-Simmons) sued Weyerhaeuser, a competing sawmill, for \"predatory buying\" in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser was accused of buying more raw materials than it needed at unnecessarily high prices. Ross-Simmons alleged that Weyerhaeuser's business practices were aimed at monopolizing the market for purchasing unprocessed sawlogs and forcing its competitors out of business. At the jury trial, jurors were instructed to rule against Weyerhaeuser if Ross-Simmons could prove that Weyerhaeuser bought more sawlogs \"than it needed\" and paid more \"than necessary\" for them. Weyerhaeuser objected, arguing that the more stringent guidelines in the case of Brooke Group v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. required a ruling in its favor. In Brooke Group, the Court held that in order for a company to be liable for \"predatory pricing,\" a company must be shown to have been operating at a loss, and to have a \"dangerous probability\" of recouping its losses.
\nThe District Court rejected Weyerhaeuser's motion, ruling that Brooke Group applies only to predatory pricing, where a company prices its products too low in order force competitors out of the market, and not to predatory buying. Under the less stringent guidelines, the jury found Weyerhaeuser to be in violation of the Sherman Act, and awarded Ross-Simmons $78.8 million in damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court, ruling that the higher standard of liability for predatory pricing compared to predatory buying is appropriate, because business practices that resemble predatory pricing may result in benefits such as efficiency incentives and lower prices for consumers.
", "facts_len": "1771", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1793", "ID": "55410", "name": "Panetti v. Quarterman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-6407", "docket": "06-6407", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Scott Louis Panetti", "second_party": "Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Scott Louis Panetti was convicted of the murder of his wife's parents and sentenced to death. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, claiming mental illness. The Supreme Court had ruled in Ford v. Wainwright that execution of the mentally ill is barred by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. A psychiatric evaluation found that Panetti believed that the State was \"in league with the forces of evil\" and was executing him in order to \"prevent him from preaching the Gospel.\" However, doctors also found Panetti to be aware of his crime, of the fact that he was to be executed, and of the State's stated reason for executing him. The District Court concluded that he was sufficiently sane to be executed.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's argument that an inmate cannot be executed if he lacks a rational understanding of the State's motivation for the execution. The Court of Appeals instead relied on Justice Lewis Powell's concurrence in Ford, holding that an inmate need only have an awareness of the State's reason for execution, not necessarily a rational understanding of it.
", "facts_len": "1264", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1794", "ID": "55413", "name": "Whorton v. Bockting", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-595", "docket": "05-595", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Glen Whorton, Director, Nevada Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Marvin Howard Bockting", "facts": "Marvin Bockting was accused of sexually assaulting his six year old stepdaughter. The girl told a detective about Bockting's crimes against her, but at the trial she became very upset and refused to testify. The judge declared the witness unavailable and allowed the detective to give hearsay testimony on what Bockting's daughter had told him. Bockting was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without having had a chance to cross-examine the only witness against him.
\nBockting's appeals in state court were denied. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser had been violated. During Bockting's appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that hearsay testimony given outside the court by an unavailable witness is only admissible if the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness before trial.
\nBockting appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit, arguing that Crawford should apply retroactively to his case. The Circuit Court ruled that Crawford had announced a \"new rule\" of criminal procedure; new rules are normally not applied to cases that were final before the rule was announced. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the rule on hearsay testimony was a \"watershed\" rule that was fundamental to a fair trial. Under an exception defined by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, watershed rules are applied retroactively.
", "facts_len": "1514", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1795", "ID": "55414", "name": "Carey v. Musladin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-785", "docket": "05-785", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Thomas L. Carey, Warden", "second_party": "Mathew Musladin", "facts": "Mathew Musladin was convicted of the murder of Tom Studer. At Musladin's trial, Studer's family wore buttons showing pictures of the victim. Musladin's defense attorney requested that the trial judge tell the family to take off the buttons because they were prejudicial to the defense, but the judge denied the motion. Musladin later appealed his conviction to a state appellate court, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court. The appellate court held that though the buttons were an \"impermissible factor\" and should be discouraged, they were not so prejudicial that he had been denied his Due Process right to a fair trial. Musladin filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, but it was denied. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the appellate court, and sent the case back the District Court.
\nUnder 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1), a provision of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court can grant habeas relief to a defendant convicted in state court only if the state court decision was \"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\" The Ninth Circuit found that this standard had been met, because the state court decision had been \"objectively unreasonable.\" The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court should have recognized the buttons as inherently prejudicial to the defense. In addition to Supreme Court precedents, the majority of the Circuit Court panel relied on one of the Circuit's own precedents that specifically dealt with buttons in the courtroom. The dissent argued that this reliance contradicted AEDPA's requirement that habeas courts consider the law \"as determined by the Supreme Court.\" The majority considered the use of the Circuit precedent appropriate because it applied general principles set down by the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1969", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1796", "ID": "55415", "name": "Burton v. Stewart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-9222", "docket": "05-9222", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Lonnie Lee Burton", "second_party": "Belinda Stewart, Superintendent, Stafford Creek Corrections Center", "facts": "Burton was convicted of burglary, robbery, and rape. Under the standard state sentencing guidelines, the burglary and robbery alone warranted the maximum sentence for a single criminal event. In order to make sure the rape was punished as well, the trial judge added a consecutive sentence for the rape to the standard sentence.
\nBurton filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence in federal court. He argued that under Blakely v. Washington, handed down after his conviction, the jury rather than the judge should have decided whether to add the extra sentence. The government argued that the holding in Blakely was a \"new rule.\" Under the Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively. Burton countered that the relevant rule was actually established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, a decision handed down before his conviction became final. Burton also argued that even if Blakely is a new rule, it is essential for a fair trial. New rules that are essential for the fundamental fairness of trials can apply retroactively.
\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Burton. The Appeals Court held that Blakely was a new rule, so it could not be used by Burton in his appeal.
", "facts_len": "1314", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1797", "ID": "55421", "name": "Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-848", "docket": "05-848", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Environmental Defense et al.", "second_party": "Duke Energy Corporation", "facts": "A 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act created the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program (PSD), which requires power companies that want to make emissions-increasing modifications to their facilities to first apply for permits. Between 1988 and 2000, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) made twenty-nine extensive improvements to its power plants without obtaining PSD permits. When the government, along with Environmental Defense and several other environmental groups, sued Duke, the company pointed to a PSD regulation explicitly defining \"modification\" for purposes of PSD as any change that increases the hourly rate of emissions from a facility. Duke's improvements increased the number of hours the plants remained open, and therefore also increased the total annual emissions from the plants. But since the improvements left the hourly rate of emissions unchanged, Duke argued that it did not have to obtain PSD permits. The government countered by citing the Environmental Protection Agency's current interpretation of the PSD regulations, which holds that a power company making improvements that increase the hours of operation of its plants does need to obtain a permit in all cases where construction is involved.
\nThe District Court ruled in favor of Duke. The judge refused to rely on the EPA's current interpretation, ruling that it was inconsistent with the wording of the PSD regulations. Environmental Defense appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the 1977 PSD amendment had taken its definition of \"modification\" directly from a 1975 Clean Air Act amendment concerning the New Source Performance Standards program (NSPS). In the 1975 amendment, the term \"modification\" explicitly excluded improvements that merely increase the hours of operation of a facility. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held, the EPA did not have statutory authority to interpret \"modification\" differently for the PSD program. Environmental Defense appealed to the Supreme Court, with the added argument that the Fourth Circuit never should have heard the case, because challenges to Clean Air Act regulations can only be brought in the D.C. Cricuit.
", "facts_len": "2270", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1798", "ID": "55417", "name": "BP America Production Co. v. Burton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-669", "docket": "05-669", "term": "2006", "first_party": "BP America Production Co., successor in interest to Amoco Production Co., et al.", "second_party": "Rejane Burton, Act Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management, Department of the Interior, et al.", "facts": "The Department of the Interior (DOI) leases the rights to the mining of natural resources on federal lands to private companies like BP America Production (BP) in return for royalty payments. BP obtained a lease for the mining of coalbed methane gas, a natural gas that requires removal of excess carbon dioxide from the gas in order to make in marketable. In 1996, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the DOI issued an administrative order clarifying that the companies themselves must bear the full cost of removing the carbon dioxide. BP had been deducting the removal cost from its royalty payments, so the MMS ordered BP to pay more than $4 million in past royalites. BP cited 28 U.S.C. Section 2415(a), which establishes a six-year statute of limitations for government actions for monetary damages. BP argued that the government could not claim past royalties from more than six years before the 1996 administrative order, because the six-year time limit had expired.
\nThe DOI Assistant Secretary rejected BP's arguments and ruled for the government. A District Court affirmed the decision, ruling that an agency administrative order was not a government action for monetary damages, so the statute of limitations did not apply. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling. The Circuit Court ruled that the government would have had to file a complaint in court in order for the statute of limitations to take effect; an agency administrative order did not activate the time limit.
", "facts_len": "1548", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1799", "ID": "55418", "name": "Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1629", "docket": "05-1629", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "second_party": "Luis Alexander Duenas-Alvarez", "facts": "Luis Duenas-Alvarez, a Peruvian citizen living in California, was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows for the deportation of aliens who are convicted of an aggravated felony, which includes \"theft offenses.\" The Department of Homeland Security began deportation proceedings against Duenas-Alvarez. An immigration judge ruled in favor of the government and ordered Duenas-Alvarez deported to Peru, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Duenas-Alvarez argued that he was not guilty of a theft offense for purposes of the INA because he had only aided and abetted the theft of the car. The California anti-theft law did not distinguish between auto-theft and merely aiding an auto-theft, but the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the INA \"theft offense\" includes only the person who actually stole and took possession of the car, and not necessarily anyone who aided in the theft. Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled in favor of Duenas-Alvarez and reversed the lower courts.
", "facts_len": "1120", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1800", "ID": "55419", "name": "Osborn v. Haley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-593", "docket": "05-593", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Pat Osborn", "second_party": "Barry Haley et al.", "facts": "Pat Osborn, an employee of a private contractor for the U.S. Forest Service, sued Barry Haley, an employee of the Forest Service, in state court. Osborn alleged that Haley had influenced her employer to fire her. Under the Westfall Act, federal employees are immune from such lawsuits if the employee acts \"within the scope of his employment.\" If the Attorney General certifies that the employee acted within his scope, the case can be transferred to federal court and the United States can be substituted for the employee as the defendant. The government conceded that if Osborn's version of events were correct, Haley would have been outside his scope. Nevertheless, the government certified that Haley was within his scope, because it denied that Haley had any role in Osborn's firing.
\nThe government brought the case to federal District Court, but the court decided that it lacked the authority to settle the factual dispute at the root of the Attorney General's certification. Instead, the court assumed that Osborn's account was true, ruled that Haley had been outside the scope of his employment by influencing Haley's firing, and sent the case back to state court.
\nThe government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Circuit Court ruled that the Westfall Act gives the courts power to settle factual disputes over the incident at issue in a lawsuit, even if the dispute is over whether or not the incident happened at all. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the District Court should not have sent the case back to state court, because the Westfall Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over the case even after the federal District Court finds that the Attorney General was wrong to certify the federal employee.
\nOsborn appealed to the Supreme Court, which instructed the parties to submit briefs on the additional question of whether the Westfall Act gives a Court of Appeals the authority to review a District Court's order remanding a case back to state court.
", "facts_len": "2059", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1801", "ID": "55420", "name": "Altadis USA, Inc. v. Sea Star Line, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-606", "docket": "06-606", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Altadis USA, Inc.", "second_party": "Sea Star Line, LLC, et al.", "facts": "Altadis USA, Inc. hired Sea Star Line, LLC (Sea Star) to ship a container of cigars from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Tampa, Florida. According to the contract, which was negotiated under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), the container would travel by ship until it reached port at Jacksonville, Florida. From there, American Trans-Freight, Inc. (ATF) would truck it to Tampa. Sea Star issued a \"'through' bill of lading\" which held Sea Star liable for the container's safety during both the land and sea portions of its transport. The container was stolen from an ATF truck and Altadis filed a claim against Sea Star in District Court. The one-year statute of limitations for filing a COGSA claim had expired and the District Court dismissed the suit. Altadis argued that the Carmack Amendment imposed a two-year minimum statute of limitations period on liability claims relating to the transport of goods into the United States.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Carmack Amendment's liability rules did not apply to the inland portion of transport because ATF did not issue a separate bill of lading. Other U.S. Courts of Appeals had ruled that the Carmack Amendment did not require a separate bill of lading to cover the inland portion of transport.
", "facts_len": "1304", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1802", "ID": "55422", "name": "Wilkie v. Robbins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-219", "docket": "06-219", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Charles Wilkie et al.", "second_party": "Harvey Frank Robbins", "facts": "Harvey Robbins owned a private dude ranch which was intermingled with federal lands. The previous owner had granted the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) right-of-way across the private land, but after Robbins bought the ranch he refused to re-grant it. Robbins alleged that BLM officials harassed him with threats and meritless criminal charges, with the aim of forcing him to grant the government right-of-way. Robbins sued the BLM officials for extortion in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). He also brought a Bivens action (an action seeking monetary damages from a federal agent for a constitutional violation). Robbins argued that the Fifth Amendment protects a \"right to exclude\" government officials from one's property, and that the BLM agents had retaliated against him for his exercise of this right. The District Court dismissed both claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the BLM officials, while acting on behalf of the government, had qualified immunity and therefore could not be sued for extortion under RICO. The government also claimed that no Bivens action could be brought, because review of the BLM's actions was already available under the Administrative Procedure Act.
", "facts_len": "1348", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1803", "ID": "55424", "name": "Limtiaco v. Camacho", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-116", "docket": "06-116", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Alicia G. Limtiaco, Attorney General of Guam", "second_party": "Felix P. Camacho, Governor of Guam", "facts": "Governor Camacho of Guam sought to borrow over $400 million through the issuance of bonds. Guam Attorney General Moylan argued that the bond issuance violated the Guam Organic Act, a federal law governing the Territory of Guam. The Organic Act sets the limit for government borrowing to 10% of the \"aggregate tax valuation of the property on Guam.\" The Governor asked the Supreme Court of Guam for a decision on the disputed text. The Guam legislature had interpreted the phrase \"aggregate tax valuation\" to mean the assessed value of property on Guam for purposes of taxation. However, the Guam Supreme Court declined to follow the legislature's interpretation and ruled that the \"aggregate tax valuation\" was equivalent to the full appraised value of property on Guam. Under that interpretation, the debt-limit would be about $1.1 billion.
\nThe Attorney General appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While the case was pending, Congress passed a law allowing parties to appeal directly from the Guam Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit declined to hear the case, Moylan appealed to the Supreme Court. Normally parties must seek Supreme Court review within 90 days of a lower court's decision, but the case had been pending before the Ninth Circuit for two years. The Supreme Court directed the parties to argue the question of whether the time the case was pending before the Ninth Circuit counted toward the time limit.
", "facts_len": "1487", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1804", "ID": "55423", "name": "Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1429", "docket": "05-1429", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America", "second_party": "Pacific Gas & Electric Company", "facts": "Prior to declaring bankruptcy, Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG & E) purchased surety bonds from Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (Travelers). These bonds obliged Travelers to settle debts PG & E couldn't repay. When PG & E went bankrupt, Travelers hired attorneys to protect its interests. State law mandated that PG & E cover all attorney fees incurred by Travelers during state bankruptcy proceedings. The litigation later moved to federal court. PG & E refused to pay for Travelers's expenditures in federal court, claiming responsibility only for fees incurred during state proceedings.
\nThe Bankruptcy Court denied Travelers's request for reimbursement because the precedents of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that only federal laws could ensure payment for federal litigation. PG & E was only under contractual and legal obligation to pay for state-court attorney fees. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit denied Travelers's claim on the same grounds. Travelers appealed to the Supreme Court, citing inconsistent rulings among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
", "facts_len": "1151", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1805", "ID": "55425", "name": "Gonzales v. Carhart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-380", "docket": "05-380", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "second_party": "Leroy Carhart et al.", "facts": "In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when \"the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.\" Dr. Leroy Carhart and other physicians who perform late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The plaintiffs argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion procedure known as \"D&E\" (\"dilation and evacuation\"), as well as to the less common \"intact D&E,\" sometimes called D&X (\"dilation and extraction\"). With this application the Act would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional \"undue burden\" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, regardless of Congress's finding in the Act that partial-birth abortions are never medically necessary.
\nA federal District Court agreed and ruled the Act unconstitutional on both grounds. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The government argued that the Act only bans a narrow category of abortion procedures, and that a health exception is not required when Congress determines that a banned abortion procedure is never necessary for the health of the mother. The Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the District Court, ruling that a health exception is required for all bans on abortion procedures when \"substantial medical authority\" supports the necessity of the procedure. The Circuit Court ruled that the ongoing disagreement among medical experts over the necessity of intact D&E abortions was sufficient to establish that the Act was unconstitutional without a health exception. The Circuit Court did not reach the question of whether the Act was so broad as to qualify as an unconstitutional \"undue burden.\"
", "facts_len": "2192", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1806", "ID": "55426", "name": "Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-84", "docket": "06-84", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Safeco Insurance Company of America et al.", "second_party": "Charles Burr et al.", "facts": "In No. 06-100, Edo, a consumer, sued GEICO General Insurance Company, alleging that GEICO had violated the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that insurance companies give consumers notice before raising rates. Edo sought statutory and punitive damages, which the FCRA awards only when a company \"willfully\" violates the law. Similarly, in 06-84, several consumers sued Safeco for failing to notify them that better credit ratings would have entitled them to better premiums. It was GEICO's policy to notify new applicants only if their credit ratings were worse than a certain \"neutral\" (average) value, while Safeco as a matter of policy did not give \"adverse action\" notices to any new applicants. GEICO argued that it was unaware that the FCRA applied to the setting of premiums for new applicants such as Edo, and thus could not be considered to have acted willfully. The District Court ruled for GEICO and Safeco, holding that their actions did not qualify as willful.
\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that that the concept of willfulness includes \"reckless disregard\" for the law as well as actual knowledge that the conduct was illegal. The ruling put the Ninth Circuit in conflict with most other circuit courts, but the court argued that its interpretation was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the purpose of the FCRA.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1807", "ID": "55427", "name": "Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1508", "docket": "05-1508", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Zuni Public School District No. 89 et al.", "second_party": "United States Department of Education et al.", "facts": "The Department of Education certified that the state of New Mexico equalizes educational expenditures among school districts. The certification of equalization allowed New Mexico to offset its funding of districts located on Indian Reservations by a proportion of the federal Impact Aid payments made to those districts. Zuni Public School District objected to the certification, arguing that the Department had not followed the statutory formula for determining that a state's expenditures are equalized. Outlier school districts falling above the 95th or below the 5th percentile in per-pupil expenditures were excluded from consideration when the Department determined equalization. The Department calculated these percentiles based on the total student population, but Zuni argued that 20 U.S.C. Section 7709 had repealed that policy.
\nAn administrative judge dismissed Zuni's complaint, and the Secretary of Education affirmed on the ground that the law was ambiguous. A divided panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the Secretary's decision as a valid interpretation of the statute. In a rehearing by the entire Circuit Court, the 12 judges split evenly, again upholding the ruling.
", "facts_len": "1236", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1808", "ID": "55428", "name": "EC Term of Years Trust v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1541", "docket": "05-1541", "term": "2006", "first_party": "EC Term of Years Trust", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that Elmer and Dorothy Cullers had established a trust for the purpose of evading taxes. The IRS filed tax liens against the trust, freezing the trustees' assets until the outstanding taxes were paid. The trustees disagreed with the IRS, but opened a bank account to settle the tax dispute. A month later, the IRS collected the outstanding taxes from the bank account. EC Term of Years Trust sued the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 7426, which entitles trustees to challenge wrongful IRS collections, and 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), which entitles taxpayers to recover erroneously collected taxes. A district court decided that only 26 U.S.C. 7426 allowed third-party tax recoveries, so the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), the general provision for tax recovery. The court dismissed the 26 U.S.C. 7426 claim because the nine-month filing time limit had expired. EC Trust claimed in a second suit that the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Williams meant that the possibility of a suit under 26 U.S.C. 7426 did not preclude suits under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The District Court rejected the argument, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1243", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1809", "ID": "55429", "name": "Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1074", "docket": "05-1074", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Lilly M. Ledbetter", "second_party": "The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc.", "facts": "Over her nineteen-year career at Goodyear Tire, Lilly Ledbetter was consistently given low rankings in annual performance-and-salary reviews and low raises relative to other employees. Ledbetter sued Goodyear for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the company had given her a low salary because of her gender. A jury found for Ledbetter and awarded her over $3.5 million, which the district judge later reduced to $360,000.
\nGoodyear appealed, citing a Title VII provision that requires discrimination complaints to made within 180 days of the employer's discriminatory conduct. The jury had examined Ledbetter's entire career for evidence of discrimination, but Goodyear argued that the jury should only have considered the one annual salary review that had occurred within the 180-day limitations period before Ledbetter's complaint.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court, but without adopting Goodyear's position entirely. Instead the Circuit Court ruled that the jury could only examine Ledbetter's career for evidence of discrimination as far back as the last annual salary review before the start of the 180-day limitations period. The Circuit Court ruled that the fact that Ledbetter was getting a low salary during the 180 days did not justify the evaluation of Goodyear's decisions over Ledbetter's entire career. Instead, only those annual reviews that could have affected Ledbetter's payment during the 180 days could be evaluated. The Circuit Court found no evidence of discrimination in those reviews, so it reversed the District Court and dismissed Ledbetter's complaint.
", "facts_len": "1704", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1810", "ID": "55430", "name": "Jones v. Bock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-7058", "docket": "05-7058", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Lorenzo L. Jones", "second_party": "Barbara Bock, Warden, et al.", "facts": "Congress passed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995 in an effort to cut down on frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. Under the PLRA, before bringing a federal civil rights suit a prisoner must go through his prison's internal complaint process. Only after exhausting all of these \"administrative remedies\" can the prisoner bring the complaint to federal court.
\nLorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries in a car accident while in custody. He sued prison officials in federal court, claiming that they were violating his Eighth Amendment rights by making him do arduous work despite his injuries. The officials moved to dismiss the suit, because Jones had not provided any evidence or description of the administrative remedies he claimed to have pursued. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the suit.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court ruled that in order for Jones to sue, he would have had to provide the court with copies of his grievance forms or at least describe the administrative processes he had exhausted. The Circuit Court further ruled that the PLRA requires \"total exhaustion,\" which means that if a prisoner's suit has multiple claims, administrative remedies must have been exhausted for each and every claim.
\nThe Supreme Court accepted review in order to resolve the conflict between Circuit Courts over which side bears the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative remedies.
\nIn Williams v. Overton, Timothy Williams suffered from a medical condition which caused tumor growth and disfigurement in his arm. He claimed that prison officials were violating his rights by ignoring his medical needs. Williams's complaint had two claims: he needed additional surgery on his arm and a single-occupancy, handicapped-accessible cell. Williams went through the administrative remedial process on both grievances and both claims were denied. Williams then sued in federal court.
\nThe District Court dismissed the suit, because Williams had neglected to name any prison officials as defendants in his medical complaint. Therefore, the court ruled, the administrative remedies for that claim could not be considered to have been exhausted.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that \"The prisoner must demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect to each individual he intends to sue.\" The Circuit Court also ruled that the PLRA requires \"total exhaustion,\" which meant that Williams's entire suit was dismissed because of his unexhausted medical claim, even though the administrative remedies for his request for a new cell had been exhausted.
", "facts_len": "2758", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1811", "ID": "55432", "name": "Smith v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-11304", "docket": "05-11304", "term": "2006", "first_party": "LaRoyce Lathair Smith", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "LaRoyce Smith was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court overturned his death sentence and sent the case back to state court because of a judge's improper jury instruction. (See Smith v. Texas , No. 04-5323.) Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-imposed the sentence, holding that the erroneous instruction had not done any \"egregious harm\" to the fairness of Smith's sentencing. The Texas court found that the jury had still been able to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, despite the unconstitutional instruction. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case a second time.
", "facts_len": "683", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1812", "ID": "55433", "name": "Hinck v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-376", "docket": "06-376", "term": "2006", "first_party": "John F. Hinck et ux.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed over $20,000 in interest fees for outstanding taxes against John and Pamela Hinck. The Hincks claimed that the interest accrued because of IRS delays and errors. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the abatement of interest fees that are caused by IRS delays. The IRS rejected the Hincks' interest abatement claim in 2000. In 2003, the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case because Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code granted the United States Tax Court jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes.
\nThe Hincks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Tucker Act granted subject matter jurisdiction to the Federal Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that Section 6404(h) grants the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled to the contrary.
", "facts_len": "1033", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1813", "ID": "55439", "name": "Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-705", "docket": "05-705", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.", "second_party": "Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc.", "facts": "In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress declared that payphone service providers (PSPs) must be compensated for every completed call using their payphones. Previously, PSPs were not compensated for coinless \"dial-around\" long-distance calls in which the caller pays a long distance carrier rather than the PSP. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted rules requiring the carriers to pay the PSPs on a per-call basis. Metrophones Telecommunications, a PSP, sued Global Crossing Telecommunications, a long-distance carrier, alleging that Global Crossing had failed to pay for calls placed from Metrophones's payphones.
\nThe District Court dismissed Metrophones's first complaint because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not create a private right of action to recover compensation from long-distance carriers. Metrophones then filed an amended complaint based on Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, which deals with \"unjust and unreasonable\" practices of carriers. Global Communications argued that Metrophones had no right to sue under this statute either, but the District Court disagreed and ruled for Metrophones.
\nThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Circuit Court relied heavily on the FCC's interpretation of the statute, which was that failure to pay compensation to PSPs is an \"unjust and unreasonable\" practice in violation of Section 201(b) and that PSPs have a private right of action to sue carriers for such violations. The Circuit Court held that though the FCC rule on the subject was brief, it was entitled to deference from the courts in the absence of specific guidance from the statute.
", "facts_len": "1690", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1814", "ID": "55435", "name": "Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-484", "docket": "06-484", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Tellabs, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., et al.", "facts": "Several plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise to a \"strong inference\" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter).
\nThe District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a \"strong inference\" of scienter on the part of Tellabs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege \"acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.\" The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that weighing competing inferences was more properly the task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent.
", "facts_len": "1561", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1815", "ID": "55436", "name": "Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-618", "docket": "06-618", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Office of Senator Mark Dayton", "second_party": "Brad Hanson", "facts": "Brad Hanson worked as State Office Manager for U.S. Senator Mark Dayton. Shortly after Hanson took medical leave for a heart problem, Dayton fired him. Hanson sued under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, claiming that Dayton had discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Dayton filed a motion to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he was immunized from the suit by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution (\"for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.\") Dayton claimed that because Hanson's duties were directly related to Dayton's legislative functions, the decision to fire him could not be challenged. The District Court denied the motion.
\nOverturning its own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit. The clause can be invoked to exclude evidence that would involve legislative acts, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that it is not a blanket ban on suits involving legislative employees. The employee would simply have to make his case without questioning legislative acts or motivations for legislative acts. Senator Dayton appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Accountability Act requires the Court to hear the appeal. He also argued that Hanson's suit should be dismissed because the case had become moot after Dayton retired from the Senate.
", "facts_len": "1540", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1816", "ID": "55434", "name": "Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Sorrell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-746", "docket": "05-746", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Norfolk Southern Railway Company", "second_party": "Timothy Sorrell", "facts": "Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the \"causation standard\" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was the same for both the employee and the railroad. According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.)
\nThe trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million.
\nThe Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.
", "facts_len": "1284", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1817", "ID": "55438", "name": "Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1382", "docket": "05-1382", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "second_party": "Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when \"the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.\"
\nPlanned Parenthood sued the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that the Act was unconstitutional under the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. The District Court agreed and stopped the Act from going into effect.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Though the government claimed that the Act banned only a narrow, rare category of abortions, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act applied to the common abortion procedure known as \"D&E\" (\"dilation and evacuation\"), as well as to the far less common \"intact D&E,\" sometimes called \"D&X\" (\"dilation and extraction\"). This made the ban expansive enough to qualify as an unconstitutional \"undue burden\" on the right to abortion, as defined in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
\nThe Ninth Circuit also ruled that the Act's lack of an exception for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it unconstitutional. Congress had included in the Act a finding that partial-birth abortions were never medically necessary, but the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart required the health exception in all cases where medical opinion on the necessity an abortion procedure is divided.
\nFinally, the Circuit Court ruled that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, because the inclusion of ambiguous statutory terms such as \"partial-birth abortion\" would prevent physicians from knowing which methods of abortion were covered. The Circuit Court determined that the proper course of action was to block enforcement of the entire Act.
", "facts_len": "2123", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "1818", "ID": "55437", "name": "Morse v. Frederick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278", "docket": "06-278", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Deborah Morse et al.", "second_party": "Joseph Frederick", "facts": "At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message \"Bong Hits 4 Jesus,\" a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District , which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.
", "facts_len": "1264", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1819", "ID": "55440", "name": "Beck v. PACE International Union", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1448", "docket": "05-1448", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jeffrey H. Beck, liquidating trustee of the Estates of Crown Vantage, Inc. and Crown Paper Company", "second_party": "PACE International Union et al.", "facts": "During Chapter 11 liquidation proceedings, Crown Vantage, Inc. (Crown) terminated its employee pension plan and purchased an annuity for the employee participants as a replacement. The participants advocated merging the current plan into a multiemployer PACE International Union (PACE) pension plan but Crown did not investigate the possibility. The participants alleged that Crown breached its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by not acting \"solely in the interests of the participants\" (Section 1104(a)(1)). A bankruptcy court ordered Crown to maintain the plan's funds until they were distributed to the participants.
\nA District Court affirmed, finding that Crown failed to consider its employees' interest. Crown appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that it did not consider the PACE plan because Section 4041 of ERISA prevents termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court, ruling that ERISA does allow termination by way of a merger into a multiemployer plan.
", "facts_len": "1121", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1820", "ID": "55441", "name": "Uttecht v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-413", "docket": "06-413", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jeffrey Uttecht, Superintendent, Washington State Penitentiary", "second_party": "Cal Coburn Brown", "facts": "A Washington State jury sentenced Cal Brown to death for murder. Brown protested that unfair jury selection had guaranteed a \"verdict of death.\" One potential juror who expressed willingness to impose the death penalty only in \"severe situations\" was dismissed by the judge for cause. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.
\nBrown appealed first to a federal district court and then to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that the dismissed juror was not \"substantially impaired\" in his ability to follow the law. Supreme Court precedent required that jurors only be dismissed if their personal views prevent them from performing their duties. The prosecution unsuccessfully petitioned for the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on the ground that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act required appeals courts to give deference to trial judges' evaluations of jurors.
", "facts_len": "937", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1821", "ID": "55442", "name": "Lance v. Coffman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-641", "docket": "06-641", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Keith Lance et al.", "second_party": "Mike Coffman, Colorado Secretary of State", "facts": "After the 2000 census, the U.S. Congress increased Colorado\u2019s representation in the U.S. House of Representatives from six congressmen to seven. The Colorado state legislature failed to redraw the districts before the 2002 elections, so the state courts redrew the districts. In 2003, the Colorado state legislature redrew a different district map, which resulted in Colorado having two conflicting district maps. The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado state constitution only allows district maps to be redrawn once per census, and therefore the courts\u2019 2002 redistricting took precedence over the redistricting by the state legislature.
\nKeith Lance and three other Colorado citizens sued in federal district court and argued that the Colorado Supreme Court\u2019s decision violated the Election Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, and those individuals\u2019 First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file for redress of grievances. The district court held that they did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. Lance appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the district court did have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district court of Colorado, which dismissed the case on the grounds of issue preclusion, since Lance was an individual citizen not directly affected by the redistricting ruling. Lance again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1435", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1822", "ID": "55444", "name": "Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1157", "docket": "05-1157", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, fka Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Glen Billing et al.", "facts": "Billing and other investors filed a class action lawsuit against Credit Suisse and other Wall Street investment firms. The lawsuit alleged that the firms had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to drive up the cost of initial public offering (IPO) securities during the stock market boom of the 1990s. The firms allegedly entered into illegal contracts with IPO purchasers, requiring subsequent investors to pay artificially inflated prices for the secutities. Credit Suisse argued that the suit should be dismissed, because the firms had implied antitrust immunity. It claimed that the firms' conduct was normal business practice, and was closely regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. If plaintiffs were able to bring antitrust suits against investment firms for securities violations, Credit Suisse argued, the plaintiffs would be able to subvert the securities laws that Congress intended to govern such suits.
\nThe federal District Court agreed with Credit Suisse and dismissed the lawsuit. On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and reinstated the suit. The Second Circuit held that there was no evidence that Congress had intended securities laws like the Securities Act of 1933 to foreclose antitrust suits challenging practices like those engaged in by Credit Suisse.
", "facts_len": "1372", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1823", "ID": "55443", "name": "Philip Morris USA v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1256", "docket": "05-1256", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Philip Morris USA", "second_party": "Mayola Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. Williams, Deceased", "facts": "Jesse Williams died of lung cancer at age 67 after a life spent smoking three packs of Marlboro cigarettes per day. His widow sued Phillip Morris, the maker of Marlboro cigarettes, alleging that the company had engaged in a deliberate, wide-spread campaign of misinformation on the dangers of smoking. The jury found for Williams and awarded her $821,485.50 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial judge found the punitive damages excessive and reduced them to $32 million.
\nUnder the Supreme Court's decision BMW v. Gore, punitive damages must be reasonably related to the harm done to the plaintiff, but larger punitive damage awards may be appropriate if the defendant displayed reprehensible conduct. Citing Gore, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the $79.5 million award, holding that Phillip Morris's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant the large amount.
\nThe Oregon Supreme Court declined to take the case. However, the U.S. Supreme Court sent the case back for consideration in light of State Farm v. Campbell, which held that punitive damages can normally only be as much as nine times greater than compensatory damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals again affirmed the $79.5 million award, ruling that the reprehensibility of Phillip Morris's conduct justified the larger ratio. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the decision.
\nPhillip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the court had unreasonably exceeded federal guidelines on punitive damages. Phillip Morris also argued that it was unfair to punish the company for its actions toward other smokers who were not parties to the suit.
", "facts_len": "1715", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1824", "ID": "55446", "name": "Winkelman v. Parma City School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-983", "docket": "05-983", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jacob Winkelman, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians, Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al.", "second_party": "Parma City School District", "facts": "Jeff and Sandee Winkelman claimed that Parma City School District failed to give their disabled son Jacob a \"free appropriate public education\" as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Despite the Winkelmans' opposition, the school district planned to place Jacob in a public elementary school. After a preliminary school district hearing affirmed Jacob's placement, the Winkelmans placed Jacob in a private school at their own expense and petitioned a federal District Court for reimbursement.
\nThe District Court ruled for the School District. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the suit because the Winkelmans lacked a lawyer. The Winkelmans argued that according to the IDEA, \"any party aggrieved by the findings\" of a preliminary school district hearing may appeal in a federal court. Also, because the IDEA demands active parental involvement in order to enforce proper child placement, the parent should be able to appear in court \"pro se\" - without a lawyer. The Sixth Circuit rejected both arguments and held that the IDEA does not establish any right of a non-lawyer parent to represent his disabled child in federal court. Non-lawyer parents cannot represent themselves either, the Circuit Court ruled, because the IDEA protects the rights of the child, not the parents.
", "facts_len": "1359", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1825", "ID": "55445", "name": "United States v. Resendiz-Ponce", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-998", "docket": "05-998", "term": "2006", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Juan Resendiz-Ponce", "facts": "Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had \"committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering\" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz- Ponce.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was \"harmless error,\" a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a \"fatal flaw.\"
", "facts_len": "1065", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1826", "ID": "55448", "name": "Bowles v. Russell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-5306", "docket": "06-5306", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Keith Bowles", "second_party": "Harry Russell, Warden", "facts": "Keith Bowles was convicted of murder. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, and was denied. Bowles did not receive timely notice of the District Court's ruling, so he missed the deadline for appeal. He filed a motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) to reopen the appeal period. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, and gave him until February 27, 2004 to file his appeal. However, Rule 4(a)(6) allows only a 14-day extension of the appeal period, which would put the deadline on February 24, 2004. Bowles filed his appeal on February 26 - on time according to the court's deadline, but untimely according to Rule 4(a)(6).
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at first declined to dismiss Bowles's appeal. Later, on its own motion, the Sixth Circuit \"correct[ed] [its] error\" and dismissed the appeal, saying Rule 4(a)(6) \"is not susceptible to extension through mistake, courtesy, or grace.\"
", "facts_len": "969", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1827", "ID": "55447", "name": "United Haulers Assocation, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1345", "docket": "05-1345", "term": "2006", "first_party": "United Haulers Association, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority et al.", "facts": "Oneida and Herkimer counties adopted a local \"flow control\" ordinance requiring locally-produced garbage to be delivered to local publicly-owned facilities. The United Haulers Association filed suit in federal district court, arguing that by prohibiting the export of waste and preventing waste haulers from using less expensive out-of-state facilities, the ordinance ran afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause forbids any state law that regulates interstate commerce. The District Court ruled against United Haulers and held that the ordinance was constitutional because it did not discriminate against out-of-state businesses.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the ordinance imposed a slight burden on interstate commerce, the effect was outweighed by the ordinance's local benefits.
", "facts_len": "927", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1828", "ID": "55450", "name": "KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/04-1350", "docket": "04-1350", "term": "2006", "first_party": "KSR International Co.", "second_party": "Teleflex Inc. et al.", "facts": "Teleflex sued KSR International (KSR), alleging that KSR had infringed on its patent for an adjustable gas-pedal system composed of an adjustable accelerator pedal and an electronic throttle control. KSR countered that Teleflex's patent was obvious, and therefore unenforceable. Under 25 U.S.C. Section 103(a), obvious inventions cannot be patented. A federal District Court granted summary judgment for KSR, accepting KSR's argument that the invention was obvious because each of the invention's components existed in previous patents. Anyone with knowledge or experience in the industry, the District Court ruled, would have considered it obvious that the two components could be combined. Teleflex appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the District Court. The Circuit Court found the lower court's analysis incomplete, because the District Court had not applied a full \"teaching-suggestion-motivation test.\" Under this test, in order to label the patent obvious the District Court would have needed to identify the specific \"teaching, suggestion, or motivation\" that would have led a knowledgeable person to combine the two previously-existing components. KSR appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court's test conflicted with Supreme Court precedent and that it would allow too many patents of obvious inventions.
", "facts_len": "1378", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1829", "ID": "55449", "name": "Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1126", "docket": "05-1126", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Bell Atlantic Corp. et al.", "second_party": "William Twombly et al.", "facts": "William Twombly and other consumers brought a class action lawsuit against Bell Atlantic Corp. and other telecommunications companies. Twombly alleged that the companies had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to end competition among themselves and to stifle new competition. In the suit, Twombly claimed that the companies had agreed not to branch out into and compete in one another's territories, even though the Telecommunications Act of 1996 might have made it relatively inexpensive to do so.
\nThe District Court granted Bell Atlantic's motion to dismiss the suit, however, because Twombly had failed to \"allege sufficient facts from which a conspiracy can be inferred.\" In order to sufficiently claim a Section 1 violation, the court held, the plaintiffs needed to establish a \"plus factor\" - a piece of evidence showing that the defendants' behavior would be against their economic self-interest unless there was a conspiratorial agreement. Twombly had not established a plus factor, the court held, because the companies' defensive behavior could have been motivated by economic factors rather than conspiracy.
\nTwombly appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Second Circuit ruled that Twombly needed only to allege a conspiracy and specific facts that would support a Section 1 violation. Since he had alleged that the companies had engaged in suspicious \"parallel conduct\" and conspired to preserve monopoly conditions, his claim was sufficient and the suit could proceed.
", "facts_len": "1578", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1830", "ID": "55452", "name": "Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1284", "docket": "05-1284", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Lisa Watson et al.", "second_party": "Philip Morris Companies, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Lisa Watson filed a class action lawsuit against the tobacco company Philip Morris, claiming that the company had violated Arkansas law by misrepresenting the amount of tar and nicotine in cigarettes branded as \"light.\" Seeking to have the case removed to federal court, Philip Morris invoked 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which allows removal when a party is sued for actions taken while \"acting under\" a federal officer. Philip Morris claimed that it was acting under the direct control of regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), so 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applied. After the federal District Court denied Watson's motion to have the case sent back to state court, Watson appealed.
\nThe dispute centered on the degree of control exercised by the FTC over Philip Morris. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Philip Morris, allowing the case to continue in the federal court system. The Eighth Circuit held that the question of whether 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) applies \"depends on the detail and specificity of the federal direction of the defendant's activities and whether the government exercises control over the defendant.\" In the case of the tobacco industry, the Eighth Circuit found \"unprecedented\" government involvement, including detailed FTC regulations concerning the testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine levels. Therefore, Philip Morris was \"acting under a federal officer\" and consequently entitled to remove the case to federal court.
", "facts_len": "1536", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1831", "ID": "55451", "name": "Wallace v. Kato", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1240", "docket": "05-1240", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Andre Wallace", "second_party": "Chicago Police Officers Kristen Kato and Eugene Roy", "facts": "In 1994, Andre Wallace was arrested and charged with murder. Two years later he was convicted and sent to prison. Wallace appealed, arguing that the police had arrested him without probable cause and coerced him into confessing to the crime. In 1998, an appeals court agreed that Wallace had been arrested without probable cause and granted him a new trial. Finally, in 2002, the prosecution dropped its case against him. The next year Wallace sued the police officers and the city of Chicago for violating his Fourth Amendment rights through false arrest.
\nThe District Court ruled against Wallace, because his suit was time-barred. In Illinois there is a two-year statute of limitations on false-arrest claims. Since Wallace had not brought suit within two years of either his arrest or the time the arrest was declared invalid, his time was up. Wallace appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the two-year limit did not begin until his conviction was finally set aside in 2002.
\nThe Circuit Court upheld the District Court, ruling against Wallace. The Circuit Court panel acknowledged that other Circuits had failed to agree on the question of when the statute of limitations for a false arrest claim should begin. The Seventh Circuit opted for a clear rule - the two-year limit starts at the time of the arrest, and therefore Wallace's suit was too late
", "facts_len": "1400", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1832", "ID": "55453", "name": "Lopez v. Gonzales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-547", "docket": "05-547", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jose Antonio Lopez", "second_party": "Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General", "facts": "Jose Lopez, a Mexican national living in South Dakota, was convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. The crime is a felony under South Dakota law, but only a misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
\nThe Immigration and Naturalization Service began proceedings to remove Lopez from the country. Lopez applied for a cancellation of his removal, citing the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The INA allows an alien to avoid removal if he meets certain qualifications and has no prior \"aggravated felony\" convictions. Lopez argued that he was eligible for cancellation of his removal because his drug offense was only a misdemeanor under federal law.
\nAn Immigration Judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, on the grounds that Lopez had committed an aggravated felony. Lopez then sued the Attorney General and brought his case to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit Court affirmed the lower courts, ruling that a crime is an aggravated felony under the INA if it is a felony under either federal or state law.
", "facts_len": "1143", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1833", "ID": "55454", "name": "Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-1342", "docket": "05-1342", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Linda A. Watters, Commissioner, Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial Services", "second_party": "Wachovia Bank, N.A., et al.", "facts": "Under 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a), states do not have regulatory powers over national banks. In 2001 the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) issued federal regulation 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, which applied 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a) to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Wachovia Mortgage was an operating subsidiary of the national bank Wachovia Bank, and was registered with the state of Michigan.
\nWhen Michigan attempted to exercise its regulatory powers over Wachovia Mortgage, Wachovia Bank sued Watters, a Michigan official, seeking a judgment that Michigan's laws on operating subsidies of national banks were superceded by 12 U.S.C Section 484(a). Michigan argued that the OCC had exceeded the authority given it by Congress by extending the definition of \"national bank\" to cover state-registered operating subsidiaries. Michigan also argued that the extension of federal authority over state entities like Wachovia Mortgage violates the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government.
\nThe District Court rejected these arguments and ruled for Wachovia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court found that the decision of the OCC to apply rules for national banks to their operating subsidiaries was a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Sixth Circuit also held that Congress had the power to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks under the Commerce Clause, so the Tenth Amendment did not reserve that power to the states.
", "facts_len": "1697", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1834", "ID": "55455", "name": "Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-11284", "docket": "05-11284", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Jalil Abdul-Kabir, fka Ted Calvin Cole", "second_party": "Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two \"special issues\" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in Penry v. Johnson. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
\nThe Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not \"constitutionally relevant,\" and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the \"deliberateness\" and \"dangerousness\" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the \"constitutional relevance\" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with Brewer v. Quarterman No. 05-11287.
", "facts_len": "1359", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1835", "ID": "55456", "name": "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/05-908", "docket": "05-908", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Parents Involved In Community Schools", "second_party": "Seattle School District No. 1 et al.", "facts": "The Seattle School District allowed students to apply to any high school in the District. Since certain schools often became oversubscribed when too many students chose them as their first choice, the District used a system of tiebreakers to decide which students would be admitted to the popular schools. The second most important tiebreaker was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. If the racial demographics of any school's student body deviated by more than a predetermined number of percentage points from those of Seattle's total student population (approximately 40% white and 60% non-white), the racial tiebreaker went into effect. At a particular school either whites or non-whites could be favored for admission depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer to the goal.
\nA non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. On appeal, a three-judge panel the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
\nUnder the Supreme Court's precedents on racial classification in higher education, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, race-based classifications must be directed toward a \"compelling government interest\" and must be \"narrowly tailored\" to that interest. Applying these precedents to K-12 education, the Circuit Court found that the tiebreaker scheme was not narrowly tailored. The District then petitioned for an \"en banc\" ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. The majority ruled that the District had a compelling interest in maintaining racial diversity. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point.
", "facts_len": "2221", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1836", "ID": "55458", "name": "Danforth v. Minnesota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-8273", "docket": "06-8273", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Stephen Danforth", "second_party": "Minnesota", "facts": "At Stephen Danforth's trial for sexual abuse of a six-year-old boy, the victim was found incompetent to testify in court, so his videotaped testimony was shown instead. Danforth was convicted and his appeals were unsuccessful. After Danforth's case became final, the Supreme Court ruled in Crawford v. Washington that pre-recorded testimony without the possibility of cross-examination is unconstitutional. Danforth filed a second petition for postconviction relief, seeking to have the Crawford decision applied retroactively to his case. Supreme Court decisions announcing constitutional rules of criminal procedure are applied retroactively only in certain circumstances, which are specified in Teague v. Lane. The state court of appeals declined to retroactively apply Crawford.
\nOn appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Danforth raised an alternative argument, claiming that the state court was free to apply a broader standard of retroactivity than the one in Teague. Under Minnesota state retroactivity principles, Danforth argued, the Crawford case met the criteria for retroactive application. In Danforth's interpretation, the Teague standard was mandatory for federal habeas corpus proceedings but not for state postconviction proceedings. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth's arguments, ruling that only U.S. Supreme Court decisions determine the proper standard for retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled in Whorton v. Bockting that Crawford does not apply retroactively under Teague, but it agreed to consider Danforth's alternative argument.
", "facts_len": "1732", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1837", "ID": "55457", "name": "Brendlin v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-8120", "docket": "06-8120", "term": "2006", "first_party": "Bruce Edward Brendlin", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Police stopped Karen Simeroth's car for having expired registration tabs. Bruce Brendlin, who had a warrant out for his arrest, was riding in the passenger seat. Police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in the car and on Simeroth's person. In a California trial court, Brendlin filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the traffic stop, claiming that the stop was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court found that Brendlin had never been detained or \"seized\" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It denied the motion, and Brendlin pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine. A California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a traffic stop necessarily results in a Fourth Amendment seizure.
\nThe California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled for California. The court held that the driver of the car is the only one detained in a traffic stop. The movement of any passengers is also stopped as a practical matter, but the court considered this merely a necessary byproduct of the detention of the driver. The court held that Brendlin had been free to leave the scene of the traffic stop or to simply ignore the police. Since he was never \"seized,\" however, he could not claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1331", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1838", "ID": "55460", "name": "Baze v. Rees", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-5439", "docket": "07-5439", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling", "second_party": "John D. Rees, Commissioner, Kentucky Department of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "Two Kentucky inmates challenged the state's four-drug lethal injection protocol. The lethal injection method calls for the administration of four drugs: Valium, which relaxes the convict, Sodium Pentathol, which knocks the convict unconscious, Pavulon, which stops his breathing, and potassium chloride, which essentially puts the convict into cardiac arrest and ultimately causes death. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the death penalty system did not amount to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.
", "facts_len": "522", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1839", "ID": "55459", "name": "Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1322", "docket": "06-1322", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Federal Express Corporation", "second_party": "Paul Holowecki et al.", "facts": "Paul Holowecki and other employees of Federal Express sued the corporation for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A district court judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had met the time limits and filing requirements of the ADEA. The ADEA requires that a plaintiff file a \"charge\" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 60 days prior to filing suit. Upon receiving the charge of discrimination, the EEOC notifies the employer of the accusation, investigates the matter, and offers to mediate. THE EEOC has an \"Intake Questionnaire\" form and a \"Charge\" form, but the EEOC regulations state only that \"A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s).\" One of the plaintiffs completed an intake questionnaire, but the EEOC did not take the steps it should have taken after the filing of a charge. Holowecki sued over 60 days later, but the judge ruled that the intake questionnaire did not qualify as a charge for purposes of the AEDA.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, allowing Holowecki's suit to go forward. The Second Circuit ruled that the minimal written information required for a charge was contained in the intake questionnaire. The questionnaire also met the ADEA's implicit requirement that the charge be intended to start the process of an ADEA suit. The Second Circuit did not consider it significant that the EEOC did not act on the questionnaire, apparently not believing it to count as a charge. To dismiss a complaint based on the EEOC's inaction would be to hold the plaintiff accountable for the failings of the agency.
", "facts_len": "1741", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1840", "ID": "55464", "name": "Ali v. Achim", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1346", "docket": "06-1346", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Ahmed Ali", "second_party": "Deborah Achim et al.", "facts": "A Somalian immigrant fled ethnic strife in his homeland, coming to the United States with his family in 1999. Two years later, he was involved in a fight during which he injured another man with a box cutter. He pleaded no contest to a felony charge of substantial battery with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to an 11-month prison term as well as seven years of probation. When he was released, immigration authorities began deportation proceedings because of the felony conviction. The immigration court ruled that the man could stay in the U.S. because he faced retribution if he returned to Somalia, but refused to offer additional forms of protection because it deemed his felony offense \"particularly serious.\" The man appealed, arguing that his crime cannot be considered \"particularly serious\" because it was not an aggravated felony.
", "facts_len": "855", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1841", "ID": "55461", "name": "Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-214", "docket": "07-214", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Allison Engine Co., Inc., et al.", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Roger L. Sanders and Roger L. Thacker", "facts": "Two workers involved in the manufacture of electrical supplies for the Navy's billion-dollar guided missile destroyers brought a whistleblower case alleging that subcontractors performed faulty work. The two charged that the companies employed unqualified workers, installed leaky gearboxes and used defective temperature gauges. After a five-week trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the companies, concluding that the False Claims Act under which the suits were brought requires that defendants \"present\" the fraudulent claims to the government. Because the subcontractors actually invoiced the general contractor and not the government, the court ruled that the presentment requirement had not been met. The appeals court reversed, holding that the Act should be liberally construed to discourage private companies from defrauding the government.
", "facts_len": "886", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1842", "ID": "55462", "name": "LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-856", "docket": "06-856", "term": "2007", "first_party": "James LaRue", "second_party": "DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., et al.", "facts": "James LaRue participated in a 401(k) retirement savings plan administered by his employer, the management consulting firm DeWolff, Boberg & Associates. Employee benefit plans are regulated under a federal law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). LaRue sought to exercise his option to make certain changes in his investment plan, but DeWolff neglected to make the changes. LaRue claimed that DeWolff's omission had cost him $150,000, and he sued the firm for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking to recover the money. In response, DeWolff argued that ERISA does not provide for the type of individual monetary award sought by LaRue.
\nSection 502(a)(2) allows plan participants to sue plan administrators for breach of fiduciary duty in order to \"make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach.\" DeWolff argued that LaRue's suit was not of the type contemplated by the text of ERISA because LaRue sued to recover losses caused to his own personal retirement plan rather than suing to vindicate the interests of the plan as a whole. LaRue also invoked Section 502(a)(3), which allows plan participants to sue to obtain \"other appropriate equitable relief.\"
\nThe U.S. District Court held that LaRue was not entitled to relief under ERISA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Section 502(a)(2) was concerned with protecting entire plans from misuse of plan assets and not with providing recovery for losses suffered by individual accounts. The court also rejected LaRue's Section 502(a)(3) claim. It ruled that the phrase \"equitable relief\" rarely includes relief in the form of a monetary award and only when the money has been unjustly possessed by the defendant.
", "facts_len": "1795", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1843", "ID": "55463", "name": "Boulware v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1509", "docket": "06-1509", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Michael H. Boulware", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Michael H. Boulware founded a coffee and bottled water company known as Hawaiian Isles Enterprises. As his company became profitable in 1987, he began transferring money \u2013 a total of $4.5 million \u2013 from his company to his mistress. Seven years later, in the midst of a divorce, his mistress refused to return the money when asked, contending that it was a gift. A Hawaii court eventually held that the woman had been holding the money in constructive trust for the company's benefit. Seven years after that, the federal government indicted Boulware for failing to pay taxes on the disputed funds as well as $6 million more that he had received from the company. Boulware argued that under the \"return of capital\" rule, holding that when unprofitable companies distribute money to shareholders, the money is considered a nontaxable return of capital up to the shareholder's basis in the stock, he owed no taxes. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument.
", "facts_len": "960", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1844", "ID": "55465", "name": "Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-9130", "docket": "06-9130", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali", "second_party": "Federal Bureau of Prisons et al.", "facts": "Before his transfer to a new prison, prisoner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer. When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. He filed an administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. After the claim was denied, he brought his case to U.S. District Court. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, but it also makes several exceptions to the waiver. One exception is for \"[a]ny claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.\" Ali argued that in context the phrase \"other law enforcement officer\" referred only to officers working in customs and related activities, but the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase \"any other law enforcement officer\" in the FTCA was not merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers.
", "facts_len": "1536", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1845", "ID": "55466", "name": "United States v. Ressam", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-455", "docket": "07-455", "term": "2007", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ahmed Ressam", "facts": "In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called \"Millennium Bomber,\" was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent.
\nRessam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such \"in relation to\" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits.
", "facts_len": "1193", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1846", "ID": "55468", "name": "Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-457", "docket": "06-457", "term": "2007", "first_party": "G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General of Maine", "second_party": "New Hampshire Motor Transport Association et al.", "facts": "In an effort to address the problem of tobacco use by minors, the Maine legislature passed the Tobacco Delivery Law, which imposes requirements on air and motor carriers that transport tobacco products. One provision of the law requires tobacco retailers to only use carriers that verify the age of each tobacco purchaser, and another provision requires that carriers ensure that no tobacco is shipped to unlicensed retailers. The New Hampshire Motor Transport Association sued, arguing that the state law was preempted by a federal law, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA). The preemption provision of the FAAAA prohibits state from enacting laws \"related to\" the prices, routes, or services of air and motor carriers. The Association argued that the Tobacco Delivery Law placed such a burden on the delivery procedures of carriers that significantly affected their prices and services. The state countered that the FAAAA was only meant to preempt traditional economic regulation by states, and therefore laws enacted pursuant to the state's police power - the power of a state to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens - were permissible. The U.S. District Court ruled that the law was preempted by the FAAAA.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court. The First Circuit held that a police power exception to the general rule of preemption would be far too broad and was not intended by Congress. Maine could validly ban all unlicensed tobacco products within its borders, but the FAAAA prohibited the state from implementing this goal by imposing requirements on carriers that significantly alter their delivery procedures.
", "facts_len": "1728", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1847", "ID": "55467", "name": "Munaf v. Geren", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1666", "docket": "06-1666", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Mohammad Munaf et al.", "second_party": "Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al.", "facts": "In 2005, Mohammad Munaf was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping by U.S. military officers acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq. Munaf's sister petitioned on his behalf for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. Soon after the petition was filed, Munaf was informed that he would be tried in an Iraqi court and transferred to Iraqi custody if convicted. Munaf filed a temporary restraining order attempting to block custody transfer.
\nAfter the Iraqi court sentenced him to death and the district court dismissed his case for lack of jurisdiction, Munaf appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit which granted an injunction against the transfer. However, the D.C. Circuit, like the district court, eventually concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Munaf's claim, basing its decision largely on the Court's ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur 338 U.S. 197 (1948). That decision prohibited Japanese citizens held abroad by U.S. troops from filing habeas petitions to challenge sentences handed down by a military tribunal sitting in Japan but including U.S. military personnel. Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Hirota and its ruling and to base its reasoning on a string of cases reaching the opposite result. The case will be consolidated and heard along with another D.C. case, Geren v. Omar, 07-394, in which the D.C. Circuit allowed a habeas petition by a U.S. citizen held in Iraq because he had not yet been charged or convicted by an Iraqi court.
", "facts_len": "1543", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1848", "ID": "55470", "name": "Rothgery v. Gillespie County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-440", "docket": "07-440", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Walter A. Rothgery", "second_party": "Gillespie County, Texas", "facts": "Walter Rothgery was arrested in Texas as a felon in possession of a firearm. Rothgery was taken before a judge for processing and, upon learning that seeking legal assistance would delay the proceedings, waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. No prosecutor was present at this hearing. Rothgery posted bail and was released, but was rearrested after a grand jury indictment several months later hiked his bail to a sum he could not afford. Throughout this entire period Rothgery continued to pursue legal counsel and only obtained such counsel approximately one week after the grand jury indictment. Rothgery's attorney produced evidence that Rothgery was in fact not a felon and he was released from custody. Rothgery brought suit against Gillespie County, TX for violating his civil rights by not appointing counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment.
\nBoth the district court and the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, the Fifth Circuit stating that Rothgery's Sixth Amendment rights were not implicated because no prosecutor was present at the initial hearing. In his petition for certiorari, Rothgery argued that both federal and state case law indicate that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any hearing where a defendant is advised of his rights and the charges against him, regardless of whether or not a prosecutor is present.
", "facts_len": "1371", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1849", "ID": "55469", "name": "Davis v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-320", "docket": "07-320", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Jack Davis", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "Jack Davis, a wealthy Democratic candidate for Congress from New York's 26th Congressional District, brought this claim challenging the constitutionality of the so-called 'Millionaire's Amendment' to the 2002 campaign finance law. Davis argued in the district court that the law, which basically raises the contribution cap for individuals running against self-financed candidates, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection principle implicit in the Fifth Amendment. The district court rejected both of these claims, stating first that the law did not implicate the First Amendment because it did not impede Davis' ability to spend money in support of his message, noting that it actually led to a higher level of speech in the race overall. The district court similarly rejected Davis' Fifth Amendment claim, reasoning that although Davis may have been held to higher reporting standards than his opponent, his disproportionate wealth meant that the two candidates were not similarly situated and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause did not apply. The campaign finance law allows direct appeal to the Court, which will consider whether Davis has standing to bring the First Amendment claim before deciding the case on the merits.
", "facts_len": "1254", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1850", "ID": "55471", "name": "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1037", "docket": "06-1037", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Kentucky Retirement Systems et al.", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "Charles Lickteig is a deputy sheriff in Kentucky. Because he is a hazardous duty worker, he is eligible to retire at age 55. Kentucky Retirement Systems offers a two-tier calculation of so-called \"disability retirement benefits.\" If hazardous duty workers like Lickteig opt to keep working and then become disabled, they receive only their scheduled retirement benefits. In contrast, workers who become disabled before reaching age 55 receive payments that reflect not only their actual years of service but the number of years remaining until they would have reached 55. In effect, if two workers were otherwise identical, the one who retired on disability before 55 would always get benefits equal to or greater than those of the post-55 retiree.
\nLickteig decided against retirement at 55. Six years later, he became disabled because of \"a deteriorating vertebra, arthritis, nerve damage, and Parkinson's disease,\" and stopped working. When he applied for disability retirement benefits, he received word that he was eligible only for standard retirement.
\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission argued unsuccessfully in federal district court that the two-tier system violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court reheard the case en banc and reversed, holding that the simple act of treating younger disabled retirees better than older ones was sufficient to make out a prima facie ADEA violation.
", "facts_len": "1526", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1851", "ID": "55472", "name": "Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1505", "docket": "06-1505", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Clifford B. Meacham et al.", "second_party": "Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, aka KAPL, Inc., et al.", "facts": "When the New York-based federal research laboratory Knolls Atomic Power Lab instituted a downsizing program, it asked supervisors to rank employees based on three factors: performance, flexibility, and the criticality of their skills, and then to add points for years of service in order to determine who would be dismissed. Of the thirty-one employees who were let go, all but one were over the age of forty. Twenty-six of these dismissed employees filed suit against Knolls for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A jury found for the employees and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
\nHowever the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, relying on its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson to hold that \"an employer is not liable under the ADEA so long as the challenged employment action, in relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer's legitimate goals.\" On remand, the Second Circuit vacated its previous decision and held that the employees had failed to carry their burden of proving the evaluation system unreasonable. In seeking Supreme Court review, the employees argued that it should be Knolls, not them, who must prove the reasonableness of an action that would otherwise be prohibited.
", "facts_len": "1340", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1852", "ID": "55473", "name": "Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-411", "docket": "07-411", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Plains Commerce Bank", "second_party": "Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc.", "facts": "The Long family, members of the Sioux nation, owned a cattle company that had been doing business with the Plains Commerce Bank for seven years when the family patriarch died. Because Plains Commerce was reluctant to grant operating loans to younger generation family members, it struck a deal with the Longs agreeing to provide the operating loans if the Longs deeded their farmland and house to the bank. According to the Longs the bank never followed through on its promise to provide the operating loans, and after the bank attempted to foreclose on the land the Longs brought suit in a local tribal court seeking a temporary restraining order blocking the land transfer as well as charging the bank with tortuous discrimination. The tribal court returned an award of $700,000 for the Longs, after which Plains Commerce filed suit in federal district court claiming that the tribal court had improperly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
\nThe district court decided that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In seeking Supreme Court review, Plains Commerce argued that the tribal court should not have had jurisdiction, and the Eighth Circuit erred in deciding so, because the claim did not fit into one of the exceptions granting such jurisdiction set forth by the Supreme Court in _Montana v. U.S. _ On the other hand, the Longs argued that federal courts whose geographic reach encompasses tribal lands have repeatedly allowed tribal courts to adjudicate civil suits against non-members who voluntarily did business with members.
", "facts_len": "1629", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1853", "ID": "55477", "name": "Snyder v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-10119", "docket": "06-10119", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Allen Snyder", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "In capital murder trial of Allen Snyder, an African-American, the prosecution used peremptory (automatic) challenges to dismiss five African-American prospective jurors. This resulted in Snyder being tried by an all-white jury, which found him guilty and approved the death penalty. The defense argued that the prosecution's striking of the black jurors was racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky. As part of its case for the prosecution's alleged discriminatory intent, the defense cited two of the prosecutor's statements comparing the case to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. After having indirectly referred to the Simpson trial before jury selection, the prosecutor had invoked the case again during the sentencing phase, comparing aspects of Snyder's case to Simpson's and noting that the latter defendant \"got away with it.\" The trial court applied the Batson framework and denied the defense's challenges.
\nOn appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court, ruling that the trial judge had not acted unreasonably when he accepted the prosecution's race-neutral justifications for the dismissals of the black jurors. The court ruled that the O.J. Simpson references were harmless comparisons made in the course of a rebuttal, and it noted that the prosecution had not mentioned Simpson's or Snyder's race. When the Supreme Court instructed the state court to reconsider the case in light of Miller-El v. Dretke, which requires that courts consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating discriminatory intent, the court affirmed the trial court a second time.
", "facts_len": "1735", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1854", "ID": "55475", "name": "Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-179", "docket": "06-179", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Donna S. Riegel, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Charles R. Riegel", "second_party": "Medtronic, Inc.", "facts": "During Charles Riegel's angioplasty, his surgeon used an Evergreen Balloon Catheter to dilate his coronary artery. The catheter burst, causing extreme complications. Riegel sued the manufacturer, Medtronic, for negligence in the design, manufacture, and labeling of the device. Medtronic argued that Riegel could not bring these state-law negligence claims because they were preempted by Section 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The MDA establishes a federal regulatory process for ensuring the safety of medical devices, and it provides that no state may set requirements that differ from or add to the federal ones. The District Court dismissed Riegel's claims as preempted by the MDA.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that the suits based on medical devices like the Evergreen Balloon Catheter are preempted by the MDA. The catheter had been through the exceptionally rigorous \"premarket approval\" (PMA) process, by which federal regulators ensured that it met federal requirements. To allow state common-law suits for PMA-approved devices, the court ruled, would be to add a state requirement to the regulatory process despite the MDA's preemption clause.
", "facts_len": "1248", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1855", "ID": "55474", "name": "Kimbrough v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-6330", "docket": "06-6330", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Derrick Kimbrough", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
\nDerrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence \"ridiculous.\" Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
", "facts_len": "1709", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1856", "ID": "55479", "name": "Begay v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-11543", "docket": "06-11543", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Larry Begay", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2004, New Mexico resident Larry Begay was arrested after brandishing and unsuccessfully shooting a rifle while begging his sister for money. Begay pleaded guilty to possessing the rifle. Prior to the firearm arrest, Begay had been convicted twelve times of driving while intoxicated. Under New Mexico law, each DWI conviction after the first three were considered felonies. The court concluded that the DWI convictions were violent felonies, triggering the federal career criminal law's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. A deeply divided court of appeals panel affirmed the decision to treat the DWIs as violent felonies.
", "facts_len": "634", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1857", "ID": "55478", "name": "G\u00f3mez-P\u00e9rez v. Potter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1321", "docket": "06-1321", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Myrna Gomez-Perez", "second_party": "John E. Potter, Postmaster General", "facts": "Myrna G\u00f3mez-P\u00e9rez worked as a clerk for the United States Postal Service (USPS) in Puerto Rico. G\u00f3mez alleged that she was subject to retaliatory treatment after filing an age discrimination complaint against her supervisors under section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). A federal district court granted summary judgment to the USPS on the ground that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity as to retaliation claims under the ADEA.
\nG\u00f3mez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals in the First Circuit. It held that the USPS and Potter have waived sovereign immunity with respect to ADEA suits, but that Section 15 of the ADEA does not provide a cause of action for retaliation by federal employers.
", "facts_len": "754", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1858", "ID": "55480", "name": "Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-923", "docket": "06-923", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Metropolitan Life Insurance Company et al.", "second_party": "Wanda Glenn", "facts": "Wanda Glenn, a long-time employee of Sears and manager of its women's department, was covered by the company's long-term disability plan. In 2000, Glenn took medical leave from Sears based on an ailing heart condition and submitted a disability claim under her ERISA plan. Metlife, the insurance carrier, approved the claim and told Glenn to seek social security payments which could then be deducted from her Metlife payments. However, after an administrative law judge determined, based in part on information provided by Metlife, that Glenn was disabled and eligible for social security payments, Metlife revised its own opinion and decided Glenn was no longer eligible for disability benefits.
\nGlenn brought suit against Metlife in district court, where Metlife's change of heart was vindicated, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit took into account Metlife's dual role as both the entity determining when disability awards should be paid out as well as the entity actually funding those payments, noting the possible conflicts of interest that could arise based on this arrangement. In seeking Supreme Court review, Metlife drew attention to circuit splits on the issue of whether these conflicts should be taken into account in determining the validity of Metlife's decisions on disability. In addition to the conflict of interest argument, Glenn pointed out that Metlife's flip-flop did not take into account certain of Glenn's doctor evaluations and that Metlife's representations to the administrative judge were at odds with its own eventual determination that she was not disabled.
", "facts_len": "1679", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1859", "ID": "55481", "name": "MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1413", "docket": "06-1413", "term": "2007", "first_party": "MeadWestvaco Corp., successor in interest to Mead Corp.", "second_party": "Illinois Department of Revenue et al.", "facts": "MeadWestvaco, an Ohio company, sold its lucrative Lexis/Nexis division for a $1 billion profit in 1994. Illinois attempted to claim a portion of that profit when collecting taxes from MeadWestvaco for doing business in the state. Illinois argued that Lexis/Nexis was an \"operational\" part of Mead's business and therefore subject to taxation outside Mead's home state. Mead countered that Lexis/Nexis was merely an \"investment,\" whose sale was immune from taxation from outside jurisdictions. The trial court found that the division was key to Mead's operations, and therefore taxable, and the Illinois Appellate Court agreed.
", "facts_len": "634", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1860", "ID": "55484", "name": "Wright v. Van Patten", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-212", "docket": "07-212", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Randall Wright, Sheriff, Shawano County, Wisconsin", "second_party": "Joseph L. Van Patten", "facts": "When Joseph Van Patten pled no contest to a charge of first-degree reckless homicide in a Wisconsin state court, his lawyer was not at his side during the hearing. Rather, the lawyer was linked to the courtroom by speakerphone. After the court imposed the maximum penalty of 25 years on Van Patten, he retained new counsel and moved in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to have his plea withdrawn. Van Patten claimed that his lawyer's failure to appear in person and the decision to conduct the plea hearing via speakerphone violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
\nThe Wisconsin appellate court, applying the Court's 1984 ruling in Strickland, concluded that Van Patten's counsel's representation was not \"deficient or prejudicial\" and denied the motion. Van Patten then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Van Patten's claim should have been analyzed under the Court's 1984 decision in Cronic, not Strickland, and came out in Van Patten's favor. The case came to the Court for a resolution of this conflicting case law.
", "facts_len": "1200", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1861", "ID": "55483", "name": "Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1498", "docket": "06-1498", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Warner-Lambert Co., LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Kimberly Kent et al.", "facts": "A group of Michigan residents who were injured after taking Warner- Lambert's Rezulin diabetes drug sued the company in Michigan state court. The plaintiffs invoked a Michigan tort reform statue immunizing drug makers' liability for FDA-approved products unless the drug makers made misrepresentations to the agency. The federal district court that eventually heard the case dismissed it, ruling that the Michigan \"fraud on the FDA\" cause of action was preempted by a federal law that empowered the FDA itself to punish misrepresentations. The appeals court reversed, reasoning that the Michigan law did not provide retribution for misrepresentations themselves, but merely created a window for consumers to bring product liability claims where the product reached the market solely through the manufacturer's chicanery.
", "facts_len": "828", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1862", "ID": "55482", "name": "Medellin v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-984", "docket": "06-984", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Jose Ernesto Medellin", "second_party": "State of Texas", "facts": "Jose Medellin, a Mexican national, was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. Medellin raised a post-conviction challenge arguing that the state had violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a party. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention gives any foreign national detained for a crime the right to contact his consulate. After his petition was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court (see Medellin v. Dretke ), Medellin's case returned to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Medellin's argument rested in part on a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that the U.S. had violated the Vienna Convention rights of 51 Mexican nationals (including Medellin) and that their convictions must be reconsidered. Medellin argued that the Vienna Convention granted him an individual right that state courts must respect, a possibility left open by the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. Medellin also cited a memorandum from the President of the United States that instructed state courts to comply with the ICJ's rulings by rehearing the cases. Medellin argued that the Constitution gives the President broad power to ensure that treaties are enforced, and that this power extends to the treatment of treaties in state court proceedings.
\nThe Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected each of Medellin's arguments and dismissed his petition. The court interpreted Sanchez-Llamas as standing for the principle that rulings of the ICJ are not binding on state courts. The Texas court stood by its position that allowing Medellin to raise the Vienna Convention issue after his trial would violate state procedural rules, and that those rules were not supplanted by the Convention. The President had no authority to order the enforcement in state court of an ICJ ruling, because that would imply a law-making power not allocated to him by the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "2048", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1863", "ID": "55485", "name": "Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1286", "docket": "06-1286", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Michael J. Knight, Trustee of William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "Trustee Michael J. Knight hired a firm to provide investment-management advice to the William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust. The Trust deducted all of the fees paid for the investment-advice service from its tax return, but the IRS rejected the deduction. A provision in 26 U.S.C. 67(e) allows trusts to fully deduct certain administrative costs, but the IRS maintained that fees for investment-advice services fall outside the statute's scope. The tax court agreed with the IRS and ruled the fees nondeductible. Federal Courts of Appeals had come to opposite conclusions on the question.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the tax court. The court cited Section 67(e)'s requirement that a trust's fees are only fully deductible when they \"would not have been incurred if the property were not held in such trust.\" The provision was meant to exempt special administrative expenses that are incurred by trusts. Therefore, the court ruled, costs that could possibly be incurred by individual taxpayers as well as trusts were never deductible in full. Since an individual could pay for investment-advice services, and since the individual's payment would not be fully deductable, Section 67(e) did not exempt a trust's payment for the same services.
", "facts_len": "1294", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1864", "ID": "55486", "name": "Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Board of Trade of the City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1265", "docket": "06-1265", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Klein & Co. Futures, Inc.", "second_party": "Board of Trade of the City of New York et al.", "facts": "In his role as chairman of a settlement committee of the Board of Trade of the City of New York, Norman Eisler allegedly manipulated the daily settlement prices of commodities futures in order to conceal bad investments. During this period Eisler's company purchased futures contracts through its broker, the commodity futures merchant Klein & Co. Futures, Inc., but the alleged price manipulation distorted Klein's appraisal of Eisler's ability to pay. When the scheme unravelled, Eisler's company could not meet its obligations and Klein was forced to absorb the loss.
\nKlein sued Eisler and the Board of Trade under Section 22 of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), claiming that the Board of Trade failed to enforce rules that would have prevented the manipulation. The CEA requires boards of trade to set rules governing the market, and Section 22 allows private parties to sue for failure to enforce the rules as long as the party was \"engaged in any transaction\" subject to the board's rules.
\nThe U.S. District Court dismissed Klein's claim for lack of standing to sue, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Second Circuit interpreted Section 22 as including buyers and sellers of futures contracts but excluding the commodity futures merchants who conduct the actual trades on behalf of their customers. The court ruled that Klein's financial loss was not sufficient to grant it standing, because the loss was suffered in the aftermath of the futures trading and not during the trading itself.
", "facts_len": "1555", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1865", "ID": "55489", "name": "Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-312", "docket": "07-312", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Florida Department of Revenue", "second_party": "Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.", "facts": "In 2003, Piccadilly Cafeterias filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in federal court in Florida asking the bankruptcy court for permission to auction off its assets in order to fund a reorganization plan. Piccadilly sought a tax exemption under 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) which states that certain asset transfers \"under a [confirmed Chapter 11] plan may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.\" Florida vehemently opposed this exemption and sought to collect $32,000 in taxes from Piccadilly.
\nThe bankruptcy court, the district court, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all found in favor of Piccadilly, holding that 11 U.S.C. 1146(c) allowed courts to exempt from taxes pre-confirmation asset sales that were essential to the completion of a reorganization plan. In urging the Court to grant certiorari, Florida pointed to both Third and Fourth Circuit decisions holding that such pre-confirmation asset sales were subject to state taxation, while Piccadilly Cafeterias contended that these so-called \"circuit splits\" only involve a small handful of cases and require no resolution by the Court.
", "facts_len": "1149", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1866", "ID": "55488", "name": "Crawford v. Marion County Election Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-21", "docket": "07-21", "term": "2007", "first_party": "William Crawford et al.", "second_party": "Marion County Election Board et al.", "facts": "In 2005, the Indiana Legislature passed a law requiring all voters who cast a ballot in person to present a photo ID issued by the United States or the State of Indiana. Plaintiffs including the local Democratic Party and interest groups representing minority and elderly citizens argued that the law constituted an undue burden on the right to vote. At trial, the plaintiffs did not produce any witnesses who claimed they would be unable to meet the law's requirements. The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the law. However, the three-judge appellate panel was deeply divided. Dissenting Judge Terrence Evans claimed that the law was a thinly-veiled attempt to dampen turnout by those likely to vote for Democratic candidates.
", "facts_len": "754", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1867", "ID": "55487", "name": "Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-219", "docket": "07-219", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Exxon Shipping Company et al.", "second_party": "Grant Baker et al.", "facts": "The Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989 while under the command of Joseph Hazelwood, a relapsed alcoholic. Exxon knew that Hazelwood had resumed drinking but did not relieve him of his post, and the ship eventually spilled 11 million gallons of oil into the ecologically sensitive sound. The jury calculated compensatory damages at $287 million, and then awarded $5 billion in punitive damages. The punitive award has been reviewed three times by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately settled on a $2.5 billion figure. In a dissent from the full court's denial of rehearing in the third review of the award, Judge Alex Kozinski posited that any award, no matter its size, violated the maritime law rule that a ship owner need not pay for the reckless actions of an employee.
", "facts_len": "839", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1868", "ID": "55491", "name": "Dada v. Mukasey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1181", "docket": "06-1181", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Samson Taiwo Dada", "second_party": "Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney General", "facts": "Samson Dada, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in 1998 and overstayed his temporary visa. Dada married a U.S. citizen which made him eligible for permanent residence under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Dada's wife failed to provide the required documentation. In 2004 the government found Dada removable. An immigration judge granted Dada's request for voluntary departure. Before the window to leave the country closed, Dada filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In so doing, he asked that the voluntary departure order be withdrawn, to avoid the 10-year bar on future re-entry that accompanies a failure to leave the country within the allotted time. The Bureau of Immigration Affairs denied the request.
\nDada appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It upheld the denial. Because Dada's voluntary departure period had expired, the appeals court found Dada subject to the 10-year bar on future re-entry.
", "facts_len": "983", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1869", "ID": "55492", "name": "Allen v. Siebert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1680", "docket": "06-1680", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Daniel Siebert", "facts": "Daniel Siebert was convicted of the murder of Linda Jarman and sentenced to death by electrocution in 1989. His conviction was confirmed on appeal, and Siebert\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in 1990. In 1992, Siebert filed a petition for state post-conviction relief that was denied because it was filed after the two-year statute of limitations period. In 2001, Siebert filed a federal writ of habeas corpus that was denied because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) has a one-year statute of limitation for filing a federal writ of habeas corpus. Siebert appealed to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and argued that the statute of limitations should not run while his \u201cproperly filed\u201d state post-conviction relief was pending. The appellate court determined that the state statute of limitations was not jurisdictional and the state courts could have granted Siebert\u2019s petition, so his petition for state post-conviction relief was \u201cproperly filed\u201d and should have prevented the AEDPA\u2019s statute of limitations from running. The appellate court remanded the case for consideration of the petition on the merits. While that review was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pace v. DiGuglielmo, in which the Court held that a petition for state post-conviction relief that was determined to be untimely did not halt the running of the AEDPA\u2019s statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court again rejected Siebert\u2019s petition. The appellate again remanded by holding that the state statute of limitations in this case was non-jurisdictional, and therefore Pace did not apply.
", "facts_len": "1684", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1870", "ID": "55490", "name": "District of Columbia v. Heller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-290", "docket": "07-290", "term": "2007", "first_party": "District of Columbia et al.", "second_party": "Dick Anthony Heller", "facts": "Provisions of the District of Columbia Code made it illegal to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited the registration of handguns, though the chief of police could issue one-year licenses for handguns. The Code also contained provisions that required owners of lawfully registered firearms to keep them unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or other similar device unless the firearms were located in a place of business or being used for legal recreational activities.
\nDick Anthony Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. Heller sued the District of Columbia. He sought an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant parts of the Code and argued that they violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The district court dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep firearms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and the District of Columbia\u2019s requirement that firearms kept in the home be nonfunctional violated that right.
", "facts_len": "1301", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1871", "ID": "55494", "name": "Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-713", "docket": "06-713", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Washington State Grange", "second_party": "Washington State Republican Party et al.", "facts": "The State of Washington reconstructed its primary election system according to Initiative 872, which was passed into law by a majority general vote in 2004. The initiative was endorsed by the Washington State Grange and created a new \"modified blanket primary\" system where each candidate on the ballot could affiliate with the party of his choosing regardless of whether the party approved of his candidacy. Political parties claimed that this system violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free association, arguing that control over which candidates to endorse constituted an essential function of association. The Grange argued that the primary was nonpartisan.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a District Court decision, ruling that since \"party designation is a powerful, partisan message that voters may rely upon in casting a vote,\" Initiative 872 \"constitutes a severe burden upon the parties' associational rights.\" (The case was consolidated with Washington v. Washington State Republican Party for argument before the Supreme Court.)
", "facts_len": "1109", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1872", "ID": "55496", "name": "Gonzalez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-11612", "docket": "06-11612", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Homero Gonzalez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Homero Gonzalez was tried with a co-defendant on several drug-related charges. He pled not guilty and opted for a jury trial. When jury selection began, a magistrate judge who had presided over several pretrial matters announced that she would conduct voir dire, and sought consent from the parties. Attorneys for the government and for Gonzalez expressly agreed. Gonzalez, who was being assisted by a translator, was not directly asked to consent, nor did he affirmatively object. He argued on appeal that he had the right to a new trial because he did not give his personal consent for a magistrate to conduct the jury interviews.
", "facts_len": "640", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1873", "ID": "55495", "name": "United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-308", "docket": "07-308", "term": "2007", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Company, et al.", "facts": "In 2000, the IRS announced it was admitting the unconstitutionality of a 1978 coal export tax. In response, Clintwood Elkhorn Mining brought suit to recover funds paid, plus interest, under the unconstitutional tax scheme between the years 1994 and 1999. Clintwood sought recovery under the Export Clause of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C Section 1491, which applies a six-year statute of limitations to claims and makes no mention of interest payments. The government argued that such claims must be brought under the Tax Code, which allows interest but applies a three-year statute of limitations.
\nBoth the Court of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit allowed the Tucker Act claims, but the circuit court overruled the federal claims court's decision denying interest payments. In urging the Court to review both conclusions, the government contended that the Federal Circuit's ruling was at odds with other circuit decisions prohibiting Tucker Act claims under similar circumstances.
", "facts_len": "1028", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "1874", "ID": "55493", "name": "Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1221", "docket": "06-1221", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Sprint/United Management Company", "second_party": "Ellen Mendelsohn", "facts": "During a company-wide reduction in force, Sprint fired fifty-one-year-old employee Ellen Mendelsohn. Mendelsohn sued, alleging that Sprint had discriminated against her on account of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. At the trial, Mendelsohn attempted to present evidence from other Sprint employees who alleged that they were also discriminated against by the company. This type of testimony by employees who are not parties to the case is sometimes called \"me, too\" testimony. The District Court judge refused to admit the testimony, citing the \"same supervisor\" rule. Since the other employees did not share a supervisor with Mendelsohn, their testimony was not relevant to the alleged discriminatory intent behind the decision to fire her.
\nThe jury returned a verdict for Sprint, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The Tenth Circuit held that the \"same supervisor\" rule applies only to discriminatory disciplinary actions and not to suits alleging a company-wide policy of discrimination. The Tenth Circuit held that the \"me, too\" testimony was relevant because the other employees were similarly situated and fired around the same time, and it held that the testimony was important enough that its exclusion had denied Mendelsohn an opportunity to present her allegation of company-wide discrimination. The ruling conflicted with those of several other Circuit Courts which approved the exclusion of \"me, too\" testimony.
", "facts_len": "1529", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1875", "ID": "55497", "name": "Greenlaw v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-330", "docket": "07-330", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Michael Greenlaw, aka Mikey", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When Michael Greenlaw was convicted of several drug and firearm offenses in federal court, the prosecution argued that he should receive a mandatory minimum sentencing hike because he had been convicted of two counts under the federal gun law. The district judge, in a decision incorrect under the Supreme Court's holding in Deal v. United States, reasoned that the mandatory minimum should not apply because the second offense was not the result of a separate, pre-existing indictment.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit vacated the sentence and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to apply the mandatory minimum. In seeking certiorari, Greenlaw argued that the Eight Circuit had ignored substantial high court precedent holding that an appellate court may not order a higher criminal sentence without a government request to do so. Greenlaw further sought clarification of two related issues: whether the lack of a government appeal deprives the appellate court of authority as a matter of jurisdiction or merely as a custom of practice, and whether such appellate court discretion is allowable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which allows courts to consider plain errors even when the parties do not raise them. The Solicitor General, while agreeing with Greenlaw that the Eighth Circuit erred, urged the Court to grant certiorari and remand the case for further briefing in order to give the appellate court an opportunity to revisit its holding.
", "facts_len": "1528", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1876", "ID": "55498", "name": "Boumediene v. Bush", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1195", "docket": "06-1195", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Lakhdar Boumediene et al.", "second_party": "George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.", "facts": "In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba. Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at Guantanamo.
\nIn 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: \"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.\"
\nThe D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA applying the law to \"all cases, without exception\" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying review three months earlier.
", "facts_len": "2608", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1877", "ID": "55500", "name": "Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-474", "docket": "07-474", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Anup Engquist", "second_party": "Oregon Department of Agriculture et al.", "facts": "Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection, substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt with such \"class of one\" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard, Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.
", "facts_len": "1478", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1878", "ID": "55499", "name": "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia State Board of Equalization", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1287", "docket": "06-1287", "term": "2007", "first_party": "CSX Transportation, Inc.", "second_party": "Georgia State Board of Equalization et al.", "facts": "The Tax Injunction Act establishes a general rule that federal courts will not interfere with matters of state taxation, but the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act) provides an exception for railroads. In an effort to prevent state tax discrimination against railroads, Section 306 of the 4-R Act requires that the ratio of the assessed value to the true market value of railroad property not exceed by more than five percent the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction. This calculation requires that states determine the \"true market value\" of the railroads' property - a valuation that can be subjective. Using a new valuation methodology, the Georgia State Board of Equalization appraised the property of the railroad company CSX Transportation, Inc. at $8.2 billion. CSX filed a complaint under the 4-R Act, noting that the old appraisal methodology would have valued the property at only $6 billion. Despite CSX's argument that the 4-R Act allows railroads to challenge state valuation methods, the district court ruled that the only the state's methodology could be considered.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that in the absence of a clear statement in the 4-R Act, principles of federalism weighed against interpreting the Act to give railroads additional power to challenge the taxing authority of the states in federal court. The Circuit Court stood by the general principle that federal courts should not interfere with state taxation policies. Since the 4-R Act did not allow challenges to the state's choice of valuation method, CSX could not bring its arguments that Georgia's methodology was faulty.
", "facts_len": "1819", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1879", "ID": "55501", "name": "Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-939", "docket": "06-939", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al.", "second_party": "Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, et al.", "facts": "After the California legislature passed laws prohibiting the use of state funds to \"assist, promote, or deter union organizing,\" a group of California companies brought suit claiming the state laws were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 7. The Act provides that companies' anti-labor speech can only be considered evidence of unfair labor practice if it threatens or coerces workers. The California companies argued that the state laws infringe upon their \"safe harbor\" for anti-labor speech embodied in the Act.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, after entering two panel decisions holding the California law preempted, issued a split en banc opinion holding that it was not. The Second Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The Court's decision in this case will affect roughly a dozen other states currently considering adopting legislation substantially similar to the California law.
", "facts_len": "972", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1880", "ID": "55505", "name": "New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-766", "docket": "06-766", "term": "2007", "first_party": "New York State Board of Elections et al.", "second_party": "Margarita Lopez Torres et al.", "facts": "New York trial court judges are appointed by way of a \"district convention system.\" Under this system, political party members elect delegates, who in turn vote for judicial candidates nominated at party conventions. Margarita Lopez Torres sought appointment to a New York Supreme Court but did not have a political party's endorsement. Lopez Torres claimed that the system unconstitutionally obstructed judicial appointments by making candidates reliant upon political parties. The New York Board of Elections defended the system, arguing that it did not bar voters from participating because they had the opportunity to elect delegates.
\nA District Court found that the system unnecessarily and excessively restricted elections. It cited the absence of a \"single successful challenge to candidates backed by the party leaders.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the system gave political party officials too much power and violated voters' and candidates' First Amendment rights to freedom of association.
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1881", "ID": "55504", "name": "Kennedy v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-343", "docket": "07-343", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Patrick Kennedy", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "A Louisiana court found Patrick Kennedy guilty of raping his eight-year-old stepdaughter. Louisiana law allows the district attorney to seek the death penalty for defendants found guilty of raping children under the age of twelve. The prosecutor sought, and the jury awarded, such a sentence; Kennedy appealed.
\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of the death sentence, noting that although the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down capital punishment for rape of an adult woman in Coker v. Georgia, that ruling did not apply when the victim was a child. Rather the Louisiana high court applied a balancing test set out by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, first examining whether there is a national consensus on the punishment and then considering whether the court would find the punishment excessive. In this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court felt that the adoption of similar laws in five other states, coupled with the unique vulnerability of children, justified imposing the death penalty.
\nIn seeking certiorari, Kennedy argued that five states do not constitute a \"national consensus\" for the purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, that Coker v. Georgia should apply to all rapes regardless of the age of the victim, and that the law was unfair in its application, singling out black child rapists for death at a significantly higher rate than whites.
", "facts_len": "1450", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1882", "ID": "55506", "name": "Logan v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-6911", "docket": "06-6911", "term": "2007", "first_party": "James D. Logan", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
\nA District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have \"had civil rights restored.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
", "facts_len": "1102", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1883", "ID": "55507", "name": "Burgess v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-11429", "docket": "06-11429", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Keith Lavon Burgess", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When Keith Burgess pleaded guilty to a drug distribution charge in 2003, the government requested that his statutory minimum sentence be increased from ten to twenty years. The government based this request on 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A), which requires such a sentencing hike for defendants with prior felony drug convictions. The statute defined \"felony drug offense\" as any felony under any provision of the statute or any other federal law. Burgess argued that this definition conflicts with 21 U.S.C. Section 802(13) which requires that a felony drug offense be punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. Therefore, any enhancement of his sentence must be barred unless both statutory definitions are fulfilled. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Burgess' argument, the D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on similar facts in 2004.
", "facts_len": "900", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1884", "ID": "55509", "name": "Giles v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-6053", "docket": "07-6053", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Dwayne Giles", "second_party": "California", "facts": "When Dwayne Giles was tried in state court for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, he claimed self-defense. Giles stated that he had heard her vow to hurt him and a friend, and that she had previously shot a man and threatened people with knives. The prosecution then introduced evidence of a conversation between Giles' ex-girlfriend and police in which she claimed that he had assaulted her and threatened to kill her. The district court eventually convicted Giles of murder.
\nOn appeal, Giles argued that use of the police conversation violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, namely, his deceased ex-girlfriend. The California Supreme Court held that Giles had waived this right because he was the cause of his ex-girlfriend's absence. Although this exclusion was justified under common law rules of \"forfeiture by wrongdoing\", the Supreme Court had greatly constrained the admissibility of such evidence in its 2004 holding in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford essentially wiped out the admissibility of such out-of-court statements unless the testimony could be subject to cross-examination at trial, an option that would be impossible under these circumstances. This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on its decision in Crawford and to apply it to a situation where the wrongdoing that kept the witness from appearing in court was not motivated by a desire to prevent the witness' testimony.
", "facts_len": "1476", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1885", "ID": "55508", "name": "Regalado Cuellar v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1456", "docket": "06-1456", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Humberto Fidel Regaldo Cuellar was apprehended in 2004 driving a Volkwagen Beetle crawling 30 miles below the speed limit on a main artery through Texas to Mexico. When police pulled Cuellar over, they discovered that he had logged about 1,000 miles in the past two days stopping in major cities along the way for just hours each time. When questioned, Cuellar acted nervously; he later turned over a large roll of cash that smelled like marijuana. When police examined the car, they found drill marks suggesting tampering with the gas tank, as well as mud splashings and animal hair typical of efforts to conceal the existence of contraband. Police found $83,000 in cash in a secret compartment beneath the floorboard. Cuellar was convicted of money laundering, but the appeals court overturned the conviction. The court ruled that the federal money laundering statute required the government to prove that Cuellar was attempting to portray the money he carried as legitimate wealth, rather than merely showing that he tried to hide it.
", "facts_len": "1045", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1886", "ID": "55510", "name": "Quanta Computer, Inc., et al. v. LG Electronics, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-937", "docket": "06-937", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Quanta Computer, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "LG Electronics, Inc.", "facts": "LG Electronics owned patents for a group of products, including microprocessor chips used in personal computers. It licensed the patents to Intel, but in a well-publicized separate agreement excluded from the license any Intel customer that integrated the chip with non-Intel components. One purchaser disregarded the agreement and used the chips in computers made for Dell, Hewlett-Packard and Gateway. LG Electronics sued those who passed the chips down the line of commerce to companies that had not purchased licenses.
", "facts_len": "530", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1887", "ID": "55512", "name": "Gall v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-7949", "docket": "06-7949", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Brian Michael Gall", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "While a student at the University of Iowa, Brian Gall was involved in a drug ring distributing ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine, MDMA). He voluntarily left the drug conspiracy and moved to Arizona where he started his own business and led a crime-free life. When federal agents tracked him down, he turned himself in and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. The government argued for a sentence of 30 months in prison, which was the minimum sentence in the range recommended for the offense by the federal sentencing guidelines. Taking into account the mitigating circumstances in Gall's case, the judge instead decided to depart from the guidelines and impose a sentence of 36 months of probation. (The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Booker had declared the sentencing guidelines to be merely advisory, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.)
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit held that while the guidelines are not mandatory, sentences that fall outside of the recommended sentencing range must overcome a presumption of unreasonableness. Sentences varying from the guidelines must be justified based on the circumstances of the case, and larger variances from the guidelines require correspondingly more compelling justifications. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court had erred by using Gall's youth as a mitigating factor, by overweighing his rehabilitation, and by underweighing the seriousness of the crime. Since the \"extraordinary variance\" was not justified by a finding of extraordinary circumstances, the Eighth Circuit ordered a new sentence.
", "facts_len": "1788", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1888", "ID": "55511", "name": "United States v. Rodriquez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1646", "docket": "06-1646", "term": "2007", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Gino Gonzaga Rodriquez", "facts": "When Gino Rodriquez was released from prison on supervision, he promptly absconded and was later found with $900 cash, heroin and a gun. Prosecutors argued that Rodriquez was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, which applies to those convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm if they have a total of three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Rodriquez had two California burglary convictions. Prosecutors argued that the third required conviction was supplied by Rodriquez's Washington drug offenses. Although none of the three drug convictions, on their own, was considered \"serious,\" the second and third were repeat offenses and therefore punishable by ten-year sentences sufficient to qualify as serious under the federal career criminal law.
", "facts_len": "804", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1889", "ID": "55513", "name": "Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-666", "docket": "06-666", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Department of Revenue of Kentucky et al.", "second_party": "George W. Davis et ux.", "facts": "When calculating gross income for tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Code exempts from taxation the interest earned on any state or local bond. However, Kentucky law requires that interest income earned on bonds issued by other states be taxed as part of an individual's adjusted gross income. George and Catherine Davis filed a class action complaint arguing that Kentucky's policy of taxing out-of-state bonds was in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause - the doctrine that the Commerce Clause forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce. The state trial court ruled in favor of the Kentucky Department of Revenue and declared the tax policy constitutional.
\nOn appeal, the Davises stressed Kentucky's market discrimination against other states as a factor indicating that the policy was unconstitutional. In response, the Department of Revenue cited a similar policy that was upheld by state courts in Ohio. The Department also invoked the \"market participant doctrine,\" which stands for the idea that only the state's actions as a regulator are subject to the dormant Commerce Clause. Actions undertaken as a market participant, such as the issuance of bonds, are not. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and struck down the tax policy. The Court of Appeals held that the tax discrimination rather than the bond issuance was at issue, and the taxation was indisputably undertaken in the state's capacity as a regulator. The court concluded that the Commerce Clause was incompatible with such a discriminatory state policy.
", "facts_len": "1576", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1890", "ID": "55514", "name": "New Jersey v. Delaware", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/134-orig", "docket": "134-orig", "term": "2007", "first_party": "State of New Jersey", "second_party": "State of Delaware", "facts": "When British Petroleum (BP) wanted to build a natural gas transfer facility on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River, the State of Delaware objected that the pier construction would require the dredging of underwater lands it considered part of its coastal zone. Delaware denied BP a permit for the construction despite the fact that most of the construction would take place on the New Jersey side of the river. New Jersey granted the permit, arguing that a 1905 compact between the States settling a boundary dispute placed the construction site under New Jersey control. New Jersey filed a claim to settle the dispute and the case went directly to the Court under its original jurisdiction to hear disputes between two States.
", "facts_len": "741", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1891", "ID": "55515", "name": "Virginia v. Moore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1082", "docket": "06-1082", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Commonwealth of Virginia", "second_party": "David Lee Moore", "facts": "Virginia police stopped David Lee Moore after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest Moore. After reading Moore his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. Moore was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
\nAt trial court, Moore's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and Moore was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "935", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1892", "ID": "55516", "name": "CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1431", "docket": "06-1431", "term": "2007", "first_party": "CBOCS West, Inc.", "second_party": "Hedrick G. Humphries", "facts": "Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS. After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 USC Section 1981. Humphries alleged that retaliation took many forms of abuse by his superiors. Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that \"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.\"
\nHumphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 protects against retaliation.
", "facts_len": "1007", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1893", "ID": "55517", "name": "Riley v. Kennedy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-77", "docket": "07-77", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama", "second_party": "Yvonne Kennedy et al.", "facts": "In 1987, the United States Attorney General precleared a local Alabama law providing for a special election to fill vacancies on the Mobile County Commission, an exception to the usual procedure of gubernatorial appointment. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the election violated the Alabama Constitution, so in response the Alabama Legislature passed an act explicitly allowing local laws to establish such an election. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the new state law failed to revive the local law. The plaintiffs, a group of Alabama residents, brought this suit in federal court alleging that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required the State of Alabama to preclear the two decisions of the Supreme Court in an action against the Governor of Alabama.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found for the plaintiffs, stating that because the local law was the most recent precleared practice put into effect with the 1987 special election, it was the baseline from which to determine if there was a change. Because the Alabama Supreme Court had rendered the local law invalid and the state law unenforceable, the two decisions represented changes that should have been precleared before being implemented.
", "facts_len": "1306", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1894", "ID": "55518", "name": "Taylor v. Sturgell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-371", "docket": "07-371", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Brent Taylor", "second_party": "Robert A. Sturgell, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, et al.", "facts": "Greg Herrick, the owner of one of two F-45s, a rare 1930s vintage airplane, in existence filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking the plans and specifications for the craft from the Federal Aviation Administration. After the FAA refused to turn over the plans as \"protected trade secrets,\" Herrick filed suit against the FAA to recover the plans. The district court found for the FAA, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Subsequently, roughly a month later, Brent Taylor, represented by Herrick's attorney, filed another FOIA request seeking the plans. When the request was again denied, Taylor also filed suit in federal court in the District of Columbia.
\nThe district court determined that Taylor had been \"virtually represented\" by Herrick in the first suit and therefore could not pursue the second suit in federal court. This judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In seeking Supreme Court review, Taylor argued the D.C. Circuit's finding that Taylor and Herrick enjoyed a close enough relationship for virtual representation to apply conflicted with several other circuits requiring a much closer nexus to block the second claim. Opposing certiorari, Fairchild Corp. (the airplane manufacturer) arguing on behalf of the FAA, claimed that Taylor had overstated the circuit splits. It also pointed out that, because Taylor and Herrick were collaborating on the plane restoration and were represented by the same attorney, the logical conclusion was that they were attempting to relitigate the same issue.
", "facts_len": "1600", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1895", "ID": "55519", "name": "Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-43", "docket": "06-43", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC", "second_party": "Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Stoneridge Investment Partners alleged that the cable company Charter Communications had fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The alleged scheme involved a \"sham transaction\" in which Charter gave its equipment vendor, Scientific-Atlanta, above-normal payments for T.V. set-top boxes and the vendor then gave back the extra payments as advertising fees. Charter then fraudulently accounted the returned payments as revenue. Stoneridge sued both Charter and Scientific-Atlanta under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the district court threw out the claim against Scientific- Atlanta. The court ruled that Stoneridge's claim against the vendor was only a claim for aiding and abetting fraud.
\nThe Supreme Court had ruled in Central Bank of Denver v. First International Bank of Denver that Section 10(b) punishes only deceptive conduct itself, not aiding and abetting such conduct. However, the Court that secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants can be considered violators of Section 10(b) if they engage in deceptive conduct along with the primary actor. On appeal, Stoneridge argued that Scientific-Atlanta qualified as a primary violator of Section 10(b). Scientific-Atlanta countered that it had not participated in Charter's fraudulent accounting practices, and, in contrast to Charter, it had made no false public statements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for Scientific Atlanta. The Circuit Court held that the vendor could at most be accused of aiding and abetting Charter's deception, and such claims are not allowed under Section 10(b) according to the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank.
", "facts_len": "1711", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1896", "ID": "55520", "name": "Irizarry v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-7517", "docket": "06-7517", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Richard Irizarry", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2004, Richard Irizarry pleaded guilty to threatening his ex-wife. The district court sentenced Irizarry to five years, the maximum sentence allowed by law. The court imposed this sentence, which is six months longer than the sentence prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, because it felt Irizarry was likely to continue to threaten his ex-wife.
\nIrizarry appealed, arguing that the district court violated Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by not giving advance notice that it was considering a ground for departure not identified in the presentence report or a prehearing government submission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this claim, stating that the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in U.S. v. Booker had made the guidelines advisory as opposed to mandatory. In imposing a harsher sentence than that suggested by the federal guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the district judge had merely varied the federal rules, not departed from them.
", "facts_len": "1027", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1897", "ID": "55521", "name": "Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-989", "docket": "06-989", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Hall Street Associates, L.L.C.", "second_party": "Mattel, Inc.", "facts": "Toy manufacturer Mattel was sued by its landlord Hall Street Associates in a dispute over a property lease. After the litigation went to federal court both parties agreed to resolve the case by arbitration according to the procedures outlined in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Atypically, the parties' arbitration agreement stipulated that the District Court could override the arbitrator's decision if \"the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous.\" This provision of the agreement granted the federal courts a much broader role in supervising the arbitration than is specifically granted in the FAA. The Act explicitly mentions only a narrow set of circumstances under which courts can override an arbitration award, such as corruption, partiality, or misbehavior on the part of the arbitrator.
\nThe arbitrator heard the parties' arguments and handed down a decision in favor of Mattel. Hall sought review from the District Court, and that court found that the arbitrator's decision contained legally erroneous conclusions. Accordingly, the arbitrator ruled for Hall Street, and the District Court affirmed.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original arbitration award favoring Mattel must stand. Even if the arbitrator did make legal errors, it was not the place of the courts to review the soundness of the arbitrator's decision. The Ninth Circuit viewed the FAA's list of circumstances meriting judicial review as an exclusive list. As far as the original arbitration agreement expanded the scope of judicial review of the arbitration, the agreement could not be enforced.
", "facts_len": "1647", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1898", "ID": "55524", "name": "Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-210", "docket": "07-210", "term": "2007", "first_party": "John Bridge et al.", "second_party": "Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Company et al.", "facts": "Property owners in Cook County, Illinois neglected to pay their tax bills and the county acquired liens on their real estate. John Bridge and Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. mailed competing bids for the real estate liens when they were auctioned off by the county. Property liens are distributed proportionally to the parties seeking the lowest penalty from the original owner. After Bridge and Phoenix tied for the best bid, they were required to mail affidavits to the county stating that they were bidding in their own names and were not related to any other bidders. Subsequently, Phoenix filed suit against Bridge claiming the affidavits he sent were false and hid the fact that he was actually in collusion with other bidders, thereby obtaining more than his fair share of the liens. The district court held Phoenix lacked standing because Bridge had made the false statements to the county, not Phoenix.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Phoenix had suffered injury in fact proximately caused by Bridge. In seeking certiorari, Bridge noted splits between the circuits on the issue of whether a plaintiff must plead and prove reliance on a false statement in a RICO claim. Although Phoenix suggested that proximate cause, not reliance or standing, was the ultimate issue in this case, the Court has decided to frame its review around the reliance issue.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1899", "ID": "55523", "name": "Watson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-571", "docket": "06-571", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Michael A. Watson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who \"uses or carries\" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs \"uses\" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that \"use\" means \"active employment\" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use.
\nOn appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of \"use.\"
", "facts_len": "1136", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1900", "ID": "55522", "name": "United States v. Santos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1005", "docket": "06-1005", "term": "2007", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Efrain Santos and Benedicto Diaz", "facts": "For his role in running an illegal lottery or \"bolita,\" Efrain Santos was convicted on charges of illegal gambling and money laundering. Santos had used income from the lottery to pay both the winners and the couriers and collectors who worked for the gambling operation. The money laundering charges were based on 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), which criminalizes the use of the \"proceeds\" of an illegal activity to promote or conceal that activity. However, federal courts disagreed on the meaning of \"proceeds.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled that the proceeds used in money laundering can be any of the gross income obtained from the illegal activity, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had jurisdiction over Santos's case, had recently ruled that only net income (gross revenues minus expenses) used to promote or conceal illegal activities can be the basis of a money laundering conviction. Because Santos had only used gross revenues to promote his lottery, the District Court reversed the convictions.
\nThe government argued on appeal that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation would put too great a burden on prosecutions, because the bookkeeping of criminal operations is often purposefully incomplete or misleading in order to obscure the distinction between gross and net income. The narrow interpretation would also restrict money laundering prosecutions to criminal enterprises that are actually profitable. Santos countered that the government's broad interpretation would result in overlapping convictions for a wide variety of offenders charged with both money laundering and the underlying crime. He argued that the government's interpretation strayed too far from the traditional understanding of money laundering, which focuses on the subsequent disguising of profits obtained from a criminal venture. The Seventh Circuit ruled for Santos and affirmed its original ruling.
", "facts_len": "1949", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1901", "ID": "55525", "name": "Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y. v. Tom F.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-637", "docket": "06-637", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York", "second_party": "Tom F., on behalf of Gilbert F., a minor child", "facts": "The Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) guarantees students with disabilities a \"free appropriate public education.\" Tom Freston enrolled his son Gilbert in a private school for students with special needs, because the New York City school district was unable to establish an adequate \"individualized education program.\" The school district reimbursed Freston for the private school tuition. After two years the school district offered to place Gilbert in another public school, but Freston chose to keep his son in private school and again sought tuition reimbursement from the district.
\nA U.S. district court ruled that the school district was not required by the IDEA to reimburse Freston, because Gilbert had never been enrolled in public school. The relevant section of the IDEA authorizes tuition reimbursement to the parents of a disabled child \"who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency,\" but it does not explicitly state that parents of children who have never received public education are not entitled to reimbursement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court. By comparing the disputed section of the IDEA with other sections of the statute, the Second Circuit reasoned that the IDEA was not meant to deny reimbursement to students who have never been enrolled in public school. To rule otherwise, the Circuit Court held, would be to require parents like Freston to enroll children in inadequate public schools in order to be eligible for tuition reimbursement.
", "facts_len": "1589", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1902", "ID": "55526", "name": "Preston v. Ferrer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1463", "docket": "06-1463", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Arnold M. Preston", "second_party": "Alex E. Ferrer", "facts": "In 2005, the former manager for Alex Ferrer, television's Judge Alex, sued him to recover alleged unpaid commissions. The management contract at issue specifically called for all such disputes to be arbitrated out of court. Judge Alex responded by filing a complaint with California's labor commissioner charging that the management contract was illegal because the manager had actually been serving as an unlicensed talent agent in violation of California law. The commissioner, who has exclusive jurisdiction over talent agency disputes, said that he lacked authority to stop the arbitration. When Judge Alex filed suit in state court, the court stopped the arbitration.
", "facts_len": "680", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1903", "ID": "55527", "name": "Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-552", "docket": "07-552", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Sprint Communications Co., L.P.", "second_party": "APCC Services, Inc.", "facts": "In 1996, the Federal Communications Commission moved to require long-distance carriers to compensate pay-phone companies for so-called coinless phone calls. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., that pay-phone operators could sue for greater compensation. This case arose when APCC Services brought such a suit against Sprint seeking compensation for coinless long-distance calls. Sprint argued that APCC had no stake in the outcome of the case because, under the terms of the assignment, any compensation from a favorable judgment or settlement would go directly to the pay-phone companies, not \"intermediary\" companies such as APCC.
\nThe district court initially dismissed APCC's suit, but the court eventually reversed itself, concluding that it was sufficient that the assignment transferred legal title to the claim rather than merely transferring power of attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit affirmed, concluding that, as a matter of law, the assignment of a legal right to bring a claim gives the assignee a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to confer standing.
", "facts_len": "1205", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1904", "ID": "55530", "name": "Arave v. Hoffman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-110", "docket": "07-110", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Avron J. Arave, Warden", "second_party": "Maxwell Hoffman", "facts": "Maxwell Hoffman was charged with first-degree murder after he and another man severely injured a drug informant, fatally pelted her with boulders, and left her for dead. Hoffman's assigned lawyer, who had never handled a capital case, advised him to reject a plea bargain deal in which he would be spared Idaho's death penalty in exchange for a guilty plea. The attorney told Hoffman that because a federal appeals court had recently stricken Arizona's identical death scheme, the Idaho law would soon be defunct and therefore could not be applied to him. Hoffman agreed to go to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to death. However, despite the attorney's prediction, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the death sentence. Hoffman eventually filed a habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to go to trial based on a faulty legal prediction. The Ninth Circuit agreed and ordered that Hoffman be freed unless the state renewed its plea bargain offer.
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1905", "ID": "55528", "name": "Indiana v. Edwards", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/07-208", "docket": "07-208", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Indiana", "second_party": "Ahmad Edwards", "facts": "Ahmad Edwards was arrested in Indiana after stealing a pair of shoes and shooting an FBI agent, a store security guard, and a bystander. Edwards was initially found mentally incompetent but, after five years of psychiatric evaluation, was put on trial for attempted murder. After his first trial resulted in a hung jury, Edwards asked to represent himself at his retrial. This request was initially granted by the trial court but was overturned when the court found that, although Edwards was competent to stand trial, he was unable to conduct a coherent defense. This ruling was supported by Edwards' filing of rambling and irrelevant documents during the proceedings.
\nAfter his conviction on all counts, Edwards appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation had been abrogated by the trial court. The Indiana high court noted that two Supreme Court decisions, Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389 (1993), which held that a defendant is competent to defend himself if he is competent to stand trial, and Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which held that a defendant need only be \"literate, competent, and understanding\" to represent himself, argued in favor of Edwards' right to self-representation while another, Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 528 U.S. 152 (2000), holding that the modern availability of lawyers undercuts the need for self-representation, argued against it. The Indiana Supreme Court eventually held that Godinez and Faretta required it to overturn the trial court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1627", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1906", "ID": "55531", "name": "John R. Sand & Gravel Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1164", "docket": "06-1164", "term": "2007", "first_party": "John R. Sand & Gravel Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John R. Sand & Gravel Company had leased the rights to mine sand and gravel on a piece of Michigan property that also contained an old landfill. After thousands of drums of illegally-buried industrial waste were discovered in the landfill, the EPA started a clean-up operation. In 1994 the EPA erected a security fence around its operations. Although John R. Sand kept mining other parts of the property, the fence blocked certain mining sites. John R. Sand's ability to mine the area was still impeded after the EPA moved the fence in 1998. In 2002 John R. Sand brought suit against the government, arguing that the restrictions on its operations amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of property. The Tucker Act waives the government's sovereign immunity for such suits, but the Act has a six-year statute of limitations. John R. Sand argued that the issue in its claim originated in 1998 when the EPA moved its fence and for the first time obtained an order granting it unrestrained access to the property. The government countered that the claim actually accrued back in 1994 when the fence first went up, which would make the suit untimely. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the suit was timely, but it also ruled that the government was not liable for a Fifth Amendment taking.
\nIn John R. Sand's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the issue of the statute of limitations was raised again - not by either of the parties, but by a group of corporations who were not parties to the case. Citing its own precedents, the Federal Circuit ruled that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. Jurisdictional requirements determine whether courts can hear a case. They cannot be waived by the parties to the case, and courts can consider jurisdictional issues on the courts' own initiative. The Federal Circuit ruled that John R. Sand's claim accrued no later than 1994. Since the suit fell outside the time limit, the Federal Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction and it dismissed the case without considering the merits of the Fifth Amendment claim.
", "facts_len": "2111", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1907", "ID": "55529", "name": "United States v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-694", "docket": "06-694", "term": "2007", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Michael Williams", "facts": "Michael Williams was convicted in federal district court of \"pandering\" (promoting) child pornography. The PROTECT Act proscribes the pandering of \"any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe\" that the material is illegal child pornography. The Act represents Congress's attempt to outlaw sexually explicit images of children - including both images of real children and computer-generated images of realistic virtual children. The Supreme Court struck down Congress's previous effort as overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Council, because the law as written could have outlawed artwork that was neither obscene nor child pornography. Williams argued that the PROTECT Act was similarly overbroad, but the district court held that the government can legitimately outlaw the pandering of material as child pornography, even if the material is not in fact child pornography.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court and struck down the PROTECT Act as unconstitutionally overbroad. The Eleventh Circuit was unmoved by the government's argument that prosecuting the promotion of virtual child pornography as real is necessary to combat the child porn market. The Circuit Court held that the Act's prohibition was broad enough to include any \"braggart, exaggerator, or outright liar\" who claims in a non-commercial context to have child pornography but actually does not. Thus, the Act's pandering provision prohibited protected speech as well as actual child pornography.
", "facts_len": "1604", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1908", "ID": "55532", "name": "Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1457", "docket": "06-1457", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.", "second_party": "Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, et al.", "facts": "The California Legislature deregulated the power industry in 1996, establishing a so-called \"spot market\" in which utilities purchased electricity on the day it was needed. Four years later, during an exceptionally hot summer, wholesale electricity prices skyrocketed. In response, several utilities on the Western power grid determined that they could no longer afford the spot market, and instead negotiated less expensive but still inflated long-term contracts with power suppliers. Once the crisis passed, the utilities asked the government to let them change the contracts to reflect newly lowered electricity prices. The government refused, citing a longstanding Supreme Court doctrine presuming that utilities' contracts are reasonable. The Ninth Circuit ultimately ordered the government to permit the changes.
", "facts_len": "826", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1909", "ID": "55533", "name": "Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1204", "docket": "06-1204", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Republic of the Philippines et al.", "second_party": "Jerry S. Pimentel, temporary administrator of the Estate of Mariano J. Pimentel, et al.", "facts": "The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors.
\nThe Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the \"equity and good conscience\" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.
", "facts_len": "1600", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1910", "ID": "55536", "name": "FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-582", "docket": "07-582", "term": "2008", "first_party": "No. 07-582\t Title: \t Federal Communications Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to \"fleeting\" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
\nThe Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was \"arbitrary and capricious\" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1911", "ID": "55537", "name": "Pearson, et al. v. Callahan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-751", "docket": "07-751", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Cordell Pearson, et al.", "second_party": "Afton Callahan", "facts": "This case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction.
\nSubsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the \"consent once removed\" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine does not apply when the officers are summoned by a police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, Callahan had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
", "facts_len": "1482", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1912", "ID": "55534", "name": "Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-1717", "docket": "06-1717", "term": "2007", "first_party": "Richlin Security Service Company", "second_party": "Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security", "facts": "Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to \"fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings.\" Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.
", "facts_len": "1303", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1913", "ID": "55535", "name": "14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-581", "docket": "07-581", "term": "2008", "first_party": "14 Penn Plaza LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Steven Pyett, et al.", "facts": "A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.
", "facts_len": "1115", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1914", "ID": "55540", "name": "Forest Grove School District v. T.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-305", "docket": "08-305", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Forest Grove School District", "second_party": "T. A.", "facts": "In 2003, T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School District, sought to be evaluated for suspected learning disabilities. In 2004, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Oregon determined that T.A. was disabled and eligible for special education under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As T.A. was no longer enrolled in the Forest Grove School District, but attending private school, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.A. for the private school tuition ($5,200 per month), determining it had failed to offer him a free and appropriate public education.
\nThe school district appealed the order in an Oregon federal district court arguing that reimbursement was not appropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability. The district court invalidated the order. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the order. It reasoned that IDEA provided the courts broad discretion in order to achieve \"equitable relief\" for disabled students, including reimbursement for private school tuition.
", "facts_len": "1304", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1915", "ID": "55541", "name": "Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-310", "docket": "08-310", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Polar Tankers, Inc.", "second_party": "City of Valdez, Alaska", "facts": "In 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment formula based on the number of days spent there. In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution.
\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non-duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "795", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1916", "ID": "55538", "name": "Republic of Iraq v. Beaty", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1090", "docket": "07-1090", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Republic of Iraq", "second_party": "Jordan Beaty et al.", "facts": "In 2003, plaintiffs sued the Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit.
\nAfter the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver.
", "facts_len": "1216", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1917", "ID": "55539", "name": "Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1239", "docket": "07-1239", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy", "second_party": "Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.", "facts": "Natural Resources Defense Council along with other environmental groups object to the \"SOCAL\" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would cause serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on Environmental Quality to provide \"alternative arrangements\" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. The district court stated that such arrangements require \"emergency circumstances\" not applicable to the case
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an \"abuse of discretion\" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the \"emergency circumstances\" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase.
", "facts_len": "1656", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1918", "ID": "55542", "name": "Al-Marri v. Spagone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-368", "docket": "08-368", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri", "second_party": "Daniel Spagone, United States Navy Commander, Consolidated Naval Brig", "facts": "In December, 2001, Ali Saleh Hahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen and permanent resident of the United States, was arrested at his home in Peoria, IL for his alleged involvement in the September 11 attacks. In February 2002, he was charged with the possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit card numbers and with the intent to defraud. In January 2003, he was additionally charged with making a false statement to the FBI, making a false statement on a bank application, and using another person's identification for the purpose of influencing the action of a federally insured financial institution. Mr. Al- Marri pleaded not guilty to all counts. Just before trial, the government moved to dismiss its criminal charges against him and by order of the President designated Mr. Al-Marri an \"enemy combatant\". Thereafter, he has been held without charge in military custody.
\nMr. Al-Marri was denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court in South Carolina. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered that his military detention cease. The court subsequently vacated this judgment and reconsidered the case en banc. It held in a 5-4 decision that if the government's allegations about Mr. Al-Marri are true then Congress by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) has provided the President the power to detain him as an enemy combatant. But, in another 5-4 vote, it held that assuming the President is empowered to detain Mr. Al Marri as an enemy combatant, he was not afforded sufficient due process to challenge his detention. It remanded the case to the district court for further fact finding.
", "facts_len": "1703", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - moot", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1919", "ID": "55543", "name": "Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-22", "docket": "08-22", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Hugh Caperton", "second_party": "A. T. Massey Coal Co.", "facts": "In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a \"constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety.\" The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried.
", "facts_len": "1457", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1920", "ID": "55546", "name": "Nijhawan v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-495", "docket": "08-495", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Manoj Nijhawan", "second_party": "Eric Holder", "facts": "Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He was found responsible for having caused over $600 million in damages and sentenced to 41 months imprisonment. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Mr. Nijhawan had committed an \"aggravated felony\" and was subject to deportation because his offense involved fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Mr. Nijhawan argued that 1) his offense did not involve fraud or deceit as those terms are used in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 2) that his conviction did not establish that loss to his victims exceeded $10,000. The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's findings and refuted Mr. Nijhawan's arguments. It held that Mr. Nijhawan's offenses constituted fraud or deceit as understood by the INA and that his conviction did establish that the loss to his victims exceeded $10,000, even though the jury did not determine that amount.
", "facts_len": "1064", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1921", "ID": "55545", "name": "Ashcroft v. Iqbal", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1015", "docket": "07-1015", "term": "2008", "first_party": "John D. Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al.", "second_party": "Javaid Iqbal et al.", "facts": "In the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into the attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a \"high interest\" detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The \"serious allegations of gross mistreatment\" were enough to sustain the remaining counts.
", "facts_len": "1709", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1922", "ID": "55544", "name": "Kansas v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/105-orig", "docket": "105-orig", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "This case represents another chapter in the longstanding dispute between the two states concerning water rights to the Arkansas River. The states had created the Arkansas River Compact in 1943 in order to allocate portions of the river between them. In 1985, Kansas brought suit before the Court alleging that Colorado had breached the agreement. The Court appointed a \"Special Master\" to investigate the allegations and to make recommendations to the Court. The Special Master submitted his report in 1994, finding that Colorado had indeed violated the Compact.
\nSince 1994, the Special Master has issued three more reports. These reports have been accompanied by several objections by both states. The Court has dismissed the majority of these objections. The question presently before the Court is whether or not to overrule two of Kansas' objections to the most recent report of the Special Master.
", "facts_len": "916", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1923", "ID": "55547", "name": "Corley v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-10441", "docket": "07-10441", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Johnnie Corley", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
\nThe court recognized that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible.
", "facts_len": "1017", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1924", "ID": "55550", "name": "Coeur Alaska v. S.E. Alaska Conservation Council", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-984", "docket": "07-984", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Coeur Alaska, Inc.", "second_party": "Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, et al.", "facts": "The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but were of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1925", "ID": "55548", "name": "Flores-Figueroa v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-108", "docket": "08-108", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Ignacio Carlos Flores-Figueroa", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Ignacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person.
", "facts_len": "561", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1926", "ID": "55549", "name": "Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1125", "docket": "07-1125", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Lisa Fitzgerald, et vir", "second_party": "Barnstable School Committee, et al.", "facts": "In February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's \"prompt\" and \"diligent\" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called \"remedial\" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983.
", "facts_len": "2724", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1927", "ID": "55551", "name": "AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-543", "docket": "07-543", "term": "2008", "first_party": "AT&T Corporation", "second_party": "Noreen Hulteen et al.", "facts": "Four employees sued their employer, AT&T, alleging that the company's policy for calculating employee pension and retirement benefits discriminated against women who had taken leave time due to pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The AT&T policy considered temporary disability leave as service time for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits except when the leave was taken by pregnant women. The employees argued that the policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which clarified that Title VII prohibits discrimination \"because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.\" The main issue in the case was one of timing: although the employees' pregnancy leave was taken before the PDA came into effect, AT&T's calculation of benefits took place after. The employees argued that under the Court's decision in Pallas the time of calculation should govern the applicability of the PDA. AT&T countered that another decision, Landgraf directly opposed Pallas and had created a \"sea change\" in retroactivity principles such that the PDA should not apply to pregnancy leave taken before it was enacted. The district court sided with the employees and granted summary judgment in their favor.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the lower court, agreeing with AT&T that Pallas gave impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA. On rehearing, the full court reversed and ruled in favor of the employees, avoiding the retroactivity problem by holding that the PDA applies to the actual calculation of pension and retirement benefits regardless of when the leave itself was taken. Because AT&T performed this calculation after the PDA had gone into effect, the denial of benefits violated Title VII.
", "facts_len": "1899", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1928", "ID": "55552", "name": "Locke v. Karass", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-610", "docket": "07-610", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Daniel B. Locke, et al.", "second_party": "Edward A. Karass, State Controller, et al.", "facts": "After the Maine State Employees Association (a union representing state workers) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement for certain employees, nonmembers voiced their disapproval with the agreement's requirement that they pay a \"service fee\" to the union as its exclusive bargaining agent. The service fee included an affiliation fee paid to the Service Employees International Union through a general pooling arrangement, meaning that the nonmembers were contributing funds to an affiliate for litigation not specifically for their own benefit. The nonmembers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine claiming that the service fee violated their First amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, applying the Court's decision in Lehnert to determine that the nonmember employees' First Amendment rights were not implicated by the service fee. Under the Lehnert test, chargeable activities must (1) \"be substantively related to bargaining and ultimately inure to the benefit of local union members, (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders, and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency.\"
", "facts_len": "1371", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "1929", "ID": "55554", "name": "Bartlett v. Strickland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-689", "docket": "07-689", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Gary Bartlett, Executive Director of North Carolina State Board of Elections, et al.", "second_party": "Dwight Strickland et al.", "facts": "Dwight Strickland, a commissioner in Pender County, NC, along with several other county commissioners, brought this suit against state officials alleging that their redistricting plan was in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The state officials argued that the redistricting plan was required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), stating that the minority group in question, comprised of African-American North Carolina citizens, was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority under the terms of the VRA. The North Carolina Superior Court agreed with the state officials and entered summary judgment in their favor.
\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the minority group did not comprise a numerical majority of citizens and, therefore, redistricting was not required by the VRA. Because the redistricting plan did not meet the conditions of the VRA, the court said, it had to comply with certain terms of North Carolina's Constitution setting a minimum county population for redistricting. The court found that the county did not meet this requirement, and declared the plan unlawful.
", "facts_len": "1173", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1930", "ID": "55553", "name": "Carcieri v. Salazar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-526", "docket": "07-526", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Donald L. Carcieri, Governor of Rhode Island", "second_party": "Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.", "facts": "In 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The U.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that \"the future allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited amount of land hangs in the balance.\"
", "facts_len": "1147", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1931", "ID": "55555", "name": "Horne v. Flores", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-289", "docket": "08-289", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Thomas C. Horne, Superintendent, Arizona Public Instruction", "second_party": "Miriam Flores et al.", "facts": "The Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's original order that it was fair to require compliance.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1932", "ID": "55558", "name": "Chambers v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/06-11206", "docket": "06-11206", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Deondery Chambers", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had \"knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution\" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
", "facts_len": "1346", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1933", "ID": "55556", "name": "Kansas v. Ventris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1356", "docket": "07-1356", "term": "2008", "first_party": "State of Kansas", "second_party": "Donnie Ventris", "facts": "In January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his \"ear open\" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas.
\nThe court held that \"[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.\" It reasoned that the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights.
", "facts_len": "1095", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1934", "ID": "55557", "name": "Moore v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-10689", "docket": "07-10689", "term": "2008", "first_party": "James Eric Moore", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal district court convicted James Eric Moore of possessing cocaine base (crack cocaine) with intent to distribute and sentenced him to 188 months in prison and 6 years of supervised release. Mr. Moore appealed arguing the district court improperly sentenced him when it failed to consider the disparate treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
\nThe Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the court of appeals to consider Mr. Moore's case in light of its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States, where it held a judge \"may consider the disparity between the Guidelines' treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses.\" The court of appeals affirmed once again. It reasoned that the district court was aware it had such discretion, but chose not to exercise it in Mr. Moore's case.
", "facts_len": "927", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1935", "ID": "55561", "name": "Ricci v. DeStefano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1428", "docket": "07-1428", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Frank Ricci et al.", "second_party": "John DiStefano et al.", "facts": "White and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1936", "ID": "55560", "name": "Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-591", "docket": "07-591", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Luis E. Melendez-Diaz", "second_party": "Massachusetts", "facts": "Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested while making a cocaine sale in a parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, bags of the cocaine alleged to have been distributed by Melendez-Diaz were introduced into evidence along with drug analysis certificates prepared by the lab technician who analyzed the drugs and identified them as cocaine. A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine in violation of Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz appealed, arguing that the State's introduction of the drug analysis certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him under the Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford had held that so-called \"testimonial\" evidence cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the witness providing the evidence. Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and argued that Crawford required the lab technician to testify on the results. The State argued that Massachusetts had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Verde, that lab reports were not testimonial.
\nThe Massachusetts Court of Appeals rejected Melendez-Diaz's claims in an unpublished opinion, referring to them in a short footnote as \"without merit.\" The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal.
", "facts_len": "1345", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1937", "ID": "55562", "name": "Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-441", "docket": "08-441", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Jack Gross", "second_party": "FBL Financial Services, Inc.", "facts": "In April 2004, Jack Gross sued FBL Financial Services, Inc. (FBL) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) alleging he was demoted because of his age. A federal district court in Iowa found in his favor and awarded him $46, 945.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The court held that the jury instruction in Mr. Gross' case was improper. It reasoned that since Mr. Gross never submitted direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in his demotion, he was not entitled to a jury instruction that put the burden of persuasion upon FBL to show that it would have demoted him regardless of his age.
", "facts_len": "695", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1938", "ID": "55559", "name": "Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-214", "docket": "08-214", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Edgar L. Townsend", "facts": "In July 2005, Edgar Townsend was allegedly injured while working aboard the tug boat Thomas. His employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. sought declaratory judgment in a federal district court to determine its obligations toward him. Mr. Townsend counterclaimed. In part, he alleged arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries, and sought punitive damages. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. motioned to dismiss the request for punitive damages. The district court denied the motion, but allowed for interlocutory appeal.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. The court held it was bound by its prior decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. There, it concluded a seaman may recover punitive damages when an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. did not apply. In that case, the Court held that recovery for \"non-pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of a seaman was not available under general maritime law\". The court of appeals reasoned that Miles was not \"clearly on point\" to the facts in Mr. Townsend's case.
", "facts_len": "1231", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1939", "ID": "55563", "name": "Puckett v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-9712", "docket": "07-9712", "term": "2008", "first_party": "James Benjamin Puckett", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.
", "facts_len": "1025", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1940", "ID": "55564", "name": "Harbison v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-8521", "docket": "07-8521", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Edward Jerome Harbison", "second_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "facts": "Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted in a Tennessee state court of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was denied by the both the federal district court as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters.
", "facts_len": "886", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1941", "ID": "55565", "name": "Spears v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-5721", "docket": "08-5721", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Steven Spears", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2004, Steven Spears was charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine and 500 grams of powder cocaine. The district court determined that the 100:1 weight ratio for sentencing crack cocaine and powder cocaine that the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (Guidelines) used was excessive given the circumstances, so the district court instead based its ruling on a 20:1 ratio. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court could not decide what ratio it wanted to apply for conviction and remanded Spears case for retrial and sentencing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the Court\u2019s decision in Kimbrough v. United States, in which the Court held that the Guidelines were advisory and that a district court does not abuse its discretion by varying from the Guidelines\u2019 prescribed ratio due to disagreement with the disparity the Guidelines create between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. On remand, the appellate court again held that the district court erred in categorically rejecting the Guidelines\u2019 ratio and substituting its own.
", "facts_len": "1200", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1942", "ID": "55566", "name": "Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-322", "docket": "08-322", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.", "facts": "Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (\"Northwest\") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits \"covered jurisdictions\" \u2013 states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting \u2013 from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
\nThe district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a \"political subdivision\" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in \"covered jurisdictions\", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.
", "facts_len": "1082", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1943", "ID": "55569", "name": "United States v. Eurodif S.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1059", "docket": "07-1059", "term": "2008", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Eurodif S. A.", "facts": "This case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called \"separate work unit\" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the U.S. Department of Commerce excluded all LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was \"unripe\" for judicial review. The court held that the issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim.
", "facts_len": "1286", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1944", "ID": "55571", "name": "Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-636", "docket": "07-636", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Kari E. Kennedy, et al.", "second_party": "Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings and Investment Plan, et al.", "facts": "William Kennedy designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his Dupont pension and retirement savings plans. The couple subsequently divorced, and as part of the settlement Liv agreed to give up any interests she may have in the plans. However, William never submitted this portion of the settlement prior to his death in 2001, so the pension and retirement savings benefits were paid out to Liv. William's daughter, Keri, the executor of his estate, brought suit against Dupont to recover the benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the estate, awarding it the value of the benefits.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that because William had never submitted the portion of the settlement agreement denying the benefits to Liv, they were correctly paid out to her by Dupont.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1945", "ID": "55567", "name": "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-295", "docket": "08-295", "term": "2008", "first_party": "The Travelers Indemnity Company, et al.", "second_party": "Pearlie Bailey, et al.", "facts": "In 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently affirmed by a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
\nOver ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions (\"Direct Actions\") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to prevent such lawsuits.
", "facts_len": "817", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1946", "ID": "55572", "name": "United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-660", "docket": "08-660", "term": "2008", "first_party": "United States, ex rel. Irwin Eisenstein,", "second_party": "City of New York, New York, et al.", "facts": "Employees of the city of New York filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that it was unlawful for the city, as a condition of employment, to require non-resident employees to pay a fee equivalent to the income taxes paid by resident-employees. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It reasoned that actions brought by private parties under the FCA must be appealed within 30 days of judgment and not 60 days as when the United States is a party to the lawsuit. Here, the employees of the city of New York appealed 54 days after judgment and thus their appeal was untimely.
", "facts_len": "779", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1947", "ID": "55570", "name": "Negusie v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-499", "docket": "07-499", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Daniel Girmai Negusie", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General", "facts": "Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated.
\nThe BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition.
", "facts_len": "1295", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1948", "ID": "55573", "name": "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Hensley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-1034", "docket": "08-1034", "term": "2008", "first_party": "CSX Transportation, Inc.", "second_party": "Thurston Hensley", "facts": "Thurston Hensley sued his longtime employer CSX Transportation Inc. (CSX) under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)in a Tennessee state court alleging that the railroad had negligently caused him to contract asbestosis. He sought pain and suffering damages for, among other things, his fear of developing lung cancer. Despite the objections of CSX, the trial court refused to provide a jury instruction as to the standard for awarding \"fear of cancer\" damages. Subsequently, the jury awarded Mr. Hensley $5 million in damages. On appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, CSX argued that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers where the Court established a standard for finding \"fear of cancer\" damages. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the trial court. In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, CSX argued that the Tennessee Court of Appeals misapplied the Court's decision in Ayers and that the jury should have been instructed that Mr. Hensley needed to prove that his fear of cancer was \"genuine and serious\" in order to collect damages.
", "facts_len": "1167", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1949", "ID": "55574", "name": "Arizona v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1122", "docket": "07-1122", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Lemon Montrea Johnson", "facts": "Lemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a \"mandatory insurance suspension.\" Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
\nThe Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1770", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1950", "ID": "55575", "name": "Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1372", "docket": "07-1372", "term": "2008", "first_party": "State of Hawaii", "second_party": "Office of Hawaiian Affairs", "facts": "The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), filed suit against the state of Hawaii to prevent the transfer of \"ceded\" lands for the purpose of private development. The OHA was established to manage the proceeds from lands ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii following its overthrow by the United States. The lands were marked to provide for the benefit of native Hawaiians. The OHA argued that \"any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third parties would amount to a breach of trust\" and would be without consideration of the claims of native Hawaiians to those lands. However, the trial court held that the State did have the power to transfer the lands. The OHA appealed.
\nThe Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue an injunction to prevent the transfer of ceded lands from the public trust. In its reasoning, it cited Ahuna to illustrate that the State as trustee of these lands was under an obligation to administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary' (native Hawaiians). Further, it gave great weight to the Apology Resolution passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to mark the 100th Anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. This resolution stated that \"native Hawaiians (1) 'never directly relinquished their claims to\u2026 their national lands to the United States,' and (2) 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory.'\" Therefore, the court held, it was the responsibility of the State of Hawaii to preserve the ceded lands in the public trust, at least until such land claims were resolved.
", "facts_len": "1675", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "1951", "ID": "55576", "name": "Jimenez v. Quarterman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-6984", "docket": "07-6984", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Carlos Jimenez", "second_party": "Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "In 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
\nIn 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition for certiorari, argued that the one-year statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted.
", "facts_len": "1214", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1952", "ID": "55577", "name": "Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1216", "docket": "07-1216", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Philip Morris USA Inc.", "second_party": "Mayola Williams, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse D. Williams, Deceased", "facts": "Mayola Williams sued the tobacco giant, Philip Morris, in Oregon state court following her husband's death from lung cancer in 1997. Ms. Williams claimed that her husband had been convinced by Philip Morris' advertisements and representations that smoking did not pose any significant health risks and had refused to quit smoking despite his family's pleas. She alleged that Philip Morris' fraud and negligence in this regard had caused her husband's death.
\nAt trial, a jury found in favor of Ms. Williams and awarded her $79.5 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $32 million. On appeal, Philip Morris argued that the trial court had committed an error when it failed to give a proposed jury instruction stating, in part, that the jury should not \"punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons.\" The case eventually wound up before the Oregon Supreme Court (\"OSC\"), which ruled that the proposed jury instruction incorrectly stated the federal requirements of due process of law, and the trial court was therefore correct to exclude it. The OSC found it unnecessary to rule, at that time, on whether the jury instruction was flawed for its description of state-law requirements. Philip Morris sought and was granted certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court reversed the OSC, stating that due process did not necessarily require exclusion of the instruction, and remanded the case so that the OSC could apply the correct standard.
\nOn remand, the OSC stated that the U.S. Supreme Court's new constitutional standard was only triggered \"upon request,\" which obligated it to determine whether Philip Morris's request was valid under state law. The OSC held that the proposed instruction misstated Oregon's statutory punitive damages criteria and therefore was not \"clear and correct in all respects,\" as it must be to be considered error. The U.S. Supreme Court, which will now hear the case for the second time after granting Philip Morris' certiorari petition, must determine whether the OSC is permitted to insert these state law issues at such a late stage in the game.
", "facts_len": "2157", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1953", "ID": "55583", "name": "Dean v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-5274", "docket": "08-5274", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Christopher Michael Dean", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal district court convicted both Christopher Michael Dean and Ricardo Curtis Lopez in part for the discharge of a pistol during an armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), a sentencing enhancement statute. They appealed arguing that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) only applies to the intentional discharge of a firearm.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not have an intent requirement. It explained, \"The mere discharge of a firearm during any crime of violence\u2026 even accidental, is subject to the sentencing enhancement\", requiring ten additional years imprisonment.
", "facts_len": "677", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1954", "ID": "55578", "name": "Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-615", "docket": "07-615", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran", "second_party": "Dariush Elahi", "facts": "In 1977, the Iranian Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with an American defense contractor for the purchase of military equipment to be used by the Iranian Air Force. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American company breached its contract with Iran and sold the equipment elsewhere. Iran requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and received $2.8 million in damages for breach of contract. Iran then reduced the award to a judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.
\nDariush Elahi, brought a wrongful death claim against the Iranian government alleging that Iranian agents had assassinated his brother in Paris in 1990. Elahi was awarded over $300 million in damages by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He attempted to satisfy this judgment in part by attaching the damages Iran had recovered from the previous contract dispute. Iran argued that the previous recovery was immune from attachment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California held that Iran had waived its immunity from attachment by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC and the district court in its prior contract dispute.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling but on different grounds. The court held that Elahi could attach the Iranian judgment under Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allows creditors such as Elahi to attach \"the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party.\" Eschewing the jurisdiction argument relied on by the district court, the Ninth Circuit characterized Iran as a \"terrorist party\" and held that the contract judgment was a \"blocked asset\" subject to attachment.
", "facts_len": "1784", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1955", "ID": "55579", "name": "Waddington v. Sarausad", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-772", "docket": "07-772", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Doug Waddington, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center", "second_party": "Cesar Sarausad", "facts": "Cesar Sarausad was arrested in Washington state for his involvement in a drive-by shooting near a school. After he was convicted of second-degree murder and two attempted second-degree murder charges in a jury trial, Sarausad filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court granted Sarausad's motion, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that certain confusing jury instructions related to accomplice liability unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proof.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on the insufficiency of evidence claim but affirmed on the jury instructions claim. The court stated that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction under Jackson v. Virginia. However, the jury instructions were ambiguous on the question of whether Sarausad could be convicted of murder and attempted murder on a theory of accomplice liability without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew an accomplice intended to commit a murder. According to the Ninth Circuit, there was a reasonable chance the jury misapplied these instructions.
", "facts_len": "1261", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1956", "ID": "55582", "name": "Safford Unified School District v. Redding", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-479", "docket": "08-479", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Safford Unified School District #1, et al.", "second_party": "April Redding", "facts": "Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances.
", "facts_len": "970", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1957", "ID": "55581", "name": "United States v. Hayes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-608", "docket": "07-608", "term": "2008", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Randy Edward Hayes", "facts": "Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal.
\nHayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a \"domestic\" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction.
", "facts_len": "1379", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1958", "ID": "55584", "name": "Pleasant Grove City v. Summum", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-665", "docket": "07-665", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Pleasant Grove City, Utah et al.", "second_party": "Summum", "facts": "Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not \"directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove.\" Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah denied Summum's request for a preliminary injunction.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Summum's injunction request. The Tenth Circuit held that the park was in fact a \"public\" forum, not a non-public forum as the district court had held. Furthermore, Summum demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were to be denied, and the interests of the city did not outweigh this potential harm. The injunction, according to the court, was also not against the public interest.
", "facts_len": "1073", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1959", "ID": "55585", "name": "Shinseki v. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1209", "docket": "07-1209", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Eric Shinseki, Secretary of Veteran Affairs", "second_party": "Woodrow Sanders", "facts": "While serving in the United States army in 1944, Woodrow Sanders had a bazooka explode near him, burning the right side of his face. Sanders also claimed that the explosion had damaged his right eye. However subsequent examinations by Veterans' Affairs (\"VA\") optometrists suggested that the cause of the condition was difficult to determine and was likely due to an infection. When Sanders appeared before the Board of Veterans' Appeals, arguing that the injury was service related and seeking cost-free treatment, the Board denied his claim, finding that the injury was not service related. On appeal to the Veterans Court, Mr. Sanders argued that the VA failed to provide notice as to who was responsible for obtaining the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim, as required by the notice provision of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (\"VCAA\"). The Veterans Court affirmed the Board, basing its decision on the fact that Sanders did not suffer any \"specific prejudice\" due to the VA's failure to notify.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Veterans Court, finding that the VCAA does not require any showing of prejudice. Any failure to notify as required by the Act creates a presumption of prejudice that need not be alleged or proved by the veteran seeking medical assistance.
", "facts_len": "1348", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1960", "ID": "55586", "name": "Wyeth v. Levine", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/06-1249", "docket": "06-1249", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Wyeth, Inc.", "second_party": "Diana Levine", "facts": "Diana Levine filed this personal injury action against Wyeth, the drug manufacturer, in state court in Vermont. Ms. Levine had intravenously injected Phenergan, a drug made by Wyeth and used to prevent allergies and motion sickness, into her arm, and complications arising from the injection eventually led to the amputation of her arm. Ms. Levine brought this claim asserting that Wyeth had failed to include a warning label describing the possible arterial injuries that could occur from negligent injection of the drug. Wyeth argued that because their warning label had been deemed acceptable by the FDA, a federal agency, any Vermont state regulations making the label insufficient were preempted by the federal approval. The Superior Court of Vermont found in favor of Ms. Levine and denied Wyeth's motion for a new trial.
\nThe Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed this ruling on appeal, holding that the FDA requirements merely provide a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. Therefore, states are free to create more stringent labeling requirements than federal law provides.
", "facts_len": "1099", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1961", "ID": "55588", "name": "Crawford v. Nashville and Davidson County, TN", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/06-1595", "docket": "06-1595", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Vicky Crawford", "second_party": "Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee", "facts": "Vicky Crawford, a government employee, took part in an internal investigation regarding sexual harassment claims against another employee. When the investigation concluded, Crawford was fired based on charges of embezzlement and drug use. When these charges were later proven untrue, Crawford filed suit against her employer in federal district court in Tennessee claiming retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on her participation in the investigation. The district court directed a verdict for her employer.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. Once again finding for the employer, the court stated that Crawford's participation in the investigation did not constitute \"opposition\" and her activity in that regard was not \"protected\" as those terms are defined in Title VII, making the Civil Rights Act inapplicable to her claim.
", "facts_len": "945", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1962", "ID": "55587", "name": "Arizona v. Gant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-542", "docket": "07-542", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Rodney Joseph Gant", "facts": "Rodney Gant was apprehended by Arizona state police on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. After the officers handcuffed Gant and placed him in their squad car, they went on to search his vehicle, discovering a handgun and a plastic bag of cocaine. At trial, Gant asked the judge to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle because the search had been conducted without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The judge declined Gant's request, stating that the search was a direct result of Gant's lawful arrest and therefore an exception to the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The court convicted Gant on two counts of cocaine possession.
\nThe Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding the search unconstitutional, and the Arizona Supreme Court agreed. The Supreme Court stated that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement must be justified by concerns for officer safety or evidence preservation. Because Gant left his vehicle voluntarily, the court explained, the search was not directly linked to the arrest and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. In seeking certiorari, Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard argued that the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling conflicted with the Court's precedent, as well as precedents set forth in various federal and state courts.
", "facts_len": "1405", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1963", "ID": "55591", "name": "Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-146", "docket": "08-146", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Arthur Andersen LLP et al.", "second_party": "Wayne Carlisle et al.", "facts": "After Wayne Carlisle and his partners (Carlisle) sold their construction equipment business, they hired multiple consultants in order to set up a tax shelter for the proceeds. The IRS later determined the tax shelter was illegal, but offered amnesty under certain conditions. Carlisle was never informed of these developments and was ultimately required to pay taxes and penalties that exceeded $25 million. Carlisle filed suit in a federal district court against nine parties alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty.
\nBefore trial, one of the defendants motioned to stay the proceedings pending arbitration with Carlisle per a written agreement with Carlisle. Stay was granted. The remaining defendants motioned seeking their own stay arguing that allowing one party to arbitrate with Carlisle and not allowing the rest would be contradictory. The district court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to review the matter. The parties then appealed the denial of jurisdiction. They argued that Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies and makes available a stay of proceedings in order to arbitrate when there is a written agreement that directs litigated issues into arbitration. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA then grants appellate jurisdiction over Section 3 motions.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Section 16(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction in this case. The court recognized that the appellants were not signatories to the arbitration agreement with Carlisle. Thus, it reasoned there was no written agreement that could direct litigated issues into arbitration. Since the appellants' motion to stay was not rooted in Section 3, Section 16(a)(1) did not grant appellate jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1882", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1964", "ID": "55590", "name": "Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1601", "docket": "07-1601", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company", "second_party": "United States et al.", "facts": "The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the State of California's Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) cleaned a parcel of contaminated land at considerable expense. They sued the responsible parties for recovery. A federal district court held the responsible parties (Burlington Northern Rail Road, Santa Fe Railway Company, and Shell Oil Company) liable for only a minor portion of the cleanup costs. The EPA and DTSC jointly appealed.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its liability calculations. It reasoned that the recovery statute employed by the EPA and DTSC imposed strict liability on parties merely partly responsible for contamination. It explained that the statute's intention was to prevent taxpayers from bearing the burden of such cleanup costs.
", "facts_len": "866", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1965", "ID": "55593", "name": "Summers v. Earth Island Institute", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-463", "docket": "07-463", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Priscilla Summers, et al.", "second_party": "Earth Island Institute, et al.", "facts": "Earth Island Institute, along with several other environmental groups, filed suit against the United States Forest Service in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that certain Forest Service regulations violated the Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). The ARA requires the Forest Service to establish an administrative appeals process providing an opportunity for notice and comment. Earth Island brought this claim when, in 2003, the Forest Service issued new regulations greatly limiting notice, appeals and public comment on certain categorically excluded activities. The district court found for the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction against the Forest Service.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that if Congress intended to allow the Forest Service to limit notice, appeals and comment for categorically excluded activities (as the regulations did) it would not have enacted the ARA in the first place. In seeking certiorari, the Forest Service argued that the Ninth Circuit had overstepped its bounds in invalidating the regulations and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit because the case was not yet ripe for judicial review.
", "facts_len": "1298", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1966", "ID": "55589", "name": "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-205", "docket": "08-205", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Citizens United", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.
\nIn an attempt to regulate \"big money\" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to \"electioneering communications.\" Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.
\nCitizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.
\nThe United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors \"might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause,\" but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.
", "facts_len": "1937", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "1967", "ID": "55592", "name": "Vaden v. Discover Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-773", "docket": "07-773", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Betty Vaden", "second_party": "Discover Bank, et al.", "facts": "Discover Bank filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in order to compel arbitration on certain counterclaims brought by Betty Vaden, a card member, in a state court suit against her. Discover had originally brought the state suit to recover on Vaden's outstanding credit card balance, but Vaden counterclaimed that certain fees and interest rates had been charged in violation of state law. The district court held that Vaden's usury claims were preempted by federal law and that the agreement clearly contained a provision compelling arbitration in such cases
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, holding that Discover was the \"real party in interest\" and that Vaden's claims were therefore preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Furthermore, Vaden had failed to overcome the presumption that she received the properly mailed arbitration agreement. Based on these conclusions, the Ninth Circuit granted Discover's motion to compel arbitration.
", "facts_len": "1054", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1968", "ID": "55595", "name": "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Communications", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-512", "docket": "07-512", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Pacific Bell Telephone Co.", "second_party": "LinkLine Communications", "facts": "LinkLine, along with several other internet-service providers (ISPs), sued Pacific Bell, claiming that the company was selling digital subscriber line (DSL) access at \"a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which [it was] providing retail services.\" The ISPs condemned the scheme as price squeezing in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a piece of U.S. antitrust legislation designed to prevent the formation of monopolies. A price squeeze occurs when a company holding a monopoly on the production of certain goods sets its wholesale prices higher than the retail prices it charges directly to consumers, preventing the wholesale customers from competing with it at the retail level. The district court denied Pacific Bell's motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a valid claim but granted its motion for an interlocutory appeal, allowing the appellate court to determine whether such price squeezing claims are permissible before delivering a final judgment at the trial level.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the ISPs had stated a legitimate price squeezing claim under Section 2. The Ninth Circuit argued that prior Supreme Court precedent had not eliminated the application of traditional antitrust laws to partially regulated industries. While noting that the wholesale market is governed by a separate document, the 1934 FCC Act, the court stated that the retail market remains unregulated and is therefore subject to the antitrust laws. As far as the retail market was concerned then, the ISPs had stated a valid price squeezing claim under Section 2.
", "facts_len": "1644", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1969", "ID": "55596", "name": "Bobby v. Bies", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-598", "docket": "08-598", "term": "2008", "first_party": "David Bobby, Warden", "second_party": "Michael Bies", "facts": "In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder and sentenced to death by an Ohio court. In his appeals to the Ohio Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Ohio, Mr. Bies argued that he was mentally retarded and this fact should mitigate his sentence. Both courts affirmed his conviction and sentence, but agreed that he was mentally retarded. While Mr. Bies proceeded with his post-conviction appeals, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Atkins stating that \"death is not a suitable punishment for mentally retarded people.\" He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court relying on Atkins. In response, the state claimed that Mr. Bies was not mentally retarded. Mr. Bies argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the state from relitigating the fact of his mental retardation. The district court agreed and granted Mr. Bies' petition for habeas corpus relief and ordered that he be resentenced.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that the state was prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause from relitigating the Supreme Court of Ohio's determination that Mr. Bies was mentally retarded.
", "facts_len": "1236", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1970", "ID": "55597", "name": "Van de Kamp v. Goldstein", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-854", "docket": "07-854", "term": "2008", "first_party": "John Van de Kamp, et al.", "second_party": "Thomas Lee Goldstein", "facts": "Thomas Lee Goldstein was released on habeas corpus from a California prison in 2004 after serving twenty-four years of a murder sentence. Goldstein then brought suit against the prosecutor and chief deputy from his trial alleging that he had been wrongly convicted. Goldstein argued that he had been prejudiced by the testimony of a jailhouse informant claiming to have heard Goldstein confess to the murder. The informant had stated that he had never, either before or during the trial, received benefits for cooperating with the government; in fact, the informant had worked with the government in the past and was getting reduced sentences in exchange for his testimony. Goldstein's claim alleged that the prosecutor and deputy had failed to fulfill their obligation to ensure that information regarding jailhouse informants was adequately shared among prosecutors. In response, the prosecutors argued that their actions during the trial were immune from suit.
\nThe district court held that the actions were administrative rather than prosecutorial and were therefore not subject to immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, finding that the prosecutor had failed to show the necessary close association with the judicial phase of the trial in order to invoke immunity.
", "facts_len": "1310", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1971", "ID": "55594", "name": "Boyle v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1309", "docket": "07-1309", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Edmund Boyle", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Edmund Boyle was convicted by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, bank burglary, bank burglary conspiracy, and attempted bank burglary. He was sentenced to 151 months imprisonment. Mr. Boyle appealed arguing that the government's case against him was factually contradictory. In his trial, the government charged that the robbery was an act of the Boyle Crew enterprise. However, in a previous case it had charged that the robbery was an act of the New Springfield Boys enterprise. Boyle maintained that this contradiction violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government's case was not factually contradictory. It reasoned that \"[n]othing dictates that a single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working together, each in furtherance of its own interests.\" Thus, the trial court did not violate Boyle's Fifth Amendment due process rights.
", "facts_len": "1045", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1972", "ID": "55599", "name": "Cone v. Bell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1114", "docket": "07-1114", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Gary Bradford Cone", "second_party": "Ricky Bell, Warden", "facts": "This is the third habeas corpus appeal of petitioner Gary Bradford Cone after his 1982 conviction in a Tennessee state court on several felony counts including first degree murder and robbery by use of deadly force. The jury found that Cone had bludgeoned two elderly people to death while hiding out after a robbery. Cone's initial appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court soon following his conviction fell on deaf ears: the court ruled that although errors had been committed during the trial, each of them had been \"harmless\" and did not warrant overturning Cone's conviction. He responded by twice filing habeas corpus petitions alleging violations of several constitutional rights, appealing both all the way up to the Court but both times having his case remanded with, in his view, several of his claims still unresolved.
\nIn his third appearance before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Cone raised two main points of contention. First, he claimed that he was entitled to relief because the jury in his trial had weighed invalid aggravating factors during his sentencing hearing, thereby entitling him to a new hearing. This argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which found that the Tennessee Supreme Court had conducted a satisfactory harmless error test on the issue. The court pointed out that habeas petitions should be granted only after finding that a state court ruling has \"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.\" Because Tennessee had not abridged any federal laws, the Sixth Circuit denied Cone relief on this first issue.
\nCone also argued that the Sixth Circuit had erred when, in a previous appeal, it had held that his claims relating to the prosecutor's improper withholding of evidence had been procedurally defaulted. Cone argued that his case met the Court's \"exceptional circumstances\" test as set out in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski for overruling the procedural default rule and rehearing the issue. The Sixth Circuit once again disagreed, ruling that Cone had failed to show \"cause and prejudice\" on the part of the prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit denied Cone's habeas appeal on all counts.
", "facts_len": "2251", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1973", "ID": "55600", "name": "Montejo v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1529", "docket": "07-1529", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Jesse Jay Montejo", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "In March 2005, Jesse Montejo was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Lewis Ferrari. At his trial, the prosecution submitted as evidence a letter of apology he wrote to the victim's wife. Montejo wrote the letter at the suggestion of a detective who accompanied him in a search for the murder weapon. Before the search, Mr. Montejo was read his Miranda rights and wrote an explanation for his participation in the search. However, no one in the search party knew, including Mr. Montejo, that he had been appointed an attorney the same morning. Mr. Montejo contended under these circumstances that the Sixth Amendment barred the introduction of this evidence since his attorney was not present when he wrote and submitted the letter of apology.
\nThe Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the letter of apology Mr. Montejo wrote was valid evidence. It found that Mr. Montejo waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It explained that when counsel was appointed Mr. Montejo remained mute and did not acknowledge it. The court reasoned that something beyond \"mute acquiescence\" is required to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1167", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1974", "ID": "55598", "name": "Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-588", "docket": "07-588", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Entergy Corp.", "second_party": "Riverkeeper, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Three consolidated cases center around whether or not the EPA surpassed its federal authority by weighing the pros and cons of systems to be used at water intake cooling structures rather than simply employing the most advanced technology available on the market. The claims, brought by environmental groups and corporations, allege that the EPA's cost/benefit analysis violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by leading to the use of structures that were insufficient to protect aquatic organisms from being harmed or killed as required by the CWA.
", "facts_len": "552", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "1975", "ID": "55601", "name": "Herring v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-513", "docket": "07-513", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Bennie Dean Herring", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended Bennie Herring in July of 2004. Upon searching Herring's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. Herring filed a motion to suppress the allegedly \"illegally obtained\" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Herring's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could \"result in appreciable deterrence\" of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that \"as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply.\" The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008.
", "facts_len": "1356", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1976", "ID": "55602", "name": "Altria Group, Inc. v. Good", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-562", "docket": "07-562", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Altria Group, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Stephanie Good et al.", "facts": "A group of cigarette smokers brought this claim against Altria, the cigarette manufacturer, in federal court in Maine. The smokers asserted that Altria's advertisement claiming that its product was \"light\" and had \"lowered tar and nicotine\" constituted misrepresentations under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted summary judgment in favor of Altria on the claim.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, reversed the lower court and found in favor of the plaintiff smokers. The court held that the Maine Act was not preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by a similar federal act, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, and that Altria's assertions did in fact constitute misrepresentations under the Maine Act.
", "facts_len": "831", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1977", "ID": "55605", "name": "Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-869", "docket": "07-869", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Ben Ysursa, Idaho Secretary of State, et al.", "second_party": "Pocatello Education Association, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs in this case are comprised of labor organizations suing officials of the State of Idaho. The organizations claim that Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA) violates their First Amendment free speech rights by restricting their ability to participate in any activities the VCA defines as \"political.\" The State officials conceded the unconstitutionality of many of the VCA's provisions, however they argued for the validity of prohibiting payroll deductions for \"political activities.\" The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho held the payroll deduction provisions constitutional as applied to the state government but unconstitutional when applied to private and local government employees. The State officials appealed, contending that the provisions should be equally applicable to both groups.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the payroll deduction provisions could not be applied to private and local government employees because the State had provided no \"compelling justification\" to do so. Furthermore, the court stated that the officials had failed to show that the case should be reviewed under the more relaxed standard for a \"non-public\" forum.
", "facts_len": "1253", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "1978", "ID": "55604", "name": "Vermont v. Brillon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-88", "docket": "08-88", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Vermont", "second_party": "Michael Brillon", "facts": "In June 2004 after 3 years awaiting trial, Michael Brillon was convicted in a Vermont court for felony domestic assault. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him for lack of a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Vermont agreed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to set aside Mr. Brillon's conviction and dismiss the charges against him.
\nThe court held that Mr. Brillon was not prosecuted within a time frame that satisfied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. It reasoned that the state was not relieved of its duty to provide Mr. Brillon with a speedy trial merely because the public defenders assigned him were mostly responsible for the delay. Rather, it considered the office of the public defender an arm of the state.
", "facts_len": "827", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1979", "ID": "55606", "name": "Bell v. Kelly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1223", "docket": "07-1223", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Edward Nathaniel Bell", "second_party": "Loretta K. Kelly, Warden", "facts": "Edward Bell was convicted and sentenced to death in a Virginia state court for murdering a police sergeant. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through direct review and state habeas proceedings, Bell filed a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Bell argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, suggesting that his lawyer failed to investigate and present evidence from five witnesses that may have reduced his death sentence to life in prison.
\nThe Supreme Court, in Strickland, has previously stated that a petitioner must show (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice in order to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance. Based on these principles, the district court dismissed Bell's claim and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Fourth Circuit found that the conclusions of the Virginia state courts were reasonable and that Bell had failed to show that he had suffered actual prejudice. According to the court, the aggravating testimony from the witnesses outweighed any mitigating effects the missing testimony may have had.
", "facts_len": "1197", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1980", "ID": "55608", "name": "Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., L. L. C.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-453", "docket": "08-453", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York", "second_party": "The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., et al.", "facts": "In 2005, the New York State Attorney General began investigating possible racial discrimination in the real estate lending practices of several national banks. The Attorney General requested that the implicated banks turn over certain non-public information to aid the investigation. The Clearing House Association (CHA), a consortium of national banks including several involved in the investigation, filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court to prevent the Attorney General from continuing his investigation. The CHA argued that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the federal agency charged with overseeing national banks, was appropriately responsible for regulating the banks' compliance with activities that fall under the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore precluded state officials like the Attorney General from doing so. In response, the Attorney General argued that the Federal Housing Act (FHA) provided an exception to the OCC's sole stewardship of the NBA and therefore authorized his investigation. The district court granted the CHA's request for an injunction and stopped the Attorney General's investigation.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the injunction against the Attorney General's investigation, but used the decision in a separate case, filed by the OCC and utilizing different arguments, to do so. Here, the court of appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FHA claim. It reasoned that since the Attorney General had not yet filed any lawsuits against the banks under investigation, the issue of whether the FHA provided an exception to the enforcement of the NBA was not ripe for adjudication.
", "facts_len": "1734", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1981", "ID": "55603", "name": "Abuelhawa v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-192", "docket": "08-192", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Salman Khade Abuelhawa", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2007, a federal district court convicted Salman Khade Abuelhawa in part for unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally using a communications facility (a telephone) in committing, causing, and facilitating a felony (distribution of cocaine) in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 843(b). Mr. Abuelhawa appealed arguing that Section 843(b) does not apply because he purchased cocaine for personal use, which is not a felony.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Abuelhawa's conviction. It reasoned that Mr. Abuelhawa's use of a cell phone facilitated cocaine distribution because his telephone call made the distribution of cocaine \"easier\" for his dealer, which is a felony, thus Section 843(b) properly applies.
", "facts_len": "757", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1982", "ID": "55607", "name": "Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1437", "docket": "07-1437", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Carlsbad Technology, Inc.", "second_party": "HIF Bio, Inc.", "facts": "The purported inventors of an anti-cancer agent, Jong-Wan park and Yang-Sook Chun through HIF Bio Inc., sued Carlsbad Technology, Inc. in a California court for various claims regarding ownership of the invention. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After dismissing the federal claim, it declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state claims and remanded the case back to state court.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the remand order. It reasoned that when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the case, it necessarily found that the claims lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "791", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1983", "ID": "55609", "name": "United States v. Navajo Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1410", "docket": "07-1410", "term": "2008", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Navajo Nation", "facts": "In 1964 the Navajo Nation entered into a contract with Sentry Royalty Company for the mining of coal on its land. The contract called for royalty payments to the Navajo Nation not to exceed 37.5 cents per ton of coal mined. However, the contract allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the royalty rate to a \"reasonable\" level after twenty years. At the end of twenty years, the Navajo Nation was being paid the equivalent of 2 percent of the proceeds from the mining operation. As stipulated by the contract, the Navajo Nation entered into discussions with Peabody Coal Company (formerly Sentry Royalty Company) to adjust the royalty rate. After discussions failed, the Navajo Nation asked the Secretary of the Interior to resolve the dispute. The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reached an initial decision to set the royalty rate at 20 percent. This decision was delayed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior. Unbeknownst to the Navajo Nation, the Secretary had been meeting with executives of the Peabody Coal Company who requested the delay. Facing dire economic circumstances, the Navajo Nation agreed to a royalty rate of 12.5 percent which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
\nIn 1993, the Navajo Nation brought suit against the United States for violations of its statutory and fiduciary duties to the Nation. It sought damages of $600 million. This latest decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents the fifth chapter in the long running saga over the original dispute. Its decision comes in the wake of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims holding, on instructions from the Supreme Court, that the Navajo Nation did not provide sufficient evidence to seek damages from the United States.
\nThe Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the Navajo Nation marshaled sufficient evidence to show that the United States \"controls the leasing of the [Navajo's] coal resources and that the government is responsible for the liabilities arising thereunder.\" It reasoned that the body of regulations and statutes that governed the Nation's resources were \"reasonably amenable\" to an interpretation that imposed liability on the part of the government for breach of its duties.
", "facts_len": "2283", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1984", "ID": "55612", "name": "Haywood v. Drown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-10374", "docket": "07-10374", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Keith Haywood", "second_party": "Curtis Drown, et al.", "facts": "Keith Haywood, while incarcerated at the Attica Correctional Facility in Attica, New York, was charged with several misbehavior reports in 2003 and 2004, including assaulting a corrections officer, failing a urinalysis test, and improperly soliciting mail. After being found guilty of these charges, Haywood commenced actions in state court against two of the corrections officers responsible for reviewing the claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), a federal statute protecting civil rights. He asserted that the guilty verdicts had been handed down without sufficient evidence, that the officers had tampered with the urinalysis test, and that they had conspired to fabricate the facts set forth in the misbehavior reports. The defendants moved to dismiss Haywood's claims, basing their argument on a New York law prohibiting civil claims such as Haywood's brought against corrections officers in their official capacities. Haywood responded by arguing that when Congress created Section 1983 it intended the statute to supersede any state laws contradicting it. Because Section 1983 allowed these claims, Haywood argued, the New York law prohibiting them violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of New York (the state's lowest-level court) agreed with the defendants and dismissed Haywood's claim based on the New York law.
\nThe Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, finding that the Supremacy Clause permits states to deny enforcement of a federal right in a case where a state court lacks jurisdiction due to a neutral state rule regarding the courts' administration. Because Haywood's claim would be barred if brought under either Section 1983 or an applicable state law, the New York law barring the claim was valid and neutral and did not violate the Supremacy Clause.
", "facts_len": "1859", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1985", "ID": "55610", "name": "Yeager v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-67", "docket": "08-67", "term": "2008", "first_party": "F. Scott Yeager", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In July 2005, a jury in a federal district court acquitted F. Scott Yeager of conspiracy, wire fraud, and security fraud, but hung on 20 counts of insider trading and 99 counts of money laundering in relation to his involvement with Enron Broadband Services. The district court declared a mistrial on the counts the jury hung on. Thereafter, the United States again indicted Mr. Yeager on a portion of the mistried counts. On interlocutory appeal, Mr. Yeager argued that in acquitting him of securities fraud, the jury \"necessarily found that he did not have insider information\", and therefore collateral estopple prevents the government from retrying him for insider trading and money laundering.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial in Mr. Yeager's case. It recognized that Mr. Yeager had the burden of proving the jury necessarily found that he was not guilty of insider trading. He did not, as a jury that found him not guilty of insider trading and \"acting rationally\" would have acquitted him of insider trading and money laundering. The court reasoned that because it was unclear the jury's rationale for its decisions, Mr. Yeager's mistried counts did not prevent his retrial on those counts.
", "facts_len": "1287", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1986", "ID": "55613", "name": "Rivera v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-9995", "docket": "07-9995", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Michael Rivera", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "In 1998, Michael Rivera was convicted in an Illinois court on two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to 85 years in prison. Before the trial, Mr. Rivera's attorney moved to dismiss a potential juror. The judge did not allow it deeming the motion discriminatory towards the juror. On appeal after his conviction, Mr. Rivera argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the pre-trial motion and thus his conviction should be reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to specify how the motion was discriminatory. After the trial court found that gender discrimination was at issue, the Illinois Supreme Court continued its review.
\nIt held that Mr. Rivera was improperly denied his pre-trial motion to dismiss the juror. It reasoned that there was no evidence Mr. Rivera's attorney aimed to dismiss the juror because of her gender. However, it also found that this was harmless error. It explained that there was no evidence that indicated Mr. Rivera was tried before a biased jury because of the improperly dismissed motion. Thus, Mr. Rivera's conviction should stand.
", "facts_len": "1144", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1987", "ID": "55611", "name": "Knowles v. Mirzayance", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-1315", "docket": "07-1315", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Michael A. Knowles, Warden", "second_party": "Alexandre Mirzayance", "facts": "Alexandre Mirzayance was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court. He was subsequently denied post-conviction relief by the trial court and the California Court of Appeals. Mr. Mirzayance then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. He maintained that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because at trial, his attorney advised him to abandon his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). The federal district court denied Mr. Mirzayance's petition, but was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ordered an evidentiary hearing limited to determining whether \"there were tactical reasons for abandoning the defense.\"
\nAt the hearing, the Magistrate Judge found that Mr. Mirzayance's counsel had \"nothing to lose\" by going forward with the NGI plea and thus found his performance ineffective. The federal district court accepted this finding and granted Mr. Mirzayance's petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's advice to withdraw his NGI plea was unreasonable because there was \"reasonable probability\" the jury would find Mr. Mirzayance insane. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin. On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision stating that Mr. Mirzayance's attorney's failure to pursue the NGI defense constituted ineffective counsel because it \"secured no tactical advantage.\"
", "facts_len": "1620", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1988", "ID": "55614", "name": "Nken v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-681", "docket": "08-681", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Jean Marc Nken", "second_party": "Eric Holder, Attorney General", "facts": "The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denied Jean Marc Nken's petition to reopen his case regarding his deportation. He appealed arguing that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion and should have used its sua sponte power to reopen his proceedings. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its discretion. It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Mr. Nken's claim that the Board failed to use its sua sponte power in order to reopen his case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Mr. Nken's motion for a stay of his removal until further proceeding by the Court.
", "facts_len": "663", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1989", "ID": "55615", "name": "Oregon v. Ice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-901", "docket": "07-901", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Oregon", "second_party": "Thomas Eugene Ice", "facts": "Thomas Eugene Ice was convicted in state court in Oregon on two counts of first-degree burglary with intent to commit sexual abuse, as well as two counts of first-degree sexual abuse committed during those burglaries. Over Ice's objection, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences based on its own findings of fact. Ice appealed, raising the question whether the Oregon or U.S. Constitutions require a jury, rather than a judge, to make the factual findings upon which a court decides to prescribe consecutive sentences.
\nThe Oregon Court of Appeals held that the consecutive sentences were not in violation of the State's Constitution because none of the factual issues reviewed by the judge were an \"element\" of the crime. However, the sentences did violate the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the factual findings were not made by a jury but were used to increase Ice's punishment to more than what the jury had imposed.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1990", "ID": "55616", "name": "United States v. Denedo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-267", "docket": "08-267", "term": "2008", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jacob Denedo", "facts": "In July 1998, a United States Navy court-martial tried Jacob Denedo on counts of conspiracy, larceny, and forgery. In exchange for his guilty plea, Mr. Denedo was offered a reduced sentence that included three months of confinement, a demotion, and a bad-conduct discharge. Eight years later, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services began proceedings to deport Mr. Denedo, a Nigerian immigrant and lawful permanent resident of the United States, based on his court-martial conviction. In light of these developments, Mr. Denedo filed a petition with the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals for extraordinary relief and requested review of his court-martial and a writ of error coram nobis in order to achieve his pre-conviction state. He argued that his counsel at the court-martial was ineffective because he had specifically stated during the proceeding that \"his primary concern and objective\" was \"to avoid the risk of deportation\" and was less concerned about the amount of time he spent in prison. At the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, the government motioned to dismiss Mr. Denedo's petition on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The court disagreed and found it had jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. Section 1651 - the All Writs Act. It then denied Mr. Denedo's petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to review the petition, but remanded the matter to the Court of Criminal Appeals for further fact finding in order to determine whether Mr. Denedo's counsel was deficient.
", "facts_len": "1651", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "1991", "ID": "55617", "name": "Nelson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-5657", "docket": "08-5657", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Lawrence W. Nelson, aka Zikee", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Lawrence Nelson was convicted in a federal district court of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine and sentenced to 360 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Nelson argued that the district court erred in presuming the United States Sentencing Guidelines were reasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated Mr. Nelson's sentence, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit in consideration of its decision in Rita v. United States. On remand, the Fourth Circuit once again affirmed Mr. Nelson's sentence, reasoning that the district court did not treat the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory.
", "facts_len": "773", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1992", "ID": "55619", "name": "District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/08-6", "docket": "08-6", "term": "2008", "first_party": "District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District, et al.", "second_party": "William G. Osborne", "facts": "In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence.
\nThe district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would \"affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent\" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post-conviction relief.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a \"reasonable probability\" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession.
", "facts_len": "1843", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1993", "ID": "55622", "name": "Holland v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-5327", "docket": "09-5327", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Albert Holland", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "A Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely.
\nOn appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "1994", "ID": "55621", "name": "Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1151", "docket": "08-1151", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.", "second_party": "Florida Department of Environmental Protection, et al.", "facts": "In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (\"BSPA\") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. (\"SBR\"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.
\nOn appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was \"on its face\" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.
", "facts_len": "972", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "1995", "ID": "55623", "name": "Astrue v. Ratliff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1322", "docket": "08-1322", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security", "second_party": "Catherine G. Ratliff", "facts": "Catherine Ratliff was the attorney for Ruby Kills Ree in her successful suit against the Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The district court also granted Kills Ree\u2019s motion for an award of attorney\u2019s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Before paying the fee award, the government discovered that Kills Ree owed the government a debt that predated the fee award and accordingly sought to offset the fee award against the debt. Ratliff then intervened in the case to challenge the offset and argued that the fee award belonged to her and therefore could not be used to offset Kills Ree\u2019s debt. The district court held that the offset was proper because the fee award goes to the \u201cprevailing party,\u201d not directly to the attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that precedent established that EAJA fee awards go to the attorney.
", "facts_len": "912", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "1996", "ID": "55618", "name": "Hedgpeth v. Pulido", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2008/07-544", "docket": "07-544", "term": "2008", "first_party": "Anthony Hedgpeth, Warden", "second_party": "Michael Robert Pulido", "facts": "Michael Pulido was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court for his involvement in the shooting of a gas station attendant during the course of a robbery. He claimed that he was only involved in the robbery after the shooting had taken place. On appeal, Mr. Pulido argued that the jury instructions were in error and allowed a jury to convict him as an accomplice in the robbery and murder, even if he only took part in the robbery. The California Supreme Court refused to overturn the conviction holding that the error was harmless because the jury had specifically found that Mr. Pulido aided the robbery during the murder.
\nMr. Pulido sought and was granted habeas relief by a federal district court in California. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which was legally improper, was \"structural error\" entitling Mr. Pulido to automatic relief and exempted the instructions from \"harmless-error\" review.
", "facts_len": "1042", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1997", "ID": "55624", "name": "United States v. Comstock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1224", "docket": "08-1224", "term": "2009", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Graydon Earl Comstock, Jr., et al.", "facts": "Convicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. A North Carolina federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of \"sexual dangerousness,\" and the government need not even allege that this \"dangerousness\" violated any federal law.
", "facts_len": "561", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "1998", "ID": "55625", "name": "Dillon v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-6338", "docket": "09-6338", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Percy Dillon", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A Pennsylvania federal district court convicted Percy Dillon for conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of cocaine base, use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to retroactively reduce the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. Mr. Dillon then moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with the new guidelines. The district court reduced Mr. Dillon's sentence by two levels, but held that it lacked the authority to reduce his sentence further. On appeal, Mr. Dillon argued that in light of United States v. Booker the district court had the authority to further reduce his sentence. Moreover, he argued that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score when determining his sentencing.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Booker did not allow a district court, when reducing a previously imposed sentence, to treat the amended guidelines' range as advisory. Moreover, the court rejected Mr. Dillon's argument that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score, reasoning that the district court had no authority to reconsider its prior criminal history determination.
", "facts_len": "1410", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "1999", "ID": "55626", "name": "Bloate v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-728", "docket": "08-728", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Taylor James Bloate", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Taylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within \"70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later.\" However, it excludes \"any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant.\" Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its calculation.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that \"pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose\" and that two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act.
", "facts_len": "1190", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2000", "ID": "55628", "name": "Bilski v. Kappos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-964", "docket": "08-964", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw", "second_party": "David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office", "facts": "Applicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that an invention is patentable if: \"1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.\" Reasoning from this, it held that the applicants' invention clearly failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.
", "facts_len": "803", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2001", "ID": "55627", "name": "Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1498", "docket": "08-1498", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.", "second_party": "Humanitarian Law Project, et al.", "facts": "Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party (\"KWP\") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (\"LTTE\"). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\"). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a \"foreign terrorist organization.\" Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide \"material support or resources\" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (\"IRTPA\") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals \"knowingly\" provide \"material support or resources\" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted \"material support or resources.\" The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms \"service,\" \"training,\" or \"other specialized knowledge\" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague.
", "facts_len": "1549", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2002", "ID": "55632", "name": "South Carolina v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/138-orig", "docket": "138-orig", "term": "2009", "first_party": "South Carolina", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "This case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina's motion for clarification of the Special Master's order.
", "facts_len": "459", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2003", "ID": "55630", "name": "Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-604", "docket": "08-604", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Union Pacific Railroad Company", "second_party": "Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region", "facts": "The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes \u2013 a prerequisite to arbitration \u2013 though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.
", "facts_len": "1064", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2004", "ID": "55631", "name": "Pottawattamie County v. McGhee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1065", "docket": "08-1065", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Pottawattamie County, Iowa, et al.", "second_party": "Curtis W. McGhee, Jr., et al.", "facts": "In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.
\nThe Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricated evidence did not fall within \"a distinctly prosecutorial function\" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims.
", "facts_len": "1269", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2005", "ID": "55633", "name": "Health Care Service Corp. v. Pollitt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-38", "docket": "09-38", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Health Care Service Corp", "second_party": "Juli Pollitt", "facts": "Juli Pollitt sued Health Care Service Corp. (\"HCSC\") in an Illinois state court for \"bad-faith conduct\" and HCSC removed the case to an Illinois federal district court. Ms. Pollitt is a federal employee and receives health insurance as one of her job's fringe benefits. HCSC manages her plan. In 2007, HCSC stopped paying claims submitted on behalf of Ms. Pollitt's son because the Department of Labor told HCSC that Ms. Pollitt's health coverage was for herself only and not her family. The district court dismissed, holding that her claim was preempted by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (\"FEHB\").
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court. The court held that removal was inappropriate. The court reasoned that preemption is a defense, and \"a federal defense does not allow removal.\" However, it recognized that where a claim is completely preempted by federal law, removal is appropriate. Here, because federal law does not completely occupy the entire field of health-insurance coverage for federal workers, Ms. Pollitt's claim did not \"arise under\" federal law such that it could be removed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441. Instead, the court stated the only other source of removal is 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), which says that \"any person acting under\" a federal officer may remove a suit that depends on the defendant's following the directions issued by a federal officer. Here, the court reasoned that because a dispute existed about whether HCSC was acting on its own or under the direction of the Department of Labor, the case should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. That court should receive evidence and make appropriate findings to determine whether it should either retain or remand the case to state court, as the facts require.
", "facts_len": "1890", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2006", "ID": "55629", "name": "Samantar v. Yousuf", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1555", "docket": "08-1555", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mohamed Ali Samantar", "second_party": "Bashe Abdi Yousuf, et al.", "facts": "Natives of Somalia filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in a Virginia federal district court under the Torture Victim Protection Act (\"TVPA\") and the Alien Tort Statute (\"ATS\"). Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Samantar committed torture and other human rights violations while he commanded Somali government agents under the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Mr. Samantar was immune to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA\").
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the FSIA did not render Mr. Samantar immune to suit. The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to foreign government officials. The court further reasoned that even if the FSIA does apply to foreign government officials, it does not apply to former foreign government officials.
", "facts_len": "873", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2007", "ID": "55634", "name": "Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-475", "docket": "09-475", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Monsanto Co., et al.", "second_party": "Geerston Seed Farms, et al.", "facts": "Geertson Seed Farms (\"Geertson\") and Trask Family Seeds (\"Trask\") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company (\"Monsanto\") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask feared that the wide-scale sale of a new Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement (\"EIS\") about the effect of Monsanto's new alfalfa variety.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction.
", "facts_len": "783", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2008", "ID": "55636", "name": "Graham v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-7412", "docket": "08-7412", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Terrance Jamar Graham", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
", "facts_len": "719", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2009", "ID": "55635", "name": "Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-103", "docket": "08-103", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Irvin Muchnick, et al.", "facts": "A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.
", "facts_len": "856", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2010", "ID": "55639", "name": "Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-497", "docket": "09-497", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Rent-A-Center West, Inc.", "second_party": "Antonio Jackson", "facts": "Antonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and discovery provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.
", "facts_len": "544", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2011", "ID": "55640", "name": "New Process Steel v. NLRB", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1457", "docket": "08-1457", "term": "2009", "first_party": "New Process Steel", "second_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "facts": "The union representing employees at a New Process Steel plant in Butler, Indiana failed to reach an agreement over a new contract with New Process Steel. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board (\"NLRB\") arguing that New Process Steel failed to honor its collective bargaining agreement to deal with the union as the exclusive representative of employees of the plant. A two-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the union. On appeal, New Process Steel argued that the NLRB's decision was invalid because 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 153(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that three members of the five member National Labor Relations Board shall \"at all times\" constitute a quorum.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the board. The court held that the NLRB had power to delegate its authority to a group of three of its members. In which case, two sitting members constituted a quorum. Therefore, the NLRB appropriately rendered its decision.
", "facts_len": "1066", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2012", "ID": "55642", "name": "Bobby v. Van Hook", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-144", "docket": "09-144", "term": "2009", "first_party": "David Bobby, Warden", "second_party": "Robert J. Van Hook", "facts": "An Ohio state court convicted Robert J. Van Hook for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, and imposed a death sentence. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Van Hook filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court. After numerous appeals and remands, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Van Hook relief, holding that Mr. Van Hook's lawyers performed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing.
", "facts_len": "500", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2013", "ID": "55637", "name": "Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1119", "docket": "08-1119", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code (\"Code\"), \"debt relief agency,\" and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of \"debt relief agency\" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide \"bankruptcy assistance\" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of \"debt relief agency.\" However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1185", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2014", "ID": "55641", "name": "NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-674", "docket": "08-674", "term": "2009", "first_party": "NRG Power Marketing LLC et al.", "second_party": "Maine Public Utilities Commission et al.", "facts": "The Maine Public Utilities Commission along with the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts filed for petitions of review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC approved a settlement and redesigned New England's \"capacity\" electricity market, which Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts were subject to, even though they were not parties to the settlement. FERC denied their request for rehearing.
\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts argued that FERC erred in finding that \"transition payments\" under the settlement should be reviewed under the \"public interest\" standard as dictated by Mobile-Sierra rather than the \"just and reasonable\" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should not apply to non-parties to the settlement agreement. It reasoned that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is premised on the existence of a \"voluntary contract\" between the parties. Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts never entered a voluntary agreement with FERC and therefore the standard was inappropriate.
", "facts_len": "1192", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2015", "ID": "55647", "name": "Wilkins v. Gaddy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-10914", "docket": "08-10914", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jamey Wilkins", "second_party": "Officer Gaddy", "facts": "In 2008, Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court. Without the aid of an attorney, he alleged that he was \"maliciously and sadistically\" assaulted \"[w]ithout any provocation\" by a corrections officer. Mr. Wilkins claimed that as a result of the assault he sustained heel and lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches and dizziness, depression, panic attacks, and nightmares of the assault. The district court, on its own motion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In a motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prove fatal to his claim. The district court denied Mr. Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2016", "ID": "55646", "name": "United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1134", "docket": "08-1134", "term": "2009", "first_party": "United Student Aid Funds Inc.", "second_party": "Francisco J. Espinosa", "facts": "Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (\"Funds\"). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can show \"undue hardship.\" This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. Espinosa failed to comply with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1805", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2017", "ID": "55645", "name": "Florida v. Powell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1175", "docket": "08-1175", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Kevin Dewayne Powell", "facts": "Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to \"talk with an attorney\" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.
", "facts_len": "622", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2018", "ID": "55643", "name": "Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-223", "docket": "09-223", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio", "second_party": "Commerce Energy, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.
\nThe Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted Hibbs v. Winn to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed.
", "facts_len": "1423", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2019", "ID": "55648", "name": "Perdue v. Kenny A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-970", "docket": "08-970", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al.", "second_party": "Kenny A., By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al.", "facts": "In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that \"the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee\" and thus justified the enhancement.
\nOn appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results.
", "facts_len": "1405", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2020", "ID": "55649", "name": "Morrison v. National Australia Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1191", "docket": "08-1191", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Robert Morrison, et al.", "second_party": "National Australia Bank Ltd., et al.", "facts": "In 1998 National Australia Bank (NAB), an Australian company, acquired Homeside Lending Inc. (Homeside), an American company. In 2001, NAB announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for inaccurately calculating the fees Homeside would generate for servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets. Its stock price then dropped 5 percent. Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion to amend for other inaccurate calculations that had been booked as present assets. NAB's stock price tumbled an additional 13 percent. Subsequently, four owners of NAB stock filed suit against NAB and Homeside in a New York federal district court alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Three of the plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American purchasers.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims only \"if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad.\" Here, the court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent statements from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, (2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the information along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1865", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2021", "ID": "55644", "name": "Briscoe v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/07-11191", "docket": "07-11191", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mark A. Briscoe and Sheldon A. Cypress", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "This appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial.
", "facts_len": "834", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2022", "ID": "55650", "name": "Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-240", "docket": "08-240", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mac's Shell Service et al.", "second_party": "Shell Oil Products Co. et al.", "facts": "Gas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that new leases that changed the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to \"constructive nonrenewal,\" prohibited by the PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.
", "facts_len": "872", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2023", "ID": "55652", "name": "Alabama v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/132-orig", "docket": "132-orig", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Alabama", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "Several states belonging to the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact (\"Compact\") and the commission created by the compact (\"Commission\") filed suit against North Carolina. The plaintiffs allege that North Carolina was designated as a host state for a waste management facility, accepted $80 million to build the facility, but then declined to fund, license, build, and operate it. The plaintiffs seek to recover the $80 million, a $10 million sanction, and attorneys' fees.
\nThe Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special Master who conducted proceedings and filed two reports. The Preliminary Report recommended denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Count I which sought enforcement of sanctions against North Carolina; granting North Carolina's motion to dismiss Count I; and denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss Counts II-V. The Special Master's Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Counts III-V. The parties then filed a total of nine exceptions to the Special Master's Reports.
", "facts_len": "1294", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2024", "ID": "55654", "name": "Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1198", "docket": "08-1198", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Stolt-Nielsen S.A., et al.", "second_party": "AnimalFeeds International Corp.", "facts": "AnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a \"global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services.\" After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts.
", "facts_len": "1437", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2025", "ID": "55655", "name": "Salazar v. Buono", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-472", "docket": "08-472", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al.", "second_party": "Frank Buono", "facts": "In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered.
\nWhile the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment.
", "facts_len": "1551", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2026", "ID": "55651", "name": "Jefferson v. Upton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-8852", "docket": "09-8852", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Lawrence Joseph Jefferson", "second_party": "Stephen Upton, Warden", "facts": "A Georgia state court convicted Lawrence Jefferson of murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal at the state and then federal court level, Mr. Jefferson argued that his lawyers were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury that he suffered as a child. On appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, it accepted the state court's factual findings and affirmed Mr. Jefferson's conviction and sentence.
", "facts_len": "470", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2027", "ID": "55656", "name": "Smith v. Spisak", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-724", "docket": "08-724", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Kevin Smith, Warden", "second_party": "Frank G. Spisak, Jr.", "facts": "Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Musladin and Landrigan.
\nOn remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.
", "facts_len": "1103", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2028", "ID": "55658", "name": "Padilla v. Kentucky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-651", "docket": "08-651", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jose Padilla", "second_party": "Kentucky", "facts": "Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
\nOn appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.
", "facts_len": "1083", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2029", "ID": "55657", "name": "Hamilton v. Lanning", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-998", "docket": "08-998", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jan Hamilton, Chapter 13 Trustee", "second_party": "Stephanie Kay Lanning", "facts": "A Kansas federal bankruptcy court denied objections to a Chapter 13 debtor's repayment plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's \"projected disposable income\" is presumed to be the debtor's current monthly income. However, the court stated that the calculation is subject to a showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor had shown there was a substantial change in her circumstances.
", "facts_len": "684", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2030", "ID": "55660", "name": "Thaler v. Haynes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-273", "docket": "09-273", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice", "second_party": "Anthony Cardell Haynes", "facts": "Anthony Cardell Haynes was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer. The state sought the death penalty. During voir dire, two separate judges presided at different stages. One judge presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually, the other judge presided when preemptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Mr. Thaler's attorney made a Batson objection -- arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The judge, who was not present during jury interviews, found that the strike was race neutral and denied the Batson objection. The case proceeded to trial and Mr. Haynes was convicted and sentenced to death.
\nOn appeal, Mr. Haynes argued that \"a trial judge who did not witness the actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a Batson challenge.\" The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. Mr. Haynes then filed for and was denied habeas corpus relief by a Texas federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted review. It held that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its decision and Mr. Haynes warranted federal habeas corpus relief.
", "facts_len": "1356", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2031", "ID": "55661", "name": "Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-60", "docket": "09-60", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo", "second_party": "Eric Holder, Attorney General", "facts": "Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo was admitted to the United States in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2004, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. One year later, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of Xanax, but was not tried as a recidivist. In 2006, Mr. Carachuri was notified that he was removable from the United States. He applied for removal cancellation, which was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Carachuri was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that because Mr. Carachuri's second drug conviction could have been punished as a felony under the Controlled Substances Abuse Act, had he been prosecuted in federal court, the conviction qualified as an \"aggravated felony\" making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
", "facts_len": "918", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2032", "ID": "55662", "name": "Beard v. Kindler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-992", "docket": "08-992", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.", "second_party": "Joseph Kindler", "facts": "Joseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post-conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
\nIn 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an \"independent and adequate\" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in Doctor v. Walters, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review.
", "facts_len": "1302", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2033", "ID": "55659", "name": "Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-586", "docket": "08-586", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jerry N. Jones, et al.", "second_party": "Harris Associates L.P.", "facts": "Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees.
", "facts_len": "714", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2034", "ID": "55663", "name": "United States v. Marcus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1341", "docket": "08-1341", "term": "2009", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Glenn Marcus", "facts": "A New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (\"TVPA\"). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a \"plain-error\" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause.
", "facts_len": "1011", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2035", "ID": "55664", "name": "Black v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-876", "docket": "08-876", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Conrad M. Black, John A. Boultbee, and Mark S. Kipnis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Four former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders \"of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger,\" and if the objective of the scheme was \"private gain.\" On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was \"private gain,\" the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their \"private gain\" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits.
", "facts_len": "1532", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2036", "ID": "55665", "name": "Magwood v. Patterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-158", "docket": "09-158", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Billy Joe Magwood", "second_party": "Tony Patterson, Warden, et al.", "facts": "An Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the federal district court arguing that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. Magwood's death sentence.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position.
", "facts_len": "1126", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2037", "ID": "55667", "name": "Porter v. McCollum", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-10537", "docket": "08-10537", "term": "2009", "first_party": "George Porter", "second_party": "Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, et al.", "facts": "A Florida state court convicted George Porter of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Porter filed for habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his attorney's failure to bring forward evidence about his war record and how it left him a changed man violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. The district court agreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Mr. Porter was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel was a reasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.
", "facts_len": "719", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2038", "ID": "55666", "name": "United States v. Stevens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-769", "docket": "08-769", "term": "2009", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Robert J. Stevens", "facts": "Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for \"knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain.\" His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.
", "facts_len": "835", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2039", "ID": "55668", "name": "United States v. O'Brien", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1569", "docket": "08-1569", "term": "2009", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess", "facts": "A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury \"beyond a reasonable doubt.\"
", "facts_len": "769", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2040", "ID": "55671", "name": "Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-448", "docket": "09-448", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Bridget Hardt", "second_party": "Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.", "facts": "A Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance (\"Reliance\"). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees.
\nOn appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a \"prevailing party\" as understood by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an award of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage.
", "facts_len": "1060", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2041", "ID": "55673", "name": "Wood v. Allen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-9156", "docket": "08-9156", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Holly Wood", "second_party": "Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "In 1994, Holly Wood was convicted in an Alabama state court of capital murder during a first-degree burglary and sentenced to death. Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Wood subsequently filed for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing that he was mentally retarded and thus not eligible for a death sentence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Rule 32 court disagreed and denied his petition. Mr. Wood then filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Alabama federal district court. The district court granted relief, agreeing that Mr. Wood's counsel was ineffective at sentencing because they failed to present evidence of Mr. Wood's deficient intellectual deficiencies.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that Mr. Wood's counsel was not ineffective. The court reasoned that Mr. Wood's attorneys acted reasonably when they decided it was in Mr. Wood's best interest to leave out information that illustrated his mental deficiencies. Moreover, the court recognized that while Mr. Wood's counsel included an inexperienced attorney, he merely acted as an assistant to the two experienced attorneys chiefly responsible for the case.
", "facts_len": "1319", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2042", "ID": "55672", "name": "Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-678", "docket": "08-678", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mohawk Industries, Inc.", "second_party": "Norman Carpenter", "facts": "In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants.
\nBefore trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney-client privilege did not qualify for exception.
", "facts_len": "1468", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2043", "ID": "55674", "name": "Barber v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-5201", "docket": "09-5201", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Michael Gary Barber, et al.", "second_party": "J. E. Thomas, Warden", "facts": "Michael Barber petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a federal district court. Mr. Barber argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inaccurately calculated his good time credit toward the service of his federal sentence. The good time credit statute provides that a prisoner \"may receive credit toward the service of his sentence\u2026 of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term.\" Mr. Barber argued that the BOP should calculate good time credit based on the sentence imposed rather than the time an inmate has actually served in prison. The district court denied his petition.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing its decision in Tablada v. Daniels as controlling. There, the court held upheld the BOP's method for calculating good time credit. The court had reasoned that the good time credit statute was ambiguous and the BOP's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2044", "ID": "55675", "name": "Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-337", "docket": "09-337", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Wanda Krupski", "second_party": "Costa Crociere, S.p.A.", "facts": "In 2007, Wanda Krupski booked a trip with Costa Cruise Lines. On February 21 while on the trip, Ms. Krupski allegedly tripped over a loose cable and broker her femur. She filed suit in a Florida federal district court against Costa Cruise Lines. One year and four days after her alleged injury, Costa Cruise Lines informed Ms. Krupski that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the carrier, Costa Crociere. The district court allowed Ms. Krupski to amend her complaint to include Costa Crociere and dismissed the action against Costa Cruise Lines. Costa Crociere then moved for summary judgment arguing the ticket sold to Ms. Krupski stipulated that suits must be filed against it within one year of the alleged injury. Therefore, Ms. Krupski was out of time. The district court agreed and granted Costa Crociere's motion for summary judgment.
\nOn appeal, Ms. Krupski argued that her amended complaint against Costa Crociere related back to her original filing and thus should be considered timely filed against Costa Crociere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. The court held that her amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint. The court reasoned that Ms. Krupski was aware that Costa Crociere was the carrier all along. Thus, to relate her amended complaint back to the original complaint was not the sort of mistaken identity correction contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(c)(1)(C).
", "facts_len": "1518", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2045", "ID": "55677", "name": "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1553", "docket": "08-1553", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "Regal-Beloit Corporation, et al.", "facts": "Shippers sued the ocean carrier and rail carrier it used to ship products from China to the United States in a California state court to recover for damages. During the transport of the shippers' products, a train derailed damaging the products. The case was removed to a California federal district court only to be dismissed. The district court held that the contracts between the parties did not cover claims for cargo damage.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis. The court reasoned that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (\"COGSA\") does not govern the inland transport of goods, unless the parties opted out of coverage by the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act. The Carmack Amendment governs damage claims against motor and rail carriers, and narrowly limits the venues in which such suits can be brought. Because the district court did not consider whether the parties opted out of the COGSA by the Carmack Amendment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that determination.
", "facts_len": "1080", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2046", "ID": "55676", "name": "Sullivan v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-7621", "docket": "08-7621", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Joe Harris Sullivan", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "When Joe Sullivan was 13 years old, he was convicted of sexual battery by a Florida state court and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Mr. Sullivan argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual and thus violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Sullivan's sentence without comment.
", "facts_len": "397", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2047", "ID": "55681", "name": "Hemi Group LLC v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-969", "docket": "08-969", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Hemi Group, LLC and Kai Gachupin", "second_party": "City of New York", "facts": "The City of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the \"causation\" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO \"causation\" requirements and thus maintained a cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's \"business or property.\"
", "facts_len": "964", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2048", "ID": "55682", "name": "Hui v. Castaneda", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1529", "docket": "08-1529", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Esther Hui, et al.", "second_party": "Yanira Castaneda, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Francisco Castaneda, et al.", "facts": "These cases involve malpractice suits against Public Health Service (\"PHS\") employees. The plaintiffs filed actions recognized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in a California federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The PHS sought a dismissal arguing that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) preempted Bivens claims. The district court rejected the argument and denied the motion to dismiss.
\nOn appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that FTCA did not preempt Bivens claims. The court reasoned that the FTCA was enacted six months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens and, thus, could not have been intended as a substitute.
", "facts_len": "769", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2049", "ID": "55683", "name": "Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1008", "docket": "08-1008", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.", "second_party": "Allstate Insurance Co.", "facts": "Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure which instruct that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by statute. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim.
\nOn appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did not control.
", "facts_len": "1098", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2050", "ID": "55687", "name": "Wong v. Belmontes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1263", "docket": "08-1263", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Wong", "second_party": "Belmontes", "facts": "A California state court convicted Fernando Belmontes of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Belmontes filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court arguing that at sentencing his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. The district court denied the petition.
\nOn appeal, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Belmontes did suffer ineffective counsel at sentencing. The court reasoned that Mr. Belmontes' attorney failed to prepare and present sufficient evidence to humanize Mr. Belmontes that may have mitigated his sentence.
", "facts_len": "696", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2051", "ID": "55684", "name": "Dolan v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-367", "docket": "09-367", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Brian Russell Dolan", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Brian Russell Dolan pleaded guilty to assault resulting in bodily harm in the New Mexico federal district court. He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered to pay the victim $250 per month in restitution. Mr. Dolan appealed arguing that because the district court failed to award restitution within ninety days of Mr. Dolan's sentencing, the district court lacked the authority to do so.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that the time limits established by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are not jurisdictional and, thus, the district court's tardiness in entering the order does not relieve the defendant of his obligation to pay.
", "facts_len": "729", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2052", "ID": "55685", "name": "Conkright v. Frommert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-810", "docket": "08-810", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Sally L. Conkright, et al.", "second_party": "Paul J. Frommert, et al.", "facts": "Current and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (\"ERISA\"). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been paid a lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable.
", "facts_len": "827", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2053", "ID": "55686", "name": "Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-304", "docket": "08-304", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al.", "second_party": "United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson", "facts": "In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (\"EWPP\"). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.
", "facts_len": "1359", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2054", "ID": "55688", "name": "McDaniel v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-559", "docket": "08-559", "term": "2009", "first_party": "E. K. McDaniel, Warden, et al.", "second_party": "Troy Brown", "facts": "On January 29, 1994, around 1:00 a.m., nine-year-old Jane Doe was raped in the bedroom of her trailer in Carlin, Nevada. Troy Brown and his brother Travis lived in the same trailer park as Jane Doe. Their brother Trent and his wife lived in a trailer across the street from Jane Doe's trailer. Both Troy and Trent were acquainted with Jane Doe's family, but Jane did not know Travis.
\nThat night, Troy drank at least ten shots of vodka followed by beer chasers; he was so drunk that he vomited on himself after leaving a bar at 12:15 a.m. Two witnesses saw a man stumbling between the Browns' trailer and that of Jane Doe's family around 1:00 a.m. Jane Doe called her mother to report the rape at approximately 1:00 a.m.; according to Troy, he returned to his trailer from the bar at approximately 1:30 a.m, theoretically giving him enough time to assault Jane Doe.
\nTroy Brown was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child, attempted murder, and abuse and neglect of a child resulting in substantial mental harm.
\nThere was a large amount of conflicting evidence drawn from Jane Doe's testimony and from the crime scene itself. Most relevantly, the state's expert tested semen taken from Jane Doe's underwear. She determined that the DNA matched Troy's and testified that the probability it belonged to another person from the general population was 1 in 3,000,000. Troy Brown's family tested the semen independently and found a random match probability of 1 in 10,000, but this was not introduced into evidence at trial. The jury found Troy Brown guilty of sexual assault and abuse and neglect of a child and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years.
\nOn appeal, Brown argued that double jeopardy barred the duplication of sexual assault charges, that the DNA evidence was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the charge for abuse and neglect and remanded to the trial court for sentencing. The trial court again sentenced Brown to life in prison. His petition for post-conviction relief was denied.
\nOn appeal to the district court, Brown claimed that the state's evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, using the habeas corpus review developed by the Court in Jackson v. Virginia. Brown submitted a report prepared by Laurence Mueller, a professor in ecology and evolutionary biology (\"Mueller report\"). The Mueller Report suggested that the prosecution's random match probability gave an improper impression that the likelihood of Troy Brown's innocence was also 1 in 3,000,000. It also questioned the state expert's testimony on the probability that one of Troy Brown's brothers would match the DNA sample, arguing that the likelihood of a match to one of Troy's brothers was as high as 1 in 66. The district court supplemented the record with the Mueller Report, as it was not presented to any state court.
\nThe district court then set aside the state's DNA testimony as unreliable and held that no rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the district court's ruling in a divided decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by supplementing the record with the Mueller report and that the admission of the state's DNA evidence was a due process violation and a violation of federal law.
", "facts_len": "3526", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2055", "ID": "55691", "name": "Schwab v. Reilly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-538", "docket": "08-538", "term": "2009", "first_party": "William G. Schwab", "second_party": "Nadejda Reilly", "facts": "In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as \"exempt\" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.
", "facts_len": "1012", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2056", "ID": "55692", "name": "Kiyemba v. Obama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1234", "docket": "08-1234", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jamal Kiyemba, et al.", "second_party": "Barack Obama, President", "facts": "Seventeen ethnic Uighurs, Chinese citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval- Base, Cuba sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District of Columbia federal district court. The petitioners argued that since they were no longer considered \"enemy combatants\" they were entitled to transfer and release from Guantanamo Bay. The petitioners feared that a transfer to China would lead to their arrest, torture, or execution. Therefore, they sought a transfer to the United States where they could be released safely. The district court granted the petition and ordered their transfer and release into the United States.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the district court lacked authority to order the petitioners' transfer and release into the United States. The court reasoned that only the political branches of government may determine the admissibility of aliens into the United States. Without specific authorization by statute, treaty, or the Constitution, the district court could not grant the relief sought by the petitioners.
", "facts_len": "1116", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2057", "ID": "55694", "name": "Alvarez v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-351", "docket": "08-351", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Anita Alvarez, Cook County State's Attorney", "second_party": "Chermane Smith, et al.", "facts": "The Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of Mathews v. Eldridge, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review.
\nOn appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.
", "facts_len": "1045", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "dismissal - moot", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2058", "ID": "55695", "name": "Michigan v. Fisher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-91", "docket": "09-91", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Jeremy Fisher", "facts": "Jeremy Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At trial, he argued that evidence be suppressed because its acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment. Leading up to Mr. Fisher's arrest, police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance where upon their arrival Mr. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and bleeding. After the officers inquired whether Mr. Fisher was okay, he ignored them and told them to get a search warrant. One of the officers then pushed the door open and entered the house and found Mr. Fisher pointing a gun at him. The trial court granted Mr. Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence, which was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied permission to appeal.
", "facts_len": "831", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2059", "ID": "55690", "name": "Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-6261", "docket": "08-6261", "term": "2009", "first_party": "John Robertson", "second_party": "United States, ex rel. Wykenna Watson", "facts": "A victim who obtained a civil protection order (\"CPO\") against John Robertson moved to hold him in criminal contempt for violating the order. A District of Columbia Superior Court convicted Mr. Robertson on three counts of criminal contempt for violating the CPO. Mr. Robertson moved to vacate the convictions, which was denied. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Robertson's conviction.
", "facts_len": "426", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2060", "ID": "55693", "name": "Merck & Co. v. Reynolds", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-905", "docket": "08-905", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Merck & Co., Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Richard Reynolds, et al.", "facts": "Investors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put on \"inquiry notice\" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the suit.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the \"inquiry notice\" standard, plaintiffs are put on notice for the purpose of the statute of limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the \"possibility\" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on \"inquiry notice\" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.
", "facts_len": "923", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2061", "ID": "55697", "name": "McDonald v. Chicago", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1521", "docket": "08-1521", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Otis McDonald, et al.", "second_party": "City of Chicago", "facts": "Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "646", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2062", "ID": "55698", "name": "Maryland v. Shatzer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-680", "docket": "08-680", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr.", "facts": "In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child.
\nPrior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under Edwards v. Arizona rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of Edwards applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.
", "facts_len": "1832", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2063", "ID": "55699", "name": "Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1214", "docket": "08-1214", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Granite Rock Co.", "second_party": "International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al.", "facts": "Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act (\"LMRA\") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement (\"CBA\"). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause.
", "facts_len": "914", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2064", "ID": "55700", "name": "Berghuis v. Thompkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1470", "docket": "08-1470", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mary Berghuis, Warden", "second_party": "Van Chester Thompkins", "facts": "A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition.
\nOn appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his Miranda rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2065", "ID": "55701", "name": "Abbott v. Abbott", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-645", "docket": "08-645", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Timothy Mark Cameron Abbott", "second_party": "Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott", "facts": "Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's \"rights of custody\" as defined by the Hague convention.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father \"rights of custody\" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of \"access to the child.\"
", "facts_len": "1260", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2066", "ID": "55705", "name": "Weyhrauch v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1196", "docket": "08-1196", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Bruce Weyhrauch", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Bruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a \"scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services.\" Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 established a uniform standard for \"honest services\" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence was admissible.
", "facts_len": "1265", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2067", "ID": "55704", "name": "Berghuis v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1402", "docket": "08-1402", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Mary Berghuis, Warden", "second_party": "Diapolis Smith", "facts": "A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
\nThe Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection \"worked no systematic exclusion.\" The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors.
", "facts_len": "1025", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2068", "ID": "55703", "name": "Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Oversight Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-861", "docket": "08-861", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP", "second_party": "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.", "facts": "The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of powers.
", "facts_len": "1086", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "2069", "ID": "55702", "name": "Kucana v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-911", "docket": "08-911", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Agron Kucana", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General", "facts": "Agron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied.
\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA \"abused its discretion\" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was \"discretionary.\" 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that \"no court has jurisdiction to review\" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals.
", "facts_len": "1252", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2070", "ID": "55706", "name": "Lewis v. Chicago", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-974", "docket": "08-974", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al.", "second_party": "City of Chicago", "facts": "African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: \"well qualified,\" \"qualified,\" and \"not qualified.\" Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 \"well qualified\" applicants, \"qualified\" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as \"qualified.\" An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
\nOn appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the \"qualified\" category and that the city would be hiring those in the \"well qualified\" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.
", "facts_len": "1160", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2071", "ID": "55708", "name": "City of Ontario v. Quon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1332", "docket": "08-1332", "term": "2009", "first_party": "City of Ontario, California et al.", "second_party": "Jeff Quon, et al.", "facts": "Employees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it did have a general \"Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy.\" The policy in part stated that \"[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice,\" and that \"[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources.\" Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used \"less intrusive methods\" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service.
", "facts_len": "1494", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2072", "ID": "55707", "name": "Carr v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1301", "docket": "08-1301", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Thomas Carr", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "An Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that \"uncontrollable circumstances\" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court.
", "facts_len": "636", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2073", "ID": "55709", "name": "Renico v. Lett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-338", "docket": "09-338", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Paul Renico, Warden", "second_party": "Reginald Lett", "facts": "On the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his retrial violated the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a \"court may not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial.\" While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an exercise of \"sound discretion.\" Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion.
", "facts_len": "1265", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2074", "ID": "55710", "name": "Skilling v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1394", "docket": "08-1394", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Jeffrey Skilling", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the \"Honest Services\" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced.
", "facts_len": "1173", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2075", "ID": "55711", "name": "Johnson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-6925", "docket": "08-6925", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Curtis Darnell Johnson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted \"violent felonies.\" Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a \"violent felony.\"
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a \"violent felony\" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a \"violent felony\" was satisfied by the \"touching or striking\" element under the state battery law.
", "facts_len": "819", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2076", "ID": "55713", "name": "American Needle Inc. v. National Football League", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-661", "docket": "08-661", "term": "2009", "first_party": "American Needle, Inc.", "second_party": "National Football League, et al.", "facts": "American Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League (\"NFL\") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis.
", "facts_len": "958", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2077", "ID": "55712", "name": "Doe #1 v. Reed", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-559", "docket": "09-559", "term": "2009", "first_party": "John Doe #1, et al.", "second_party": "Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, et al.", "facts": "Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act (\"PRA\"). In response to a petition titled \"Preserve Marriage, Protect Children,\" plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.
", "facts_len": "1378", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2078", "ID": "55714", "name": "Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1200", "docket": "08-1200", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Karen L. Jerman", "second_party": "Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA et al.", "facts": "Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\"FDCPA\"). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.
", "facts_len": "1006", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2079", "ID": "55716", "name": "Hertz Corp. v. Friend", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1107", "docket": "08-1107", "term": "2009", "first_party": "The Hertz Corporation", "second_party": "Melinda Friend, et al.", "facts": "Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the \"place of operations test\" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case.
", "facts_len": "741", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2080", "ID": "55718", "name": "Christian Legal Society Chapter v. Martinez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1371", "docket": "08-1371", "term": "2009", "first_party": "Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship", "second_party": "Leo P. Martinez, et al.", "facts": "The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow \"any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs.\" In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that \"I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life.\" The district court dismissed the case.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights.
", "facts_len": "1190", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2081", "ID": "55719", "name": "CSX Transportation v. McBride", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-235", "docket": "10-235", "term": "2010", "first_party": "CSX Transportation, Inc.", "second_party": "Robert McBride", "facts": "Locomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence \"played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury.\" The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250.
\nCSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.
", "facts_len": "754", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2082", "ID": "55720", "name": "Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-514", "docket": "10-514", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Stok & Associates, P.A.", "second_party": "Citibank, N.A.", "facts": "In November 2008, Stok & Associates, a Florida law firm, deposited a cashier's check for $173,015 from someone the firm thought was a client into its Citibank trust account. After Citibank accepted the check and made the funds available, the bank discovered the check was counterfeit and restricted Stok's use of the funds. The problem was the firm had already wired the money to the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. Stok said Citibank then removed $173,015 from his trust account and notified the Florida Bar of the deficiency in the trust account.
\nThe firm filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, alleging fraud and breach of contract, among other things. Citibank meanwhile filed a petition in federal court to compel arbitration and stay the state court proceedings, pursuant to an arbitration clause that appears in the contract governing the parties' relationship. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1016", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2083", "ID": "55722", "name": "Bond v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1227", "docket": "09-1227", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Carol Anne Bond", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1138", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2084", "ID": "55721", "name": "Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-152", "docket": "09-152", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Russell Bruesewitz, et al.", "second_party": "Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al.", "facts": "Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market.
\nThe Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1179", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2085", "ID": "55724", "name": "Pepper v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-6822", "docket": "09-6822", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Jason Pepper", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release \u2013 a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.
", "facts_len": "1106", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2086", "ID": "55723", "name": "Connick v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-571", "docket": "09-571", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, et al.", "second_party": "John Thompson", "facts": "John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C \u00a7 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.
", "facts_len": "655", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2087", "ID": "55725", "name": "Tapia v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5400", "docket": "10-5400", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Alejandra Tapia", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Alejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program.
\nTapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.
", "facts_len": "778", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2088", "ID": "55726", "name": "Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-188", "docket": "10-188", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Schindler Elevator Corporation", "second_party": "United States ex re. Daniel Kirk", "facts": "Daniel Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans.
\nUsing documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1623", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2089", "ID": "55728", "name": "PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-993", "docket": "09-993", "term": "2010", "first_party": "PLIVA, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Gladys Mensing", "facts": "Gladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label.
\nMetoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide.
\nA federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.
", "facts_len": "1069", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2090", "ID": "55727", "name": "Premo v. Moore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-658", "docket": "09-658", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary", "second_party": "Randy Joseph Moore", "facts": "Randy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post-conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police.
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2091", "ID": "55729", "name": "Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-987", "docket": "09-987", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization", "second_party": "Kathleen M. Winn, et al.", "facts": "Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.
", "facts_len": "490", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2092", "ID": "55731", "name": "Walker v. Martin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-996", "docket": "09-996", "term": "2010", "first_party": "James Walker, Warden, et al.", "second_party": "Charles W. Martin", "facts": "A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court \u2013 all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2093", "ID": "55733", "name": "Bobby v. Mitts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-1000", "docket": "10-1000", "term": "2010", "first_party": "David Bobby, Warden", "second_party": "Harry Mitts", "facts": "Harry Mitts drank bourbon until he became intoxicated and then shot and killed an African American man, while speaking racial epithets. During the police shoot-out that followed, Mitts shot and killed one police officer and wounded two others before being apprehended. At trial, Mitts did not contest the evidence proving that he had killed two men, but he instead attempted to establish that he was too intoxicated to form the required intent to kill. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty on both aggravated murder counts and terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders.
\nThe trial court sentenced Mitts to death for the aggravated murders and to terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Mitts' convictions and sentences, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences and denied rehearing, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury to merge duplicative death penalty specifications, but holding that the error did not influence the jury and was resolved by re-weighing on appeal.
\nMitts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A federal judge in Cleveland affirmed the sentence, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate.
", "facts_len": "1297", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2094", "ID": "55732", "name": "Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-76", "docket": "10-76", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al.", "second_party": "Edgar D. Brown et ux., co-administrators of the Estate of Julian David Brown, et al.", "facts": "The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "420", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2095", "ID": "55734", "name": "Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-350", "docket": "09-350", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Los Angeles County, CA", "second_party": "Craig Arthur Humphries et al.", "facts": "Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index (\"CACI\") \u2013 a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.
", "facts_len": "1322", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2096", "ID": "55736", "name": "Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1314", "docket": "08-1314", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Delbert Williamson, et al.", "second_party": "Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action \"to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt.\" On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (\"NHTSA\") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.
", "facts_len": "791", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2097", "ID": "55735", "name": "Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-98", "docket": "10-98", "term": "2010", "first_party": "John Ashcroft", "second_party": "Abdullah al-Kidd", "facts": "In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.
\nThe lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.
", "facts_len": "872", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2098", "ID": "55740", "name": "FCC v. AT&T Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1279", "docket": "09-1279", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "second_party": "AT&T Inc.", "facts": "CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of \"personal privacy.\"
\nThe FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase \"personal privacy\" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined \"person\" as a corporation.
", "facts_len": "765", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2099", "ID": "55738", "name": "Abbott v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-479", "docket": "09-479", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Kevin Abbott", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C \u00a7 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.
", "facts_len": "594", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2100", "ID": "55739", "name": "Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-115", "docket": "09-115", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.", "second_party": "Michael B. Whiting, et al.", "facts": "Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act (\"LAWA\") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.
\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (\"IRCA\"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws \u2013 like LAWA \u2013 from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.
", "facts_len": "1021", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2101", "ID": "55745", "name": "United States v. Tinklenberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1498", "docket": "09-1498", "term": "2010", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jason Louis Tinklenberg", "facts": "Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
\nBefore trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg's conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
", "facts_len": "714", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2102", "ID": "55741", "name": "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-520", "docket": "09-520", "term": "2010", "first_party": "CSX Transportation, Inc.", "second_party": "Alabama Department of Revenue", "facts": "CSX Transportation, Inc. (\"CSX\") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (\"RRRR\"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2103", "ID": "55746", "name": "Wall v. Kholi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-868", "docket": "09-868", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Ashbel T. Wall, II, Director of Rhode Island Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Khalil Kholi", "facts": "In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.
", "facts_len": "1352", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2104", "ID": "55747", "name": "Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1403", "docket": "09-1403", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.", "second_party": "Halliburton Co., et al.", "facts": "A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.
", "facts_len": "603", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2105", "ID": "55748", "name": "Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-529", "docket": "09-529", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy", "second_party": "James W. Stewart III, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, et al.", "facts": "The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy (\"VOPA\"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.
", "facts_len": "1182", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2106", "ID": "55749", "name": "Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-779", "docket": "10-779", "term": "2010", "first_party": "William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, et al.", "second_party": "IMS Health Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.
\nThree companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.
", "facts_len": "805", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2107", "ID": "55750", "name": "Freeman v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-10245", "docket": "09-10245", "term": "2010", "first_party": "William Freeman", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.
\nBut in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "649", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2108", "ID": "55751", "name": "General Dynamics Corp. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1298", "docket": "09-1298", "term": "2010", "first_party": "General Dynamics Corporation", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.
\nThe government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.
", "facts_len": "1055", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2109", "ID": "55752", "name": "Harrington v. Richter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-587", "docket": "09-587", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Kelly Harrington, Warden", "second_party": "Joshua Richter", "facts": "A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
\nHowever, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that \"counsel's performance was deficient.\" And, the defendant must show that \"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.\" Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.
", "facts_len": "1130", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2110", "ID": "55753", "name": "CIGNA v. Amara", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-804", "docket": "09-804", "term": "2010", "first_party": "CIGNA Corp. and CIGNA Pension Plan", "second_party": "Janice C. Amara, et al.", "facts": "Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a \"summary plan description\" (SPD), as well as a \"summary of material modifications\" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.
", "facts_len": "772", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2111", "ID": "55754", "name": "Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-72", "docket": "10-72", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Madison County, New York", "second_party": "Oneida Indian Nation of New York", "facts": "In 2005, U.S. District Judge David Hurd barred Oneida and Madison counties in New York from foreclosing on Oneida Indian Nation-owned properties on which taxes haven't been paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the counties don't have the right to sue an Indian tribe unless Congress has authorized the lawsuit or the tribe has waived its legal immunity.
", "facts_len": "401", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2112", "ID": "55755", "name": "J.D.B. v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11121", "docket": "09-11121", "term": "2010", "first_party": "J.D.B.", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.
", "facts_len": "1137", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2113", "ID": "55756", "name": "Ortiz v. Jordan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-737", "docket": "09-737", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Michelle Ortiz", "second_party": "Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright", "facts": "Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told \"that the man was leaving,\" \"this was his nature,\" and he \"is just an old dirty man.\" The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials \u2013 Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not \"deliberately indifferent\" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.
", "facts_len": "1198", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2114", "ID": "55757", "name": "Astra USA v. Santa Clara County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1273", "docket": "09-1273", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Astra USA", "second_party": "Santa Clara County, Calif.", "facts": "In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.
", "facts_len": "615", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2115", "ID": "55761", "name": "Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-907", "docket": "09-907", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Jason M. Ransom", "second_party": "FIA Card Services, N.A., fka MBNA America Bank, N.A.", "facts": "Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for \"vehicle ownership expense\" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.
", "facts_len": "859", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2116", "ID": "55758", "name": "Henderson v. Shinseki", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1036", "docket": "09-1036", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Doretha H. Henderson, Authorized Representative of David L. Henderson, Deceased", "second_party": "Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs", "facts": "David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.
", "facts_len": "659", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2117", "ID": "55759", "name": "Smith v. Bayer Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1205", "docket": "09-1205", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Keith Smith, et al.", "second_party": "Bayer Corp.", "facts": "Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.
\nCounsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.
", "facts_len": "951", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2118", "ID": "55760", "name": "Chase Bank USA v. McCoy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-329", "docket": "09-329", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Chase Bank USA, N.A.", "second_party": "James A. McCoy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated", "facts": "A class of Chase Bank (\"Chase\") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act (\"TILA\"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.
", "facts_len": "701", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2119", "ID": "55762", "name": "Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-290", "docket": "10-290", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Microsoft Corporation", "second_party": "i4i Limited Partnership, et al.", "facts": "The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer \"clear and convincing evidence\" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.
", "facts_len": "797", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2120", "ID": "55764", "name": "Sykes v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11311", "docket": "09-11311", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Marcus Sykes", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.
\nIn March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that \"fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code \u00a7 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA.\"
", "facts_len": "579", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2121", "ID": "55766", "name": "Flores-Villar v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-5801", "docket": "09-5801", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Ruben Flores-Villar", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
", "facts_len": "1028", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2122", "ID": "55768", "name": "Tolentino v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11556", "docket": "09-11556", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Jose Tolentino", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.
", "facts_len": "638", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2123", "ID": "55765", "name": "Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1159", "docket": "09-1159", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University", "second_party": "Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., Roche Diagnostics Corp., and Roche Diagnostics Operation Inc.", "facts": "The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.
", "facts_len": "855", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2124", "ID": "55771", "name": "National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-530", "docket": "09-530", "term": "2010", "first_party": "National Aeronautics and Space Administration", "second_party": "Robert M. Nelson, et al.", "facts": "A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.
", "facts_len": "699", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2125", "ID": "55772", "name": "Milner v. Department of the Navy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1163", "docket": "09-1163", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Glen Scott Milner", "second_party": "Department of the Navy", "facts": "Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are \"predominantly\" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.
", "facts_len": "858", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2126", "ID": "55767", "name": "United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-382", "docket": "10-382", "term": "2010", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jicarilla Apache Nation", "facts": "In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.
", "facts_len": "420", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2127", "ID": "55770", "name": "Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-6", "docket": "10-6", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.", "second_party": "SEB S.A.", "facts": "French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a \"right-to-use study\" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that \"deliberate indifference\" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.
", "facts_len": "1402", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2128", "ID": "55773", "name": "Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1423", "docket": "08-1423", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Costco Wholesale Corporation", "second_party": "Omega, S.A.", "facts": "Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or \"first sale\" rule, under which certain rights are \"exhausted\" after a sale of the copyrighted good.
\nA judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.
", "facts_len": "780", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2129", "ID": "55774", "name": "Bullcoming v. New Mexico", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-10876", "docket": "09-10876", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Donald Bullcoming", "second_party": "New Mexico", "facts": "Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.
\nThe New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.
", "facts_len": "1332", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2130", "ID": "55775", "name": "Camreta v. Greene", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1454", "docket": "09-1454", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Bob Camreta", "second_party": "Sarah Greene, et al.", "facts": "Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she \"doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap.\" After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.
", "facts_len": "1297", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2131", "ID": "55776", "name": "DePierre v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1533", "docket": "09-1533", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Frantz DePierre", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.
", "facts_len": "534", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2132", "ID": "55778", "name": "J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1343", "docket": "09-1343", "term": "2010", "first_party": "J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.", "second_party": "Robert Nicastro, et al.", "facts": "An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.
", "facts_len": "536", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2133", "ID": "55777", "name": "Kentucky v. King", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1272", "docket": "09-1272", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Kentucky", "second_party": "Hollis Deshaun King", "facts": "Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.
\nThe Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.
", "facts_len": "1315", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2134", "ID": "55780", "name": "Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1156", "docket": "09-1156", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.", "second_party": "James Siracusano, et al.", "facts": "Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. (\"Matrixx\") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged \"materiality\" in their claim because their evidence was not \"statistically significant.\"
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact \u2013 usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.
", "facts_len": "976", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2135", "ID": "55779", "name": "McNeill v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5258", "docket": "10-5258", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Clifton Terelle McNeill", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.
", "facts_len": "804", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2136", "ID": "55782", "name": "Fox v. Vice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-114", "docket": "10-114", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Ricky D. Fox", "second_party": "Judy Ann Vice, as executrix of the Estate of Billy Ray Vice, et al.", "facts": "In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an \"anonymous\" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2137", "ID": "55781", "name": "Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/137-orig", "docket": "137-orig", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Montana", "second_party": "Wyoming and North Dakota", "facts": "1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.
\nSpecial Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2138", "ID": "55783", "name": "Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-291", "docket": "09-291", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Eric L. Thompson", "second_party": "North American Stainless, LP", "facts": "Eric Thompson and his fianc\u00e9e-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to \"discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title.\" The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII \"does not permit third party retaliation claims.\" A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2139", "ID": "55785", "name": "United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-846", "docket": "09-846", "term": "2010", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Tohono O'odham Nation", "facts": "In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and \"has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged \"gross mismanagement\" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, \"the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action.\"
", "facts_len": "1040", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2140", "ID": "55784", "name": "Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-834", "docket": "09-834", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Kevin Kasten", "second_party": "Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation", "facts": "On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.
", "facts_len": "874", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2141", "ID": "55787", "name": "American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-174", "docket": "10-174", "term": "2010", "first_party": "American Electric Power Company Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Connecticut, et al.", "facts": "Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.
\nThe states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.
", "facts_len": "1156", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2142", "ID": "55788", "name": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-277", "docket": "10-277", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.", "second_party": "Betty Dukes, et al.", "facts": "Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart \"greeter\" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size \u2013 formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure \u2014 are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.
", "facts_len": "886", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2143", "ID": "55789", "name": "Turner v. Rogers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-10", "docket": "10-10", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Michael D. Turner", "second_party": "Rebecca L. Rogers, et al.", "facts": "In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
", "facts_len": "550", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2144", "ID": "55792", "name": "Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-313", "docket": "10-313", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Talk America, Inc.", "second_party": "Michigan Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T Michigan, et al.", "facts": "Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.
\nCompetitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "869", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2145", "ID": "55790", "name": "Staub v. Proctor Hospital", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-400", "docket": "09-400", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Vincent E. Staub", "second_party": "Proctor Hospital", "facts": "As a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.
", "facts_len": "666", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2146", "ID": "55795", "name": "Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-238", "docket": "10-238", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al.", "second_party": "Ken Bennett, in His Official Capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, et al.", "facts": "Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.
\nThe U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found \"minimal\" impact on freedom of speech.
", "facts_len": "848", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2147", "ID": "55796", "name": "Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1476", "docket": "09-1476", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al.", "second_party": "harles J. Guarnieri", "facts": "In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.
", "facts_len": "1116", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2148", "ID": "55797", "name": "Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1448", "docket": "08-1448", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Edmund Gerald Brown, Governor, et al.", "second_party": "Entertainment Merchants Association, et al.", "facts": "Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of \"violent video games\" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute \"obscenity\" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.
", "facts_len": "962", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2149", "ID": "55793", "name": "Stern v. Marshall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-179", "docket": "10-179", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall", "second_party": "Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall", "facts": "The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.
\nThe Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.
", "facts_len": "1043", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Private Action"}, {"": "2150", "ID": "55802", "name": "Skinner v. Switzer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-9000", "docket": "09-9000", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Henry W. Skinner", "second_party": "Lynn Switzer, District Attorney for the 31st Judicial District of Texas", "facts": "A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
", "facts_len": "764", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2151", "ID": "55801", "name": "United States v. Juvenile Male", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-940", "docket": "09-940", "term": "2010", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Juvenile Male", "facts": "At the age of 13, S.E. engaged in non-consensual sexual acts with a 10-year-old child. This activity continued until S.E. was 15 and the victim was 12. S.E. and the victim were residents of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana. In 2005, the district court sentenced S.E. to two years of detention at a juvenile facility, followed by supervised release until his 21st birthday.
\nIn 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (\"SORNA\"). Its reporting and registration requirements apply to adults and juveniles 14 or older who commit certain serious sex offenses.
\nWhen S.E. completed his sentence, he moved to a prerelease center for six months. S.E. did not engage in a required job search and center officials deemed him a program failure, requesting his removal. In 2007, after SORNA's enactment, the district court revoked S.E.'s supervised release because he failed to meet the conditions of supervision. The court ordered, among other conditions, that S.E. register as a sex offender.
\nS.E. appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, challenging the mandate to register as a sex offender. In May 2008, S.E. turned 21, and the order to register expired. Over a year later, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for a unanimous court, held that SORNA was invalid on its face because the constitution forbids laws that are enforced retroactively. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, asked the Montana Supreme Court to decide whether the question presented was moot because the district court's order had expired. Justice Jim Rice, writing for the court with two dissents, held that S.E. was obligated to register under the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (\"MSVORA\"). Hence, as Montana law required S.E. to register, and this registration was not contingent on the 9th Circuit's decision, the federal question was moot.
", "facts_len": "1921", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2152", "ID": "55798", "name": "Brown v. Plata", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1233", "docket": "09-1233", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, et al.", "second_party": "Marciano Plata, et al.", "facts": "The Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans \"cruel and unusual punishment.\" Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the \"primary cause\" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.
", "facts_len": "696", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2153", "ID": "55800", "name": "Davis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11328", "docket": "09-11328", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Willie Gene Davis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2154", "ID": "55804", "name": "Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-568", "docket": "10-568", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Nevada Commission on Ethics", "second_party": "Michael A. Carrigan", "facts": "Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan.
\nThe Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.
", "facts_len": "829", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2155", "ID": "55805", "name": "Fowler v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5443", "docket": "10-5443", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Charles Andrew Fowler, aka Man", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.
", "facts_len": "947", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2156", "ID": "55806", "name": "Sossamon v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1438", "docket": "08-1438", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III", "second_party": "Texas, et al.", "facts": "Harvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (\"RLUIPA\"). The district court dismissed the claim.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities. As to official-capacity lawsuits, the Fifth Circuit held that regardless of whether RLUIPA creates such a cause of action, it is barred by Texas's sovereign immunity.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2157", "ID": "55808", "name": "Cullen v. Pinholster", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1088", "docket": "09-1088", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Vincent Cullen, Acting Warden", "second_party": "Scott Lynn Pinholster", "facts": "A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
\nDuring rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court\u2019s grant of habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that Strickland v. Washington requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.
", "facts_len": "955", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2158", "ID": "55809", "name": "Snyder v. Phelps", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-751", "docket": "09-751", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Albert Snyder", "second_party": "Fred W. Phelps, Sr., et al.", "facts": "The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, \"Thank God for dead soldiers\" and \"Fag troops\" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, \"notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words.\"
", "facts_len": "722", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2159", "ID": "55807", "name": "Mayo Foundation v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-837", "docket": "09-837", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research (\"Mayo\") and the University of Minnesota (\"University\") sued the United States in a Minnesota federal district court seeking a refund for taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (\"FICA\"). They argued that payments made to doctors in their residency qualify for FICA's student exemption. The district court agreed and awarded judgment in favor of Mayo and the University.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the residents in this case did not qualify for the FICA exemption. The court reasoned that Treasury Regulation 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 3121(b)(10) excludes \"full-time employees\" from the FICA student exemption. Here, the resident doctors were full-time employees and, therefore, were excluded from the FICA exemption.
", "facts_len": "846", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2160", "ID": "55810", "name": "Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-525", "docket": "09-525", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "First Derivative Traders", "facts": "First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group (\"JCG\") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management (\"JCM\") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit \"market timing\" of the funds \u2013 the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.
", "facts_len": "1287", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2161", "ID": "55811", "name": "AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-893", "docket": "09-893", "term": "2010", "first_party": "AT&T Mobility LLC", "second_party": "Vincent Concepcion, et ux.", "facts": "Customers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act (\"FAA\") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.
", "facts_len": "766", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2162", "ID": "55812", "name": "Michigan v. Bryant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-150", "docket": "09-150", "term": "2010", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Richard Perry Bryant", "facts": "A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were \"testimonial\" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.
", "facts_len": "1235", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2163", "ID": "55814", "name": "Lafler v. Cooper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-209", "docket": "10-209", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Blaine Lafler, Warden", "second_party": "Anthony Cooper", "facts": "Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.
", "facts_len": "710", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2164", "ID": "55813", "name": "FAA v. Cooper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1024", "docket": "10-1024", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Federal Aviation Administration", "second_party": "Stanmore Cooper", "facts": "In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue.
", "facts_len": "550", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2165", "ID": "55815", "name": "FCC v. Fox Television Stations", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1293", "docket": "10-1293", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.\u2028 The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were \"unconstitutionally vague\" and had a \"chilling effect.\"
", "facts_len": "599", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2166", "ID": "55817", "name": "Vasquez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-199", "docket": "11-199", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Alexander Vasquez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency (\"DEA\") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, \"We got the money here.\" Vasquez echoed this statement.
\nDiaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road.
\nSeveral minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment.
\nA federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his \"customers\" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002.
\nVasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, \"everybody is going to lose.\" The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents.
\nThe jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between \"customers\" and \"customer\" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion.
\nIn a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question.
\nJudge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of innocence without the recordings on record.
", "facts_len": "5858", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2167", "ID": "55816", "name": "Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-551", "docket": "11-551", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Kenneth L. Salazar, et al.", "second_party": "Ramah Navajo Chapter, et al.", "facts": "In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs.
\nRamah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs.
\nThe tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1955", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2168", "ID": "55818", "name": "Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-553", "docket": "10-553", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.", "facts": "Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.
\nPerich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the \"ministerial exception\" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2169", "ID": "55821", "name": "KPMG LLP v. Cocchi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1521", "docket": "10-1521", "term": "2011", "first_party": "KPMG LLP", "second_party": "Robert Cocchi et al.", "facts": "Respondents, 19 individuals and entities, bought limited partnerships, which were invested with Bernard Madoff. After losing millions, Respondents sued Petitioner KPMG LLC, a financial auditor, alleging use of improper accounting standards. KPMG moved to compel arbitration under an audit services agreement between KPMG and Tremont, a fund who managed the limited partnerships. This agreement stated that any claim arising out of KPMG's services, including claims by any person for whose benefit the services were provided, would be resolved in mediation or arbitration. The Florida Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County denied the motion. The Court of Appeal of Florida, 4th Circuit affirmed. The court found that Respondents never expressly consented to the arbitration agreement, so the only claims derived from KPMG's services for the management fund were subject to arbitration. The court concluded that two of the claims were direct and not covered under the arbitration agreement. Because these claims were not arbitrable the court refused to compel arbitration of any part of the complaint.
", "facts_len": "1136", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2170", "ID": "55820", "name": "Christopher v. SmithKline", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-204", "docket": "11-204", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Michael Shane Christopher, Frank Buchanan", "second_party": "SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline", "facts": "Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan began working for GlaxoSmithKline LLC (\"Glaxo\") as pharmaceutical sales representatives (\"PSRs\") in 2003. Glaxo developed, produced, marketed and sold pharmaceutical products to distributors or retail pharmacies, which subsequently sell those products to consumers when authorized by doctors via prescription. The plaintiffs worked between ten and twenty hours outside of normal business hours each week. PSRs are compensated with a salary and additional incentive-based pay; they are not paid overtime for work done outside of standard business hours.
\nThe Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\") was enacted in 1938 to protect the well-being of workers. It imposed a baseline overtime wage on employers for employees who work over forty hours a week. There was an exception to the rule for \"outside salesmen\", defined by the Secretary of Labor (\"Secretary\") as an employee whose primary duty is making sales or obtaining contracts and who is primarily and regularly engaged outside of the employer's office. Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in August of 2008, alleging that Glaxo's practice of requiring overtime work without additional pay violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court found for Glaxo, agreeing that the plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's \"outside salesman\" exception.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The Secretary filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Christopher and Buchanan's position, arguing that when a PSR promotes pharmaceutical products but does not receive items of value in exchange for those products, he does not fall within the \"outside salesman\" exception to the FLSA. The court rejected the Secretary's argument, however, reasoning that this definition is a simple parroting of the Congressional statute; such definitions require less deference by courts because they are not interpretive. Instead, the court pointed to Christopher and Buchanan's training in sales --and their experience in sales as a qualification for employment by Glaxo-- as evidence of their status as \"outside salesmen.\" The court noted that the pharmaceutical industry self-regulated marketing to doctors much like other industries self-regulate direct-to-consumer marketing.
", "facts_len": "2372", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2171", "ID": "55819", "name": "Vartelas v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1211", "docket": "10-1211", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Panagis Vartelas", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General", "facts": "Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.
\nVartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.
\nVartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.
", "facts_len": "1820", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2172", "ID": "55823", "name": "Ryburn v. Huff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-208", "docket": "11-208", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Darin Ryburn, et al.", "second_party": "George R. Huff, et al.", "facts": "Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda were Burbank Police Officers. Vincent Huff was a student at Bellarmine-Jefferson High School, who was rumored to be intending to \"shoot-up\" the school. Ryburn, Zepeda, and other officers arrived at the school to investigate the rumors. After conducting some interviews, the officers went to Vincent Huff's home. The officers attempted to speak with Vincent Huff and his parents. Eventually, Mrs. Huff came out of the house, but she refused to let the officers to enter her home. After the police asked if there were any weapons in the house, Mrs. Huff ran back into the house. Officer Ryburn followed Mrs. Huff into the house, because he believed that Mrs. Huff's behavior was unusual and further believed that the officers were in danger. Officer Zepeda and the other officers followed Officer Ryburn into the house. The officers briefly questioned the Huffs and left after concluding that Vincent Huff did not actually pose any danger.
\nThe Huffs brought an action against the officers. The Huffs claimed that the officers entered their home without a warrant and thereby violated the Huffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that the officers had qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff's odd behavior made it reasonable for the police to believe that they were in imminent danger. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court's ruling. The court acknowledged that the police officers could enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believed that immediate entry was necessary to protect themselves or others from imminent serious harm, but the court concluded that the officers' belief that they were in serious immediate danger was objectively unreasonable. The officers appealed the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1861", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2173", "ID": "55824", "name": "Zivotofsky v. Clinton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-699", "docket": "10-699", "term": "2011", "first_party": "M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.", "second_party": "Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State", "facts": "Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as \"Jerusalem, Israel.\" United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record \"Jerusalem\" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received.
\nOn his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as \"Jerusalem, Israel\" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording \"Israel\" as Zivotofsky's place of birth.
\nOn remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if \"Israel\" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such \"unilateral action\" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians \"would critically compromise\" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.
", "facts_len": "1851", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "2174", "ID": "55822", "name": "United States v. Home Concrete & Supply", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-139", "docket": "11-139", "term": "2011", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.", "facts": "Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created \"outside basis,\" or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed.
\nHome Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets.
\nThe IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed \"solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners.\" On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase.
\nAs a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for \"all taxable years\u2026 that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction\u2026 in which a decision had not become final.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs.
", "facts_len": "2982", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2175", "ID": "55825", "name": "Sackett v. EPA", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1062", "docket": "10-1062", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Chantell Sackett, et vir", "second_party": "Environmental Protection Agency, et al.", "facts": "Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition.
\nThe Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an \"any information available\" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.
", "facts_len": "1573", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2176", "ID": "55829", "name": "United States v. Alvarez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-210", "docket": "11-210", "term": "2011", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Xavier Alvarez", "facts": "On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, \"I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.\" In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
\nThe Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
\nAlvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
", "facts_len": "1660", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2177", "ID": "55828", "name": "Perry v. Perez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-713", "docket": "11-713", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Rick Perry, Governor of Texas et al.", "second_party": "Shannon Perez, et al.", "facts": "The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011.
\nUnder Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle.
\nThe district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter.
", "facts_len": "1246", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2178", "ID": "55826", "name": "Pacific Operators Offshore v. Valladolid", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-507", "docket": "10-507", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Pacific Operators of Offshore, LLP, et al.", "second_party": "Luisa L. Valladolid", "facts": "Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (\"OCSLA\") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (\"LHWCA\"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the \"situs-of-injury\" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is \"a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf.\" Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.
", "facts_len": "1539", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2179", "ID": "55827", "name": "RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-166", "docket": "11-166", "term": "2011", "first_party": "RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., et al.", "second_party": "Amalgamated Bank", "facts": "RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., owned the Radisson Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as trustee and administrative agent.
\nAfter taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure.
\nOn June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid.
\nThe Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax's proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1455", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2180", "ID": "55831", "name": "Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-391", "docket": "11-391", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Marmet Health Care Center", "second_party": "Brown", "facts": "These are two consolidated case involving negligence suits against nursing homes in West Virginia. In both cases, the children of nursing home patients signed an agreement with the nursing home requiring arbitration for any disputes. In both cases, the patients died under the nursing homes' care and the children sued in state court for negligence. The trial court dismissed both suits because of the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed, holding that the forcing arbitration for personal injury and wrongful death cases violated public policy. The court also held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt state public policy despite recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.
", "facts_len": "740", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2181", "ID": "55832", "name": "Smith v. Cain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8145", "docket": "10-8145", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Juan Smith", "second_party": "Burl Cain, Warden", "facts": "Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois.
", "facts_len": "572", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2182", "ID": "55830", "name": "Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1042", "docket": "10-1042", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Tammy Foret Freeman, et al.,", "second_party": "Quicken Loans, Inc.", "facts": "In 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken charged the Freemans a \"loan discount fee\", and charged the other couples similar fees including a \"loan origination fee\" and a \"loan processing fee\". The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).
\nIn 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken's motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court's opinion.
", "facts_len": "1102", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2183", "ID": "55833", "name": "Armour v. City of Indianapolis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-161", "docket": "11-161", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Christine Armour", "second_party": "City of Indianapolis", "facts": "In April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis (\"the city\") sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project (\"the project\"). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks.
\nIn July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works (\"the board\") levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners (\"property owners\"), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety.
\nIn 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners' contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program (\"STEP\"). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied.
\nThe property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners' motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving the debt of owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city's motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals.
\nJustice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city's tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners' argument that they were a \"class of one\" --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city's action-- because the property owners were not singled out for discriminatory treatment.
", "facts_len": "2877", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2184", "ID": "55834", "name": "Astrue v. Capato", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-159", "docket": "11-159", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security", "second_party": "Karen K. Capato", "facts": "In 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert's health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.
\nShortly after Robert's death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband's death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. \u00a7 416(e) of the Social Security Act (\"SSA\") defined \"child\" as \"the child or legally adopted child of an individual\". In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual's death. \u00a7 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child's qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual.
\nThe Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert's \"child(ren)\" for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ's interpretation of \"child(ren)\". The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida's law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under \u00a7 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court's argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before \u00a7 416(e), holding \u00a7 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child's status is in doubt.
", "facts_len": "2366", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2185", "ID": "55839", "name": "Kawashima v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-577", "docket": "10-577", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Akio Kawashima, et ux.", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General", "facts": "Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement.
\nImmigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation.
", "facts_len": "695", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2186", "ID": "55835", "name": "Howes v. Fields", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-680", "docket": "10-680", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Carol Howes, Warden", "second_party": "Randall Lee Fields", "facts": "A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time.
\nFields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under Miranda.
\nFields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1037", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2187", "ID": "55840", "name": "Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1184", "docket": "11-1184", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Natalie E. Tennant, Earl Ray Tomblin, Jeffrey Kessler, and Richard Thompson, in their official capacities.", "second_party": "Jefferson County Commission, Patricia Noland (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated), and Dale Manuel (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated)", "facts": "In January 2012, the Jefferson County Commission brought suit against West Virginia Secretary of State Natalie E. Tennant, Governor Earl Ray Tomblin, State Senate President Jeffrey Kessler, and Speaker Richard Thompson of the West Virginia House of Delegates, each in his or her official capacity. The county commission and two of its commissioners claimed that the State's congressional apportionment statute enacted after the 2010 census violates Article I Section 2 of the US Constitution. The new statute created voting districts with significant disparities in population, violating the constitutional principle of \"one person, one vote.\"
\nSince the plaintiffs showed that the population disparities could have been reduced, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the apportionment is not constitutional and declared it null and void. The state officials appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "974", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2188", "ID": "55838", "name": "PPL Montana v. Montana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-218", "docket": "10-218", "term": "2011", "first_party": "PPL Montana, LLC", "second_party": "Montana", "facts": "In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's \"school trust lands.\" The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act.
\nThe federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the \"equal footing doctrine.\" The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.
", "facts_len": "1180", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2189", "ID": "55841", "name": "Minneci v. Pollard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1104", "docket": "10-1104", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Margaret Minneci, et al.", "second_party": "Richard Lee Pollard, et al.", "facts": "Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a \"black box\" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by \"a federal agent acting under his authority.\"
", "facts_len": "808", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2190", "ID": "55842", "name": "American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1179", "docket": "11-1179", "term": "2011", "first_party": "American Tradition Partnership, Inc.", "second_party": "Steve Bullock, Attorney General of Montana, et al.", "facts": "A Montana law states that a corporation may not \"make an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.\" The petitioners - American Tradition Partnership (formerly Western Tradition Partnership), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Association - sued the Attorney General of Montana and the Commissioner of Political Practices on the grounds that the statute violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court found the statute unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Montana found that the statute did not materially impact the freedom of speech of the corporations, and if it did, it served a compelling state interest to protect the electoral process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the judgment of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "893", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2191", "ID": "55837", "name": "National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393", "docket": "11-393", "term": "2011", "first_party": "National Federation of Independent Business, et al.", "second_party": "Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "facts": "Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay.
\nThe ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees.
\nShortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown.
\nThe plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty.
\nThe District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision.
\nThe court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.
\nThe District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive.
\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA.
", "facts_len": "2922", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2192", "ID": "55843", "name": "Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-246", "docket": "11-246", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians", "second_party": "David Patchak", "facts": "The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band (\"the Band\") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township \u2013known as the \"Bradley Tract\"-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act (\"IRA\").
\nDavid Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act (\"QTA\") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do not fall within the IRA's zone-of-interests.
\nOn appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering \"affected members of the public\" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.
", "facts_len": "2371", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2193", "ID": "55844", "name": "Williams v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8505", "docket": "10-8505", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Sandy Williams", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.
", "facts_len": "861", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2194", "ID": "55846", "name": "Perry v. New Hampshire", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8974", "docket": "10-8974", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Barion Perry", "second_party": "New Hampshire", "facts": "Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was \"unnecessarily suggestive\" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction.
", "facts_len": "539", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2195", "ID": "55845", "name": "Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/09-958", "docket": "09-958", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Services", "second_party": "Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid.
\nThe Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. The other two cases are Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2196", "ID": "55849", "name": "Hardy v. Cross", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-74", "docket": "11-74", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Marcy Hardy, Warden", "second_party": "Irving L. Cross", "facts": "At a trial for kidnapping and sexual assault, Irving Cross' victim, known as A.S., was terrified to testify against him, but did so anyway. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnapping, but was unable to reach a decision on the sexual assault charges. The judge declared a mistrial and the State opted to retry Cross on the sexual assault charges.
\nA.S. said she would testify at the second trial, but about a month beforehand, the State discovered that A.S. was missing. After an exhaustive search, which included visits to her parent's and old boyfriend's homes on multiple occasions, the State moved to declare A.S. unavailable and enter her prior testimony into evidence in the new trial. The trial court granted the motion and a clerk read the testimony at trial. The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but found him guilty of criminal sexual assault. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross' petition for leave to appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari.
\nCross then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that the testimony in the second case violated the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. According to Cross, the State had not made good faith efforts to locate A.S.. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court of appeals stressed the importance of the testimony, and several avenues of inquiry the State did not exhaust in its search.
", "facts_len": "1591", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2197", "ID": "55847", "name": "Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-88", "docket": "11-88", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Asid Mohamad, et al.", "second_party": "Jibril Rajoub, et al.", "facts": "In September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit against the respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act.
\nThe district court dismissed the petitioners' action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "828", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2198", "ID": "55851", "name": "Wetzel v. Lambert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-38", "docket": "11-38", "term": "2011", "first_party": "ohn E. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.", "second_party": "James Lambert", "facts": "Bruce Reese and Bernard Jackson were brothers-in-law who had committed several robberies together in the past; James Lambert was a newcomer to the group. On September 23, 1982, they agreed to rob a bar in Philadelphia, eventually settling on Prince's Lounge. During the robbery, one man walked to the rear bar and pointed a gun in the face of a barmaid, Janet Ryan. A different man instructed another barmaid, Sarah Clark, to \"get the money.\" While Clark was placing money in a bag, she heard two gunshots from the back of the bar; a single actor had shot and killed two patrons.
\nTwo weeks later, Jackson identified Lambert and Reese while in custody for an unrelated robbery. Lambert and Reese were tried jointly, with Jackson testifying against them. Janet Ryan also testified, and was at first unable to identify Lambert; shortly after stepping down from the stand, however, she approached the prosecutor and indicated that Lambert was the man who pointed the gun in her face. No other witness was able to identify Lambert or Reese, but the jury found Lambert guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to death.
\nA few months later, the Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit of the Federal Defender Association of Philadelphia seized the police investigatory file in what was later ruled to be an abuse of subpoena power. Lambert's lawyers declared that several seized documents should have been available to the defense at trial, filing a claim under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act. One document indicated that Jackson named a \"Lawrence Woodlock\" as a co-defendant. The district court denied this claim, concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood the disclosure would have changed the verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the additional evidence was not significant because the defense had already thoroughly impeached Jackson's testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that Jackson's statement about an additional co-defendant opened up an entirely new line of impeachment.
", "facts_len": "2180", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2199", "ID": "55848", "name": "Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1195", "docket": "10-1195", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Marcus D. Mims", "second_party": "Arrow Financial Services, LLC", "facts": "Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.
", "facts_len": "388", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2200", "ID": "55850", "name": "Reichle v. Howards", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-262", "docket": "11-262", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Virgil D. \"Gus\" Reichle, Jr., et al.", "second_party": "Steven Howards", "facts": "On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War.
\nOn that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone \"I'm going to ask him how many kids he's killed today.\" Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand.
\nAgent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed.
\nHowards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest.
", "facts_len": "2300", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2201", "ID": "55853", "name": "Bobby v. Dixon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1540", "docket": "10-1540", "term": "2011", "first_party": "David Bobby", "second_party": "Archie Dixon", "facts": "On September 22nd, 1993, Archie Dixon and Timothy Hoffner arrived at the Toledo home of Kirsten Wilkerson. Christopher Hammer was staying at Wilkerson's house. Upon arriving at Wilkerson's house, Dixon and Hoffner beat up Hammer, tied him to a bed, and robbed him. After restraining Hammer, Dixon and Hoffner proceeded to kill Hammer by burying him alive.
\nAfter burying Hammer alive, Dixon used Hammer's birth certificate and social security card to obtain a state identification card in Hammer's name. He used the new ID to obtain a duplicate auto title to Hammer's car. He then sold Hammer's car to a dealer for $2,800.
\nOn November 4th, a police detective spoke with Dixon at a local police station in a chance encounter. The detective issued Miranda warnings to Dixon and asked to talk to him about Hammers disappearance; Dixon declined to discuss the disappearance. In the course of the investigation into Hammer's disappearance, the police discovered that Dixon had sold Hammer's car and forged Hammer's signature when cashing the check he received in the sale. On November 9th, the police detained Dixon and charged him with forgery.
\nThe police questioned Dixon without reading him his Miranda rights. The focus of the questioning was Hammer's disappearance and not Dixon's alleged act of forgery. Dixon asserted his right to have an attorney present, but the police continued to question Dixon without an attorney. Dixon admitted to the auto title forgery but said that he had no knowledge of Hammer's disappearance. Later that day, Hoffner led the police to Hammer's body. The police interviewed Dixon again. They did not inform Dixon of his Miranda rights until the second session because they feared Dixon would request counsel. Dixon confessed to the kidnapping, robbery, and murder.
\nAt trial, Dixon was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, robbery and kidnapping. The Appellate Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction. Dixon appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, and Judge Gilbert Merritt, writing for the majority, held that the police should have terminated the forgery interrogation when Dixon requested counsel. The court also held that the police's planned refusal to read Dixon his Miranda rights during the first session of his interrogation for murder was unconstitutional. It further held that Dixon's were not \"voluntary\".
", "facts_len": "2425", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2202", "ID": "55852", "name": "Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-945", "docket": "10-945", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Albert W. Florence", "second_party": "Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, et al.", "facts": "Albert Florence was searched twice in seven days after he was arrested on a warrant for a traffic violation he had already paid. Florence filed a lawsuit against officials at the two jails, contending the jailhouse searches were unreasonable because he was being held for failure to pay a fine, which is not a crime in New Jersey.
\nU.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez ruled that the strip search of Florence violated the Constitution. However, officials representing both Burlington and Essex Counties appealed the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that it is reasonable to search everyone being jailed, even without suspicion that a person may be concealing a weapon or drugs.
", "facts_len": "743", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2203", "ID": "55854", "name": "Wood v. Milyard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9995", "docket": "10-9995", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Patrick Wood", "second_party": "Kevin Milyard, Warden, Sterling Correctional Facility, et al.", "facts": "Patrick Wood filed pro se (on his own behalf) in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his convictions for felony murder and second degree murder violated the Sixth Amendment privilege against double jeopardy and challenging the validity of his jury trial waiver. The District Court denied relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appointed Wood with an attorney and directed the parties to address the timeliness of Wood's petition. The appeals court found that Wood's habeas petition was untimely and affirmed the decision of the District Court.
", "facts_len": "597", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2204", "ID": "55856", "name": "Parker v. Matthews", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-845", "docket": "11-845", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Philip Parker", "second_party": "David Eugene Matthews", "facts": "In 1981, David Eugene Matthews broke into the home he once shared with his estranged wife, Marlene. Matthews found Marlene's mother asleep in bed and shot her in the head at point blank range. Matthews went to the next room and found Marlene, who he raped and then shot twice. Marlene died instantly and her mother died later that day. Police found Matthews at his mother's house attempting to wash the clothes he wore during the shootings. Police found the murder weapon hidden under the floorboards of a shed in the backyard. At the police station, Matthews made a tape recorded statement denying responsibility for the murders. A grand jury indicted Matthews for both murders and burglary.
\nAt trial, Matthews did not contest the fact that he committed the murders. Instead, he tried to argue that he suffered an \"extreme emotional disturbance\", which reduces a murder to first-degree manslaughter under Kentucky law. Matthews claimed the Marlene abused him throughout their relationship, which lead to his extreme behavior. The jury convicted Matthews and sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed and rejected Matthews claim that the jury erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove an extreme emotional disturbance. Matthews filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court violated clearly established federal law in denying his claims of error.
", "facts_len": "1558", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2205", "ID": "55857", "name": "Roberts v. Sea-Land Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1399", "docket": "10-1399", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Dana Roberts", "second_party": "Sea-Land Services, Inc., et al.", "facts": "On February 24, 2002, Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working as a gatehouse dispatcher for Sea-Land Services Inc. As a result of his fall, Roberts suffered injuries to his shoulder and cervical spine. These injuries ultimately left Roberts permanently partially disabled and ended his longshore career. In accordance with the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, Sea-Land's insurer paid Roberts compensation for temporary total disability for a period from 2002 to 2005. In May 2005, the insurer disputed Roberts' claim and stopped compensating him.
\nOn October 12, 2006, an administrative law judge determined that Sea-Land continued to be liable under the Longshore Act for Roberts' on-the-job injuries after May of 2005. The Longshore Act required an employer to compensate a disabled worker at a rate based on the worker's average weekly wage at the time of injury. However, the act set an upper limit to compensation based on the average national weekly wage in the fiscal year that an individual was newly awarded compensation. The administrative judge determined that the applicable maximum rate for Roberts was $966.08 per week, based on fiscal year 2002, the year Roberts first became disabled. Roberts claimed that his maximum rate should be $1,114 per week, based on fiscal year 2007, the year the administrative law judge awarded Roberts compensation.
\nRoberts filed a motion for reconsideration, which the administrative judge denied. Both Sea-Land and Roberts appealed to the Benefits Review Board, which adopted the rationale that the maximum compensation rate was based on the year in which the disability began rather than the year compensation was awarded. Roberts appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the Benefit Review Board's interpretation. Roberts appealed that decision.
", "facts_len": "1878", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2206", "ID": "55855", "name": "Martel v. Clair", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1265", "docket": "10-1265", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Michael Martel, Warden", "second_party": "Kenneth Clair", "facts": "Facts of the case: Kenneth Clair was sentenced to death in Orange County, Calif., in 1987 for the sexual assault, beating and strangulation of babysitter Linda Faye Rodgers. Clair filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court appointed the federal public defender as Clair's federal habeas counsel. The district court then stayed the federal proceedings to give Clair a chance to return to the California Supreme Court to \"exhaust\" his state remedies on some newly raised claims. Clair filed a second state habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied. Clair then returned to federal court. On June 16, 2005, Clair wrote a letter to the court, requesting that new counsel be appointed. The court was aware that Clair was having problems with his counsel; only three months earlier it had received from him a letter alleging a longstanding pattern of inattention to his case. In response to that letter, the district court made inquiry of Clair's counsel, who notified the court in April 2005 that they had spoken with Clair and that he was willing to have them continue to represent him for the time being.
\nThe June 16th letter repeated allegations made in the previous letter, but also included a serious additional allegation: that a private investigator working on Clair's behalf had located important physical evidence from the crime scene that had never been tested, and that his counsel, despite having been informed of the evidence, had made no effort to obtain it, analyze it or present it to the court. Clair's private investigator sent the court a letter substantiating Clair's claims. The court received and opened the private investigator's letter, but returned it without filing it. Following receipt of Clair's June 16th letter, however, the district court made no inquiry into the truth of Clair's allegations or their potential impact on the case before it. The district judge without explanation denied the motion on the same day that he denied Clair's petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the district court abused its discretion.
", "facts_len": "2143", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2207", "ID": "55858", "name": "Southern Union Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-94", "docket": "11-94", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Southern Union Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Southern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup.
\nOn September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The U.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment.
\nSouthern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment.
\nThe district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1850", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2208", "ID": "55859", "name": "Arizona v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-182", "docket": "11-182", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Arizona et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States.
\nArizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1409", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2209", "ID": "55861", "name": "Holder v. Gutierrez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1542", "docket": "10-1542", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General", "second_party": "Carlos M. Gutierrez", "facts": "Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that \"[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent.\"
", "facts_len": "779", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2210", "ID": "55862", "name": "Magner v. Gallagher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1032", "docket": "10-1032", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Steve Magner et al.", "second_party": "Thomas J. Gallagher et al.", "facts": "Thomas J. Gallagher, along with other respondents, were owners of approximately 120 rental properties in the City of Saint Paul. All the rental properties were subject to the City's housing code. Failure to meet the City's housing code requirements led to aggressive housing code enforcement. Gallagher, and the other respondents, claimed that the aggressive code enforcement had a disparate impact on African-Americans. The respondents sought to prevent the aggressive selective enforcement of the City's housing code by asserting a disparate impact claim under the Fair Housing Act.
\nSteve Magner and others moved for summary judgment under the disparate impact claim, and the District Court granted the motion because it did not find that the City's code enfocement had a disparate impact on African-Americans. Gallagher appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Circuit reversed the decision finding that the Gallagher showed a disparate impact and showed that there were viable alternatives to the City's aggressive enforcement that would still satisfy the City's policy objectives. The Eighth Circuit denied Magner's request for a rehearing.
", "facts_len": "1182", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2211", "ID": "55860", "name": "Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-879", "docket": "10-879", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Gloria Gail Kurns, Executrix of the Estate of George M. Corson, Deceased, et al.", "second_party": "Railroad Friction Products Corporation, et al.", "facts": "Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives.
\nKurns, the executor of his state, and Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products Corp. over brake pads they manufactured containing asbestos.
\nThe United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1561", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2212", "ID": "55864", "name": "Kappos v. Hyatt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1219", "docket": "10-1219", "term": "2011", "first_party": "David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office", "second_party": "Gilbert P. Hyatt", "facts": "When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action by one of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide whether a plaintiff in a civil (\u00a7 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under \u00a7 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO.
\nGilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under \u00a7145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1810", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2213", "ID": "55866", "name": "Golan v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-545", "docket": "10-545", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Lawrence Golan, et al.", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.", "facts": "In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing \"no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.\" The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1122", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2214", "ID": "55865", "name": "Knox v. Service Employees International Union", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1121", "docket": "10-1121", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Dianne Knox, et al.", "second_party": "Service Employees International Union, Local 1000", "facts": "All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a \"Political Fight Back Fund\" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "718", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2215", "ID": "55863", "name": "Miller v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646", "docket": "10-9646", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Evan Miller", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon's trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
\nMiller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller's petition for writ of certiorari.
\nIn the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
\nIn January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1944", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2216", "ID": "55867", "name": "Filarsky v. Delia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1018", "docket": "10-1018", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Steve A. Filarsky", "second_party": "Nicholas B. Delia", "facts": "On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation.
\nOn September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies.
\nOn May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed.
", "facts_len": "1628", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2217", "ID": "55870", "name": "Judulang v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-694", "docket": "10-694", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Joel Judulang", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr.", "facts": "Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
\nIn 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony \"crime of violence.\" The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a \"crime of violence\" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
\nA panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1755", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2218", "ID": "55871", "name": "Setser v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-7387", "docket": "10-7387", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Monroe Ace Setser", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court.
", "facts_len": "1074", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2219", "ID": "55869", "name": "Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1491", "docket": "10-1491", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Esther Kiobel, et al.", "second_party": "Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al.", "facts": "The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses.
\nThe petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
\nBoth parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners' request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied.
\nFollowing oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.
", "facts_len": "1939", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2220", "ID": "55872", "name": "Reynolds v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-6549", "docket": "10-6549", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Billy Joe Reynolds", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is \"actually innocent\" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "555", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2221", "ID": "55874", "name": "Missouri v. Frye", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-444", "docket": "10-444", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Missouri", "second_party": "Galin E. Frye", "facts": "Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty.
", "facts_len": "531", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2222", "ID": "55875", "name": "Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1016", "docket": "10-1016", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Daniel Coleman", "second_party": "Court of Appeals of Maryland", "facts": "Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency.
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2223", "ID": "55873", "name": "Cavazos v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1115", "docket": "10-1115", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Javier Cavazos, acting warden", "second_party": "Shirley Ree Smith", "facts": "On November 29, 1996, 7-week-old Etzel Glass died. Doctors initially attributed Etzel's death to sudden infant death syndrome. However, an autopsy conducted by a coroner concluded that the cause of death was shaken baby syndrome (SBS). Shirley Ree Smith, Etzel's grandmother, stated that when Etzel had not responded to her touch she picked him up and gave him a little jostle. Smith was arrested and charged with assault on a child resulting in death.
\nAt Smith's trial, the jury heard seven days of expert medical testimony on the cause of Etzel's death. The prosecutors offered three experts who each testified that Etzel's death was the result of shaken baby syndrome. The defense called two expert witnesses to dispute the conclusions. The jury found Smith guilty.
\nSmith filed a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that the jury carefully weighed the tremendous amount of evidence. On direct review, Smith contended that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Etzel died from SBS. After reviewing the medical testimony, the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim, determining that where there was competing medical testimony it was for the jury to resolve the conflicts. Smith appealed to the California Supreme Court, which denied review.
\nSmith subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the evidence against her was insufficient. The District Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the lower court's opinion, concluding that the absence of physical evidence indicated that the Court of Appeal had unreasonably upheld Smith's conviction. The petitioners appealed.
", "facts_len": "1870", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2224", "ID": "55877", "name": "First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-708", "docket": "10-708", "term": "2011", "first_party": "First American Financial Corporation, Successor in Interest to The First American Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "Denise P. Edwards", "facts": "Ohio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on her home purchase. Edwards later filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class.
", "facts_len": "1127", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2225", "ID": "55879", "name": "Greene v. Fisher", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-637", "docket": "10-637", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Eric Greene, aka Jarmaine Q. Trice", "second_party": "Jon Fisher, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, et al.", "facts": "A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements.
\nGreene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal \"as having been improvidently granted.\"
\nIn 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as \"habeas corpus.\" By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates \"clearly established Federal law.\" The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not \"clearly established\" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
", "facts_len": "1828", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2226", "ID": "55878", "name": "Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Simmonds", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1261", "docket": "10-1261", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Credit Suisse Securities LLC et. al.", "second_party": "Vanessa Simmonds", "facts": "Vanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.
", "facts_len": "1085", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2227", "ID": "55880", "name": "Dorsey v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-5683", "docket": "11-5683", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Edward Dorsey, Sr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
", "facts_len": "874", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2228", "ID": "55882", "name": "United States v. Jones", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1259", "docket": "10-1259", "term": "2011", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Antoine Jones", "facts": "Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the \"Levels\" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.
", "facts_len": "799", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2229", "ID": "55881", "name": "Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1150", "docket": "10-1150", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al.", "second_party": "Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.", "facts": "Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order.
", "facts_len": "466", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2230", "ID": "55884", "name": "Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1472", "docket": "10-1472", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Kouichi Taniguchi", "second_party": "Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.", "facts": "On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income.
\nTaniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted \"compensation of interpreters\" in U.S.C. \u00a7 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents.
\nTaniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi's petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed.
", "facts_len": "1356", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2231", "ID": "55883", "name": "Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-844", "docket": "10-844", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "Novo Nordisk A/S, et al.", "facts": "Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application (\"ANDA\") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code \u2014 a description of the scope of the patent \u2014undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code.
\nThe Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand's new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo's patent did not claim any approved method of use.
", "facts_len": "1476", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2232", "ID": "55885", "name": "CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-948", "docket": "10-948", "term": "2011", "first_party": "CompuCredit Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "Wanda Greenwood, et al.", "facts": "CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required.
\nThe United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims \"unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.\" Accordingly, the \"burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.\"
", "facts_len": "1225", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2233", "ID": "55887", "name": "Rehberg v. Paulk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-788", "docket": "10-788", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Charles A. Rehberg", "second_party": "James P. Paulk, et al.", "facts": "Charles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a \"favor\" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed.
\nRehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among other things, that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1196", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2234", "ID": "55886", "name": "Elgin v. Department of the Treasury", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-45", "docket": "11-45", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Michael B. Elgin, et al.", "second_party": "Department of the Treasury, et al.", "facts": "Michael B. Elgin, Aaron Lawson, Henry Tucker, and Christon Colby, the petitioners, were all federal employees. Each man was terminated or constructively terminated under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 3328, after the Office of Personnel Management determined that he was ineligible for federal employment under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 3328 for failing to have registered for the selective service between the ages of 18 and 26.
\nElgin initially challenged his termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdiction over challenged terminations of federal employees under certain conditions under the Civil Service Reform Act. On November 16, 2007, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Elgin's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction over appeals where employees were terminated under absolute statutory prohibitions and that it lacked the power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute.
\nOn December 28, 2007, Elgin and the other petitioners joined and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 3328 to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They claimed that the statute was an unlawful Bill of Attainder, and that the statute violated the petitioners' rights to equal protection based on sex. Both sides moved for summary judgment as to certain issues, and the court granted the petitioner's motion by finding that the law was a Bill of Attainder and granted part of the respondents' motion by finding that the law was not a violation of the petitioners' rights to equal protection. The government filed a motion for reconsideration as to whether the statute was a Bill of Attainder, and also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, but, on reconsideration, determined that the statute was not a Bill of Attainder.
\nPetitioners appealed the district court's decisions dismissing the equal protection claim and granting the motion for reconsideration on the Bill of Attainder claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Circuit confirmed the lower court's decision as to dismissal of the claims, and a divided court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The petitioners appealed in order to settle the question of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "2381", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2235", "ID": "55889", "name": "Messerschmidt v. Millender", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-704", "docket": "10-704", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Curt Messerschmidt, et al.", "second_party": "Augusta Millender, et al.", "facts": "Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims.
\nThe district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant's scope to items supported by probable cause.
", "facts_len": "1528", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2236", "ID": "55891", "name": "Martinez v. Ryan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1001", "docket": "10-1001", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Luis Mariano Martinez", "second_party": "Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections", "facts": "Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.
", "facts_len": "860", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2237", "ID": "55888", "name": "Gonzalez v. Thaler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-895", "docket": "10-895", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez", "second_party": "Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Raphael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court on June 14, 2005, and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He filed an appeal to the Texas intermediate court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez's counsel did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals within the 30-day timeframe permitted by state law. 2. On July 19, 2007, Gonzalez filed in Texas state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition on the merits on November 21, 2007. On January 24, 2008, Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
", "facts_len": "743", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2238", "ID": "55892", "name": "National Meat Association v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-224", "docket": "10-224", "term": "2011", "first_party": "National Meat Association", "second_party": "Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, et al.", "facts": "The National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse. The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group hadn't shown its members would suffer \"irreparable injury.\"
", "facts_len": "910", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2239", "ID": "55893", "name": "Blueford v. Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1320", "docket": "10-1320", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Alex Blueford", "second_party": "Arkansas", "facts": "On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford's live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford's friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child.
\nThe state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial.
\nThe state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror's communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford's petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1891", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2240", "ID": "55890", "name": "Maples v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-63", "docket": "10-63", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Cory R. Maples", "second_party": "Kim T. Thomas, Interim Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections", "facts": "Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in.
\nWhen Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case.
", "facts_len": "1047", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2241", "ID": "55896", "name": "FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1160", "docket": "11-1160", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Federal Trade Commission", "second_party": "Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital", "facts": "In 1941, the Georgia legislature enacted the Hospital Authorities Law, allowing the creation of hospital authorities as public bodies to oversee the public health needs of Georgia communities. The City of Albany and Dougherty County created the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (\"Authority\"). Since its establishment, the Authority acquired hospitals throughout the area and leased the facilities to two non-profit corporations: Phoebe Putney Health System (\"PPHS\") and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (\"PPMH\"). In December 2010, PPHS presented to the Authority a plan to buy the only remaining hospital in the area, Palmyra Hospital. The Authority approved the plan in April 2011.
\nFollowing the approval, the petitioner Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether the plan would create a monopoly in the hospital services market in Dougherty County and the surrounding area. To ensure that the plan did not come into fruition prior to the FTC's final determination, the FTC filed suit against the respondents: the Authority, PPMH, PPHS, and Palmyra. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the state-action doctrine immunized the Authority and its operation of the hospitals from antitrust liability. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the legislature in its enactment of the Hospital Authorities Law must have anticipated the anti-competitive effects that the FTC alleged.
", "facts_len": "1643", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2242", "ID": "55895", "name": "Chafin v. Chafin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1347", "docket": "11-1347", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Jeffrey L. Chafin", "second_party": "Lynne H. Chafin", "facts": "In March 2006, U.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple's child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child's schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United States and allowed Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot because the child had already returned to Scotland.
", "facts_len": "1149", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2243", "ID": "55900", "name": "Metrish v. Lancaster", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-547", "docket": "12-547", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Linda Metrish, Warden", "second_party": "Burt Landcaster", "facts": "On April 23, 1993, Burt Lancaster, a former Detroit police officer with a history of mental health problems, shot and killed his girlfriend. He was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At his trial in state court, Lancaster admitted to the killing but argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and diminished capacity. The jury convicted Lancaster on both counts.
\nAfter exhausting his appeals in state courts, Lancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and argued that the state had improperly excluded a black juror based on his race. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and Lancaster received a new trial in 2005. At the new trial, Lancaster waived his right to a jury and limited his defense to diminished capacity. Since Lancaster's first trial, the Michigan Supreme Court had held that diminished capacity defense was no longer valid. The trial court held that the Michigan Supreme Court ruling applied retroactively and that Lancaster could not use the diminished capacity defense. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Lancaster was again convicted on both counts.
\nLancaster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a substantive change in the law and that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retroactively applying the change to his case. The district court denied his petition and held that the abolition of the diminished capacity defense was a reasonable change because the defense was not well established under Michigan law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the retroactive application of the new ruling denied Lancaster his right to due process.
", "facts_len": "1896", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2244", "ID": "55894", "name": "Hall v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-875", "docket": "10-875", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Lynwood D. Hall, et ux.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt \"incurred by the estate\". The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings.
", "facts_len": "665", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2245", "ID": "55897", "name": "Hollingsworth v. Perry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-144", "docket": "12-144", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Dennis Hollingsworth, et al.", "second_party": "Kristin Perry, et al.", "facts": "In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term \"marriage\" to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that \"only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California.\"
\nThe respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California's marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2246", "ID": "55898", "name": "United States v. Kebodeaux", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-418", "docket": "12-418", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Anthony James Kebodeaux", "facts": "Anthony Kebodeaux was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender's intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress' powers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances of this case, the court did not question Congress' ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence.
", "facts_len": "1064", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2247", "ID": "55899", "name": "McQuiggin v. Perkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-126", "docket": "12-126", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Greg McQuiggin, Warden", "second_party": "Floyd Perkins", "facts": "Floyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the \"new evidence\" provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the \"factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence\", applied.
\nIn support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the \"new\" evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way.
", "facts_len": "1853", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2248", "ID": "55901", "name": "Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-52", "docket": "12-52", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Dan's City Used Cars d/b/a Dan's Auto Body", "second_party": "Robert Pelkey", "facts": "In 2009, Dan's City Used Cars towed Robert Pelkey's car from the parking lot of the Colonial Village apartments pursuant to a policy requiring tenants to move their cars during snowstorms. Pelkey was confined to bed with a serious medical condition, so he did not know his car had been towed. Soon after, he was admitted to the hospital to amputate his left foot. During the operation, Pelky suffered a heart attack. After recovering and returning home, Pelky discovered that his car was missing. Pelkey's attorney learned that Dan's had possession of the car and planned to sell it at public auction. When the attorney tried to arrange return of the vehicle, Dan's falsely told him that the car had already been sold. Dan's later traded the car to a third party, but Pelky did not receive any compensation.
\nPelkey sued for violations of the Consumer Protection Act, a statute concerning liens, and a negligence claim based on the common law duty of a bailee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dan's, holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act) preempted Pelkey's claims. The Act provides that state law claims \"related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier, with respect to the transportation of property\" are preempted. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed, holding that Pelkey's claims only related to Dan's role in disposing of the vehicle, and did not concern the transportation of property.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2249", "ID": "55903", "name": "Horne v. Department of Agriculture", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-123", "docket": "12-123", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Marvin D. Horne, et al.", "second_party": "Department of Agriculture", "facts": "The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was enacted to protect farmers from radical fluctuations in the market. The AMAA allows the Secretary of Agriculture to impose production quotas or supply limitations on products as needed. Refusal to comply with these orders can result in civil and criminal penalties. The orders only applied to \"handlers,\" those who process and package the products for distribution. The Raisin Marketing Order of 1949 created reserve-tonnage, a percentage of raisins that must be turned over the government each year.
\nMarvin and Laura Horne were raisin producers living in California who implemented a system to bring their raisins to market without handlers to avoid the AMAA. The Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service initiated an enforcement action against the Hornes for failure to comply with the orders. The Administrative Law Judge held that the Hornes should be subject to the Order under the auspices of the AMAA. The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision and held the Hornes liable. The Hornes filed for judicial review in district court, and the court granted summary judgment for the Department of Agriculture.
\nThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Hornes' claim that the Order violated their Fifth Amendment rights under the Takings Clause. The Court held that the Hornes must bring that claim before the Court of Federal Claims, as required by the Tucker Act.
", "facts_len": "1539", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2250", "ID": "55902", "name": "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-697", "docket": "11-697", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Supap Kirtsaeng", "second_party": "John Wiley & Sons, Inc.", "facts": "Supap Kirtsaeng came to the United States from Thailand in 1997. He obtained an undergraduate degree at Cornell University before being accepted into a PhD program at the University of Southern California. To subsidize the cost of his education, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand and to ship those books to him in the United States. Kirstaeng then sold the textbooks on eBay at a profit. Among the books Kirtsaeng sold, were eight textbooks printed in Asia by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
\nWiley sued Kirtsaeng in district court for copyright infringement under Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which makes it impermissible to import a work \"without the authority of the owner.\" Kirtsaeng asserted a defense under Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy \"lawfully made under this title\" to sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission. The district court rejected Kirtsaeng's argument, and held that the doctrine was inapplicable to goods manufactured in a foreign country.
\nKirtsaeng appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A divided panel acknowledged that it was a difficult question of statutory construction, but the majority held that Section 109(a) referred specifically to works that are made in the United States and did not apply to works manufactured abroad. Kirtsaeng's request for rehearing was denied, and he appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1534", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2251", "ID": "55904", "name": "Marx v. General Revenue Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1175", "docket": "11-1175", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Olivea Marx", "second_party": "General Revenue Corporation", "facts": "Elenea Marx defaulted on her student loans. In September 2008, her guarantor, EdFund, a division of the California Student Aid Commission, hired the General Revenue Corporation (\"GRC\") to collect on the account. That same month, a GRC agent faxed Marx's employer a form displaying basic contact information for GRC. It also left blanks for the employer to fill in information about the employee's employment status and other related information.
\nThe Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\"FDCPA\") prohibited communications with third parties in connection with the collection of debt. It also allowed courts to award costs to prevailing defendants in actions brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment. Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, prevented courts from awarding courts if a statute provided otherwise. Marx sued GRC in October 2008, alleging abusive and threatening phone calls in violation of the FDCPA. She amended her complaint in March 2009 to add a claim that GRC violated the FDCPA by sending the fax to her workplace to request employment information.
\nThe district court dismissed her complaint, holding that the fax was not a \"communication\" within the meaning of the act, and ordering Marx to pay court costs. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed with one dissent, holding that the fax was not a communication. The Tenth Circuit also held that the act did not prevent courts from awarding costs to prevailing defendants. Marx's petition for an en banc rehearing was denied.
", "facts_len": "1570", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2252", "ID": "55905", "name": "United States v. Bormes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-192", "docket": "11-192", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "James X. Bormes", "facts": "In October 2000, the United States Treasury Department launched Pay.gov, a billing and payment processing system that allows consumers to make online payments to government agencies by credit or debit card. Numerous government agencies use Pay.gov to process credit and debit payments. On August 9, 2008, attorney James X Bormes filed a lawsuit on behalf of one of his clients in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, paying the filing fee with a credit card via Pay.gov. The confirmation page displayed the expiration date of Bormes' credit card.
\nBormes alleged that the inclusion of his card's expiration date violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (\"FCRA\"); he brought this action on behalf of himself and a class of individual cardholders. The statute provides that no person accepting credit or debit cards for a business transaction shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card or the expiration date on any receipt provided to the cardholder after a transaction. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction under the FCRA, but granted the government's motion to dismiss because the FCRA did not waive the government's sovereign immunity. It held that Bormes' invocation of the Little Tucker Act was moot because the court had jurisdiction under the FCRA.
\nOn appeal, a motions panel denied the government's motion to transfer to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. It held that Bormes' complaint invoked the district court's jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act; the Little Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to district courts over claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. Afterwards, a panel of the Seventh Circuit determined that the Little Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for the FCRA in Talley v. U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Seventh Circuit later vacated this opinion; the Talley case remains pending. Bormes appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which determined that the FCRA mandates money damages from the federal government, giving jurisdiction to the district courts through the Little Tucker Act.
", "facts_len": "2315", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2253", "ID": "55907", "name": "Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1085", "docket": "11-1085", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Amgen Inc, Kevin W. Sharer, Richard D. Nanula, Roger M. Perlmutter, George J. Morrow", "second_party": "Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds", "facts": "Amgen, Inc. is an American pharmaceutical corporation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two Amgen products that stimulate production of red blood cells and reduce the need for blood transfusions in anemic patients. Amgen allegedly made misrepresentations to the FDA about the safety of these products. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought an action against Amgen alleging four counts of misrepresentation. Connecticut Retirement Plans specifically alleged that Amgen misrepresented the nature of several FDA committee meetings to shareholders. It sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Amgen stock between April 22, 2004 and May 10, 2007, the dates when two of the meetings in question occurred. On May 10, 2007, Amgen's stock value dropped by more than nine percent.
\nTo certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and that these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members. Amgen opposed the class certification, arguing that the that the misrepresentations did not have any impact on the price of Amgen stock. The district court rejected Amgen's arguments and granted the class certification. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed, rejecting Amgen's argument that a plaintiff must give proof that the misrepresentations were material at the class certification stage.
", "facts_len": "1488", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2254", "ID": "55906", "name": "Florida v. Jardines", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-564", "docket": "11-564", "term": "2012", "first_party": "State of Florida", "second_party": "Joelis Jardines", "facts": "On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified \"crime stoppers\" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally smelled marijuana.
\nThe detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was issued. A search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines moved to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree.
\nThe trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppress the evidence. The state appealed the suppression ruling and the state appellate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the officer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was not necessary for the drug dog's sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1568", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2255", "ID": "55909", "name": "Salinas v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-246", "docket": "12-246", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Genovevo Salinas", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located.
\n15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1430", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2256", "ID": "55908", "name": "Evans v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1327", "docket": "11-1327", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Lamar Evans", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house in Detroit, Michigan. He was charged with \"burning other real property.\" The trial court required the prosecution to prove that the building was not a dwelling, although that is not an element of the crime under Michigan law. As a result of this extra element, the court granted Evans' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court decision and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Double Jeopardy did not bar a retrial because the trial court did not resolve any factual element of the case. The directed verdict was based only on the prosecution's failure to prove an element that is not part of the crime. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.
", "facts_len": "779", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2257", "ID": "55910", "name": "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-71", "docket": "12-71", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Arizona, et al.", "second_party": "Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, et al.", "facts": "On November 2, 2004, Arizona passed Proposition 200, which required voters to provide proof of citizenship when registering to vote or casting a ballot. Shortly after the Proposition passed, a group of plaintiffs, including the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona sued the state. They argued that Proposition 200 violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments, and is inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA). The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs appealed.
\nThe U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency injunction to allow the case to proceed without allowing Proposition 200 to affect the 2006 election. The Supreme Court vacated the emergency injunction and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and held that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Arizona. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the Proposition was not an unconstitutional poll tax and did not violate the NVRA, but that the NVRA preempts the Proposition's requirements.
", "facts_len": "1367", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2258", "ID": "55911", "name": "Bailey v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-770", "docket": "11-770", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Chunon L. Bailey aka Polo", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On July 28, 2005, an informant told Officer Richard Sneider of the Suffolk County Police Department that he had purchased six grams of crack cocaine at 103 Lake Drive, Wyandanch, New York, from an individual named \"Polo.\" Officer Sneider obtained a warrant to search the basement apartment at that address; the warrant provided that the apartment was occupied by a heavy set black male with short hair, known as \"Polo.\" That evening during surveillance, officers observed two men -later identified as Chunon L. Bailey and Bryant Middleton-exiting the gate that led to the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive. The officers followed Bailey and Middleton as they left the premises in a black Lexus, and pulled the Lexus over about one mile from the apartment.
\nThe officers patted down Bailey and Middleton, finding keys in Bailey's front left pocket. They placed both men in handcuffs and informed them that they were being detained, not arrested. Bailey insisted that he did not live in the basement apartment at 103 Lake Drive, but his driver's license address in Bay Shore was consistent with the informant's description of Polo. The police searched the apartment while Bailey and Middleton were in detention, finding a gun and drugs in plain view. The police arrested Bailey, and seized his house keys and car key incident to his arrest; later, an officer discovered that one of the house keys opened the door to the basement apartment.
", "facts_len": "1453", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2259", "ID": "55912", "name": "Fisher v. University of Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-345", "docket": "11-345", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Abigail N. Fisher", "second_party": "University of Texas at Austin, et al.", "facts": "In 1997, the Texas legislature enacted a law requiring the University of Texas to admit all high school seniors who ranked in the top ten percent of their high school classes. After finding differences between the racial and ethnic makeup of the university's undergraduate population and the state's population, the University of Texas decided to modify its race-neutral admissions policy. The new policy continued to admit all in-state students who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school classes. For the remainder of the in-state freshman class the university would consider race as a factor in admission.
\nAbigail N. Fisher, a Caucasian female, applied for undergraduate admission to the University of Texas in 2008. Fisher was not in the top ten percent of her class, so she competed for admission with other non-top ten percent in-state applicants. The University of Texas denied Fisher's application.
\nFisher filed suit against the university and other related defendants, claiming that the University of Texas' use of race as a consideration in admission decisions was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university argued that its use of race was a narrowly tailored means of pursuing greater diversity. The district court decided in favor of the University of Texas, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Fisher appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1500", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2260", "ID": "55914", "name": "Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1231", "docket": "11-1231", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Auburn Regional Medical Center et al.", "facts": "Hospitals receive compensation from the federal government based on the number of low-income patients they serve. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) decides how much this payment will be. In an unrelated case, it came out that CMS miscalculated this payment between 1993 and 1996 so hospitals received less than they were due. In 2006, a group of hospitals filed claims with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) for full payment from the Department of Health and Human Services for years 1987-1994. Although the statute of limitations for such claims is 180 days, the hospitals argued that the limitations period should be tolled because CMS knowingly and unlawfully failed to disclose its error. The PRRB held that it did not have the authority to toll the statute of limitations, so the claims were untimely.
\nThe hospitals sued in district court, but the district court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the PRRB's decision was not final. The court also held that the relevant statute does not allow for tolling the statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that it did have jurisdiction because the PRRB decision was final. It also held that tolling the statute of limitations for \"good cause\" is possible, but whether it is appropriate in this case is a question for remand. The court of appeals denied a petition for a rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "1462", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2261", "ID": "55913", "name": "Sebelius v. Cloer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-236", "docket": "12-236", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Melissa Cloer, M.D.", "facts": "While a student at the University of Missouri, Dr. Melissa Cloer was vaccinated for Hepatitis B in 1996 and 1997. Soon after, she began developing symptoms of multiple sclerosis (MS). Several years later, Dr. Cloer learned about a possible connection between the vaccine and MS. Dr Cloer sued under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (the Act). The Chief Special Master denied her claim as untimely because she brought it more than 36 months after the onset of symptoms. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. Dr. Cloer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Federal Circuit granted the government's petition for rehearing and held that the Act's statute of limitations can be paused in certain circumstances, but Dr. Cloer's case did not meet the requirements. Her claims were again dismissed as untimely, but she filed a petition for attorney fees and costs incurred in the appeal. The Act provides that a claimant may recover attorney fees in connection with any proceeding under the Act brought in good faith with a reasonable basis for the claim even if the claimant does not win the case. The Federal Circuit held that Dr. Cloer was entitled to attorney fees if her claim was brought in good faith with a reasonable basis. The court remanded the case with instructions to decide those issues
", "facts_len": "1358", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2262", "ID": "55915", "name": "Florida v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-817", "docket": "11-817", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Clayton Harris", "facts": "The State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. This dog was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog's alert was false and did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied Harris motion, holding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the dog's reliability in drug detection sufficiently to show probable cause.
", "facts_len": "982", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2263", "ID": "55917", "name": "Vance v. Ball State University", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-556", "docket": "11-556", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Maetta Vance", "second_party": "Ball State University", "facts": "Maetta Vance began working for University Dining Services at Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server. She was the only African-American working in the department. Vance submitted a complaint to the University when a coworker used a racial epithet directed at her and African-American students at the University. The University issued the coworker a written warning, but following a series of incidents that resulted in Vance reporting that she felt unsafe in her workplace, the University investigated but found no basis for action. On October 3, 2006, Vance sued Ball State University in federal district court for lessening her work duties and ability to work overtime, forcing her to work through her breaks, and unjustly disciplining her. After filing the suit, Vance claimed her work environment continued to worsen, but the University's investigations did not yield enough evidence to discipline anyone.
\nThe University moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and held that there was not enough evidence to prove a hostile work environment and that the University was not liable for the actions of individual coworkers. Vance appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2264", "ID": "55916", "name": "United States v. Windsor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-307", "docket": "12-307", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Edith Windsor, in her capacity as the executor of the estate of Thea Clara Spyer, et al.", "facts": "The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996, states that, for the purposes of federal law, the words \"marriage\" and \"spouse\" refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Since that time, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding the DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale.
\nEdith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been imposed.
\nOn November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1568", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2265", "ID": "55918", "name": "Ryan v. Gonzales", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/10-930", "docket": "10-930", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Charles L. Ryan, Director Arizona Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Ernest Valencia Gonzales", "facts": "Ernest Valencia Gonzales was convicted for the murder of Darrel Wagner. His conviction and death sentence became final on January 8, 1996. Gonzalez exhausted his state-court post-conviction relief opportunities before challenging his conviction in federal court.
\nIn November 1999, Gonzales initiated a federal habeas proceeding, which raised 60 claims for federal habeas relief, including claims relating to Gonzales' competence and ability to rationally communicate with his court-appointed attorneys. The federal court stayed Gonzales' execution pending resolution of those proceedings. Ultimately, the district court denied Gonzales' motion for a competency hearing and a stay of proceedings. Even though it determined that Gonzales was incompetent, the court considered this irrelevant because Gonzales' claims could not benefit from rational communication with counsel.
\nGonzales appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It disagreed with the lower court and held that Gonzales was entitled to a stay pending a competency determination. The Arizona Department of Corrections appealed.
\nThe related case, Tibbals v. Carter, was a similar capital murder appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Sean Carter, the defendant, was adjudged incompetent to assist his attorneys following his murder conviction. The district court granted Carter a stay on his habeas corpus proceedings based on a right to competence in such proceedings. After the appellate court affirmed, the State appealed further and the Court granted certiorari to answer the same question as in Ryan v. Gonzales.
", "facts_len": "1666", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2266", "ID": "55919", "name": "American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-798", "docket": "11-798", "term": "2012", "first_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "second_party": "The City of Los Angeles, the Harbor Department of the City of Los Angeles, and the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles", "facts": "In 1997, the Port of Los Angeles (\"the Port\") introduced a plan to expand its cargo terminals to better accommodate its high shipping volume. Following public concern that the plan could significantly increase air pollution, the Board of Harbor Commissioners adopted a Clean Air Action Plan (\"CAAP\"). The CAAP aimed to reduce emissions and specifically targeted the Port's drayage truck business. Roughly 16,000 drayage trucks regularly serve the Port, transporting goods between customers and the cargo terminals. Beginning in 2008, the CAAP banned drayage trucks from the Port, unless the carriers entered into a series of concession agreements. These agreements imposed a progressive ban on older trucks and provided incentives for drayage truck operators to convert their aging fleets to cleaner trucks.
\nAmerican Trucking Associations (\"ATA\"), a national association of motor carriers, challenged several provisions within the concession agreements and brought suit against the City of Los Angeles and its Harbor Department. ATA argued that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (\"FAAA\") preempted the agreements. The FAAA Act prohibits a state from enacting any regulation related to the \"price, route, or service of any motor carrier.\" ATA claimed that the concession agreements amounted to such a regulation. ATA further argued that the State could not limit a federally licensed motor carrier's access to a port.
\nThe district court disagreed with ATA and held that none of the provisions were preempted; ATA appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court determined that when the Port was acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the FAAA Act did not apply. ATA appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari limited to the two questions below.
", "facts_len": "1922", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2267", "ID": "55921", "name": "Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Knowles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1450", "docket": "11-1450", "term": "2012", "first_party": "The Standard Life Insurance Co.", "second_party": "Greg Knowles", "facts": "On March 10, 2010, Greg Knowles' home was damaged in a hailstorm, and he requested payment from his insurer, Standard Fire Insurance Company, for the full amount of the damage. On April 13, 2011, Knowles filed a class action lawsuit against Standard Fire Insurance Company alleging that he and others had been denied the full payment for damages that their contracts provided.
\nAccording to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), defendants in a class action lawsuit can move the case to federal court if the potential damages exceed $5 million. In the past, plaintiffs have attempted to avoid federal jurisdiction by stipulating that the potential damages in a given case are worth less than $5 million, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has allowed such a stipulation.
\nThe defendant, Standard Fire Insurance Company moved the case from the Miller County Circuit Court to the Western District of Arkansas. The district court held that the plaintiffs' stipulation that the potential damages were less than $5 million was sufficient to prove with \"legal certainty\" that was the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1188", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2268", "ID": "55922", "name": "Kloeckner v Solis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-184", "docket": "11-184", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Carolyn M. Kloeckner", "second_party": "Hilda L. Solis, Secretary of Labor", "facts": "Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging hostile work environment as well as sex and age discrimination. When her employer charged her with being \"absent without leave,\" she amended her complaint to include retaliation. Kloeckner never returned to work, and eventually her employer terminated her. Kloeckner challenged the termination while her initial complaint was still pending, making it a \"mixed case.\" Kloeckner appealed the termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but then requested a dismissal so she could amend her EEOC complaint. The MSPB granted the dismissal, giving her a set period to refile.
\nWhen the EEOC found there had been no discrimination or retaliation, Kloeckner appealed the decision to the MSPB. While the appeal was within 30 days of the EEOC decision, it was 10 months after the refilling period set by the MSPB. The MSPB dismissed the case as untimely. Kloeckner filed an appeal in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was removed to the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had exclusive jurisdiction because the MSPB had not ruled on the merits of the case.
", "facts_len": "1282", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2269", "ID": "55920", "name": "Peugh v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-62", "docket": "12-62", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Marvin Peugh", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1996, Marvin Peugh and Steven Hollewell formed two companies: the Grainary, Inc., which bought, stored and sold grain; and Agri-Tech, Inc., which provided custom farming services to landowners and tenants. From January 1999 to August 2000, the two obtained bank loans by falsely representing future contracts and inflating the bank accounts by writing bad checks between the two accounts. Peugh pleaded not guilty to all counts, while Hollewell pleaded guilty to one count and agreed to testify against Peugh in exchange for the other charges being dropped. After a jury trial, Peugh was convicted on five counts of bank fraud. At sentencing, Peugh argued that he should be sentenced under the 1999 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the offense, rather than the 2009 Guidelines that were in effect at the time of sentencing. He argued that use of the later Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. He was sentenced to 70 months in prison, and he and Hollewell were jointly ordered to pay nearly $2 million. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1110", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2270", "ID": "55923", "name": "Trevino v. Thaler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-10189", "docket": "11-10189", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Carlos Trevino", "second_party": "Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "On the night of June 9, 1996, Carlos Trevino and four others drove to a nearby store to pick up beer for a party. One of the men noticed 15-year old Linda Salinas and offered to drive her to a nearby restaurant. Instead, the group drove Linda to Espada Park in San Antonio, Texas where they started to sexually assault her. Trevino's cousin, Juan Gonzalez, refused to participate and returned to the car; meanwhile, Trevino and the three other men continued the assault. Linda's body was discovered in the park the next day with fatal stab wounds to her neck.
\nAfter their investigation, the San Antonio Police arrested Trevino and a grand jury indicted him on one count of intentional murder and attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault. At trial, Trevino's cousin Gonzalez testified against him. Gonzalez testified that the men returned to the car with blood on their shirts discussing the murder, with Trevino bragging about how he learned to kill in prison. With this evidence, the jury found Trevino guilty and was left to decide on an appropriate punishment. They determined that Trevino intended to kill Linda and was likely to commit such violent acts in the future. At the jury's suggestion, the trial court sentenced Trevino to death.
\nThrough both the punishment phase of the trial and the first state habeas corpus proceeding, Trevino's attorney did not investigate or present any mitigating evidence that could have reduced Trevino's sentence. During the federal habeas proceeding that followed, Trevino's attorney withdrew and the court appointed new counsel. Trevino's new counsel undertook his own investigation and discovered several pieces of evidence that the jury could have found relevant during the punishment phase of the trial.
\nTrevino returned to state court and filed a second habeas corpus application on the basis that his first attorney had a duty to investigate and present the mitigating evidence. Since the attorney failed to do so, Trevino claimed that his Sixth Amendment right to a competent attorney had been denied. The state court denied his application, stating that Trevino should have presented the ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the first state habeas proceeding. Trevino returned to the federal district court to reassert this claim, but that court also denied his claim because it was never properly raised in state court. The district court went on to explain that the allegedly ineffective performance of his first attorney during state habeas proceedings did not excuse his failure to present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim during those proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and Trevino appealed further. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question below.
", "facts_len": "2848", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2271", "ID": "55924", "name": "City of Arlington v. FCC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1545", "docket": "11-1545", "term": "2012", "first_party": "City of Arlington, TX; City of San Antonio, TX", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "Generally, wireless phone service providers must obtain zoning approvals from state and local governments before building wireless towers or attaching wireless equipment to buildings. To speed up the process, Congress amended the 1934 Communications Act and required local governments to respond to zoning requests within a reasonable period of time. Despite this law, the zoning approval process still dragged on and severely delayed construction. In 2008, the Wireless Association petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\") to bring an end to these unreasonable delays. The Association recommended placing time limits on how long these zoning requests could take. The FCC agreed and in November 2009 set the following \"reasonable time\" limits for zoning requests: 90 days for attachments to current buildings and a 150 days for new structures.
\nThe local governments claimed that the FCC cannot set these limits because the FCC cannot determine its own power under the Communications Act. When Congress passed the Act, it granted a certain amount of power to the FCC to enforce and define the rules under the Act. Under the long-standing Chevron doctrine of interpretation, courts should always defer to an agency's interpretation of a particular act. However, the Supreme Court had never determined whether this applies to situations where the agency defines its own power under a particular law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless deferred to the FCC and affirmed the declaratory ruling. The local governments appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari exclusively to answer whether the Chevron doctrine applies in this situation.
", "facts_len": "1701", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2272", "ID": "55925", "name": "Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1377", "docket": "11-1377", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC", "second_party": "Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider", "facts": "Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider worked for Nitro-Lift Technologies LLC. As a condition of employment, they entered into confidentiality and noncompetition agreements that contained a clause requiring any dispute between Nitro-Lift and its employees to be settled in arbitration. When Howard and Schneider quit, they went to work for one of Nitro-Lift's competitors. Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration for breach of the noncompetition agreements. Howard and Schneider sued in the District Court of Johnson County, Oklahoma, asking the court to declare their noncompetition agreements null and void. The court dismissed the case, holding that the agreements contained a valid arbitration clause, so the arbitrator had to settle any dispute between the parties. On appeal, Nitro-Lift cited several U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), noting that the law favoring arbitration applied in both federal and state cases. Despite this, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, holding that the existence of an arbitration clause did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The court went on to find the noncompetition agreements \"void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma's public policy.\"
", "facts_len": "1245", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2273", "ID": "55926", "name": "Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-10", "docket": "12-10", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States Agency for International Development, et al.", "second_party": "Alliance for Open Society International, et al.", "facts": "In 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (\"the Act\"). Through the Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations (\"NGOs\") involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.
\nThe Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act's funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations' speech and forcing them to promote the government's viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1239", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2274", "ID": "55927", "name": "Already LLC v. Nike", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-982", "docket": "11-982", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Already, LLC", "second_party": "Nike, Inc.", "facts": "Since 1982, Nike Inc. sold a shoe called the Air Force 1. The shoe has a distinctive appearance and Nike owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the shoe's design. In July 2009, Nike filed suit against Already, LLC for selling shoes that were confusingly similar to the Air Force 1 shoe. In November 2009, Already counterclaimed and requested cancellation of Nike's trademark on the basis that it interfered with Already's ability to continue selling its shoes.
\nTo avoid further litigation, Nike provided Already with a covenant not to sue. The agreement promised that Nike would not pursue any legal action against Already with regard to trademark infringement. The District Court held a hearing to determine whether the covenant caused the court to lose subject matter jurisdiction over Already's counterclaims. Following the hearing, the District Court determined that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the counterclaim alone did not create a case or controversy before the court; therefore the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
", "facts_len": "1205", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2275", "ID": "55928", "name": "Maryland v. King", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-207", "docket": "12-207", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Alonzo Jay King, Jr.", "facts": "The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
\nKing appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.
", "facts_len": "1086", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2276", "ID": "55931", "name": "Wos v. E.M.A. et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-98", "docket": "12-98", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Aldona Wos, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "E. M. A., a Minor, By and Through Her Guardian ad Litem, Daniel H. Johnson, et al.", "facts": "Emily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25, 2000. She was seriously injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy and several other medical conditions. Emily's mother applied for Medicaid two months after her daughter's birth. Since then the North Carolina state Medicaid program had paid over $1.9 million in medical expenses on Emily's behalf. Emily's parents and guardian sued the physicians for negligently delivering their child and won a settlement of $2.8 million. As a result, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (\"DHHS\") placed a lien on Emily's settlement, looking to recover some of the money it paid for Emily's health care services. Under the North Carolina third-party liability statutes, when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, the DHHS has the right to recover either the total amount spent on the patient's health care, or one third of the patient's recovery payment, which ever is less.
\nEmily's parents and guardian brought suit against the DHHS, claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds. Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical expenses. Since under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past medical expenses, Emily's settlement could not include such expenses. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina disagreed with this argument and granted summary judgment to the state.
\nThe Armstrongs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision. While the appellate court agreed with the lower court that the DHHS has the right to recover from Emily's settlement, it remanded the case because the state failed to provide a mechanism for determining what part of a settlement covers past medical expenses. Since the North Carolina statutes do not attempt to recover payment for past medical expenses, they violate federal Medicaid law.
", "facts_len": "2071", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2277", "ID": "55929", "name": "Levin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1351", "docket": "11-1351", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Steven A. Levin", "second_party": "United States, et al.", "facts": "On March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure but claims that he attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "958", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2278", "ID": "55930", "name": "United States v. Davila", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-167", "docket": "12-167", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Anthony Davila", "facts": "In early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be the best advice his attorney could have given him. Following the judge's advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment.
\nDavila appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge's advice to plead guilty warranted a new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1315", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2279", "ID": "55932", "name": "Shelby County v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96", "docket": "12-96", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Shelby County, Alabama", "second_party": "Eric Holder, Jr. Attorney General", "facts": "The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to \"race, color, or previous condition of servitude.\" The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state.
\nThe Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change \"neither has the purpose nor will have the effect\" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time.
\nShelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination.
", "facts_len": "1765", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2280", "ID": "55938", "name": "Henderson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-9307", "docket": "11-9307", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Armarcion D. Henderson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Armarcion D. Henderson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "858", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2281", "ID": "55934", "name": "Chaidez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-820", "docket": "11-820", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Roselva Chaidez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Roselva Chaidez came to the United States from Mexico in 1971; she became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance scheme. On the advice of her attorney, Chaidez pleaded guilty and received a sentence of four years of probation. The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings in 2009 under a federal law that allows deportation of any alien who commits an aggravated felony. Chaidez's attorney never told her that pleading guilty could lead to her deportation.
\nChaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. While this motion was pending before the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that it is ineffective assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to advise a client that he or she may face deportation as a result of pleading guilty. The district court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule, so its holding applied to Chaidez's case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla does announce a new rule and is not retroactively applicable in this case.
", "facts_len": "1294", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2282", "ID": "55936", "name": "University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-484", "docket": "12-484", "term": "2012", "first_party": "University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center", "second_party": "Naiel Nassar", "facts": "Dr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar's productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar's presence, \"Middle Easterners are lazy.\" In 2006, after hiring the candidate, Levine made a similar statement in Keiser's presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar's productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine's harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors.
\nIn 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge.
", "facts_len": "2046", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2283", "ID": "55935", "name": "Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1274", "docket": "11-1274", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Marc J. Gabelli, et al.", "second_party": "Securities Exchange Commission", "facts": "Defendant Mark Gabelli was the portfolio manager for the Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF), as well as several affiliated funds, from 1997 until 2004. Defendant Bruce Alpert had been the Chief Operating Officer of Gabelli Funds, a company that advises GGGF, since 1988. Beginning in 1999, Gabelli permitted another company, Headstart, to engage in \"market-time\" trading with GGGF. \"Market-time\" trading is premised on the fact that price movements during the New York trading day can cause corresponding movements in the international markets that will not be incorporated into new stock prices until the following day. Traders can then buy and sell at artificially low and high prices, respectively. By early 2002, Alpert became concerned about the effects of market-timing and instructed Headstart to reduce the number of those transactions. On August 7, 2002, Gabelli announced that all market-timing must stop, and Headstart pulled its money from GGGF.
\nOn September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced an inquiry into market-timing. On April 24, 2008, the SEC sued the defendants and alleged that Gabelli and Alpert knew of Headstart's market-timing but deliberately mislead GGGF's Board and shareholders in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the SEC's claims for failure to bring the suit within the five-year statute of limitations, and the SEC appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1504", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2284", "ID": "55937", "name": "Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1447", "docket": "11-1447", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Coy Koontz", "second_party": "St. John's River Water Management", "facts": "In 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested a permit from St. John's River Water Management to develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John's had jurisdiction over Koontz's land. St. John's agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John's denied the permit application.
\nKoontz sued St. John's River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John's actions effected a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed.
", "facts_len": "918", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2285", "ID": "55939", "name": "Lefemine v. Wideman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-168", "docket": "12-168", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Steven Lefemine dba Columbia Christians for Life", "second_party": "Dan Wideman et al.", "facts": "Steven Lefemine and Members of the Columbia Christians for Life engaged in pro life demonstrations where they carry posters featuring graphic pictures of aborted fetuses. During a protest in Greenwood, South Carolina, police officers told Lefemine that he would be ticketed for a breach of the peace if he did not discard the posters. Lefemine objected, arguing that the police officers were infringing on his First Amendment right to free speech, but he eventually disbanded the group. A year later, Lefemines attorney sent a letter to Dan Wideman, sheriff of Greenwood County, informing him that the group would be protesting again on the same site with the posters. The police reiterated that they would ticket the group if they showed up with the offending posters. The group decided not to protest, but two years later Lefamine filed a complaint alleging First Amendment violations and seeking nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and attorneys fees.
\nUnder the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act the prevailing party in a suit may recover attorney fees from the opposing party. The district court issued a permanent injunction against the police officers, but declined to award money damages. The court also denied attorney fees, holding that attorney fees were not warranted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Lefemine was not a prevailing party under the Act. The court reasoned that the injunction did not alter the relative positions of the parties, so no party actually prevailed.
", "facts_len": "1567", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2286", "ID": "55933", "name": "Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-338", "docket": "11-338", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Doug Decker, in his official capacity as Oregon State Forester, et al.", "second_party": "Northwest Environmental Defense Center, et al.", "facts": "Two logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife that relies on the water.
\nThe Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as \"point sources,\" the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the \"point source\" and the permit requirement.
", "facts_len": "1249", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2287", "ID": "55940", "name": "Missouri v. McNeely", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1425", "docket": "11-1425", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Missouri", "second_party": "Tyler G. McNeely", "facts": "On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.
\nThe state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1423", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2288", "ID": "55947", "name": "Hillman v. Maretta", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1221", "docket": "11-1221", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Jacqueline Hillman", "second_party": "Judy A. Maretta", "facts": "In December 1996, Warren Hillman made his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance (\"FEGLI\") policy. In 1998, the two divorced and Mr. Hillman remarried. Despite the divorce, Mr. Hillman never changed the beneficiary designation on his policy to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008, Warren died and Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim the death benefits under his policy. Her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary on her husband's policy; Ms Maretta received the death benefits instead. Mrs Hillman sued Ms Maretta for the full amount of death benefits under the policy.
\nWhen a divorce is finalized in Virginia, state law revokes any beneficiary designations between former spouses. State law also creates a cause of action against anyone who wrongfully receives FEGLI policy proceeds. However, federal law under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act dictates that death benefits from FEGLI policies shall go to the designated beneficiary, regardless of state regulation to the contrary. The trial court applied state law and granted summary judgment to Mrs. Hillman, but Ms Maretta appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the lower court's decision and held that federal law preempted the state law; therefore Mr. Hillman's beneficiary designation was not revoked. Mrs. Hillman appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
", "facts_len": "1435", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2289", "ID": "55941", "name": "Millbrook v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-10362", "docket": "11-10362", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Kim Millbrook", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Kim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 U.S.C. \u00a72680(h), the United States is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, except for certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under \u00a72680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook's claim was precluded by Pooler. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure of evidence.
", "facts_len": "1026", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2290", "ID": "55945", "name": "Gunn v. Minton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1118", "docket": "11-1118", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Jerry Gunn, et al.", "second_party": "Vernon Minton", "facts": "In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000.
\nMinton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD and NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
\nMinton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed the case.
", "facts_len": "2033", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2291", "ID": "55943", "name": "Lozman v. Riviera Beach", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-626", "docket": "11-626", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Fane Lozman", "second_party": "City of Riviera Beach, Florida", "facts": "In 2002, Fane Lozman purchased a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing.
\nLozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina.
\nIn response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a \"vessel\" under 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city's motion and held that Lozman's floating home was a \"vessel\" for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court's determination that his floating home was a \"vessel\" under 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 3.
", "facts_len": "1465", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2292", "ID": "55942", "name": "Alleyne v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-9335", "docket": "11-9335", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Allen Ryan Alleyne", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment.
\nAlleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him wasn't strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury's decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm.
", "facts_len": "1518", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2293", "ID": "55944", "name": "Bowman v. Monsanto", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-796", "docket": "11-796", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Vernon Hugh Bowman", "second_party": "Monsanto Company, et al.", "facts": "In 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a patent to the Monsanto Company for genetic material from a virus that can be used to incorporate new genetic material into a plant. In 2006, Monsanto patented a gene that makes plants resistant to the glyphosate-based herbicides that farmers can use on weeds. Both patents are included in the Monsanto Technology agreement which states that growers who purchase Monsanto's products may only use the seed for a single season and may not sell the seeds to any other grower. Growers may sell the second-generation seed to a grain elevator.
\nVernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer in Knox County, Indiana, began purchasing Monsanto's Pioneer Hi-Bred seed in 1999 and followed the terms of the agreement by not saving any of his seed. Also beginning in 1999, Bowman purchased second-generation seed from a grain elevator for his second planting and saved seeds from that purchase for reuse later. In 2006, Monsanto contacted Bowman to examine his planting activities and found that his second-round crops contained the patented genetic material. Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for Monsanto. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1282", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2294", "ID": "55946", "name": "Descamps v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-9540", "docket": "11-9540", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Matthew R. Descamps", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (\"ACCA\"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force\u2014or burglary\u2014and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
\nDescamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
", "facts_len": "1260", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2295", "ID": "55948", "name": "FTC v. Actavis Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-416", "docket": "12-416", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Federal Trade Commission", "second_party": "Actavis Inc. et al.", "facts": "In 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay's patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors.
\nShortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission (\"FTC\") filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay's already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers' reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way that patent protection typically restrains competition.
", "facts_len": "1906", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2296", "ID": "55949", "name": "Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States of America", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-597", "docket": "11-597", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Arkansas Game & Fish Commission", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "From 1993 through 2000, the United States Army Corps of Engineers imposed a temporary flood regime around the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area. The flood regime caused flooding across the region encompassed by the wildlife management area, which restricted access to and destroyed or degraded thousands of timber trees.
\nThe petitioners brought a case in federal court in an attempt to recover under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for the loss of their property resulting from the United State's flood regime. The federal court held that the flood regime constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and that the United States owed petitioners approximately $5.6 million as just compensation.
\nThe government appealed, and the appellate court reversed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the flood regime was a temporary government action, and that only a permanent flooding condition would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The petitioners appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2297", "ID": "55951", "name": "Ryan v. Schad", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-1084", "docket": "12-1084", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Dept. of Corrections", "second_party": "Edward Harold Schad", "facts": "In 1985, an Arizona jury convicted Edward Schad of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death for strangling 74-year-old Lorimer Grove. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, and Schad sought state habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the state courts denied his petition. Schad then sought federal habeas relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to consider whether Schad\u2019s state habeas counsel was properly diligent, at which point the state of Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded the case based on a recent decision holding that federal habeas review is limited to the record of the state habeas proceedings. The appellate court then affirmed the district court\u2019s denial of relief.
\nSchad filed a motion for the appellate court to reconsider, which was denied, and the Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Schad then filed a motion requesting a stay of the mandate for the execution, which the appellate court denied. Then, instead of issuing the mandate, the appellate court construed the previous motion as another motion to reconsider, which it granted and remanded the case to the district court.
", "facts_len": "1381", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2298", "ID": "55955", "name": "Boyer v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-9953", "docket": "11-9953", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Jonathan Edward Boyer", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "In 2002, Jonathan Edward Boyer and his brother Anthony walked along a roadway in Sulphur, Louisiana. When Bradlee Marsh gave the brothers a ride, Boyer demanded money from Marsh. Marsh refused, and Boyer shot him in the head three times and took his money and a silver chain. Marsh died from his injuries.
\nBoyer was indicted in Louisiana state court on second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm charges. The jury found Boyer guilty on both counts. Boyer filed a motion for a new trial, but was denied. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the second-degree murder charge, and 104 years without parole for the armed robbery charge. On appeal, Boyer argued that that the trial court erred in determining his mental competency, by sustaining the State's objection to Boyer's attempt to present testimony showing his brother - Anthony - had violent tendencies, and by giving Jonathan Boyer an excessively long sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not prejudice Boyer.
", "facts_len": "1093", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2299", "ID": "55954", "name": "Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-460", "docket": "11-460", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Los Angeles County Flood Control Distric", "second_party": "Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek\u2014collectively known as the Watershed Rivers\u2014far exceeds what is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible.
\nThe federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River.
", "facts_len": "1220", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2300", "ID": "55952", "name": "Sekhar v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-357", "docket": "12-357", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Giridhar C. Sekhar", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel received an anonymous email of \"blackballing a recommendation on a fund\" and threatened to disclose the General Counsel's extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails.
\nSekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing that the General Counsel's recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel's right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1344", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2301", "ID": "55950", "name": "Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1059", "docket": "11-1059", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al.", "second_party": "Laura Symczyk", "facts": "Genesis Healthcare Corporation (\"Genesis\") employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees' meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (\"FLSA\"). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk's unpaid wages and attorney's fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief.
\nSince Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk's collective action, the District Court dismissed the case. Symczyk appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not cause an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed.
", "facts_len": "1134", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2302", "ID": "55956", "name": "Bullock v. BankChampaign", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1518", "docket": "11-1518", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Randy Curtis Bullock", "second_party": "BankChampaign, N.A.", "facts": "In 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father's trust. The trust's only asset was his father's life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust's only beneficiaries. As trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father's business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid.
\nWhen Bullock's two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother's actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys' fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased\u2014a mill in Ohio\u2014in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father's trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment.
\nIn 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of \"fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity\" are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court recognized that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power; however, it still affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and held that Bullock's conduct met the standard for defalcation because it was objectively reckless and constituted a known breach of a fiduciary duty.
", "facts_len": "2411", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2303", "ID": "55953", "name": "US Airways v. McCutchen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1285", "docket": "11-1285", "term": "2012", "first_party": "US Airways, Inc. in its capacity as Fiduciary and Plan Administrator of the US Airways Employee Benefit Plan", "second_party": "James E. McCutchen", "facts": "After James E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for \"appropriate equitable relief\" under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2304", "ID": "55958", "name": "PPL Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-43", "docket": "12-43", "term": "2012", "first_party": "PPL Corporation", "second_party": "Commissioner of Internal Revenue", "facts": "PPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. \u00a7901 on its U.S. tax return. \u00a7901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on \"income, war, profits, [or] excess profits.\" The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS's determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that \u00a7901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on the company's value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit.
", "facts_len": "967", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2305", "ID": "55957", "name": "American Express Co., et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-133", "docket": "12-133", "term": "2012", "first_party": "American Express, et al.", "second_party": "Italian Colors Restaurant", "facts": "American Express Company provides charge card services to supermarkets and other merchants throughout the United States. When a store decides to accept American Express cards, it must enter into a Card Acceptance Agreement. This standard form contract outlines the basic relationship between American Express and the merchant. A clause within the agreement requires arbitration of all claims brought against American Express and prohibits merchants from bringing any class action claims.
\nSeveral merchants, including Italian Colors Restaurant, brought individual lawsuits against American Express, claiming that the Card Acceptance Agreement violates U.S. antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the cases and American Express moved to dismiss in order to force the merchants to arbitrate. The district court enforced the arbitration clause and dismissed the case. The merchants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in particular the class action waiver, is unenforceable because it would essentially protect American Express from antitrust suits. American Express further appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court vacated the ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International. The appellate court reevaluated its decision and still found the class action waiver to be unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to resolve this issue.
", "facts_len": "1599", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2306", "ID": "55959", "name": "Comcast v. Behrend", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-864", "docket": "11-864", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Comcast Corp., et al.", "second_party": "Caroline Behrend, et al.", "facts": "In 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast's video programming services since December 1999.
\nIn May 2007, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October 2009, which consisted of dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst class members and a common methodology available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision.
", "facts_len": "1446", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2307", "ID": "55960", "name": "Smith v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-8976", "docket": "11-8976", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Calvin Smith, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "744", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2308", "ID": "55961", "name": "Moncrieffe v. Holder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-702", "docket": "11-702", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Adrian Moncrieffe", "second_party": "Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General", "facts": "Adrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
\nIn 2010, the department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an \"aggravated felony\" and did not make him removable.
\nAn immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner's conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe's argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the deportation order.
", "facts_len": "1278", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2309", "ID": "55963", "name": "Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-135", "docket": "12-135", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Oxford Health Plans", "second_party": "John Ivan Sutter", "facts": "John Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans entered into a Primary Care Physician Agreement (PCPA). Under this agreement, Sutter provided primary care health services to patients in Oxford's care network in exchange for reimbursement by Oxford. The contract also included a general arbitration clause, which stated, in part, \"No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court.\" In 2002, Sutter initiated a class action, on behalf of himself and other health care providers under the PCPA, against Oxford, alleging breach of contract and violations of New Jersey law. Oxford moved to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause was so general that it encompassed any conceivable court action, including class actions. The arbitrator certified the class, and Oxford moved to vacate that decision in district court arguing the arbitration clause did not encompass class actions and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion and class wide arbitration proceeded.
\nIn 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had no agreement on the issue. Oxford moved for reconsideration from the arbitrator in light of Stolt-Neilson, and then moved in district court to vacate the arbitrator's most recent award. Both motions were unsuccessful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1588", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2310", "ID": "55962", "name": "Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-142", "docket": "12-142", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.", "second_party": "Karen L. Bartlett", "facts": "In December 2004, Karen Bartlett's doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness.
\nBartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire heard evidence that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers' conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim.
\nAfter 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual's arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1805", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2311", "ID": "55964", "name": "Clapper v. Amnesty International USA", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1025", "docket": "11-1025", "term": "2012", "first_party": "James R. Clapper, et al.", "second_party": "Amnesty International USA, et al.", "facts": "Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2312", "ID": "55965", "name": "Johnson v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-465", "docket": "11-465", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden of the Central California Women's Facility at Chowchilla", "second_party": "Tara Sheneva Williams", "facts": "In 1999, Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams' trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias.
\nWilliams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the \"lone holdout\" juror violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied further direct appellate review.
\nWilliams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court's factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice.
\nWilliams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams' federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "2017", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2313", "ID": "55967", "name": "Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-398", "docket": "12-398", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Association for Molecular Pathology et al.", "second_party": "Myriad Genetics", "facts": "The Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated \u00a7101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. \u00a7101 limits patents to \"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.\"
\nThe district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories. On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes.
", "facts_len": "1649", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2314", "ID": "55968", "name": "Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-889", "docket": "11-889", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Tarrant Regional Water District", "second_party": "Rudolf John Herrmann, et al.", "facts": "Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) supplies water to north-central Texas. In 1955, Congress allowed Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an agreement allocating the water from the Red River, which forms the boundary between southeastern Oklahoma and northeastern Texas. In 1980, the states signed the Red River Compact and Congress ratified it.
\nIn 2007, Tarrant sought to appropriate water from three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas and applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), which was established to regulate in-state and out-of-state water usage. On November 1, 2007, Tarrant sued the OWRB and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Oklahoma statutes on water usage. Tarrant argued that the statutes placed burdens on interstate water commerce that are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and overstep the bounds of the Compact that Congress allowed the states to establish. OWRB moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1084", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2315", "ID": "55966", "name": "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-399", "docket": "12-399", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Adoptive Couple", "second_party": "Baby Girl, a minor child under the age of fourteen years, Birth Father, and the Cherokee Nation", "facts": "When the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father's name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father's registration. The mother listed Baby Girl's ethnicity as \"Hispanic\" instead of \"Native American\" on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support.
\nAdoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an \"Indian Child\" under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a \"parent\" under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father's consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1821", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2316", "ID": "55971", "name": "McBurney v. Young", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-17", "docket": "12-17", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Mark J. McBurney et al.", "second_party": "Nathaniel L. Young, Deputy Commissioner and Director, Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement, et al.", "facts": "Mark McBurney is a citizen of Rohde Island and a former resident of Virginia where his son lives. When McBurney's wife defaulted on child support obligations, he asked the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (VDCSE) to file a petition for child support on his behalf. After a nine-month delay, the petition was filed and granted. He then filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request with the VDCSE for all records pertaining to his son and ex-wife. The VDCSE denied the request, arguing that the information was confidential and McBurney was not a citizen of the state. While McBurney eventually obtained most of needed the information through other sources, he never got all of the information from his VFOIA request.
\nMcBurney sued in district court arguing that denial of the VFOIA request violated the privileges and immunities clause and the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled against McBurney. Mc Burney along with two others appealed their VFOIA denials to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that VFOIA did not hinder a non citizen's right to pursue buisness in the state and did not place a burden on interstate commerce.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2317", "ID": "55969", "name": "Maracich v. Spears", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-25", "docket": "12-25", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Edward F. Maracich, Martha L. Weeks, and John C. Tanner, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals", "second_party": "Michael Eugene Spears; Michael Spears, PA; Gedney Main Howe III; Gedney Main Howe III, PA; Richard A. Harpootlian; Richard A. Harpootlian, PA; A. Camden Lewis; Lewis & Babock, LLP", "facts": "Michael Eugene Spears and three other lawyers instituted several \"group action\" lawsuits against several South Carolina car dealerships for allegedly collecting unlawful fees from car buyers. The lawyers obtained the personal information of thousands of car buyers from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles through a Freedom of Information Act request. The lawyers used this data to identify potential plaintiffs for the group action, and sent mailings to each of those plaintiffs notifying them of the litigation.
\nEdward F. Maracich and two other car buyers who received mailings, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, sued the lawyers. The buyers alleged that the lawyers violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by obtaining their personal information for purposes of mass solicitation. The lawyers argued that they acted properly under the litigation exception to the DPPA. The DPPA allows disclosure of private information in connection with any state or federal litigation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyers, holding that they did not engage in prohibited solicitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lawyers did engage in solicitation, but their actions were within the litigation exception to the DPPA.
", "facts_len": "1354", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2318", "ID": "55972", "name": "Nevada v. Jackson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-694", "docket": "12-694", "term": "2012", "first_party": "Nevada, et al.", "second_party": "Calvin O'Neil Jackson", "facts": "On October 22, 1998, Calvin O'Neil Jackson was arrested outside of his girlfriend's apartment. His girlfriend, Annette Heathmon, told the police that Jackson forced his way into her apartment, assaulted her, threatened to kill her with a screwdriver, and raped her. At trial, Heathmon testified that Jackson had previously sexually and physically assaulted her but had never been convicted of a crime. The defense attempted to call police officers to testify that Jackson's girlfriend's previous accusations were unconvincing and unsubstantiated by the evidence. The court barred this testimony and also refused to allow the defense to cross-examine Heathmon regarding alleged prior acts of prostitution. The jury found Jackson guilty of burglary, battery with intent to commit a crime, first degree kidnapping with a deadly weapon, and two counts of sexual assault with a deadly weapon.
\nJackson appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Nevada and argued that the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence of Heathmon's previous accusations violated his right to present a defense. That court affirmed his conviction and stated that the excluded evidence was neither relevant nor material to his defense. Jackson then filed a habeas corpus claim based on the same argument. The district court denied his claim, holding that the state court's exclusion of police testimony did not violate Jackson's constitutional right to present a complete defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1573", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2319", "ID": "55973", "name": "United States v. Apel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1038", "docket": "12-1038", "term": "2013", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "John D. Apel", "facts": "The Department of the Air Force owns a section of land that Highway 1 crosses, and the Department has granted roadway easements to the State of California and Santa Barbara County. Highway 1 runs next to the main gate of Vandenberg Air Force Base (Vandenberg). Near the gate is a designated area for public protesting that falls under the Highway 1 easement.
\nJohn D. Apel was barred from Vandenberg's property in 2007 for trespassing. In 2010, while the order barring him was still in effect, he entered the designated protest area three times and was asked to leave. On all three occasions the respondent failed to leave. In two separate trials, Apel was convicted of three violations of a federal statute prohibiting a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter. Apel appealed, arguing that the federal statute requires that the base has exclusive possession over the area. The district court affirmed the convictions by holding that, under the terms of the easement, the land is subject to base rules and regulations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because the area is subject to an easement, the federal government does not have an exclusive right of possession, so the conviction cannot stand.
", "facts_len": "1316", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2320", "ID": "55974", "name": "Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-682", "docket": "12-682", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Schuette", "second_party": "Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, et al.", "facts": "In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit \"all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting.\" The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation.
", "facts_len": "1403", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2321", "ID": "55976", "name": "Mississippi, ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1036", "docket": "12-1036", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Mississippi, ex rel. James Hood, Attorney General", "second_party": "AU Optronics Corporation, et al.", "facts": "On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the CAFA.
\nThe State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable.
", "facts_len": "1145", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2322", "ID": "55975", "name": "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-515", "docket": "12-515", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Bay Mills Indian Community", "facts": "The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal-State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs' claims, while Bay Mills' sovereign immunity bars the others.
", "facts_len": "1092", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2323", "ID": "55977", "name": "BG Group PLC v. Argentina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-138", "docket": "12-138", "term": "2013", "first_party": "BG Group PLC", "second_party": "Republic of Argentina", "facts": "In the early 1990s, BG Group PLC (BG), a British company, made a major investment in Argentina's natural gas industry. Later, in the midst of an economic crisis, Argentina enacted an emergency law that required investors to collect tariff revenues in Argentinian pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. Given the weak international peso-to-dollar exchange rate, these changes that made it difficult for BG to see a return on its investment. Simultaneously, Argentina adopted legislation that stayed all lawsuits arising from the emergency measures. . BG sought recourse under a bilateral investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Treaty required that BG first attempt to resolve its dispute before a \"competent tribunal\" in Argentina for at least eighteen months. Instead, BG bypassed the Argentinian courts and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral panel, seated in Washington, D.C., held that Argentina's changes to its judicial system excused the eighteen-month precondition to arbitration and awarded BG over US$185 million in damages. Argentina petitioned the district court to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act by arguing that the arbitral panel exceeded its powers. The court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the determination of whether BG could submit its dispute directly to arbitration must be made by a court, not the arbitral tribunal.
", "facts_len": "1502", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2324", "ID": "55979", "name": "Stanton v. Sims", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1217", "docket": "12-1217", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Mike Stanton", "second_party": "Drendolyn Sims", "facts": "In the early hours of the morning on May 27, 2008, Officer Mike Stanton and his partner responded to a reported disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat in La Mesa, California. When the officers arrived at the location, they observed three men walking along the street, two of whom promptly turned into a nearby apartment complex while the third crossed the street in front of the police vehicle. Although he did not see a baseball bat, Stanton considered the behavior of this third man to be suspicious and ordered him to stop. The man continued walking into the residence and closed a gate behind him. With the gate closed, Stanton's view was blocked, and believing that the man had committed a jailable offense by refusing to stop, he decided to forcibly open the gate. Unbeknownst to Stanton, the residence's owner, Drendolyn Sims was standing behind the gate and was injured when Stanton opened it.
\nSims sued Stanton in federal district court and argued that he had unreasonably searched her home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Stanton and held that Stanton's entry was justified by the potential danger of the situation, Sims had a lesser expectation of privacy in the curtilage\u2014surrounding area\u2014of her home, and Stanton was entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Stanton's actions were unconstitutional because Sims was entitled to the same expectation of privacy in the curtilage of her home as she was in her home itself. The Court of Appeals also held that Stanton's warrantless entry was not justified because the man was only suspected of a misdemeanor and that Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity.
", "facts_len": "1782", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2325", "ID": "55983", "name": "Prado Navarette v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-9490", "docket": "12-9490", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale.
\nAt trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1596", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2326", "ID": "55978", "name": "Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-354", "docket": "13-354", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "second_party": "Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.", "facts": "The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
\nOn September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were \"persons\" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1752", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2327", "ID": "55980", "name": "Daimler AG v. Bauman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-965", "docket": "11-965", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Daimler AG", "second_party": "Barbara Bauman et al.", "facts": "The workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG (\"the company\"), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's \"Dirty War\" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels.
\nThe plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and held that it is reasonable for a California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state.
", "facts_len": "1400", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2328", "ID": "55985", "name": "Walden v. Fiore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-574", "docket": "12-574", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Anthony Walden", "second_party": "Gina Fiore, Keith Gipson", "facts": "In 2006 Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to San Juan, Puerto Rico before returning to Las Vegas by way of Atlanta, Georgia. The two are professional gamblers with residences in California and Las Vegas. At a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint in San Juan, Fiore and Gipson were subjected to heightened security because they were travelling on a one-way ticket. TSA officers search the gamblers luggage and found $97,000 in U.S. currency. San Juan Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers arrived and questioned the pair to determine whether the money was the proceeds of illegal drug trade. Fiore and Gipson stated that the cash was their seed money and winnings from gambling. The DEA let Fiore and Gipson board the plane to Atlanta with their luggage.
\nWhen Fiore and Gipson landed at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Anthony Walden and other DEA agents approached and questioned them. Fiore and Gipson repeated their story and produced records of their travels. When a drug-detecting dog pawed Gipson's bag once, Walden stated that he had probable cause to seize the cash and took both Fiore and Gipson's bags before allowing them to continue on to Las Vegas without the money. When Fiore and Gipson got to Las Vegas they sent records of their gambling earnings along with past tax returns to prove their status as professional gamblers to Walden. Walden refused to return the money and referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney in Georgia based on a false probable cause affidavit. The U.S. Attorney found no probable cause and ordered the money returned. The money was returned to Fiore and Gipson seven months after it was seized.
\nFiore and Gipson sued Walden in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have personal jurisdiction because Walden intentionally caused foreseeable harm in Nevada by falsifying the probable cause affidavit and attempting to secure the seized funds permanently for the Atlanta DEA.
", "facts_len": "2299", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2329", "ID": "55984", "name": "Fernandez v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-7822", "docket": "12-7822", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Walter Fernandez", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun.
\nAt trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented.
", "facts_len": "1459", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2330", "ID": "55988", "name": "Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-751", "docket": "12-751", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Fifth Third Bancorp, et al.", "second_party": "John Dudenhoeffer, et al.", "facts": "John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss.
", "facts_len": "1608", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2331", "ID": "55987", "name": "Abramski v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1493", "docket": "12-1493", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Bruce J. Abramski", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (\"ATF\") on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person.
\nIn June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a \"material fact\" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski.
\nAbramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld a \"material fact\" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2059", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2332", "ID": "55986", "name": "United States v. Quality Stores", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1408", "docket": "12-1408", "term": "2013", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Quality Stores Inc. et al.", "facts": "In October 2001, Quality Stores -- a national company -- and its affiliates commenced bankruptcy proceedings. When laying off employees, Quality Stores issued severance pay as part of its employees' gross income and reported the payments for federal income tax purposes as \"wages\" on W-2 forms. As required for \"wages\", the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax was paid on severance payments. FICA is a tax imposed on wages earned to fund Social Security and Medicare; both employer and employee pay part of the tax. The employee's part is withheld from his paycheck. Quality Stores contends that severance pay does not qualify as \"wages\", but rather payments under a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan that are not taxable under FICA. SUB is a corporate program that creates severance payments in the event of involuntary termination; SUB payments do not qualify as \"wages\" under FICA because they are given after termination of a job rather than for work completed.
\nBased on this line of reasoning, Quality Stores filed for a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS did not respond to Quality Stores' request for a refund, neither by allowing the claim nor denying it, and Quality Stores sued the IRS. The federal district court agreed with Quality Stores' view on severance payments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that severance pay satisfies the elements Congress set out to determine SUB payments, which therefore makes such payments exempt from FICA taxes.
", "facts_len": "1568", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2333", "ID": "55989", "name": "Kansas v. Cheever", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-609", "docket": "12-609", "term": "2013", "first_party": "State of Kansas", "second_party": "Scott D. Cheever", "facts": "On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels at the residence of Darrell and Belinda Coopers in Hilltop, Kansas. Samuels had gone to the Coopers' residence based on a tip to arrest Cheever for outstanding warrants. He found the Coopers, Cheever, and two others cooking and ingesting methamphetamines. In the following attempts to arrest Cheever and retrieve the injured Samuels, Cheever also shot at several other officers.
\nAt trial, Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. During the course of the trial, the judge ordered Cheever to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a psychiatric hired by the government. The prosecution sought to bring the transcript of the interview into evidence to impeach Cheever's testimony regarding the order of events at the Coopers' residence, which the court allowed. After the defense rested their case, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to the stand as a rebuttal witness to respond to the defense's claims regarding Cheever's mental capacity at the time of the crime. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist's testimony as a rebuttal witness. The jury found Cheever guilty and, at a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced him to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the admission of the government psychiatrist's testimony into evidence violated Cheever's Fifth Amendment rights.
", "facts_len": "1527", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2334", "ID": "55991", "name": "McCullen v. Coakley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1168", "docket": "12-1168", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Eleanor McCullen, Jean Zarrella, Gregory A. Smith, Eric Cadin, Cyril Shea, Mark Bashour, and Nancy Clark", "second_party": "Martha Coakley, Attorney General for the state of Massachusetts", "facts": "In 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in \"pro-life counseling\" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics.
", "facts_len": "857", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2335", "ID": "55990", "name": "Loughrin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-316", "docket": "13-316", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Kevin Loughrin", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "915", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2336", "ID": "55993", "name": "Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1184", "docket": "12-1184", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Octane Fitness, LLC", "second_party": "ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.", "facts": "ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) manufactures and sells exercise equipment throughout the United States. In 2000, ICON obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (the '710 patent) for a system designed to link parts in elliptical exercise machines. In 2010, ICON filed a complaint against another manufacturer and seller of exercise equipment, Octane Fitness (Octane), and claimed that Octane's elliptical design infringed upon the '710 patent.
\nThe federal district court held that Octane's design did not violate ICON's '710 patent. ICON appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Octane argued that ICON's lawsuit was not based on any real patent infringement, but instead aimed at hampering upstart competitors with expensive, frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, Octane asked the court to apply a patent law attorney fees statute, a statute that awards attorney fees when the plaintiff's suit is found to be \"exceptional.\" The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but found that ICON had not acted \"exceptionally\" under the statute.
", "facts_len": "1078", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2337", "ID": "55992", "name": "Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-815", "docket": "12-815", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Sprint Communications Company", "second_party": "Elizabeth S. Jacobs, et al.", "facts": "In January 2010, Sprint Communications Co. filed a complaint with the Iowa Utilities Board (\"IUB\") asking for a declaration that it was proper to withhold certain VoIP call access charges from Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom). Before IUB addressed the complaint, Sprint settled the dispute with Windstream and withdrew its complaint. However, IUB continued the proceeding so that it could decide a greater underlying issue of how VoIP communications should be classified under federal law. In February 2011, IUB issued an order with its own interpretation of VoIP's classification under federal law along with a determination that Sprint was liable to Windstream for the access charges.
\nSprint challenged IUB's order by filing a complaint in both state court and federal district court, alleging that federal law preempts the IUB's decision. In order to proceed with the federal complaint first, Sprint filed a motion to stay the state case until resolution of the federal case. In turn, the IUB filed a motion asking the federal court to abstain and dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Generally, this doctrine states that a federal court shall abstain from hearing a case if there is a threat of interference with a state court proceeding involving important state interests. The district court granted IUB's motion and dismissed Sprint's federal complaint. Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which upheld the district court's abstention, but determined that a stay on the federal proceedings was more appropriate than dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1622", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2338", "ID": "55994", "name": "Lexmark International v. Static Control Components", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-873", "docket": "12-873", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Lexmark International, Inc.", "second_party": "Static Control Components, Inc.", "facts": "Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing.
\nThe Sixth Circuit relied on the \"reasonable interest\" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest.
", "facts_len": "1115", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2339", "ID": "55995", "name": "Harris v. Quinn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-681", "docket": "11-681", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Pamela Harris, Ellen Bronfeld, Carole Gulo, Michelle Harris, Wendy Partridge, Theresa Riffey, Stephanie Yencer-Price, Susan Watts, and Patricia Withers", "second_party": "Pat Quinn, in his official capacity as governor of the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, SEIU Local 73, and AFSCME Council 31", "facts": "Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in-home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Disabilities Program). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services (Rehabilitation Program). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a \"fair share\" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009.
\nIn 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review.
", "facts_len": "1586", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2340", "ID": "55996", "name": "Petrella v. MGM, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1315", "docket": "12-1315", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Paula Petrella", "second_party": "Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., et al.", "facts": "After Jake LaMotta retired from boxing, he and Frank Peter Petrella (F. Petrella) created two screenplays and a book based on LaMotta's life. These works were registered with the United States Copyright Office in 1963, 1973, and 1970, respectively. In 1976, LaMotta and F. Petrella signed a written agreement that granted the exclusive rights to the book and the screenplays to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc, which in turn assigned those rights to a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (MGM), United Artists Corporation. In 1980, United Artists Corporation registered a copyright for the film \"Raging Bull\" based on LaMotta and F. Petrella's work. When F. Petrella died in 1981, which was still within the original 28-year period of the copyright, his renewal rights passed to his heirs.
\nIn 1991, Paula Petrella (Petrella), the daughter of F. Petrella, filed an application for the renewal of copyright rights on the 1963 screenplay. In 1998, Petrella's attorney contacted MGM and asserted that Petrella had obtained the rights to the screenplay and its derivative works, which included the movie \"Raging Bull,\" and that MGM was infringing on those rights. MGM argued that the 1963 screenplay was a collaboration between LaMotta and F. Petrella, so MGM retained the rights to the screenplay under the agreement with LaMotta. MGM also argued that there was no \"substantial similarity of protectable elements\" between the 1963 screenplay and the film. In 2009, Petrella sued MGM for copyright infringement, and the federal district court granted summary judgment for MGM under the doctrine of laches, which prevents a legal claim from being enforced if a long delay in filing the claim adversely affected the defendant's ability to fight the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1835", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2341", "ID": "55997", "name": "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-315", "docket": "12-315", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation", "second_party": "William L. Hoeper", "facts": "Section 125 of the Aviation Transportation Safety Act (ATSA) states that an air carrier who voluntarily reports suspicious transactions or behavior shall not be \"civilly liable.\" The immunity does not apply to disclosures made with \"actual knowledge\" that the disclosure is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Likewise, the immunity does not extend to an air carrier that makes a disclosure with \"reckless disregard\" as to its truth or falsity.
\nWilliam Hoeper, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, made four unsuccessful attempts to become certified to fly another type of aircraft after Air Wisconsin discontinued use of the type of plane that Hoeper had previously piloted. During his fourth and final opportunity to pass the test, Hoeper abruptly ended the test because he believed that the test administrators were deliberately sabotaging his efforts to pass. One test administrator knew that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had issued a firearm to Hoeper in his role as a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). FFDO pilots are not allowed to carry the firearm while traveling as passengers. This administrator booked Hoeper on a flight from the testing center in Virginia to Hoeper's home in Denver and then called the TSA to report that Hoeper was a disgruntled, and possibly armed, employee. In response, TSA officials arrested and searched Hoeper.
\nHoeper sued Air Wisconsin in a Colorado state court and alleged defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that it was immune from civil liability under ATSA. Air Wisconsin also argued that Hoeper could not prove \"actual malice\" because its statements were \"substantially true\" and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The jury found that Air Wisconsin's statements to the TSA were false and that it made at least one statement with reckless disregard for the truth, so the jury awarded Hoeper damages. A Colorado appellate court affirmed the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court's submission of the matter to the jury was improper; however, the error was harmless in this case because Air Wisconsin was not entitled to claim immunity under ATSA. The Colorado Supreme Court further held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were false.
", "facts_len": "2410", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2342", "ID": "55998", "name": "Wood v. Moss", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-115", "docket": "13-115", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Tim Wood et al.", "second_party": "Michael Moss et al.", "facts": "During the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush's team scheduled a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. With the approval of local law enforcement agencies, opponents of President Bush organized a peaceful demonstration to protest his policies. The demonstration took place at a public park before moving to the street near the local inn where the President was staying. Eventually, both opponents and supporters of President Bush gathered on the street of near the entrance to the inn, and each group had equal access to deliver its message to the President at the time of his arrival. Before the President arrived, Secret Service agents ordered local police to push protestors away from the immediate area for security reasons. The agents then ordered that the protesters be driven farther away from the inn onto the east side of 5th street. However, agents failed to give the same directive for supporters who remained stationed on the streets close to the inn. The plaintiffs alleged that the orders to move were unintelligibly given and that police proceeded to use force before confirming that the orders were understood or were being followed.
", "facts_len": "1176", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2343", "ID": "55999", "name": "Burt v. Titlow", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-414", "docket": "12-414", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Sherry L. Burt, Warden", "second_party": "Vonlee Nicole Titlow", "facts": "In August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke to a sheriff's deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy's advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea.
\nFollowing his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so.
\nTitlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\"). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow's original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take the plea bargain.
", "facts_len": "1713", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2344", "ID": "56000", "name": "Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1128", "docket": "12-1128", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Medtronic Inc", "second_party": "Boston Scientific Corp. et al.", "facts": "Between 1969 and 1980, Dr. Morton Mower worked with Dr. Mieczyslaw Mirowski to develop the implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) and the cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT), both devices that are meant to treat different kinds of heart failure. Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) held both patents and licensed them to Guidant Corp. In 1991, Medtronic, a manufacturer of medical devices and equipment, entered into a sublicense agreement with Eli Lilly & Co., Guidant Corp's predecessor-in-interest regarding these patents. The agreement obligated MFV to inform Medtronic which items were covered by which patents, and if Medtronic disagreed, Medtronic could retain patent rights and file for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement on the patents. In October and November of 2007, MFV identified several Medtronic products that it believed infringed on its patents, and Medtronic subsequently sued for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.
\nIn the bench trial in district court, the court, relying on precedent, stated that the patent holder bears the burden of proving that infringement occurred and found in favor of Medtronic. MFV appealed and argued that the burden falls on the alleged patent infringer to prove that infringement did not occur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because Medtronic is the party seeking relief from the court, it bears the burden to prove that it did not infringe on MFV's patents.
", "facts_len": "1495", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2345", "ID": "56001", "name": "Atlantic Marine Construction Company v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-929", "docket": "12-929", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Atlantic Marine Construction Company", "second_party": "U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas", "facts": "In 2009 the U.S. Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction Company (Atlantic) to build a child development center at Fort Hood, a military base located in the western district of Texas. Atlantic then subcontracted with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) to provide labor and materials. The subcontract agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that any dispute would be litigated in Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Despite this clause, J-Crew brought suit against Atlantic in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for failure to pay for work J-Crew performed.
\nAtlantic moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a71406, arguing that the forum selection clause required the suit to be brought in Virginia. Atlantic also moved, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. \u00a71404(a). The district court denied Atlantic's motions, holding that Atlantic did not show why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of Virginia. Atlantic petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Virginia. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and venue was proper in the Texas court because the parties entered into and performed the agreement in that district.
", "facts_len": "1575", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2346", "ID": "56002", "name": "Madigan v. Levin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-872", "docket": "12-872", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Lisa Madigan et al.", "second_party": "Harvey N. Levin", "facts": "Harvey N. Levin was hired as an Illinois Assistant District Attorney on September 5, 2000. On May 12, 2006 when he was fired, Levin was over the age of sixty, and he believed that he was fired due to his age and gender. He was replaced by a female attorney in her thirties. Levin sued the state of Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in both her individual and official capacities, and four other Attorney General employees under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit by arguing that either the claim under the ADEA precluded the Civil Rights Act claim or that they were entitled to qualified immunity under the ADEA. The district court originally ruled that the ADEA did not prevent the claim from proceeding under the Civil Rights Act and granted the qualified immunity. After the case was reassigned to a different district court judge, the district court held that Levin was not an employee for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, so he could not pursue those claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1275", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2347", "ID": "56003", "name": "White v. Woodall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-794", "docket": "12-794", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Randy White, Warden", "second_party": "Robert Keith Woodall", "facts": "On January 25, 1997, a sixteen-year-old girl was kidnapped, murdered, and raped. After an investigation, the police arrested Robert Woodall, who subsequently pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At trial, Woodall invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination and declined to testify, and so he asked the judge to instruct the jury not to make any adverse inferences from that decision. The judge refused to issue the \"no adverse inference\" instruction and stated that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The jury found Woodall guilty on all charges and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty and two subsequent life sentences.
\nWoodall appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed both Woodall's conviction and sentence. In 2006, Woodall filed a habeus corpus petition in federal court, and that court held that the trial court violated Woodall's Fifth Amendment right when it refused to offer the requested jury instruction. In addition, that court also held that Woodall's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court allowed the state to dismiss an African-American juror without a mandatory hearing for cause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of self-incrimination but did not address the other issues.
", "facts_len": "1466", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2348", "ID": "56005", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1281", "docket": "12-1281", "term": "2013", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "Noel Canning", "facts": "The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five-year terms.
\nIn 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 (Union). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning.
\nNoel Canning appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress.
", "facts_len": "2718", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "2349", "ID": "56004", "name": "Chadbourne and Parke LLP v. Troice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-79", "docket": "12-79", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Chadbourne and Parke LLP", "second_party": "Samuel Troice et al.", "facts": "In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a \"covered security.\" The term \"covered security\" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company.
\nIn 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of \"covered securities.\" The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as \"covered\" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1938", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2350", "ID": "56006", "name": "Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1200", "docket": "12-1200", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Executive Benefits Insurance Agency", "second_party": "Peter H. Arkison", "facts": "Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long-time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA). Pearce then deposited over $100,000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed.
\nOn appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court.
", "facts_len": "1458", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2351", "ID": "56007", "name": "Plumhoff v. Rickard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1117", "docket": "12-1117", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Vance Plumhoff", "second_party": "Whitne Rickard", "facts": "At midnight on July 18, 2004, West Memphis Police Officer Forthman pulled over Donald Rickard's vehicle because of an inoperable headlight. After Officer Forthman noticed damage on the vehicle and asked Rickard to step out of the car, Rickard sped away. Officer Forthman called for backup and pursued Rickard from West Memphis, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee. The police officers were ordered to continue the pursuit across the border and ultimately surrounded Rickard in a parking lot in Memphis, Tennessee. When Rickard again attempted to flee, the police fired shots into the vehicle, ultimately killing both Rickard and Kelley Allen, a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle. The entire exchange was captured on police video.
\nRickard and Allen's families sued the police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor of West Memphis under federal and state law claims. The families argued that the police used excessive force when pursuing and ultimately killing Rickard and Allen and that using that force violated the Fourth Amendment. They also brought claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. The government argued that, because the police acted in their official capacity, they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from any lawsuit. The district court refused to dismiss the case against the government, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity only applies when officers are acting reasonably, and after reviewing subsequent cases, held that the police did not act reasonably in this case. Additionally, because the video evidence showed that the police fired on unarmed, fleeing drivers, a jury could determine that the police were not acting reasonably.
", "facts_len": "1905", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2352", "ID": "56009", "name": "United States v. Woods", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-562", "docket": "12-562", "term": "2013", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Gary Woods et al.", "facts": "In 1999, Gary Woods and Billy McCombs became investors in two partnerships. Those partnerships then transferred their assets to a corporation that was jointly owned by Woods and McCombs, which caused the partnerships to be considered liquidated for tax purposes. Because the value of a liquidated asset is equal to the partner's basis in the investment, the partnerships reported their losses on their tax reports as equal to the purchased options Woods' and McCombs' separate companies originally contributed to the partnerships. After conducting an audit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the partnership transactions served no business purpose and were solely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore they had no legal basis and the IRS did not consider the partnerships valid. The IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties for understatements of income and gross valuation misstatements.
\nIn 2005, Woods (as the tax matters representative for the partnership) brought the matter before a district court and argued that penalties were inappropriate because the tax consequences of the transactions were accurately reported. The district court held that the transactions \"lacked economic substance\" and that their reported losses should be disregarded. The court also held that, because the transactions had no economic substance, the valuation misstatement penalties did not apply. The United States appealed the decision with regard to the valuation misstatement penalties, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.
", "facts_len": "1596", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2353", "ID": "56010", "name": "Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-99", "docket": "12-99", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Unite Here Local 355", "second_party": "Martin Mulhall, et al.", "facts": "On August 23, 2004, Unite Here Local 355 (UHL) entered an agreement with Mardi Gras Gaming (Mardi Gras), the owner of a casino and dog track in Florida. Under the terms of the agreement, UHL would pay for advertisements to support a gambling ballot initiative that Mardi Gras wanted to pass, and Mardi Gras would facilitate the union organizing Mardi Gras' workers by providing the union with access to work premises, employee information, and neutrality toward the unionization of their employees. UHL also agreed not to strike, protest, picket or otherwise pressure the company's business.
\nMartin Mulhall, a Mardi Gras employee, sued both Mardi Gras, and UHL. He opposed the agreement and argued that it violates the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which prohibits an employer giving or a union receiving a \"thing of value.\" The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that Mulhall was not injured by UHL merely seeking to represent him. Mulhall appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mulhall appealed again and the Court of Appeals again reversed and remanded.
", "facts_len": "1241", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2354", "ID": "56012", "name": "Town of Greece v. Galloway", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-696", "docket": "12-696", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Town of Greece, NY", "second_party": "Susan Galloway et al.", "facts": "The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented.
\nIn February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers.
", "facts_len": "1206", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2355", "ID": "56014", "name": "McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-536", "docket": "12-536", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Shaun McCutcheon, et al.", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor\u2014defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations\u2014may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation.
\nShaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a \"cognizable government interest\" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.
", "facts_len": "1219", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2356", "ID": "56011", "name": "Kaley v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-464", "docket": "12-464", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Kerri L. Kaley and Brian P. Kaley", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys.
\nFollowing the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded.
\nOn remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys' offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1582", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2357", "ID": "56015", "name": "Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1094", "docket": "12-1094", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Terry Cline, et al.", "second_party": "Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice", "facts": "In 2011, the Oklahoma state legislature passed a bill that restricts the use of abortion-inducing drugs to the uses described on their Federal Drug Administration (FDA) labels. The law criminalizes the use of these drugs in alternative combinations, known as \"off-label uses,\" that have been found to produce safer, less costly abortions. Before the law took effect, the Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice and Nova Health Systems sued the state in state district court and sought an injunction to prohibit enforcement of the law. They argued that the law effectively banned abortions in violation of both the state and federal constitutions. The state district court held the law unconstitutional and the state officials appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state law conflicted with Supreme Court rulings that protected a woman's right to seek an abortion and was therefore unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "953", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2358", "ID": "56016", "name": "Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-1507", "docket": "11-1507", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Township of Mount Holly", "second_party": "Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.", "facts": "The Gardens is a low-income neighborhood in the Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey. African American and Hispanic residents made up most of the occupants of the neighborhood's 329 homes. Problems relating to crowding, vacant properties, and crime have long plagued the Gardens. Shortly after designating the area \"in need of development\" in 2000, the Township began acquiring properties and instituted a series of redevelopment plans over the next several years. Each plan called for the demolition of most, if not all, of the original homes in the neighborhood and the construction of new, more expensive homes in their place. The number and type of affordable-housing units available to existing Gardens residents varied in each plan.
\nIn 2003, Citizens in Action sued the Township in state court and alleged violations of New Jersey redevelopment and antidiscrimination laws. The court dismissed some of their claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Township on other claims. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action and a number of current and former Gardens residents sued in federal court in 2008 and argued that the Township's actions violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and other federal antidiscrimination laws. The FHA makes it unlawful to \"refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.\" The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township by ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the plans had a racially disparate impact under the FHA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the plaintiffs had indeed presented a prima facie case of discrimination and that material questions of fact relating to less discriminatory alternatives available to the Township remained open.
", "facts_len": "1880", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2359", "ID": "56017", "name": "Highmark v. Allcare Management Systems", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1163", "docket": "12-1163", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Highmark, Inc.", "second_party": "Allcare Management Systems, Inc.", "facts": "The Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim.
", "facts_len": "1216", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2360", "ID": "56019", "name": "United States v. Castleman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1371", "docket": "12-1371", "term": "2013", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "James Alvin Castleman", "facts": "In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court and charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "994", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2361", "ID": "56021", "name": "United States Forest Service v. Pacific Rivers Council", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-623", "docket": "12-623", "term": "2012", "first_party": "United States Forest Service, et al.", "second_party": "Pacific Rivers Council", "facts": "In 2001, the United States Forest Service (\"Forest Service\") produced a study into the aquatic and river systems in the Sierra Nevada mountain range. As a result of this study, the Forest Service issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement that set new standards designed to protect and repair the aquatic and river systems in that area. In 2004, the Forest Service amended these standards and recommended considerable changes to other existing programs.
\nFollowing this change, the Pacific Rivers Council filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging that the changes to the Environmental Impact Statement violated provisions of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. The Pacific Rivers Council appealed.
\nThe Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. First, that court held that the amended 2004 Environmental Impact Statement failed to adequately account for the specific environmental impacts that the standards may have on fish in the Sierra Nevada. This lack of analysis violated the NEPA and the APA. The 2004 statement did, however, adequately analyze the effect that the new standards may have on amphibians. Therefore, the new standards with respect to amphibians did not violate either the NEPA or the APA. The Forest Service appealed.
", "facts_len": "1489", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2362", "ID": "56020", "name": "Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1173", "docket": "12-1173", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Brandt Revocable Trust, et al", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming\u23afland that surrounds the ROW\u23afto Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1249", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Private Action"}, {"": "2363", "ID": "56023", "name": "Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-992", "docket": "12-992", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Ray Haluch Gravel Co. et al.", "second_party": "Central Pension Fund et al.", "facts": "A collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2364", "ID": "56024", "name": "Ford Motor Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-113", "docket": "13-113", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Ford Motor Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is entitled to interest from the government for the period between the date of overpayment and the ultimate refund, but the \"date of overpayment\" is not specifically defined.
\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) informed the Ford Motor Company (Ford) that it had underpaid on its taxes between 1983 and 1989. Ford subsequently submitted deposits to the IRS that covered the underpayment. Ford later requested that the deposits be considered to cover additional taxes that Ford owed. The parties eventually determined that Ford had overpaid its taxes and was owed a refund. Ford argued that the date of overpayment was the date that it first submitted the deposits to the IRS for the underpayment of taxes, and the Government argued that the date of overpayment was the date when Ford requested that the payment cover additional taxes. Ford sued the Government in federal district court, and the court found in favor of the Government. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1044", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2365", "ID": "56022", "name": "Rosemond v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-895", "docket": "12-895", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Justus C. Rosemond", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aiding and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond \"intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm\" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction.
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2366", "ID": "56025", "name": "Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-317", "docket": "13-317", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Halliburton Co., et al", "second_party": "Erica P. John Fund, Inc.", "facts": "Former shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for class certification, the shareholders invoked the \"fraud on the market\" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide reliance on Halliburton's statements. The \"fraud on the market\" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.
", "facts_len": "1139", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2367", "ID": "56028", "name": "Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1182", "docket": "12-1182", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Environmental Protection Agency, et al.", "second_party": "EME Homer City Generation, L.P., et al.", "facts": "The Clean Air Act creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible spread of air pollution from \"upwind\" states to \"downwind\" states.
\nIn 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission reduction standards for 28 \"upwind\" states based on the air quality standards in \"downwind\" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution.
", "facts_len": "1048", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2368", "ID": "56027", "name": "Lawson and Zang v. FMR, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-3", "docket": "12-3", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang", "second_party": "FMR LLC, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged.
\nZang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated \"whistleblower\" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act.
", "facts_len": "1554", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2369", "ID": "56029", "name": "Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-820", "docket": "12-820", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Manuel Jose Lozano", "second_party": "Diana Lucia Montoya Alvarez", "facts": "Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally \"very happy together.\" In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved.
\nAfter Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in U.S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would cause undue harm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1224", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2370", "ID": "56030", "name": "Paroline v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-8561", "docket": "12-8561", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Doyle Randall Paroline", "second_party": "United States and Amy Unknown", "facts": "Doyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, the Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate cause of the injuries for which restitution was sought. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses.
", "facts_len": "943", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2371", "ID": "56032", "name": "Lane v. Franks", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-483", "docket": "13-483", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Edward Lane", "second_party": "Steven Franks", "facts": "In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth (\"CITY\") program at Central Alabama Community College (\"CACC\"). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public employee.
", "facts_len": "1287", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2372", "ID": "56031", "name": "Burrage v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-7515", "docket": "12-7515", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Marcus Burrage", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.
", "facts_len": "838", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2373", "ID": "56034", "name": "Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-462", "docket": "12-462", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Northwest, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "S. Binyomin Ginsberg", "facts": "S. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.
\nAt trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2374", "ID": "56033", "name": "Hall v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-10882", "docket": "12-10882", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Freddie Lee Hall", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
\nHall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with \"unquantifiable weight,\" and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
\nIn 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test\u2014whether he had an IQ below 70\u2014could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2423", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2375", "ID": "56035", "name": "Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-417", "docket": "12-417", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Clifton Sandifer, et al.", "second_party": "United States Steel Corporation", "facts": "Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent \"changing clothes.\" United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time.
\nThe company appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.
", "facts_len": "868", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2376", "ID": "56036", "name": "Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-729", "docket": "12-729", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Julie Heimeshoff", "second_party": "Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. and Walmart Stores", "facts": "Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007.
\nHeimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2377", "ID": "56038", "name": "Bond v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-158", "docket": "12-158", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Carol Anne Bond", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act).
\nIn the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.
", "facts_len": "1437", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2378", "ID": "56037", "name": "Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-930", "docket": "12-930", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Lori Scialabba, Acting Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, et al.", "second_party": "Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio, et al.", "facts": "The respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the U.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had \"aged out\" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas.
\nIn 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, the respondents filed two cases in federal district court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed.
", "facts_len": "1542", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2379", "ID": "56041", "name": "Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/12-1226", "docket": "12-1226", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Peggy Young", "second_party": "United Parcel Service, Inc.", "facts": "Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter.
\nYoung sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1424", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2380", "ID": "56045", "name": "M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1010", "docket": "13-1010", "term": "2014", "first_party": "M&G Polymers USA, et al.", "second_party": "Hobert Freel Tackett, et al.", "facts": "Retirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia\u23afowned by M&G since 2000\u23afsued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that \"capped\", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that \"capping\" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
\nThe district court dismissed the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement.
", "facts_len": "1723", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2381", "ID": "56043", "name": "Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S. ex rel. Carter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/12-1497", "docket": "12-1497", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.", "second_party": "United States, ex rel. Benjamin Carter", "facts": "In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a U.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the U.S. Government for services rendered in Iraq.
\nIn 2010, just before trial, the U.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter\u2019s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA\u2019s \u201cfirst-to-file\u201d requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA\u2019s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter\u2019s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter\u2019s complaint, but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter\u2019s claim from proceeding.
", "facts_len": "1505", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2382", "ID": "56050", "name": "Chen v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-10400", "docket": "13-10400", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Bobby Chen", "second_party": "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, et al.", "facts": "Bobby Chen was the owner of a residential property that was damaged when the city of Baltimore and the city's contractor P & J Contracting Company were in the process of razing the adjacent rowhouse. Chen originally sued in 2009 and alleged that, instead of repairing the damage they had caused, the defendants razed Chen's property on the pretext that it was an unsafe structure. The court dismissed the case later in 2009 due to Chen's failure to meet various procedural deadlines. Chen filed a second action in 2011, but when the clerk of the court issued summonses, they were returned as undeliverable and the 120-day limit for the period of service lapsed. The court issued an order requiring Chen to show cause about why his case should not be dismissed, and Chen sought an extension of time to effect service of process. The court granted Chen a further 60-day extension, and he was warned that failure to effect service of process during this time would result in dismissal. The 60-day period expired and the defendant moved for dismissal, which the trial court granted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1177", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2383", "ID": "56048", "name": "Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1032", "docket": "13-1032", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Direct Marketing Association", "second_party": "Barbara Brohl, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Revenue", "facts": "Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of Revenue. Retailers that do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties.
\nIn June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)\u2014a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet\u2014sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort.
", "facts_len": "1648", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2384", "ID": "56046", "name": "Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1019", "docket": "13-1019", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Mach Mining, LLC", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC (Mach Mining) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants' behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate.
\nNonetheless, the court certified the question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure-to-conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure-to-conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases.
", "facts_len": "1527", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2385", "ID": "56049", "name": "Mellouli v. Lynch", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1034", "docket": "13-1034", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Moones Mellouli", "second_party": "Loretta Lynch, Attorney General", "facts": "In 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law \"relating to a controlled substance\" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable.
\nIn immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily \"relate to a controlled substance\" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is \"related to a controlled substance,\" and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in light of the INA's use of the general term \"relating to\" instead of a more specific term like \"involving.\"
", "facts_len": "1680", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2386", "ID": "56051", "name": "Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1041", "docket": "13-1041", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, et al.", "second_party": "Mortgage Bankers Association, et al.", "facts": "The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those \"employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity\u2026or in the capacity of outside salesman.\"
\nMortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the definition of \"administrative\" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's 2010 interpretation.
", "facts_len": "1485", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2387", "ID": "56053", "name": "United States v. Kwai Fun Wong", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1074", "docket": "13-1074", "term": "2014", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Kwai Fun Wong", "facts": "Kwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for unlawful entry into the U.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied.
\nFollowing denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the U.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong\u2019s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was \u201cjurisdictional\u201d and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or\u00a0delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline.
\nThis case was consolidated with\u00a0United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run until she had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in\u00a0Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was \u201cjurisdictional,\u201d and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe.
", "facts_len": "2189", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2388", "ID": "56056", "name": "U.S. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1080", "docket": "13-1080", "term": "2014", "first_party": "U.S. Department of Transportation, et al.", "second_party": "Association of American Railroads", "facts": "In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity.
\nThe district court rejected the AAR\u2019s argument, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.
", "facts_len": "1204", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2389", "ID": "56063", "name": "Johnson v. City of Shelby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1318", "docket": "13-1318", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Tracey L. Johnson, et al.", "second_party": "City of Shelby, Mississippi", "facts": "Tracey L. Johnson and David James, Jr., were police officers for the city of Shelby, Mississippi. In September 2009, the city's board of aldermen, which has sole authority over the city's employment decisions, fired Johnson and James supposedly for violations of police procedure and residents' rights. Johnson and James sued the city in district court and argued that they were fired because they refused to ignore the criminal activities of Harold Billings, one of the city's aldermen. Therefore, the city's decision to fire Johnson and James violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights and maliciously interfered with their employment in violation of state law. The city moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Johnson and James failed to include a civil action for deprivation of rights under Section 1983 in their complaint. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and denied James and Johnson's subsequent motion to amend their complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decisions.
", "facts_len": "1078", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2390", "ID": "56057", "name": "Gelboim v. Bank of America", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1174", "docket": "13-1174", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Ellen Gelboim", "second_party": "Bank of America Corp., et al.", "facts": "The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is a daily interest rate benchmark that is used to help set the interest rate of financial transactions across the globe. Between August 2007 and May 2010, it has been alleged that the LIBOR rate was artificially manipulated downward by a number of colluding financial institutions. Ellen Gelboim was one of many parties to file individual suits against these financial institutions. Given the large number of cases, Gelboim's case was consolidated with a number of other similar cases for pre-trial purposes. During this pre-trial phase, the district court dismissed a number of the cases, including Gelboim's, for failure to state a claim. Gelboim sought to appeal the dismissal, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Gelboim's appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court had not entered a final order concerning all the claims in the consolidated action.
", "facts_len": "977", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2391", "ID": "56061", "name": "Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1211", "docket": "13-1211", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Hana Financial, Inc.", "second_party": "Hana Bank, et al.", "facts": "In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name \"Hana Overseas Korean Club\" in English as well as \"Hana Bank\" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the \"dancing man.\" A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words \"Hana Financial\" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other.
\nIn 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the \"Hana Bank\" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the \"Hana Financial\" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be \"tacked\" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase \"Hana Bank.\" HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be \"tacked\" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision.
", "facts_len": "1496", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2392", "ID": "56062", "name": "Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1314", "docket": "13-1314", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Arizona State Legislature", "second_party": "Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.", "facts": "Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC).
\nIn 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution.
", "facts_len": "1011", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2393", "ID": "56058", "name": "City of Los Angeles v. Patel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1175", "docket": "13-1175", "term": "2014", "first_party": "City of Los Angeles", "second_party": "Naranjibhai Patel, et al.", "facts": "Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are \"closely regulated\" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections.
\nThe district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized \"closely regulated\" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels do not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private \"papers\" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre-compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records.
", "facts_len": "1337", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2394", "ID": "56069", "name": "Ohio v. Clark", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1352", "docket": "13-1352", "term": "2014", "first_party": "State of Ohio", "second_party": "Darius Clark", "facts": "On March 17, 2010, a preschool teacher at Cleveland's William Patrick Day Head Start Center noticed some facial injuries on one of her three-year-old students. When the teacher inquired about the injuries, the student indicated that his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark, caused them. The teacher forwarded her concerns to a child-abuse hotline, which resulted in the arrest and subsequent charging of Clark for child abuse.
\nPrior to trial, a judge ruled the three-year-old child was incompetent to testify but refused to exclude the child's out-of-court identification of Clark as his abuser. Clark was found guilty. On appeal Clark claimed that the admission of the child's out-of-court statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's ruling and held that, because state law required the teacher to report suspected incidences of child abuse, the teacher was acting as an agent for law enforcement when inquiring about the child's injuries. Therefore, the child's out-of-court statements could only be admitted if the primary purpose of the teacher's questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, as opposed to attempting to establish past events. Because the child was not in immediate danger of further injury, the out-of-court statement could not be admitted.
", "facts_len": "1371", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2395", "ID": "56072", "name": "Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1371", "docket": "13-1371", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.", "second_party": "The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.", "facts": "Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low-income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a non-profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
\nAt trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch , the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act.
", "facts_len": "1879", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2396", "ID": "56066", "name": "Coleman v. Tollefson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1333", "docket": "13-1333", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Andre Lee Coleman", "second_party": "Todd Tollefson, et al.", "facts": "The \"three strikes\" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis.
\nThe district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a \"strike.\"
", "facts_len": "1256", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2397", "ID": "56075", "name": "City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1412", "docket": "13-1412", "term": "2014", "first_party": "City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.", "second_party": "Teresa Sheehan", "facts": "Teresa Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and lived in a San Francisco group home. After Sheehan threatened her social worker when he attempted to perform a welfare check, he became concerned that she was a danger to herself or others and summoned the police for help transporting her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the police officers arrived, they entered Sheehan's room without a warrant to take her into custody. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers. They were forced to withdraw outside her room and call for backup, but instead of waiting for the backup to arrive, they drew their weapons and forced their way back into her room. When Sheehan again threatened the officers with a knife, they shot her several times.
\nSheehan sued the officers and the city for violations of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Sheehan appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' second entry into Sheehan's room was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan's disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
", "facts_len": "1429", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2398", "ID": "56074", "name": "Kerry v. Din", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1402", "docket": "13-1402", "term": "2014", "first_party": "John Kerry, Secretary of State", "second_party": "Fauzia Din", "facts": "Fauzia Din, who is a United States citizen, filed a visa petition for her husband Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Nine months later, the State Department denied the petition based on a broad provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that excludes aliens on terrorism-related grounds. Berashk asked for clarification of the visa denial and was told that it is not possible for the Embassy to provide him with a detailed explanation of the reasons for denial.
\nAfter several other unsuccessful attempts to receive explanation of the visa denial, Din sued and argued that denying notice for aliens who were not granted a visa based on terrorism grounds is unconstitutional. The district court held that Din did not have standing to challenge the visa denial notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the government is required to give notice of reasons for visa denial based on terrorism grounds.
", "facts_len": "976", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2399", "ID": "56078", "name": "Davis v. Ayala", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1428", "docket": "13-1428", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Ron Davis, Acting Warden", "second_party": "Hector Ayala", "facts": "Hector Ayala, a Hispanic man, was charged with three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder stemming from a failed robbery. During jury selection for his trial in California state court, the prosecution used seven preemptory challenges to exclude each black or Hispanic prospective juror. Ayala challenged the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges as a violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In accordance with Batson, if a party can make a prima facie showing that preemptory challenges are being used in a racially motivated way, the other party must give a non-racially motivated reason for their use of the preemptory challenges. The state court allowed the prosecution to give their non-racially motivated reasons in a closed hearing, from which Ayala and his attorneys were excluded, and subsequently found the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges was not racially motivated. Ayala was not given the prosecution's reasoning or a transcript of the meeting until after the conclusion of his trial. Additionally, after the trial it was discovered that the vast majority of the questionnaires all the potential jurors had to fill out had been lost. Ayala was found guilty of the majority of the charges against him and sentenced to death.
\nOn appeal, the California Supreme Court found that the state court erred in excluding Ayala from the Batson hearing, but that error as well as the loss of the questionnaires were harmless, and therefore upheld Ayala's conviction. Ayala appealed to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Batson hearing procedure and loss of the questionnaires violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the appellate court found that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Ayala's claims of federal constitutional violations on the merits largely on the basis that the California Court had determined the procedure used for the Batson hearing violated California state law; therefore the appellate court reviewed Ayala's claims de novo and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing, as well as the loss of the questionnaires, violated Ayala's constitutional rights. To determine whether the errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson , which asked whether the errors had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury's verdict, and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing deprived him of the ability to prevail on a compelling Batson challenge.
", "facts_len": "2854", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2400", "ID": "56080", "name": "Henderson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1487", "docket": "13-1487", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Tony Henderson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Tony Henderson was a former United States Border Patrol Agent who was charged with, among other crimes, distribution of marijuana. On June 9, 2006, two days after he was arrested, Henderson voluntarily turned 19 firearms over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which he argued was for \"safekeeping as a condition of the bond.\" He later pled guilty to his narcotics charges.
\nIn 2008 and 2009, Henderson requested that the FBI return his firearms so that he could transfer them to a purported buyer, but the FBI refused to do so. Henderson then moved the district court to allow him to transfer the firearms to the 2009 buyer or his wife. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion because Henderson was a convicted felon, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Henderson appealed and argued that, because he had not been given notice that his guilty plea would disqualify him from firearm ownership, he is entitled to relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1066", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2401", "ID": "56081", "name": "Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1499", "docket": "13-1499", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Lanell Williams-Yulee", "second_party": "The Florida Bar", "facts": "During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the \"community Public Defender\" \u2013 although her title was \"assistant public defender\" \u2013 and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running.
\nThe Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.
", "facts_len": "992", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2402", "ID": "56082", "name": "Oneok, Inc. et al. v. Learjet, Inc. et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-271", "docket": "13-271", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Oneok, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "Learjet, Inc. et al.", "facts": "Learjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000\u20132002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet claimed that Oneok reported false data and engaged in \"wash sales,\" which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as retail prices. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted.
", "facts_len": "1138", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2403", "ID": "56079", "name": "Brumfield v. Cain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1433", "docket": "13-1433", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Kevan Brumfield", "second_party": "Burl Cain", "facts": "In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation.
\nBrumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
", "facts_len": "2250", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2404", "ID": "56085", "name": "Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-433", "docket": "13-433", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc.", "second_party": "Jesse Busk, et al.", "facts": "Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws.
\nThe district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were \"integral and indispensable\" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable.
", "facts_len": "1556", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2405", "ID": "56083", "name": "B&B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Industries Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-352", "docket": "13-352", "term": "2014", "first_party": "B&B Hardware Inc.", "second_party": "Hargis Industries Inc.", "facts": "B&B Hardware (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark \"Sealtight,\" which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark \"Sealtite\" in the construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court.
", "facts_len": "1022", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2406", "ID": "56086", "name": "Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-435", "docket": "13-435", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Omnicare, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "Indiana State District Council of Laborers and Hod Carriers Pension and Welfare Fund, et al.", "facts": "Plaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under \u00a711 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal activities that included kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering.
\nThe original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under \u00a711 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under \u00a711 and remanded the case to district court.
", "facts_len": "1673", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2407", "ID": "56091", "name": "Reed et al. v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-502", "docket": "13-502", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Clyde Reed, et al.", "second_party": "Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al.", "facts": "Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
\nThe district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.
", "facts_len": "1123", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2408", "ID": "56092", "name": "Warger v. Shauers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-517", "docket": "13-517", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Gregory P. Warger", "second_party": "Randy D. Shauers", "facts": "In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection.
\nThe district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1769", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2409", "ID": "56094", "name": "North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-534", "docket": "13-534", "term": "2014", "first_party": "North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners", "second_party": "Federal Trade Commission", "facts": "The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists\u23afwho are elected by other dentists in North Carolina\u23afone dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry.
\nIn 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market.
\nThe Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws.
", "facts_len": "1581", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2410", "ID": "56089", "name": "Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-485", "docket": "13-485", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury", "second_party": "Brian Wynne et ux.", "facts": "Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is \"passed through\" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes.
\nThe Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland.
", "facts_len": "2455", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2411", "ID": "56096", "name": "Tibble v. Edison International", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-550", "docket": "13-550", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Glenn Tibble, et al.", "second_party": "Edison International, et al.", "facts": "Edison International is a holding company for electric utilities and energy interests. Since 1999, Edison International and its related benefits and investment committees (collectively, Edison) have offered retail-class mutual funds as part of its 401(k) employee benefits plan, even though otherwise identical institutional-class funds that charged lower fees were available. Those mutual funds also give a portion of the fees collected back to plan service providers, including Edison's, which thereby reduces Edison's administrative costs.
\nIn 2007, Glenn Tibble and other Edison employees (Employees) sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which requires fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan to administer the plan prudently for the exclusive benefit of the participants. The Employees argued that the continued inclusion of the higher-cost funds in the benefit plan was a \"continuing violation\" of ERISA. Edison argued that ERISA's statute of repose, which bars claims filed more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the violation, prevented Employees' claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Edison and held that there was no \"continuing violation\" theory under ERISA. The court stated that the act of designating an investment for inclusion started the six-year period, and since Edison had not made any misstatements or actively concealed any breach following the initial inclusion, the six-year period had passed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1585", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2412", "ID": "56100", "name": "Heien v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-604", "docket": "13-604", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Nicholas B. Heien", "second_party": "State of North Carolina", "facts": "On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car.
\nA grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the \"reasonable suspicion\" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals.
\nThe North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created \"fundamental unfairness\" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that \"ignorance of the law is no excuse\" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal.
", "facts_len": "1713", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2413", "ID": "56098", "name": "Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-553", "docket": "13-553", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Alabama Department of Revenue, et al.", "second_party": "CSX Transportation, Inc.", "facts": "Alabama imposes a 4% sales tax on the gross receipts of retail businesses and a 4% use tax on storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property. Accordingly, rail carriers that purchase diesel fuel within the state are subject to a 4% sales tax. However, motor and water carriers that purchase fuel in Alabama pay an excise tax of $0.19 per gallon.
\nIn 2008, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) sued the Alabama Department of Revenue for violating the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 (4-R Act), which targeted local and state taxation schemes that discriminated against rail carriers. CSX argued that the sales tax was discriminatory because it required the rail carriers to pay more than their competitors for purchasing diesel fuel in the state. The district court dismissed the case and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal by citing precedent that held that a railroad could not challenge its competitors' exemptions from a sales tax as discriminatory under the 4-R Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the ruling, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and issued an order holding that the state's sales tax does not discriminate against rail carriers for the purposes of the 4-R Act, because the amount that motor carriers paid was roughly equal to that paid by rail carriers. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the tax is discriminatory because the state had not offered sufficient justification for exempting CSX's competitors from the sales tax.
", "facts_len": "1622", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2414", "ID": "56103", "name": "Public Employees' Retirement System v. IndyMac MBS, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-640", "docket": "13-640", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi, et al.", "second_party": "IndyMac MBS, Inc., et al.", "facts": "IndyMac MBS, Inc. (IndyMac MBS) is an issuer of mortgage-backed securities that issued securities known as mortgage pass-through certificates. The Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit and the Wyoming Retirement System filed two separate class action suits on behalf of asserted members of the class who had purchased some of the certificates. The suits claimed that IndyMac MBS had made fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions regarding the sale of the certificates. The district court consolidated these suits and dismissed the claims for lack of standing.
\nDespite the fact that the three-year statute of limitation set out in the Securities Act of 1933 had expired, several putative class members sought to intervene and revive the claims. They argued that the rule established in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, which allowed the commencement of a class action to suspend the statute of limitations as it relates to members of the class, applied in this case. They also argued that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowed them to \"relate back\" their claims to the original class action suit. The district court denied the motions to intervene, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2415", "ID": "56102", "name": "Zivotofsky v. Kerry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-628", "docket": "13-628", "term": "2014", "first_party": "M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians, Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.", "second_party": "John Kerry, Secretary of State", "facts": "In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the U.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as \"Israel,\" in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed \"Jerusalem\" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) \"impermissibly intereferes\" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch.
", "facts_len": "1143", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "2416", "ID": "56105", "name": "Holt v. Hobbs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-6827", "docket": "13-6827", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Gregory Houston Holt", "second_party": "Ray Hobbs, Director, Arkansas Department of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy.
\nThe district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1118", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2417", "ID": "56106", "name": "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-684", "docket": "13-684", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Larry D. Jesinoski, et ux.", "second_party": "Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al.", "facts": "On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011.
\nCountrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1253", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2418", "ID": "56108", "name": "Johnson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-7120", "docket": "13-7120", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Samuel Johnson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons.
\nA grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an \"armed career criminal.\" This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as \"violent felonies\"\u2014attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1571", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2419", "ID": "56114", "name": "Jennings v. Stephens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-7211", "docket": "13-7211", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Robert Mitchell Jennings", "second_party": "William Stephens, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "On July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not \"incorrigible,\" and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors.
\nIn 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed to find and present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a \"mild organic brain dysfunction.\" The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly.
\nIn 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal.
", "facts_len": "2058", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2420", "ID": "56111", "name": "Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company LLC v. Owens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-719", "docket": "13-719", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Dart Cherokee Operating Company, LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Brandon W. Owens", "facts": "On October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount.
\nOn December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the removal to produce evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested.
", "facts_len": "1840", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2421", "ID": "56112", "name": "Kimble v. Marvel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-720", "docket": "13-720", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Stephen Kimble, et al.", "second_party": "Marvel Enterprises, Inc.", "facts": "In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court.
\nThe magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a \"hybrid\" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.
", "facts_len": "2021", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2422", "ID": "56116", "name": "Yates v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-7451", "docket": "13-7451", "term": "2014", "first_party": "John L. Yates", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed of the fish he had measured.
\nYates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal \"a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence\" a governmental investigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1603", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2423", "ID": "56117", "name": "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-854", "docket": "13-854", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.", "second_party": "Sandoz, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Sandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively shown to be definite.
", "facts_len": "981", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2424", "ID": "56120", "name": "Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-895", "docket": "13-895", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Alabama Democratic Conference, et al.", "second_party": "Alabama, et al.", "facts": "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama\u2019s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama\u2019s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a \u201cdominant and controlling\u201d factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama\u2019s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was \u201cnarrowly tailored\u201d to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address the district court\u2019s application of existing legal principles.
", "facts_len": "1166", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2425", "ID": "56118", "name": "Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-894", "docket": "13-894", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Department of Homeland Security", "second_party": "Robert J. MacLean", "facts": "In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position.
\nMacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA.
", "facts_len": "1989", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2426", "ID": "56127", "name": "Lopez v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-946", "docket": "13-946", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Raul Lopez, Warden", "second_party": "Marvin Vernis Smith", "facts": "On December 15, 2005, Minnie Smith was found dead in the home she shared with her husband, Marvin Smith. Smith was charged with first-degree murder for the death of his wife. At the end of the trial, the prosecution asked for and received an aiding-and-abetting instruction, which would allow the jury to convict Smith even if they found that he had not delivered the fatal blow. The jury convicted Smith but did not specify which theory of guilt they adopted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and rejected Smith's argument that he had not been given adequate notice of the possibility of the aiding-and-abetting instruction. The California Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review.
\nSmith filed a petition for habeas relief. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting the relief, and the district court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that Smith should have been aware that the aiding-and-abetting instruction was possible because under California law aiding and abetting the crime is part of the same substantive offense as the commission of the crime itself. However, the appellate court held that Smith's Sixth Amendment right had been violated because the prosecution had tried the case on a single theory before adding the second instruction at the very end of the trial. In reaching this decision, the appellate court relied on its own precedent, which it claimed faithfully applied Supreme Court precedent.
", "facts_len": "1499", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2427", "ID": "56121", "name": "Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-896", "docket": "13-896", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Commil USA, LLC", "second_party": "Cisco Systems, Inc.", "facts": "Commil USA, LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense to claims of induced infringement.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2428", "ID": "56124", "name": "Whitfield v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-9026", "docket": "13-9026", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Larry Whitfield", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery.
\nA grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate cause of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1884", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2429", "ID": "56129", "name": "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-975", "docket": "13-975", "term": "2014", "first_party": "T-Mobile South, LLC", "second_party": "City of Roswell, Georgia", "facts": "Telecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a 108\u2013foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application.
\nTwo days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that Roswell had not met the \"in writing\" component of the TCA, which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the \"in writing\" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning.
", "facts_len": "1879", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2430", "ID": "56130", "name": "Elonis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-983", "docket": "13-983", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Anthony Elonis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. \u00a7875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a \"true threat,\" which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that \"true threats\" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the \"true threat\" exception was created to prevent.
", "facts_len": "777", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2431", "ID": "56126", "name": "Wellness International Network v. Sharif", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-935", "docket": "13-935", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Wellness International Network, Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "Richard Sharif", "facts": "Richard Sharif and others entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions.
\nSharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims.
", "facts_len": "1741", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2432", "ID": "56132", "name": "Rodriguez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-9972", "docket": "13-9972", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Dennys Rodriguez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found.
\nRodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop.
", "facts_len": "903", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2433", "ID": "56135", "name": "Baker Botts, LLP v. ASARCO, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-103", "docket": "14-103", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Baker Botts, LLP", "second_party": "ASARCO, LLC", "facts": "Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $117 million to cover the fees in addition to $5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court affirmed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition.
", "facts_len": "734", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2434", "ID": "56136", "name": "King v. Burwell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-114", "docket": "14-114", "term": "2014", "first_party": "David King, et al.", "second_party": "Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "facts": "In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an \"exchange\" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low-income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges.
\nVirginia declined to establish a state-run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1686", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2435", "ID": "56138", "name": "Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-144", "docket": "14-144", "term": "2014", "first_party": "John Walker, III, et al.", "second_party": "Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., et al.", "facts": "In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it \"may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public.\" The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application.
\nTexas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that \"discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage.\"
", "facts_len": "1633", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2436", "ID": "56137", "name": "Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-116", "docket": "14-116", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Louis B. Bullard", "second_party": "Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings Bank", "facts": "Louis Bullard borrowed $387,000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over \"final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees.\"
", "facts_len": "1036", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2437", "ID": "56142", "name": "Bank of America v. Caulkett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1421", "docket": "13-1421", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Bank of America, N.A.", "second_party": "David B. Caulkett", "facts": "David Caulkett\u2019s property was subject to two mortgage liens when he filed for bankruptcy. Because the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the property, the second mortgage, which Bank of America held, was considered \u201cunderwater.\u201d When Caulkett filed for bankruptcy, he moved the bankruptcy court to void Bank of America\u2019s lien on the second mortgage and argued that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed a debtor filing for bankruptcy to void a second mortgage when the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the collateral property. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
\nThis case was consolidated with a similar case, Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, which had substantially the same facts and an identical procedural history.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2438", "ID": "56141", "name": "Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-15", "docket": "14-15", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Richard Armstrong, et al.", "second_party": "Exceptional Child Center, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The federal Medicaid Act requires that state Medicaid plans contain procedures to ensure that reimbursement rates for healthcare providers \"are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers\" to meet the need for care and services in the geographic area. Ninth Circuit precedent also requires that reimbursement rates bear a reasonable relationship to Medicaid provider costs, and where rates do not \"substantially reimburse providers their costs,\" a state cannot justify its rates with \"purely budgetary reasons.\" Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare, and others (the Directors) conducted provider cost studies and recommended increasing reimbursement rates but ultimately did not increase rates for budgetary reasons.
\nA group of Idaho Medicaid providers (the Providers) sued the Directors and claimed that, based on the new cost information, the Department's failure to raise rates was not consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirements. The Directors argued that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution does not give providers a private right of action and that the existing rates were consistent with the Medicaid Act's requirements of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment and held that the failure to increase rates led to a failure to substantially reimburse providers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1529", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2439", "ID": "56143", "name": "Reyes Mata v. Lynch", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-185", "docket": "14-185", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Noel Reyes Mata", "second_party": "Loretta Lynch, Attorney General of the United States", "facts": "Noel Reyes Mata, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of assaulting a woman he was dating; he was deported in 2010. His appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed after his attorney failed to file an appellate brief. Mata subsequently moved to reopen his case based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the BIA denied Mata's motion as untimely because it was filed well after the 90 days allowed. Mata appealed the BIA's denial of his motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and argued that the BIA should not have enforced the filing period limitation because his attorney's failure to file a brief deprived him of his due process rights. The appellate court held that such a motion was subject to the complete discretion of the BIA, and thus the appellate court lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision.
", "facts_len": "860", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2440", "ID": "56144", "name": "Carroll v. Carman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-212", "docket": "14-212", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Jeremy Carroll", "second_party": "Andrew Carman, et ux.", "facts": "On July 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania State Police Department received a report that Michael Zita had stolen a car and two handguns and then likely fled to the Carman residence. Officers Jeremy Carroll and Brian Roberts went to the Carman residence to investigate and noticed that a small structure in the rear of the property had a light on a door open, so they approached and announced their presence. When no one responded, the officers continued to approach the house via a back door that the officers believed looked like a customary entrance. The residents confronted the officers, but eventually identified themselves as the Carmans and allowed the officers to search their house. The officers did not find Zita, and the Carmans were not charged with a crime.
\nThe Carmans later sued Officer Carroll in district court and argued that he had unlawfully entered their property in violation of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Carroll argued that his entry was legal under the \"knock and talk\" exception to the warrant requirement, which allows officers to knock on someone's door as long as the officers are standing on the parts of the person's property on which the general public is allowed. The Carmans argued that exception did not apply in this case because a normal visitor would have used the front door. The jury found in favor of Carroll, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because the \"knock and talk\" exception requires that the police begin their interaction at the front door. The appellate court also held that Carroll was not entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated clearly established law.
", "facts_len": "1683", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2441", "ID": "56146", "name": "McFadden v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-378", "docket": "14-378", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Stephen D. McFadden", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Stephen McFadden sold overstocked products on the Internet to augment his income. In 2011, McFadden noticed that a lot of businesses where he lived were selling a product known as \"bath salts,\" an aromatherapy product that emits a stimulating vapor when burned. After confirming that bath salts were not illegal, McFadden began selling them like his other products. He continued to sell them until he learned they had been placed on the list of substances that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibited.
\nThe government prosecuted McFadden under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, which allows substances not listed as \"controlled\" to be treated as illegal if the analogue has effects and a chemical make-up that are \"substantially similar\" to those listed in the CSA. At trial, McFadden argued that the state needed to prove that he was aware, or actively resisted finding out, that the bath salts were substantially similar to a controlled substance and constituted an analogue. Instead, the district court held that the state only needed to prove that the petitioner knew \"the products were intended for human consumption.\" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1229", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2442", "ID": "56145", "name": "Horne v. Department of Agriculture", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-275", "docket": "14-275", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Marvin D. Horne", "second_party": "U.S. Department of Agriculture", "facts": "In 1949 the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000.
\nHorne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court found for the Department of Agriculture by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices.
", "facts_len": "1947", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2443", "ID": "56151", "name": "Toca v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-6381", "docket": "14-6381", "term": "2014", "first_party": "George Toca", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "In the 1980s, George Toca was arrested and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of his sentence for accidentally shooting his friend while the two of them committed a robbery. At the time of the robbery, George was 17 years old and was considered a juvenile. In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. In light of the Miller case, Toca applied for a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, which the district court approved by holding that the Miller decision applied retroactively to cases like Toca's. The Supreme Court of Louisiana overturned that decision by denying Toca's motion and holding that the Miller rule does not apply retroactively because it is not a substantive rule, nor does it correct any substantive issues of fairness or accuracy in the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of Louisiana also held that the Miller rule is simply a new rule of criminal procedure and does not apply retroactively.
", "facts_len": "1202", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2444", "ID": "56147", "name": "Harris v. Viegelahn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-400", "docket": "14-400", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Charles E. Harris, III", "second_party": "Mary K. Viegelahn", "facts": "In February 2010, Charles Harris filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The approved plan instructed Harris to make monthly payments to the trustee Mary Viegelahn for sixty months, as well as monthly payments directly to Chase, which held his mortgage. After the mortgage and secured creditors debts were paid off, the payments would go to Harris' unsecured creditors. In October 2010, Chase moved to lift the automatic stay of Harris' home for his failure to make the mortgage payments, and Harris moved out of his house when the stay was lifted in November 2010. At that point, Viegelahn held the portion of the monthly payments intended to go to Chase. After Harris voluntarily converted his bankruptcy case to Chapter 7, Viegelahn distributed those funds to Harris' creditors. Harris sued for that money and argued that Viegelahn had no authority to disburse funds after conversion of the case. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the return of the funds and the district court affirmed. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the undistributed payments that the Chapter 13 trustee holds at the time of the case's conversion to Chapter 7 must be distributed to creditors pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.
", "facts_len": "1291", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2445", "ID": "56148", "name": "Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-46", "docket": "14-46", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Michigan, et al.", "second_party": "Environmental Protection Agency, et al.", "facts": "The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) if it finds that such regulation was \"appropriate and necessary\" after conducting a utility study. In December 2000, the EPA issued a notice that such regulation was necessary based on the results of the utility study, which showed that the mercury emissions from EGUs were a threat to public health. In 2005, the EPA reversed its findings and determined that it was not \"appropriate and necessary\" to regulate coal-and oil-fired EGUs. States and other groups petitioned for review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's attempt to reverse its findings was unlawful because it could not remove pollutant sources from the regulation list once they were on it. In 2012, the EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated emission standards. State, industry, and labor groups petitioned the appellate court for review of the EPA's interpretation of the \"appropriate and necessary\" requirement with respect to these regulations. The appellate court denied the petition.
", "facts_len": "1191", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2446", "ID": "56152", "name": "Christeson v. Roper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-6873", "docket": "14-6873", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Mark A. Christeson", "second_party": "Don Roper, Warden", "facts": "In 1999, a jury convicted Mark Christeson of capital murder for invading the home of a mother and her two children, raping the mother, and then cutting their throats and pushing them into the pond. The jury sentenced Christeson to death. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, which meant that Christeson's federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before the deadline, the Court appointed attorneys Phil Horwitz and Eric Butts to represent Christeson. Horwitz and Butts failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after the petition was due, and they filed the petition 117 days late. The federal district court dismissed the petition as untimely. Seven years later, Horwitz and Butts contacted attorneys Jennifer Merrigan and Joseph Perkovich to discuss Christeson's case. Merrigan and Perkovich discovered Christeson's only chance would be to reopen the final judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitation should not have been enforced in this case. Horwitz and Butts, knowing this would ruin their reputations, refused to let outside counsel access their files. Merrigan and Perkovich moved for substitution of counsel, which the district court denied because they were from out of state and because Horwitz and Butts had not abandoned their client. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1378", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2447", "ID": "56149", "name": "Obergefell v. Hodges", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556", "docket": "14-556", "term": "2014", "first_party": "James Obergefell, et al.", "second_party": "Richard Hodges, Director of the Ohio Department of Health, et al.", "facts": "Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
", "facts_len": "862", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2448", "ID": "56150", "name": "Kingsley v. Hendrickson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-6368", "docket": "14-6368", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Michael B. Kingsley", "second_party": "Stan Hendrickson", "facts": "In May 2010, Michael Kingsley, who was being held as a pretrial detainee in Monroe County Jail, was ordered to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed but refused to do so. After Sergeant Stan Hendrickson ordered Kingsley to take down the paper several times and each time was met with refusal, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, the jail administrator, ordered the jail staff to take down the paper and transfer Kingsley to another cell. During the transfer, Kingsley refused to act as ordered, so the officers pulled him to his feet in such a manner that his feet hit the bedframe, which caused pain and made him unable to walk or stand. In the new cell, when Kingsley resisted the officers' attempts to remove the handcuffs, Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley yelled at him. Kingsley also claimed that Hendrickson smashed his head into the concrete bunk. After further verbal exchange, another officer applied a taser to Kingsley's back.
\nKingsley sued Hendrickson and other jail staff members and claimed that their actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury found the defendants not guilty. Kingsley appealed and argued that the jury was wrongly instructed on the standards for judging excessive force and intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1368", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2449", "ID": "56155", "name": "Glebe v. Frost", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-95", "docket": "14-95", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Patrick Glebe, Superintendent of the Stafford Creek Corrections Center", "second_party": "Joshua James Frost", "facts": "Over the course of eleven days in April 2003, Joshua James Frost and two associates committed a series of armed robberies in the state of Washington. Frost was charged with robbery and related offenses. During closing arguments, Frost's lawyer expressed his desire to argue both that the prosecution did not meet their burden and that Frost acted under duress. The trial judge made the defense choose between the two alternative defenses, and the defense chose duress. The jury convicted Frost of multiple counts.
\nThe Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court's restriction of the closing argument violated Frost's rights to due process and assistance of counsel. However, that decision constituted trial error, which makes the mistake reviewable, rather than structural error, which would require automatic reversal. Upon such review, the Washington Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Frost and upheld the conviction.
\nFrost filed a petition for a writ of habeas of corpus that the district court denied, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Upon rehearing en banc, the appellate court reversed and directed the district court to grant the petition because the Washington Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established law by failing to classify the trial court's restriction of the defense's closing argument as structural error.
", "facts_len": "1449", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2450", "ID": "56165", "name": "Woods v. Donald", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-618", "docket": "14-618", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Jeffrey Woods, Warden", "second_party": "Cory Donald", "facts": "Cory Donald, Seante Liggins, Rashad Moore, Dewayne Saine, and Fawzi Zaya decided to rob Mohammed Makki, a local drug dealer. During the course of the robbery, several shots were fired and Makki was later discovered dead. Liggins and Zaya pled guilty, and Donald was tried with Moore and Saine for one count of first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. When the government sought to admit evidence of phone communication among the defendants on the day in question, Donald\u2019s lawyer indicated that evidence did not affect his client, so the judge allowed testimony to proceed when Donald\u2019s lawyer was not in the courtroom. The jury convicted Donald on all three counts. He appealed and argued that his lawyer\u2019s absence from the courtroom during the phone call testimony denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim and the Michigan Supreme Court denied review.
\nDonald moved for federal habeas relief, which the district court granted, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed by holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not properly apply the precedent established by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Cronic. In that case, the Court held that courts may presume a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment rights have been violated when he is denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in his trial, which the appellate court found happened in this case.
", "facts_len": "1509", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2451", "ID": "56153", "name": "Glossip v. Gross", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-7955", "docket": "14-7955", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Richard E. Glossip, et al.", "second_party": "Kevin J. Gross, et al.", "facts": "On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution.
\nCharles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a \"known and available\" alternative to the drug in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
\nOn January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again.
", "facts_len": "1585", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2452", "ID": "56154", "name": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-86", "docket": "14-86", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "second_party": "Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.", "facts": "Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) is a national chain of clothing stores that requires its employees to comply with a \"Look Policy\" that reflects the store's style and forbids black clothing and caps, though the meaning of the term cap is not defined in the policy. If a question arises about the Look Policy during the interview or an applicant requests a deviation, the interviewer is instructed to contact the corporate Human Resources department, which will determine whether or not an accommodation will be granted.
\nIn 2008, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a position at an Abercrombie store. She wore a headscarf, or hijab, every day, and did so in her interview. Elauf did not mention her headscarf during her interview and did not indicate that she would need an accommodation from the Look Policy. Her interviewer likewise did not mention the headscarf, though she contacted her district manager, who told her to lower Elauf's rating on the appearance section of the application, which lowered her overall score and prevented her from being hired.
\nThe Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf and claimed that the company had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to hire Elauf because of her headscarf. Abercrombie argued that Elauf had a duty to inform the interviewer that she required an accommodation from the Look Policy and that the headscarf was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Abercrombie because there is no genuine issue of fact that Elauf did not notify her interviewer that she had a conflict with the Look Policy.
", "facts_len": "1866", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2453", "ID": "56175", "name": "Grady v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-593", "docket": "14-593", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Torrey Dale Grady", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "Between 1997 and 2006, Torrey Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a trial court civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina\u2019s satellite-based monitoring program for the duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to an unreasonable search that was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.
", "facts_len": "743", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2454", "ID": "56177", "name": "Montgomery v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-280", "docket": "14-280", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Henry Montgomery", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. At his new trial, Montgomery was again convicted, but he was sentenced to life without parole.
\nIn 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring children convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. In light of that decision, Montgomery filed a motion in state district court to correct what he argued was now an illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery\u2019s motion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery\u2019s application by holding that the decision in Miller does not apply retroactively.
", "facts_len": "959", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2455", "ID": "56176", "name": "Hurst v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-7505", "docket": "14-7505", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Timothy Lee Hurst", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Timothy Lee Hurst was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing his co-worker, Cynthia Harrison, during a robbery of the Popeye\u2019s restaurant where they both worked. He was sentenced to death and appealed. On appeal, Hurst was granted a new sentencing trial because the Supreme Court of Florida found that his counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of Hurst\u2019s borderline intelligence and possible organic brain damage. At his new sentencing trial, Hurst was prevented from presenting mental retardation evidence as an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty, though he was allowed to present it as mitigating evidence. The jury again sentenced Hurst to the death penalty by a vote of seven to five, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
\nIn 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the presence of aggravating factors, which Arizona\u2019s death penalty sentencing scheme viewed as essentially elements of a larger offense, be determined by the jury. The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that the decision in Ring v. Arizona did not apply to Florida\u2019s death penalty sentencing scheme generally and specifically did not require that a jury\u2019s recommendation of the death penalty be unanimous or that a jury determine the factual issue of a defendant\u2019s potential mental retardation.
", "facts_len": "1446", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2456", "ID": "59176", "name": "Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/1", "docket": "1", "term": "1956", "first_party": "William Thompson", "second_party": "Coastal Oil Co.", "facts": "William Thompson suffered a head injury aboard the SS. Rosina Marron after an attack by a fellow crewmember. After several months of recuperation, Thompson signed an agreement releasing Costal Oil Company from liability in exchange for $4000. Later, Thompson discovered the damage from his injury was much more extensive than originally thought. Thomson sued to recover damages from his injury. The district court upheld the release, noting that Thompson adamantly refused to consult an attorney, although he had many opportunities to do so, and freely entered into the agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "651", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2457", "ID": "56180", "name": "Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-723", "docket": "14-723", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Robert Montanile", "second_party": "Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan", "facts": "In late 2008, Robert Montanile was involved in a car accident that resulted in significant injuries. Montanile was covered by an employee welfare benefit plan administered by the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (Plan). After Montanile\u2019s accident, the Plan dispersed over $120,000 to cover Montanile\u2019s medical expenses. Montanile later sued the driver of the other car involved in the accident, eventually obtaining a $500,000 settlement. Per its terms, the Plan then requested that Montanile reimburse the initial $120,000 disbursement. When Montanile and the Plan were unable to reach an agreement, the Plan sued Montanile.
\nThe Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which allows plan administrators to recover overpayment from a beneficiary when the recovery would constitute \u201cappropriate equitable relief\u201d. The trial court held that the terms of the Plan required Montanile to repay the initial $120,000, and that this repayment was appropriate equitable relief in part because the Plan was able to identify a source of funds within Montanile\u2019s possession\u2014the $500,000 settlement. Montanile appealed and claimed that the repayment would not be equitable relief because the settlement had been spent or disbursed to other parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the Plan had a right to reimbursement, the Plan\u2019s lien against Montanile\u2019s $500,000 settlement attached before Montanile spent or disbursed the funds. Therefore, Montanile could not evade the repayment by claiming the settlement funds had been spent or disbursed.
", "facts_len": "1665", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2458", "ID": "59177", "name": "Pennsylvania v. Nelson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1955/10", "docket": "10", "term": "1955", "first_party": "Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Nelson", "facts": "Nelson, a member of the Communist Party, was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. This Act was implemented prior to Congress's adoption of the Smith Act of 1940 (amended in 1948) which prohibited the same conduct as Pennsylvania's law.
", "facts_len": "260", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2459", "ID": "56178", "name": "DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-462", "docket": "14-462", "term": "2015", "first_party": "DIRECTV, Inc.", "second_party": "Amy Imburgia, et al.", "facts": "On September 7, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV), and argued that DIRECTV had improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California precedent that had previously held that, in certain circumstances, arbitration clauses in customer agreements were unenforceable. Less than one month after that decision, DIRECTV moved to stay or dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 case and compel arbitration, which DIRECTV argued it had not done previously because it thought the arbitration clause in its customer agreement was void under California precedent. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed by holding that the language of the customer agreement subjected the arbitration clause to state law.
", "facts_len": "962", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2460", "ID": "56181", "name": "Kansas v. Carr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-449", "docket": "14-449", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Jonathan and Reginald Carr", "facts": "In December 2000, brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr committed a series of crimes in Wichita, Kansas, known as \u201cThe Wichita Massacre,\u201d which included assault, robbery, rape, and the murder of five people. The Carrs were prosecuted jointly. They moved to sever their cases and argued that being tried jointly would be prejudicial because they intended to mount antagonistic defenses and introduce evidence that would be admissible or non-prejudicial only in separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Carrs were later jointly convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to death. The jury instructions at the sentencing trial did not state that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
\nOn appeal, the Carrs argued that their Eighth Amendment rights to individualized sentencing were violated both by the trial judge\u2019s refusal to sever their cases and the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the death sentences by holding that the trial judge failed to do the necessary analysis and carefully consider the severance issue. The court also held that the jurors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence because they were not instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
\nIn the consolidated case, Kansas v. Gleason,\u00a0Gleason was convicted of capital murder for the killings of several people in connection with a robbery. He was also convicted of pre-meditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced Gleason to death for the capital murder charge and a consecutive sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years for the other charges. Gleason appealed his convictions, and the Kansas Supreme Court vacated his conviction of life imprisonment because it was multiplicitous with his death sentence and vacated his death sentence because the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider mitigating circumstances.
", "facts_len": "2190", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2461", "ID": "56172", "name": "McConnell v. Federal Election Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1674", "docket": "02-1674", "term": "2003", "first_party": "Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senator", "second_party": "Federal Election Commission", "facts": "In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted (\"soft money\") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of \"issue ads\" or \"coordinated expenditures\").
\nThe campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.
", "facts_len": "1370", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2462", "ID": "59203", "name": "Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1955/23", "docket": "23", "term": "1955", "first_party": "Harry Slochower", "second_party": "Board of Higher Education of New York City", "facts": "New York City municipal charter provision \u00a7903 required discharge of any municipal employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in a legally authorized inquiry into that employee\u2019s official conduct. Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, invoked this privilege in a congressional committee investigation into his past Communist Party membership. Despite his tenured status, which required notice and a hearing before termination, the city terminated him immediately. The state trial court dismissed a motion to review the discharge and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.
", "facts_len": "642", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2463", "ID": "59241", "name": "Cole v. Young", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1955/442", "docket": "442", "term": "1955", "first_party": "Cole", "second_party": "Young", "facts": "The Food and Drug Administration (\"FDA\") fired Kendrick Cole when it determined that his employment was not \"clearly consistent with the interests of national security.\" Mr. Cole was a food and drug inspector and a \"preference-eligible veteran,\" but was charged with having \"a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists.\" Mr. Cole appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which denied his appeal, finding that the Veterans' Preference Act did not afford Mr. Cole a right of appeal under the circumstances. Mr. Cole brought an action seeking declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia federal district court alleging that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission improperly denied his appeal. The district court dismissed the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
", "facts_len": "877", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2464", "ID": "59267", "name": "Reid v. Covert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1955/701", "docket": "701", "term": "1955", "first_party": "Curtis Reid, Superintendent of the District of Columbia Jail", "second_party": "Claris Covert", "facts": "Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a \u201cstatus-of-forces\u201d executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury.
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2465", "ID": "59280", "name": "Griffin v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1955/95", "docket": "95", "term": "1955", "first_party": "Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without cost, on the basis that they could not afford the standard fee for the transcript. The lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence.
", "facts_len": "396", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2466", "ID": "59326", "name": "Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2)", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/349us294", "docket": "1", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel et al.", "second_party": "Board of Education of Topeka", "facts": "After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "400", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2467", "ID": "59307", "name": "Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/348us483", "docket": "184", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Williamson", "second_party": "Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.", "facts": "An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law.
", "facts_len": "316", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2468", "ID": "59345", "name": "Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/107", "docket": "107", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Kingsley Books, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "Peter Campbell Brown", "facts": "New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.
", "facts_len": "468", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2469", "ID": "59359", "name": "Butler v. Michigan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/16", "docket": "16", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Butler", "second_party": "Michigan", "facts": "John H. Griffin\u2019s book <i>The Devil Rides Outside</i> traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler\u2019s application for leave to appeal.
", "facts_len": "852", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2470", "ID": "59366", "name": "Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/199", "docket": "199", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Earl R. Deen", "second_party": "Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company", "facts": "Not Available.
", "facts_len": "31", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2471", "ID": "59374", "name": "Jencks v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/23", "docket": "23", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Clinton D. Jencks", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Clinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1181", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2472", "ID": "59380", "name": "Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/26", "docket": "26", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Leiter Minerals, Inc.,", "second_party": "United States, The California Company, Allen L. Lobrano", "facts": "In December 1938, Thomas Leiter conveyed approximately 8,711 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana to the United States. The deed contained a mineral reservation under which Leiter retained the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals until April 1, 1945. The deed allowed for the extension of this reservation for an additional five years so long as operations were conducted profitably during the previous five years for an average of fifty days a year. If at the end of the original term or an additional extended term the operation had not carried on for fifty days a year, Leiter\u2019s right to mine would terminate, and complete title would become vested in the United States. No mineral operations were conducted on the land in question during the original term.
\nOn March 1, 1949, the United States conveyed the operating rights under lease to Frank J. and Albert Lobrano, who then conveyed those rights to The California Company. The California Company drilled and completed eighty wells, producing $3,500,000 in royalties for the United States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. then filed an action in state court against Allen L. Lobrano and The California Company based on a Louisiana law allegedly making a reservation of mineral rights to the United States \u201cimprescriptible\u201d. The United States was not a party to the suit. Leiter Minerals claimed that it was the fee simple owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in or on the land acquired by the United States from Thomas Leiter.
\nThe United States then brought an action in district court; it sought to quiet Leiter Minerals\u2019 title and rights and to enjoin Leiter Minerals from further asserting any claims in state court. The United States argued in part that irreparable injury in the form of lost royalties would result from any dispossession to its lessees. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the action could only be tried in federal court because the United States was not a party to the state court action.
", "facts_len": "2026", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2473", "ID": "59382", "name": "Watkins v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/261", "docket": "261", "term": "1956", "first_party": "John Watkins", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority of the Committee.
", "facts_len": "442", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2474", "ID": "59428", "name": "Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/46", "docket": "46", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Virgil Herdman", "second_party": "Pennsylvania Railroad Company", "facts": "On February 1, 1951, Virgil Herdman, a train conductor, was in charge of a freight train traveling from Indiana to Ohio. While passing through Dayton, Ohio, the train braked abruptly to avoid hitting a car stopped on a railroad crossing. Herdman fell and was injured as the train came to a stop.
\nHerdman sued the railroad company for negligence and claimed that the company was responsible for his fall under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts typically apply this doctrine when negligence can be inferred, without actual direct evidence, from the very nature of the accident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the railroad on the basis that Herdman did not provide enough facts to support his negligence claim, even under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Herdman appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "956", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2475", "ID": "59431", "name": "Lambert v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/47", "docket": "47", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Lambert", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to include some mental state element, and she was not aware of it.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "435", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2476", "ID": "59437", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1956", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "Lion Oil Company, Monsanto Chemical Company", "facts": "Beginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement.
\nOn August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer.
\nThe company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day.
\nThe National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA.
\nDuring the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company\u2019s response to the employees\u2019 offer to return to work. The five member Board held in a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company\u2019s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board\u2019s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection.
\nWhile the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case.
", "facts_len": "3174", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2477", "ID": "59438", "name": "Rowoldt v. Perfetto", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Charles Rowoldt", "second_party": "J.D. Perfetto", "facts": "Charles Rowoldt, a German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because he joined the Party to \"fight for his daily needs\" and get \"something to eat and something to crawl into.\" The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2478", "ID": "59441", "name": "United States v. Howard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/52", "docket": "52", "term": "1956", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Ludenia Howard, trading as Stokes Fish Company", "facts": "Federal criminal information was filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues are governed by the regulations of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not \u201claws\u201d of Florida under the meaning of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "608", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2479", "ID": "59442", "name": "Mallory v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/521", "docket": "521", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Mallory", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.
", "facts_len": "299", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2480", "ID": "59443", "name": "Fikes v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/53", "docket": "53", "term": "1956", "first_party": "William Earl Fikes", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "On April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him \u201con an open charge of investigation.\u201d The police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator\u2019s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1074", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2481", "ID": "59448", "name": "Carroll v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/571", "docket": "571", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Leon F. Carroll, Daniel J. Stewart", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable.
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2482", "ID": "59447", "name": "Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/57", "docket": "57", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Boyd Leedom et al. Members of the National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers", "facts": "The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required union officers to file non-communist affidavits to gain the protections of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRA also made filing a false affidavit a crime. The NLRB found that an officer of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt workers had filed a false affidavit. The NLRB issued a decompliance order ceasing all protections. The union sued to enjoin the order. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "562", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2483", "ID": "59449", "name": "Roviaro v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/58", "docket": "58", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Roviaro", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (\"FBN\") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by \"John Doe,\" an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe.
\nDurham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin.
\nThe government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity.
", "facts_len": "1631", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2484", "ID": "59450", "name": "Roth v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/582", "docket": "582", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Roth", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.
", "facts_len": "438", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2485", "ID": "59454", "name": "Yates v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Oleta O'Connor Yates", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.
", "facts_len": "360", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2486", "ID": "59464", "name": "Trop v. Dulles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/70", "docket": "70", "term": "1956", "first_party": "Albert L. Trop", "second_party": "John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State", "facts": "In 1944, United States Army private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he \"decided to return to the stockade\" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "937", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2487", "ID": "59478", "name": "United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/1", "docket": "1", "term": "1957", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Shotwell Manufacturing Company, et al.", "facts": "Shotwell Manufacturing, along with several employees, was convicted of evading income taxes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district court had denied Shotwell\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of certain disclosures. Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability. After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence. If true, this new evidence could prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith.
", "facts_len": "624", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2488", "ID": "59492", "name": "Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/12", "docket": "12", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company", "second_party": "State of Illinois, Illinois Commerce Commission, and Milwaukee Road Commuters' Association", "facts": "The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) passed an order making intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road\u2019s Chicago suburban commuter line higher than the fares the state commission had authorized. The state of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters\u2019 Association sued the ICC in district court and sought to enjoin the enforcement of the order. The district court held that the ICC had failed to show that the fares authorized by the state commission caused undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and therefore the order was not justified. The ICC appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "686", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2489", "ID": "59511", "name": "Cicenia v. Lagay", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/177", "docket": "177", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Cicenia", "second_party": "Lagay", "facts": "During police interrogation for a murder, Cicenia and his counsel repeatedly requested to see one another but they were refused their requests. By the time Cicenia saw his attorney, he had made and signed a written confession to the murder. Cicenia moved the state trial court for an order requiring the state to produce his written confession. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court affirmed the decision. Cicenia commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding and the lower court discharged the writ, holding that Cicenia had failed to establish the involuntariness of his confession and that the state's refusal to permit petitioner to communicate with counsel during the inquiry did not deprive him of due process. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "818", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2490", "ID": "59512", "name": "Crooker v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/178", "docket": "178", "term": "1957", "first_party": "John Russell Crooker, Jr.", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On July 5, 1955, John Russell Crooker was arrested for the murder of his boss with whom he had been having an illicit relationship. For the next fourteen hours, Crooker was sporadically questioned and interrogated in his home and in the West Los Angeles Police Station; he repeatedly asked to meet with an attorney and was told that he could call only after the investigation was over. After fourteen hours of detainment and periodic interrogation, Crooker wrote a full confession to the murder. The next morning, Crooker was asked to orally repeat his confession, but he refused and again asked to speak with an attorney. Crooker was permitted to call his attorney at that point, and from then forward, he was represented by his counsel.
\nAt trial, Crooker argued that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because his confession was coerced by state authorities, and even if it was given voluntarily, he was denied the right to counsel. The issue of whether Crooker\u2019s confession was voluntary was presented to the jury, which resolved the question against Crooker and convicted him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1192", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2491", "ID": "59518", "name": "Cooper v. Aaron", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/1_misc", "docket": "1 MISC", "term": "1957", "first_party": "William G. Cooper et al., Members of the Board of Directors of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Independent School District, et al.", "second_party": "John Aaron, et al.", "facts": "The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. On February 20, 1958, five months after the integration crisis involving the Little Rock Nine, members of the school board (along with the Superintendent of Schools) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, urging suspension of its plan of desegregation. The relief the plaintiffs requested was for the African American children to be returned to segregated schools and for the implementation of the desegregation plan to be postponed for two and a half years. The district court granted the school board's request, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "770", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2492", "ID": "59523", "name": "International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/21", "docket": "21", "term": "1957", "first_party": "International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO)", "second_party": "Paul S. Russell", "facts": "On July 18, 1951 the International Automobile Union called a strike against Wolverine Tube, Inc., a subsidiary of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, located in Decatur, AL. As a result of this strike, Mr. Paul Russell, a non-union employee at the plant, was prevented from working when members of the picket line made violent threats against him and physically blocked the only entrance into the plant. The strike lasted until August 22, 1951.
\nRussell sued the union in Alabama state court, claiming that the union unlawfully invaded his right to engage in a lawful occupation free from unlawful interference. The Union argued that the Labor Management Act of 1947 removed jurisdiction from the state court to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). When the trial court decided for the union, Russell appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court\u2019s decision and remanded the case for trial.
\nAt trial, a jury returned a $10,000.00 verdict for Russell. The union appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was excessive and reiterating its argument that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear this case. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1236", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2493", "ID": "59542", "name": "Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Francisco Romero", "second_party": "International Terminal Operating Company Compania Trasatlantica, also known as Spanish Line, Garcia & Diaz, Inc., and Quin Lumber Co., Inc.", "facts": "While the Spanish ship S.S. Guadalupe was docked in Hoboken, NJ, a cable struck Francisco Romero and seriously him. He sued for negligence under the Jones act and maritime law. The Jones Act provides jurisdiction for claims under the Constitution and treaties of the U.S. for persons of diverse citizenship. Both Romero and his employer were aliens, so there was no diversity of citizenship. Also, the maritime laws did not arise from the Constitution or treaties of the U.S.. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also held that Romero could receive adequate remedies under Spanish law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "708", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2494", "ID": "59559", "name": "First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/382", "docket": "382", "term": "1957", "first_party": "First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles", "second_party": "County of Los Angeles et al.", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship. The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any person or organization who advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means. To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity.
\nIn both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the churches refused to agree to the oath. The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund. The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the U.S. Constitution. In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. In 385, the court upheld the oath under the U.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed.
", "facts_len": "1196", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2495", "ID": "59586", "name": "Staub v. City of Baxley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/48", "docket": "48", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Rose Staub", "second_party": "City of Baxley", "facts": "Rose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the International Ladies\u2019 Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst Manufacturing Company. She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived. That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to apply for a permit from the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason. Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional right to free speech. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.
", "facts_len": "794", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2496", "ID": "59587", "name": "Kent v. Dulles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/481", "docket": "481", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Kent", "second_party": "Dulles", "facts": "Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari.
", "facts_len": "881", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2497", "ID": "59597", "name": "Wiener v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/52", "docket": "52", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Wiener", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "By the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress established the War Claims Commission for the purpose of adjudicating claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the Commission by President Truman in 1950. In 1953, when President Eisenhower requested Wiener's resignation, Wiener refused. Eisenhower subsequently appointed a substitute to Wiener's post. The Commission was abolished in 1954, and Wiener brought a claim to recover his salary from the time of his removal to the last day of the Commission's existence.
", "facts_len": "590", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2498", "ID": "59609", "name": "Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/57", "docket": "57", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Byrd", "second_party": "Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.", "facts": "Byrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge defended against his claim based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should trump that provision of the state law.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "693", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2499", "ID": "59614", "name": "American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1957", "first_party": "American Trucking Associations, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company between Silvis, Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. The certificate limited motor operations to service to or from points on the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any restrictions the commission might impose under the Interstate Commerce Act to insure that the service was auxiliary or supplementary to train service. The Act authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of common carriers if the commission deemed it to be \u201cconsistent with the public interest.\u201d In a separate section, Congress directed the commission not to certify a railroad corporation seeking to operate motor carriers unless it also found that the railroad would use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not unduly restrain competition.
\nIn 1944, Rock Island purchased the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska. Rock Island filed for permission to provide motor service to points along the Frederickson Lines. The commission granted Rock Island permission, but placed five conditions on motor service for both the White and Frederickson routes. Rock Island challenged the conditions in district court and won, but on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the commission\u2019s power to impose the conditions.
\nRock Island then filed for permission to provide unrestricted motor service to points along the White and Frederickson lines. In 1954, the application was substantially granted. American Trucking Associations, Inc., nine other motor carriers, a group of railway trade unions, and several other organizations intervened, arguing that 1) the commission was required to limit motor service by a rail-owned motor carrier to auxiliary or supplementary service, and 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the commission\u2019s certification order. The district court upheld the certificate as granted.
", "facts_len": "2089", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2500", "ID": "59620", "name": "Beilan v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/63", "docket": "63", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Herman A. Beilan", "second_party": "Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia", "facts": "On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent\u2019s office at the latter\u2019s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan\u2019s failure to answer the Superintendent\u2019s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of \u201cincompetency.\u201d There was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan\u2019s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.
", "facts_len": "1184", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2501", "ID": "59666", "name": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/91", "docket": "91", "term": "1957", "first_party": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People", "second_party": "Patterson", "facts": "Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "293", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2502", "ID": "59664", "name": "Lawn v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1957", "first_party": "Howard Lawn", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion scheme. The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment. The appeals court affirmed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending, the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The petitioners suspected that prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "757", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2503", "ID": "59690", "name": "Scales v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/1", "docket": "1", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Junius Irving Scales", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States (\"Party\") because it advocated the overthrow of the government \"as speedily as circumstances would permit.\" Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 (\"Security Act\") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.
", "facts_len": "669", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2504", "ID": "59699", "name": "Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Federal Housing Administration", "second_party": "The Darlington, Inc.", "facts": "The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans\u2019 Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for \u201cprincipally\u201d residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1107", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2505", "ID": "59703", "name": "Draper v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/136", "docket": "136", "term": "1958", "first_party": "James Draper", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag.
\nBefore his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1262", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2506", "ID": "59724", "name": "Abel v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist\u2019s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as \u201cMark\u201d, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (\u201cFBI\u201d) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel.
\nFBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (\u201cINS\u201d) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel\u2019s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial.
\nTwo INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel\u2019s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel\u2019s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel\u2019s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant.
", "facts_len": "2090", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2507", "ID": "59737", "name": "Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/248", "docket": "248", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division", "second_party": "WDAY, Inc.", "facts": "The radio and television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley\u2019s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish \u201ca Communist Farmers Union Soviet.\u201d Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.
", "facts_len": "734", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2508", "ID": "59766", "name": "Barenblatt v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/35", "docket": "35", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Barenblatt", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.
", "facts_len": "327", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2509", "ID": "59767", "name": "Barr v. Matteo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/350", "docket": "350", "term": "1958", "first_party": "William G. Barr", "second_party": "Linda A. Matteo and John J. Madigan", "facts": "Linda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter. The Office\u2019s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended. William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor. Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan. He issued a press release explaining his reasons. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release.
\nIn certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr\u2019s claim that his statements were protected by privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege. On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr\u2019s malice. The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial.
", "facts_len": "1314", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2510", "ID": "59777", "name": "Williams v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/39", "docket": "39", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Williams", "second_party": "Lee", "facts": "A non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review.
", "facts_len": "359", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2511", "ID": "59782", "name": "Brown v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Emanuel Brown", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Emanuel Brown was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA). Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The district judge ordered Brown to answer the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown\u2019s testimony. Brown still refused to answer. After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him to 15 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "676", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2512", "ID": "59795", "name": "Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/45", "docket": "45", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Beacon Theatres, Inc.", "second_party": "The Hon. Harry C. Westover, Judge of the United States District Court of the Southern District of California, Central Division, et al.", "facts": "Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for \"first-run\" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their \"first-run\" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.
\nThe lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.
", "facts_len": "861", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2513", "ID": "59808", "name": "Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255", "second_party": "Sax Enterprises, Inc.", "facts": "In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.
\nIn March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union\u2019s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.
\nThe hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels\u2019 complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.
", "facts_len": "1682", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2514", "ID": "59823", "name": "Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/58", "docket": "58", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Blanche Dick", "second_party": "New York Life Insurance Company", "facts": "William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from \u201cself-destruction, whether sane or insane.\u201d On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm\u2019s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.
\nThe county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as \u201csuicide.\u201d
\nNew York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.
", "facts_len": "2434", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2515", "ID": "59825", "name": "Spano v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/582", "docket": "582", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Vincent Joseph Spano", "second_party": "State of New York", "facts": "On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers\u2019 questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano\u2019s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.
\nThe confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1096", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2516", "ID": "59838", "name": "Abbate v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Abbate", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others\u2019 assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, and Shelby with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.
", "facts_len": "1459", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2517", "ID": "59844", "name": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/753", "docket": "753", "term": "1958", "first_party": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People", "second_party": "Alabama ex rel. Patterson", "facts": "Alabama filed a civil contempt order against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) when it refused to present a list of the names and addresses of all its members and agents within the state. The NAACP claimed the order violated the NAACP\u2019s constitutional rights. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review a final contempt judgment.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "409", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2518", "ID": "59854", "name": "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Bowers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company", "second_party": "Stanley J. Bowers, Tax Comissioner of Ohio", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States.
\nIn 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax.
\nIn 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2519", "ID": "59858", "name": "Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/94", "docket": "94", "term": "1958", "first_party": "Bibb", "second_party": "Navajo Freight Lines Inc.", "facts": "An Illinois law required that trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of the other states required one type or the other. Arguing that the Illinois law unduly burdened interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "405", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2520", "ID": "59863", "name": "Aquilino v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/1", "docket": "1", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Robert Aquilino and Joseph Sero dba Home Maintenance Co.", "second_party": "United States, Ada Bottone, Fleetwood Paving Corp., Colonial Sand and Stone Co. Inc.", "facts": "A general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the \u201cproperty rights to the property\u201d of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted \u201ctrust funds\u201d under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these \u201ctrust funds\u201d so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor\u2019s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States
", "facts_len": "728", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2521", "ID": "59900", "name": "Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/22", "docket": "22", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Nina Kinsella", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Singleton", "facts": "Specialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
\nMrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the writ of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case Reid v. Covert, in which\u00a0the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in Reid v. Covert was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.
", "facts_len": "1410", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2522", "ID": "59916", "name": "Goett v. Union Carbide Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Ellen Goett as administratrix of the estate of Marvin Paul Goett", "second_party": "Union Carbide Corp. and Amherst Barge Corp.", "facts": "Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband\u2019s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.
", "facts_len": "850", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2523", "ID": "59945", "name": "International Association of Machinists v. Street", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1959", "first_party": "International Association of Machinists, et al.", "second_party": "S. B. Street, et al.", "facts": "Several labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
", "facts_len": "474", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2524", "ID": "59974", "name": "Hess v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Henry L. Hess Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called \u2018baffles\u2019, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson\u2019s work, but did not have direct control over it.
\nOn August 20, 1954, Larson\u2019s tug \u2018Muleduzer\u2019 set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson\u2019s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River\u2019s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters.
\nUnder Oregon\u2019s Employers\u2019 Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon\u2019s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham\u2019s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess\u2019 case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess\u2019 claim.
", "facts_len": "2166", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2525", "ID": "59985", "name": "Flemming v. Nestor", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/54", "docket": "54", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Arthur Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare", "second_party": "Ephram Nestor", "facts": "Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "727", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2526", "ID": "59989", "name": "United States v. Republic Steel Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/56", "docket": "56", "term": "1959", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Republic Steel Corp., International Harvester Company, Interlake Iron Corp.", "facts": "Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the \u201ccreation of any obstruction\u2026.to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.\u201d The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an \u201cobstruction\u201d under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.
", "facts_len": "1068", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2527", "ID": "59992", "name": "Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Sentilles", "second_party": "Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation", "facts": "In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (\u201cShipping\u201d), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury\u2019s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping\u2019s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.
", "facts_len": "1379", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2528", "ID": "60033", "name": "Dusky v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/504_misc", "docket": "504 MISC", "term": "1959", "first_party": "Dusky", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Dusky was charged with kidnapping and rape. He was schizophrenic, but was found competent to stand trial and was convicted. On petition of writ of certiorari, Dusky argued his conviction to be reversed on the grounds that he was not competent to stand trial.
", "facts_len": "266", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2529", "ID": "60043", "name": "Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/11", "docket": "11", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Crown Kosher Super Market", "second_party": "Gallagher", "facts": "The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts\u2019 Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.
", "facts_len": "861", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2530", "ID": "60053", "name": "Meyer v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Meyer", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.
\nPeter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.
\nThe United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.
\nDistrict court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.
", "facts_len": "2008", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2531", "ID": "60060", "name": "Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/164", "docket": "164", "term": "1960", "first_party": "William H. Burton et al.", "second_party": "Wilmington Parking Authority et al.", "facts": "In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "926", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2532", "ID": "60076", "name": "Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/21", "docket": "21", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.", "facts": "Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a \u201cconvertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.\u201d The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "668", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2533", "ID": "60079", "name": "Chaunt v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/22", "docket": "22", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Chaunt", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (\u201cINS\u201d). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt\u2019s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "863", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2534", "ID": "60081", "name": "Knetsch v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/23", "docket": "23", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Knetsch", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create \"indebtedness\" and, therefore, there was \"no commercial economic substance\" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1038", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2535", "ID": "60083", "name": "Mapp v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/236", "docket": "236", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Dollree Mapp", "second_party": "Ohio", "facts": "Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.
", "facts_len": "203", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2536", "ID": "60103", "name": "Gomillion v. Lightfoot", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/32", "docket": "32", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Gomillion", "second_party": "Lightfoot", "facts": "An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.
", "facts_len": "337", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2537", "ID": "60118", "name": "Wilkinson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/37", "docket": "37", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Frank Wilkinson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "811", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2538", "ID": "60119", "name": "Torcaso v. Watkins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/373", "docket": "373", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Roy R. Torcaso", "second_party": "Clayton K. Watkins, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland", "facts": "Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.
", "facts_len": "474", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2539", "ID": "60123", "name": "Monroe v. Pape", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/39", "docket": "39", "term": "1960", "first_party": "James Monroe, et al.", "second_party": "Frank Pape, et al.", "facts": "On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on \"open\" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.
\nMonroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1064", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2540", "ID": "60141", "name": "United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/49", "docket": "49", "term": "1960", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Virginia Electric & Power Company", "facts": "In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government\u2019s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.
\nThe district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1280", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2541", "ID": "60162", "name": "Baker v. Carr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Charles W. Baker et al.", "second_party": "Joe C. Carr et al.", "facts": "Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.
", "facts_len": "303", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2542", "ID": "60163", "name": "Poe v. Ullman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/60", "docket": "60", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Poe", "second_party": "Ullman", "facts": "Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "534", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2543", "ID": "60168", "name": "Braunfeld v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/67", "docket": "67", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Braunfeld", "second_party": "Brown", "facts": "Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.
", "facts_len": "552", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2544", "ID": "60178", "name": "Boynton v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1960", "first_party": "Bruce Boynton", "second_party": "Commonwealth of Virginia", "facts": "Bruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so.
\nBoynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "893", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2545", "ID": "60188", "name": "McGowan v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1960", "first_party": "McGowan", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "Several employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.
", "facts_len": "302", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2546", "ID": "60218", "name": "Kesler v. Dept. Of Public Safety", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/14", "docket": "14", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Harold Beck Kesler", "second_party": "Department Of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility Division, State of Utah", "facts": "In June, 1957, a Utah court entered a judgment against Harold Kesler for negligently operating a motor vehicle. When Kesler failed to pay the judgment for over sixty days, the judgment\u2019s creditors, following Utah\u2019s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (UMVSRA), filed the unpaid judgments with Utah\u2019s Department of Public Safety. As a result, the Department suspended Kesler\u2019s driver\u2019s license and vehicle registration until he paid his judgment.
\nIn December, 1959 Kesler, who had still failed to pay the judgment, filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court. Although this released him from his judgment debts, the Department refused to restore his driver\u2019s license and vehicle registration. The Department claimed that, under the UMVSRA, a bankruptcy proceeding will not release debts for negligently operating a motor vehicle.
\nThe United States District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed the law and refused to both restore his license and to invalidate Utah\u2019s law. A direct appeal to the United States\u2019 Supreme Court followed.
", "facts_len": "1071", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2547", "ID": "60222", "name": "Western Union Telegraph Company v. Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/15", "docket": "15", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Western Union Telegraph Company", "second_party": "Pennsylvania", "facts": "Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
", "facts_len": "897", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2548", "ID": "60223", "name": "Coppedge v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/157", "docket": "157", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Mark Coppedge, Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
", "facts_len": "758", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2549", "ID": "60237", "name": "United States v. Gilmore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/21", "docket": "21", "term": "1962", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Don Gilmore et ux.", "facts": "Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for \"ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income.\"
\nGilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.
", "facts_len": "1266", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2550", "ID": "60247", "name": "Glidden Company v. Zdanok", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/242", "docket": "242", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Glidden Company", "second_party": "Olga Zdanok", "facts": "Olga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence.\u00a0
\nPrevious judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Article III of the Constitution.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1084", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2551", "ID": "60250", "name": "Garner v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/26", "docket": "26", "term": "1961", "first_party": "John Burrell Garner", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "In a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "453", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2552", "ID": "60261", "name": "Organized Village of Kake v. Egan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Organized Village of Kake, Angoon Community Association", "second_party": "William A. Egan, Governor of Alaska", "facts": "The State of Alaska threatened to enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.
", "facts_len": "668", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2553", "ID": "60260", "name": "Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Robert Kennedy, Attorney General", "second_party": "Francisco Mendoza-Martinez", "facts": "Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the \"Act\") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.
", "facts_len": "1013", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2554", "ID": "60266", "name": "Hoyt v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/31", "docket": "31", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Hoyt", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "A Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Court upheld the conviction.
", "facts_len": "335", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2555", "ID": "60274", "name": "Douglas v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/34", "docket": "34", "term": "1961", "first_party": "William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes", "second_party": "California", "facts": "William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies.
\nThe defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California\u2019s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants\u2019 case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1105", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2556", "ID": "60271", "name": "Vaughan v. Atkinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/323", "docket": "323", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Vaughan", "second_party": "Atkinson", "facts": "The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to \"maintenance and cure,\" that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.)
\nAt discharge, after two voyages on S.S. National Liberty, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1259", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2557", "ID": "60280", "name": "Wong Sun v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/36", "docket": "36", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Wong Sun and James Wah Toy", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named \u201cBlackie Toy\u201d once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as \u201cBlackie Toy\u201d, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy\u2019s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "796", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2558", "ID": "60287", "name": "Brown Shoe Company, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Brown Shoe Company, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "When Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the United States sued Brown for antitrust violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.
", "facts_len": "732", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2559", "ID": "60291", "name": "Campbell v. Hussey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/42", "docket": "42", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Phil Campbell, Commissioner of Agriculture of Georgia and Georgia Farm Bureau Federation Inc.", "second_party": "William Hussey, Jr., et al.", "facts": "The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "594", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2560", "ID": "60292", "name": "Link v. Wabash Railroad Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/422", "docket": "422", "term": "1961", "first_party": "William Link", "second_party": "Wabash Railroad Company", "facts": "On August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link\u2019s attorney contacted the Wabash Railroad attorney to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link\u2019s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found that Link\u2019s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case \u201cfor failure to prosecute the action.\u201d The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "971", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2561", "ID": "60296", "name": "United States v. Borden Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/439", "docket": "439", "term": "1961", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Borden Company", "facts": "The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores.
\nThe government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act.
\nThe United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1520", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2562", "ID": "60301", "name": "Hutcheson v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/46", "docket": "46", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Hutcheson", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Maurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in a pending state criminal trial, he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a \"pretrial\" of the state charges.
\nThe United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.
", "facts_len": "933", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2563", "ID": "60303", "name": "Engel v. Vitale", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/468", "docket": "468", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Steven I. Engel, et al.", "second_party": "William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.", "facts": "The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.
", "facts_len": "325", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2564", "ID": "60312", "name": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1962", "first_party": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People", "second_party": "Button", "facts": "The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned \"the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business.\"
", "facts_len": "145", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2565", "ID": "60324", "name": "Hodges v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/58", "docket": "58", "term": "1961", "first_party": "John E. Hodges", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On April 30, 1956, the Chicago Police Department arrested John E. Hodges on charges of armed robbery. On May 2, 1956, two members of the District of Columbia Police Department traveled to Chicago and interrogated Hodges for about an hour before producing a written statement. Hodges was returned to Washington, D.C., indicted, and pled guilty. Hodges later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of not guilty. On April 15, 1957, Hodges went to trial and was found guilty. He did not appeal.
\nThree months later, Hodges filed a motion in district court to vacate his sentence, arguing that his confession was coerced and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. The motion was denied without a hearing. Hodges appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "821", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2566", "ID": "60320", "name": "Robinson v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/554", "docket": "554", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Robinson", "second_party": "California", "facts": "A jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "221", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2567", "ID": "60327", "name": "Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Theodore R. Gibson", "second_party": "Florida Legislative Investigation Committee", "facts": "In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called \"subversive organizations.\" Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt.
", "facts_len": "578", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2568", "ID": "60337", "name": "Fong Foo v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/64", "docket": "64", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Fong Foo, Robert Knupp, Standard Coil Products Co.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil\u2019s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal.
", "facts_len": "895", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2569", "ID": "60346", "name": "Killian v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1961", "first_party": "John Joseph Killian", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act.
\nAs early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group\u2019s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings.
\nKillian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses\u2019 testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka\u2019s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian\u2019s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.
", "facts_len": "2480", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2570", "ID": "60356", "name": "Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/78", "docket": "78", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Goldblatt", "second_party": "Town of Hempstead", "facts": "Herbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres of land within the Town of Hempstead (town) and often used the land for his business of mining sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.
", "facts_len": "919", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2571", "ID": "60359", "name": "Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/79", "docket": "79", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "United States, et al.", "facts": "In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a \u201ccompensatory payment.\u201d The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the \u201ccompensatory payment\u201d provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.
", "facts_len": "828", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2572", "ID": "60360", "name": "Russell v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1961", "first_party": "Norton Anthony Russell", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions.
", "facts_len": "380", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2573", "ID": "60371", "name": "Townsend v. Sain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Charles Townsend", "second_party": "Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois", "facts": "The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a \"truth serum.\" While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction.
\nTownsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record.
", "facts_len": "1062", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2574", "ID": "60390", "name": "Ferguson v. Skrupa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/111", "docket": "111", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Ferguson", "second_party": "Skrupa", "facts": "A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for \"debt adjusting\" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a \"Credit Advisor\" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an \"unreasonable regulation of a lawful business\" and struck it down.
", "facts_len": "407", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2575", "ID": "60395", "name": "Avent v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/11", "docket": "11", "term": "1962", "first_party": "John Thomas Avent et al.", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only.
\nOn May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store\u2019s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing.
\nAt trial, Boger testified that it was Kress\u2019 policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors\u2019 common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.
", "facts_len": "1724", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2576", "ID": "60391", "name": "Gray v. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/112", "docket": "112", "term": "1962", "first_party": "James H. Gray et al.", "second_party": "James O'Hear Sanders", "facts": "Since the beginning of the 20th century, the State of Georgia used a county unit system for counting votes in primary elections. Under this system, the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The overall winning candidate would then have to receive a majority of the county unit votes statewide. This system ended up giving rural counties a majority of the unit votes, even though rural counties made up only about a third of the population as of the 1960s.
\nIn 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter in Georgia's most populous county, brought suit against several representatives of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Sanders claimed that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As a voter within one of the urban counties, Sanders claimed his vote had less of an influence on the nomination of candidates than that of a rural voter. A special three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with Sanders and held that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the district court did not outlaw the county unit system entirely. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
", "facts_len": "1417", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2577", "ID": "60406", "name": "School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/142", "docket": "142", "term": "1962", "first_party": "School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania", "second_party": "Edward Lewis Schempp", "facts": "Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself.\u00a0
\nThe Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "730", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2578", "ID": "60408", "name": "Haynes v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/147", "docket": "147", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Raymond L. Haynes", "second_party": "Washington", "facts": "On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "581", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2579", "ID": "60411", "name": "Gideon v. Wainwright", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/155", "docket": "155", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Clarence Earl Gideon", "second_party": "Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections", "facts": "Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.
", "facts_len": "676", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2580", "ID": "60433", "name": "Lopez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/236", "docket": "236", "term": "1962", "first_party": "German S. Lopez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On August 31, 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Roger S. Davis visited Clauson\u2019s Inn, located in North Falmouth, Massachusetts, as part of an investigation into possible tax evasion. He spoke with German S. Lopez, who operated the inn, to determine whether there was any dancing or other form of evening entertainment. Lopez denied it, but when Davis returned later that night, he saw dancing in the lounge and bar. On October 21, Davis returned to tell Lopez that the Inn might owe a cabaret tax and requested the Inn\u2019s financial records. Lopez suggested that the two could reach an \u201cagreement\u201d and offered Davis $420 with a promise of more money if he dropped the issue. In Lopez\u2019s version of the events, the money was for Davis to prepare the paperwork and put the Inn\u2019s books in order. Lopez agreed to file paperwork for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back on October 24. Davis reported the meeting and turned the money over to his superior. When he returned on October 24, Davis wore a recording device. As they discussed Lopez\u2019s tax liability, Lopez emphasized that he wanted Davis \u201con [his] side\u201d and gave him more money.
\nLopez was charged with four counts of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent. Prior to trial, Lopez filed a motion to suppress the recorded evidence, and the motion was denied. He was convicted on three of the counts in district court. Although the defense did not focus on entrapment, the trial court judge provided jury instructions on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1577", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2581", "ID": "60480", "name": "Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/45", "docket": "45", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.", "second_party": "Paul", "facts": "California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "608", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2582", "ID": "60489", "name": "McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/480", "docket": "480", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Louis McNeese, Jr., a minor, by Mabel McNeese, his mother and next friend et al.", "second_party": "Board of Education for Community Unit School Dist. 187, Cahoka, IL et al.", "facts": "African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "617", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2583", "ID": "60488", "name": "Federal Power Commission v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/48", "docket": "48", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Federal Power Commission", "second_party": "Tennessee Gas Transmission Company", "facts": "In 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds.\u00a0
\nTennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas.
", "facts_len": "1068", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2584", "ID": "60494", "name": "Brady v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/490", "docket": "490", "term": "1962", "first_party": "John L Brady", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady\u2019s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.
", "facts_len": "598", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2585", "ID": "60509", "name": "Sherbert v. Verner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/526", "docket": "526", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Sherbert", "second_party": "Verner", "facts": "Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday.\u00a0
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "461", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2586", "ID": "60507", "name": "Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/52", "docket": "52", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Best", "second_party": "Humboldt Placer Mining Company", "facts": "In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.
", "facts_len": "908", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2587", "ID": "60521", "name": "Griffin v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1962", "first_party": "William L. Griffin et al.", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy \"not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park.\" During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "719", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2588", "ID": "60566", "name": "Edwards v. South Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/86", "docket": "86", "term": "1962", "first_party": "Edwards", "second_party": "South Carolina", "facts": "187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law.
", "facts_len": "720", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2589", "ID": "60612", "name": "Malloy v. Hogan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/110", "docket": "110", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Malloy", "second_party": "Hogan", "facts": "William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, \"on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]\" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "812", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2590", "ID": "60623", "name": "Bell v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/12", "docket": "12", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Bell", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
", "facts_len": "606", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2591", "ID": "60630", "name": "Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/16", "docket": "16", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Banco Nacional de Cuba", "second_party": "Peter L.F. Sabbatino et al.", "facts": "Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba\u2019s taking of the sugar violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "811", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2592", "ID": "60634", "name": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/169", "docket": "169", "term": "1963", "first_party": "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People", "second_party": "Alabama ex rel. Richmond M. Flowers, Attorney General", "facts": "In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP\u2019s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records.
\nThe Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members\u2019 freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court\u2019s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists.
\nThe NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court\u2019s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP\u2019s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP\u2019s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2430", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2593", "ID": "60636", "name": "United States v. Boyd", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/185", "docket": "185", "term": "1963", "first_party": "United States , et al.", "second_party": "B. J. Boyd, Commissioner", "facts": "In 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors must pay a contractor\u2019s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. \u2014 both of which hold AEC contracts \u2014 and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor\u2019s tax.
\nThe trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state\u2019s right to collect a contractor\u2019s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.
", "facts_len": "706", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2594", "ID": "60638", "name": "Massiah v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/199", "docket": "199", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Winston Massiah", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah\u2019s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "765", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2595", "ID": "60637", "name": "Fahy v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/19", "docket": "19", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Harold Fahy and William Arnold", "second_party": "Connecticut", "facts": "A jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy\u2019s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.
", "facts_len": "588", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2596", "ID": "60639", "name": "WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/20", "docket": "20", "term": "1963", "first_party": "WMCA, Inc.", "second_party": "Lomenzo", "facts": "The WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari.
", "facts_len": "482", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2597", "ID": "60646", "name": "Wesberry v. Sanders", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/22", "docket": "22", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Wesberry", "second_party": "Sanders", "facts": "James P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "636", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2598", "ID": "60650", "name": "Reynolds v. Sims", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/23", "docket": "23", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Reynolds", "second_party": "Sims", "facts": "In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.
", "facts_len": "712", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2599", "ID": "60662", "name": "Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/29", "docket": "29", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Maryland Committee for Fair Representation", "second_party": "Tawes", "facts": "Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "878", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2600", "ID": "60669", "name": "Roman v. Sincock", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/307", "docket": "307", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Roman", "second_party": "Sincock", "facts": "Following the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged the constitutionality of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.
", "facts_len": "610", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2601", "ID": "60695", "name": "New York Times Company v. Sullivan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/39", "docket": "39", "term": "1963", "first_party": "New York Times Company", "second_party": "Sullivan", "facts": "During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law.\u00a0
\nWhen the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "909", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2602", "ID": "60698", "name": "Garrison v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Jim Garrison", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish\u2019s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges\u2019 inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.
", "facts_len": "671", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2603", "ID": "60723", "name": "Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/508", "docket": "508", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Lucas", "second_party": "Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado", "facts": "Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari.
", "facts_len": "998", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2604", "ID": "60720", "name": "Gotthilf v. Sills", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/50", "docket": "50", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Morris Gotthilf", "second_party": "Benjamin Sills, Morton Sills, Sills of Cambridge Inc.", "facts": "The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granted an order to arrest debtor, Morris Gotthilf. Gotthilf appealed the decision, arguing that the statute authorizing arrest to enforce collection of debts violated the New York State and U.S. Constitutions. The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the appeal, because the original order was not final. Gotthilf did not file for leave to appeal certified questions before appealing the the U.S. Supreme Court as is required by New York law for non-final orders.
", "facts_len": "525", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2605", "ID": "60743", "name": "Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/592", "docket": "592", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al.", "second_party": "County School Board of Prince Edward County, et al.", "facts": "In 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation.
\nIn 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools.
", "facts_len": "1924", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2606", "ID": "60747", "name": "Escobedo v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/615", "docket": "615", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Danny Escobedo", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel.
", "facts_len": "455", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2607", "ID": "60748", "name": "Jackson v. Denno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/62", "docket": "62", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Nathan Jackson", "second_party": "Wilfred Denno, Warden", "facts": "On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room.
\nJackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
\nJackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "1558", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2608", "ID": "60760", "name": "Davis v. Mann", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/69", "docket": "69", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Davis", "second_party": "Mann", "facts": "Acting on behalf of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state \"substantially in proportion to their respective populations.\" When Levin Davis appealed an adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "572", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2609", "ID": "60797", "name": "Barr v. City of Columbia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1963", "first_party": "Charles F. Barr, et al.", "second_party": "City of Columbia", "facts": "The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder\u2019s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
", "facts_len": "832", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2610", "ID": "60849", "name": "Hanna v. Plumer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/171", "docket": "171", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Hanna", "second_party": "Plumer", "facts": "After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand.
\nThe parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1039", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2611", "ID": "60855", "name": "Hamm v. City of Rock Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Arthur Hamm, Jr., Frank James Lupper", "second_party": "City of Rock Hill, Arkansas", "facts": "On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory\u2019s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them.
\nThe city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory\u2019s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s due process protections.
\nThe Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.
", "facts_len": "1292", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2612", "ID": "60863", "name": "Cox v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/24", "docket": "24", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Cox", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality (\"CORE\") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members.
\nBaton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration \"to the west side of the street\" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox.
\nCox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his \"disturbing the peace\" and \"obstructing public passages\" convictions on certiorari, and the \"courthouse picketing\" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the \"disturbing the peace\" and \"obstructing public passages\" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the \"courthouse picketing\" statute.
", "facts_len": "1626", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2613", "ID": "60895", "name": "City of El Paso v. Simmons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/38", "docket": "38", "term": "1964", "first_party": "City of El Paso", "second_party": "Simmons", "facts": "Since the late 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955.
", "facts_len": "681", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2614", "ID": "60898", "name": "United States v. Brown", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/399", "docket": "399", "term": "1964", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Brown", "facts": "Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 forbids any member of the Communist Party from serving as an executive officer of a labor union, with the goal of preventing politically-motivated strikes that would pose a danger to the national economy. Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman and admitted member of the Communist Party, was three times elected to the executive board of the local International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union from 1959 through 1961. On May 24, 1961, Brown was charged with violating section 504 of the LMRDA. No evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Brown was involved in any other illegal activity or plotting a political strike. Brown was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction and found that section 504 violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. In response to appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, Brown also argued that section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, a law that targets a single individual or group, and therefore violates Article I, Section 9.
", "facts_len": "1211", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2615", "ID": "60920", "name": "United States v. Seeger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/50", "docket": "50", "term": "1964", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Seeger", "facts": "Seeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his personal morals. He argued that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being.
", "facts_len": "812", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2616", "ID": "60919", "name": "Griswold v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/496", "docket": "496", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Estelle T. Griswold, et al.", "second_party": "State of Connecticut", "facts": "In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "593", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2617", "ID": "60923", "name": "Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/515", "docket": "515", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II.
", "facts_len": "333", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2618", "ID": "60928", "name": "Katzenbach v. McClung", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/543", "docket": "543", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Katzenbach", "second_party": "McClung", "facts": "Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state.
\nHe argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "786", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2619", "ID": "60933", "name": "Pointer v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/577", "docket": "577", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Pointer", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "On the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe.
\nThe police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not.
\nPointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront a witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
", "facts_len": "1755", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2620", "ID": "60941", "name": "Henry v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Aaron Henry", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "During Aaron Henry\u2019s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry\u2019s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry\u2019s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry\u2019s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry\u2019s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion of Error pointing out that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, holding that even honest mistakes are binding.
", "facts_len": "1093", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2621", "ID": "60940", "name": "United States v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/5_orig", "docket": "5-orig", "term": "1964", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "California", "facts": "In United States v. California (1947), the Court ruled that the federal government owned rights to the undersea land off the California coast, an area with rich oil and mineral deposits. The Court held that California's rights were limited to low and inland waters and appointed a special master to better define the limits of California's land rights. In a report filed in 1952, the special master based his definition on the one used by the federal government in foreign relations. In 1953, before the Court considered the special master's report, Congress passed the Submerged Land Act, granting to the states' ownership of underwater land within their borders \"as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union.\" The act limited states' seaward rights, however, to no more than three miles from the coastline. The act also acknowledged states' ownership of land beneath inland waters. The act gave no specific definition of either \"coastline\" or \"inland waters\" and did not address bodies of water adjoining the sea, such as bays.
", "facts_len": "1069", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2622", "ID": "60954", "name": "Louisiana v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/67", "docket": "67", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Louisiana", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Attorney General on behalf of the United States sued Louisiana in a Louisiana federal district court alleging that the state had denied and would continue to deny African-Americans the right to vote. In 1898 Louisiana adopted a constitutional amendment that imposed burdensome requirements for voter registration, but which had a clause exempting those people registered to vote as of January 1, 1867 and the son or grandson of such people. African- Americans were not entitled to vote as of January 1, 1867. The district court agreed with the United States and held that Louisiana's requirements were unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "631", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2623", "ID": "60955", "name": "Freedman v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/69", "docket": "69", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Freedman", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "428", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2624", "ID": "60974", "name": "Abernathy v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Ralph D. Abernathy, et al.", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "In 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter. There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed \u201ccalculated to provoke a breach of the peace.\u201d
\nAbernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.
", "facts_len": "1204", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2625", "ID": "60978", "name": "Linkletter v. Walker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/95", "docket": "95", "term": "1964", "first_party": "Linkletter", "second_party": "Walker", "facts": "Victor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. Linkletter argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.
", "facts_len": "363", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2626", "ID": "60994", "name": "United States v. Yazell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/10", "docket": "10", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Yazell", "facts": "After a flood, the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "778", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2627", "ID": "60996", "name": "Kent v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/104", "docket": "104", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Kent", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Morris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a \"full investigation\" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.
", "facts_len": "719", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2628", "ID": "61000", "name": "Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/11", "docket": "11", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Graham", "second_party": "John Deere Company of Kansas City", "facts": "Graham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an \"old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way.\" Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a \"hold-down\" cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of Appeals sustained the patent.
", "facts_len": "858", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2629", "ID": "61024", "name": "United States v. Romano", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Romano", "facts": "On the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the \"Apinook Mill\" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th.
\nOn October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed.
\nSection 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 (\"ETTCA\"), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still.
\nThe United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury found both men guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still.
\nChief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.
", "facts_len": "2225", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2630", "ID": "61029", "name": "Time, Inc. v. Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/22", "docket": "22", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Time Inc.", "second_party": "James J. Hill", "facts": "In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine (\"Life\") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. (\"Time\") certiorari.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2631", "ID": "61030", "name": "South Carolina v. Katzenbach", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/22_orig", "docket": "22-orig", "term": "1965", "first_party": "South Carolina", "second_party": "Katzenbach", "facts": "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a \"test or device\" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.
", "facts_len": "274", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2632", "ID": "61042", "name": "United States v. Standard Oil Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/291", "docket": "291", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Standard Oil Company", "facts": "Standard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word \u201crefuse\u201d meant \u201crejected matter,\u201d which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "561", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2633", "ID": "61041", "name": "United States v. Ewell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/29", "docket": "29", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis", "facts": "Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "891", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2634", "ID": "61043", "name": "Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1965", "first_party": "William Albertson, Roscoe Quincy Proctor", "second_party": "Subversive Activities Control Board", "facts": "On November 22, 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order requiring the Communist Party to register under Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) as a Communist-action organization. The Court sustained this order in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board. On May 31, 1962, the Attorney General separately required William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, as alleged members of the Communist Party, to fill out two registration forms each. Neither registration form was specifically mandated by the SACA.
\nAlbertson and Proctor did not provide personal information required by the forms, instead asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the board and denying that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization. The Attorney General presented the testimony of paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informers that Albertson and Proctor participated in meetings of the Party and had been elected to Party offices. The board took official note of the proceedings and issued a final order stipulating that petitioners had not properly registered as members of the Communist Party. On appeal, the court held that Albertson and Proctor\u2019s claims of privilege were premature in part because they had not yet been prosecuted for a criminal activity.
", "facts_len": "1411", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2635", "ID": "61052", "name": "A Book Named \"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure\" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/368", "docket": "368", "term": "1965", "first_party": "A Book Named \"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure", "second_party": "Attorney General of Massachusetts", "facts": "A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an \"obscene\" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene.
", "facts_len": "377", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2636", "ID": "61055", "name": "Rosenblatt v. Baer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/38", "docket": "38", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Alfred D. Rosenblatt", "second_party": "Frank P. Baer", "facts": "Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer\u2019s performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt\u2019s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice\u2014knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact.
", "facts_len": "925", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2637", "ID": "61060", "name": "Leh v. General Petroleum Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Leh", "second_party": "General Petroleum Corporation", "facts": "The Clayton Antitrust Act (\"Clayton Act\") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action.
\nOn September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a cause of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to United States v. Standard Oil, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit.
\nDistrict court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from Standard Oil -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in Standard Oil did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel.
", "facts_len": "2056", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2638", "ID": "61063", "name": "Brown v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/41", "docket": "41", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Brown", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested \"for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer.\"
", "facts_len": "710", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2639", "ID": "61066", "name": "Ginzburg v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/42", "docket": "42", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Ginzburg", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari.
", "facts_len": "475", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2640", "ID": "61080", "name": "Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/48", "docket": "48", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Harper", "second_party": "Virginia Board of Elections", "facts": "Virginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "416", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2641", "ID": "61082", "name": "Mishkin v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/49", "docket": "49", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Edward Mishkin", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "On December 29, 1959, New York City police officers entered the Publishers Outlet, where they seized a number of books and magazines. On January 12, 1960, the police raided the basement below a printing shop belonging to Norman Levenberg. The police discovered, through Levenberg, that a number of books were kept for Edward Mishkin in a storage room. Also that day, officers entered Midget Book Shop, where they seized an additional number of books and magazines. On February 10, 1960, the police confiscated three books from the Main Stern Book Store. Levenberg later testified that Mishkin controlled all of the books, and that he operated both the Publishers\u2019 Outlet and the Main Stern Book Store; officers indeed encountered Mishkin at both stores. In all, the police seized fifty books allegedly possessed by Mishkin.
\nThe seized books were paper-bound \u201cpulps,\u201d and most had jackets with illustrations relating to the fictional subject matter within. The covers of nineteen of the books displayed illustrations of women being whipped, beaten, tortured or abused. Most of the book jackets depicted symbols associated with fetishism, such as leather boots, excessively tight clothing, black gloves, whips, masks and corsets. Some presented incidents of sexual seduction, transvestism, sodomy, rape and masturbation.
\nThe state of New York charged Mishkin with multiple counts of possessing obscene books, of hiring others to prepare obscene books, and of publishing obscene books. At trial, authors who worked under Mishkin for several years testified that he instructed them to fill the books with strong sexual material. Mishkin was convicted before a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Sessions. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines. The appellate court affirmed Mishkin\u2019s sentence, modifying the judgment to remove charges related to Mishkin\u2019s failure to print the name and address of the publisher or printer on the books; the court held the statute requiring this action to be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment, holding that the New York law forbidding obscene material itself did not violate Mishkin\u2019s constitutional rights and was not unconstitutionally vague.
", "facts_len": "2283", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2642", "ID": "61083", "name": "Sheppard v. Maxwell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/490", "docket": "490", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Sheppard", "second_party": "Maxwell", "facts": "After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "565", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2643", "ID": "61084", "name": "Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Fred L. Shuttlesworth", "second_party": "City of Birmingham", "facts": "On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry\u2019s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry\u2019s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation.
\nByars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry\u2019s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, \u201cYou mean to say we can\u2019t stand here on the sidewalk?\u201d Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry\u2019s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence.
\nOn April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder\u2019s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars\u2019 initially testified that the group\u2019s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth\u2019s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution\u2019s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth\u2019s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth\u2019s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth\u2019s applications for certiorari and rehearing.
", "facts_len": "2488", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2644", "ID": "61086", "name": "Dennis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/502", "docket": "502", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Raymond Dennis et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.
", "facts_len": "724", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2645", "ID": "61099", "name": "United States v. Price", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/59", "docket": "59", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Cecil Ray Price", "facts": "On June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff\u2019s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 U.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2646", "ID": "61104", "name": "Harris v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Harris", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Al Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "554", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2647", "ID": "61106", "name": "Evans v. Newton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/61", "docket": "61", "term": "1965", "first_party": "E. S. Evans, et al.", "second_party": "Charles E. Newton, et al.", "facts": "In his will, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "877", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2648", "ID": "61112", "name": "United States v. Guest", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/65", "docket": "65", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Herbert Guest et al.", "facts": "On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to \"injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.\" The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1351", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2649", "ID": "61116", "name": "Schmerber v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/658", "docket": "658", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Schmerber", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted.
", "facts_len": "327", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2650", "ID": "61125", "name": "Hanna Mining Company v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Hanna Mining Company", "second_party": "District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO", "facts": "Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were \"supervisors\" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be \"employees.\" The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing.
\nHanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
", "facts_len": "1527", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2651", "ID": "61133", "name": "United States v. Huck Manufacturing Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1965", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Huck Manufacturing Co. and Townsend Co.", "facts": "Huck Manufacturing Company owned the patent for a certain type of lock bolt. Huck granted a license to Townsend Company to manufacture the lock bolt on the condition that Townsend sell those bolts at a price set by Huck. Huck granted no other licenses to manufacture its lock bolt patents. The United States filed a complaint against Huck and Townsend, alleging Sherman Act violations of conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in lock bolts. The district court ruled in favor of Huck and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "616", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2652", "ID": "61130", "name": "Miranda v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/759", "docket": "759", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Miranda", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.
\nOn March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.
", "facts_len": "971", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2653", "ID": "61139", "name": "Katzenbach v. Morgan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/847", "docket": "847", "term": "1965", "first_party": "Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General et al.", "second_party": "Morgan, et ux", "facts": "New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "913", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2654", "ID": "61163", "name": "Klopfer v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/100", "docket": "100", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Peter H. Klopfer", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state\u2019s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.
", "facts_len": "721", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2655", "ID": "61171", "name": "Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/105", "docket": "105", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Henry Keyishian, et al.", "second_party": "Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, et al.", "facts": "Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of \u201csubversive persons.\u201d Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.
", "facts_len": "787", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2656", "ID": "61179", "name": "Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/11", "docket": "11", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Canada Packers, Ltd.", "second_party": "Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al.", "facts": "Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers\u2019 plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers\u2019 sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment. The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.
", "facts_len": "716", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2657", "ID": "61185", "name": "In re Gault", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/116", "docket": "116", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Gault", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.
", "facts_len": "395", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2658", "ID": "61194", "name": "Garrity v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Edward J. Garrity, et al.", "second_party": "State of New Jersey", "facts": "The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions.
", "facts_len": "793", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2659", "ID": "61210", "name": "Adderley v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/19", "docket": "19", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Adderley", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of \"trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent\" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.
", "facts_len": "441", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2660", "ID": "61219", "name": "Gilbert v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/223", "docket": "223", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Jesse James Gilbert", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Jesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "925", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2661", "ID": "61226", "name": "Walker v. City of Birmingham", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/249", "docket": "249", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Walker", "second_party": "City of Birmingham", "facts": "Civil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.
", "facts_len": "376", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2662", "ID": "61227", "name": "United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/25", "docket": "25", "term": "1966", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Arnold Schwinn & Co., Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association", "facts": "The United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn & Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal
", "facts_len": "516", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2663", "ID": "61231", "name": "Stovall v. Denno", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/254", "docket": "254", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Theodore Stovall", "second_party": "Wilfred Denno, Warden", "facts": "On August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Berheldt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home. His wife was also injured in the attack. The next day, Theodore Stovall was arrested for the murder and promptly arraigned, but he did not yet have counsel. On August 25, although Stovall had still not retained counsel, police brought him to the hospital room where Mrs. Berheldt\u2019s was recovering from surgery to see if she could identify him. Stovall was the only African-American man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer. Mrs. Berheldt positively identified him after he was directed to say a few words for voice identification purposes. The prosecution used this identification as evidence in the trial, and Mrs. Berheldt again identified Stovall in court.
\nStovall was convicted, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Stovall sought habeas corpus relief in district court on the grounds that Mrs. Berheldt\u2019s identification was inadmissible. The district court dismissed after hearing argument on an unrelated issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
\nIn 1967, the Court issued rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California that excluded identification evidence from trial when identification came from a tainted lineup \u2014 one at which the defendants did not have counsel present.
", "facts_len": "1357", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2664", "ID": "61235", "name": "Osborn v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/29", "docket": "29", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Z. T. Osborn", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "At attorney Z.T. Osborn\u2019s trial for attempting to bribe a juror in a federal criminal trial, the judge admitted a tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Osborn and a local police officer. The officer recorded the conversation secretly under authorization of the court. Osborn argued that the recording violated his right to privacy and he was entrapped. A jury convicted Osborn and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.
", "facts_len": "467", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2665", "ID": "61236", "name": "Redrup v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Redrup", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal.
\nWilliam Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name \u2013High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial.
\nGent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling.\"
", "facts_len": "1481", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2666", "ID": "61241", "name": "Hoffa v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/32", "docket": "32", "term": "1966", "first_party": "James R. Hoffa", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "These are several consolidated cases involving similar circumstances. In the lead case, a district court in Tennessee tried and convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial. A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial. The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial. At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant. Hoffa alleged that the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "707", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2667", "ID": "61244", "name": "United States v. Wade", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/334", "docket": "334", "term": "1966", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Billy Joe Wade", "facts": "Billy Joe Wade was arrested and indicted for robbing a federally-insured bank. Without giving notice to Wade\u2019s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners. The officer had each prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, \u201cPut the money in the bag,\u201d like the robbers did. The employees identified Wade as the robber. At trial, the employees identified him again. Wade\u2019s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2668", "ID": "61251", "name": "Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/37", "docket": "37", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Curtis Publishing Company", "second_party": "Wallace Butts", "facts": "In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made \"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.\" These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul \"Bear\" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case.
", "facts_len": "2072", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2669", "ID": "61257", "name": "Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/39", "docket": "39", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Abbott Laboratories", "second_party": "Gardner", "facts": "In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (\"FFDCA\") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the \"established name\" of the drug \"prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug,\" on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices.
\nThe act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used.
\nAbbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act (\"DJA\") and the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"). Abbott Laboratories argued that the \"every time\" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress.
\nChief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's \"every time\" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.
", "facts_len": "1686", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2670", "ID": "61259", "name": "Loving v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/395", "docket": "395", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Loving et ux.", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).
", "facts_len": "496", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2671", "ID": "61261", "name": "Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Cascade Natural Gas Corporation", "second_party": "El Paso National Gas Co., United States, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp.", "facts": "In an antitrust suit, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso\u2019s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "651", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2672", "ID": "61270", "name": "Afroyim v. Rusk", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/456", "docket": "456", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Afroyim", "second_party": "Rusk", "facts": "After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall \"lose\" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.
", "facts_len": "802", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2673", "ID": "61277", "name": "Warden v. Hayden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/480", "docket": "480", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Warden, Maryland Penitentiary", "second_party": "Bennie Joe Hayden", "facts": "Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden\u2019s room.
\nHayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had \u201cevidential value only\u201d and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial.
", "facts_len": "1312", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2674", "ID": "61299", "name": "Spevack v. Klein", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/62", "docket": "62", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Samuel Spevack", "second_party": "Solomon A. Klein", "facts": "The New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states.
", "facts_len": "545", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2675", "ID": "61308", "name": "Washington v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/649", "docket": "649", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Jackie Washington", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "698", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2676", "ID": "61312", "name": "Berenyi v. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/66", "docket": "66", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Kalman J. Berenyi", "second_party": "District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service", "facts": "Kalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of \u201cgood moral character.\u201d In Berenyi\u2019s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a \u201cmeaningful association\u201d with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2677", "ID": "61315", "name": "Travis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/67", "docket": "67", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Helen Maxine Levi Travis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "This is a companion case to United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis\u2019 passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the U.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "570", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2678", "ID": "61334", "name": "United States v. Robel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1967", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Eugene Frank Robel", "facts": "Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a \u201cdefense facility\u201d. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "717", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2679", "ID": "61336", "name": "Parker v. Gladden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/81", "docket": "81", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Lee E. A. Parker", "second_party": "Clarence T. Gladden", "facts": "On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, \u201cOh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.\u201d Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court.
\nAfter the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs\u2019 statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs\u2019 statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff\u2019s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman\u2019s.
\nParker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff\u2019s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff\u2019s statements did not violate Parker\u2019s state or federal constitutional rights.
", "facts_len": "1936", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2680", "ID": "61345", "name": "United States v. Sealy, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1966", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Sealy, Inc.", "facts": "Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers.
\nIn 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940\u2019s, Sealy\u2019s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories.
\nThe Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.\u2019s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.\u2019s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court\u2019s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.\u2019s licensing structure.
", "facts_len": "1894", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2681", "ID": "61347", "name": "Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/92", "docket": "92", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Roland Camara", "second_party": "Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco", "facts": "An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.
", "facts_len": "925", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2682", "ID": "61379", "name": "Witherspoon v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/1015", "docket": "1015", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Witherspoon", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with \"conscientious scruples\" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment.
\nWitherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an \"impartial jury\" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place.
", "facts_len": "762", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2683", "ID": "61351", "name": "Chapman v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/95", "docket": "95", "term": "1966", "first_party": "Ruth Elizabeth Chapman, Thomas LeRoy Teale", "second_party": "California", "facts": "On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club\u2019s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman\u2019s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club\u2019s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door.
\nThe next day, the Spot Club\u2019s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body\u2019s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found.
\nOfficers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman\u2019s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting.
\nChapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman\u2019s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants\u2019 failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California\u2019s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants\u2019 silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
", "facts_len": "2640", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2684", "ID": "61380", "name": "Bumper v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/1016", "docket": "1016", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Wayne Darnell Bumper", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper\u2019s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper\u2019s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.
", "facts_len": "647", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2685", "ID": "61398", "name": "Wainwright v. City of New Orleans", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Wainwright", "second_party": "City of New Orleans", "facts": "On October 12, 1964, Wainwright, a student at Tulane University Law School, was out walking around midnight. Two New Orleans Police Department officers stopped him because, in their opinion, he fitted the description of a man suspected of murder. Wainwright told the officers he had identification at home, but not on his person. The officers then asked Wainwright to remove this jacket so that they could search him for a tattoo that the suspected murdered had on his left arm. Wainwright ultimately refused to do so after trying to walk away and some mild verbal sparing. The officers then arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him. After Wainwright continued to refuse to remove his jacket at the police station, officers used force to remove it and discovered that he had no tattoo.
", "facts_len": "818", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2686", "ID": "61401", "name": "Alderman v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/133", "docket": "133", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Willie Israel Alderman", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing.
\nThe United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.
", "facts_len": "827", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2687", "ID": "61410", "name": "Mempa v. Rhay", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/16", "docket": "16", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Jerry Douglas Mempa", "second_party": "B. J. Rhay", "facts": "Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa\u2019s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa\u2019s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.
", "facts_len": "746", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2688", "ID": "61422", "name": "Marchetti v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1967", "first_party": "James Marchetti", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers. Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "466", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2689", "ID": "61428", "name": "First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/23", "docket": "23", "term": "1967", "first_party": "First National Bank of Arizona", "second_party": "Cities Service Company", "facts": "Gerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies. Waldron sought treble damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil. The trial judge limited Waldron\u2019s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees. After an extended period of depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment because there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy. The court denied Waldron\u2019s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.
", "facts_len": "674", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2690", "ID": "61429", "name": "United States v. O'Brien", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/232", "docket": "232", "term": "1967", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "O'Brien", "facts": "David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.
", "facts_len": "217", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2691", "ID": "61451", "name": "Watts v. Seward School Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/325", "docket": "325", "term": "1967", "first_party": "James A. Watts, et al.", "second_party": "Seward School Board, et al.", "facts": "James A. Watts, a schoolteacher in Alaska, held private conversations with other teachers to obtain their support to remove the superintendent from his position. His further language included words to the effect of \u2018we are unable to get rid of the superintendent, so let\u2019s get rid of the school board.\u2019 The Seward School Board considered Watts' conduct to be \u201cimmoral,\u201d defined as \u201cconduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect\u201d under the relevant Alaska statute, so Watts was dismissed from his teaching job.
\nWatts' dismissal was upheld in both the Alaska Superior Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Watts' conduct \u201chad a tendency to bring the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.\u201d Watts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and argued that his dismissal violated his First Amendment right because the school board was attempting to limit his freedom of political speech. He also argued a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right because he should have the same equal protection for expression as any other private individual. After Watts filed his petition, Alaska amended the relevant state statute to reflect the rights of teachers to comment and criticize school administrators just as any private individual would have the right to do. Under the amended statute, Watts would not have been dismissed from his job.
", "facts_len": "1481", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2692", "ID": "61459", "name": "Katz v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/35", "docket": "35", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Katz", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "673", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2693", "ID": "61470", "name": "Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/40", "docket": "40", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Edward J. Hardin, Mayor of Tazewell, Tennessee, Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, Tennessee Valley Authority", "second_party": "Kentucky Utilities Company", "facts": "Dixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell.
\nThe Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU\u2019s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA\u2019s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns\u2019 governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA\u2019s power grid.
\nKU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board\u2019s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU\u2019s original county road corridor were an \u2018area\u2019 for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to that area.
", "facts_len": "2148", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2694", "ID": "61473", "name": "Umans v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/41", "docket": "41", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Sam Umans", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Sam Umans was a certified public accountant. Between 1959 and 1961, the Internal Revenue Service audited six couples represented by Umans. According to Louis R. Deitsch, an IRS employee, Umans approached Deitsch before each audit to \u201cwork something out together on it\u201d. They agreed upon a disallowance for each audit and Umans gave Deitsch an envelope containing $50 for each case. Five other IRS employees described similar transactions between the years 1961 and 1963, wherein smaller disallowances were given during audits followed by cash payments to the auditing IRS employees.
\nUmans and the six IRS employees, including Deitsch, were indicted in August 1964. Umans was charged with aiding and abetting IRS employees in receiving illegal fees. He was also charged with giving money to government officials. On March 25, 1965, Umans and the six IRS employees were re-indicted. The grand jury additionally charged Umans with giving money to government officials with the intent to influence their actions. The evidence before the grand jury consisted solely of an IRS agent summarizing statements made by witnesses who would later testify at Umans\u2019 trial. At trial, Umans requested access to statements made by the IRS employees that they took bribes from persons other than Umans; the court denied this request and sealed the documents in question. The government\u2019s case was based almost entirely on the testimonies of three of the IRS employees, including that of Deitsch.
\nJudge Sterry R. Waterman, writing for a unanimous United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of Umans\u2019 charge for aiding and abetting IRS employees, but that this instruction was not in plain error. He held that the instruction was not sufficiently prejudicial, noting that it was not objected to at trial. Judge Waterman did, however, reverse the sentence for giving money to officials, holding that this sentence could not be concurrent with the sentence for giving money to officials with intent to influence their actions. He noted that the charges were identical but for the higher requirement of proof in the latter charge. Looking to the statute itself, Judge Waterman determined that Congress intended to make the charge for giving money to officials a lesser, included offense.
\nJudge Waterman held that the trial court properly excluded the IRS employees\u2019 statements about taking bribes from other persons from the record. He reasoned that it would have been within the court\u2019s discretion to prevent Umans from cross-examining the IRS employees on this subject for impeachment purposes, as the government did not broach the subject during the employees\u2019 direct examination. Judge Waterman also held that the government properly indicted Umans with hearsay evidence, holding that this evidence was competent. He dismissed Umans\u2019 concerns about inconsistencies between the evidence presented to the grand jury and evidence presented at trial. He noted that Umans had access to affadavits used by the government to indict him; thus, he could have objected to any inconsistencies at trial, but did not do so.
", "facts_len": "3206", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2695", "ID": "61475", "name": "Flast v. Cohen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/416", "docket": "416", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Flast", "second_party": "Cohen", "facts": "Florence Flast and a group of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use of tax money violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A district court held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.
", "facts_len": "393", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2696", "ID": "61472", "name": "Powell v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/405", "docket": "405", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Leroy Powell", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Police arrested Leroy Powell for public intoxication. He was tried, convicted, and fined $20 in the Corporation Court of Austin Texas. On appeal, Powell argued that criminal punishment for public intoxication is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because he had chronic alcoholism. Under this theory, he appeared in public drunk as a compulsive symptom of the disease, not his own choice. The County court of Travis County held that alcoholism is not a defense to the charge and affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "547", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2697", "ID": "61474", "name": "Duncan v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/410", "docket": "410", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Duncan", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.
", "facts_len": "240", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2698", "ID": "61483", "name": "Ginsberg v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/47", "docket": "47", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Ginsberg", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated \u201cSam\u2019s Stationary and Luncheonette\u201d in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called \u201cgirlie\u201d magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of \u201cSir\u201d and \u201cMr. Annual\u201d; the purchase was instigated by the boy\u2019s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg\u2019s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of \u201cMan to Man\u201d and \u201cEscapade\u201d at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and \u201cEscapade\u201d and \u201cMr. Annual\u201d contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.
\nSection 484-h of New York\u2019s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were \u201charmful to minors.\u201d It defined \u201charmful to minors\u201d as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
\nGinsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
", "facts_len": "1674", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2699", "ID": "61496", "name": "Pickering v. Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/510", "docket": "510", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Marvin L. Pickering", "second_party": "Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County", "facts": "Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes. The letter complained about the board\u2019s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The school board felt the letter was \u201cdetrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools\u201d and opted to terminate Pickering\u2019s employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.
", "facts_len": "678", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2700", "ID": "61498", "name": "St. Amant v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/517", "docket": "517", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Phil A. St. Amant", "second_party": "Herman A. Thompson", "facts": "On June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities with the head of the local Teamsters Union. Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and St. Amant\u2019s political opponent.
\nThompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation. Louisiana\u2019s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with \u201cmalice.\u201d Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with utter disregard of whether the remarks were true. Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant.
", "facts_len": "1106", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2701", "ID": "61520", "name": "Sibron v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/63", "docket": "63", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Sibron", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: \"You know what I am after,\" Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.
", "facts_len": "941", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2702", "ID": "61526", "name": "Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/645", "docket": "645", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Jones", "second_party": "Alfred H. Mayer Company", "facts": "Jones, a black man, charged that a real estate company in Missouri's St. Louis County refused to sell him a home in a particular neighborhood on account of his race.
", "facts_len": "173", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2703", "ID": "61533", "name": "Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/660", "docket": "660", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 et al.", "second_party": "James E. Allen Jr., Commissioner of Education of the State of New York et al.", "facts": "A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "897", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2704", "ID": "61535", "name": "Terry v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/67", "docket": "67", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Terry", "second_party": "Ohio", "facts": "Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be \"casing a job, a stick-up.\" The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.
", "facts_len": "307", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2705", "ID": "61532", "name": "Case-Swayne Company, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/66", "docket": "66", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Case-Swayne Co.", "second_party": "Sunkist Growers, Inc.", "facts": "Since 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure.
\nSunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area.
\nThe Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act\u2019s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist\u2019s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act.
", "facts_len": "2081", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2706", "ID": "61542", "name": "Green v. County School Board of New Kent County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/695", "docket": "695", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Charles C. Green et al.", "second_party": "County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia et al.", "facts": "New Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school. Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students. After Brown v. Board of Education, the school district implemented a \u201cfreedom of choice\u201d plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend. While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins. Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system. The district court upheld the plan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers.
", "facts_len": "957", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2707", "ID": "61550", "name": "Bruton v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/705", "docket": "705", "term": "1967", "first_party": "George William Bruton", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "George William Bruton and William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a U.S. Postal Service contract station. At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans\u2019 confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police. In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice. The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans\u2019 guilt or innocence, but to disregard it as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton\u2019s charges. The jury convicted both men. Evans and Bruton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans\u2019 conviction, finding that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence. The court upheld Bruton\u2019s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton\u2019s charges.
", "facts_len": "894", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2708", "ID": "61557", "name": "Maryland v. Wirtz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/742", "docket": "742", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "Wirtz", "facts": "The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of \"employer.\" In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions.
\nThe state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2709", "ID": "61591", "name": "Shapiro v. Thompson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1967", "first_party": "Bernard Shapiro", "second_party": "Vivian Marie Thompson", "facts": "Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen-year-old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code.
", "facts_len": "836", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2710", "ID": "61627", "name": "Watts v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/1107_misc", "docket": "1107 MISC", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Robert Watts", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On August 27, 1966 while attending a protest and discussing police brutality, eighteen-year-old Robert Watts stated, \"I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.\" A federal statute makes it a crime to \"knowingly and willfully\" threaten the life of the President. Watts was arrested, tried, and convicted in federal court for violating this statute. Watts argued the statement \"did not constitute a 'threat' within the language of the statute.\" On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected this argument, finding that the statement violated the statute even if Watts had no intention of carrying out his threat, and affirmed the lower court's judgment.
", "facts_len": "872", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2711", "ID": "61637", "name": "Maxwell v. Bishop", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Maxwell", "second_party": "Bishop", "facts": "On November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial.
", "facts_len": "822", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2712", "ID": "61643", "name": "Powell v. McCormack", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/138", "docket": "138", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Adam Clayton Powell", "second_party": "John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives", "facts": "Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him.
", "facts_len": "410", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2713", "ID": "61644", "name": "Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., Interstate Commerce Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company, et al.", "facts": "The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company operated in the \u201cOfficial territory,\u201d along with several other railroad companies (Northern lines). Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company and several other railroad companies (Southern lines) operated within the \u201cSouthern territory.\" Beginning on July 17, 1947, the Northern lines tried to obtain new divisions of the freight rates that applied between the Official territory and Southern territory from the Interstate Commerce Commission. These proposed divisions would be based on actual, relative costs of service.
\nThe Commission determined that the existing divisions violated the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which directed the Commission to set aside inequitable divisions of joint rates and to prescribe equitable divisions. In determining the relative costs that controlled the divisional formula, the Commission frequently relied on unadjusted average costs incurred by the railroads on the average of all traffic in their territories, and not on actual costs incurred by the Northern and Southern lines. The Commission found that the existing divisions violated the ICA because they allocated a lesser share of revenues to the Northern lines based on relative costs.
\nThe Administrative Procedure Act required that courts set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal from the Commission\u2019s decision, the district court set aside the Commission\u2019s decision. It held that the Northern lines failed to prove that the Commission relied on substantial evidence about the relative costs of handling north-south freight traffic, noting that the burden of proof lay with the Northern lines. It also rejected the Commission\u2019s finding that the divisions required adjustment due to the greater revenue needs of the Northern lines.
", "facts_len": "1832", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2714", "ID": "61655", "name": "Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/19", "docket": "19", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation", "second_party": "Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission", "facts": "The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.
", "facts_len": "724", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2715", "ID": "61660", "name": "Younger v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney of Los Angeles County", "second_party": "John Harris, Jr. et al.", "facts": "California's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a \"chilling effect\" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth.
", "facts_len": "429", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2716", "ID": "61661", "name": "Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/20", "docket": "20", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Joyce C. Thorpe", "second_party": "Housing Authority of the City of Durham", "facts": "Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building\u2019s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe\u2019s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction.
\nWhile the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.
", "facts_len": "1128", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2717", "ID": "61663", "name": "Benton v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/201", "docket": "201", "term": "1968", "first_party": "John Dalmer Benton", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Palko decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings.
", "facts_len": "804", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2718", "ID": "61665", "name": "Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/21", "docket": "21", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Tinker", "second_party": "Des Moines Independent Community School District", "facts": "In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest.
\nThrough their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.
", "facts_len": "1226", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2719", "ID": "61674", "name": "Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/258", "docket": "258", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Morris H. Kramer et al.", "second_party": "Union Free School District No. 15", "facts": "Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.
", "facts_len": "1030", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2720", "ID": "61681", "name": "Stanley v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/293", "docket": "293", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Stanley", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.
", "facts_len": "417", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2721", "ID": "61679", "name": "United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/29", "docket": "29", "term": "1968", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Concentrated Phosphate Export Association, Inc. et al.", "facts": "After World War II, the United States made funds available through the \u2018Marshall Plan\u2019 to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
\nIn 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States.
\nThe United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA\u2019s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA\u2019s sales were \u2018export trade\u2019 for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court\u2019s favorable ruling.
", "facts_len": "1795", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2722", "ID": "61684", "name": "Allen v. State Board of Elections", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/3", "docket": "3", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Allen et al.", "second_party": "State Board Of Elections et al.", "facts": "Voters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated.
", "facts_len": "561", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2723", "ID": "61700", "name": "Boyle v. Landry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/4", "docket": "4", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Boyle et al.", "second_party": "Lawrence Landry et al.", "facts": "Plaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited \"the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act\" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute.
", "facts_len": "1034", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2724", "ID": "61723", "name": "Street v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/5", "docket": "5", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Street", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Sidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi.
\nStreet went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified that he heard Street shout, \"If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag.\"
\nThe New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning was an act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace.
", "facts_len": "1856", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2725", "ID": "61721", "name": "Brandenburg v. Ohio", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/492", "docket": "492", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Clarence Brandenburg", "second_party": "State of Ohio", "facts": "Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating \"crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform,\" as well as assembling \"with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.\"
", "facts_len": "439", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2726", "ID": "61726", "name": "Kaufman v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/53", "docket": "53", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Harold Kaufman", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During his trial for armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, Harold Kaufman admitted to the crime but unsuccessfully claimed insanity. He was convicted and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Kaufman then filed a post-conviction motion in district court challenging the evidence that proved his sanity. He alleged that the evidence was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief, holding that unlawful search and seizure was not an available attack in post-conviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "618", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2727", "ID": "61729", "name": "Williams v. Rhodes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/543", "docket": "543", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Glen A. Williams et al.", "second_party": "James A. Rhodes, Governor of Ohio", "facts": "To be placed on the ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in U.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots.
", "facts_len": "1456", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2728", "ID": "61740", "name": "Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/6", "docket": "6", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Carroll", "second_party": "President and Commissioners of Princess Anne", "facts": "A white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was ex parte, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary.
", "facts_len": "761", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2729", "ID": "61751", "name": "Boykin v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/642", "docket": "642", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Edward Boykin, Jr.", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "In the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers.
\nPursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin\u2019s punishment. Boykin did not testify and offered no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.
", "facts_len": "1009", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2730", "ID": "61756", "name": "Hadnott v. Amos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/647", "docket": "647", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Sallie M. Hadnott, et al.", "second_party": "Mabel S. Amos, et al.", "facts": "The National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
\nInitially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed the merits of the controversy on March 25.
", "facts_len": "706", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2731", "ID": "61763", "name": "Samuels v. Mackell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1970", "first_party": "George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis", "second_party": "Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz", "facts": "George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal
", "facts_len": "491", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2732", "ID": "61766", "name": "Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/71", "docket": "71", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Presbyterian Church in United States", "second_party": "Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church", "facts": "The general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches\u2019 property. Each of the local churches sued the general church for trespass on the disputed property. The general church argued that the civil courts don't have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church\u2019s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1153", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2733", "ID": "61777", "name": "Chimel v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/770", "docket": "770", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Chimel", "second_party": "California", "facts": "Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.
", "facts_len": "329", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2734", "ID": "61784", "name": "Epperson v. Arkansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Epperson", "second_party": "Arkansas", "facts": "The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.
", "facts_len": "417", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2735", "ID": "61783", "name": "Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/7", "docket": "7", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Lester Gunn, Sheriff of Bell County, Texas et al.", "second_party": "University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam", "facts": "Members of the University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal court of three judges.
", "facts_len": "1117", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2736", "ID": "61785", "name": "Spinelli v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/8", "docket": "8", "term": "1968", "first_party": "William Spinelli", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to \"local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker.\" The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they \"had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136.\"
", "facts_len": "880", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2737", "ID": "61796", "name": "Nacirema Operating Company, Inc. v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/9", "docket": "9", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Nacirema Operating Co. Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company", "second_party": "William H. Johnson, Julia T. Kloseck, and Albert Avery", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen\u2019s and Harbor Worker\u2019s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur \u201cupon the navigable waters of the United States\u201d as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "788", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2738", "ID": "61819", "name": "Dutton v. Evans", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/10", "docket": "10", "term": "1969", "first_party": "A.L. Dutton", "second_party": "Alex S. Evans", "facts": "A jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans\u2019 participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans\u2019 conspirators in the murder said \u201cwe wouldn\u2019t be in this now\u201d if it weren\u2019t for Evans. Evans\u2019 counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans\u2019 right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans\u2019 objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator\u2019s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.
\nEvans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no \u201ccogent reasons\u201d for the Georgia hearsay exception.
", "facts_len": "986", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2739", "ID": "61828", "name": "Williams v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/1089", "docket": "1089", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Williams", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to \u201cwork off\u201d the fine at a rate of $5 per day.
\nWhile in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the \u201cwork off\u201d provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams\u2019 ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.
", "facts_len": "1051", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2740", "ID": "61827", "name": "Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/108", "docket": "108", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Colonnade Catering Corporation", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering\u2019s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade\u2019s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels.
\nAt trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept \u201cso far as it may be necessary\u201d in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.
", "facts_len": "1327", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2741", "ID": "61840", "name": "United States v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/13", "docket": "13", "term": "1970", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "James A. White", "facts": "A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.
", "facts_len": "573", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2742", "ID": "61844", "name": "Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/135", "docket": "135", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Walz", "second_party": "Tax Comm'n of the City of New York", "facts": "Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.
", "facts_len": "287", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2743", "ID": "61849", "name": "Wheeler v. Montgomery", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/14", "docket": "14", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Mae Wheeler", "second_party": "John Montgomery", "facts": "Mae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her cause could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later.
\nWheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion
", "facts_len": "1214", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2744", "ID": "61841", "name": "Dandridge v. Williams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/131", "docket": "131", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare", "second_party": "Linda Williams et al.", "facts": "The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a \"standard of need\" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.
", "facts_len": "1350", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2745", "ID": "61854", "name": "North Carolina v. Alford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/14", "docket": "14", "term": "1970", "first_party": "North Carolina", "second_party": "Henry C. Alford", "facts": "North Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford\u2019s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence.
\nAfter unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford\u2019s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.
", "facts_len": "1007", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2746", "ID": "61859", "name": "DeBacker v. Brainard", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/15", "docket": "15", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Clarence De Backer", "second_party": "Homer Brainard, Sherriff of Dodge County Nebraska", "facts": "A juvenile court judge declared 17-year-old Clarence DeBacker a \u201cdelinquent child\u201d and ordered him committed to the Boys\u2019 Training School for forging his father\u2019s signature on a check and attempting to pass it off as legitimate. Before the hearing, DeBacker had requested a jury trial, but the judge denied the request. The Nebraska Juvenile Court Act denies juveniles a trial by jury. Instead of seeking review of his sentence, DeBacker flied for state habeas corpus, arguing that the juvenile court violated the Sixth Amendment when it denied him a jury trial. The Nebraska District Court dismissed the petition and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, DeBacker argued that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Duncan v Louisiana and Bloom v Illinois entitle him to a jury trial.
", "facts_len": "821", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2747", "ID": "61855", "name": "Baird v. State Bar of Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/15", "docket": "15", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Sara Baird", "second_party": "State Bar of Arizona", "facts": "Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she \u201chad ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization \u2018that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.\u2019\u201d Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird\u2019s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona.
", "facts_len": "764", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2748", "ID": "61863", "name": "In re Stolar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/18", "docket": "18", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Martin Robert Stolar", "second_party": "State of Ohio, Columbus Bar Association", "facts": "Martin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee\u2019s recommendation without opinion.
", "facts_len": "899", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2749", "ID": "61878", "name": "Waller v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/24", "docket": "24", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Joseph Waller, Jr.", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "Joseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.
", "facts_len": "480", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2750", "ID": "61886", "name": "Boddie v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/27", "docket": "27", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Gladys Boddie et al.", "second_party": "Connecticut", "facts": "Gladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "733", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2751", "ID": "61887", "name": "Brady v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/270", "docket": "270", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Robert M. Brady", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Robert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision United States v. Jackson, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused\u2019s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2752", "ID": "61891", "name": "United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/28", "docket": "28", "term": "1969", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Interstate Commerce Commission, et al.", "facts": "The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of themselves and three subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the railroad\u2019s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "943", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2753", "ID": "61894", "name": "Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/30", "docket": "30", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Willie Carter Sr., John Head, Rev. Percy McShan", "second_party": "Jury Commission of Greene County et al.", "facts": "African-American citizens of Greene County Alabama filed a class action against the Greene County, Alabama Jury Commission, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of potential jurors, and the Governor of Alabama, for appointing an all-white jury commission in a predominantly African-American county. The class members alleged that they were qualified for jury service but never summoned. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the Alabama statute governing jury selection was unconstitutional and enjoining future enforcement of the statute. The Alabama statute provided that potential jurors should be \u201cgenerally reputed to be honest and intelligent\u201d and \u201cesteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment.\u201d The district court held that the Jury Commission did not follow the Alabama statute and systematically discriminated in preparing jury lists. The court ordered a new list created in compliance with the Alabama statute and constitutional principles. The court declined to invalidate the statue or compel the Governor to appoint African-Americans to the jury commission. This case was heard on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "1186", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2754", "ID": "61922", "name": "Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/41", "docket": "41", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Choctaw Nation", "second_party": "Oklahoma et al.", "facts": "Through several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "635", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2755", "ID": "61946", "name": "Evans v. Abney", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/60", "docket": "60", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Reverend E.S. Evans et al.", "second_party": "Guyton G. Abney et al.", "facts": "In 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust for the purpose of providing a park for white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon\u2019s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon\u2019s heirs. The trial court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1088", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2756", "ID": "61949", "name": "Goldberg v. Kelly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/62", "docket": "62", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Goldberg", "second_party": "Kelly", "facts": "
John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.
", "facts_len": "526", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2757", "ID": "61954", "name": "Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/632", "docket": "632", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Beatrice Alexander", "second_party": "Holmes County Board of Education", "facts": "The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate \u201cwith all deliberate speed.\u201d However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using \u201cfreedom of choice\u201d laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "941", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2758", "ID": "61953", "name": "United States v. W. M. Webb, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/63", "docket": "63", "term": "1969", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "W.M. Webb, Inc., et al.", "facts": "W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions.
\nThe commercial fishing companies paid employers\u2019 taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not \u201cemployees\u201d for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1389", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "2759", "ID": "61967", "name": "Coleman v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/72", "docket": "72", "term": "1969", "first_party": "John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.
", "facts_len": "786", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2760", "ID": "61969", "name": "Vale v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/727", "docket": "727", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Donald J. Vale", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale\u2019s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale\u2019s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale\u2019s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
", "facts_len": "663", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2761", "ID": "61976", "name": "Welsh v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/76", "docket": "76", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Elliot Ashton Welsh II", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded \"No\" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as \"religious,\" Welsh's conviction was valid.
", "facts_len": "1004", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2762", "ID": "61978", "name": "In re Winship", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/778", "docket": "778", "term": "1969", "first_party": "", "second_party": "In Re Winship", "facts": "At age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower \"preponderance of the evidence\" burden of proof, was rejected in both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "806", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2763", "ID": "61987", "name": "Byrne v. Karalexis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/83", "docket": "83", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Garrett H. Byrne", "second_party": "Serafim Karalexis et al.", "facts": "Serafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled \u201cI am Curious (Yellow).\u201d The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl\u2019s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a \u201cprurient interest in sex,\u201d was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films.
\nKaralexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction.
", "facts_len": "1025", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2764", "ID": "61995", "name": "United States v. Reynolds", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/88", "docket": "88", "term": "1969", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "W.G. Reynolds and Mary N. Reynolds", "facts": "The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided \u201cjust compensation\u201d. The Reynolds\u2019 claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds\u2019 $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury\u2019s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States\u2019 argument that the \u201cscope of the project\u201d issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.
", "facts_len": "792", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2765", "ID": "62000", "name": "Williams v. Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/927", "docket": "927", "term": "1969", "first_party": "Williams", "second_party": "Florida", "facts": "In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "254", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2766", "ID": "62019", "name": "Time, Inc. v. Pape", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/109", "docket": "109", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Time, Inc.", "second_party": "Frank Pape", "facts": "In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case Monroe v. Pape. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report\u2019s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings.
\nPape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.
", "facts_len": "1619", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2767", "ID": "62026", "name": "Griggs v. Duke Power Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/124", "docket": "124", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Griggs", "second_party": "Duke Power Company", "facts": "Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's \"inside\" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
", "facts_len": "683", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2768", "ID": "62033", "name": "Griffin v. Breckenridge", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/144", "docket": "144", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Eugene Griffin et al.", "second_party": "Lavon Breckenridge et al.", "facts": "A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, Collins v. Hardyman. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.
", "facts_len": "1270", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2769", "ID": "62035", "name": "Tilton v. Richardson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/153", "docket": "153", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Tilton", "second_party": "Richardson", "facts": "The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.
", "facts_len": "355", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2770", "ID": "62042", "name": "New York Times Company v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873", "docket": "1873", "term": "1970", "first_party": "New York Times Company", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In what became known as the \"Pentagon Papers Case,\" the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.
", "facts_len": "442", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2771", "ID": "62047", "name": "Harris v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/206", "docket": "206", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Harris", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.
", "facts_len": "504", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2772", "ID": "62050", "name": "Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/281", "docket": "281", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Swann", "second_party": "Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education", "facts": "After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "442", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2773", "ID": "62053", "name": "Cohen v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/299", "docket": "299", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Cohen", "second_party": "California", "facts": "A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with \"FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR\" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits \"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct.\" Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.
", "facts_len": "409", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2774", "ID": "62054", "name": "United States v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/30", "docket": "30", "term": "1970", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Roosevelt Hudson Harris", "facts": "A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris\u2019 residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris\u2019 property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris\u2019 residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.
", "facts_len": "915", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2775", "ID": "62059", "name": "Coolidge v. New Hampshire", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/323", "docket": "323", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Coolidge", "second_party": "New Hampshire", "facts": "In the wake of a \"particularly brutal\" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.
", "facts_len": "516", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2776", "ID": "62056", "name": "Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/301", "docket": "301", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Webster Bivens", "second_party": "Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics", "facts": "In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens\u2019 home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "570", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2777", "ID": "62058", "name": "McKeiver v. Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/322", "docket": "322", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Joseph McKeiver et al.", "second_party": "Pennsylvania", "facts": "These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. In re Burrus concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.
", "facts_len": "1240", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2778", "ID": "62080", "name": "Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/444", "docket": "444", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Mrs. Robert Lee Moore, et al.", "second_party": "Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education", "facts": "Plaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children\u2019s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction by holding that the state statute was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1058", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2779", "ID": "62079", "name": "Procunier v. Atchley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/44", "docket": "44", "term": "1970", "first_party": "R. K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Veron Atchley", "facts": "In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley\u2019s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley\u2019s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction.
\nAtchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1045", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2780", "ID": "62078", "name": "Oregon v. Mitchell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/43-orig", "docket": "43-orig", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Oregon, et al.", "second_party": "John Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States", "facts": "In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.
", "facts_len": "462", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2781", "ID": "62084", "name": "Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/49", "docket": "49", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Lowell Wadmond, et al.", "facts": "The requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant \u201cpossesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.\u201d The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing a class of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants\u2019 First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants\u2019 political beliefs, membership in political association, and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.
", "facts_len": "1113", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2782", "ID": "62085", "name": "North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/498", "docket": "498", "term": "1970", "first_party": "North Carolina State Board of Education, et al.", "second_party": "James E. Swann, et al.", "facts": "Following a desegregation case that began in 1965, on February 5, 1970, the district court ordered the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system to implement a court-approved desegregation plan. Prior to this order, a suit had been filed in state court that sought an order enjoining the use of public funds for the transportation of students for desegregation purposes. In the midst of the extensive litigation, the North Carolina legislature enacted an anti-busing bill. Swann and other plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the statute, and a three-judge panel was convened to consider the issue. The three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "684", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2783", "ID": "62109", "name": "Perez v. Ledesma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/60", "docket": "60", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Leander H. Perez, Jr.; Louis Reichart; George Bethea; Earl Wendling", "second_party": "August M. Ledesma, Jr.; Harold J. Speiss; Lawrence P. Pittman", "facts": "August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "912", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2784", "ID": "62112", "name": "Graham v. Richardson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/609", "docket": "609", "term": "1970", "first_party": "John O. Graham, Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare, State of Arizona", "second_party": "Carmen Richardson et al.", "facts": "The state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.
", "facts_len": "1236", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2785", "ID": "62120", "name": "Wyman v. James", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/69", "docket": "69", "term": "1970", "first_party": "George K. Wyman, Commissioner of the State of New York Department of Social Services", "second_party": "Barbara James et al.", "facts": "Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.
", "facts_len": "929", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2786", "ID": "62119", "name": "Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/66", "docket": "66", "term": "1970", "first_party": "George A. Rosenbloom", "second_party": "Metromedia, Inc.", "facts": "George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words \u201callegedly\u201d or \u201creportedly\u201d in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors \u201cgirlie look peddlers\u201d and \u201csmut distributors\u201d. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.
\nRosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.
", "facts_len": "1179", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2787", "ID": "62121", "name": "Johnson v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/69-5035", "docket": "69-5035", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Johnson", "second_party": "Louisiana", "facts": "The Louisiana State Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure allowed less-than-unanimous juries to convict defendants in criminal cases in which hard labor is considered as punishment. Nine of twelve jury members were needed to return a guilty verdict. Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a jury split nine to three.
", "facts_len": "333", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2788", "ID": "62122", "name": "Apodaca v. Oregon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5046", "docket": "69-5046", "term": "1971", "first_party": "Apodaca", "second_party": "Oregon", "facts": "Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.
", "facts_len": "262", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2789", "ID": "62127", "name": "Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/73", "docket": "73", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Ida Phillips", "second_party": "Martin Marietta Corporation", "facts": "In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "677", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2790", "ID": "62135", "name": "Clay v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/783", "docket": "783", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Clay", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Board No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, and that this objection is sincere. Subsequently, the Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1006", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2791", "ID": "62133", "name": "Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/78", "docket": "78", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Atlantic City Electric Co.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order increasing freight rates on several commodities, including bituminous coal. The increases were issued at the request of several railroads because of a need for revenue to offset increased operating costs. Seven public utilities, who use large amounts of bituminous coal, sued to enjoin and set aside the order, claiming that the rates were unreasonable and the ICC\u2019s order deprived them of due process of law. Several state departments of agriculture intervened as parties plaintiff, and several railroads intervened in support of the ICC. The district court granted the ICC\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that the utilities failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act. This case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal.
", "facts_len": "847", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2792", "ID": "62137", "name": "Connell v. Higginbotham", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/79", "docket": "79", "term": "1970", "first_party": "James Higginbotham", "second_party": "Stella Connell", "facts": "Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees \u201cwill support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida\u201d and \u201cdo not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence.\u201d The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "812", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2793", "ID": "62139", "name": "Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/80", "docket": "80", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Zenith Radio Corporation", "second_party": "Hazeltine Research, Inc.", "facts": "After refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was sued by Hazeltine Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets.
\nBefore trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a party to the litigation.
", "facts_len": "1260", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2794", "ID": "62140", "name": "Williams v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/81", "docket": "81", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Clarence Williams", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "These are two consolidated cases. In 81, Clarence Williams was arrested in his house in 1967. Police searched the house for an hour and 45 minutes, discovering heroin on a shelf in a bedroom. The heroin was admitted at trial and Williams was convicted of concealing illegally imported heroin. Williams appealed, arguing that the search of his house was illegal under Chimel v. California, a case decided on June 23, 1969 that narrowed the permissible scope of searches incidental to an arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively, and the search was valid under pre-Chimel standards.
\nIn 82, Joseph Elkanich was convicted on three counts of selling narcotics in 1962. At trial, evidence included marked bills planted by a federal narcotics agent. The bills were seized during a search of Elkanich\u2019s apartment after his arrest. The arrest and search were upheld at trial and on appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Elkanich then unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the district court. While the appeal of that decision was pending, <i>Chimel</i> was decided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.
", "facts_len": "1263", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2795", "ID": "62145", "name": "United States v. Vuitch", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/84", "docket": "84", "term": "1970", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Vuitch", "facts": "The District of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless \u201cnecessary for the preservation of the mother\u2019s life or health.\u201d Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was indicted in federal district court for performing abortions that violated this statute. The district court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "414", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2796", "ID": "62150", "name": "Lemon v. Kurtzman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/89", "docket": "89", "term": "1970", "first_party": "Alton J. Lemon, et al.", "second_party": "David H. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.", "facts": "Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers\u2019 salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island\u2019s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers\u2019 annual salaries.
\nThe appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials\u2019 motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1196", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2797", "ID": "62166", "name": "Taylor v. Barkes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-939", "docket": "14-939", "term": "2014", "first_party": "Stanley Taylor, et al.", "second_party": "Karen Barkes, et al.", "facts": "On November 13, 2004, Christopher Barkes was arrested for violating his probation. As part of his intake procedure, a nurse performed a medical evaluation, as required by the institution in which he was being held. Despite Barkes\u2019 long history of mental health and substance abuse problems, neither his responses nor the nurse\u2019s observations reached the threshold necessary under the institution\u2019s protocols to initiate suicide prevention measures, so he was placed in a cell by himself. Barkes was awake and behaving normally at several points the following morning, but when an officer arrived to deliver lunch, Barkes had hanged himself with a sheet.
\nBarkes\u2019 wife and children sued Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction, and Raphael Williams, the warden of the institution in which Barkes had been held. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated Barkes\u2019 Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to properly supervise the contractor that provided medical treatment at the institution. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment.
", "facts_len": "1398", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2798", "ID": "62164", "name": "Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1339", "docket": "13-1339", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Spokeo, Inc.", "second_party": "Thomas Robins", "facts": "Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo) operated a website that provided information about individuals such as contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and certain types of economic information. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo and claimed that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on the website. However, Robins was unable to allege any \u201cactual or imminent harm,\u201d so the district court granted Spokeo\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Robins\u2019 lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Robins then filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he suffered actual harm to his employment prospects due to the website falsely claiming that he was wealthy. The district court originally denied Spokeo\u2019s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered its order and dismissed the complaint for failure to state an injury in fact. Robins appealed and argued that the district court could not reconsider its previous decision and that he had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to qualify for Article III standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, although the district court could reconsider its ruling, the allegation of a violation of a statutory right is sufficient injury to qualify for standing.
", "facts_len": "1342", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2799", "ID": "62167", "name": "Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-857", "docket": "14-857", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Campbell-Ewald Company", "second_party": "Jose Gomez", "facts": "On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the U.S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics.
\nGomez sued and argued that that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell-Ewald\u2019s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell-Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez\u2019s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell-Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects.
", "facts_len": "1401", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2800", "ID": "62165", "name": "Green v. Brennan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-613", "docket": "14-613", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Marvin Green", "second_party": "Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General", "facts": "Marvin Green began working for the United States Postal Service in 1973. In 2002, he became the postmaster at the Englewood, Colorado, post office. In 2008, a postmaster position opened in Boulder, and Green applied but did not receive the position. He filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) charge regarding the denial of his application, and the charge was settled. In 2009, Green filed an informal EEO charge and alleged that his supervisor and supervisor\u2019s replacement had been retaliating against him for his prior EEO activity. Throughout that year, Green was subject to internal Postal Service investigations including a threat of criminal prosecution. He ultimately signed an agreement that he would immediately give up his position and either retire or accept a much lower paying position. Green chose to retire and filed subsequent charges with the EEO Office, which dismissed his claim. Green then sued in district court and alleged, among other claims, that he had been constructively discharged. The district court held that Green\u2019s constructive discharge claim was barred because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of signing the agreement, which was the last allegedly discriminatory act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1300", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2801", "ID": "62168", "name": "Evenwel v. Abbott", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-940", "docket": "14-940", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Sue Evenwel, et al.", "second_party": "Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al.", "facts": "The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three-judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law.
\nPlaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts do not adhere to the 'one person, one vote' principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal.
", "facts_len": "1478", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2802", "ID": "62174", "name": "City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1042", "docket": "86-1042", "term": "1987", "first_party": "City of Lakewood", "second_party": "Plain Dealer Publishing Co.", "facts": "Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever \"terms and conditions\" which he \"deemed necessary and reasonable.\" On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.
", "facts_len": "639", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2803", "ID": "62178", "name": "Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278", "docket": "86-1278", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Hustler Magazine, Inc.", "second_party": "Falwell", "facts": "A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a \"parody\" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.
", "facts_len": "534", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2804", "ID": "62189", "name": "Michigan v. Chesternut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1824", "docket": "86-1824", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Michigan", "second_party": "Michael Mose Chesternut", "facts": "On December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed him discarding a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut\u2019s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "839", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2805", "ID": "62195", "name": "Basic Inc. v. Levinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-279", "docket": "86-279", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Basic, Incorporated, et al.", "second_party": "Max L. Levinson, et al.", "facts": "Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic\u2019s board approved the offer from Combustion.
\nThe respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders who sold their stock after Basic\u2019s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic\u2019s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company\u2019s statements untrue.
", "facts_len": "1718", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2806", "ID": "62197", "name": "Carpenter v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-422", "docket": "86-422", "term": "1987", "first_party": "David Carpenter", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled Heard on the Street (Heard) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in Heard to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When Heard featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans\u2019 information regarding stocks yet to be featured in Heard to make trades that resulted in profits of around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed.
\nThe district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ\u2014the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges\u2014had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners\u2019 misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ.
", "facts_len": "1557", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2807", "ID": "62212", "name": "Boos v. Barry", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-803", "docket": "86-803", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Boos", "second_party": "Barry", "facts": "A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to \"bring that government into public odium or public disrepute.\" Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy.
", "facts_len": "411", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2808", "ID": "62209", "name": "Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-7113", "docket": "86-7113", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Kadrmas", "second_party": "Dickinson Public Schools", "facts": "North Dakota was a sparsely populated state, and as late as the mid-20th century some children were educated in crowded one-room schools. Since 1947, the legislature encouraged thinly populated school districts to reorganize themselves into larger districts; once reorganized, districts could only charge for transportation provisions with voter approval. Dickinson Public Schools chose not to participate in the reorganization. In 1973, the district began charging a fee for door-to-door bus service; about thirteen percent of students rode the bus, and the district charged their parents ninety-seven dollars a year for one child or one hundred fifty dollars a year for two children. In 1979, North Dakota enacted legislation expressly indicating that non-reorganized school districts could charge fees for transporting students.
\nSarita Kadrmas, her mother Paula, and the rest of her family lived about sixteen miles from Sarita\u2019s school. In September 1985, the family\u2019s annual income was at or near the poverty level. Until 1985, the Kadrmas family agreed each year to pay the busing fee for Sarita, but they refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year and the bus no longer stopped for Sarita. The Kadrmas family then used private transportation, but the costs exceeded $1,000 per school year.
\nIn September 1985, Paula Kadrmas and other parents in the district filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools and various school district officials from collecting any bus service fees. The district court rejected their action on the merits. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, rejected Kadrmas\u2019 argument that the busing fee violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It characterized the statute as purely economic legislation, concluding that the charges authorized by the statute were rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating limited resources. In the spring of 1987, while her appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was pending, the Kadrmas family signed a busing contract for the remainder of the 1986 school year and paid part of the fee. They also signed a contract for the 1987 school year.
", "facts_len": "2237", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2809", "ID": "62222", "name": "Frisby v. Schultz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-168", "docket": "87-168", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Russell Frisby et al.", "second_party": "Sandra Schultz et al.", "facts": "Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was \"the protection and preservation of the home.\" When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "867", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2810", "ID": "62221", "name": "Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-16", "docket": "87-16", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Richard D. Shapero", "second_party": "Kentucky Bar Association", "facts": "Richard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval. Shapero directed the letter at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements \u201cprecipitated by a specific event\u201d such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association\u2019s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission\u2019s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "657", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2811", "ID": "62227", "name": "Arizona v. Roberson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-354", "docket": "87-354", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Arizona", "second_party": "Ronald William Roberson", "facts": "On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
", "facts_len": "777", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2812", "ID": "62229", "name": "Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-399", "docket": "87-399", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Supreme Court of Virginia", "second_party": "Friedman", "facts": "Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court.
", "facts_len": "346", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2813", "ID": "62237", "name": "Clark v. Jeter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-5565", "docket": "87-5565", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Clark", "second_party": "Jeter", "facts": "A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired.
", "facts_len": "652", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2814", "ID": "62240", "name": "Huddleston v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-6", "docket": "87-6", "term": "1987", "first_party": "Guy Rufus Huddleston", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32,000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston\u2019s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1276", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2815", "ID": "62243", "name": "New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-654", "docket": "87-654", "term": "1987", "first_party": "New Energy Company of Indiana", "second_party": "Limbach", "facts": "An Indiana law gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, provided that the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme.
", "facts_len": "251", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2816", "ID": "62245", "name": "South Carolina v. Baker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/94_orig", "docket": "94-orig", "term": "1987", "first_party": "South Carolina", "second_party": "Baker", "facts": "In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt.
", "facts_len": "623", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2817", "ID": "62252", "name": "Law v. Siegel", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-5196", "docket": "12-5196", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Stephen Law", "second_party": "Alfred Siegel", "facts": "On January 5, 2004, Stephen Law filed for bankruptcy. He claimed that there were two liens on his property consuming all of the property's value beyond a homestead exemption. A homestead exemption protects equity in a house when filing for bankruptcy. One of these liens turned out to be a fictional construction involving a woman in China. Alfred Siegel (the Trustee) claimed that, in exposing the false lien, he incurred $465,000 in attorney fees. Because these costs resulted from Law's misconduct and misrepresentation, the Bankruptcy Court added a surcharge equal to the full amount of Law's homestead exemption to offset the Trustee's costs.
\nLaw appealed the decision to the Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, federal appeals courts may create panels of judges to hear appeals from Bankruptcy Court. The BAP affirmed the order and held that the surcharge was necessary to protect the Bankruptcy Court's integrity. Law appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the BAP decision.
", "facts_len": "1076", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2818", "ID": "62257", "name": "Robers v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-9012", "docket": "12-9012", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Benjamin Robers", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan applications\u23afby misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the mortgage\u23afthen allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise.
\nAfter government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically (wired) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in the amount of $218,952.18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed (the offset value). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and \"other expenses\" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum.
", "facts_len": "1479", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2819", "ID": "62254", "name": "Pom Wonderful, LLC v. The Coca-Cola Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-761", "docket": "12-761", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Pom Wonderful, LLC", "second_party": "The Coca-Cola Company", "facts": "Pom Wonderful, LLC (Pom Wonderful), a California-based beverage company, sold various types of juice, including a pomegranate blueberry juice blend. In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) announced its own version of a pomegranate blueberry juice. In 2008, Pom Wonderful sued Coca-Cola in federal district court and argued that Coca-Cola misled consumers into believing that Coca-Cola's product contained pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contained 99% apple and grape juices and only 0.5% pomegranate and blueberry juice. Specifically, Pom Wonderful claimed that Coca-Cola violated provisions of the Lanham Act, a federal law prohibiting false advertising, as well as California's false advertising and unfair competition laws. The lawsuit challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's product.
\nThe district court held that Pom Wonderful's claims regarding the name and label of the juice were barred by a separate law, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The FDCA allows the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the labels on, among other items, juices. Because the FDA has exclusive authority to file claims for violations of the FDCA, the court feared that a decision under the Lanham Act would undercut the FDA's authority to regulate juice labels. After both parties gathered evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the name and label issues. Although the court gave Pom Wonderful the opportunity to proceed to trial on the remaining issues, Pom Wonderful conceded that it could not win without the name and label issues. Pom Wonderful appealed.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to bar Pom Wonderful's claim with respect to the name and labeling of Coca-Cola's juice. It vacated the lower court's ruling in favor of Coca-Cola, instead allowing Pom Wonderful's case to proceed on the remaining claims.
", "facts_len": "1967", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2820", "ID": "62255", "name": "Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-786", "docket": "12-786", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Limelight Networks", "second_party": "Akamai Technologies", "facts": "In the late 1990s, two professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Tom Leighton and Daniel Lewin, began to research techniques to provide stable internet services during periods of high traffic. These men eventually founded Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) to capitalize on this research. Akamai is an internet content delivery company that owns and maintains thousands of servers around the United States and contracts with internet service providers. By contracting with these companies, Akamai can deliver stable, fast internet to far-reaching customers with less danger of internet slowdown or failure. On July 14, 1998, the two men filed a patent through MIT for a method designed to alleviate Internet congestion by delivering content from multiple available servers. MIT then licensed this patent to Akamai.
\nShortly thereafter, several other internet companies filed patent applications for internet content delivery systems. This led to a series of litigations that spanned from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. In 2004, in the midst of these court battles, Akamai entered into negotiations to purchase Limelight Networks, Inc. (Limelight). In 2006, however, Limelight informed Akamai that it no longer wished to be purchased. Akamai subsequently sued Limelight in district court for violating 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(a) and \u00a7 271(b), federal laws prohibiting patent infringement. Specifically, \u00a7 271(a) prohibits general patent infringement and \u00a7 271(b) prohibits inducing patent infringement.
\nThe case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Akamai a $41.5 million verdict based on lost profit, lost royalties, interest, and price erosion damages. After a series of post-trial motions, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of Limelight and held that, although Akamai's patent was violated, much of the violation occurred when Limelight's customers took the key steps to violate the patent. Although Limelight allowed these steps to occur, it did not control its customers' actions and therefore was not liable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that an entity accused of patent infringement must either perform all of the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through its direct control.
", "facts_len": "2284", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2821", "ID": "62256", "name": "Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-842", "docket": "12-842", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Republic of Argentina", "second_party": "NML Capital, Ltd.", "facts": "During an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US$2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The district court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity.
", "facts_len": "991", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2822", "ID": "62258", "name": "Riley v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-132", "docket": "13-132", "term": "2013", "first_party": "David Leon Riley", "second_party": "State of California", "facts": "David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.
\nBefore trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1765", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2823", "ID": "62259", "name": "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-193", "docket": "13-193", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Susan B. Anthony List", "second_party": "Steven Driehaus", "facts": "Prior to the 2010 general election, Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a nonprofit, pro-life organization, announced that it intended to put up a billboard in the district of then-Congressman Steven Driehaus. The planned billboard would have asserted that Driehaus's vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act amounted to a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion. Citing threats of legal action by Driehaus's counsel, the company that owned the billboard space refused to put up the ad. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA List violated Ohio's campaign laws by making false statements about his voting record. SBA List filed an action in federal district court arguing that the Ohio statutes infringed upon its rights to free speech and association under the First Amendment. Driehaus withdrew his complaint upon losing his bid for re-election and subsequently moved to Swaziland for an assignment with the Peace Corps. The district court dismissed the suit by SBA List for lack of standing and ripeness. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1114", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2824", "ID": "62260", "name": "Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-298", "docket": "13-298", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd.", "second_party": "CLS Bank International, et al.", "facts": "Alice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720, and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor.
\nOn May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1572", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2825", "ID": "62261", "name": "Clark v. Rameker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-299", "docket": "13-299", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark", "second_party": "William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al.", "facts": "In 2001, Heidi Heffron-Clark inherited a $300,000 individual retirement account (IRA) from her mother's estate. The U.S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband (the \"Clarks\"), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.
", "facts_len": "1125", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2826", "ID": "62262", "name": "United States v. Clarke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-301", "docket": "13-301", "term": "2013", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Michael Clarke, et al.", "facts": "The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served five summonses to top officers of the Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) during its investigation into the company's tax liabilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted enforcement of the summonses. Dynamo opposed the summonses by arguing that it was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the summonses were proper. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision that allowed the summonses to be enforced and remanded the case back to the district court for a hearing on whether the investigation was launched under an improper purpose, which would render enforcement of the summonses unlawful.
", "facts_len": "738", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2827", "ID": "62267", "name": "Martinez v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-5967", "docket": "13-5967", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Esteban Martinez", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Esteban Martinez was indicted in August 2006 for aggravated battery and mob action against Avery Binion and Demarco Scott. Following several continuances due to the State's inability to locate Binion and Scott beginning in July 2009, trial was ultimately set for May 2010. At trial, the State informed the judge that Binion and Scott were still not present and asked for another continuance. The judge initially gave the State some additional time while the jury was selected but eventually denied the motion for continuance. The judge then swore in the jury and started the proceedings. The State did not participate in the case or present any evidence. Martinez moved for directed findings of not guilty on both counts, which the judge granted.
\nThe State appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and argued that the trial court should have granted its motion for continuance. Martinez argued that the State's appeal was improper under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court had found him not guilty. The Appellate Court reversed and held that the action was appealable because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was presented, and thus jeopardy had not attached. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted review and affirmed, though it noted that jeopardy generally attaches when a jury is sworn. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the relevant question is whether a defendant \"was subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction\" and that by this standard Martinez was never at risk of conviction.
", "facts_len": "1543", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2828", "ID": "62265", "name": "ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-461", "docket": "13-461", "term": "2013", "first_party": "American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Aereo, Inc.", "facts": "Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) provides a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet-enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions: that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs.
\nTwo groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to \"publicly perform\" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non-violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs' businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to deny the motion.
", "facts_len": "1534", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2829", "ID": "62266", "name": "Tolan v. Cotton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-551", "docket": "13-551", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Robert R. Tolan", "second_party": "Jeffrey Wayne Cotton", "facts": "In the early morning hours of New Year's Eve 2008, Jeffrey Cotton, a police officer, fired three shots at Robert Tolan in front of Tolan's parents' home in Bellaire, Texas. Cotton mistakenly believed that Tolan and his cousin, Anthony Cooper, had stolen a black Nissan, because another officer had incorrectly entered the license plate number of Tolan's black Nissan Xterra. One bullet hit Tolan, collapsed his right lung, and pierced his liver. Tolan sued Cotton in district court and argued that he had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cotton filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity, which protects government officials from litigation when their conduct has not violated a clearly established right. The district court ruled in favor of Cotton and found that Cotton's use of force was not unreasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but declined to adopt the lower court's reasoning. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether he violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not violate a \"clearly established\" right. In support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals cited evidence that would lead a reasonable officer in Cotton's position to believe that Tolan presented an immediate threat to his safety.
", "facts_len": "1427", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2830", "ID": "62264", "name": "Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-369", "docket": "13-369", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Nautilus, Inc.", "second_party": "Biosig Instruments, Inc.", "facts": "Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) holds the '753 Patent, which refers to a heart rate monitor associated with exercise equipment and procedures. Biosig sued Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus) in federal district court and alleged that Nautilus infringed on several claims of the patent. Nautilus moved for summary judgment on two issues: whether there was infringement, and whether the patent was invalid due to its vagueness. The district court denied Nautilus' motion as far as the issue of infringement due to lack of discovery and granted the motion as it related to the patent's invalidity because of its vagueness. Biosig appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite when it is \"insolubly ambiguous,\" or not possible for a person of ordinary skill in the area to understand and resolve.
", "facts_len": "909", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2831", "ID": "62268", "name": "Hinton v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-6440", "docket": "13-6440", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Anthony Ray Hinton", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "Between February and July of 1985, there were a series of restaurant robberies in Birmingham, Alabama. During the commission of the first two robberies, the manager of each restaurant was shot and killed by a .38 caliber bullet. The manager of the restaurant that was the target of the third robbery, however, survived and identified Anthony Ray Hinton in a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and found in his house a .38 caliber revolver. After Alabama's Department of Forensic Sciences analyzed the bullets and found that they had been fired from that revolver, Hinton was charged with two counts of capital murder for the killings during the first two robberies.
\nAt trial, the prosecution's case rested on the connection between the bullets located at the scenes of the crimes and the gun located at Hinton's house; no other physical evidence was presented. Hinton's defense attorney filed a motion for funding to hire an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's experts, which the judge granted. Because the judge did not know how much funding he could grant, he invited the attorney to file additional requests for further funding if necessary. Hinton's attorney did not take the judge up on this invitation because he did not know that Alabama law allowed for funding in excess of what the judge had already granted. With this amount of money, the defense attorney was only able to find one expert who was willing to testify, and that expert was badly discredited during cross-examination. Hinton was convicted and sentenced to death.
\nIn his post-conviction petition, Hinton argued that his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not seek additional funds to obtain more effective expert testimony. The circuit court denied the petition and held that the jury had not been prejudiced against Hinton due to the testimony. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial court did not rule on whether or not Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify. On remand, the circuit court held that Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the case.
", "facts_len": "2254", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2832", "ID": "62263", "name": "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-339", "docket": "13-339", "term": "2013", "first_party": "CTS Corp.", "second_party": "Peter Waldberger, et al.", "facts": "In 1980, in response to concerns about the repercussions of toxic waste dumping, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which was designed to establish a comprehensive response mechanism and to shift the cost of the clean-up to the parties responsible. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by adding a section stating that, if a state statute of limitations allows the period in which action may be brought to begin before the plaintiff has knowledge of the harm, CERCLA preempts the state statute and allows the period to begin only from the point at which the plaintiff has knowledge.
\nCTS Corporation (CTS) manufactures and disposes of electronics and electronic parts. From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap Road Facility (Facility) in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of carcinogenic solvents were stored. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility and promised the realtors that the property was environmentally safe and clean. Subsequently, the land was sold to David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and others (landowners), who learned that the land was contaminated and that their well water contained concentrated levels of carcinogenic solvents in 2009. The landowners sued CTS in federal district court and argued that CTS should be required to remove the toxic contaminants as well as pay monetary damages. CTS moved to dismiss the case by arguing that North Carolina's ten-year statute of limitations on real property actions resulting from physical damage to a claimant's property prevented the suit from going forward. Although the landowners argued that CERCLA preempted the limitation, the district court held that the ten-year limitation was actually a statute of repose, which limits legal action to a particular timeframe regardless of when the harm becomes apparent. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that CERCLA's preemption applied to both statutes of repose, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is not relevant to when the time period begins, as well as to statutes of limitation, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is relevant.
", "facts_len": "2235", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2833", "ID": "62269", "name": "Williams v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-9085", "docket": "13-9085", "term": "2013", "first_party": "Tara Sheneva Williams", "second_party": "Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden", "facts": "In October 1993, Tara Williams drove two of her friends to a liquor store in Long Beach, California, with the intent to commit a robbery. Williams waited in the car to serve as the getaway driver while her friends stole the cash from the liquor store and fatally shot the store's owner. Five years later, Williams was apprehended and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the judge discharged a juror for bias and replaced that juror with an alternate, after which the jury convicted Williams for first-degree murder. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. While Williams' petition to the California Supreme Court was pending, that court decided a case that held that a court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror who seemed to disagree with the other jurors. Based on that decision, the California Supreme Court remanded Williams' case, and the California Court of Appeal issued a revised opinion holding that the lower court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the juror.
\nWilliams filed a federal habeas corpus petition, but the district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which restricts federal habeas relief to cases that have already been adjudicated on their merits in state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the California Court of Appeal had disregarded Williams' argument that dismissal of the juror in question violated the Sixth Amendment. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the California court had adjudicated the case on the merits, even if the Sixth Amendment claim was not explicitly addressed. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of habeas relief.
", "facts_len": "1781", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2834", "ID": "62270", "name": "Republican Party of Minnesota v. White", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-521", "docket": "01-521", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Republican Party of Minnesota", "second_party": "White", "facts": "Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
", "facts_len": "881", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2835", "ID": "62272", "name": "Waters v. Churchill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1450", "docket": "92-1450", "term": "1993", "first_party": "Waters", "second_party": "Churchill", "facts": "A public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed.
", "facts_len": "370", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2836", "ID": "62275", "name": "Franconia Associates v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-455", "docket": "01-455", "term": "2001", "first_party": "Franconia Associates", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Under the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low-or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized \"prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower.\" In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date.
", "facts_len": "1296", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2837", "ID": "62274", "name": "Kansas v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/105-orig", "docket": "105-orig", "term": "2004", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a \"river master\" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river.
", "facts_len": "764", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2838", "ID": "62273", "name": "Branch v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1437", "docket": "01-1437", "term": "2002", "first_party": "Smith", "second_party": "Branch", "facts": "After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.
", "facts_len": "1157", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2839", "ID": "62286", "name": "Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/2", "docket": "2", "term": "1968", "first_party": "Red Lion Broadcasting Co.", "second_party": "Federal Communications Commission", "facts": "The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged.
", "facts_len": "715", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2840", "ID": "62301", "name": "Luis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-419", "docket": "14-419", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Sila Luis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "745", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2841", "ID": "62306", "name": "Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1496", "docket": "13-1496", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Dollar General Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al.", "facts": "Dollar General Corporation (Dollar General) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (Tribe). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Tribe alleged that he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate.
\nIn 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Montana v. United States, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the Montana decision did not apply in this case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1369", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2842", "ID": "62309", "name": "Fisher v. University of Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981", "docket": "14-981", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Abigail Noel Fisher", "second_party": "University of Texas at Austin, et al.", "facts": "Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University\u2019s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University\u2019s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court\u2019s decision by holding that the University of Texas\u2019 use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny.
", "facts_len": "1136", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2843", "ID": "62302", "name": "Shapiro v. McManus", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-990", "docket": "14-990", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Stephen M. Shapiro, et al.", "second_party": "David J. McManus, Jr., et al.", "facts": "In 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan based on the results of the 2010 census. Several of the districts consisted of de-facto non-contiguous segments\u2014discrete segments that would be wholly unconnected but for one or two narrow strips connecting the two\u2014often with largely inconsistent demographics between the two large segments. The plaintiffs were a group of citizens who sued the Chair of the Maryland State Board of Elections (Board) and the State Administrator of the Board and argued that the new districting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires that a complaint be plausible on its face and enable the court to draw a reasonable inference of misconduct. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and held that the complaint did no more than imply the mere possibility of misconduct. Therefore, the case did not go before a three-judge panel, as the Three-Judge Court Act requires for cases dealing with congressional districts unless the claim is determined to be insubstantial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2844", "ID": "62307", "name": "Bruce v. Samuels", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-844", "docket": "14-844", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Antoine Bruce", "second_party": "Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al.", "facts": "Several prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang-affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival gangs. The prisoners moved to proceed in forma pauperis, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back-and-forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to join in the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees.
", "facts_len": "989", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2845", "ID": "62308", "name": "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association, et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-840", "docket": "14-840", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Federal Energy Regulatory Commission", "second_party": "Electric Power Supply Association, et al.", "facts": "The Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate transmission and sale of electric power. In 2011, FERC promulgated a rule that established uniform compensation levels for suppliers of demand-side resources that meet certain conditions, including cost-effectiveness as measured by a net benefits test. The rule\u2019s stated purpose was to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when it was economically efficient to do so. Various state regulatory agencies, trade associations, publicly owned utilities, transmission owners, and other industry groups requested a rehearing on the rule and argued that it conflicted with FERC\u2019s efforts to promote a competitive market as well as FERC\u2019s statutory mandate to avoid unjust and discriminatory rates. FERC confirmed the rule, and the industry groups petitioned for review in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not have the statutory authority to directly regulate the retail market and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not adequately consider and respond to the arguments made in opposition to the rule.
", "facts_len": "1249", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2846", "ID": "62310", "name": "Foster v. Chatman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8349", "docket": "14-8349", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Timothy Tyrone Foster", "second_party": "Bruce Chatman, Warden", "facts": "In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty.
\nFoster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution\u2019s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster \u00a0petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new Batson challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1322", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2847", "ID": "62314", "name": "Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-915", "docket": "14-915", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Rebecca Friedrichs, et al.", "second_party": "California Teachers Association, et al.", "facts": "California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an \u201cagency shop\u201d arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the form of a \u201cfair share service fee.\u201d Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year.
\nPetitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt-out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1425", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2848", "ID": "62315", "name": "Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-232", "docket": "14-232", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Wesley Harris, et al.", "second_party": "Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al.", "facts": "In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were under-populated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act.
", "facts_len": "745", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2849", "ID": "62316", "name": "Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-916", "docket": "14-916", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Kingdomware Technologies, Inc.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Various policies, regulations, and statutes of the federal government are intended to promote small businesses, especially those run by veterans. Although agencies generally have wide discretion to decide what method of contracting to use, a 2003 amendment to the Small Business Act established a goal of awarding three percent of government contracts to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and the Veterans Act of 2006 expanded the reach of the relevant provisions.
\nKingdomware Technologies is a small business owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran and has been certified as such by the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). In 2012, Kingdomware filed a bid for a project, but the VA awarded the contract to a company that was not a veteran-owned business. Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and argued that the contract award was illegal. The GAO issued a recommendation that the VA cancel the contract and re-solicit bids. The VA refused to accept the recommendation, and Kingdomware sued in U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which held that there was sufficient ambiguity in the relevant statute and that the VA\u2019s interpretation was reasonable, so therefore the contract award should stand. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1334", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2850", "ID": "62313", "name": "Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-181", "docket": "14-181", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board", "second_party": "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company", "facts": "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self-insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state statute because the state statute\u2019s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted.
", "facts_len": "942", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2851", "ID": "62317", "name": "Lockhart v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8358", "docket": "14-8358", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Avondale Lockhart", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart\u2019s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first-degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre-sentencing report for Lockhart\u2019s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart\u2019s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1067", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2852", "ID": "62318", "name": "Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-510", "docket": "14-510", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin", "second_party": "United States, et al.", "facts": "Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Menominee Tribe) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The self-determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs in annual funding agreements.
\nIn 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS\u2019s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six-year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe\u2019s argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running.
", "facts_len": "1383", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2853", "ID": "62321", "name": "Luna Torres v. Lynch", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1096", "docket": "14-1096", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Jorge Luna Torres", "second_party": "Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General", "facts": "In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an \u201calien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.\u201d Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres\u2019 appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA\u2019s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute\u2019s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres\u2019 petition for cancellation of the removal order.
", "facts_len": "1525", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2854", "ID": "62319", "name": "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1132", "docket": "14-1132", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Greg Manning, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. (Escala), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs\u2019 shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs\u2019 claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs\u2019 motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state court.
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2855", "ID": "62320", "name": "Musacchio v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1095", "docket": "14-1095", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Michael Musacchio", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services (ETS), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services (TTS), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $10 million.
\nIn 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court\u2019s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial.
", "facts_len": "1511", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2856", "ID": "62322", "name": "Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1146", "docket": "14-1146", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Tyson Foods, Inc.", "second_party": "Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.", "facts": "Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) at the company\u2019s meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a \u201cgang-time\u201d system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars.
\nTyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company\u2019s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s certification of the plaintiff class.
", "facts_len": "1299", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2857", "ID": "62323", "name": "OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1067", "docket": "13-1067", "term": "2015", "first_party": "OBB Personenverkehr AG", "second_party": "Carol P. Sachs", "facts": "OBB Personenverkehr AG (OBB) is owned by OBB Holding Group, a joint-stock company created by the Republic of Austria to operate rail service within Austria. OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, an association organized under Luxembourg law to provide rail pass to non-European residents.
\nIn March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail Pass from the Rail Pass Experts (RPE) website for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic. RPE is located in Massachusetts, and the pass Sachs purchased listed a series of disclaimers, including that the \u201cissuing office is merely an intermediary of the carriers in Europe and assumes no liability resulting from the transport.\u201d In April 2007, Sachs used her Eurail Pass in Innsbruck, Austria. While boarding the train, Sachs fell between the tracks, and her legs were crushed by the moving train; they had to be amputated above the knee. Sachs sued OBB in district court in California. OBB moved to dismiss and argued that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), or alternatively, that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed but, upon rehearing en banc, later reversed and held that the commercial-activity exception of FSIA applied in this case because OBB was a common carrier owned by a foreign state that acted through a domestic agent to sell tickets to U.S. citizens and residents. Therefore, the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1650", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2858", "ID": "62325", "name": "Ocasio v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-361", "docket": "14-361", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Samuel Ocasio", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio\u2019s conviction.
", "facts_len": "762", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2859", "ID": "62324", "name": "Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-520", "docket": "14-520", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson", "second_party": "Community Bank of Raymore", "facts": "Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson\u2019s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC (PHC). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) made four loans totaling more than $2,000,000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment.
\nHawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands\u2019 loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1208", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2860", "ID": "62331", "name": "Marbury v. Madison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/5us137", "docket": "5us137", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "William Marbury", "second_party": "James Madison, Secretary of State", "facts": "Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State.\u00a0
\nWilliam Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "981", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2861", "ID": "62335", "name": "Martin v. Hunter's Lessee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/14us304", "docket": "None", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Denny Martin", "second_party": "Hunter's Lessee", "facts": "During the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property.\u00a0
\nThe Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's law permitting the confiscation of property, even though it conflicted with the federal treaty. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty superseded state law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.\u00a0On remand, the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to follow the ruling and argued that the law granting the Supreme Court appellate review over state court decisions, section 25 of the Judiciary Act (the Act), was unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "952", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2862", "ID": "62333", "name": "Fletcher v. Peck", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/10us87", "docket": "None", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Robert Fletcher", "second_party": "John Peck", "facts": "In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract.
", "facts_len": "572", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2863", "ID": "62337", "name": "Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/17us518", "docket": "17us518", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Trustees of Dartmouth College", "second_party": "William H. Woodward", "facts": "In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.
", "facts_len": "434", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2864", "ID": "62336", "name": "McCulloch v. Maryland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/17us316", "docket": "17us316", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "McCulloch", "second_party": "Maryland", "facts": "In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "425", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2865", "ID": "62339", "name": "Cohens v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/19us264", "docket": "None", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Philip and Mendes Cohen", "second_party": "Virginia", "facts": "An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government.
", "facts_len": "362", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2866", "ID": "62341", "name": "Gibbons v. Ogden", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/22us1", "docket": "22us1", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Thomas Gibbons", "second_party": "Aaron Ogden", "facts": "A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors\u2019 boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license \u2013 formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction. The New York state court rejected Gibbons\u2019 argument asserting that U.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "782", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2867", "ID": "62346", "name": "Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/32us243", "docket": "None", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "John Barron ex rel. Tiernan", "second_party": "Mayor of Baltimore", "facts": "Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "386", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2868", "ID": "62345", "name": "Worcester v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/31us515", "docket": "None", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Samuel A. Worcester", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for \"residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license\" and \"without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia.\" They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled \"an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians.\" Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled \"an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.\" Worcester was convicted and sentenced to \"hard labour in the penitentiary for four years.\" The U.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error.
", "facts_len": "1005", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2869", "ID": "62349", "name": "Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/36us420", "docket": "36us420", "term": "1789-1850", "first_party": "Proprietors of Charles River Bridge", "second_party": "Proprietors of Warren Bridge", "facts": "In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract.
", "facts_len": "410", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2870", "ID": "62357", "name": "Dred Scott v. Sandford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/60us393", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "Dred Scott", "second_party": "John F. A. Sanford", "facts": "Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no \u201cnegro\u201d or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.
", "facts_len": "535", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2871", "ID": "62362", "name": "Ex parte Milligan", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/71us2", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "Lambdin P. Milligan et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.
", "facts_len": "211", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2872", "ID": "62370", "name": "Slaughter-House Cases", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/83us36", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "-", "second_party": "-", "facts": "Louisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "833", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2873", "ID": "62372", "name": "Munn v. Illinois", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/94us113", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "Munn and Scott", "second_party": "Illinois", "facts": "Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.
", "facts_len": "106", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2874", "ID": "62373", "name": "Reynolds v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/98us145", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "George Reynolds", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "422", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2875", "ID": "62377", "name": "The Civil Rights Cases", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/109us3", "docket": "None", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "The Civil Rights Cases", "second_party": "Various appellants", "facts": "The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.
", "facts_len": "478", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2876", "ID": "62391", "name": "United States v. E. C. Knight Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/156us1", "docket": "675", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "E. C. Knight Company", "facts": "The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed \"every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade\" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.
", "facts_len": "602", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2877", "ID": "62394", "name": "Plessy v. Ferguson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/163us537", "docket": "210", "term": "1850-1900", "first_party": "Homer Adolph Plessy", "second_party": "John Ferguson", "facts": "Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy \u2013 who was seven-eighths Caucasian \u2013 agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a \"whites only\" car of a Louisiana train.\u00a0
\nThe railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested.\u00a0
\nAt trial, Plessy\u2019s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted.
", "facts_len": "932", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2878", "ID": "62404", "name": "Lochner v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/198us45", "docket": "292", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Joseph Lochner", "second_party": "New York", "facts": "The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "639", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2879", "ID": "62406", "name": "Muller v. Oregon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/208us412", "docket": "107", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Curt Muller", "second_party": "Oregon", "facts": "Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The state supreme court upheld the law\u2019s constitutionality.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "275", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2880", "ID": "62414", "name": "Weeks v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/232us383", "docket": "461", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Fremont Weeks", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.
", "facts_len": "282", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2881", "ID": "62420", "name": "Hammer v. Dagenhart", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/247us251", "docket": "704", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney", "second_party": "Roland H. Dagenhart et al.", "facts": "The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.
", "facts_len": "244", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2882", "ID": "62424", "name": "Abrams v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/250us616", "docket": "316", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Jacob Abrams et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against \"Workers Soviets of Russia\". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.
", "facts_len": "619", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2883", "ID": "62423", "name": "Schenck v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/249us47", "docket": "437", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Charles Schenck", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "569", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2884", "ID": "62435", "name": "Pierce v. Society of Sisters", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us510", "docket": "583", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Walter M. Pierce, Governor", "second_party": "Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary", "facts": "The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.
", "facts_len": "414", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2885", "ID": "62436", "name": "Gitlow v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us652", "docket": "19", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Benjamin Gitlow", "second_party": "People of the State of New York", "facts": "Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a \u201cLeft Wing Manifesto\" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York\u2019s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state.
", "facts_len": "627", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2886", "ID": "62445", "name": "Olmstead v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/277us438", "docket": "493", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Roy Olmstead et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.
", "facts_len": "629", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2887", "ID": "62449", "name": "Powell v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/287us45", "docket": "98", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Ozie Powell", "second_party": "Alabama", "facts": "Nine black youths -- described as, \"young, ignorant, and illiterate\" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.
", "facts_len": "519", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2888", "ID": "62447", "name": "Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/283us697", "docket": "91", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Jay Near", "second_party": "Minnesota ex rel. Olson", "facts": "In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person \"engaged in the business\" of regularly publishing or circulating an \"obscene, lewd, and lascivious\" or a \"malicious, scandalous and defamatory\" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "775", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2889", "ID": "62459", "name": "United States v. Butler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/297us1", "docket": "401", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp.", "facts": "In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "562", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2890", "ID": "62457", "name": "A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/295us495", "docket": "854", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "539", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2891", "ID": "62463", "name": "United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/299us304", "docket": "98", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation", "facts": "The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned U.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "582", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2892", "ID": "62466", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/301us1", "docket": "419", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation", "facts": "With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country\u2019s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members.
", "facts_len": "415", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2893", "ID": "62465", "name": "West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/300us379", "docket": "293", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "West Coast Hotel Company", "second_party": "Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife", "facts": "Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "613", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2894", "ID": "62469", "name": "Palko v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/302us319", "docket": "135", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Frank Palko", "second_party": "Connecticut", "facts": "Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.
", "facts_len": "292", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2895", "ID": "62475", "name": "United States v. Miller", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/307us174", "docket": "696", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Jack Miller and Frank Layton", "facts": "An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act\u00a0 of 1934 (\"NFA\") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.
", "facts_len": "375", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2896", "ID": "62483", "name": "United States v. Darby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/312us100", "docket": "82", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "F. W. Darby Lumber Company and Fred W. Darby", "facts": "In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA\u2019s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause.
", "facts_len": "484", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2897", "ID": "62481", "name": "Minersville School District v. Gobitis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us586", "docket": "690", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Minersville School District", "second_party": "Walter Gobitis et al.", "facts": "In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "336", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2898", "ID": "62480", "name": "Cantwell v. Connecticut", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296", "docket": "632", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell", "second_party": "Connecticut", "facts": "Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace.
", "facts_len": "494", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2899", "ID": "62489", "name": "Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/315us568", "docket": "255", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Walter Chaplinsky", "second_party": "New Hampshire", "facts": "On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal \"a God-damned racketeer\" and \"a damned Fascist.\" He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "570", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2900", "ID": "62490", "name": "Betts v. Brady", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/316us455", "docket": "837", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Smith Betts", "second_party": "Patrick J. Brady, Warden", "facts": "Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel.
", "facts_len": "342", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2901", "ID": "62493", "name": "Wickard v. Filburn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/317us111", "docket": "59", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture et al.", "second_party": "Roscoe C. Filburn", "facts": "Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act.\u00a0He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "521", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2902", "ID": "62497", "name": "West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/319us624", "docket": "591", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "West Virginia State Board of Education", "second_party": "Walter Barnette", "facts": "In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.
", "facts_len": "458", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2903", "ID": "62500", "name": "Yakus v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/321us414", "docket": "374", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Albert Yakus", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act to control commodity prices and prevent inflation during wartime. This case is the consolidation of two cases in which the defendants were tried and convicted in district court on several counts of selling wholesale cuts of beef at prices above the maximum prices set by the Revised Maximum Price Regulation under the Act. During the trial, the district court overruled all motions regarding the validity of the Regulation and the Act, including questions of whether the Act deprived the defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.
", "facts_len": "686", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2904", "ID": "62502", "name": "Korematsu v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/323us214", "docket": "22", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the U.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction.
", "facts_len": "633", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2905", "ID": "62511", "name": "Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/330us1", "docket": "52", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Arch R. Everson", "second_party": "Board of Education of the Township of Ewing", "facts": "A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds.
", "facts_len": "535", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2906", "ID": "62517", "name": "Shelley v. Kraemer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/334us1", "docket": "72", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "J. D. Shelley and Ethel Lee Shelley et al.", "second_party": "Louis Kraemer and Fern Kraemer", "facts": "In 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "560", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2907", "ID": "62515", "name": "Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/333us203", "docket": "90", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Illinois ex rel. Vashti McCollum", "second_party": "Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois", "facts": "The case tested the principle of \"released time\", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "666", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2908", "ID": "62524", "name": "Wolf v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/338us25", "docket": "17", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Julius A. Wolf", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.
", "facts_len": "436", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2909", "ID": "62527", "name": "Sweatt v. Painter", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/339us629", "docket": "44", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Heman Marion Sweatt", "second_party": "Theophilis Shickel Painter", "facts": "In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to whites, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.
", "facts_len": "390", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2910", "ID": "62531", "name": "Dennis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/341us494", "docket": "336", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Eugene Dennis, John B. Williamson, Jacob Stachel, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction.
", "facts_len": "505", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2911", "ID": "62535", "name": "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/343us579", "docket": "744", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company", "second_party": "Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce", "facts": "In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America.
", "facts_len": "297", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2912", "ID": "62547", "name": "Hernandez v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/347us475", "docket": "406", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Pete Hernandez", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that \"Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race\" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a \"special class\" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that \"so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality\" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.
", "facts_len": "1265", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2913", "ID": "62548", "name": "Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1)", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/347us483", "docket": "1", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Oliver Brown, Mrs. Richard Lawton, Mrs. Sadie Emmanuel, et al.", "second_party": "Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, et al.", "facts": "This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the \u201cseparate but equal\u201d doctrine.)\u00a0
", "facts_len": "731", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2914", "ID": "62549", "name": "Bolling v. Sharpe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/347us497", "docket": "8", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Spotswood Thomas Bolling et al.", "second_party": "C. Melvin Sharpe et al.", "facts": "The D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court.
", "facts_len": "410", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2915", "ID": "62578", "name": "Gayle v. Browder", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1956/342", "docket": "342", "term": "1956", "first_party": "W. A. Gayle, Mayor of Montgomery", "second_party": "Aurelia Browder", "facts": "While the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. led a boycott of the racially segregated bus system in Montgomery Alabama, the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP challenged racial segregation on the bus system in the federal courts. This case arose in federal court as a violation of Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes and as a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge district court held that state enforcement of the segregated but privately owned bus system in Montgomery violated the Equal Protection Clause. The city appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "606", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2916", "ID": "62577", "name": "Thornburgh v. Abbott", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-1344", "docket": "87-1344", "term": "1988", "first_party": "Richard L. Thornburgh", "second_party": "Jack Abbott, et al.", "facts": "Jack Abbott and other prisoners were denied access to publications that Richard Thornburgh, the U.S. Attorney General at the time, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) deemed to be detrimental to penological interests. FBP regulations allow publications that may pose a threat to the security and discipline of prisons or that promote criminal activity to be rejected. Material cannot be rejected based on its political, philosophical, or distasteful nature, and prison officials have the burden of showing why the restriction was necessary and how the denied material was detrimental to penological interests. Abbott and others sued and argued that the restriction on certain publications violated their First Amendment rights. The district court held that prisons had a right to deny access to certain publications and that prison wardens must be given broad discretion in their duties to maintain the security of the prison, but their discretion must not limit the prisoners\u2019 First Amendment right more than what is necessary to protect the government\u2019s penological interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the prison officials had the burden of showing how the denied material is detrimental to penological interests.
", "facts_len": "1288", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2917", "ID": "62580", "name": "Taylor v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-6166", "docket": "14-6166", "term": "2015", "first_party": "David Anthony Taylor", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "David Anthony Taylor was a member of the \u201cSouthwest Goonz,\u201d a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor\u2019s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government\u2019s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor\u2019s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.
", "facts_len": "1081", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2918", "ID": "62582", "name": "RJR Nabisco v. The European Community", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-138", "docket": "15-138", "term": "2015", "first_party": "RJR Nabisco, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "The European Community, et al.", "facts": "The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal organizations\u2019 home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR\u2019s cigarettes. The lawsuit alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion based on the presumption the U.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.
", "facts_len": "1235", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2919", "ID": "62579", "name": "Wittman v. Personhuballah", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1504", "docket": "14-1504", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Robert J. Wittman, et al.", "second_party": "Gloria Personhuballah, et al.", "facts": "In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia\u2019s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
\nThe defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority\u2019s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan.
", "facts_len": "1782", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2920", "ID": "62584", "name": "MHN Government Services, Inc., and Managed Health Network, Inc. v. Zaborowski, et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1458", "docket": "14-1458", "term": "2015", "first_party": "MHN Government Services Inc., and Managed Health Network, Inc.", "second_party": "Thomas Zaborowki, et al.", "facts": "MHN Government Services (MHN) hired the plaintiffs, a group of professionally licensed counselors, to provide counseling to military service members and their families across the United States and overseas. The plaintiffs sued MHN for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act and claimed they were improperly identified as \u201cconsultants\u201d for MHN and not full-time employees, which resulted in the denial of overtime compensation. MHN filed a motion to compel arbitration because the plaintiffs\u2019 employment contract with MHN included a clause requiring arbitration and denying the right to \u201cjury or court trial.\u201d The district court denied the motion because it held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable, and under California law, unconscionable contracts are unenforceable. The district court held that the provision was unconscionable due to its placement near the bottom of the employment contract with no effort to highlight or draw attention to the provision, the fact that MHN is a major corporation whose bargaining power and finances put it in a superior position to the plaintiffs during arbitration, and the fact that the arbitration provision of the employment contract allowed for limited discovery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1324", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - moot", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2921", "ID": "62581", "name": "Molina-Martinez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8913", "docket": "14-8913", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Saul Molina-Martinez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Saul Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being in the United States illegally following deportation proceedings that stemmed from his felony convictions. The district court accordingly sentenced Molina-Martinez to 77 months in prison, pursuant to the sentencing range established in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for his criminal history category. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if they were imposed on the same day unless the offenses in question were separated by an intervening arrest. Molina-Martinez\u2019s prior offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest, so when his probation officer calculated his criminal history points and concluded that they placed him in category VI, he erred; Molina-Martinez should properly have been placed in category V, which carries a lower sentencing range of 70-87 months. Molina-Martinez appealed his sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in sentencing him based on the incorrect criminal history category. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, despite the error in calculation, Molina-Martinez failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights and therefore affirmed his conviction and sentence.
", "facts_len": "1248", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2922", "ID": "62585", "name": "Utah v. Strieff", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1373", "docket": "14-1373", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Utah", "second_party": "Edward Joseph Strieff", "facts": "Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff\u2019s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.
", "facts_len": "1038", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2923", "ID": "62583", "name": "Duncan v. Owens", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1516", "docket": "14-1516", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Stephen Duncan", "second_party": "Lawrence Owens", "facts": "Ramon Nelson was riding his bike when he suffered a lethal blow to the back of his head with a baseball bat. After two eyewitnesses identified Lawrence Owens from an array of photos and then a lineup, he was tried and convicted for Nelson\u2019s death. Because Nelson was carrying cocaine and crack cocaine potentially for distribution, the judge at Owens\u2019 bench trial ruled that Owens was probably also a drug dealer and was trying to \u201cknock [Nelson] off.\u201d Owens was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison.
\nOwens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his constitutional right to due process was violated during the trial. He argued that the eyewitness identification should have been inadmissible based on unreliability and that the judge impermissibly inferred a motive when a motive was not an element of the offense. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and Owens appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and held that the trial judge\u2019s inference about Owens\u2019s motive violated his right to have his guilt adjudicated solely based on the evidence presented at trial.
", "facts_len": "1194", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2924", "ID": "62586", "name": "Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1382", "docket": "14-1382", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Americold Realty Trust", "second_party": "Conagra Foods, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust\u2019s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust\u2019s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), not just the trustees.
", "facts_len": "1020", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2925", "ID": "62588", "name": "Bank Markazi v. Peterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-770", "docket": "14-770", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Bank Markazi", "second_party": "Deborah Peterson, et al.", "facts": "Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
\nWhile this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, \u201c[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution\u2026in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].\u201d The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States\u2019 separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2926", "ID": "62587", "name": "Nebraska v. Parker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1406", "docket": "14-1406", "term": "2015", "first_party": "State of Nebraska, et al.", "second_party": "Mitch Parker, et al.", "facts": "Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the U.S. Senate\u2019s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "921", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2927", "ID": "62597", "name": "Maryland v. Kulbicki", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-848", "docket": "14-848", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Maryland", "second_party": "James Kulbicki", "facts": "In 1993, James Kulbicki fatally shot his 22-year-old mistress the weekend before a scheduled hearing on unpaid child support in an ongoing paternity suit between the two. At Kulbicki\u2019s trial, the prosecution presented evidence that the bullet removed from the victim\u2019s brain and the bullet taken from Kulbicki\u2019s gun were a close enough match that they likely came from the same package. After being presented with this ballistics evidence, as well as other physical evidence and witness testimony, the jury convicted Kulbicki of first-degree murder.
\nKulbicki filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to question the legitimacy of the ballistics evidence. Kulbicki\u2019s petition was denied at the trial level, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Kulbicki\u2019s conviction.
", "facts_len": "915", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2928", "ID": "62589", "name": "Sturgeon v. Frost", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1209", "docket": "14-1209", "term": "2015", "first_party": "John Sturgeon", "second_party": "Bert Frost", "facts": "John Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is part of the National Park Service (NPS), in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned.
", "facts_len": "914", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2929", "ID": "62595", "name": "Heffernan v. City of Paterson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1280", "docket": "14-1280", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Jeffrey Heffernan", "second_party": "City of Paterson", "facts": "Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be \u201covert involvement in political activities.\u201d Heffernan sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City\u2019s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the city\u2019s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1252", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2930", "ID": "62596", "name": "Williams v. Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-5040", "docket": "15-5040", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Terrance Williams", "second_party": "Pennsylvania", "facts": "Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams\u2019 conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court\u2019s decision and lifted the stay of execution.
\nThe Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams\u2019 trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court\u2019s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.
", "facts_len": "1301", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2931", "ID": "62599", "name": "Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-614", "docket": "14-614", "term": "2015", "first_party": "W. Kevin Hughes, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, fka PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, et al.", "facts": "The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV\u2019s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants.
", "facts_len": "1370", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "2932", "ID": "62601", "name": "Fowler v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/73-7031", "docket": "73-7031", "term": "1975", "first_party": "Jesse Thurman Fowler", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "A jury found Fowler guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death in the state's gas chamber. Fowler appealed his conviction and sentence. Both were affirmed. Fowler then attacked the mandatory imposition of his sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certioriari.
", "facts_len": "321", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "memorandum", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2933", "ID": "62598", "name": "Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-108", "docket": "15-108", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico", "second_party": "Luis M. Sanchez Valle, et al.", "facts": "In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro Garc\u00eda, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
\nThe trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro Garc\u00eda precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.
", "facts_len": "1831", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2934", "ID": "62611", "name": "Voisine v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-10154", "docket": "14-10154", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Stephen Voisine, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person \u201cknowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.\u201d A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
\nWilliam Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine\u2019s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend\u2019s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
\nVoisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine\u2019s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because \u201crecklessness\u201d is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the \u201cphysical force\u201d requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine\u2019s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.
", "facts_len": "2170", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2935", "ID": "62604", "name": "Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1175", "docket": "14-1175", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Franchise Tax Board of California", "second_party": "Gilbert P. Hyatt", "facts": "Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) based on the FTB\u2019s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity.
\nAt trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $300 million in damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1306", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "opinion of the court", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2936", "ID": "62616", "name": "Nichols v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-5238", "docket": "15-5238", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Lester Ray Nichols", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside U.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction.
", "facts_len": "966", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2937", "ID": "62617", "name": "Mullenix v. Luna", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1143", "docket": "14-1143", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Chadrin Lee Mullenix", "second_party": "Beatrice Luna, individually and as representative of the estate of Israel Leija, Jr., et al.", "facts": "On March 23, 2010, a police officer approached Israel Leija, Jr. at a drive-in restaurant with a warrant for his arrest. Leija proceeded to lead the police on a high-speed chase on the interstate while periodically calling the police dispatcher, saying that he had a gun and threatening to shoot the officers chasing him. The officers continued their pursuit, and other officers deployed spike strips. Trooper Chadrin Lee Mullenix, upon learning that other spike strips were set up, decided to pursue the alternate tactic of shooting at Leija\u2019s car in order to stop it. Although he had not received training on this maneuver, he informed one of the officers in pursuit of his plan and radioed his supervisor for permission. Before receiving a response, Mullenix got in position on an overpass. Witnesses testified that Mullenix could hear his supervisor respond to say that he should \u201cstand by\u201d and \u201csee if the spikes work first.\u201d When Leija\u2019s car approached, Mullenix fired six shots. The car struck the spike strips, hit the median, and rolled several times. It was later determined that Leija died as a result of Mullenix\u2019 shots, four of which struck his body and none of which struck the car\u2019s radiator, hood, or engine block.
\nThe respondents sued Mullenix under 42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 and argued that Mullenix had violated Leija\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. Mullenix moved for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion and held that there were genuine questions of fact regarding whether Mullenix acted as a reasonable officer would have under similar circumstances. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and subsequently denied Mullenix\u2019s petition for a rehearing.
", "facts_len": "1799", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2938", "ID": "62603", "name": "Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1513", "docket": "14-1513", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Halo Electronics", "second_party": "Pulse Electronics Inc., et al.", "facts": "Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) and Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) are both suppliers of electronic components. Halo owns three patents regarding surface mount electronic packages; Pulse designs and sells surface mount electronic packages and does its manufacturing in Asia. In 2002, Halo unsuccessfully attempted to license their patents to Pulse. In 2007, Halo sued Pulse for patent infringement. The district court held that Pulse infringed on Halo\u2019s patents with products shipped into the United States, had induced others to infringe on products delivered outside of the U.S. but ultimately imported into the U.S. as finished products, and found that it was highly probable that Pulse\u2019s infringement was willful. The court later found that Pulse\u2019s infringement was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that there was no \u201cwillful infringement.\u201d In determining that there was no willful infringement, the appellate court applied a rigid two-part test established in In re Seagate that required that willfulness be proven on both an objective and subjective basis. In this case, the appellate court held that the objective prong was not met. This two-part test is similar to one the Supreme Court struck down last term in Octane Fitness, LLc v. ICON Health & Fitness, which dealt with a test for awarding attorneys fees.
\nIn the consolidated case, Stryker Corporation (Stryker) sued Zimmer, Inc. (Zimmer) over patent infringement of medical equipment. Stryker and Zimmer are both competitors in the market for pulsed lavage devices, which deliver pressurized irrigation for certain medical procedures in orthopedic medicine. Stryker holds three patents for pulsed lavage devices that it claimed Zimmer had infringed. The district court found Zimmer liable for patent infringement. The jury awarded Stryker treble damages as allowed under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 284 on the grounds that Zimmer intentionally violated Stryker\u2019s patents. Zimmer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which requires that the patent-holder prove the infringement was willful to be eligible for treble damages. Therefore, the appellate court overturned the award for treble damages on the grounds that Zimmer did not intentionally violate Stryker\u2019s patents.
", "facts_len": "2328", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2939", "ID": "62620", "name": "Zubik v. Burwell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1418", "docket": "14-1418", "term": "2015", "first_party": "David A. Zubik, et al.", "second_party": "Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "facts": "In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health plans to provide preventative care and screenings for women pursuant to the guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These guidelines include \u201capproved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.\u201d The regulations include an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a religious employer. The exemption does not mean that such services are not covered, but that they are not covered through a cost-sharing mechanism.
\nThe petitioners are religious organizations that argue that the contraceptive coverage mandate of the ACA violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress enacted in 1993, because the mandate requires these organizations to \u201cfacilitate\u201d the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services that they oppose on religious grounds. In several separate cases, the relevant district courts issued injunctions against the government, and the relevant Courts of Appeals reversed. The appellate courts held that the religious organizations were unable to show that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of their religious freedom.
", "facts_len": "1388", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2940", "ID": "62619", "name": "Husky Electronics v. Ritz", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-145", "docket": "15-145", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Husky International Electronics, Inc.", "second_party": "Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr.", "facts": "Husky International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the discharge of Ritz\u2019s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not \u201cpierce the veil\u201d to go after Ritz\u2019s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed.
\nHusky appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court\u2019s determination and found that Ritz had not committed \u201cactual fraud\u201d by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted \u201cmaliciously and willfully.\u201d The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision to discharge Ritz\u2019s debt.
", "facts_len": "1181", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2941", "ID": "62621", "name": "Whole Woman\u2019s Health v. Hellerstedt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-274", "docket": "15-274", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Whole Woman\u2019s Health, et al.", "second_party": "John Hellerstedt, Commissioner, Texas Department of State Health Services, et al.", "facts": "In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
", "facts_len": "1319", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "2942", "ID": "62622", "name": "Simmons v. Himmelreich", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-109", "docket": "15-109", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Jermaine Simmons et al.", "second_party": "Walter J. Himmelreich", "facts": "Walter Himmelreich is a federal prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. In 2008, he was attacked by another prisoner. Himmelreich filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging many causes of action, including a claim that his First Amendment rights were violated when he was placed in administrative detention after filing a claim under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) and a claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the prison officials failed to protect him from being assaulted by another inmate. The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case for reconsideration of the First and Eighth Amendment claims.
\nOn remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants by holding that Himmelreich had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the claims and that the prison officials were subject to the discretionary exception to the FTCA, which triggered the judgment bar of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. \u00a72676, that prohibits \u201cany action by the same claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act of omission gave rise to the claim.\u201d The appellate court again vacated and remanded the lower court\u2019s judgment. It held that Himmelreich\u2019s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused because he had been intimidated and threatened by prison officials to not pursue a grievance process against them. The appellate court also found that the dismissal of Himmelreich\u2019s claim based on discretionary exception to the FTCA as applied by the district court does not necessarily trigger a judgment bar of 28 U.S.C \u00a72676.
", "facts_len": "1794", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2943", "ID": "62631", "name": "Betterman v. Montana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1457", "docket": "14-1457", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Brandon Thomas Betterman", "second_party": "State of Montana", "facts": "Brandon Thomas Betterman failed to appear in court on December 8, 2011, on charges of partner or family member assault, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 9, 2012, Betterman turned himself in and stated that he knew he was supposed to appear in court but claimed he had neither money nor transportation to get to the courthouse that day. He was convicted on March 15, 2012, and sentenced to five years. On April 19, 2012, he pled guilty to the charges of jumping bail. His sentence hearing did not occur until January 17, 2013, when he filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was denied a speedy and fair trial due to the amount of time that had lapsed between his guilty plea and sentencing hearing. On April 29, 2013, his motion was denied, and on June 27, 2013, Betterman was sentenced to seven years for his bail-jumping charge. The Supreme Court of Montana held that the delay between Betterman\u2019s plea and sentencing was unacceptably long but had not violated his rights to fair and speedy trial.
", "facts_len": "1036", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2944", "ID": "62632", "name": "Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-233", "docket": "15-233", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al.", "second_party": "Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, et al.", "facts": "Unlike states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities, including utilities, to declare bankruptcy and seek relief under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In June 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act), which expressly provided different protections for creditors than Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
\nThe plaintiffs in this case are a group of investors who collectively hold nearly two billion dollars in bonds issued by one of Puerto Rico\u2019s public utilities, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), which could potentially file for bankruptcy under the Recovery Act. The plaintiffs sued Puerto Rico in district court and argued that Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits state municipal debt restructuring laws from binding creditors without their consent, preempts the Recovery Act. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the enforcement of the Recovery Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1099", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2945", "ID": "62636", "name": "Ross v. Blake", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-339", "docket": "15-339", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Michael Ross", "second_party": "Shaidon Blake", "facts": "On June 21, 2007, Lieutenants Michael Ross and James Madigan were escorting Shaidon Blake from his cell when Madigan shoved Blake several times. The incident escalated to Madigan punching Blake in the face several times with a key ring wrapped around his fingers while Ross held him. Blake was then taken to the medical unit and later diagnosed with nerve damage. Blake reported the incident to senior corrections officers, and the Internal Investigative Unit of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services conducted an investigation and issued a formal report. The formal report determined that Madigan had used excessive force against Blake and that Blake was not at fault in any way. Blake subsequently sued Ross and Madigan in addition to two supervisors and three government entities under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and argued that they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force.
\nNearly two years after Blake initially filed the suit, Ross filed an amended answer to the complaint that alleged that Blake had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required. Ross also moved for summary judgment based on the same argument, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d exception to the PLRA\u2019s exhaustion requirement was met in this case. Because the internal investigation provided the correction officials time and opportunity to address the complaints internally and Blake reasonably believed that he had exhausted his administrative remedies by participating in an internal investigation, the requirements for the \u201cspecial circumstances\u201d exception to the PLRA were met.
", "facts_len": "1771", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2946", "ID": "62633", "name": "Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-7", "docket": "15-7", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Universal Health Services, Inc.", "second_party": "United States and Massachusetts, ex rel. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa", "facts": "Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, and the state has promulgated regulations for such \u201csatellite\u201d facilities.
\nJulio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a \u201cdoctor\u201d who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure.
\nEscobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an \u201cimplied certification\u201d test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment.
", "facts_len": "1657", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2947", "ID": "62635", "name": "Sheriff v. Gillie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-338", "docket": "15-338", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Mark J. Sheriff, et al.", "second_party": "Pamela Gillie, et al.", "facts": "In 1977, Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in an effort to combat abusive debt collection practices, which were particularly problematic with third party or independent debt collectors, who are unlikely to have contact with the consumer and therefore have little incentive to act fairly. One of the issues that the FDCPA addressed was independent debt collectors representing themselves as government officials. Therefore, the FDCPA targeted these \u201cdebt collectors\u201d while exempting government officials from that definition. The statutory language of the exemption was specific to \u201cany officer or employee of ... any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties.\u201d
\nThe Ohio Revised Code contains a provision that unpaid debts owed to a state entity get \u201ccertified\u201d to the Ohio Attorney General, who is then responsible for collecting the debt or disposing of it by other means. The Attorney General may enlist \u201cspecial counsel\u201d to collect debts on the Attorney General\u2019s behalf. To do so, the special counsel and the Attorney General enter into a retention agreement that, among other terms, allows the special counsel to use the Attorney General\u2019s letterhead in connection with claims arising out of the tax debts the special counsel is authorized to collect.
\nThe plaintiffs in this case are individuals who received debt collection letters that used the seal of the Ohio Attorney General from the defendants, who became special counsel to the Attorney General in 2013. The plaintiffs sued and argued that the defendants violated the FDCPA by using the Ohio Attorney General letterhead. The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and held that special counsel are not \u201cdebt collectors\u201d under the meaning of the FDCPA because they are officers of the state for the purposes of debt collection, and therefore the use of the Ohio Attorney General letterhead was not false or misleading. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the lower court\u2019s decision and held that special counsel are \u201cdebt collectors\u201d under the meaning of the FDCPA and do not fall under the exemption, and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the use of Ohio Attorney General\u2019s seal on debt collection letters was misleading.
", "facts_len": "2392", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2948", "ID": "62634", "name": "CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1375", "docket": "14-1375", "term": "2015", "first_party": "CRST Van Expedited Inc.", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "facts": "The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit on behalf of approximately 270 female employees against CRST Van Expedited (CRST). Two years after filing the suit, the EEOC failed to identify the 270 women, and the district court ordered the EEOC to amend its list of 270 women to include only the women who wished to continue with the suit and to ensure that those women be available for deposition. The EEOC complied with the first court order and failed to fulfill the second before the deadline. CRST had filed seven motions to dismiss, and the district granted (or granted in part) six of the motions. CRST subsequently filed a bill of costs against the EEOC for $4,560,285.11, and the district court granted the fee award. The EEOC appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the fee award. The appellate court held that the EEOC\u2019s pre-suit obligations were not elements of the claim and did not constitute a ruling on the merits that was eligible for fees.
", "facts_len": "1033", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2949", "ID": "62637", "name": "White v. Wheeler", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1372", "docket": "14-1372", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Randy White, Warden", "second_party": "Roger L. Wheeler", "facts": "In October 1997, Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield were found dead in their apartment. Blood at the crime scene matched Roger L. Wheeler\u2019s, and he was arrested for the murders. During voir dire, one of the potential jurors gave equivocal responses in response to questions regarding his beliefs about the death penalty. The prosecution moved to strike the juror for cause and cited these replies. The defense opposed the motion and argued that the responses indicated nothing more than an ability to consider all penalty options. The judge struck the juror, and Wheeler was subsequently convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentence and held that the trial judge appropriately struck all the jurors who could not impose the death penalty.
\nWheeler exhausted his state post-conviction proceedings and petitioned for a writ of habeas from the federal district court. The federal district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, granted the petition, and held that the exclusion of the juror in question was an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Witherspoon v. Illinois. In that case, the Supreme Court held that only a juror who is \u201csubstantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty\u201d can be excused for cause. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in interpreting the juror\u2019s responses that he did not know if he could consider the death penalty as meaning that he could not consider the death penalty.
", "facts_len": "1616", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2950", "ID": "62638", "name": "Birchfield v. North Dakota", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1468", "docket": "14-1468", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Danny Birchfield", "second_party": "State of North Dakota", "facts": "Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence.
\nAll three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1943", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2951", "ID": "62640", "name": "United States v. Bryant", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-420", "docket": "15-420", "term": "2015", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Michael Bryant, Jr.", "facts": "In June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr. was convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117(a), a federal law that criminalizes domestic assault by any person who has been convicted of at least two domestic violence offenses in federal, state, or Indian tribal court. For the predicate offenses, the prosecution relied on Bryant\u2019s previous domestic abuse convictions in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. Bryant moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the use of the tribal court convictions as predicate convictions for the charge violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was not afforded counsel in the tribal court proceedings, so his convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment if they had occurred in state or federal court. The district court denied the motion, and Bryant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that preserved his right to appeal the district court\u2019s denial of the motion to dismiss. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that an uncounseled conviction that violated the Sixth Amendment could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of a charge under Section 117(a).
", "facts_len": "1221", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2952", "ID": "62639", "name": "United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-290", "docket": "15-290", "term": "2015", "first_party": "United States Army Corps of Engineers", "second_party": "Hawkes Co., Inc., et al.", "facts": "Hawkes Co., Inc. (Hawkes) was interested in purchasing a piece of land in northern Minnesota to mine high-quality peat. Hawkes applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources for a permit to begin extracting peat from the land once they purchased the property in October 2010. The Corps informed Hawkes that the permit process would be very costly and would take a long time and so urged Hawkes not to purchase the property. The Corps then submitted an Approved Jurisdictional Determination to derail Hawkes\u2019 plan to purchase and mine the property by arguing that the land was a wetland connecting to \u201cwaters of the United States,\u201d which are protected under the Clean Water Act. Hawkes challenged the jurisdictional determination and filed an action for immediate judicial review. The trial court dismissed the action and held that the jurisdictional determination was not a \u201cfinal agency action\u201d under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore it was not subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the jurisdictional determination was a final agency action and remanded the action for judicial review.
", "facts_len": "1209", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2953", "ID": "62641", "name": "Berger v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/255us22", "docket": "460", "term": "1900-1940", "first_party": "Victor L. Berger, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Victor L. Berger, Adolph Germer, William F. Kruse, J. Louis Engdahl, and Irwin St. John Tucker were all indicted and charged with violating the Espionage Act of 1917. Their case was assigned to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, and the defendants moved to have another judge preside over the trial under Section 21 of the Judicial Code, which states that, whenever a party to an action files an affidavit that the judge before whom the action is proceeding has a personal bias or prejudice, another judge will be designated to hear the case. In this case, the defendants provided an affidavit alleging that Judge Landis was biased against people of German descent, and several of the defendants were German. The motion was denied, Judge Landis heard the case, and the defendants were convicted. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which certified questions of law about Section 21 to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "949", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2954", "ID": "62650", "name": "Manuel v. City of Joliet", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/14-9496", "docket": "14-9496", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Elijah Manuel", "second_party": "City of Joliet, Illinois, et al.", "facts": "Elijah Manuel was a passenger in a car that was pulled over for failing to signal on March 18, 2011. When the police officer detected an odor of marijuana in the car, he dragged Manuel out of the car, pushed and kicked him, and handcuffed him. The officer found a bottle of pills in Manuel\u2019s pocket during his pat-down. The pills were tested and the officers falsified the results to show the pills were ecstasy. The initial positive pill results were later tested at the scene of the arrest. More detailed negative lab results were presented by Manuel later. Manuel was arrested based on these initial results. The officers continued to rely on the false positive initial test throughout the grand jury proceedings, and he was held until May 4, when the Assistant State\u2019s Attorney sought dismissal of the charges.
\nManuel sued the City of Joliet and various city officials and alleged malicious prosecution as well as other civil rights claims. The district court dismissed most of Manuel\u2019s claims as falling outside of the statute of limitations. His malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, however, but was dismissed under Newsome v. McCabe, which held that federal claims of malicious prosecution stem from the right to due process and are not a Fourth Amendment issue. Therefore, there was no malicious prosecution claim under federal law if the state provided a similar cause of action, as Illinois did. On appeal, Manuel argued that Newsome did not foreclose a malicious prosecution claim on Fourth Amendment grounds when officers misrepresented evidence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s ruling against Manuel as consistent with the Newsome precedent.
", "facts_len": "1744", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2955", "ID": "62651", "name": "Murr v. Wisconsin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-214", "docket": "15-214", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Joseph P. Murr, et al.", "second_party": "Wisconsin, et al.", "facts": "The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs\u2019 parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County\u2019s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs\u2019 application to sell the lots separately.
\nThe Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of \u201call, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.\u201d The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property.
", "facts_len": "1285", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "2956", "ID": "62654", "name": "United States v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-674", "docket": "15-674", "term": "2015", "first_party": "United States, et al.", "second_party": "Texas, et al.", "facts": "In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program.
\nTexas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims.
", "facts_len": "1359", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "equally divided", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2957", "ID": "62653", "name": "Dietz v. Bouldin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-458", "docket": "15-458", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Rocky Dietz", "second_party": "Hillary Bouldin", "facts": "Hillary Bouldin\u2019s vehicle collided with Rocky Dietz\u2019s in Montana in 2009. Dietz filed a negligence claim for injuries sustained from the accident. The action was removed to federal court. The parties made stipulations as to past damages, and the jury ruled in Dietz\u2019s favor but awarded $0 in damages. The district court judge dismissed the jury but then reconsidered and re-empaneled the jury. He asked them to re-determine the damages in a manner consistent with the parties\u2019 stipulation. The jury returned the same verdict and awarded $15,000 in damages. On appeal, Dietz claimed that the district court erred by recalling the jury after it had been dismissed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision and held that dismissing the jury, then recalling the jurors, was not an abuse of discretion because the jurors were not exposed to prejudicial influence during the brief duration of their dismissal.
", "facts_len": "954", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2958", "ID": "62652", "name": "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-375", "docket": "15-375", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Supap Kirtsaeng", "second_party": "John Wiley & Sons, Inc.", "facts": "Academic textbook publisher John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (Wiley) owns the American copyright for textbooks and often assigns its rights to its foreign subsidiaries to publish, print, and sell its textbooks abroad. Supap Kirtsaeng is a Thai citizen who came to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics. While he was in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy the English-language versions of his textbooks there, where they were cheaper, and mail them to him. Kirtsaeng would then sell the textbooks in America, where they were worth more, reimburse his friends and family, and make a profit.
\nIn 2008, Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether Kirtsaeng was barred from asserting an affirmative defense because the copyrighted works in question were manufactured abroad. The Court held that the affirmative defense was available to Kirtsaeng and remanded the case. Kirtsaeng won the case on remand and sought an award of attorneys' fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses pursuant to Section 505 of the Copyright Act. The district court held that Section 505 provides that the court may \u201cin its discretion\u201d award attorney\u2019s fees but is not bound to do so. Because Wiley\u2019s suit was not \u201cfrivolous\u201d or \u201cobjectively unreasonable,\u201d the district court held that awarding Kirtsaeng attorney\u2019s fees would \u201cnot promote the purposes of the Copyright Act.\u201d The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1537", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2959", "ID": "62655", "name": "Microsoft v. Baker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-457", "docket": "15-457", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Microsoft Corporation", "second_party": "Seth Baker, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and scratch against internal components of the gaming system, which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations.
", "facts_len": "866", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2960", "ID": "62657", "name": "Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-446", "docket": "15-446", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC", "second_party": "Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office", "facts": "Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC. (Cuozzo) owns the 074 patent, \u201cSpeed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit,\u201d and Garmin International, Inc. (Garmin) petitioned the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) for inter partes review of claims regarding the patent. The Board was established to process patent litigation faster by using inter partes review, and during that process, the Board uses the broadest reasonable interpretation when reviewing patent claims instead of the plain and ordinary meaning of patent claims. The Board found that claims 10, 14, and 17 were unpatentable. Cuozzo filed a motion to amend by replacing claims 10, 14, and 17 with claims 21, 22, and 23. The Board denied this request by applying the broadest reasonable interpretation standard to the term \u201cintegrally attached\u201d regarding claim 14 on the components of the \u201cSpeed Limit Indicator.\u201d Cuozzo appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that it lacked authority to review the Board\u2019s finding under the broadest reasonable interpretation.
", "facts_len": "1113", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2961", "ID": "62656", "name": "Encino Motorcars v. Navarro", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-415", "docket": "15-415", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Encino Motorcars, LLC", "second_party": "Hector Navarro, et al.", "facts": "Encino Motorcars, LLC (Encino) sold and serviced Mercedes-Benz automobiles. Hector Navarro was employed there as a service advisor, which involved him greeting customers and assessing their needs as they entered the business. Navarro, along with other similarly-situated plaintiffs, sued Encino for failing to pay overtime compensation when they worked more than forty hours a week. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, \u201cservice advisors\u201d engaged in servicing automobiles are not entitled to overtime compensation, so the district court dismissed their overtime claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court\u2019s decision and held that Navarro and other employees were not exempted from overtime compensation. In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on the Department of Labor\u2019s 2011 determination that service advisors were not exempt under the FLSA, which was a reversal of the position that the Department had taken in 1987.
", "facts_len": "978", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "2962", "ID": "62661", "name": "Salman v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-628", "docket": "15-628", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Bassam Yacoub Salman", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Maher Kara joined Citigroup\u2019s healthcare investment banking group in 2002, and began asking his older brother, Michael, who held a degree in chemistry, questions about certain aspects of his job. From 2004 to 2007 the Kara brothers regularly discussed mergers and acquisitions by Citigroup clients, though Maher suspected that Michael was using the information they discussed for insider trading. In the meantime, Maher became engaged to Bassam Yacoub Salman\u2019s sister and Michael began to share some of the insider information he received from his brother with Salman. Salman did not directly trade through his own accounts but went through his brother-in-law, Karim Bayyouk. There were numerous occasions where Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed identical trades issued by Citigroup clients. As a result, Salman\u2019s account reached $2.1 million. Salman was charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud and insider trading in 2011 and found guilty. He applied for a new trial, but his request was denied. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued there was insufficient evidence that he knew the information used for trades was from insider information. The appellate court found that, because of the close family relationship, there was sufficient evidence that Salman knew he was trading on insider information.
", "facts_len": "1361", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2963", "ID": "62658", "name": "McDonnell v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-474", "docket": "15-474", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Robert F. McDonnell", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On November 3, 2009, Robert F. McDonnell was elected Governor of Virginia. At the time of his election, he and his family were experiencing economic difficulties; by September 2010, he and his wife had a combined credit card balance of $90,000, and by 2012 the business he and his sister operated had a loan balance of $2.5 million. Shortly after his election, McDonnell met with Jonnie Williams, the founder and CEO of Star Scientific, Inc. (Star), which was trying to market a product called Anatabloc that could be used to treat chronic inflammation. Star wanted the Food and Drug Administration to classify Anatabloc as a pharmaceutical, which would be more profitable than the alternative classification of nutraceutical. However, such a classification would require expensive testing, clinical trials and studies, and Star lacked the funds. Between 2009 and 2012, Williams and McDonnell met several times and agreed that \u201cindependent testing [of Anatabloc] in Virginia was a good idea.\u201d Williams also provided expensive gifts to the McDonnells and \u201cwas willing to help\u201d with their financial troubles. A launch event for Anatabloc was held at the Governor\u2019s Mansion, and Mrs. McDonnell facilitated meetings between Star officials and officials at the University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University to get the studies started. Mrs. McDonnell also purchased, sold, and gifted Star stock in such as way as to avoid reporting requirements, and McDonnell spoke to various government officials about the benefits of Anatabloc.
\nThe McDonnells were eventually arrested and charged for corruption, under federal statutes that make it a felony to take \u201cofficial action\u201d in exchange for money, campaign contributions, or any other thing of value. On September 4, 2014, McDonnell was found guilty on 11 counts of corruption. McDonnell appealed his conviction and argued that the jury instructions given at trial did not properly define the term \u201cofficial action.\u201d The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held that the jury instructions in question were adequate.
", "facts_len": "2120", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2964", "ID": "62660", "name": "Mathis v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-6092", "docket": "15-6092", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Richard Mathis", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On March 8, 2013, police officers executed a warrant to search Richard Mathis\u2019 house following allegations of sexual abuse from young men. The officers found a loaded rifle and ammunition. After he was arrested and while in custody, Mathis admitted to owning the rifle and ammunition, and he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because of his five previous burglary convictions in Iowa state courts. At trial, the district court used a modified categorical approach to determine that Mathis\u2019 prior convictions constituted violent felonies because the elements of the offense were substantially similar to generic burglary and posed the same risk of harm to others. Therefore, Mathis was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment pursuant to the ACCA. Mathis appealed his conviction and argued that his Iowa convictions should not have constituted predicate offenses under the ACCA, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1049", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2965", "ID": "62662", "name": "James v. City of Boise", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-493", "docket": "15-493", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Melene James", "second_party": "City of Boise, Idaho", "facts": "Melene James filed a complaint against City of Boise police officers after she was bitten by a police dog as the officers were responding to a call about a burglary in progress. The officers mistakenly thought James was a burglar. James brought claims of assault, battery, false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the officers. The Idaho Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental entity is liable for negligent or wrongful acts of its employees if the acts were committed in the course and scope of their employment, but is not liable for intentional torts. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District dismissed the claim because the officers had immunity for their intentional torts and James failed to show that they acted negligently. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and awarded the defendants appellate attorney fees under the civil rights attorney fee statute. The court awarded these fees without determining that \u201cthe plaintiff\u2019s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation\u201d as required under the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Hughes v. Rowe. The Idaho Supreme Court decided that Hughes did not apply because the U.S. Supreme Court did not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts without a limit in the relevant statute.
", "facts_len": "1364", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "2966", "ID": "62675", "name": "V.L. v. E.L.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-648", "docket": "15-648", "term": "2015", "first_party": "V.L.", "second_party": "E.L., et al.", "facts": "V.L. and E.L., a lesbian couple, were in a long-term relationship and raised three children together, of which E.L. was the biological parent. They eventually decided that V.L. should adopt the children and filed a petition to do so in Georgia state court, which granted the petition. In 2011, while living in Alabama, V.L. and E.L. ended their relationship. V.L. filed a petition in Alabama state court that alleged the E.L. had denied her access to her children and interfered with her parental rights. V.L. asked the Alabama state court to register the Georgia adoption judgment and order custody or visitation, which the court did, and E.L. appealed. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the lower court had failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the Georgia state court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an adoption order for V.L. while still recognizing E.L.\u2019s parental rights and therefore the Alabama courts did not have to recognize that judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
", "facts_len": "1079", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2967", "ID": "62663", "name": "Amgen, Inc. v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-278", "docket": "15-278", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Amgen Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Steve Harris", "facts": "Current and former employees of Amgen, Inc. (Amgen) and Amgen Manufacturing, Limited (AML) participated in two employer-sponsored pension plans (the Plans). The Plans included holdings in the Amgen Common Stock Fund which held only Amgen common stock. The plaintiffs were a group of employees who filed a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against Amgen, AML, Amgen\u2019s board of directors, and the Fiduciary Committees of the Plans when the value of the Amgen common stock fell. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by allowing the participants to purchase and hold Amgen stock while knowing its price was artificially inflated. The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded on the grounds that the district court did not properly apply the \u201cpresumption of prudence\u201d as illustrated in Quan v. Computer Science Corp. The presumption of prudence explains that the fiduciary who invests assets in the employer\u2019s stock is entitled to a presumption that they acted consistently with ERISA. The court found that even if the presumption of prudence did apply, the plaintiffs had sufficiently argued a violation of the defendant\u2019s fiduciary duty. On remand, the district court again dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals again reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded the case in light of its decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, which held that ERISA fiduciaries who administer employee stock ownership plans are not entitled to a presumption of prudence but are \u201csubject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, except that they need not diversify the fund\u2019s assets.\u201d The appellate court again reversed the dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds.
", "facts_len": "1972", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2968", "ID": "62659", "name": "Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-577", "docket": "15-577", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc.", "second_party": "Carol S. Comer, Director, Missouri Department of Natural Resources", "facts": "Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, \u201cno money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.\u201d Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment\u2019s protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint.
", "facts_len": "1441", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "2969", "ID": "62664", "name": "Welch v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-6418", "docket": "15-6418", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Gregory Welch", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Police entered Gregory Welch\u2019s apartment because they had reason to believe that a robbery suspect was on the premises. After obtaining Welch\u2019s consent to search the apartment, the police located a gun and ammunition that Welch later identified as his own. Welch was subsequently arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and he pleaded guilty. Because Welch had three prior felony convictions, the district court determined that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) required that he be sentenced to a minimum of 15 years in prison. Welch appealed his sentence and argued that one of his felonies, a conviction for \u201cstrong arm\u201d robbery in Florida state court in 1996, did not qualify as a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because, at the time he was convicted, Florida state law allowed for a conviction of robbery with a much lower level of force than the federal law required. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s determination that Welch\u2019s conviction for robbery under Florida state law was a predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because it involved force that was \u201ccapable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.\u201d
\nIn 2013, Welch filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and argued that his prior conviction for strong arm robbery vague and that his trial counsel had been ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced under the ACCA. He sought a certificate of appealability to the appellate court, which the district court denied. Welch then sought a certificate of appealability from the appellate court and noted that there was a challenge to the ACCA based on its vagueness pending in the Supreme Court, Johnson v. United States. The appellate denied the certificate of appealability.
\nThree weeks later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States and held that the residual clause of the ACCA, which included action that \u201cotherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another\u201d in the definition of a violent felony, was unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments because it was so vague that it failed to give people adequate notice of the conduct it punished. In order to apply the residual clause to a case, courts had to assess the \u201chypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version\u201d of the crime in question, which made the application of the clause unconstitutionally arbitrary and unpredictable.
", "facts_len": "2619", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2970", "ID": "62676", "name": "Wearry v. Cain", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-10008", "docket": "14-10008", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Michael Wearry", "second_party": "Burl Cain, Warden", "facts": "Eric Walber was murdered on April 4, 1998. Nearly two years after the murder, Sam Scott, who was incarcerated at the time, contacted authorities and implicated Michael Wearry in the murder. Scott had been friends with the victim and claimed that Wearry had confessed the crime to him. However, Scott gave an account of the murder that differed from the actual facts and changed his story several times before Wearry\u2019s trial. The prosecution\u2019s other main witness was also incarcerated at the time of trial and had made a prior inconsistent statement to the police that he also recanted. Wearry was convicted and sentenced to death.
\nAfter Wearry\u2019s conviction, information emerged that revealed that the prosecution had failed to disclose evidence that cast doubt on these witnesses\u2019 testimony and would have materially aided Wearry\u2019s defense at trial. Wearry sought state postconviction relief and argued that the state had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the potentially exculpatory evidence and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court determined that, even if the state should have disclosed the evidence and Wearry\u2019s counsel was ineffective, he was not prejudiced, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied further relief.
", "facts_len": "1323", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2971", "ID": "62690", "name": "Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-777", "docket": "15-777", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "Apple Inc.", "facts": "In April 2011, Apple Inc. (Apple) sued Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd. (Samsung) and argued that certain design elements of Samsung\u2019s smartphones infringed on specific patents for design elements in the iPhone that Apple holds. The jury held that Samsung had infringed on Apple\u2019s patents and awarded over $1 billion in damages. The district court ordered a partial retrial on the issue of damages because some damages had been awarded for a period in which Samsung did not have notice of some of the asserted patents. On retrial, the jury awarded nearly $300 million in damages. On appeal, Samsung argued that the district court erred in allowing the jury to award damages based on Samsung\u2019s entire profits, rather than the fraction of profits directly attributable to the infringed patents themselves. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s award of damages because Samsung did not argue that there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the award.
", "facts_len": "1004", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2972", "ID": "62691", "name": "Caetano v. Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-10078", "docket": "14-10078", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Jamie Caetano", "second_party": "Massachusetts", "facts": "Jamie Caetano was convicted of possession of a stun gun in Massachusetts state court. Caetano appealed and claimed her conviction violated her Second Amendment right to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of self-defense, which was necessary to protect herself from her abusive ex-boyfriend. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Caetano\u2019s conviction and held that a stun gun is not eligible for Second Amendment protection.
", "facts_len": "456", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2973", "ID": "62692", "name": "Marshall v. Rodgers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-382", "docket": "12-382", "term": "2012", "first_party": "John Marshall, Warden", "second_party": "Otis Lee Rodgers", "facts": "On July 15, 2001, Otis Lee Rodgers was arrested after he threatened to shoot his wife in the head outside of the Garden Estates Apartments in Riverside, California. Before his trial, Rodgers waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and chose to represent himself. Rodgers then changed his mind several times, retaining and dismissing court-appointed attorneys, until his eventual trial. A Riverside County Superior Court jury subsequently found him guilty of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm as a felon, possession of ammunition as a felon, and making criminal threats. He also admitted that he was on bail for another pending felony trial and had two prior felony convictions. Rodgers was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.
\nAfter sentencing, Rodgers asked the court to appoint an attorney to help him file a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied his request and subsequently denied his pro se motion for a new trial. Rodgers appealed to the U. S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking habeus corpus relief for the judge\u2019s refusal to appoint counsel for the motion for a new trial. That court denied his petition. Rodgers then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court granted Rodgers\u2019 petition and remanded the case for trial.
", "facts_len": "1327", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2974", "ID": "62693", "name": "Bravo-Fernandez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-537", "docket": "15-537", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Juan Bravo-Fernandez, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In May 2005, Juan Bravo-Fernandez, the president of a private security firm in Puerto Rico, and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, a member of the Puerto Rican Senate, traveled to Las Vegas to see a boxing match. Bravo-Fernandez and Martinez-Maldonado were later indicted on charges that Bravo-Fernandez\u2019s payment for the trip was connected to Martinez-Maldonado\u2019s support of legislation beneficial to the security firm. The charges included violations of the federal bribery statute, conspiracy, and the Travel Act, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce for a criminal purpose -- in this case, the violation of the federal bribery statute. The jury convicted the defendants of violating the federal bribery statute, but found the defendants not guilty of conspiracy to violate the statute or of violating the Travel Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the convictions for violating the federal bribery statute because the jury was improperly instructed about what the government needed to prove. The appellate court remanded the case.
\nBased on this holding, the district court entered an order that acquitted the defendants, but that order was vacated after the government clarified that the appellate court\u2019s decision vacating the federal bribery convictions did not require the district court to enter an order of acquittal. The district court subsequently entered an order that clarified that the bribery convictions were vacated. The defendants moved to reinstate the initial order and argued that it was a judgment of acquittal that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, could not be rescinded. The district court denied the motion. The defendants then moved for acquittal and argued that the original acquittals for the Travel Act and conspiracy charges prevented the government from relitigating the bribery charges because a jury had already determined that the government failed to prove elements essential to conviction under the bribery statute. The defendants argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits relitigation of these issues. The district court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2160", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2975", "ID": "62694", "name": "Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-606", "docket": "15-606", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez\u2019s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and the alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez\u2019s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the \u201cbiased\u201d juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez\u2019s likely guilt and the alibi witness\u2019 lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors\u2019 affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado\u2019s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire.
", "facts_len": "1270", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2976", "ID": "62695", "name": "Woods v. Etherton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-723", "docket": "15-723", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Jeffrey Woods", "second_party": "Timothy Etherton", "facts": "In 2006, Michigan law enforcement received an anonymous tip that two white males were traveling between Detroit and Grand Rapids on I-96 in an Audi and were possibly carrying cocaine. Timothy Etherton was driving a car that matched that description, and he was pulled over. Both he and his passenger, Ryan Pollie, were arrested when the officers found 125.2 grams of cocaine in the car. During Etherton\u2019s trial in state court, Pollie testified that he accompanied Etherton to Detroit without knowing that they were traveling there to obtain cocaine and that Etherton did not inform Pollie about the drugs until the two started back to Grand Rapids. Several police officers also testified at trial and described the anonymous tip, which was \u201cnot evidence\u201d but admitted \u201conly to show why the police did what they did.\u201d Etherton was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
\nEtherton sought state postconviction relief and argued that the admission of the anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the tip on that ground, and his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the previous two claims. The state court denied postconviction relief because Etherton failed to prove that his counsel acted unreasonably. Etherton then sought federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which specifies that federal habeas relief is only available after a state court\u2019s denial if the state court\u2019s decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. If \u201cfairminded jurists\u201d could disagree as to the validity of the state court\u2019s determination, federal habeas relief is unavailable. The district court denied relief by finding the state court\u2019s denial of relief was objectively reasonable because Etherton\u2019s counsel was adequately prepared for trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Etherton\u2019s right to confrontation had been violated because the anonymous tip was referenced four times during the trial, which indicated that the tip was admitted for its truth. The court concluded Etherton\u2019s counsel had been constitutionally ineffective and \u201cno fairminded jurist could conclude otherwise.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2457", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2977", "ID": "62700", "name": "Manrique v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-7250", "docket": "15-7250", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Marcelo Manrique", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Marcelo Manrique was convicted in federal district court of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to a life term of supervised release and mandatory restitution, though the final judgment did not include an amount for the restitution and stated that would be included in the amended judgment. Manrique filed his notice of appeal before the amended judgment was entered. When the amended judgment was entered while the appeal was pending, it included the details of the restitution award, and both parties subsequently included arguments regarding the challenge of the award in their briefs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the restitution award because Manrique did not file a second notice of appeal regarding the amended judgment that included the amount of the restitution award.
", "facts_len": "890", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2978", "ID": "62701", "name": "Shaw v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-5991", "docket": "15-5991", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Lawrence Eugene Shaw", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese business man, opened a Bank of America bank account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail and forward it to him in Taiwan. Lawrence Eugene Shaw lived with the daughter and regularly checked her mail. When the Bank of America statements arrived for Hsu\u2019s account, Shaw concocted a scheme in which he opened a PayPal account under Stanley Hsu\u2019s name and used it to convince banks that he was Hsu for the purpose of transferring money from Hsu\u2019s accounts to the PayPal account and from there to an account that Shaw controlled. Using this scheme, Shaw was able to transfer approximately $307,000 of Hsu\u2019s money to himself before the fraud was discovered. Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, and PayPal returned approximately $106,000. Hsu lost about $170,000 by not notifying the banks within 60 days of the fraudulent transactions, as standard banking procedures require.
\nThe government charged Shaw with violating the Bank Fraud Act of 1984, which criminalizes schemes \u201cto defraud a financial institution.\u201d Shaw requested a jury instruction that stated that the government had to prove that he intended not only to defraud the bank but also that he intended to target the bank as the principal financial victim. The district court refused to give the instruction and determined that the language of the Act required that the government prove only that the defendant intended to deceive the bank, not that he also intended the bank to bear the loss that resulted from the fraud. The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud under the Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1763", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2979", "ID": "62703", "name": "SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-927", "docket": "15-927", "term": "2016", "first_party": "SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag, et al.", "second_party": "First Quality Baby Products, LLC, et al.", "facts": "SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag (SCA) produces adult incontinence products, as does First Quality Baby Products, LLC (First Quality). In 2003, SCA notified First Quality that it believed First Quality was infringing on one of its patents, and First Quality responded by arguing that, because the SCA patent in question was essentially the same as a prior-filed patent, it was invalid and therefore First Quality could not be infringing. The two companies ceased communication on the issue, but in 2004, SCA requested that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine its patent in light of the prior-filed one, and in 2007, the PTO determined that the patent in question was valid.
\nIn 2010, SCA sued First Quality for patent infringement. First Quality moved for summary judgment because SCA had unreasonably delayed litigation, and the district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s opinion regarding the unreasonable delay because SCA should have been able to proceed with litigation after the reexamination and had not provided evidence to justify the delay. SCA requested a rehearing before the entire appellate court to reconsider the issue in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <i>Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer</i>, which held that the unreasonable delay defense cannot bar suits for copyright infringement that occurred during the three-year limitations period, and argued that the same analysis should apply to patent suits like this one. Upon rehearing, the appellate court rejected SCA\u2019s argument and held that the Petrella decision did not affect its precedent, which stated that an unreasonable delay defense may be used in patent infringement claims brought within the six-year statute of limitations, and courts must examine the circumstances underlying those claims and the defense.
", "facts_len": "1908", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2980", "ID": "62702", "name": "Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-866", "docket": "15-866", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Star Athletica, LLC", "second_party": "Varsity Brands, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Varsity Brands, Inc. (Varsity) designs and manufactures clothing and accessories for use in various athletic activities, including cheerleading. Design concepts for the clothing incorporate elements such as colors, shapes, lines, etc., and do not consider the functionality of the final clothing. Varsity received copyright registration for the two-dimensional artwork of the designs at issue in this case, which were very similar to ones that Star Athletica, LLC (Star) was advertising. Varsity sued Star and alleged, among other claims, that Star violated the Copyright Act. Star asserted counterclaims, including one that alleged that Varsity had made fraudulent representations to the Copyright Office because the designs at issue were not copyrightable. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Star argued that Varsity did not have valid copyrights because the designs were for \u201cuseful articles,\u201d which cannot be copyrighted, and the designs cannot be separated from the uniforms themselves, which also makes the designs impossible to copyright. Varsity argued that the designs were separable and non-functional, and therefore that the copyrights were valid and had been infringed. The district court granted summary judgment for Star and held that the designs were integral to the functionality of the uniform. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Copyright Act allows graphic features of a design to be copyrighted even when those designs are not separable from a \u201cuseful article.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1543", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2981", "ID": "62709", "name": "Kernan v. Hinojosa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-833", "docket": "15-833", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Scott Kernan, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation", "second_party": "Antonio A. Hinojosa", "facts": "In 2009, while Antonio Hinojosa was serving a 16-year sentence for armed robbery and related crimes, prison officials determined that he was a prison-gang associate and placed him in a secured housing unit. At that time, California law allowed prisoners placed in a secured housing unit solely because of prison-gang affiliation could continue to accrue good-time credits. In 2010, the California Legislature amended the law so that, while prisoners in secured housing units could retain whatever good-time credits they had upon entry, they could no longer accrue good-time credits while in the unit. Hinojosa filed a state habeas petition and argued that the amended law\u2019s application to him violated the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution. The state court denied the claim because Hinojosa did not file it in the court for the county in which he was incarcerated. Hinojosa sought review by the appellate court and then the state supreme court, both of which denied his petition. Hinojosa then sought federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which establishes a deferential standard of review of state denials of habeas, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that, because the initial state court denial was not based on the merits, the AEDPA did not apply.
", "facts_len": "1406", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2982", "ID": "62711", "name": "Coleman v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1053", "docket": "11-1053", "term": "2011", "first_party": "Brian Coleman, Superintendant, State Correctional Institution at Fayette et al.", "second_party": "Lorenzo Johnson", "facts": "In 1995, Corey Walker shot and killed Taraja Williams following an argument about a debt Williams owed. Lorenzo Johnson was present for this argument and heard Williams repeat several times that he was \u201cgoing to kill that kid.\u201d A witness saw Walker and Johnson walking into an alley with Williams in between them. Walker wore a long coat concealing a shotgun. Johnson waited at the front of the alley while Williams shot Walker. Johnson was tried as an accomplice to the murder. The jury convicted him after hearing the testimony of several witnesses, among other evidence. Johnson appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction, and Johnson filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Third Circuit held that the evidence did not sufficiently prove Johnson\u2019s intent to kill Williams.
", "facts_len": "1047", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2983", "ID": "62712", "name": "Lynch v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-8366", "docket": "15-8366", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Shawn Patrick Lynch", "second_party": "Arizona", "facts": "Shawn Patrick Lynch was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and burglary, with all the charges stemming from the 2001 kidnapping and murder of James Panzarella. Arizona sought the death penalty and moved to prevent Lynch\u2019s counsel from informing the jury that the only alternative to sentence to death was life without parole. The trial court granted the motion, and after the first jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, the second jury sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch appealed and argued that, by granting Arizona\u2019s motion, the trial court had violated Lynch\u2019s Due Process Clause rights under the Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Simmons v. South Carolina. In that case, the Supreme Court established that, when a capital defendant\u2019s future dangerousness is at issue and the only alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the Due Process Clause grants the defendant the right to inform the jury of his ineligibility for parole. The Supreme Court of Arizona vacated the sentence without addressing the Simmons argument, and on remand the jury again sentenced Lynch to death. Lynch again appealed and raised the Simmons argument, which the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected by holding that the failure to inform the jury of Lynch\u2019s parole ineligibility was not error.
", "facts_len": "1363", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2984", "ID": "62713", "name": "Johnson v. Lee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-789", "docket": "15-789", "term": "2015", "first_party": "Deborah K. Johnson, Warden", "second_party": "Donna Kay Lee", "facts": "Donna Kay Lee and Peter Carasi were each convicted in California state court of two counts of first-degree murder for the murder of Carasi\u2019s mother and for his ex-girlfriend. Lee was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, and the California appellate courts affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. Lee filed a petition for federal habeas relief without seeking state postconviction relief, and the petition mostly raised claims that Lee had not raised on direct appeal. Because Lee had not exhausted state relief measures, the district court stayed the case until the state law claims could be fully litigated. The California Supreme Court ruled that Lee\u2019s state law claims were barred based on the precedent of In re Dixon, which held that a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal but wasn\u2019t raised until postconviction relief proceedings is considered procedurally defaulted. The federal district court similarly dismissed Lee\u2019s claims based on the Dixon bar. On appeal, Lee argued that the California courts were not consistently applying Dixon because the courts had not cited the case in every instance in which it should have applied and therefore that the bar was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded for further evidence, and after the presentation of evidence about how often California courts applied the Dixon bar, the district court again dismissed Lee\u2019s claims. The appellate court reversed and held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the Dixon bar was being consistently applied, and therefore that the bar was inadequate.
", "facts_len": "1647", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2985", "ID": "62714", "name": "State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Rigsby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-513", "docket": "15-513", "term": "2016", "first_party": "State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.", "second_party": "United States ex rel. Cori Rigsby, et al.", "facts": "Many homeowners in the Gulf Coast area had two separate insurance policies: One that covered flood but not wind damage, and another that covered wind but not flood damage. These policies were frequently administered by the same private insurance company, but the company would be responsible for paying wind damage claims, while government funds would pay for flood damage claims; therefore, there was an incentive for the companies to classify damage as caused by flood rather than wind. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (State Farm) was one of these companies that administered such policies in the Gulf Coast area. Cori Rigsby was a State Farm claims adjuster who believed that State Farm was wrongfully seeking to maximize its policyholders\u2019 flood damage claims and minimize wind damage claims after Hurricane Katrina. Rigsby sued State Farm under the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court determined that State Farm had submitted false claims in violation of the FCA. On appeal, State Farm argued Rigsby had violated the FCA\u2019s seal requirement, which stated that the complaint cannot be disclosed until the court orders the complaint served on the defendant, and that violation of the FCA seal requirement warrants immediate dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, although Rigsby violated the seal requirement by disclosing the existence of the suit, the violation of the seal requirement does not warrant immediate dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1475", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2986", "ID": "62718", "name": "UBS Financial Services v. Union de Empleados de Muelles", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-1208", "docket": "12-1208", "term": "2012", "first_party": "UBS Financial Services Incorporated of Puerto Rico, et al.", "second_party": "Union de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan, et al.", "facts": "In 2008, UBS Trust Company of Puerto Rico (UBS Trust) sold approximately $757 million worth of bonds to a group of investment funds (Funds) that it advises. The Funds suffered significant losses when the value of the bonds plummeted shortly after the sale. Union de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico AP Welfare Plan (AP) and Union de Empleados de Muelles de Puerto Rico PRSSA Welfare Plan (PRSSA) are Puerto Rico pension plans that own shares in the Funds. In 2010, AP and PRSSA sued the investment funds\u2019 directors, UBS Trust, and UBS Financial Services Inc. in federal district court. The plaintiffs argued that the UBS defendants engaged in manipulative trading by using the Funds to artificially drive up the price of the bonds. Under corporate law, officers and directors are usually the only parties that litigate on behalf of a corporation. Shareholders like AP and PRSSA may file suit in behalf of the corporation (shareholder derivative action) if they satisfy certain procedural requirements that vary by jurisdiction. The Federal Rules of Procedure require a derivative action complaint to prove that a demand was presented to and refused by the defendants\u2019 Board of Directors or to list the reasons that such a demand would have been futile. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim because these requirements had not been met, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. Reviewing the merits of the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals determined that the majority of the Funds\u2019 Board members were too closely connected to the UBS defendants personally and financially to be able to exercise independent judgment in responding to a demand regarding the transaction in question.
", "facts_len": "1772", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - rule 46", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "2987", "ID": "62721", "name": "National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1251", "docket": "15-1251", "term": "2016", "first_party": "National Labor Relations Board", "second_party": "SW General, Inc.", "facts": "In 1998, Congress enacted the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), which provided that, if a position for which the President nominates and the Senate confirms (PAS position) becomes vacant, the first assistant automatically takes over as an \u201cacting officer\u201d for a period of 210 days. The President may also select a senior employee from the same agency or someone in a PAS position from another agency to serve as the acting officer. Pursuant to the FVRA, when the Ronald Meisberg resigned as the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a PAS position, the President directed Lafe Solomon, who held a senior position in the NLRB, to serve as the Acting General Counsel. Six months into his tenure, the President nominated him for the General Counsel position, but the Senate did not confirm him. On October 29, 2013, the Senate confirmed a different nominee, so by the time he stepped down, Solomon had served as Acting General Counsel from June 21, 2010, until November 4, 2013.
\nSW General, Inc. provides ambulance services to hospitals in Arizona. Its emergency medical technicians (EMTs), nurses, and firefighters, are negotiated by a union that had negotiated with SW General for \u201clongevity pay,\u201d which meant that employees who had been with the company for at least ten years were guaranteed annual bonuses. In December 2012, between the expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and the negotiation of a new one, SW General stopped paying the longevity pay. The union filed an unfair labor practices claim with the NLRB, which issued a formal complaint. An administrative law judge determined that SW General had committed unfair labor practices, and SW General filed a list of exceptions, among which was a claim that Acting General Counsel was serving in violation of the FVRA. A provision of the FVRA states that the acting officer may not become the nominee for the position, and the nominee to fill the position may not serve in an acting capacity unless that nominee was the first assistant to the vacant position for at least 90 days in the previous year. Solomon was briefly a nominee for the position, and he had not served as the first assistant to the vacant position. SW General petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review, and the appellate court did not address the merits of the case because it determined that Solomon\u2019s tenure as Acting General Counsel violated the FVRA.
", "facts_len": "2480", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "2988", "ID": "62715", "name": "Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-680", "docket": "15-680", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Golden Bethune-Hill, et al.", "second_party": "Virginia State Board of Elections, et al.", "facts": "Based on the 2010 Census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia Legislature. At the time the districting legislation was prepared, Virginia was subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and therefore any new districting plan must have ensured that there would be no \u201cretrogression\u201d in the ability of racial minorities to elect the candidate of their choice. Accordingly, the new districting plan contained 12 majority-minority districts. On December 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, each of whom resided in one of the twelve challenged districts, sued and argued that those districts constituted racial gerrymanders that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the plaintiffs did not establish that race was the predominant factor in the creation of 11 of the 12 challenged district. The district court also held that, although race was the predominant factor in the creation of one district, in doing so the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest and its use of race was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
", "facts_len": "1145", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2989", "ID": "62716", "name": "Moore v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-797", "docket": "15-797", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Bobby James Moore", "second_party": "Texas", "facts": "In 1980, Bobby James Moore was convicted of capital murder for the shooting of James McCarble, a seventy-year-old store clerk, in Houston, Texas. Moore was sentenced to death, and his conviction and sentence were both affirmed on appeal. After a federal court granted habeas corpus relief, a new punishment hearing occurred in 2001, and Moore was again sentenced to the death penalty. His sentence was again affirmed on appeal. Moore sought state habeas relief and argued that the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Atkins v. Virginia should apply to his case; therefore, because he was intellectually disabled, he was exempt from execution. The habeas court granted relief based on the Atkins argument. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, however, reversed and held that Moore had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had the requisite intellectual disability for the Atkins precedent to apply based on Texas case law that used a 1992 definition of intellectual disability.
", "facts_len": "1037", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2990", "ID": "62717", "name": "Buck v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-8049", "docket": "15-8049", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Duane Edward Buck", "second_party": "Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "In July 1995, Duane Edward Buck was arrested for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Debra Gardner, and her friend Kenneth Butler. Buck was convicted of capital murder for both of the deaths. During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Buck\u2019s future dangerousness based on his criminal history, his conduct, and his demeanor before and after arrest. The defense presented the testimony of a clinical psychologist to evaluate the risk of future dangerousness. That expert stated that he considered demographic factors, including race, in his analysis and that, statistically, minorities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system. On cross-examination, the prosecution clarified that the expert\u2019s opinion was that the race factor \u201cblack\u201d increased the likelihood of future dangerousness. The jury found that there was sufficient evidence of Buck\u2019s future dangerousness without any sufficient mitigating factors to justify a life sentence, so the jury sentenced Buck to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
\nBuck filed various claims for state and federal habeas relief that were denied, until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Trevino v. Thaler, which held that Texas\u2019 procedural scheme made it almost impossible to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, and therefore that a procedural default on such a claim could be excused. While some of these claims were pending, the state attorney general admitted in a different case that the state should not have called an expert witness to testify about future dangerousness of a defendant based on race and named Buck\u2019s case as one affected by similar testimony. Buck again sought federal habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel knowingly called an expert witness who testified that race was a factor in determining future dangerousness. The district court dismissed the claim because Buck failed to show that the outcome of his trial was prejudiced. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit similarly denied Buck\u2019s request for a Certificate of Appealability by holding that Buck did not show sufficient extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from the lower court\u2019s judgment.
", "facts_len": "2295", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2991", "ID": "62723", "name": "Cooper v. Harris", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1262", "docket": "15-1262", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Roy Cooper, Governor of North Carolina, et al.", "second_party": "David Harris, et al.", "facts": "After the 2010 Census, pursuant to the state Constitution, the North Carolina state legislature appointed House and Senate Committees to prepare a redistricting plan for U.S. House of Representatives districts. The heads of the respective committees hired a redistricting coordinator to design the new districts. The coordinator was given instructions orally; there were no written records of the precise instructions he received. The heads of the committees published public statements that highlighted certain criteria used in creating their proposed redistricting plan, such as the fact that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, districts must be constructed to have a \u201cBlack Voting Age Population\u201d (BVAP) of 50% plus one. To comply with this criterion, two districts were altered to have a BVAP over 50%, which meant that there were two more majority-black districts than there were under the 2001 Congressional Districting Plan. The state legislature enacted the new plan and the Department of Justice granted it preclearance pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
\nDavid Harris and Christine Bowser are U.S. citizens registered to vote in the two districts at issue. They sued and argued that North Carolina used the Voting Rights Act\u2019s requirements as a pretext to place more black voters in those two districts to reduce black voters\u2019 influence in other districts. The district court determined that race was the predominant factor motivating the redistricting plan and therefore that the redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause.
", "facts_len": "1689", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2992", "ID": "62722", "name": "Jennings v. Rodriguez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1204", "docket": "15-1204", "term": "2017", "first_party": "David Jennings, et al.", "second_party": "Alejandro Rodriguez, et al.", "facts": "Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered in the bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions.
", "facts_len": "1658", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2993", "ID": "62725", "name": "Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/14-1538", "docket": "14-1538", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Life Technologies Corp., et al.", "second_party": "Promega Corp.", "facts": "Promega Corporation owned four patents and was the exclusive licensee of another one for technology used in kits that can conduct genetic testing. The kits are usually used for the purposes of identifying forensic or paternity matches. In 2010, Promega sued Life Technologies Corporation (LifeTech) for infringing on the patents in question, and LifeTech filed counterclaims that argued that the asserted claims of the patents were invalid. The district court determined that LifeTech had directly infringed on the patents and the case proceeded to damages. During the damages phase, there was a dispute about whether or not Promega had met its burden to prove that it was eligible for damages based on its worldwide sales. The jury determined that Promega was eligible for the worldwide damages, but the district court granted LifeTech\u2019s motion to vacate the judgment because it determined that, as a matter of law, Promega had failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain that jury verdict. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and determined that there was substantial evidence that LifeTech was liable for worldwide damages.
", "facts_len": "1162", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2994", "ID": "62730", "name": "Beckles v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-8544", "docket": "15-8544", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Travis Beckles", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "On April 11, 2007, Travis Beckles was arrested because a sawed-off shotgun was located in his residence, and he had previous felony convictions, mostly for drug possession and sales. Beckles was convicted, and during the sentencing phase of his trial, the district court determined that Beckles was an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) who had been in possession of a firearm and was therefore subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, Beckles was eligible for a sentence range from 360 months to life imprisonment, and the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, five months of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. Beckles appealed and argued that the Sentencing Guidelines imposed an unreasonable sentence, that his prior convictions did not qualify as \u201cviolent felonies\u201d subject to sentencing enhancement under ACCA, and that possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d subject to sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Beckles\u2019 conviction and sentence.
\nThe U.S. Supreme Court vacated the appellate court\u2019s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. United States, which determined that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutional. On remand, the appellate court again upheld Beckles\u2019 conviction and sentence because possession of a sawed-off shotgun was a \u201ccrime of violence.\u201d The appellate court also held that the Johnson decision did not affect this case because Beckles was not sentenced under the residual clause of ACCA but rather under express language from the Sentencing Guidelines about sentencing enhancements for crimes of violence.
", "facts_len": "1816", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "2995", "ID": "62732", "name": "Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-423", "docket": "15-423", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, et al.", "second_party": "Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company, et al.", "facts": "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act protects foreign sovereigns from suits in American courts unless one of a set of specifically enumerated exceptions applies. One of these exceptions is when the foreign sovereign takes U.S. property (the expropriation exception), and another is when the action of the foreign sovereign has direct effect on U.S. commercial activity (the commercial activity exception).
\nOklahoma-based company Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company owns a subsidiary that contracts with the Venezuelan state-owned corporation that controls the exploration, production, and exportation of oil in Venezuela. In 2007, the two companies executed contracts for the Venezuelan corporation to use Helmerich & Payne\u2019s drilling rigs. By 2008, the unpaid debt from those contracts totaled more than $63 million, and when the debt was over $100 million in 2009, Helmerich & Payne announced it would not be renewing the contract and packed up its drills. Employees of the Venezuelan corporation, assisted by members of the Venezuelan National Guard blockaded the yards in which Helmerich & Payne was keeping its equipment, and then-President Hugo Chavez issued a Decree of Expropriation. Helmerich & Payne sued Venezuela and its state-owned corporation in federal district court under the expropriation and commercial activity exceptions to the FSIA. Venezuela moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion with respect to the expropriation claim but denied it with respect to the commercial activity claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that, because the expropriation claim was neither insubstantial nor frivolous, the district court should not have granted the motion to dismiss that claim.
", "facts_len": "1810", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2996", "ID": "62731", "name": "Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/14-1055", "docket": "14-1055", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Crystal Monique Lightfoot, et al.", "second_party": "Cendant Mortgage Corporation, et al.", "facts": "Crystal Monique Lightfoot and Beverly Ann Hollis-Arlington sued the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) in federal district court and alleged numerous state and federal law claims arising out of the foreclosure proceedings Fannie Mae initiated against Hollis-Arlington\u2019s home. The district court dismissed and held that the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
\nThe plaintiffs then sued in California state court and alleged the state law equivalents of the claims in the earlier federal suit. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court and argued that its federal corporate charter contained language that granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over cases in which it was involved as a plaintiff or defendant. The plaintiffs in this case moved for a remand back to state court, but the district court denied the remand and then dismissed all the claims as having already been litigated in the earlier case in federal court. The appellate court determined that the language in Fannie Mae\u2019s federal charter conferred subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts and affirmed the dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1271", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "2997", "ID": "62734", "name": "Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-497", "docket": "15-497", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Stacy Fry, et vir, as Next Friends of Minor E. F.", "second_party": "Napoleon Community Schools, et al.", "facts": "The Frys\u2019 daughter, E.F., was born with cerebral palsy and was prescribed a service dog to assist with everyday tasks. Her school, which provided her with a human aide in accordance with her Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), did not allow her to bring her service dog to school. The Frys sued the school, the principal, and the school district and argued that they violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and state disabilities laws. The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss because the claims necessarily implicated the IDEA, which required plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before suing under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The Frys appealed and argued that the exhaustion requirement did not apply because they were seeking damages, which is not the sort of relief the IDEA provided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and held that the Frys\u2019 claims were essentially educational, which are precisely the sort of claims the IDEA was meant to address, and therefore the exhaustion requirement applied.
", "facts_len": "1183", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "2998", "ID": "62735", "name": "Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-649", "docket": "15-649", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Casimir Czyzewski, et al.", "second_party": "Jevic Holding Corp., et al.", "facts": "Jevic Transportation, Inc. was a trucking company headquartered in New Jersey that in 2006 was purchased by a subsidiary of Sun Capital Partners. In 2008, Jevic filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; at that point, it owed about $53 million to its first-priority senior secured creditors and about $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. Two lawsuits ensued in bankruptcy court: one was the truck drivers suing Jevic for violating federal and state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Acts, which required 60 days\u2019 notice to workers before they were laid off, and the other was a fraudulent conveyance action on behalf of the unsecured creditors. In March 2012, the parties to the fraudulent conveyance action negotiated a structured dismissal settlement that disposed of many of the claims, but left out the drivers. The drivers objected to the settlement because it distributed property to creditors of lower priority than the drivers, according to the priorities established in the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected the objections and approved the proposed settlement. The federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed and held that the bankruptcy court had the discretion to approve a settlement scheme outside of the Chapter 11 proceedings that did not comply with the Bankruptcy Code\u2019s distribution scheme.
", "facts_len": "1420", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "2999", "ID": "62738", "name": "Sessions v. Morales-Santana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1191", "docket": "15-1191", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Jeffrey B. Session III, Attorney General", "second_party": "Luis Ramon Morales-Santana", "facts": "Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in 1962 in the Dominican Republic to a father who had become an American citizen in 1917 and a mother who was a citizen of the Dominican Republic. At the time, Morales-Santana\u2019s parents were unmarried, and when they married in 1970, Morales-Santana was \u201clegitimated\u201d by his father\u2019s citizenship, and he became a lawful permanent resident in 1975. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act in effect at the time of Morales-Santana\u2019s birth, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and a non-citizen mother only had citizenship at birth if the citizen father was physically present in the United States or one of its possessions for a period totalling ten years at some point prior to the child\u2019s birth, and at least five of those years had to be after the age of 14. Because Morales-Santana\u2019s father was only physically present in Puerto Rico until 20 days before his 19th birthday, when he left to work in the Dominican Republic, he did not meet the requirements to transfer derivative citizenship to Morales-Santana upon his birth.
\nIn 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings because he had been convicted of various felonies. He applied to have the removal withheld and argued that he had derivative citizenship from his father, but the immigration judge denied the application. Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen and argued that the denial of derivative citizenship violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although his father did not satisfy the requirements for unwed citizen fathers to transfer derivative citizenship, he did meet the less stringent requirements for unwed citizen mothers (which required physical presence in the United States or one of its possessions for at least a year at some point prior to the child\u2019s birth), and the gender-based difference was a violation of Equal Protection. The Bureau of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the gender-based difference in the physical presence requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
", "facts_len": "2170", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3000", "ID": "62753", "name": "Goodyear Tire v. Haeger", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1406", "docket": "15-1406", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company", "second_party": "Leroy Haeger, et al.", "facts": "In 2003, Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger were injured when one of the tires on their motorhome failed while they were driving on the highway, which caused the motorhome to swerve off the road and overturn. The tire was manufactured by The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear). In 2005, the Haegers sued Goodyear, which was represented by Basil J. Musnuff on all cases involving that particular model of tire and by Graeme Hancock as local counsel. The parties reached a settlement without going to trial in 2010.
\nOver a year later, the Haegers\u2019 attorney saw an article that indicated that Goodyear had done testing on the tire in question that had not been provided to the Haegers during discovery. The attorney filed a motion for sanctions with the district court and argued that Goodyear had committed discovery fraud by knowingly concealing crucial tests. Goodyear opposed the motion and argued that it had never represented that it provided all the test records that had been conducted on the tire at issue. The district court determined that Goodyear and Musnuff had deliberately tried to frustrate attempts to resolve the case on its merits. The district court also determined that, while it could not impose sanctions because the matter was settled, it could award the plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees for all costs incurred after Goodyear\u2019s responses to the first discovery request, which came to approximately $2.7 million. Musnuff and Goodyear were held jointly responsible for 80% of this figure, and Hancock for the other 20%. Musnuff and Goodyear appealed and argued that the district court could not impose such sanctions without the additional procedural protections required for the imposition of punitive sanctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in both appeals that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed the award of sanction fees.
", "facts_len": "1932", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3001", "ID": "62737", "name": "Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1111", "docket": "15-1111", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Bank of America Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "City of Miami, Florida", "facts": "The city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and argued that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, that their actions denied the city of expected property and tax revenues, and cost the city money that it would not have had to pay had the banks not engaged in these predatory lending practices. The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the \u201czone of interests\u201d the statute was meant to protect, and therefore did not have standing to sue under the FHA. The district court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks\u2019 conduct was the proximate cause of the harm the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that, as long as the plaintiffs in an FHA case would have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, they can sue under the FHA; the statutory standing requirement is not more narrow than Article III. The appellate court also determined that Miami had sufficiently shown that the banks\u2019 actions were the proximate cause of the harm because the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the actions.
", "facts_len": "1473", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3002", "ID": "62755", "name": "Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-827", "docket": "15-827", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Endrew F.", "second_party": "Douglas County School District RE-1", "facts": "Endrew F. is an autistic fifth grade student who was placed in private school because his parents believed his public school education was inadequate. Endrew was placed in Firefly Autism House and his parents sued for reimbursement of Endrew\u2019s private school tuition and related expenses pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA provides that if a free public school cannot meet the educational needs of a disabled student, the student\u2019s parents may enroll their child in a private school and seek reimbursement for tuition and related expenses.
\nThis case first went to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for review. The ALJ rejected Endrew\u2019s parent\u2019s request for reimbursement concluding that Endrew\u2019s public school had provided him with \u201cfree appropriate public education\u201d (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ\u2019s ruling and held that Endrew\u2019s parents failed to meet their burden to prove that Endrew was not provided with FAPE. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1053", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3003", "ID": "62754", "name": "Sessions v. Dimaya", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1498", "docket": "15-1498", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General", "second_party": "James Garcia Dimaya", "facts": "James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years\u2019 imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a \u201ccrime of violence,\u201d which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.
\nWhile Dimaya\u2019s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held \u00a0that the definition of a \u201cviolent felony\u201d in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA\u2019s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial.
", "facts_len": "1726", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3004", "ID": "62757", "name": "McLane Company, Inc. v. E.E.O.C", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1248", "docket": "15-1248", "term": "2016", "first_party": "McLane Company, Inc.", "second_party": "Equal Opportunity Employment Commission", "facts": "Damiana Ochoa filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, McLane Company (McLane), for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McLane required all new employees and employees returning work after a medical leave to take a physical capability strength test for positions that are classified as physically demanding. Ochoa failed the test three times, and therefore her employment was terminated. The EEOC opened up an investigation into McLane Co. During the investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena for information McLane withheld, including either \u201cpedigree information\u201d for each test-taker or reasons the test-taker\u2019s employment was terminated. McLane continued to refuse to provide that information, so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action. The district court required McLane to disclose some of the information the EEOC subpoenaed, but it refused to require McLane to divulge the \u201cpedigree information\u201d or reasons for termination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part after reviewing the lower court\u2019s decision \u201cde novo,\u201d or without giving deference to the lower court\u2019s determination.
", "facts_len": "1224", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3005", "ID": "62758", "name": "Bosse v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-9173", "docket": "15-9173", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Shaun Michael Bosse", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Booth v. Maryland that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing jury in a death penalty case from considering victim impact evidence that does not directly relate to the circumstances of the crime. In Payne v. Tennessee, four years later, the Supreme Court determined that the ban only applied to victim impact testimony. Because Payne did not deal with the victim\u2019s family member\u2019s characterizations of the defendant, the crime, or the sentence as Booth had, the Payne Court did not address these types of evidence.
\nShaun Michael Bosse was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder for killing Katrina Griffin and her two children. The prosecution sought the death penalty and, over Bosse\u2019s objection, asked three of the victims\u2019 family members to recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended the death penalty, and the jury sentenced Bosse to death. Bosse appealed and argued that the sentencing process had violated the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Booth. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and held that Payne had \u201cimplicitly overruled\u201d Booth as it related to characterizations of the defendant and opinions about the sentence.
", "facts_len": "1251", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3006", "ID": "62756", "name": "Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1391", "docket": "15-1391", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Expressions Hair Design, et al.", "second_party": "Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.", "facts": "The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as permissible regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined \u00a0that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague.
", "facts_len": "1236", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3007", "ID": "62759", "name": "Ziglar v. Abbasi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1358", "docket": "15-1358", "term": "2016", "first_party": "James W. Ziglar", "second_party": "Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, et. al.", "facts": "The respondents in this case are a group of male, non-U.S. citizens, most of whom are Muslim of Middle Eastern origin who were detained after the September 11, 2001 attacks and treated as \u201cof interest\u201d in the government\u2019s investigation of these events. In their original claims, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained without notice of the charges against them or information about how they were determined to be \u201cof interest,\u201d that their access to counsel and the courts was interfered with, and that they were subjected to excessively harsh treatment during their detention. They also asserted that their race, ethnicity, and national origin played a determinative role in the decision to detain them. The plaintiffs sued a number of government officials and argued that the government used their status as non-citizens to detain them when the government\u2019s real purpose was to investigate whether they were terrorists and that the conditions of their confinement violated their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. After a series of motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims regarding the length of confinement but allowed the Constitutional claims to proceed. Both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed various aspects of that ruling.
\nWhile that appeal was pending, some of the plaintiffs settled their claims against the government and the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that a complaint must allege sufficient facts to be plausible on its face and to allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the claimed conduct. Based on these events, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the length of confinement claims but remanded the conditions of confinement claims and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The appellate court again dismissed some of the claims and allowed others to proceed.
", "facts_len": "1961", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3008", "ID": "62761", "name": "Matal v. Tam", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1293", "docket": "15-1293", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO", "second_party": "Simon Shiao Tam", "facts": "Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band\u2019s name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name \u00a0would likely be disparaging towards \u201cpersons of Asian descent.\u201d The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that \u201c[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.\u201d Tam appealed the trademark officer\u2019s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1149", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3009", "ID": "62760", "name": "Nelson v. Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1256", "docket": "15-1256", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden", "second_party": "Colorado", "facts": "The state of Colorado, like most states, imposes certain monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were both separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. Nelson was acquitted of all charges, and Madden was acquitted of one of two charges against him. Both requested refunds from the state for the penalties they had been charged, since their convictions were overturned. The trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction in Nelson\u2019s case and only returned the funds taken from Madden in connection with the one charge on which he was acquitted. The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the state must refund the money Nelson and Madden had paid respective to their sexual assault charges that had been thrown out. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both cases and held that, \u00a0under the state\u2019s Exoneration Act, an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can \u201cprove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they were] \u2018actually innocent.\u2019\u201d
", "facts_len": "1050", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3010", "ID": "62766", "name": "Dean v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-9260", "docket": "15-9260", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Levon Dean, Jr.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Levon Dean, Jr. and Jamal Dean were brothers who agreed to participate in a robbery of a local drug dealer known as J.R. with Jessica Cabbell and Sarah Berg. On April 15, 2013, Levon and Jamal accompanied Berg to the Palmer House Motel in Sioux City, Iowa, to confront J.R. Jamal pulled a gun on J.R. and hit him on the head with the firearm. Berg, Jamal, and Levon fled the scene with J.R.\u2019s car, cell phone, and methamphetamines. Later that month, Levon and Jamal robbed another methamphetamine dealer, C.B., at gunpoint in his home. In a similar manner, Jamal hit C.B. with his gun and fled the scene in C.B.\u2019s car with $300, methamphetamines, and other electronics. During this robbery, the Deans ordered Hope Marsh who was living at the residence to come with and live with them. The Deans were eventually arrested in May of 2013.
\nThe Deans were convicted of multiple crimes including robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, which requires that a crime \u00a0\u201cobstruct, delay, or affect commerce.\u201d Levon Dean, Jr. was sentenced to 400 months, including a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive sentence pursuant to the sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7924(c). \u00a0Without the mandatory minimum, Levon\u2019s sentence guideline would have been 84-105 months. On appeal, Levon Dean challenged the sufficiency the evidence to establish a nexus to interstate commerce as the Hobbs Act requires, the sufficiency of evidence for his firearm convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s decision to follow the precedent it established in United States v. Hatcher, which held that the district court did not have discretion to reconsider mandatory minimums in sentences. The appellate court held that the district court\u2019s sentence of 40-months to be served consecutively with the 360-month sentence was \u201csubstantively reasonable and not an abuse of the district court\u2019s discretion.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2032", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3011", "ID": "62767", "name": "Hernandez v. Mesa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-118", "docket": "15-118", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.", "second_party": "Jesus Mesa, Jr.", "facts": "On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the U.S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez\u2019s friends at the U.S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the U.S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him.
\nSix months after Hernandez\u2019s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution\u2019s deadly-force protections stop at the border for non-citizens like Hernandez. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed.
", "facts_len": "2078", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3012", "ID": "62768", "name": "Lewis v. Clarke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1500", "docket": "15-1500", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Brian Lewis, et al.", "second_party": "William Clark", "facts": "On October 22, 2011, Brian Lewis was driving southbound on Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when William Clarke crashed into him while driving a limousine owned by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Lewis sued Clarke, claiming that he was injured as a result of Clarke\u2019s negligent and careless driving. Clarke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that, because he was driving the limousine as an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion and held that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because Lewis sought damages from Clarke personally, not from the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and held that tribal sovereign immunity extended to Clarke as a member of the tribe acting within the scope of his employment as a limousine driver with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority.
", "facts_len": "1048", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3013", "ID": "62771", "name": "Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-32", "docket": "16-32", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership, et al.", "second_party": "Janis E. Clark, et al.", "facts": "Olive Clark and Joe Wellner were both residents at the Fountain Circle Care and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership (Kindred Nursing) in Winchester, Kentucky. Prior to their admission to the facility, each had designated their relatives as attorneys-in-fact, which gave the relatives broad authority to enter into transactions and agreements on their behalf. Their relatives, Janis E. Clark and Beverly Wellner, used their status as attorneys-in-fact to sign an alternative dispute resolution agreements with the facility that stipulated that any disputes arising from the Olive\u2019s and Joe\u2019s stays at the facility would be resolved through arbitration.
\n\u00a0\n
Olive and Joe both passed away in the spring of 2009, and Janis and Beverly each filed lawsuits against Kindred Nursing for personal injury and wrongful death on their behalf. Kindred Nursing moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements that Janis and Beverly had signed. The state trial court initially dismissed both judicial actions in favor of arbitration, but later reversed in accordance with the precedent the Supreme Court of Kentucky established in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney that authorized an attorney-in-fact to manage the principal\u2019s \u201cfinancial affairs\u201d and \u201chealth-care decisions\u201d did not include the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1586", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3014", "ID": "62769", "name": "Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-54", "docket": "16-54", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Juan Esquivel-Quintana", "second_party": "Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General", "facts": "Juan Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant statute in California. In California, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor and not the spouse of the perpetrator. The statute further provides that anyone who is convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony.
\nAfter 2009, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan, which is where the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA states that a non-citizen may be removed from the United States if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as sexual abuse of a minor. An Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana\u2019s conviction under California law constituted sexual abuse of a minor and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that the term \u201csexual abuse of a minor\u201d in the INA encompassed convictions under the relevant California statute without looking at the individual facts of the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA\u2019s decision. The appellate court determined that the BIA\u2019s decision was entitled to deference as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute under the Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and that the rule of lenity--requiring that statutory ambiguity be resolved in the defendant\u2019s favor--did not apply in a civil case.
", "facts_len": "1735", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3015", "ID": "62770", "name": "Midland Funding v. Johnson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-348", "docket": "16-348", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Midland Funding, LLC", "second_party": "Aleida Johnson", "facts": "In 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy in Alabama bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 2003 and years prior, Midland Funding had purchased a bundle of debt worth almost $2,000 from Johnson, so after she filed for bankruptcy, Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in the same court. Because the date of the last transaction in the account in question occurred in 2003 and the statute of limitations for collecting unpaid debt in Alabama is six years, Johnson sued Midland Funding in federal district court argued that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prevented bankruptcy actions that had passed their statutes of limitations.
\n\u00a0\n
Midland Funding moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court determined determined that, while the FDCPA prohibited the filing of a proof of claim known to be barred by the statute of limitations, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditor to file a proof of claim even after the statute of limitations has run. The district court resolved that conflict by holding that the creditors\u2019 right to file a claim precluded debtors from challenging that practice under the FDCPA. Johnson appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that, although the Bankruptcy Code allowed creditors to file claims barred by the statute of limitations, that did not preclude them from liability under the FDCPA for filing the claim.
", "facts_len": "1530", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3016", "ID": "62775", "name": "Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-149", "docket": "16-149", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc.", "second_party": "Jodie Nevils", "facts": "Jodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies\u2019 claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company\u2019s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to \u201cthe nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.\u201d
\n\u00a0\n
After the Supreme Court of Missouri\u2019s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier\u2019s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier\u2019s plan \u201crelate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits\u201d for the purpose of the FEHBA. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court\u2019s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency\u2019s interpretation of a preemption clause receives judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law.
", "facts_len": "1859", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3017", "ID": "62772", "name": "Packingham v. North Carolina", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1194", "docket": "15-1194", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Lester Gerard Packingham", "second_party": "North Carolina", "facts": "Lester Packingham was convicted of taking \u201cindecent liberties\u201d with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to \u201cremain away from\u201d the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina\u2019s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender\u2019s access to social media websites.
\n\u00a0\n
In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the \u201cprotection of minors.\u201d The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a \u201climitation on conduct\u201d and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in \u201cforestalling the illicit lurking and contact\u201d of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims.
", "facts_len": "1404", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3018", "ID": "62776", "name": "County of Los Angeles v. Mendez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-369", "docket": "16-369", "term": "2016", "first_party": "County of Los Angeles, et al.", "second_party": "Angel Mendez, et al.", "facts": "In October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff\u2019s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O\u2019Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O\u2019Dell was not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes\u2019 backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden shed surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the shed. Conley yelled \u201cGun!\u201d and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back.
\n\u00a0
\nMendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on both these allegations and also held that, although the officers\u2019 use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit\u2019s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property. \u00a0The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied shed led to the shooting.
", "facts_len": "2504", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3019", "ID": "62782", "name": "Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-254", "docket": "16-254", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Water Splash, Inc.", "second_party": "Tara Menon", "facts": "Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that makes aquatic playgrounds known as \u201csplash pads\u201d that are popular in urban areas. Tara Menon is a Canadian citizen who lives in Quebec, Canada, and at one point worked for Water Splash as a regional sales representative. Later, Menon began to work for South Pool, a Water Splash competitor. Sometime in 2012, Water Splash learned that South Pool had used some of its drawings and designs when it submitted a bid to the City of Galveston to construct splash pads at two of its city parks, and Water Splash subsequently sued Menon in Texas state court. \u00a0Water Splash served Menon by mail, as allowed by a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. When Menon did not respond, the trial court award Water Splash a default judgment.
\nMenon filed a motion for a new trial seeking to set aside the default judgment because service was not accomplished pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the \u201cHague Service Convention\u201d), a treaty that governs service of process from one member state to another. Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the treaty. The trial court denied Menon\u2019s motion for a new trial but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Hague Service Convention did not authorize service by mail. The Texas Court of Appeals denied a motion for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review.
", "facts_len": "1489", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3020", "ID": "62783", "name": "Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-74", "docket": "16-74", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Advocate Health Care Network, et al.", "second_party": "Maria Stapleton, et al.", "facts": "The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) protects employees from unexpected losses in their retirement plans by putting in place required safeguards on plans that qualify for ERISA protections. Church plans are exempted from the Act and its protections to prevent excessive entanglement of the government with religion through regulation.
\nMaria Stapleton and the other plaintiffs in this case are a group of employees who work for Advocate Health Care Network (Advocate), which operates hospitals, inpatient, and outpatient treatment centers through northern Illinois, and are members of Advocate\u2019s retirement plan. Advocate formed in 1995 as the result of a merger between two religiously affiliated hospital systems (though neither system was owned or financially operated by the church with which it was affiliated). Advocate is also affiliated with a church, and though it is not owned or financially operated by the church, it maintains contracts with the church and \u201caffirms [the church\u2019s] ministry.\u201d The plaintiffs in this case sued Advocate and argued that the Advocate retirement plan is subject to ERISA, and therefore Advocate has breached its fiduciary duty by failing to adhere to ERISA\u2019s requirements. The defendants moved for summary judgment because the Advocate plan fell under the ERISA exemption for church plans. The district court denied the motion because it determined that a plan established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization was not a church plan within the meaning of the statutory language. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and this case was consolidated with two other ones presenting the same issue before the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1742", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3021", "ID": "62785", "name": "Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1189", "docket": "15-1189", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Impression Products, Inc.", "second_party": "Lexmark International, Inc.", "facts": "Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark\u2019s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a \u201cReturn Program,\u201d which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose \u00a0a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark\u2019s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States.
\nLexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark\u2019s patents because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Impression\u2019s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression\u2019s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder\u2019s rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark\u2019s sale did not \u201cconfer authority\u201d to Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark\u2019s foreign sales did not confer authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark\u2019s rights to its patent.
", "facts_len": "2059", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3022", "ID": "62784", "name": "Honeycutt v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-142", "docket": "16-142", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Terry Michael Honeycutt", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee who worked at Brainerd Army Store, which was owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. In 2008, when Terry noticed an increase in the number of \u201cedgy looking\u201d people purchasing Polar Pure, an iodine-based water purification product, he called the local police station to find out if there was anything he should know about it. The police confirmed Terry\u2019s suspicion that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine and that he shouldn\u2019t sell it if he felt uncomfortable. Brainerd Army Store was the only place that sold Polar Pure locally, and the product was kept behind the counter, so only the Honeycutt brothers sold it. Over the course of the next year, the Honeycutt brothers sold increasing amounts of Polar Pure. The Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating the brothers and the store, which culminated in a search warrant in 2010. The search warrant revealed that Polar Pure was the store\u2019s highest grossing item and that it generated $260,000 of profit. After the DEA agents seized the store\u2019s inventory of Polar Pure, the number of area meth labs using the iodine method dropped to \u201cinsignificant\u201d levels. A grand jury indicted both brothers. Tony pled guilty, and Terry went to trial, where he was convicted on 11 of the 14 counts with which he was charged. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 months for each count, but the jury did not order any forfeiture of the proceeds of the sales, because it found that, as a salaried employee, Terry did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy.
\nOn appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the doctrine of joint and several liability applied to co-conspirators for the purpose of forfeiture of the proceeds of drug sales. For the purposes of the forfeiture statute, a defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of drug sales obtained by others with whom the defendant participated in the crime. Therefore, in this case, the district court erred in not ordering forfeiture of the proceeds.
", "facts_len": "2148", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3023", "ID": "62788", "name": "TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-341", "docket": "16-341", "term": "2016", "first_party": "TC Heartland LLC", "second_party": "Kraft Food Brands Group LLC", "facts": "TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is a company organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is a company organized under Delaware law and with its principal place of business in Illinois. Heartland sold liquid water-enhancing products that it shipped to Delaware, pursuant to two of its contracts. Kraft sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware and argued that these products infringed on Kraft\u2019s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim and argued that the Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Heartland is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence in Delaware, and does not solicit business in Delaware. The district court held that, under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent, the subsection of the general venue statute that allows a defendant to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction applies to the patent venue statute. However, this precedent runs counter the the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., which held that the definition of corporate residence is limited to the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the subsection of the general venue statute does not expand jurisdiction under the patent venue statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision and held that Congress\u2019 amendments to the general venue statute post-dated and therefore superseded the Fourco precedent.
", "facts_len": "1561", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3024", "ID": "62786", "name": "Turner v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1503", "docket": "15-1503", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Charles S. Turner, et al.", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
\nNearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants.
", "facts_len": "2096", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3025", "ID": "62787", "name": "Lee v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-327", "docket": "16-327", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Jae Lee", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Jae Lee came to the United States from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived in the United States legally ever since, though he did not become a citizen. He eventually moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he got involved in the drug trade. In 2009, after a successful sting operation, Lee was arrested and charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. The government\u2019s case against Lee was very strong, and on the advice of his attorney, Lee pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee\u2019s attorney had assured him that the guilty plea would not have immigration consequences; however, Lee\u2019s guilty plea constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony, which is a deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Lee subsequently appealed his conviction and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which provides for a two-pronged test: whether the attorney\u2019s counsel was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Lee\u2019s conviction and determined that Lee could not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test because there was not sufficient evidence that the outcome of Lee\u2019s case would have been substantially different had he known about the risk of deportation.
", "facts_len": "1381", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3026", "ID": "62789", "name": "Howell v. Howell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1031", "docket": "15-1031", "term": "2016", "first_party": "John Howell", "second_party": "Sandra Howell", "facts": "John Howell, a veteran, and his ex-wife Sandra Howell divorced in 1991. The Arizona Superior Court granted Sandra half of John\u2019s Military Retirement Plan (MRP) funds when the payments were to begin. John retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began receiving his retirement funds soon after. In 2005, the Department of Veterans\u2019 Affairs determined that John suffered from degenerative joint disease in his shoulder, that the cause of the disease was directly related to his service, and that it caused him a net loss of 20% in his earnings. Because of this, he was entitled to tax-exempt military disability payments. To receive the disability payments, John had to waive an equal portion of his MRP benefits, which he did in July of 2004.
\nIn 2013, Sandra sued John and claimed that she was still entitled to a full 50% of the MRP benefits John received, regardless of his waiver of a portion of his benefits due to disability. Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in Sandra\u2019s favor. John appealed and cited the Arizona Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses\u2019 Protection Act (USFSPA) preempted state courts from allowing the former spouses of veterans to claim interest in the waived portion of the veteran\u2019s MRP. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court\u2019s decision and stated that, while the Mansell standard was applicable before divorce proceedings were finalized and during the proceedings, courts were split regarding the rules after a divorce had been granted. The Court found that, because the lower court did not grant Sandra an interest in the disability sum itself, but rather an interest in John\u2019s overall assets in an equal sum, then Sandra was free to require payment from John to make up for the losses she would suffer due to his waiver of a portion of the benefits shared between them.
", "facts_len": "1938", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3027", "ID": "62790", "name": "White v. Pauly", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-67", "docket": "16-67", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Ray White, et al", "second_party": "Daniel T. Pauly, as personal representative of the estate of Samuel Pauly, et al.", "facts": "Officer Kevin Truesdale responded to a report of a drunk driver and interviewed the two women who called 911. They gave him the license plate of the car that they observed driving recklessly, and the officer ran a search that showed the car was registered to the address of Daniel and Samuel Pauly. Officer White and Officer Mariscal joined Officer Truesdale, and they determined that there was probable cause to arrest the driver and wanted to speak with him. Officer White stayed behind, and the other two officers proceeded to the address. They found two residences at the addresses and approached the one with lights and in which they saw people moving. They yelled to the occupants to open the door or they were coming in. The Pauly brothers heard people yelling but claimed that the voices never identified themselves as police officers. The Pauly brothers yelled back that they had guns, and Daniel Pauly fired out the door. Officer White arrived on the scene as this was happening. He took cover, then fired at Samuel, who was leaning out the door and pointing his gun in Officer White\u2019s direction. Officer White\u2019s shot killed Samuel.
\nDaniel and Samuel\u2019s estate sued the officers and argued that the officers violated the brothers\u2019 Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. The officers moved for summary judgment and argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. The district court denied the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that reasonable officers should have known that their conduct would cause the Pauly brothers to defend their home in a manner that required the police to respond with deadly force. Especially in the case of Officer White, who arrived later to the scene, the court determined that a reasonable officer would have determined that a warning was required before firing. The appellate court also held that these rules were clearly established at the time of the incident.
", "facts_len": "2144", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3028", "ID": "62798", "name": "National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-299", "docket": "16-299", "term": "2017", "first_party": "National Association of Manufacturers", "second_party": "Department of Defense, et al.", "facts": "The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides for judicial review in instances where the Environmental Protection Agency\u2019s action results in the issuance or denial of any permit or places restrictions on waste emissions or other activities related to the waters.On August 28, 2015, a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined the scope of \u201cthe waters of the United States\u201d under the CWA came into effect. Numerous states and other organizations challenged the validity of the agencies\u2019 rule and contended both that it did not conform with the CWA and was improperly adopted in violation of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Following consolidation of the claims before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers intervened to join the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA does not provide the federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over the agencies\u2019 rule and that review is properly held in the district courts instead. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction because, although the rule only defined the scope of U.S. waters, by defining its boundaries, the rule functionally placed restrictions on activity related to the waters. Therefore, the rule affected permitting requirements and thus had the practical effect of granting or denying permits.
", "facts_len": "1421", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3029", "ID": "62797", "name": "Weaver v. Massachusetts", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-240", "docket": "16-240", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Kentel Myrone Weave", "second_party": "Commonwealth of Massachusetts", "facts": "On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver\u2019s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver\u2019s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.The trial court denied Weaver\u2019s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver\u2019s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel\u2019s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a \u201cstructural error,\u201d which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice.
", "facts_len": "1152", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3030", "ID": "62800", "name": "Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-605", "docket": "16-605", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Town of Chester, New York", "second_party": "Laroe Estates, Inc.", "facts": "Land developer Steve Sherman sued the Town of Chester (Chester) and alleged a regulatory taking of his property because Chester prevented him from developing his land by requiring unfair and repetitive procedures. While that case was pending, a real estate company, Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), sought to intervene in the case and claimed that it currently owned the property in question based on an initial 2003 agreement and a subsequent one in 2013. In 2013, TD Bank, which held a superior mortgage on the property, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Laroe and Sherman then entered into a new sales agreement that took the foreclosure proceedings into account, but TD Bank took possession of the property. The district court denied Laroe\u2019s motion to intervene because Laroe was not the owner of an interest in the property at the time of the alleged taking and therefore lacked independent standing in the takings claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Laroe was not required to show it independently had standing to intervene. The appellate court reasoned that the Second Circuit case United States Postal Service v. Brennan, which held that there is no need to impose a standing requirement on an intervenor if there is an established valid case or controversy, applied in this case.
", "facts_len": "1368", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3031", "ID": "62799", "name": "Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1039", "docket": "15-1039", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Sandoz Inc.", "second_party": "Amgen Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 established a process for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license \u201cbiosimilar\u201d products: products that are \u201chighly similar\u201d to already-approved biological products. Under the Act, biosimilar product applicants must provide notice to the seller of the original product at least 180 days prior to the first commercial marketing of the biosimilar product. The Act also requires the biosimilar seller to provide the original seller with the details of its application within 20 days of receiving notice of FDA review.
\nIn May 2014, Sandoz Inc. filed an application for FDA approval of its product Zarxio, which was highly similar to Amgen Inc.\u2019s product Neupogen (both products are bone marrow stimulants). On July 7, 2014, the FDA notified Sandoz that its application was under review, and the next day, Sandoz notified Amgen of the application. Later that month, Sandoz informed Amgen that it would not disclose the details of its application as required by the Act. On March 6, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz\u2019s application; Sandoz then notified Amgen of the FDA\u2019s approval.
\nIn October 2014, Amgen sued Sandoz and claimed that Sandoz violated the Act because it failed to disclose the details of its application and did not give proper notice of commercial marketing before the FDA\u2019s approval of its biosimilar product. The district court held that failure to disclose application details under the Act does not authorize the original seller to receive damages from the biosimilar product seller or prevent the sale of the biosimilar product. The court also held that an applicant may give notice of commercial marketing before FDA approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court\u2019s ruling and held that effective notice may only be given after the FDA has approved the application. Therefore, Sandoz\u2019s notice was effective in March 2015 rather than July 2014, and Sandoz could not sell its biosimilar product until 180 days after the March 2015 notice. The court also held that, because the Act only permits remedies based on patent infringement claims, Sandoz\u2019s failure to disclose the details of its application did not violate the Act. Both parties filed petitions for writs of certiorari which were granted and consolidated.
", "facts_len": "2354", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3032", "ID": "62801", "name": "Kokesh v. SEC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-529", "docket": "16-529", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Charles R. Kokesh", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Charles Kokesh for violating federal securities law by misappropriating funds from four business development companies. The district court found in favor of the SEC and ordered that Kokesh pay $34.9 million for \u201cthe ill-gotten gains causally connected\u201d to Kokesh\u2019s violations. On appeal, Kokesh argued that this \u201cdisgorgement\u201d order is barred by the five-year statute of limitations on this type of claim because the SEC brought its action more than five years after the claims accrued. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s ruling. The appellate court held that the five-year statute of limitations did not apply to this case because the ordered payment was remedial rather than punitive in nature. The goal of disgorgement is not to punish a wrongdoer for illegal activity, but rather to return to the rightful owner whatever profits the wrongdoer gained in the course of the illegal activity. Therefore, a disgorgement payment may be ordered so long as the amount \u201creasonably approximates the ill-gotten gains causally connected to the Defendant\u2019s violations.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1158", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3033", "ID": "62802", "name": "Maslenjak v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-309", "docket": "16-309", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Divna Maslenjak", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In April 1998, Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, met with a U.S. immigration official to seek refugee status for her and her family at the close of the Bosnian civil war. Through a translator, Maslenjak told the immigration official that the family feared persecution in their home region of Bosnia based on their Serbian ethnicity. Maslenjak also told the immigration official that the family feared reprisal because her husband had evaded conscription into the Bosnian Serb militia during the war. Maslenjak and her family were granted refugee status in 1999 and immigrated to the United States in September 2000. Maslenjak was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on August 3, 2007. During the naturalization process, Maslenjak denied ever having given false or misleading information to a U.S. official in order to gain entry to the United states or to avoid removal.
\nOn October 7, 2007 Maslenjak\u2019s husband, Ratko, was convicted on two counts of making false statements on a government document for his failure to disclose that he had in fact served as an officer in a Serbian military unit. To avoid deportation, Ratko applied for asylum. Testifying on his behalf at the asylum hearing, Maslenjak admitted that Ratko had served in the Serbian militia and that she had lied to the immigration officer during the refugee application interview in 1998. Maslenjak was subsequently charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for denying having ever given false or misleading information to a U.S. official. At trial, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Maslenjak guilty of fraudulently obtaining her naturalization, it need not find that her false statements were material to the decision to approve her naturalization, merely that she made them knowing their falsehood. Maslenjak was convicted on both counts, sentenced to two years probation, and stripped of her citizenship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction and held that proof of a material false statement was not a required element of naturalization fraud.
", "facts_len": "2108", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3034", "ID": "62803", "name": "Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-285", "docket": "16-285", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Epic Systems Corporation", "second_party": "Jacob Lewis", "facts": "Epic Systems Corporation (Epic) is a Wisconsin-based healthcare data management software company. Epic has an arbitration agreement that requires its employees to resolve any employment-based disputes with Epic through individual arbitration and to waive their right to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. In February 2015, former Epic employee Jacob Lewis sued Epic in federal court individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees and claimed that they had been denied overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Epic moved to dismiss the complaint and cited the waiver clause of its arbitration agreement. The district court denied Epic\u2019s motion and held that the waiver was unenforceable because it violated the right of employees to engage in \u201cconcerted activities\u201d under Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision and added that the waiver was also unenforceable under the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). That clause provides that arbitration agreements are to be enforced unless there legal or equitable grounds that would render a contract unenforceable. Finding the waiver of collective proceedings illegal under the NLRA, the appellate court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA. This case was consolidated with Ernst & Young v. Morris \u00a0and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., both cases that dealt with the relationship between the FAA and the NLRA.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1646", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3035", "ID": "62804", "name": "McWilliams v. Dunn", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-5294", "docket": "16-5294", "term": "2016", "first_party": "James E. McWilliams", "second_party": "Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, et al.", "facts": "On December 30, 1984, James McWilliams raped and robbed Patricia Reynolds, who died in surgery later that night. McWilliams was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder during robbery in the first degree and murder during rape in the first degree. At the sentencing phase, defense counsel requested that the court order neuropsychological testing for McWilliams. The court did so and ordered that the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) conduct the testing. The DOC doctor who conducted the testing recommended further testing from a doctor who was not affiliated with the DOC. The second doctor\u2019s report was made available to both parties but did not arrive at the court until the day before the sentencing hearing, and the court did not allow a continuance for defense counsel to review the report with the assistance of an expert. At the sentencing hearing, the court concluded that there were aggravating factors but no mitigating factors and sentenced McWilliams to death by electrocution. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Alabama state courts.
\n\u00a0
\nIn 2004, McWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition without addressing all of the specific claims, one of which included a claim that he was denied his due process rights under the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma because the court did not provide him with an independent psychiatric expert. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court\u2019s decision and remanded the case for the district court to address the specific claims in the petition. The district court again denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision by holding that McWilliams\u2019 due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a competent psychiatric expert, which met the requirement of Ake, and any harm that he might have suffered was not prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing hearing.
", "facts_len": "2067", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3036", "ID": "62805", "name": "BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-405", "docket": "16-405", "term": "2016", "first_party": "BNSF Railway Co.", "second_party": "Kelli Tyrrell, Special Administrator for the Estate of Brent T. Tyrrell, Deceased, et al.", "facts": "In March 2011, Robert Nelson was employed by BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) and sued the company for damages under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act (FELA) based on knee injuries sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion and Nelson appealed. Brent Tyrrell also worked for BNSF and was allegedly exposed to carcinogens that caused him to develop ultimately fatal kidney cancer. In May 2014, Kelli Tyrell, the administrator of Brent\u2019s estate, \u00a0sued BNSF on Brent\u2019s behalf under FELA for damages based on the injuries Brent sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF filed a motion to dismiss Tyrrell\u2019s claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court denied the motion, and BNSF appealed. Both cases were filed in Montana state court because Supreme Court precedent for FELA decisions allows state courts jurisdiction to hear FELA cases solely due to the railroad doing business in the forum state. However, the injuries did not occur in Montana, and BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas.
\n\u00a0
\n\u00a0
\nThe Supreme Court of Montana consolidated both cases to decide whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law. BNSF argued that, under the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the state courts cannot exercise general jurisdiction. However, the Montana Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that, because BNSF does business in Montana, under FELA, Montana courts have personal jurisdiction. Montana\u2019s Supreme Court also held that the state has general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law because BNSF \u201cmaintains substantial, continuous, and systematic\u201d contacts with Montana.
", "facts_len": "1932", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3037", "ID": "62806", "name": "Davila v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-6219", "docket": "16-6219", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Erick Daniel Davila", "second_party": "Lorie Davie, Director, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "In February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila was found guilty of capital murder for the killings of Annette Stevenson and her granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson. The jury sentenced Davila to death. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Davila pursued habeas relief in the state courts, which was denied at the trial and appellate levels. Davila then sought federal habeas relief and claimed, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state habeas counsel. Because Davila did not raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state habeas proceedings, the federal district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted and denied habeas relief. Davila appealed and argued that Supreme Court precedent that ineffective state habeas counsel can overcome the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial claim should also apply to the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s denial of relief.
", "facts_len": "1204", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3038", "ID": "62807", "name": "District of Columbia v. Wesby", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1485", "docket": "15-1485", "term": "2017", "first_party": "District of Columbia, et al.", "second_party": "Theodore Wesby, et al.", "facts": "On March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint for a house party. Upon arrival, the officers heard loud music coming from the house. The officers then entered the house and observed party guests, including Theodore Wesby, drinking and watching \u201cscantily clad women with money tucked into garter belts.\u201d The partygoers claimed that a woman called \u201cPeaches\u201d was the host of the party, and that she had received permission from the owner, from whom Peaches was leasing the house. One partygoer called Peaches on the phone for an officer, since Peaches was not present. Peaches confirmed that she had permission from the owner, but when an officer called the owner, the owner claimed that the lease had not been executed and that he had not given permission for the party. The officers subsequently arrested the partygoers.
\nSixteen of the arrested partygoers sued the officers and the District of Columbia for false arrest. The district court ruled in favor of the partygoers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed and held both that the officers did not have probable cause for entry and were not entitled to immunity from liability. Probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry under D.C. law exists where a reasonable officer concludes from information known at the time that the arrestee knew or should have known that they entered the house against the will of the owner. The court reasoned that, because the partygoers believed in good faith that the owner had given Peaches permission for the party, they could not have intended to enter unlawfully. The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to immunity because it was unreasonable for them to believe that they were not violating the partygoers\u2019 clearly established Fourth Amendment rights against false arrest.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1864", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3039", "ID": "62808", "name": "Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-399", "docket": "16-399", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Anthony W. Perry", "second_party": "Merit Systems Protection Board", "facts": "In the mid-2000s, Anthony Perry began to develop osteoporosis, so in order to alleviate his pain and to ensure that he could continue working, he made an informal agreement with his supervisor at the U.S. Census Bureau. The deal allowed Perry to take breaks throughout the day to control the symptoms of his osteoporosis, and to make up any time lost during the workday after hours with no penalty. On June 7, 2011, Perry received a proposed removal notice that alleged that he had been paid for hours that he had not worked. He contested the charges and pointed to the informal agreement he and his supervisor had made and his unblemished performance record. In August 2011, Perry and the agency entered into an agreement that required him to serve a thirty-day suspension, to retire on or before September 4, 2012, and to forfeit any discrimination claims against the agency. After serving his suspension and retiring, Perry brought a pro se claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the federal board that is authorized the hear certain challenges by federal employees to adverse employment actions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction because retirements are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board cannot review claims that resulted in settlement with the agency. Perry appealed to the Board, which remanded the case. Upon further review, the ALJ again denied that it had jurisdiction and held that Perry had not sufficiently shown that he was improperly coerced into settling his claims. Perry appealed to the Board again, which affirmed the ALJ\u2019s ruling. Perry appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on a lack of proper jurisdiction.The appellate court docketed the case but granted Perry\u2019s motion to suspend proceedings until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves the jurisdictional issue of which court system should hear the case.
", "facts_len": "2005", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3040", "ID": "62811", "name": "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-466", "docket": "16-466", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.", "second_party": "Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco", "facts": "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a global pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug intended to prevent blood clotting, and markets and sells the drug nationwide, including in California. In addition, BMS maintains five offices in California, four research facilities, and one government affairs office, as well as 250 sales representatives. In eight amended complaints filed with the San Francisco Superior Court, 86 California residents and 575 non-California residents joined in suing BMS and McKesson Corporation, a California-based Plavix distributor, on individual product defect claims. Each alleged serious side effects from their use of Plavix, that BMS had misrepresented the drug\u2019s safety and efficacy, and asserted numerous California product liability causes of action against BMS. BMS moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. BMS argued that these claims had no link to its California activities, as the nonresident plaintiffs were not injured by Plavix in California, had not been prescribed Plavix in California, and had not received Plavix distributed by McKesson from California. Additionally, BMS did not research or manufacture Plavix at its facilities in California. The trial court denied BMS\u2019s motion and held that the company was subject to the California court\u2019s general jurisdiction because it had \u201cwide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California.\u201d The California Court of Appeal rejected the trial court\u2019s assessment that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in California, but held that the nonresident plaintiffs\u2019 claims were sufficiently related to BMS\u2019s California activities to support specific jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court affirmed and held that BMS\u2019s nationwide marketing and distribution created a \u201csubstantial nexus\u201d between the nonresident plaintiffs\u2019 claims and BMS\u2019s activities in California because the claims were based on the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing that allegedly caused injury both in and outside of California.
", "facts_len": "2152", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3041", "ID": "62809", "name": "Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-349", "docket": "16-349", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Ricky Henson, et al.", "second_party": "Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The petitioners are a group of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA (Santander), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a \u201cdebt collector\u201d under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc.
", "facts_len": "1090", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3042", "ID": "62810", "name": "California Public Employees\u2019 Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-373", "docket": "16-373", "term": "2016", "first_party": "California Public Employees' Retirement System", "second_party": "ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees\u2019 Retirement System (CPERS), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund\u2019s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1417", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3043", "ID": "62818", "name": "Artis v. District of Columbia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-460", "docket": "16-460", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Stephanie C. Artis", "second_party": "District of Columbia", "facts": "In 2007, Stephanie Artis was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Health (DOH) as a code inspector. She alleges that she and her supervisor developed a contentious relationship and that he singled her out for unfair treatment in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, Artis took her first administrative step against DOH by filing a discrimination claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and while that claim was pending, DOH terminated Artis\u2019s employment in November 2010.
\nIn December 2011, Artis filed a lawsuit against the District in federal court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and invoked the district court\u2019s supplemental jurisdiction to assert claims based on the District\u2019s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and common law. The district court granted the District\u2019s motion on the pleadings and dismissed Artis\u2019s sole federal claim, violation of Title VII, as facially deficient. It thus found it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
\nFifty-nine days after her claims were dismissed in federal court, Artis filed the remaining claims in a D.C. trial court. The District alleged that Artis\u2019s claims were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitations, and the trial judge agreed, finding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3044", "ID": "62817", "name": "Class v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-424", "docket": "16-424", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Rodney Class", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "In May 2013, Rodney Class was arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of three firearms on United States Capitol Grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. \u00a75104(e). Class, representing himself, pleaded guilty in the district court. He appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on grounds of constitutional error and statutory error. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court and found Class guilty due to his guilty plea. The appellate court explained that the its precedent in United States v. Delgado-Garcia\u2014which held that, \u201c[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are knowing and intelligent...waive the pleading defendant[\u2018s] claims of error on appeal, even constitutional claims\u201d\u2014is binding on this case. Delgado articulates two exceptions to this rule in which a defendant may appeal: (1) \u201cthe defendant\u2019s claimed right to not be haled into court at all\u201d and (2) \u201cthat the court below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case\u2026\u201d However, the court held that neither exception applies here.
", "facts_len": "1071", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3045", "ID": "62821", "name": "Rippo v. Baker", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-6316", "docket": "16-6316", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Michael Damon Rippo", "second_party": "Renee Baker, Warden", "facts": "Michael Damon Rippo was charged with first-degree murder in Nevada state court. During his trial, Rippo obtained information that the judge was the subject of a federal bribery investigation and that the Clark County District Attorney\u2019s Office prosecuting his case was a participant in the judge\u2019s investigation. Rippo moved to disqualify the judge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and argued that a judge could not impartially preside over a case in which one of the parties was investigating him. The judge declined to recuse himself, Rippo was convicted. After the initial judge was indicted on federal charges, another judge denied Rippo\u2019s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Rippo\u2019s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and held that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation.
\nRippo later applied for state post-conviction relief. He reasserted his bias claim, this time with evidence of state authorities\u2019 involvement in the federal investigation of the trial judge. The state court denied post-conviction relief. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed and determined that Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations did not support an assertion that the trial judge was actually biased in his case.
", "facts_len": "1377", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3046", "ID": "62820", "name": "Wilson v. Sellers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-6855", "docket": "16-6855", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Marion Wilson", "second_party": "Eric Sellers, Warden", "facts": "A Georgia jury convicted Marion Wilson of malice murder and several other felonies. At sentencing, Wilson\u2019s attorney argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and presented evidence of his difficult childhood. The trial court sentenced Wilson to death, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wilson filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, in which he argued ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his trial. His argument rested on lay testimony that could have been used as evidence of his difficult childhood and expert testimony that could have explained his poor judgment skills. The superior court denied the petition in a written order. Wilson then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied in a one-sentence order.\u00a0
\nWilson then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied him relief on the grounds that the state trial court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on the issue of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision, reasoning that \u201cthe one-line decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . is the relevant state-court decision for our review because it is the final decision on the merits.\u201d In his petition for rehearing en banc, Wilson argued that the panel should have examined the last reasoned decision by a state court. Georgia originally argued a federal court should \u201clook through\u201d a summary order to see whether it was based on procedural grounds or merits, but then it changed its position and argued that the court should look to the reasoned opinion. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, appointed an amicus curiae to argue Georgia\u2019s original position on the matter. The Eleventh Circuit en banc ultimately concluded that federal courts do not need to \u201clook through\u201d a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of a lower court.
", "facts_len": "2203", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3047", "ID": "62819", "name": "Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-658", "docket": "16-658", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Charmaine Hamer", "second_party": "Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago", "facts": "Charmaine Hamer, a former intake specialist for the Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) and Fannie Mae\u2019s Mortgage Help Center, filed suit against her former employers, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae and NHS on September 14, 2015.
\nUnder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), Hamer had until October 14, 2015 to appeal the judgment. On October 8, 2015, her attorney filed a motion to extend the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015, which the district court granted. Hamer filed her appeal on December 11, 2015.
\nIn a brief requested by the appellate court, Fannie Mae and NHS argued that Hamer\u2019s appeal was untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(C) and thus that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. That rule states that \u201c[n]o extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.\u201d Hamer argued that the rule is at odds with 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), which provides that \u201cthe district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.\u201d The appellate court found Hamer\u2019s argument unpersuasive and dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1524", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3048", "ID": "62830", "name": "Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-499", "docket": "16-499", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Joseph Jesner, et al.", "second_party": "Arab Bank, PLC", "facts": "Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC (Arab Bank), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\u2019s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals\u2019 holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court \u00a0affirmed the lower court\u2019s dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1358", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3049", "ID": "62828", "name": "U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1509", "docket": "15-1509", "term": "2017", "first_party": "U.S. Bank National Association", "second_party": "Village at Lakeridge, LLC", "facts": "The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, (Lakeridge) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC (MBP), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge\u2019s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP\u2019s board. U.S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge\u2019s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin\u2019s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. U.S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non-statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court\u2019s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP\u2019s board to be considered an insider.
", "facts_len": "1558", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3050", "ID": "62831", "name": "Ayestas v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-6795", "docket": "16-6795", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Carlos Manuel Ayestas", "second_party": "Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Institutional Division)", "facts": "In July 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, a Honduran national, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Santiaga Paneque at her home in Houston, Texas. Ayestas appealed his conviction and filed for state habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; he argued that his trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of family members who could have presented mitigating evidence. The state habeas court found that Ayestas\u2019 trial attorney was not ineffective and denied his application for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings of the state habeas court and denied relief as well.
\nIn 2009, Ayestas, with a new attorney, filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered \u201cavailable and abundant\u201d mitigating factors. However, the district court found that his claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the state habeas proceeding and denied relief. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court subsequently decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may excuse a procedural default. The Supreme Court later extended the holding of Martinez to Texas\u2019 habeas scheme in Trevino v. Thaler. In light of these decisions, Ayestas asked for a rehearing. On rehearing in the district court, Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance that was \u201creasonably necessary\u201d to develop his broader ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3599(f). The district court denied the motion based on Fifth Circuit precedent that holds that investigative assistance is not \u201creasonably necessary\u201d unless the habeas petitioner can carry the ultimate burden of proof on the underlying claim at the time of the request for investigative assistance. The district court determined that Ayestas could not meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and therefore denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2236", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3051", "ID": "62839", "name": "Patchak v. Zinke", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-498", "docket": "16-498", "term": "2017", "first_party": "David Patchak", "second_party": "Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior", "facts": "The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe\u2019s use under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property.
\nDavid Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the U.S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property \u201cshall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1328", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3052", "ID": "62843", "name": "Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-784", "docket": "16-784", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Merit Management Group", "second_party": "FTI Consulting, Inc.", "facts": "Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
\n\u00a0
\nFTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30% shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $16.5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548(a)(1)(b), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers \"made by or to\" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language \u201cmade by or to\u201d includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and do not benefit from it.
\nThe Seventh Circuit held that section 546(e) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary.
", "facts_len": "1495", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3053", "ID": "62847", "name": "SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-969", "docket": "16-969", "term": "2017", "first_party": "SAS Institute Inc.", "second_party": "Joseph MatalAndrei Iancu, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al.", "facts": "SAS Institute Inc. appealed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in which that court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) did not err in issuing a final written decision in an inter partes review that was petitioned by SAS Institute. While the PTAB contended that it need only have addressed certain challenged claims, rather than every challenged claim, SAS alleged that the PTAB in fact misconstrued a claim term, as well as erred by not addressing all the claims SAS challenged in its original petition.\u2028
", "facts_len": "556", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3054", "ID": "62848", "name": "Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-980", "docket": "16-980", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Jon Husted", "second_party": "A. Philip Randolph Institute", "facts": "Ohio currently employs a process that clears the state\u2019s voter rolls of individuals who have died or relocated. Under this process, voters who have not voted for two years are sent notices to confirm their registration. If the state receives no response and these individuals do not vote over the next four years, they are ultimately removed from the rolls.
\nPlaintiffs are various civil rights groups that are challenging the process, claiming that it is not only inappropriate to remove individuals from the voter rolls as a consequence of failing to vote but also violates part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Act prohibits a program for voter-list maintenance for federal elections that involves \u201cthe removal of the name of any personal from the official list of voters . . . by reason of the person\u2019s failure to vote.\u201d Plaintiffs believe that the Supreme Court should involve itself and determine whether this process violates the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit previously struck down these rules, deeming them a violation of federal voting law because Ohio's process involves using an individual's failure to vote as a \"trigger\" for sending out a confirmation notice to that person. Plaintiffs consequently argue that there is no reason to disturb the appellate court decision. Defendants argue that Ohio is adhering to federal voter law, as set forth in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).
", "facts_len": "1511", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3055", "ID": "62851", "name": "North Carolina v. Covington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-1023", "docket": "16-1023", "term": "2016", "first_party": "North Carolina, et al.", "second_party": "Sandra Little Covington, et al.", "facts": "In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew state legislative districts in response to changes in population recorded in the 2010 Census. In May 2015, several North Carolina citizens sued North Carolina in federal district court and argued that 28 majority-black districts under the new districting plan were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs in August 2016 and held that race had been the predominant factor in redrawing the districts at issue. The court did not require changes to the districts in the short time before the November 2016 election but did order the General Assembly to redraw the map prior to holding any other elections. Three months later, the court put in place a remedial order that set a March 2017 deadline for the redrawing of the districts, required that any legislator elected in 2016 from a later-modified district serve only a one-year term, and ordered special elections take place in the fall of 2017. North Carolina appealed the remedial order to the U.S. Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1075", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3056", "ID": "62849", "name": "Carpenter v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402", "docket": "16-402", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Timothy Ivory Carpenter", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain \"transactional records\" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when \"specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.\" The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers\u2014\"cell site\" location information (CSLI).
\nBased on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1507", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3057", "ID": "62858", "name": "Virginia v. LeBlanc", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-1177", "docket": "16-1177", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Virginia, et al.", "second_party": "Dennis LeBlanc", "facts": "In 2003, Dennis LeBlanc was sentenced in Virginia state court to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for raping a woman when he was 16 years old. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. The Court noted that Graham did not require states to guarantee eventual freedom to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes, but they did have to allow for \u201csome meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.\u201d LeBlanc subsequently filed a motion in state trial court seeking to vacate his sentence under Graham. The trial court denied the motion based on a Virginia Supreme Court decision that held that the state\u2019s geriatric release program--that allows for conditional release for older inmates under some circumstances--satisfied the Graham requirements. Therefore, the state trial court held that LeBlanc\u2019s sentence did not violate the rule established in Graham.
\nIn 2012, LeBlanc filed a federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be dismissed, but the district court disagreed and granted the petition because it determined that the state court\u2019s decision was an unreasonable application of the law established in Graham. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3058", "ID": "62852", "name": "Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene\u2019s Energy Group, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-712", "docket": "16-712", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Oil States Energy Services LLC", "second_party": "Greene\u2019s Energy Group, LLC", "facts": "During hydraulic fracturing (known as \u201cfracking\u201d) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2,195,118 (the \u2019118 Application) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a \u201cmandrel\u201d into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism (described in Patent No. 6,179,053, or the \u2019053 Patent), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene\u2019s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the \u2019053 Patent to be distinct from the \u2019118 Application using the \u201cordinary meaning\u201d standard. Greene\u2019s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO\u2019s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent invalidated.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1672", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3059", "ID": "62862", "name": "Pavan v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-992", "docket": "16-992", "term": "2016", "first_party": "Marisa N. Pavan", "second_party": "Nathaniel Smith", "facts": "Leigh and Jana Jacobs, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan\u2014both same-sex couples\u2014were married in Iowa in 2010, and in New Hampshire in 2011, respectively. Leigh and Terrah each gave birth to a child in Arkansas in 2015, and each couple completed the requisite paperwork for birth certificates for the newborns listing both spouses as parents\u2014Leigh and Jana in one case, and Terrah and Marisa in the other. Citing a provision of Arkansas law, Ark. Code 20-18-401, the Arkansas Department of Health issue certificates bearing only the birth mother's name.
\nThe Jacobses and Pavans filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the director of the Arkansas Department of Health seeking a declaration that the State's birth-certificate law violates the constitution. The trial court agreed with the couples, holding that the state statute is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court.
", "facts_len": "970", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3060", "ID": "62859", "name": "Gill v. Whitford", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1161", "docket": "16-1161", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Beverly R. Gill", "second_party": "William Whitford", "facts": "In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in the state assembly and the senate, and a Republican governor. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario. The redistricting plan was introduced in July 2011, and both the senate and the assembly passed the bill shortly thereafter. The governor signed the bill into law in August 2011. Even before it was enacted, the plan faced two legal challenges, on constitutional and statutory grounds. A federal court upheld the plan as not violating the \u201cone person one vote\u201d principle nor violating the Equal Protection Clause.
\nPlaintiffs in this case challenge the plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. At issue is whether the plan systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "970", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3061", "ID": "62863", "name": "Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1439", "docket": "15-1439", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Cyan, Inc., et. al.", "second_party": "Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.", "facts": "Since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims.
\nBeaver County Employees' Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims.
", "facts_len": "910", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3062", "ID": "62869", "name": "Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-476", "docket": "16-476", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Philip D. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey, et al.", "second_party": "National Collegiate Athletic Association, et. al.", "facts": "In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling.
\nIn 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act (\"2012 Act\"), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events.
\nFive sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law (\"2014 Law\") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel.
", "facts_len": "1942", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3063", "ID": "62866", "name": "Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111", "docket": "16-111", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.; and Jack C. Phillips", "second_party": "Colorado Civil Rights Commission; Charlie Craig; and David Mullins", "facts": "In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.
\nCraig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), \u00a7\u00a7 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA.
\nThe Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling.
", "facts_len": "1239", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3064", "ID": "62875", "name": "Marinello v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1144", "docket": "16-1144", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Carlo J. Marinello, III", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.
\nOne of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who \"in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.\" Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase \"the due administration of this title\" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3065", "ID": "62872", "name": "Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-534", "docket": "16-534", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Jenny Rubin, et. al.", "second_party": "Islamic Republic of Iran", "facts": "In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA\") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment.
\nThe case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (\"TRIA\"). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while \u00a7 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property \"used for a commercial activity in the United States,\" that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that \u00a7 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in \u00a7 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that \u00a7 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either.
\nThe Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that \u00a7 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.
", "facts_len": "2416", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3066", "ID": "62877", "name": "Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1276", "docket": "16-1276", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Digital Realty Trust, Inc.", "second_party": "Paul Somers", "facts": "Paul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report his concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a \"whistleblower\" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under its provisions.
\nThe Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of \"whistleblower\" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying Chevron deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
", "facts_len": "1465", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3067", "ID": "62884", "name": "Murphy v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1067", "docket": "16-1067", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Charles Murphy", "second_party": "Robert Smith, et al.", "facts": "Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award.
\nThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state-law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1997e(d) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage.
", "facts_len": "1282", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "3068", "ID": "62887", "name": "Byrd v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1371", "docket": "16-1371", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Terrence Byrd", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Terrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant\u2019s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to confirm they did not seek Byrd\u2019s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd\u2019s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias.
\nThe officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd\u2019s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car.
\nAt trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers\u2019 developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all\u2014that is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers\u2019 search of the vehicle did not require his consent.
\nThere is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd\u2019s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court.
", "facts_len": "2575", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3069", "ID": "62888", "name": "City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1495", "docket": "16-1495", "term": "2017", "first_party": "City of Hays, Kansas", "second_party": "Matthew Jack Dwight Vogt", "facts": "Matthew Vogt was employed as a police officer with the City of Hays, Kansas, when he applied for a position with the City of Haysville police department. During Vogt\u2019s interview process with the City of Haysville, he disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained while working for the City of Hays.
\nThe City of Haysville made Vogt an offer of employment contingent on his reporting his acquisition of the knife to the City of Hays and returning it, which Vogt did. Upon this report, the City of Hays chief of police ordered Vogt to issue a statement regarding the knife, which Vogt submitted nominally, in addition to a letter of resignation due to his intent to accept the position with the Haysville Police Department.
\nThe Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt and required him to issue a more detailed statement regarding the knife. This subsequent statement led to additional evidence, and Hays Police Department submitted both to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, asking the Bureau to initiate a criminal investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdraw its offer of employment to Vogt.
\nVogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. Vogt brought a federal lawsuit alleging that the use of his compelled statements (1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
\nThe district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, and, reviewing the claims de novo, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s holding as to the first three claims but reversed as to the fourth one, finding that the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing.
", "facts_len": "2213", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3070", "ID": "62889", "name": "Collins v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1027", "docket": "16-1027", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Ray Austin Collins", "second_party": "Commonwealth of Virginia", "facts": "On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property.
\nAt trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not \u201cimmediately mobile\u201d and applies to vehicles parked on private property.
", "facts_len": "1628", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3071", "ID": "62892", "name": "Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1362", "docket": "16-1362", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Encino Motorcars, LLC", "second_party": "Hector Navarro, et al.", "facts": "Encino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as \u201cservice advisors.\u201d Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers\u2019 concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done.
\nNavarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme Court vacated the panel\u2019s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors.
", "facts_len": "1279", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3072", "ID": "62891", "name": "Dalmazzi v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-961", "docket": "16-961", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Nicole A. Dalmazzi", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a \"civil office,\u201d including positions that require \"an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Nicole Dalmazzi of wrongfully using ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance and sentenced her to dismissal and confinement for one month. The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Dalmazzi moved the CCA to vacate its judgment because of the participation of Judge Mitchell on the panel. Before the CCA ruled on her motion, Dalmazzi filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), so the CCA dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The CAAF rejected as moot Dalmazzi\u2019s challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits. Both of the other consolidated cases involve similar facts, where Judge Mitchell was on the CCA panel that affirmed the convictions of the petitioners.
", "facts_len": "1411", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3073", "ID": "62893", "name": "Hall v. Hall", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1150", "docket": "16-1150", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Elsa Hall, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ethlyn Louise Hall and as Successor Trustee of the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust", "second_party": "Samuel H. Hall, Jr., et al.", "facts": "Ethlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew\u00a0dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the \u201cEstate\u201d) and continued to press Ethlyn\u2019s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate\u2019s claims and Samuel\u2019s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate\u2019s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel\u2019s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the\u00a0jury\u2019s decision.\u00a0
\nThe Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed.
\nThe Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The Estate argues that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp. affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment.
", "facts_len": "1761", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3074", "ID": "62896", "name": "Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1466", "docket": "16-1466", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Mark Janus", "second_party": "American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al.", "facts": "In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union\u2019s collective bargaining agreement with the employer.
\nIllinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason.
", "facts_len": "1052", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3075", "ID": "62897", "name": "McCoy v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-8255", "docket": "16-8255", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Robert McCoy", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be\u00a0indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy\u2019s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy\u2019s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy\u2019s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty.
\nThe Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel\u2019s failure to follow McCoy\u2019s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a\u00a0conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1657", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3076", "ID": "62903", "name": "United States v. Microsoft Corporation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-2", "docket": "17-2", "term": "2017", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Microsoft Corporation", "facts": "Since 1997, Microsoft has operated a web-based email service available for public use without charge (most recently called Outlook.com). Much of the data associated with this service is saved on datacenters operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries, which are located throughout the world.
\nIn 2013, Microsoft was served with a search and seizure warrant for the data pertaining to a particular user. That user's data was stored solely in Microsoft's datacenter in Dublin, Ireland. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information requested in the warrant but moved the magistrate judge to quash the warrant with respect to the user data stored in Dublin. The magistrate judge denied Microsoft's motion to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) authorized the district court to issue a warrant for \"information that is stored on servers abroad.\" The magistrate judge held that the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place where the content was stored (Ireland) was the relevant place of seizure.
\nMicrosoft appealed the magistrate judge's decision, and the district court affirmed after reviewing de novo. The district court also held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the warrant. The Second Circuit held that the SCA does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against US-based service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively on foreign servers and thus reversed the district court's denial of the motion to quash, vacated the finding of contempt, and remanded the case to the district court.
", "facts_len": "1661", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3077", "ID": "62898", "name": "Rosales-Mireles v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-9493", "docket": "16-9493", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Florencio Rosales-Mireles", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326(a) and (b)(2). His total criminal-history score was calculated according to the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but when calculating the criminal-history score, the probation officer erroneously counted a 2009 Texas conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. His total criminal-history score, combined with other factors, led a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the sentence after it was imposed.
\nThe Fifth Circuit found that Rosales-Mireles met the three prongs necessary to meet the plain error standard. However, if all three prongs are met, the court has the discretion to remedy the plain error if the error \u201cseriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d The court declined to exercise its discretion in this case and therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence.
", "facts_len": "999", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3078", "ID": "62904", "name": "Dahda v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-43", "docket": "17-43", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Los Rovell Dahda, et al.", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Los and Roosevelt Dahda \u2013 twin brothers \u2013 were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced.
\nThe Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not \"directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two \u201ccore concerns\u201d of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968\u2014privacy and uniformity\u2014that were not implicated by the Dahdas\u2019 argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court\u2019s jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1228", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3079", "ID": "62905", "name": "Ohio v. American Express Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1454", "docket": "16-1454", "term": "2017", "first_party": "State of Ohio, et al.", "second_party": "American Express Company, et al.", "facts": "In the credit-card industry, there is what is called a \u201ctwo-sided market.\u201d Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card.
\nIn the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees.
\nIn the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex\u2019s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs).
\nIn 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex\u2019s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court\u2019s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs\u2019 net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted \u201crule of reason.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2141", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3080", "ID": "62911", "name": "Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/141-orig", "docket": "141-orig", "term": "2017", "first_party": "State of Texas", "second_party": "State of New Mexico and State of Colorado", "facts": "The Rio Grande originates in Colorado, flows south into New Mexico, and flows into Texas near El Paso. The Rio Grande Compact apportions the water of the Rio Grande Basin among the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Among other things, the Compact provides that Colorado must deliver a specific quantity of water to the New Mexico state line, and that New Mexico must then deliver a specific quantity of water to Elephant Butte Reservoir, a federal Bureau of Reclamation project that distributes water to New Mexico and Texas.
\nTexas alleges that New Mexico has depleted Texas's equitable apportionment of water under the Compact by allowing diversion of surface water and pumping of groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte. New Mexico contends that the Compact does not require it to deliver any specific amount of water to the Texas state line and thus that its actions do not violate the Compact.
", "facts_len": "965", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3081", "ID": "62909", "name": "Florida v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/142-orig", "docket": "142-orig", "term": "2017", "first_party": "State of Florida", "second_party": "State of Georgia", "facts": "The Chattahoochee River starts in north Georgia, flows southwest past Atlanta, and then flows south along Georgia's border, first with Alabama, then with Florida. In the southwest corner of Georgia, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River, to form the Apalachicola River, which flows south through northwest Florida and into the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. At issue is the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin), which the US Army Corps of Engineers reports drains a total of 19,800 square miles in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, which is distributed roughly into 74%, 15%, and 11%, respectively.
\nPursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps operates a system of dams in the ACF Basin based on a Master Manual governing all the dams and a reservoir regulation manual for each individual dam. The Master Manual was completed in 1958 and has not been comprehensively revised since then. There have been several lawsuits among the states seeking update and clarify the apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin. The present action was filed by Florida, which alleges that the ecosystem and economy of the Apalachicola region \"are suffering serious harm\" because of Georgia's consumption and storage of water from the Basin. Florida invokes the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to ask that the Court equitably apportion the waters of the ACF Basin. For equitable relief to be granted, Florida must first show standing\u2014that is, that it has suffered a wrong through the action of another state that can be corrected by the courts. Second, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence a \"threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude.\" Third, the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result. If a state meets this burden, the Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. After lengthy evidentiary hearings, the Special Master filed a report recommending that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that \"Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin.\"
", "facts_len": "2251", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3082", "ID": "62920", "name": "Kernan v. Cuero", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1468", "docket": "16-1468", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Scott Kernan", "second_party": "Michael Daniel Cuero", "facts": "In 2005, the State of California charged Michael Cuero with two felonies and a misdemeanor. Cuero initially pleaded \u201cnot guilty\u201d but subsequently changed to plead guilty to the two felony counts. Cuero admitted that he had previously served four separate prison terms, including a term for residential burglary, which counts toward California\u2019s \u201cthree strikes\u201d law. On his guilty-plea form, Cuero indicated that he understood that he \u201cmay receive this maximum punishment as as result of my plea: 14 years, 4 months in State Prison, $10,000 fine and 4 years parole.\u201d After a hearing, the state trial court accepted the plea and granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge. The court then scheduled a sentencing hearing.
\nBefore the sentencing hearing occurred, the prosecution determined that a second of Cuero\u2019s prior convictions qualified as a \u201cstrike\u201d and that the guilty-plea form erroneously listed only one strike. The fact that the present conviction would constitute his third \u201cstrike\u201d under the law, Cuero faced instead a minimum sentence of 25 years. The State asked the trial court for permission to amend the criminal complaint accordingly, and over Cuero\u2019s objection, the court granted the State\u2019s motion. However, the court permitted Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the change. Cuero withdrew his initial guilty plea and entered a new guilty plea to the amended complaint, which charged Cuero with one felony.
\nThe trial court sentenced Cuero to 25 years to life, his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied a state habeas petition.
\nCuero then filed a petition for federal habeas relief in the US District Court for the Southern District of California, which denied his petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state trial court had \u201cacted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law\u201d by refusing to enforce the original plea agreement.\u201d
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1993", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3083", "ID": "62919", "name": "Dunn v. Madison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-193", "docket": "17-193", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections", "second_party": "Vernon Madison", "facts": "Vernon Madison is a 66-year-old man on death row in Alabama for the murder of a police officer over thirty years ago. Madison has suffered strokes resulting in significant cognitive and physical impairments, and his lawyers argue that he is mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman. At a competency hearing held by an Alabama trial court, Madison's lawyers presented testimony from a doctor that Madison's strokes caused him not to remember committing the murder and that he does not understand why the state is seeking to execute him. The State presented a different doctor's expert testimony that Madison was able to accurately discuss his legal appeals and legal theories with his attorneys and thus that he has a rational understanding of his sentence.
\nThe trial court decided that Madison was competent to be executed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that facts in the record were insufficient to support the trial court's decision and that the trial court erroneously applied the test for competency established in Panetti.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1165", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3084", "ID": "62907", "name": "Currier v. Virginia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1348", "docket": "16-1348", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Michael N. Currier", "second_party": "Commonwealth of Virginia", "facts": "Michael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier of both charges.
\nWhen the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the remaining charge of felon in possession of a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court\u2019s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia.
", "facts_len": "924", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3085", "ID": "62921", "name": "National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140", "docket": "16-1140", "term": "2017", "first_party": "National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, et al.", "second_party": "Xavier Becerra, et al.", "facts": "The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively \u201cNIFLA\u201d) sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the \u201cAct\u201d). The law\u2019s stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act\u2019s requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.
\nThe U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims.
\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA\u2019s argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived.\u00a0
\nThe Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny.
\nFinally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court\u2019s grant of certiorari did not include this issue.
", "facts_len": "2393", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "3086", "ID": "62922", "name": "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-21", "docket": "17-21", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Fane Lozman", "second_party": "The City of Riviera Beach, Florida", "facts": "Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the \u201cCity\u201d), where he was a vocal critic of the City\u2019s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City\u2019s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman\u2019s claim.\u00a0
\nOn November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember\u2019s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman.\u00a0
\nLozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely.\u00a0
\nIn February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied.\u00a0
\nOn appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury\u2019s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law.\u00a0
\nThe Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman\u2019s challenge to the district court\u2019s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury\u2019s probable cause finding defeated Lozman\u2019s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman\u2019s challenge to the lower court\u2019s jury instructions regarding the City\u2019s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court\u2019s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.
", "facts_len": "3012", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3087", "ID": "62930", "name": "Sveen v. Melin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1432", "docket": "16-1432", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Ashley Sveen, et al.", "second_party": "Kaye Melin, et al.", "facts": "Mark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011.\u00a0
\nMinnesota had changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death.\u00a0
\nThe insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen\u2019s children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin\u2019s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
\nThe Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under its own precedent, the dispositive issue in this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that right in violation of the Contract Clause.
", "facts_len": "1383", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3088", "ID": "62923", "name": "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1435", "docket": "16-1435", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.", "second_party": "Joe Mansky, et al.", "facts": "Minnesota Statute \u00a7 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define \u201cpolitical\u201d, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request.
\nThis case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote.
\nMinnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights.
\nInitially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, et al., on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, et al., then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts\u2019 ruling was correct.\u00a0
\nEIW\u00a0indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit\u2019s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned.
", "facts_len": "3538", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3089", "ID": "62931", "name": "Hughes v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-155", "docket": "17-155", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Erik Lindsey Hughes", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been \u201csentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.\u201d The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor\u2019s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced \u201cbased on a sentencing range,\u201d but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s holding.
", "facts_len": "829", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3090", "ID": "62932", "name": "United States v. Sanchez-Gomez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-312", "docket": "17-312", "term": "2017", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Rene Sanchez-Gomez, et al.", "facts": "Rene Sanchez-Gomez and defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively \u201cDefendants\u201d) objected to a policy (the \u201cPolicy\u201d) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the \u201cDistrict\u201d) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the U.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District\u2019s judges.
\nThe magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants\u2019 objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy\u2019s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were consolidated before the 9th Circuit.
\nThe 9th Circuit, sitting en banc, construed the Defendants\u2019 appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy\u2019s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants\u2019 claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus.
", "facts_len": "1623", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3091", "ID": "62933", "name": "Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-387", "docket": "17-387", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Upper Skagit Indian Tribe", "second_party": "Sharline Lundgren, et vir", "facts": "Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the \u201cTribe\u201d) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe\u2019s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013.
\nThe Lundgrens\u2019 property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens\u2019 property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land.\u00a0
\nIn 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe\u2019s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens\u2019 motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence.
\nThe Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe\u2019s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe\u2019s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe\u2019s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "2031", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3092", "ID": "62934", "name": "China Agritech v. Resh", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-432", "docket": "17-432", "term": "2017", "first_party": "China Agritech, Inc.", "second_party": "Michael H. Resh, et al.", "facts": "China Agritech is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business in Beijing. The company represented that it manufactured and sold organic compound fertilizers and other agricultural products to farmers in over two dozen provinces throughout China. It listed its shares on NASDAQ in 2005, and in 2009 reported to the SEC a net revenue of triple the amount it had reported four years earlier. In 2011, company shareholders alleged fraudulent business practices by China Agritech. The company denied the allegations and announced that it would conduct an internal investigation, and subsequently dismissed its independent auditor. Later that year, NASDAQ halted trading in and initiated delisting proceedings against China Agritech\u2019s stock, and in 2012 the SEC revoked the stock\u2019s registration.
\nShareholders sued China Agritech in two successive putative class actions in 2011 and 2012, alleging various securities law violations against the company and several individual defendants. Class certification was denied in both cases.
\nShareholder Michael Resh brought a third putative class action against the company and individual defendants in 2014, alleging securities law violations arising from the same facts and circumstances as the first two cases. China Agritech moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it had been filed after the two year limitations period applicable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Resh and the additional plaintiffs argued that under the American Pipe & Construction v. Utah line of cases, the limitations period had been tolled on their claims during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The district court rejected this contention, finding that under American Pipe and its progeny, the limitations period was tolled as to individual class members, but that the Supreme Court had not decided whether an entirely new class action based on a substantially identical class was subject to the same rule. It ruled that the limitations period was therefore tolled as to the individual claims of the named plaintiffs in the instant case, but not as to the putative class.
\nThe Ninth Circuit reversed, with a three-judge panel finding that the plaintiffs\u2019 class action would not be time-barred where: (1) the named plaintiffs had been unnamed in the two prior suits, which were against many of the same defendants and involved the same underlying events; (2) the two prior cases were timely; (3) class certification was denied in the earlier actions; and (4) pursuant to the American Pipe line of cases, the named plaintiffs\u2019 individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The panel explained that permitting such claims to go forward was consistent with the policy goals of tolling in general. The panel further stated that in light of FRCP 23\u2019s requirements, as well as principles of comity and preclusion, the existing legal system contains sufficient safeguards to prevent litigants from filing repetitious actions in light of this ruling.
", "facts_len": "3115", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3093", "ID": "62935", "name": "Koons v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-5716", "docket": "17-5716", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant\u2019s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant\u2019s sentence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(e) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government\u2019s motion and reduced the defendant\u2019s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of \u201ca defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.\u201d
\nThe Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary \u00a7 3582(c)(2) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be based on a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court.
", "facts_len": "1533", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3094", "ID": "62937", "name": "Tharpe v. Sellers", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-6075", "docket": "17-6075", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Keith Tharpe", "second_party": "Eric Sellers, Warden", "facts": "Keith Tharpe was convicted in Georgia state court of the September 25, 1990 murder of his sister-in-law, Jacqueline Freeman. A jury sentenced him to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, an affidavit came to light in which a white juror from Tharpe\u2019s trial, Barney Gattie, made several highly discriminatory statements regarding African Americans. Tharpe, who is black, sought habeas relief from the Butts County Superior Court, claiming that improper racial animus had influenced the jury\u2019s deliberations. His petition was denied on the basis that he had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the racial bias issue in earlier proceedings, and because he did not adequately support his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel was to blame for the omission. Juror testimony was also deemed inadmissible to prove Tharpe\u2019s racial animus claim. He then applied for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the Georgia Supreme Court, and his application was denied.\u00a0
\nTharpe next petitioned the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254, alleging that racial bias among the jury had rendered his conviction and sentence unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The district court found this claim to be procedurally defaulted, but granted him a certificate of appeal (COA) on an ineffective assistance claim. The 11th Circuit then affirmed the district court\u2019s judgment.
\nFollowing the US Supreme Court\u2019s 2017 decisions in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and Buck v. Davis, Tharpe petitioned the district court under FRCP 60(b)(6) to reopen his \u00a7 2254 case. He argued that Pena-Rodriguez should apply retroactively, allowing him to present the juror testimony that had previously been deemed inadmissible, and ultimately overcome procedural default to prevail on his claim that improper racial animus had led to his conviction and sentence. The district court denied Tharpe\u2019s motion, concluding, inter alia, that his claim was procedurally defaulted, and that he had failed to produce any clear evidence that Gattie\u2019s statements had influenced the jury\u2019s conclusions. The 11th Circuit affirmed, declining to issue a COA and stating that Tharpe had failed to show that the district court\u2019s correctness was debatable with regard to its procedural ruling.
", "facts_len": "2437", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3095", "ID": "62936", "name": "Benisek v. Lamone", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-333", "docket": "17-333", "term": "2017", "first_party": "O. John Benisek, et al.", "second_party": "Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.", "facts": "In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state entails two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the Governor\u2019s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland\u2019s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC-developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the ones developed by NCEC; rather, former Governor Martin O\u2019Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the \u201cCook Partisan Voting Index\u201d rated the Sixth District as a \u201clikely\u201d Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a \u201csafe\u201d Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20.9% margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates.
\nThe plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1726", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3096", "ID": "62941", "name": "Abbott v. Perez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-586", "docket": "17-586", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Greg Abbott, et al.", "second_party": "Shannon Perez, et al.", "facts": "Individual voters in Texas, along with organizations representing Latinos and African Americans, filed a number of lawsuits in 2011, challenging the Texas legislature\u2019s congressional and state house redistricting plans. The actions were consolidated and proceed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (\u201cTexas District Court\u201d). The plaintiffs alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of \u00a7 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) as well as the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution. At that time Texas was bound by the preclearance requirements under \u00a7 5 of the VRA, and therefore the State simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (\u201cD.C. District Court\u201d) seeking preclearance of the redistricting plans.\u00a0
\nWhile trial proceedings were pending in both district courts, the 2012 primary elections were approaching. As a result, the Texas District Court assumed the task of implementing interim redistricting plans, which it did on an expedited basis, without access to all relevant facts, and with the understanding that most parties to the litigation alleged that those plans contained many of the same statutory and constitutional infirmities as the challenged plans. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the first iteration of the interim maps on the grounds that the court had not been sufficiently deferential to the legislature; the Texas District Court issued more deferential plans in February 2012.\u00a0
\nThe D.C. District Court subsequently denied preclearance to the proposed redistricting plans on the basis that they were enacted with discriminatory intent and had the effect of abridging minority voting rights. Texas appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.
\nAfter the Texas District Court\u2019s interim maps were used for the 2012 elections, the Texas legislature failed to take any action on redistricting in the 2013 regular session. However, it convened a special session during which it adopted, among others, the Texas District Court\u2019s congressional interim map (\u201cPlan C235\u201d) without any changes. The governor subsequently signed the legislation adopting this plan.
\nIn June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder, which removed the \u00a7 5 preclearance requirements from the VRA. Texas was therefore no longer automatically subject to preclearance requirements, and the U.S. Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for further proceedings the D.C. District Court\u2019s preclearance decision, which the lower court then dismissed as moot.
\nThe defendants subsequently sought to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 claims in the Texas District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the case had become moot. In response, the plaintiffs expressed their desire to amend their complaints regarding the 2011 plans and to challenge the 2013 plans. The court granted them leave to amend, and denied the State\u2019s motions to dismiss. The court explained that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims regarding the 2011 plans were not moot because, inter alia, the plaintiffs continued to be harmed by them. The court also ordered that the 2013 plans, which included Plan C235, be used for the 2014 elections. The plaintiffs then filed their amended complaints, including claims related to both the 2011 and 2013 plans. Most plaintiffs included claims that Plan C235 violated \u00a7 2 of the VRA and the 14th and 15th Amendments.
\nThe Texas District Court held trials on the 2011 plans in 2014, and found that they violated certain aspects of \u00a7 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. In the ongoing litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the 2013 plans, including Plan C235, included some of the same elements that the court determined were the result of discriminatory intent or statutory or constitutional violations as in the 2011 plans.
\nIn August 2017, the Texas District Court issued an interlocutory order regarding the plaintiffs\u2019 C235 claims. It found that the racially discriminatory intent and effects identified in the 2011 plans carried through to the 2013 plans where the redistricting lines remained the same. It explained that the legislature had adopted the court\u2019s interim plans (which included C235) as part of a litigation strategy that was designed to insulate the plans from any further challenge. The legislature had not engaged in any deliberative process to remove the discriminatory elements from the plans before adopting them, but instead intentionally furthered and continued the discrimination in the existing plans.
\nThe court also concluded that the configurations of CD 27 and CD 35 under Plan C235 violated \u00a7 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. As to CD 27, though the court had found in 2012 that this district did not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose because it was not possible to create an additional Latino opportunity district in the region, the Texas legislature had still engaged in vote dilution. Regarding CD 35, the court stated that while C235 was enacted in 2013, the challenged district boundaries that it reflected were drawn in 2011 and found to violate \u00a7 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. The court explained that the Texas legislature did not engage in any meaningful effort to cleanse the discriminatory elements from the 2013 plan before it was adopted, and in fact intended to maintain that discrimination in enacting the plan in substantially the same form.\u00a0
\nThe court additionally found that the plaintiffs had proven a \u00a7 2 \u201cresults\u201d violation as to CD 27, HD 32, and HD 34, and a racial gerrymandering claim as to HD 90.
\nThe court\u2019s order directed the Texas Attorney General to issue a written advisory within three days as to whether the legislature would convene a special session to address the issue of redistricting. If the legislature did not plan to hold a special session, the parties were ordered to appear before the court to prepare remedial redistricting plans.\u00a0
\nIn January 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the defendants\u2019 appeal on the merits, at which time the Court would also consider the question of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "6201", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3097", "ID": "62942", "name": "WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1011", "docket": "16-1011", "term": "2017", "first_party": "WesternGeco LLC", "second_party": "ION Geophysical Corporation", "facts": "The US Supreme Court issued a 2016 order granting certiorari in this patent infringement case, vacating a 2015 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanding the matter for further consideration in light of , 579 U.S. __ (2016). On remand, the appellate court vacated the district court\u2019s judgment for enhanced damages for willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 284, but reinstated its 2015 opinion in all other respects.\u00a0
\nThe underlying dispute in the case related to patent-practicing devices sold by ION Geophysical Corporation (\u201cION\u201d) which were combined and used in non-infringing streamer systems at sea, but that would infringe on patents belonging to WesternGeco LLC (\u201cWesternGeco\u201d) if used in that manner in the US. The jury found infringement by ION, found no invalidity as to any asserted claims, and awarded WesternGeco, among other amounts, $93.4 million in lost profits.\u00a0
\nIn a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit, ION asked, among other things, that the lost profits award be reversed. In its 2015 opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed that award on the grounds that under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(f), WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits arising from foreign uses of its patented invention. As stated above, the court then reinstated this portion of that opinion in 2016.
", "facts_len": "1348", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3098", "ID": "62945", "name": "Lagos v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1519", "docket": "16-1519", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Sergio Fernando Lagos", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Sergio Fernando Lagos pled guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and multiple counts of wire fraud. He admitted that for a period of two years, he and his co-conspirators misled General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) regarding the value of their assets in order to increase their revolving loan amount and secure under-collateralized funds.
\nFollowing his guilty plea, Lagos appealed the district court\u2019s order of restitution to the 5th Circuit. He argued that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) did not allow restitution for the legal, expert, or consulting fees incurred by GECC in the course of investigating Lagos\u2019 suspected fraud and the bankruptcy proceedings that followed.
\nThe 5th Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s order\u00a0 in light of its own precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3663A(b)(4) under the MVRA to permit restitution for investigative and legal costs, even under circumstances where these costs were incurred outside of the government\u2019s investigation. The appeals court noted that the D.C. Circuit has adopted a narrower reading of the statute in question, though multiple other circuits have not.
", "facts_len": "1185", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3099", "ID": "62943", "name": "Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1215", "docket": "16-1215", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP", "second_party": "R. Scott Appling", "facts": "R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (\u201cLamar\u201d) to represent him in legal proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(2)(A) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling\u2019s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed.
\nThe 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling\u2019s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements \u201crespecting [his] . . . financial condition\u201d under \u00a7 523(a)(2)(B), the debt could be discharged.
", "facts_len": "1325", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3100", "ID": "62947", "name": "Washington v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-269", "docket": "17-269", "term": "2017", "first_party": "State of Washington", "second_party": "United States of America, et al.", "facts": "In 1854 and 1855, the federal Indian tribes in what is currently the state of Washington entered into a series of treaties, collectively known as the \u201cStevens Treaties,\u201d which provided that the Tribes would relinquish significant portions of their land to make up the state of Washington, and in exchange, they would be guaranteed the right to off-reservation fishing. This so-called \u201cfishing clause\u201d guaranteed the Tribes \u201cthe right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all citizens of the Territory.\u201d
\nSince those treaties, there have been recurring and ongoing disputes between the Tribes and (originally) the white settlers there and (today) the state government itself. The present case arises from the Tribes\u2019 contention that the government was building and maintaining culverts (channels carrying water under roads or sidewalks) that diminished the size of salmon runs in traditional fishing areas for the Tribes. The 20+ Tribes represented in the suit allege that this diminishment amounts to violation of the fishing clause of the treaties.
\nWashington contends that it constructed the culverts in a particular way according to federal law and that the federal requirement caused it to violate the treaties.
\nThe district court found for the Tribes and issued an injunction ordering Washington to correct its offending culverts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1440", "majority_vote": "4", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3101", "ID": "62946", "name": "Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-130", "docket": "17-130", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Raymond J. Lucia, et al.", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "The Securities and Exchange Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d) commenced an administrative enforcement action against Raymond J. Lucia and Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (collectively \u201cPetitioners\u201d) for alleged anti-fraud violations of the Investment Advisers Act arising from the way they presented their retirement wealth management strategy to prospective clients. An administrative law judge (\u201cALJ\u201d) found liability and imposed sanctions including a lifetime industry bar against Petitioners. The Commission granted the parties\u2019 petitions for review, and found that Petitioners had committed anti-fraud violations and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ. The Commission also rejected the argument that the administrative proceedings had been unconstitutional because the ALJ who handed down the initial decision was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.\u00a0
\nPetitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to vacate the Commission\u2019s decision and order under review on the grounds that the ALJ who made the administrative ruling was a constitutional Officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause. The appeals court rejected this argument, explaining that Commission ALJs were not constitutional Officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, primarily because of their lack of authority to issue final decisions on behalf of the Commission pursuant to the agency\u2019s regulatory scheme.
", "facts_len": "1530", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "3102", "ID": "62948", "name": "Pereira v. Sessions", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-459", "docket": "17-459", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Wescley Fonseca Pereira", "second_party": "Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General", "facts": "Wescley Fonseca Pereira entered the United States in June 2000 as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to stay until December 21, 2000. Pereira overstayed his visa, and in May 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personally served him with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The notice did not specify the date and time of his initial removal hearing, but instead ordered him to appear before an immigration judge \u201con a date to be set at a time to be set.\u201d When the immigration court set a date and time, it mailed Pereira a notice with such information. However, the notice was sent to Pereira\u2019s street address on Martha\u2019s Vineyard rather than his post office box, so Pereira never received it. When Pereira did not appear for his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia.
\nPereira was not removed and instead remained in the country. In March 2013, he was arrested for a motor vehicle violation and detained by DHS. Through his attorney, Pereira filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, claiming he had never received the hearing notice with the time and place. Although Pereira conceded that he could be removed, he sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b(b)(1), a provision that gives the attorney general discretion to cancel the removal of a non-permanent resident alien if the alien meets certain criteria, including ten years of continuous physical presence in the United States. This continuous period ends \u201cwhen the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a)\u201d of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Pereira contends that because he did not receive notice of the time and place of his removal hearing, his presence in the country was continuous and over ten years under the statute.
\nThe Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a notice to appear that does not contain the date and time of the hearing is nonetheless effective to end the period of continuous physical presence. However, Pereira challenges this reading of the statute. The First Circuit determined that the relevant provisions of the INA are ambiguous as to whether notice must include the date and time of the hearing to be effective, but the court found that the BIA\u2019s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and thus subject to Chevron deference.
", "facts_len": "2378", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3103", "ID": "62950", "name": "Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-530", "docket": "17-530", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Wisconsin Central Ltd., et al.", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Several subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company (\u201cthe railway\u201d) began in 1996 paying its employees in stock options as part of their compensation. Under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 3231(e)(1), any form of \u201cmoney remuneration\u201d paid to railway employees is subject to an excise tax \u201cequal to a specified percentage of its employees\u2019 wages\u2026.\u201d (Railroad retirement tax rates are much higher than social security tax rates.)
\nWhen employees exercise their stock options when the market price exceeds the price at which the employee has a right to buy the stock, the employee can benefit from a windfall. The Internal Revenue Service argues that this windfall is taxable, just as employees\u2019 wages are taxable.\u00a0
\nThe district court found for the government, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court reasoned that while the government\u2019s argument that \u201canything that has a market value is a form of money remuneration\u201d was too broad, it was still correct in its assertion that stock is equivalent to cash. Moreover, as a policy concern, the government\u2019s position avoids creating a tax incentive that could distort the ways in which employers structure compensation packages.
", "facts_len": "1225", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "3104", "ID": "62949", "name": "South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-494", "docket": "17-494", "term": "2017", "first_party": "South Dakota", "second_party": "Wayfair, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The so-called Dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution prohibits states from imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval. Consistent with this doctrine, the US Supreme Court held, in 1967, that a state cannot require an out-of-state seller with no physical presence within that state to collect and remit taxes for goods sold or shipped into the state. The Court affirmed this holding in 1992. In 2015, the Court heard another case with similar facts and while it declined to change its jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence questioning whether the Court should continue following the earlier cases in light of additional dormant Commerce Clause cases as well as the significant technological and social changes that affect interstate commerce.
\nIn an apparent appeal to the doubt expressed by Justice Kennedy in that concurring opinion, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law requiring sellers of \u201ctangible personal property\u201d in that state who do not have a physical presence in the state to remit sales tax according to the same procedures as sellers who do have a physical presence. The act limited the obligation to sellers with gross revenue from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000, or 200 or more separate transactions, within one year. The legislature passed the law in defiance of Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing its inability to maintain state revenue in the face of increasing internet sales and their effect on sales tax collections.
\nThe State commenced a declaratory judgment action in state court seeking a declaration that certain internet sellers subject to the law must comply with it. The sellers moved for summary judgment based on the binding Supreme Court cases. The court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed to the state supreme court, and likewise bound by Supreme Court precedent, that court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1991", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3105", "ID": "62951", "name": "Chavez-Meza v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-5639", "docket": "17-5639", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Adaucto Chavez-Mesa", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135\u2013168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had \u201ctak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG \u00a7 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a).\u201d Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the \u00a7 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
\nThere is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the \u00a7 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient.
", "facts_len": "1452", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3106", "ID": "62956", "name": "Montana v. Wyoming", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/137-orig", "docket": "137-orig", "term": "2017", "first_party": "State of Montana", "second_party": "State of Wyoming and State of North Dakota", "facts": "The Yellowstone River Compact is an interstate compact to which Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming are parties. The Compact was ratified in 1950, and went into effect in 1951, in order to provide for an equitable division and apportionment of the waters of the Yellowstone River and its tributaries and encourage mutually beneficial development and cooperation between the three states. Among other things, the Compact serves to protect the appropriative rights that existed before 1950 among the three states.
\nIn 2004, Wyoming reduced the volume of water available at the state line between Wyoming and Montana by 1300 acre feet, and by 56 acre feet in 2006. Montana invoked the Supreme Court\u2019s original jurisdiction over disputes among states.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "769", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3107", "ID": "62957", "name": "CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-515", "docket": "17-515", "term": "2017", "first_party": "CNH Industrial N.V., et al.", "second_party": "Jack Reese, et al.", "facts": "In 1998, CNH agreed to a collective-bargaining agreement, which provided health care benefits under a group benefit plan to certain employees retiring under the pension plan. Other benefits, including life insurance, ceased upon retirement. The agreement also contained a clause stating that it would terminate in May 2004. When it did expire in 2004, a class of CNH retirees and surviving spouses filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that their health care benefits vested for life and asking the district court to enjoin CNH from changing them. While that lawsuit was pending, the US Supreme Court issued a decision in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, holding that collective-bargaining agreements must be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. The Court\u2019s holding in Tackett specifically targeted the Sixth Circuit, in which there was precedent for courts to presume that collective-bargaining agreements vested retiree benefits for life.
\nBecause of the intervening ruling by the US Supreme Court in Tackett, the district court initially awarded summary judgment in favor of CNH, but then it awarded summary judgment to the retirees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the court\u2019s award of summary judgment to the retirees, using the same precedents the Court proscribed in Tackett to find the collective-bargaining agreement ambiguous as a matter of law and thus susceptible to interpretation based on extrinsic evidence about lifetime vesting.
", "facts_len": "1583", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Private Action"}, {"": "3108", "ID": "62963", "name": "Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-647", "docket": "17-647", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Rose Mary Knick", "second_party": "Township of Scott, Pennsylvania", "facts": "In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that \u201call cemeteries within the Township \u2026 be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours\u201d and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the \u201cpublic-access provision\u201d). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision.
\nRose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge.
\nKnick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an \u201cinverse-condemnation proceeding\u201d against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government.
\nThe district court dismissed all but two of Knick\u2019s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court\u2019s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.
", "facts_len": "2352", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3109", "ID": "62954", "name": "Trump v. Hawaii", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-965", "docket": "17-965", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.", "second_party": "Hawaii, et al.", "facts": "On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump signed Executive Order No. 13,769 (EO-1), which, among other things, suspended entry for 90 days of foreign nationals from seven countries identified by Congress or the Executive as presenting heightened terrorism-related risks. EO-1 was immediately challenged in federal district court, and the judge entered a nationwide temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of several of its provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency motion to stay the order pending appeal. Rather than continuing to litigate the matter, the government announced that it would revoke that order and issue a new one.
\nOn March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,780 (EO-2). Section 2(c) of EO-2 directed that entry of nationals from six of the seven countries designated in EO-1 be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of the order, citing a need for time to establish adequate standards to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists. Section 6(a) directed that applications for refugee status and travel of refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) be suspended for 120 days from the effective date \"to review the adequacy of USRAP application and adjudication procedures.\" Section 6(b) suspended the entry of any individual under USRAP once 50,000 refugees have entered the United States in fiscal year 2017. The effective date of the order was March 16, 2017. EO-2 was subject to swift litigation as well.
\nOn June 14, just before Section 2(c) of EO-2 was by its terms set to expire, President Trump issued a memorandum to Executive Branch officials declaring the effective date of each enjoined provision of EO\u20132 to be the date on which the injunctions in these cases \u201care lifted or stayed with respect to that provision.\" The government sought review in both cases, making arguments both on the merits of the cases and on procedural issues.
\nIn a per curiam opinion issued simultaneously with an order granting certiorari, the Court granted the government's applications for a stay of the preliminary injunction with respect to Sections 6(a) and (b) of Executive Order 13,780 (EO-2), thereby allowing enforcement of those provisions. Under the Court's ruling, the government may enforce Section 6(a) except as to any \"individual seeking admission as a refugee who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,\" nor may such an individual be excluded under Section 6(b).
\nOn September 24, 2017\u2014the same day EO-2 was expiring\u2014President Donald Trump issued a Proclamation restricting travel to the United States by citizens from eight countries. That Proclamation too was challenged in federal court as attempting to exercise power that neither Congress nor the Constitution vested in the president. The Ninth Circuit struck down the Proclamation, and the Supreme Court granted review.
", "facts_len": "3000", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3110", "ID": "62955", "name": "Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-71", "docket": "17-71", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Weyerhaeuser Company", "second_party": "United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.", "facts": "In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (\u201cUnit 1\u201d) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the \u201cLandowners\u201d), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1\u2019s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.\u00a0
\nA divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling, upholding Unit 1\u2019s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners\u2019 argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered \u201cessential\u201d under 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency\u2019s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be \u201ccurrently\u201d habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat.
\nThe 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1856", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3111", "ID": "62964", "name": "Gundy v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086", "docket": "17-6086", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Herman Avery Gundy", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law.
\nIn January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release.\u00a0
\nThe 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16913 to impose the law\u2019s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted.
", "facts_len": "1242", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "3112", "ID": "62970", "name": "Stokeling v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-5554", "docket": "17-5554", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Denard Stokeling", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was \u201covercoming victim resistance.\u201d Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as \u201cviolent felonies\u201d in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling\u2019s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal.
", "facts_len": "846", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3113", "ID": "62971", "name": "Kisela v. Hughes", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-467", "docket": "17-467", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Andrew Kisela", "second_party": "Amy Hughes", "facts": "Tucson police officer Andrew Kisela and two other officers responded to a\u00a0police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic\u00a0behavior with a knife. When they arrived, they saw Amy Hughes\u00a0holding a large kitchen knife in what appeared to be a confrontation with another woman later identified as Sharon Chadwick. Despite at least two commands to drop the knife, Hughes did not do so and instead took several steps toward Chadwick. Kisela fired four shots through the chain link fence, seriously injuring Hughes.
\nHughes sued Kisela under 42 U.S.C.\u00a0\u00a71983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in\u00a0violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court\u00a0granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of\u00a0Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the record, viewed\u00a0in the light most favorable to Hughes (as is required in a motion for summary judgment), was sufficient to\u00a0demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment.\u00a0Further, the Ninth Circuit next held that Kisela was not entitled to qualified immunity because, in its view, his actions violated clearly established law in that jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1140", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3114", "ID": "62965", "name": "Nielsen v. Preap", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1363", "docket": "16-1363", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.", "second_party": "Mony Preap, et al.", "facts": "Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs\u2019 position was that they were not detained \u201cwhen . . . released\u201d from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226(c).\u00a0
\nThe district court certified the class, which included \u201c[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.\u201d The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to \u00a7 1226(a).
\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under \u00a7 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen\u2019s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute\u2019s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays.
", "facts_len": "1585", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3115", "ID": "62986", "name": "Frank v. Gaos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-961", "docket": "17-961", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Theodore H. Frank, et al.", "second_party": "Paloma Gaos, et al.", "facts": "In a group of consolidated class actions, three plaintiffs sued Google on behalf of internet users who claimed that their privacy was violated under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2701, et. seq., and California law by the company\u2019s disclosure of their internet search terms to third party websites. The case went to mediation, and the parties reached a settlement which they submitted to the district court for approval in July 2013.\u00a0
\nAmong the terms of the settlement were that Google would pay $5.3 million of the $8.3 million total to six cy pres recipients, provided that they agreed to dedicate the funds to promoting education and initiatives relating to internet privacy. The district court certified the class for settlement purposes, and preliminarily approved the settlement. Notice was sent out to the class in 2014, with 13 class members opting out and 5, including Thomas Frank, filing objections (\u201cthe Objectors\u201d).\u00a0
\nThe district court approved the parties\u2019 settlement in 2015, and with regard to the objections, found that: (1) the cy pres award was appropriate because the award was non-distributable, (2) Rule 23(b)(3)\u2019s superiority requirement was not affected by whether the award was cy pres, (3) there was a substantial nexus between the cy pres recipients and the interests of the class members, and there was no evidence that the parties\u2019 preexisting relationships with the recipients influenced the selection process, and (4) the amount of attorney fees was commensurate with the benefit to the class.
\nThe Ninth Circuit approved the district court\u2019s ruling approving the settlement, holding that the district court had not abused its discretion with regard to any of the four findings described above.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1766", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3116", "ID": "62987", "name": "Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-988", "docket": "17-988", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Lamps Plus, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Frank Varela", "facts": "Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.
\nThe district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward.
\nThe appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite \u201ccontractual basis\u201d for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int\u2019l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
", "facts_len": "1606", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3117", "ID": "62981", "name": "United States v. Stitt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-765", "docket": "17-765", "term": "2018", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Victor J. Stitt, II", "facts": "In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend\u2019s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt\u2019s nine prior \u201cviolent felony\u201d convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted \u201cviolent felonies.\u201d The US Supreme Court\u2019s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.
\nIn a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing.
\nThe US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are \u201cthe same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.\u201d If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "2022", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3118", "ID": "62988", "name": "Bucklew v. Precythe", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-8151", "docket": "17-8151", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Russell Bucklew", "second_party": "Anne Precythe, et al.", "facts": "Russell Bucklew was convicted by a state court jury of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and was sentenced to death. After exhausting the state appeals process, Bucklew was scheduled to be executed on May 21, 2014. He then filed an action in federal district court alleging that execution by Missouri\u2019s lethal injection protocol would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as applied to him because of a unique congenital medical condition from which he suffers. According to Bucklew, lethal injection would likely cause him to hemorrhage during the execution, potentially choking on his own blood.\u201d As an alternative method, Bucklew proposed execution by nitrogen hypoxia. He also requested discovery of the qualifications of two members of the lethal injection team, alleging that they might not be qualified for the positions for which they are hired.
\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the state, finding that Bucklew failed to show that the state\u2019s execution method \u201cpresents a risk that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering, and give rise to sufficiently imminent dangers,\u201d and failed to propose \u201can alternative that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain,\u201d both of which steps are required by US Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, the district court denied Bucklew\u2019s request for discovery, finding that it was inappropriate to \u201cassume that Missouri employs personnel who are incompetent or unqualified to perform their assigned duties.\u201d Reviewing the district court\u2019s findings de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1737", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3119", "ID": "62992", "name": "BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1042", "docket": "17-1042", "term": "2018", "first_party": "BNSF Railway Company", "second_party": "Michael D. Loos", "facts": "Michael Loos worked as an employee of BNSF Railway Company until his termination in November 2012 for a series of attendance policy violations. Related to at least some of the attendance violations was an injury Loos sustained in 2010 when he fell in the train yard. After being terminated, Loos brought two claims against his former employer: a claim of retaliation under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) and a claim of negligence under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). The district court found that Loos had not established a prima facie case of retaliation under FRSA and granted BNSF's motion for summary judgment on that claim, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
\nThe FELA negligence claim proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Loos\u2014$30,000 for lost wages and $11,212.78 for medical expenses. BNSF moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to offset the lost wages award by the amount of Loos\u2019s share of taxes owed under the RRTA. The district court denied the motion, finding no RRTA tax was owed on the award. The Eighth Circuit reviewed this determination de novo and found that the text of RRTA is unambiguous in not including damages for lost wages in its definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered. Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling using alternate reasoning.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1405", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "3120", "ID": "62990", "name": "Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-587", "docket": "17-587", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Mount Lemmon Fire District", "second_party": "John Guido, et al.", "facts": "In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District.
\nThe Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an \u201cemployer\u201d within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1076", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3121", "ID": "62991", "name": "Madison v. Alabama", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-7505", "docket": "17-7505", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Vernon Madison", "second_party": "State of Alabama", "facts": "Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed.
\nIn November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court\u2019s determinations of law and fact were \u201cnot so lacking in justification\u201d as to give rise to error \u201cbeyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement\u201d as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
\nMadison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier.
", "facts_len": "1574", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3122", "ID": "62989", "name": "New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-340", "docket": "17-340", "term": "2018", "first_party": "New Prime Inc.", "second_party": "Dominic Oliveira", "facts": "Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were \u201csubstantially identical\u201d to those he had as an independent contractor.
\nOliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide.
\nThe district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that \u201ccontracts of employment of transportation workers\u201d does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime\u2019s motion to compel arbitration.
\nThe US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship.
", "facts_len": "2136", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3123", "ID": "62994", "name": "Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1220", "docket": "16-1220", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Animal Science Products, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al.", "facts": "Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. (\u201cPetitioners\u201d) are US vitamin C purchasers who commenced a multidistrict class action lawsuit against Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., et al. (\u201cRespondents\u201d), which are business entities incorporated under the laws of China, alleging violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Specifically, they claimed that Respondents engaged in price-fixing and supply manipulation in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Respondents did not deny that they had coordinated prices and sought to create a supply shortage, but moved to dismiss on the grounds that they acted in accordance with Chinese government regulations requiring them to do so. The district court denied Respondents\u2019 motion to dismiss and a subsequent motion for summary judgment. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment of approximately $147 million against Respondents, and enjoined them from engaging in any further anti-competitive activity.
\nRespondents appealed to the 2nd Circuit, which vacated the judgment, reversed the district court\u2019s denial of the motion to dismiss, and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court to dismiss Petitioners\u2019 complaint with prejudice. The appellate court based its reversal on international comity grounds, explaining that the district court had erred in not deferring appropriately to the Chinese government\u2019s explanation of its domestic laws, which mandated the conduct by Respondents that was considered anti-competitive under US law. Particularly given that the Chinese government had appeared in the proceedings, the fact that Respondents could not simultaneously comply with US and Chinese laws necessitated the conclusion that the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this case. The appeals court further held that other factors significant under an international comity balancing test derived from 3rd and 9th Circuit case law affirmed that abstention was appropriate in the instant matter.
", "facts_len": "2010", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3124", "ID": "62993", "name": "Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1104", "docket": "17-1104", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al.", "second_party": "Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.", "facts": "Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of \u201cbare metal\u201d ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability.
\nThe defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors\u2019 injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs\u2019 negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule.\u00a0
\nThe plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court\u2019s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer\u2019s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule.
", "facts_len": "1985", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Private Action"}, {"": "3125", "ID": "62995", "name": "Culbertson v. Berryhill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-773", "docket": "17-773", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Richard Allen Culbertson", "second_party": "Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration", "facts": "Attorney Richard Culbertson represented four plaintiffs appealing denials of Social Security benefits. After successfully challenging all four denials, Culbertson asked the district court to award him attorney\u2019s fees in those cases under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412(d). Fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 406(b) pertain to proceedings in court, and are statutorily limited to 25% of the past-due benefits the claimant receives. Fees awarded under \u00a7 406(a) pertain to administrative proceedings; that section does not explicitly limit the fee amount that the Social Security Commissioner can award in that context.
\nIn ruling on Culbertson\u2019s fee requests, the district court relied on 11th Circuit precedent limiting the total fee amount awarded under both \u00a7 406(a) and 406(b) to 25% of the past-due benefits awarded to the claimants. This meant that in one case his fee award was limited to 25% of the past-due benefits, in two cases the district court declined to rule on the \u00a7 406(b) fee award until the Commissioner ruled on the \u00a7406(a) award (so as to not award him an amount that exceeded 25% of the past-due benefits), and that in the final case, the court granted his \u00a7 406(b) request but barred him from requesting any further fees under \u00a7 406(a), again seeking to prevent him from exceeding the 25% cap.\u00a0
\nIn his appeal, Culbertson contended that other circuits have not applied this 25% cap to the aggregate fee amount awardable under both \u00a7 406(a) and (b), but instead applied that limit only to \u00a7 406(b) fees. The 11th Circuit rejected this argument, applying its prior precedent to affirm the district court\u2019s ruling.
", "facts_len": "1688", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Attorneys"}, {"": "3126", "ID": "62997", "name": "Jam v. International Finance Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1011", "docket": "17-1011", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Budha Ismael Jam, et al.", "second_party": "International Finance Corporation", "facts": "Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital.\u00a0 The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project.
\nThe plant\u2019s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC\u2019s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance.
\nThe plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company.
\nThe district court dismissed the plaintiffs\u2019 claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations \u201cshall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.\u201d 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the \u201cprivileges, exemptions, and immunities\u201d conferred by the statute.
\nThe Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit.
", "facts_len": "2129", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3127", "ID": "62998", "name": "Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1275", "docket": "16-1275", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Virginia Uranium, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "John Warren et al.", "facts": "The federal Atomic Energy Act regulates nuclear power generation in the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforces the provisions of the Act. In the early 1980s, a uranium deposit was discovered in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, on land owned by Coles Hill and Bowen Minerals (both plaintiffs in this case). The Virginia General Assembly called upon the state Coal and Energy Commission to evaluate the effects of mining uranium but in the meantime banned the mining of uranium \u201cuntil a program for permitting uranium mining is established by statute.\u201d Despite a recommendation by the state commission, the ban on uranium mining remains in effect.
\nVirginia Uranium, Coles Hills, and Bowen Minerals filed a federal lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia asking the court to declare the ban preempted by federal law and enjoining the state to grant uranium mining permits. The district court granted the state\u2019s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that the AEA does not regulate non-federal uranium deposits and thus does not preempt the state law ban. Reviewing the district court\u2019s conclusion de novo, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1178", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3128", "ID": "62999", "name": "Azar v. Garza", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-654", "docket": "17-654", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.", "second_party": "Rochelle Garza, as Guardian ad Litem to Unaccompanied Minor J. D.", "facts": "Jane Doe entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor when she was eight weeks pregnant. She was detained by immigration authorities, and placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). She was later placed in a federally funded shelter in Texas, where, after a medical examination, she requested an abortion. ORR denied her request on the grounds that agency policy prohibited shelter staff from taking any action to facilitate an abortion without direction and approval from the ORR director absent emergency circumstances.
\nDoe\u2019s guardian ad litem, Rochelle Garza, filed a putative class action challenging the constitutionality of ORR\u2019s policy on behalf of Doe and \u201call other pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody.\u201d On October 18, 2017, the district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) permitting Doe to have an abortion immediately. The next day, Doe attended pre-abortion counseling, which was required under Texas law to take place at least 24 hours in advance of the procedure, and with the same doctor who would perform the abortion.
\nOn October 20, a panel of the D.C. Circuit court vacated the pertinent portions of the TRO on the grounds that ORR\u2019s policy did not constitute an \u201cundue burden.\u201d However, sitting en banc, on October 24 the appellate court vacated the panel order and remanded the matter to the district court. The same day, Garza asked the court for an amended restraining order, requesting that the government make Doe available to repeat the required pre-abortion counseling. The district court granted Garza\u2019s request, and arrangements were made for Doe to have the counseling appointment at 7:30 a.m. on October 25.
\nThe details of the subsequent events were disputed, but the government, under the impression that the soonest the abortion would happen was October 26, informed Garza\u2019s counsel that they planned to appeal the new order early on the morning of October 25. However, the same doctor who conducted Doe\u2019s pre-abortion counseling became available for her October 25 appointment, so the appointment was moved up to 4:15 a.m. and Doe had the abortion instead of repeating the counseling with a new doctor.
\nBecause the abortion made the government\u2019s claim moot, it did not ask the Supreme Court to review the en banc order as planned, but instead filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the appellate court\u2019s en banc ruling so that it would not stand as precedent. The government also sought sanctions against Garza\u2019s lawyers, arguing that they had made misrepresentations in an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review.
", "facts_len": "2674", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3129", "ID": "63000", "name": "Apple v. Pepper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-204", "docket": "17-204", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Apple, Inc.", "second_party": "Robert Pepper, et al.", "facts": "This lawsuit arose out of Apple\u2019s handling of the sale of apps for its iPhone devices. Apple released the iPhone in 2007, and from the outset, it has been a \u201cclosed system,\u201d meaning that Apple controls which apps can be loaded onto an iPhone, which it does via the \u201cApp Store.\u201d Although Apple develops some of the apps sold in the App Store, most are developed by third parties. For every App Store sale made by a third-party developer, Apple receives 30% of the sale price.
\nIn 2011, four named plaintiffs filed a putative antitrust class action complaint against Apple, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of the iPhone app market. The complaint was dismissed on technical grounds, as were several subsequent attempts at similar lawsuits by both the same and other plaintiffs. In September 2013, a set of plaintiffs included in their allegations sufficient facts for the lawsuit to move forward. Among these facts was the key allegation that each plaintiff had purchased iPhone apps from the App Store, and that these transactions involved Apple collecting the entire purchase price and paying the developers after the sale.
\nApple filed yet another motion to dismiss the lawsuit, contending that the plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to sue under the US Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Under Illinois Brick, \u201conly the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution\u201d may bring a lawsuit for antitrust violations. If the plaintiffs are considered to have purchased their iPhone apps directly from the app developers, then they cannot sue Apple. However, if they are considered to have bought the apps from Apple, then they may sue Apple.
\nThe district court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under Illinois Brick and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court\u2019s decision de novo and found that, contrary to a ruling on the same issue by the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs are direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning of Illinois Brick and thus have standing.
", "facts_len": "2285", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3130", "ID": "63003", "name": "Sturgeon v. Frost", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-949", "docket": "17-949", "term": "2018", "first_party": "John Sturgeon", "second_party": "Bert Frost, in His Official Capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al.", "facts": "John Sturgeon wanted to use his hovercraft on the Nation River, which runs through Alaska\u2019s Yukon-Charley National Preserve conservation unit, designated as such by the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 3101 et seq., to reach moose hunting grounds. The State of Alaska would permit him to do so, whereas the federal government would not pursuant to National Park Service regulations. Sturgeon argued that the Nation River belonged to Alaska, and that the National Park Service could not regulate or prohibit the use of hovercraft on that portion of the river. Sturgeon sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the Park Service from enforcing its hovercraft ban. The district court and appellate court denied him relief, interpreting the statute as limiting the Park Service\u2019s authority to impose Alaska-specific regulations on inholdings but not its authority to enforce nationwide regulations like the hovercraft rule. The US Supreme Court rejected this interpretation and remanded the case for further consideration.
\nOn remand from the US Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Nation River was public land for purposes of ANILCA and thus that it was subject to the regulatory authority of the National Park Service.
", "facts_len": "1290", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3131", "ID": "63001", "name": "Garza v. Idaho", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1026", "docket": "17-1026", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Gilberto Garza, Jr.", "second_party": "Idaho", "facts": "On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea\u2014that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt\u2014to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers.
\nFour months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza\u2019s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza\u2019s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.
\nUnder Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to \u201creasonably effective\u201d legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel\u2019s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel\u2019s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel\u2019s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant\u2019s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights.
\nThe Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic \u201cpresumption of prejudice\u201d when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
", "facts_len": "2260", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3132", "ID": "63004", "name": "Timbs v. Indiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1091", "docket": "17-1091", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Tyson Timbs", "second_party": "Indiana", "facts": "Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father\u2019s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January.
\nThe state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200.
\nIn addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs\u2019 Land Rover. The trial court denied the state\u2019s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs\u2019 felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed.
\nThe Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law.
", "facts_len": "1793", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3133", "ID": "63002", "name": "Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1077", "docket": "17-1077", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Francis V. Lorenzo", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo\u2019s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology.
\nThe technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in \u201cdebentures\u201d\u2014which is debt secured only by the debtor\u2019s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E\u2019s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company\u2019s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million.
\nAfter an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo\u2019s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors \u201cseveral key points\u201d about W2E\u2019s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E\u2019s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with \u201c3 layers of protection,\u201d which were: $10 million in \u201cconfirmed assets\u201d; purchase orders and LOIs for \u201cover $43 [million] in orders\u201d; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent \u201cat the request of [Lorenzo\u2019s boss]\u201d and the other stated it was sent \u201cat the request of [another broker with the firm].\u201d Lorenzo\u2019s name and title were at the bottom of both emails.
\nThe SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo\u2019s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ\u2019s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission\u2019s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo\u2019s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained \u201cultimate authority\u201d over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court\u2019s definition of \u201cmaker\u201d of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
", "facts_len": "3046", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3134", "ID": "63006", "name": "Cox v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1017", "docket": "16-1017", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Laith G. Cox", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "This case was consolidated for argument with\u00a0Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961) and\u00a0Ortiz v. United States (16-1423).
", "facts_len": "125", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - improvidently granted", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3135", "ID": "63007", "name": "Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1498", "docket": "16-1498", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Washington State Department of Licensing", "second_party": "Cougar Den, Inc.", "facts": "Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have \"the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways.\" Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department\u2019s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department\u2019s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe\u2019s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing \"any trade, traveling, and importation\" by members of the Yakama tribe \u201cthat requires the use of public roads,\u201d even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state\u2019s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes.
", "facts_len": "1622", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3136", "ID": "63009", "name": "Dawson v. Steager", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-419", "docket": "17-419", "term": "2018", "first_party": "James Dawson, et ux.", "second_party": "Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner", "facts": "West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (\u201cSection 12(c)(6)\u201d) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. \u00a7 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if \u201cthe taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.\u201d James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson\u2019s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption.
\nThe Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner\u2019s denial of the Dawsons\u2019 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. \u00a7 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court\u2019s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed.
", "facts_len": "1093", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3137", "ID": "63008", "name": "Republic of Sudan v. Harrison", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/16-1094", "docket": "16-1094", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Republic of Sudan", "second_party": "Rick Harrison, et al.", "facts": "Sailors and spouses of sailors injured in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen filed suit in 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1130, 1602, et seq., alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda, whom they alleged was responsible for the attack. In accordance with the plaintiffs\u2019 request, the clerk of the court served the summons and complaint on Sudan by mailing the case documents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received a return receipt. Sudan did not answer the complaint within the required time frame, and the clerk of the court therefore entered a default against Sudan. In 2012, the district court entered a default judgment against Sudan in the amount of approximately $314,000, and found that service had been proper. The clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgement to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan via the Sudanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., and received confirmation that it had been delivered.\u00a0
\nThe judgment was registered in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which in late 2013 and early 2014 issued three turnover orders directing particular banks to turn over assets of Sudan to the plaintiffs. After the third turnover order was issued, Sudan filed a notice of appearance, and on the same day, appealed the turnover orders to the Second Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the orders, holding that service of process had been proper under FSIA. In 2015, Sudan sought a rehearing en banc, and the United States filed an amicus brief in support of the petition. The Second Circuit denied Sudan\u2019s request for a rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "1811", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3138", "ID": "63005", "name": "Ortiz v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1423", "docket": "16-1423", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Keanu D.W. Ortiz", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a \"civil office,\u201d including positions that require \"an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA).
\nA judge convicted Keanu Ortiz of possessing and distributing child pornography, and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. A panel of the AFCCA, which included Judge Mitchell, affirmed the findings and sentence. Ortiz filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), asking the court to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the CMCR. Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell's CMCR appointment precluded him from serving on the CCA under both the the federal statute and the Constitution. The CAAF rejected both of Ortiz's arguments.
\nNote: This case was original consolidated under Dalmazzi v. United States (16-961), and the oral argument audio and transcripts can be found there.
", "facts_len": "1434", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3139", "ID": "63012", "name": "Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1229", "docket": "17-1229", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Helsinn Healthcare S.A.", "second_party": "Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations\u00a0of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (\u201cCINV\u201d). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 102.
\nThe sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed.
\nThe district court upheld as valid Helsinn\u2019s patents and rejected Teva\u2019s \u201con sale\u201d defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was \u201coverwhelming.\u201d
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1132", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3140", "ID": "63013", "name": "Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1272", "docket": "17-1272", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Henry Schein, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Archer and White Sales, Inc.", "facts": "In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.\u2014a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers\u2014filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company\u2014allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (\u201cDealer Agreement\u201d) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein\u2019s predecessor in interest.
\nAfter a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement.
\nThe district court vacated the magistrate judge\u2019s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
\nIn the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties \u201cclearly and unmistakably\u201d intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, \u201cthe motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,\u201d except where \u201cthe argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is \u2018wholly groundless.\u2019\u201d This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, \u201cthe district court may decide the \u2018gateway\u2019 issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.\u2019\u201d
\nReviewing the district court\u2019s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.
", "facts_len": "2240", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3141", "ID": "63011", "name": "Biestek v. Berryhill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1184", "docket": "17-1184", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Michael J. Biestek", "second_party": "Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration", "facts": "Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge\u2019s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ\u2019s determination, and the district court affirmed.
\nThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ\u2019s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert.
", "facts_len": "1178", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3142", "ID": "63015", "name": "Sexton v. Beaudreaux", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-1106", "docket": "17-1106", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Michael Sexton, Warden", "second_party": "Nicholas Beaudreaux", "facts": "Nicholas Beaudreaux shot and killed Wayne Drummond in 2006. Two witnesses to the shooting recognized or were able to describe Beaudreaux but did not know his name. Seventeen months later, one of the witnesses was arrested for an unrelated crime, and while in custody, was shown a middle-school yearbook with Beaudreaux's photograph. The witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter in the Drummond murder.
\nOfficers interviewed the second witness the following day, and the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter from a photo array that included Beaudreaux and five other men. Later, the witness was shown a different photo array that used a different photograph of Beaudreaux, and again the witness identified Beaudreaux as the shooter. At a preliminary hearing, the witness positively identified Beaudreaux after seeing him in person.
\nBeaudreaux was tried in 2009 for first-degree murder and attempted second-degree robbery. Both witnesses testified and identified Beaudreaux as the shooter, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of 50 years to life. His conviction was affirmed\u00a0on direct appeal, and his first state habeas petition was denied. He filed a second state habeas petition claiming, among other things, that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the second witness\u2019s identification testimony. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Beaudreaux filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court denied. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was not reliable enough to overcome the suggestiveness of the procedures and that counsel\u2019s failure to move to suppress the identification prejudiced Beaudreaux\u2019s case.
", "facts_len": "1853", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3143", "ID": "63018", "name": "Nieves v. Bartlett", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1174", "docket": "17-1174", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Luis A. Nieves, et al.", "second_party": "Russell P. Bartlett", "facts": "Russell Bartlett was arrested by Alaska state troopers Luis Nieves and Bryce Weight for disorderly conduct and harassment. Bartlett subsequently sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, making claims including false arrest and imprisonment, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s ruling on the retaliatory arrest claim, explaining that under its own precedent, a showing of probable cause did not preclude a claim of retaliatory arrest. The appellate court noted that in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court had clarified that its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which held that a plaintiff could not make a retaliatory prosecution claim if the charges were supported by probable cause, did not necessarily extend to retaliatory arrests. And since that time, the Ninth Circuit had held that a plaintiff could make a retaliatory arrest claim even if the arresting officers had probable cause.
", "facts_len": "1119", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3144", "ID": "63020", "name": "Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1307", "docket": "17-1307", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Dennis Obduskey", "second_party": "McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.", "facts": "Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey\u2019s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
\nUpon Obduskey\u2019s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute\u2019s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court\u2019s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt.
\nIn reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits.
\nObduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC.
", "facts_len": "2051", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3145", "ID": "63017", "name": "Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-290", "docket": "17-290", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp.", "second_party": "Doris Albrecht, et al.", "facts": "Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (\u201cMerck\u201d), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck\u2019s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures.
\nIn 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is \u201cclear evidence\u201d that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court\u2019s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth\u2019s demanding \u201cclear evidence\u201d standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to Wyeth and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial.
", "facts_len": "1926", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3146", "ID": "63019", "name": "Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-571", "docket": "17-571", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation", "second_party": "Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.", "facts": "Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it\u00a0continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate.
\nFourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding \u201cregistration\u201d under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights \u201cregister the claim,\u201d and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "982", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3147", "ID": "63022", "name": "Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1299", "docket": "17-1299", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Franchise Tax Board of California", "second_party": "Gilbert P. Hyatt", "facts": "In 1993, a tax auditor for the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) read a newspaper about Gilbert P. Hyatt, an inventor, and the large amounts of money he was making from the patent. The auditor decided to investigate Hyatt, and, after finding some discrepancies, opened an audit on Hyatt\u2019s 1991 state tax return. In conducting the audit, the auditor found additional discrepancies\u00a0 surrounding Hyatt\u2019s move from California to Nevada and opened an audit as to his 1992 tax returns. FTB determined that Hyatt owed $1.8 million in state income taxes, plus $1.4 million in penalties and $1.2 million in interest, resulted in a tax assessment of $4.5 million for Hyatt\u2019s 1991 tax year. FTB further found that Hyatt owed over $6 million in taxes and interest for 1992, plus penalties.
\nHyatt challenged the conclusions by filing protests with FTB and then in California courts. In 1998, Hyatt sued FTB in Nevada state court seeking damages for intentional torts and bad-faith conduct allegedly committed by FTB auditors during tax audits of Hyatt\u2019s 1991 and 1992 state tax returns.
\nFTB filed a motion for partial summary judgment challenging the Nevada district court\u2019s jurisdiction over Hyatt\u2019s declaratory relief cause of action. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding that the timing of Hyatt\u2019s move from California to Nevada should be resolved via the administrative investigation. FTB also asked the Nevada Supreme Court to decide whether it was entitled to complete immunity under several theories: it enjoyed complete immunity under California law, it was entitled to sovereign immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and comity. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded FTB was not entitled to complete immunity under any of these principles, but was entitled to partial immunity equal to the immunity a Nevada government agency would receive. Thus, the court concluded that FTB was immune from the negligence cause of action, but not from the intentional tort causes of action.
\nFTB appealed to the US Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the court\u2019s determination that FTB was entitled only to partial immunity under comity principles. Two other questions from this litigation made their way to the US Supreme Court, and the Court (1) split 4\u20134 as to whether it should overrule Nevada v. Hall, which provides \u201cthat one State \u2026 can open the doors of its courts to a private citizen\u2019s lawsuit against another State \u2026 without the other State\u2019s consent,\u201d and (2) held that the Constitution does not permit Nevada to award damages against California agencies under its state law that are greater than it could award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. With these preliminary legal questions resolved, a Nevada jury finally found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for invasion of privacy, over $1 for special damages for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages. The Nevada Supreme Court issued upholding the damages, subject to the statutory caps to which FTB is entitled, consistent with the US Supreme Court\u2019s holding on that issue.
\nFTB asked the US Supreme Court to reconsider the first question again, whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall.
", "facts_len": "3281", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3148", "ID": "63016", "name": "Sause v. Bauer", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-742", "docket": "17-742", "term": "2017", "first_party": "Mary Anne Sause", "second_party": "Timothy J. Bauer, et al.", "facts": "Mary Ann Sause, representing herself, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 against members of the Louisburg, Kansas, police department, as well as the current and former mayor of the town. In her complaint she alleges that two police officers visited her apartment in response to a noise complaint, entered her apartment without consent, and \u201cthen proceeded to engage in a course of strange and abusive conduct.\u201d She further alleges that at one point she \u201cknelt and began to pray but one of the officers ordered her to stop.\u201d Sause claims that the officers\u2019 conduct violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The defendants moved to dismiss Sause\u2019s claim for failure to state a claim, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Sause\u2014now with counsel\u2014argued only that her free exercise rights were violated by the officers\u2019 conduct (dropping her Fourth Amendment claims). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the action, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
", "facts_len": "1218", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3149", "ID": "63023", "name": "Gamble v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-646", "docket": "17-646", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Terance Martez Gamble", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called \u201cseparate sovereigns\u201d exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court.
", "facts_len": "795", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3150", "ID": "63024", "name": "Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1094", "docket": "17-1094", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Nutraceutical Corporation", "second_party": "Troy Lambert", "facts": "Troy Lambert purchased an alleged aphrodisiac dietary supplement that was manufactured by Nutraceutical, but that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Based on the product\u2019s labels, Lambert believed that the supplement would enhance his sexual performance, and had he known these claims were false, he would not have purchased the product.\u00a0
\nLambert believed that the product violated FDA regulations because it purported to increase sexual desire but had not been through clinical testing, and because it was not FDA-approved. He further alleged that the product illegally failed to prominently display this lack of FDA approval on its labeling, and that the labeling also failed to mention a potentially dangerous ingredient. Lambert filed a consumer class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(b)(3), alleging state law claims related to unfair competition, false advertising, and other violations.
\nThe district court granted class certification based on the full refund damages model, which applies when a product is useless and involves calculating the average retail price and the number of units sold. The judge hearing the case retired, and Lambert\u2019s action was reassigned to a new judge. Discovery was completed, and Nutraceutical filed a motion for decertification. The new judge granted the motion, finding that Lambert had failed to provide essential evidence to apply his classwide damages model, meaning that common issues did not predominate as required under Rule 23(b)(3).\u00a0
\nTen days after the order was issued decertifying the class, Lambert informed the court that he intended to file a motion for reconsideration, and the court instructed him to file the motion within ten days, which was twenty days after the decertification order. In accordance with the court\u2019s instructions, Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration ten days later, highlighting evidence from his class certification motion that could be used to support the full refund damages model. He also offered an alternative damages model for the first time, based on non-restitutionary engorgement.\u00a0
\nThree months later, the court denied his motion for reconsideration, rejecting his proposed damages models. Lambert timely filed a petition under Rule 23(f) for permission to appeal the district court\u2019s orders denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion for class decertification to the 9th Circuit, which conditionally granted his petition.
\nA three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit held that Lambert\u2019s Rule 23(f) petition for class certification had been timely filed with the appellate court. The court explained that because Rule 23(f)\u2019s 14-day deadline was procedural rather than jurisdictional, equitable exceptions such as tolling could apply. It also held that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Rule 23(f) deadline would toll the deadline. The panel further held that other circumstances could toll the deadline. In this case, Lambert had informed the district court of his intention to file a motion for reconsideration within Rule 23(f)\u2019s 14-day window, and had submitted the filing within the ten-day time frame set by that court. The panel concluded that under these circumstances the deadline should be tolled and Lambert\u2019s motion for reconsideration should be considered timely filed with the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing that a number of other circuits would likely reach the opposite conclusion.
", "facts_len": "3516", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3151", "ID": "63027", "name": "Azar v. Allina Health Services", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1484", "docket": "17-1484", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Alex M. Azar, II, Secretary of Health and Human Services", "second_party": "Allina Health Services, et al.", "facts": "The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers the Medicare program, which provides health insurance to Americans 65 and older. Patients may obtain coverage under different \u201cparts\u201d of Medicare, two of which are at issue in this case. When patients enrolled in Medicare Part A receive healthcare, the government makes direct payments to hospitals for the services provided. Patients enrolled in Medicare Part C receive a government subsidy to enroll in a private insurance plan. Importantly, patients enrolled in Part A tend to have lower incomes than those enrolled in Part C.
\nHHS contracts with \u201cfiscal intermediaries\u201d to reimburse healthcare service providers for services rendered to Medicare Part A patients. These intermediaries make an initial payment based on an estimate of the cost of services provided and are later adjusted based on actual cost reports.
\nThe Medicare Act authorizes reimbursement adjustments to increase payments to hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients. The rate of adjustment is calculated in part based on the number of \u201cpatient days\u201d for patients \u201centitled to benefits under part A\u201d of Medicare. In 2012, HHS sought to interpret this phrase as including patient days for patients entitled to benefits under Part C of Medicare as well. Including Part C days in the adjustment calculus would result in lower reimbursement rates, which translates into hundreds of millions of dollars.
\nThe plaintiff hospitals challenged the rate adjustment in the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, as required by statute. The Board concluded that it lacked authority to resolve the issue, which triggered expedited review before the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS, finding that the rate adjustment was an \u201cinterpretive rule\u201d under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and thus was exempt from the APA\u2019s notice-and-comment requirement for new rules. The hospitals appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the adjustment was not merely an \u201cinterpretive rule\u201d and that HHS violated the Medicare Act by promulgating the rule without providing notice and the opportunity for comment.
", "facts_len": "2269", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3152", "ID": "63028", "name": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1471", "docket": "17-1471", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.", "second_party": "George W. Jackson", "facts": "In 2016, Citibank initiated a debt-collection action in a North Carolina state court against George W. Jackson, alleging that Jackson had failed to pay for a water treatment system he purchased using a Citibank-issued credit card. In responding to Citibank\u2019s complaint, Jackson asserted a counterclaim against Citibank and third-party class-action claims against Home Depot and Carolina Water Systems (CWS). In these third-party claims, Jackson alleged that Home Depot and CWS had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to the water treatment systems; Jackson\u2019s counterclaim against Citibank alleged that Citibank was jointly and severally liable to him because Home Depot had sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank. Citibank subsequently dismissed its claims against Jackson.
\nHome Depot filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Home Depot then filed a motion to realign parties with Jackson as plaintiff and Home Depot, CWS, and Citibank as defendants. Jackson moved to remand the case to state court and amended his third-party complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.
\nThe district court denied Home Depot\u2019s motion to realign parties, finding that there were not \u201cantagonistic parties on the same side,\u201d and granted Jackson\u2019s motion to remand because Home Depot was not a \u201cdefendant\u201d eligible to remove under CAFA. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly declined to realign the parties because the purpose of realignment\u2014to prevent parties from fraudulently manufacturing diversity jurisdiction\u2014was not implicated in the dispute. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that allowing Home Depot to remove would be inconsistent with its prior interpretations of CAFA\u2019s removal statute.
", "facts_len": "1871", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3153", "ID": "63025", "name": "Herrera v. Wyoming", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-532", "docket": "17-532", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Clayvin Herrera", "second_party": "Wyoming", "facts": "Clayvin Herrera is an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe of Indians. Herrera and several other tribal members went elk hunting on the Crow Reservation, and at some point, followed several elk across a fence, thereby leaving the Crow Reservation and entering the Big Horn National Forest in Wyoming. They shot three bull elk and took the meat with them to Montana. None of the hunters had a license, and it was closed season.
\nHerrera was cited with two hunting-related misdemeanors under Wyoming law. He moved to dismiss the charges under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution and the Laramie Treaty of 1868. He argued that the treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to hunt off the reservation and that the treaty was still valid and thus preempted state law. Bound by the Tenth Circuit\u2019s 1995 decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the state court held that Crow Tribe members do not have off-reservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of Wyoming. Herrera was tried and convicted by a jury on both counts. He appealed the lower court\u2019s pretrial determination on the off-reservation treaty hunting right. Reviewing the lower court\u2019s conclusions de novo, the state appeals court affirmed the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1369", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3154", "ID": "63029", "name": "Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1625", "docket": "17-1625", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Rimini Street, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Oracle USA, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Oracle licenses its enterprise software for a substantial one-time payment and also sells maintenance contracts to licensees so they can update their software through Oracle\u2019s support website. Rimini Street provided third-party support for Oracle\u2019s software in lawful competition with Oracle\u2019s direct maintenance service. To compete effectively, however, Rimini also needed to provide software updates to its customers, which would constitute copyright infringement if obtained without a proper license (which Rimini did not have). With Oracle\u2019s knowledge, Rimini obtained Oracle software updates from Oracle\u2019s website by a means that violated the Oracle website\u2019s terms of use.
\nOracle filed a lawsuit against Rimini and obtained a partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. The jury awarded Oracle $50,027,000 plus attorney\u2019s fees and costs, resulting in a total monetary judgment of $124,291,396.82. Rimini appealed the judgment. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 505 allows for recovery of \u201cfull costs\u201d and the district court properly relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Twentieth Century Fox v. Entertainment Distribution in awarding $12,774,550.26 in non-taxable costs, despite ostensibly conflicting language in 28 U.S.C \u00a7 1920 identifying six categories of costs taxable against the losing party.
", "facts_len": "1483", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3155", "ID": "63030", "name": "Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1201", "docket": "17-1201", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Gary Thacker, et ux.", "second_party": "Tennessee Valley Authority", "facts": "Gary and Venida Thacker filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for its alleged negligence involving an accident on the Tennessee River. The Thackers and a friend were participating in a fishing tournament on the river at the same time the TVA was attempting to raise a downed power line in the same part of the river. An electrical component struck Gary Thacker and the friend, severely injuring Thacker and killing the friend instantly.
\nThe district court dismissed the Thackers\u2019 lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
\nThe United States enjoys sovereign immunity from suit unless it unequivocally waives its immunity by statute. This immunity extends to government agencies, as well. TVA is a corporate agency expressly authorized to engage in commercial, power-generating activities, and the TVA Act expressly provides that TVA \u201cmay sue and be sued in its corporate name,\u201d subject to certain exceptions. Extrapolating from a principle of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Eleventh Circuit has held that TVA cannot be subject to liability when engaged in governmental functions that are discretionary in nature. Applying its own precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found that TVA was engaged in exactly this type of function at the time of the accident with the Thackers and thus was immune from suit.
", "facts_len": "1414", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3156", "ID": "63031", "name": "Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-96", "docket": "18-96", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association", "second_party": "Russell F. Thomas, Executive Director of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission, et al.", "facts": "To sell liquor in the state of Tennessee, one must have a license from the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). Under Tennessee Code Annotated \u00a7 57-3-204(b)(2)(A), an individual must have \u201cbeen a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made to the commission,\u201d and there is a ten-year residency requirement to renew a liquor license. The state imposes similar requirements on entities seeking a license.
\nTwo entities did not satisfy the residency requirement when they applied for a license with the TABC, so TABC deferred voting on their applications. The Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association, which represents Tennessee business owners and represented the two entities here, informed TABC that litigation was likely. In response, the state attorney general filed an action in state court seeking declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The Association removed the action to federal district court.
\nThe district court determined that the durational-residency requirements are facially discriminatory, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1271", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3157", "ID": "63041", "name": "Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1702", "docket": "17-1702", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Manhattan Community Access Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "Deedee Halleck, et al.", "facts": "A New York regulation requires cable-TV networks with 36 or more channels to provide \u201cat least one full-time activated channel for public-access use.\u201d This channel must be open to the \u201cpublic on a first-come, first-served, non-discriminatory basis.\u201d New York City awarded cable franchises for Manhattan to Time Warner, provided that Time Warner provide four public-access channels, which are designated to be overseen by the Manhattan Community Access Corporation (MCAC), known as the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (MNN).
\nPetitioners DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez have had a contentious relationship with MNN since 2011, and their feud culminated in August 2013 with MNN suspending both Melendez and Halleck from all MNN services and facilities. They filed a lawsuit against MCAC, several employees, and the City of New York, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights.
\nGenerally, private actors cannot violate the constitutional rights of individuals; a finding of a constitutional violation requires \u201cstate action.\u201d However, when the government creates a private entity by special law and retains authority to appoint a majority of directors, the actions of that private entity can sometimes be regarded as governmental action. Finding that the government retained authority to appoint only two of the thirteen members of MCAC\u2019s board, the district court held that MCAC, its employees, and the City of New York did not create a public forum within the First Amendment and dismissed the First Amendment claim for lack of state action. A majority of a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed as to the City of New York but reversed as to MCAC and its employees, relying on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC to find that New York City had \u201cdelegated to MNN the traditionally public function of administering and regulating speech in the public forum\u201d of public-access cable television. Thus, MNN creates a public forum and functions as a state actor.
", "facts_len": "2152", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3158", "ID": "63044", "name": "United States v. Haymond", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1672", "docket": "17-1672", "term": "2018", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Andre Ralph Haymond", "facts": "Andre Ralph Haymond was convicted by a jury of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 38-months\u2019 imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Two years into his supervised release, probation officers conducted a surprise search of Haymond\u2019s apartment and seized several devices. After conducting a forensic examination of the devices, officers found evidence that the devices had recently contained child pornography. Based on these findings, Haymond\u2019s probation officer alleged that Haymond had committed five violations of his supervised release, the relevant one of which was the possession of child pornography, in violation of the mandatory condition that Haymond not commit another federal, state, or local crime.
\nThe district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Haymond had possessed child pornography, which triggered a mandatory minimum sentence of five years\u2019 incarceration under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(k). Haymond challenged the district court\u2019s findings, arguing, among other things, that the statute violates his constitutional rights by subjecting him to imprisonment based on facts not found by a jury. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond\u2019s constitutional arguments. It affirmed the district court\u2019s revocation of his supervised release but vacated his sentence and remanded for sentencing.
", "facts_len": "1397", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3159", "ID": "63049", "name": "Gray v. Wilkie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1679", "docket": "17-1679", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Robert H. Gray", "second_party": "Robert Wilkie", "facts": "The Agent Orange Act of 1991 was intended to make it easier for US veterans who were injured by Agent Orange, the toxic herbicide used during the Vietnam War, to obtain disability benefits. The Act provides that to obtain benefits, veterans need only show that they served in the \u201cRepublic of Vietnam\u201d during a 13-year period and that they developed any one of several diseases associated with Agent Orange.
\nIn 2016, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) changed its policy to allow only veterans who set foot on Vietnamese soil or served in the country\u2019s \u201cinland waterways\u201d to be eligible for benefits under the Act. This change effectively excludes US Navy veterans, such as the petitioner in this case, who served in Vietnam\u2019s ports, harbors, and bays, which are definitionally excluded from \u201cinland waterways.\u201d
\nThe crux of the dispute in this case is that the VA made this policy change by revising the manual in which it publishes its policies and procedures for resolving benefits claims. Petitioner Robert Gray challenged the new policy in the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, relying on 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 502, which gives that court authority to review challenges to rules and policies issued by the VA before the rules are actually enforced. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim because the challenged policy was merely a revision of the manual and did not amount to \u201crulemaking\u201d that carries the force of law. As such, it falls outside the scope of \u00a7 502.
", "facts_len": "1526", "majority_vote": "0", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - moot", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3160", "ID": "63042", "name": "Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1594", "docket": "17-1594", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Return Mail, Inc.", "second_party": "United States Postal Service", "facts": "Return Mail, Inc. owns a US patent directed to the processing of mail items that are undeliverable due to an inaccurate or obsolete address of the intended recipient. Return Mail sought to license the patent to the US Postal Service (\u201cUSPS\u201d) and when it was unsuccessful, it filed a lawsuit against USPS alleging unlicensed and unlawful use and infringement of the patent. USPS filed a petition with the Patent and Trademark Office\u2019s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (\u201cBoard\u201d) asking that the patent be declared unpatentable on several grounds. In response, Return Mail addressed the unpatentability arguments and further argued that USPS lacked statutory standing to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (\u201cAIA\u201d).
\nThe Board held that USPS was not statutorily barred from filing the petition for review, and on the merits determined that all of the challenged patent claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1017", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3161", "ID": "63048", "name": "Smith v. Berryhill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1606", "docket": "17-1606", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Ricky Lee Smith", "second_party": "Nancy A. Berryhill", "facts": "In 1987, Ricky Lee Smith filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI) resulting from disability. The following year, an administrative law judge (ALJ) approved his application, and Smith received benefits until 2004, when he was found to be over the resource limit.
\nSmith filed another application for SSI in August 2012, alleging additional medical conditions as a result of his original disability. The claim was initial denied, and denied again upon reconsideration.
\nSmith filed a timely request for a hearing before an ALJ, and after the hearing, an ALJ denied Smith\u2019s claim on March 26, 2014. Smith claims to have mailed a written request for review before the Appeals Council on April 24, 2014, and followed up by fax on September 21, 2014. A claims representative spoke with Smith on October 1, 2014, to inform him that his request may not have been received and that his request was filed as of that day, October 1, 2014.
\nThe Appeals Council dismissed the request for review as untimely, as Smith proffered no evidence showing the request for was sent within the appropriate time. Smith filed a civil action seeking review of the Appeals Council\u2019s dismissal. The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Appeals Council\u2019s dismissal did not constitute a final decision subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405(g).
", "facts_len": "1415", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3162", "ID": "63043", "name": "Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1657", "docket": "17-1657", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Mission Product Holdings, Inc.", "second_party": "Tempnology, LLC", "facts": "Tempnology, LLC, made and owned the intellectual property to specialized products such as towels, socks, headbands, and other accessories designed to stay at a low temperature even when used during exercise. Tempnology and Mission Product Holdings executed an agreement in 2012 that (1) granted Mission distribution rights to some of Tempnology\u2019s products, (2) granted Mission a nonexclusive license to Tempnology\u2019s intellectual property, and (3) granted Mission a license to use Tempnology\u2019s trademark and logo to sell and promote the products.
\nAfter accruing multi-million-dollar operating losses in 2013 and 2014, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 2015. The following day, it moved to reject its agreement with Mission under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a debtor-in-possession to \u201creject any executory contract\u201d that is not beneficial to the company.
\nAlthough the parties do not dispute that Mission can insist that the rejection not apply to the patent licenses in the agreement, it is unsettled in the First Circuit (where the proceedings were brought) whether Mission can also insist that the rejection not apply to the trademark licenses. The bankruptcy court found that Tempnology\u2019s rejection of the agreement left Mission with only a claim for damages for breach of contract, and no claim that Tempnology was under an obligation to further perform the license agreement. The First Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1503", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3163", "ID": "63052", "name": "Mont v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-8995", "docket": "17-8995", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Jason J. Mont", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Petitioner Jason Mont was convicted for federal drug-related offenses in 2005 and sentenced to 120 months\u2019 imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. He was released on March 6, 2012, so by his sentence he was subject to supervised release until March 6, 2017.
\nWhile on supervised release, Mont allegedly engaged in and was indicted for state-law offenses. In October 2016, Mont pleaded guilty to some of the state-court charges in exchange for a predetermined six-year sentence. Due to administrative delays and a series of continuances, Mont was sentenced on March 21, 2017. The sentencing judge credited as time served the roughly ten months Mont had spent incarcerated pending a disposition. On March 30, 2017, Mont\u2019s probation officer informed the federal district court of Mont\u2019s state-court convictions and sentences, and the court exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate whether he violated the terms of his supervised release. The district court then sentenced Mont to 42 months\u2019 imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his imprisonment for state-court convictions.
\nMont challenged the district court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction, but the US Court of Appeals held that under binding precedent, a term of supervised release is paused by imprisonment in connection with a new state conviction. As such, the federal district court properly exercised jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1408", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3164", "ID": "63050", "name": "The American Legion v. American Humanist Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1717", "docket": "17-1717", "term": "2018", "first_party": "The American Legion, et al.", "second_party": "American Humanist Association, et al.", "facts": "In Bladensburg, Maryland, as part of a memorial park honoring veterans is a 40-foot tall cross, which is the subject of this litigation. Construction on the cross began in 1918, and it was widely described using Christian terms and celebrated in Christian services. In 1961, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission acquired the cross and the land, as well as the responsibility to maintain, repair, and otherwise care for the cross. The Commission has spent approximately $117,000 to maintain and repair the cross, and in 2008, it set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations.
\nSeveral non-Christian residents of Prince George\u2019s County, Maryland, expressed offense at the cross, which allegedly amounts to governmental affiliation with Christianity. American Humanist Association is a nonprofit organization advocating for separation of church and state. Together, AHA and the individual residents sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that the Commission\u2019s display and maintenance of the cross violates the Establishment Clause. Applying the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the district court found that the Commission did not violate the Establishment Clause because (1) the cross has a secular purpose, (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not have a primary effect of endorsing religion. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.
", "facts_len": "1493", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3165", "ID": "63053", "name": "Flowers v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-9572", "docket": "17-9572", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Curtis Giovanni Flowers", "second_party": "State of Mississippi", "facts": "In 1996, four employees of Tardy Furniture Store in Winona, Mississippi, were killed during an armed robbery. Curtis Giovanni Flowers was tried for the murder of one of the employees and was convicted and sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that Flowers\u2019s right to a fair trial had been violated by admission of evidence of the other three murder victims. Flowers was tried and convicted for the murder of a second victim of the same incident, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the same grounds. In a third trial, Flowers was tried for all four murders, and a jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Finding that prosecutor Doug Evans had engaged in racial discrimination during jury selection, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed and remanded. The fourth and fifth trials were on all four counts of capital murder, and both resulted in mistrials when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict during the guilt phase.
\nIn the sixth trial, Flowers was tried again and convicted for all four murders.
\nFlowers appealed his conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the State violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during the jury selection process by exercising its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory way. The prosecution had struck five African American prospective jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Flowers\u2019s arguments as to the jury selection, but the US Supreme Court ordered the court to reconsider in light of its ruling in Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), where it held that the defendant in a capital case had shown intentional discrimination in the selection of jurors. On remand to the state supreme court, the court again upheld the ruling for the state. Flowers again sought review by the US Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari as to the question whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US 79 (1986).
", "facts_len": "2187", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3166", "ID": "63068", "name": "City of Escondido v. Emmons", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1660", "docket": "17-1660", "term": "2018", "first_party": "City of Escondido, California, et al.", "second_party": "Marty Emmons", "facts": "In April 2013, Escondido police officers responded to a domestic violence call, which ended in the arrest of Maggie Emmons\u2019s husband. He was later released. In May 2013, police received a 911 call about another domestic disturbance at the same residence. The same officer responded, along with a second officer, and the 911 dispatcher informed the officers that two children could be in the residence and attempts to return the 911 call had gone unanswered.
\nWhen the officers arrived at the residence, they knocked on the door but received no answer. Through a side window, the officers spoke with Emmons wife and convinced her to open the door so they could perform a welfare check. As officers were speaking with her, an unidentified man told Emmons to back away from the window.
\nA few minutes later, and after additional officers had arrived, a man opened the apartment door and came outside. One of the officers told the man not to close the door, but the man closed the door and tried to walk past the officer. The officer stopped him, took him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Police body-camera video shows that the officer did not hit the man or display any weapon, and that the man was not in any visible or audible pain either as a result of the takedown or while on the ground. Minutes later, officers helped the man up and arrested him for the misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest and delaying a police officer.
\nThe man turned out to be Emmons\u2019s father, Marty Emmons. Marty Emmons sued all of the police officers present and the City of Escondido for use of excessive force, among other claims, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The federal district court rejected the excessive force claim as to all but the officer who took down Marty Emmons. With respect to that officer, the district court found that the law was not clearly established that the officer could not act the way he did in that situation, so he was entitled to qualified immunity.
\nThe Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on the excessive force claims against two of the officers, finding that the right to be free of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the events in question.
", "facts_len": "2245", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3167", "ID": "63067", "name": "Kisor v. Wilkie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-15", "docket": "18-15", "term": "2018", "first_party": "James L. Kisor", "second_party": "Robert L. Wilkie", "facts": "Petitioner James L. Kisor is a veteran of the US Marine Corps who served in the Vietnam War. In 1982, Kisor filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) asserting that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of his service in Vietnam. Ultimately, the VA denied his claim in May 1983. In June 2006, Kisor sought review of his previously denied claim, and the VA granted him relief under 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.156(a), which allows a petitioner to \u201creopen\u201d a denial by \u201csubmitting new and material evidence.\u201d In his 2006 petition, Kisor identified materials supporting his claim that existed in 1983 but which were not associated with his file.
\nNotably, the VA did not grant Kisor relief under Section 3.156(c), which authorizes the agency to \u201creconsider\u201d a previously denied claim in the event that it \u201creceives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.\u201d This provision is more favorable to veterans because it provides for a retroactive effective date for any benefits awarded, whereas benefits granted under Section 3.156(a) are effective only on the date the application to reopen was filed.
\nThe VA\u2019s decision (technically made by the Board of Veterans Appeals) relied on the meaning of the term \u201crelevant\u201d as used in 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.156(c)(1). The VA found that the additional documents (Kisor\u2019s Form 214 and the Combat History document) did not qualify as \u201crelevant\u201d for purposes of this section because it did not \u201csuggest or better yet establish that [petitioner] has PTSD as a current disability.\u201d In the VA\u2019s view, records are not \u201crelevant\u201d when they are not \u201coutcome determinative.\u201d
\nCourt of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board\u2019s decision, and the Federal Circuit affirmed as well.
", "facts_len": "1918", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3168", "ID": "63074", "name": "Taggart v. Lorenzen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-489", "docket": "18-489", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Bradley Weston Taggart", "second_party": "Shelley A. Lorenzen, et al.", "facts": "In the words of the Ninth Circuit decision below, \u201c[t]his case arises out of a complex set of bankruptcy proceedings.\u201d
\nPetitioner Bradley Taggart is a real estate developer who owned 25% interest in Sherwood Park Business Center (\u201cSPBC\u201d). Respondents Terry Emmert and Keith Jehnke also each owned a 25% interest in SPBC. In 2007, Taggart purported to transfer his share of SPBC to his attorney, John Berman.
\nEmmert and Jehnke sued Taggart and Berman in Oregon state court, alleging that the transfer violated SPBC\u2019s operating agreement by not allowing Emmert and Jehnke the right of first refusal. Emmert and Jehnke also sought attorneys\u2019 fees. Taggart moved to dismiss the claim and filed a counterclaim for attorneys\u2019 fees.
\nIn November 2009, shortly before the case went to trial, Taggart filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The state-court action was stayed pending the resolution of the bankruptcy petition, and in February 2010, Taggart received his discharge in the bankruptcy proceedings.
\nAfter the discharge, Emmert and Jehnke, represented by attorney Stuart Brown, continued the state-court action. Taggart was largely absent from subsequent proceedings, although Berman renewed his motion to dismiss on Taggart\u2019s behalf at the close of evidence. After a trial, the state court ruled in favor of Emmert and Jehnke and unwound the transfer of Taggart\u2019s share of SPBC to Berman and expelled Taggart from the company. The state court entered a judgment that allowed any party to petition for attorneys\u2019 fees, which led to yet more complicated litigation in state and federal courts.
\nBrown, the attorney for Emmert and Jehnke, filed a petition for attorneys\u2019 fees in state court on behalf of SPBC, Emmert, and Jehnke, against both Berman and Taggart, but limiting fees against Taggart to those incurred after the date of Taggart\u2019s bankruptcy discharge. The petition notified the court of Taggart\u2019s bankruptcy discharge but argued he could still be liable for attorneys\u2019 fees on the theory that Taggart had \u201creturned to the fray.\u201d
\nWhile the attorneys\u2019 fee petition was pending in state court, Taggart sought to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding in bankruptcy court. Once reopened, Taggart asked the court to hold Brown, Jehnke, Emmert, and SPBC (collectively the \u201cCreditors\u201d) in contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge by seeking an award of attorneys\u2019 fees against him in the state court action.
\nThe state court ruled that Taggart had \u201creturned to the fray\u201d as a matter of law, so he could be held liable for attorneys\u2019 fees incurred after his bankruptcy. Taggart timely appealed the state-court determination.
\nSubsequently, the bankruptcy court denied Taggart\u2019s motion for contempt, agreeing with the state court that Taggart had \u201creturned to the fray.\u201d On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that Taggart\u2019s actions did not constitute a \u201creturn to the fray\u201d and thus the discharge injunction barred the claim against him for attorneys\u2019 fees. The district court remanded for a determination whether the Creditors had \u201cknowingly violated the discharge injunction in seeking attorneys\u2019 fees.\u201d On remand, the bankruptcy court found they had knowingly violated the discharge injunction and thus held them in contempt. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (\u201cBAP\u201d) reversed the bankruptcy court\u2019s finding of contempt, finding they had a good faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their attorneys\u2019 fee claim.
\nBack in state court, the state appellate court found that Taggart\u2019s actions did not constitute a \u201creturn to the fray\u201d and thus reversed the state trial court as to its ruling on attorneys\u2019 fees. As a result, the federal district court and the state appellate court both agreed that the Creditors could not pursue attorneys\u2019 fees against Taggart, and the BAP\u2019s ruling freed them from being held in contempt for knowingly violating the discharge injunction.
\nThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP\u2019s opinion, holding that the Creditors did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction and thus could not be held in contempt because they had a subjective good-faith belief that the discharge injunction did not apply to their state-court claim for attorneys\u2019 fees.
", "facts_len": "4299", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3169", "ID": "63069", "name": "Shoop v. Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-56", "docket": "18-56", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Tim Shoop, Warden", "second_party": "Danny Hill", "facts": "In 1986, Danny Hill was convicted in an Ohio court for the torture, rape, and murder of a 12-year-old boy. An intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1993.
\nAfter unsuccessfully seeking to obtain post-conviction relief in state and federal court, Hill filed a new petition in Ohio state court arguing that his death sentence was illegal under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal execution of a defendant who is \u201cmentally retarded.\u201d The trial court denied the claim, an intermediate court affirmed the denial, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review.
\nIn 2010, Hill filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 seeking federal review of his Atkins claim. The federal district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state-court adjudication \u201cresulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\u201d Though it expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supreme Court\u2019s 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. __ (2017)\u2014in which the Court struck down a state law that relied on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for the purpose of eligibility for the death penalty\u2014the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the language and the decision of Moore itself in reaching its decision granting the petition.
", "facts_len": "1763", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3170", "ID": "63073", "name": "Emulex Corp. v. Varjabedian", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-459", "docket": "18-459", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Emulex Corporation, et al.", "second_party": "Gary Varjabedian and Jerry Mutza", "facts": "Emulex Corp., a Delaware company that sold computer components, and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc., announced in February 2015 that they had entered into a merger agreement, with Avago offering to pay $8.00 for every share of outstanding Emulex stock, which was 26.4% higher than the value of Emulex stock the day before the merger was announced. Pursuant to the terms of the merger agreement, Emerald Merger Sub, Inc., initiated a tender offer for Emulex\u2019s outstanding stock in April 2015. (A tender offer is a type of takeover bid in which the offeror publicly offers to purchase a specified amount of the target company\u2019s stock, usually at a price higher than market value.)
\nIt is customary for the target company to issue a statement to shareholders recommending that they either accept or reject the tender offer. Before issuing such a statement, Emulex hired Goldman Sachs to determine whether the proposed merger agreement would be fair to shareholders. Goldman Sachs determined that it would be fair, despite a below-average merger premium, and Emulex issued a statement consistent with that determination. Some of the shareholders were unhappy with the merger\u2019s terms and brought a class action lawsuit against Emulex, Avago, Merger Sub, and the Emulex Board of Directors, alleging violations of federal securities laws.
\nThe district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the lead plaintiff\u2019s claim under Section 14(e) did not plead the requisite mental culpability for claims under that section, the separate claim under Section 14(d) failed because that section does not establish a private right of action for shareholders confronted with a tender offer, and its Section 20(a) claim because its first two claims were insufficient.
\nReviewing de novo the district court\u2019s grant of the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision as to the Section 14(e) claim (but affirmed as to the Section 14(d) claim). Citing the US Supreme Court\u2019s intervening decisions in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the five other circuits that have interpreted Section 14(e). Under the Ninth Circuit\u2019s view, claims under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 78n(e) require a showing of negligence, not scienter (intent or knowledge of wrongdoing).
", "facts_len": "2584", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3171", "ID": "63075", "name": "United States v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-431", "docket": "18-431", "term": "2018", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover", "facts": "On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a \u201cHobbs Act robbery\u201d) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above.
\nOn appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants\u2019 challenges and affirming the district court\u2019s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court\u2019s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part.
\n18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c) contains both an \u201celements clause\u201d and a \u201cresidual clause.\u201d The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it \u201chas as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,\u201d and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, \u201cby its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.\u201d In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in \u00a7 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause.
", "facts_len": "2196", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3172", "ID": "63072", "name": "Iancu v. Brunetti", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-302", "docket": "18-302", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office", "second_party": "Erik Brunetti", "facts": "Erik Brunetti owns the clothing brand \u201cfuct,\u201d founded in 1990. In 2011, two individuals filed an intent-to-use application for the mark FUCT, and the original applicants assigned the application to Brunetti. The examining attorney refused to register the mark under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, finding it comprised immoral or scandalous matter (the pronunciation of \u201cfuct\u201d sounds like a vulgar word) in violation of that section. Brunetti requested reconsideration and appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the examining attorney\u2019s refusal to register the mark. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that while the Board did not err in concluding the mark should be excluded under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, that section\u2019s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.
", "facts_len": "950", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3173", "ID": "63078", "name": "Rehaif v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-9560", "docket": "17-9560", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Hamid Mohamed Rehaif", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Hamid Mohamed Ahmed Ali Rehaif was present in the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa to study at Florida Institute of Technology. He was academically dismissed in December 2014, and his immigration status was terminated in February 2015. Rather than departing the country, Rehaif remained, and in December 2015 went to a shooting range, purchased a box of ammunition, and rented a firearm for an hour. Six days later, an employee at the hotel where Rehaif was staying reported to the police that Rehaif had been acting strangely. Following up on the tip, an FBI agent spoke with Rehaif, who admitted firing firearms at the shooting range and knowing that his student visa was out of status because he was no longer a student. Rehaif consented to a search of his hotel room, where agents found the remainder of the ammunition he purchased.
\nA federal grand jury charged Rehaif with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits a person who \u201cis illegally or unlawfully in the United States\u201d from possessing \u201cany firearm or ammunition.\u201d The penalty for violating that statute, described in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(a)(2), is a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both.
\nAt trial, the government requested a jury instruction that \u201c[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States.\u201d Rehaif objected to this instruction, arguing that the government had to prove both that he had knowingly possessed a firearm and that he had known that he was illegally or unlawfully in the United States when he possessed the firearm.\u201d The government also requested the instruction that \u201c[t]he alien\u2019s status becomes unlawful upon the date of the status violation\u201d; Rehaif requested instead the instruction that \u201c[a] person admitted to the United States on a student visa does not become unlawfully present until an Immigration Officer or an Immigration judge determines that [he] ha[s] violated [his] student status.\u201d The district court instructed the jury as requested by the government and overruled Rehaif\u2019s objection. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, citing binding circuit precedent holding that the government does not need to prove that the defendant knew of his prohibited status, as well as precedents from other circuits and lack of action by Congress to alter the law (suggesting the common judicial construction of the law was what Congress intended).
", "facts_len": "2486", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3174", "ID": "63077", "name": "Quarles v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-778", "docket": "17-778", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Jamar Alonzo Quarles", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Jamar Quarles was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C \u00a7 922(g). At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles\u2019s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (\u201cACCA\u201d) but declined to rule whether the offense constituted generic burglary. Finding the felon-in-possession conviction to be a third offense under the ACCA, the court sentenced Quarles to 204 months in prison. In light of the US Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. __ (2015), in which it held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the ACCA, the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. The district court found that Michigan\u2019s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under the ACCA and resentenced Quarles to 204 months\u2019 incarceration.
\nUnder federal law, a generic burglary is \u201can unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.\u201d\u00a0Michigan law defines the crime of third-degree home invasion as breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, entering the dwelling without permission with intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaking and entering a dwelling and while entering or present in the dwelling, committing a misdemeanor. This third option of intent is the subject of the present dispute. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit found unpersuasive Quarles\u2019s argument that the Michigan crime lacks the intent-upon-entry element that is required under generic burglary. Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, generic burglary does not require intent at entry, so the Michigan crime of third-degree home invasion is not broader than the crime of generic burglary.
", "facts_len": "1975", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3175", "ID": "63080", "name": "North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-457", "docket": "18-457", "term": "2018", "first_party": "North Carolina Department of Revenue", "second_party": "The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust", "facts": "In 1992, Joseph Lee Rice III established in New York an inter vivos trust with William B. Matteson as trustee and Rice\u2019s descendants as the primary beneficiaries (none of whom lived in North Carolina at the time of creation). In 2002, the original trust was divided into three separate trusts, one for each of Rice\u2019s children. One of these trusts was the Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust (\u201cthe Trust\u201d), benefitting his daughter Kimberley Rice Kaestner, who, at the time of the division, was a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina.
\nIn 2005, Matteson resigned as trustee for the three trusts, and Rice appointed a successor trustee, who resided in Connecticut. From 2005 to 2008, the Trust paid state income taxes on income accumulated during those years, despite that no funds were distributed. In 2009, representatives of the Trust filed a claim for a refund of taxes paid to the North Carolina Department of Revenue, which the Department denied. The representatives brought suit in state court, asking the court to require the Department to refund all taxes paid and declare unconstitutional the state statute enabling the Department to collect taxes from the foreign trust. The judge granted the Department\u2019s motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief but denied the motion as to the constitutional claims. Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment as to the constitutional claims. Finding the state statute unconstitutional as applied, the state court granted the Trust\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The Department appealed.
\nThe The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires \u201cminimum contacts\u201d connecting a state and the property it seeks to tax. The state appellate court found that the mere fact that a non-contingent beneficiary of the trust is domiciled in North Carolina, alone, where the trust location, its assets, and its trustee, are all outside the state, does not establish sufficient contacts with North Carolina to permit taxing the trust in that state. The state supreme court affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2073", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3176", "ID": "63076", "name": "Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-315", "docket": "18-315", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Cochise Consultancy, Inc. et al.", "second_party": "United States, ex rel. Billy Joe Hunt", "facts": "The US Department of Defense awarded petitioner The Parsons Corporation a $60 million contract to perform munitions cleanup in Iraq. One component of the contract was that Parsons must provide adequate security to its employees who would be performing the cleanup. After seeking bids for a subcontract, a Parsons committee awarded it to ArmorGroup. Although petitioner Cochise Consultancy had submitted a bid, it did not win the subcontract. However, an Army Corps of Engineers contracting officer, Wayne Shaw, whom Cochise had allegedly bribed undertook elaborate efforts\u2014including forgery, deception, and threats\u2014to induce Parsons to award the subcontract to Cochise rather than to ArmorGroup. One employee in particular refused to award the subcontract to Cochise, believing that the award was made in violation of government regulations. That employee was replaced, and his replacement allowed the award of the subcontract to Cochise to move forward.
\nFrom February to September 2006, Cochise provided security services under the subcontract. Each month, the US government paid Cochise at least $1 million more than it would have paid ArmorGroup had ArmorGroup been awarded the subcontract, plus other expenses related to Cochise not being adequately equipped to perform the services required. In 2006, Shaw, who had orchestrated the fraudulent award of the subcontract to Cochise, rotated out of Iraq, and Parsons immediately reopened the subcontract for bidding and awarded it to ArmorGroup.
\nSeveral years later, in 2010, FBI agents interviewed Parsons employee Billy Joe Hunt about his role in a separate kickback scheme, and during that interview Hunt informed the agents about the contractors\u2019 fraudulent scheme involving the subcontract for security services. Hunt was charged with federal crimes related to the kickback scheme and served ten months in federal prison.
\nAfter he was released, in 2013, Hunt filed a qui tam action under seal alleging that Parsons and Cochise had violated the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3729\u201333, by submitting to the United States false or fraudulent claims for payment. The United States declined to intervene in the action, and Hunt\u2019s complaint was unsealed. The contractors moved to dismiss, arguing that Hunt\u2019s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3731(b)(1), which requires a civil action alleging an FCA violation to be brought within the later of (1) \u201c6 years after the date on which the violation \u2026 is committed\u201d or (2) \u201c3 years after the date when facts material to the right of action\u00a0are known or reasonably should have been known by the\u00a0official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in\u00a0the circumstances\u2026.\u201d The district court granted the contractors\u2019 motion to dismiss, finding that under either provision, Hunt\u2019s claim would be time-barred. Reviewing the district court\u2019s dismissal de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Eleventh Circuit held that when Hunt (the relator) learned of the fraud is immaterial for statute of limitation purposes, and thus the period began to run when government officials learned of the facts giving rise to the claim.
", "facts_len": "3248", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3177", "ID": "63079", "name": "Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-389", "docket": "18-389", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Parker Drilling Management Services, Ltd.", "second_party": "Brian Newton", "facts": "Respondent Brian Newton worked for Parker Drilling Management Services on a drilling platform fixed on the outer Continental Shelf, off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. His shifts lasted fourteen days, and he regularly worked twelve hours per day. He alleges that he usually took fifteen to thirty minutes during his shifts to eat without clocking out and that Parker did not provide 30-minute meal periods for each five hours worked, as required under California law. After Parker terminated him, Newton sued in state court for wage and hour violations under California law. Parker removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion, finding that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a comprehensive statutory scheme that leaves no room for state law to address wage and hour grievances arising on the Outer Continental Shelf. The district court recognized that the FLSA contains a clause that expressly allows for more protective state wage and overtime laws but held nonetheless that California\u2019s laws offered Newton no protections.
\nA panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court\u2019s dismissal on the pleadings, finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act allows the laws of adjacent states to apply to drilling platforms as long as state law is \u201capplicable\u201d and \u201cnot inconsistent\u201d with federal law. California\u2019s wage and hour laws are not inconsistent with the FLSA, so the district court erred in dismissing the claims.
", "facts_len": "1586", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3178", "ID": "63081", "name": "Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-481", "docket": "18-481", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Food Marketing Institute", "second_party": "Argus Leader Media, d/b/a Argus Media", "facts": "The Food Stamp Act of 1964 started one of the largest and fastest-growing welfare programs in the country. Formerly known as the Food Stamp Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) spent over $78 billion on over 46 million people in fiscal year 2012, as compared to the $75 million spent during its first year. Respondent Argus Leader Media, who runs a newspaper in South Dakota, invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to seek information from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) on how much money individual retailers received from taxpayers each year. The USDA refused to provide the information, citing numerous exemptions to FOIA.
\nArgus filed a lawsuit against the USDA in federal district court, which found that the USDA properly withheld the information under FOIA Exemption 3, which applies to information prohibited from disclosure by another federal law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that Exemption 3 did not apply to the contested data, and remanded the case back to the district court. On remand, the issue before the court was whether Exemption 4\u2014which covers \u201ctrade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential\u201d\u2014applied to the information sought.
\nFor the purpose of applying Exemption 4, the circuit courts have adopted a definition of \u201cconfidential\u201d different from the term\u2019s ordinary meaning. Courts have held the term to mean that Exemption 4 applies only if disclosure is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the source of the information. There is a circuit split as to what \u201csubstantial competitive harm\u201d means. The district court in this case adopted the definition from the DC Circuit, which has held that \u201ccompetitive harm may be established if there is evidence of \u2018actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury.\u2019\u201d\u00a0 Appling that definition to the facts at hand, the court found speculative the USDA\u2019s claims of competitive injury and entered judgment for Argus. The USDA decided not to appeal the judgment, so petitioner Food Marketing Institute (FMI) intervened and filed the appeal. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.
", "facts_len": "2266", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "3179", "ID": "63082", "name": "McDonough v. Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-485", "docket": "18-485", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Edward G. McDonough", "second_party": "Youel Smith", "facts": "During the 2009 Working Families Party primary election in Troy, New York, several individuals forged signatures and provided false information on absentee ballot applications in an attempt to affect the outcome of the primary. The individuals submitted the forged applications to the commissioner of the Rensselaer County elections board, Edward G. McDonough. McDonough approved the applications but later claimed that he did not know they had been forged.
\nAfter the plot was uncovered, the state court appointed Youel Smith as a special district attorney to lead the investigation and prosecution of those involved. McDonough claimed that Smith engaged in an elaborate scheme to frame McDonough for the crimes. According to McDonough, Smith knew that McDonough was innocent and fabricated evidence in the form of forged affidavits, false testimony, and faulty DNA methods. After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the second trial ended in McDonough\u2019s acquittal on December 21, 2012.
\nOn December 18, 2015, McDonough filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 claiming that\u00a0Smith and the other defendants violated his due process rights by fabricating evidence and using it against him before a grand jury and in two trials. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that McDonough\u2019s claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the allegedly fabricated evidence had been disclosed to McDonough over three years before he filed his Section 1983 claim.
\nThe district court granted the motions to dismiss as to McDonough\u2019s due process claims, citing the statute of limitations. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the precedent in that circuit established that the statute of limitations begins to run on a fabrication of evidence claim when the plaintiff has \u201creason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.\u201d The Second Circuit acknowledged that Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held otherwise but expressly disagreed with those decisions.
", "facts_len": "2070", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3180", "ID": "63083", "name": "Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-525", "docket": "18-525", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Fort Bend County, Texas", "second_party": "Lois M. Davis", "facts": "Lois Davis was an information technology (IT) supervisor for Fort Bend County, Texas. She filed a complaint with the county human resources department alleging that the IT director had sexually harassed and assaulted her, and following an investigation by the county, the director resigned.\u00a0Davis alleges that after the director\u2019s resignation, her supervisor\u2014who was a personal friend of the director\u2014retaliated against her for making the complaint.
\nDavis filed a charge with the Texas Workforce Commission alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. While the charge was pending, Davis allegedly informed her supervisor of a specific Sunday she could not work due to a \u201cprevious religious commitment,\u201d and the supervisor did not approve the absence. Davis attended the event and did not report to work, and Fort Bend terminated her employment.
\nDavis submitted to the Commission an \u201cintake questionnaire\u201d in which she wrote in the word \u201creligion\u201d next to a checklist labeled \u201cEmployment Harms or Actions\u201d but did not amend her charge of discrimination or explain the note. The Commission informed Davis that it had made a preliminary decision to dismiss her charge and issued a right-to-sue letter. Davis filed her lawsuit in federal district court alleging both retaliation and religious discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all claims.
\nThe Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court as to the retaliation claim but reversed and remanded as to her religious discrimination claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact that warranted a trial. On remand, Fort Bend argued for the first time that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on the religious discrimination claim, as required by Title VII. The district court agreed, finding that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII cases. Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by failure to challenge it, the district court dismissed Davis\u2019s religious discrimination claim with prejudice.
\nTitle VII requires plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing formal charges with the EEOC. There is no consensus within the Fifth Circuit whether this requirement is a jurisdictional requirement (which may be raised at any point and cannot be waived) or merely a prerequisite to suit (and thus subject to waiver). Relying on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), in which the Court held that the Title VII\u2019s statutory limitation of covered employers to those with 15 or more employees was not jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit held that the administrative exhaustion requirement was also not jurisdictional. This holding is consistent with holdings in the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and DC Circuits, but inconsistent with holdings by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
", "facts_len": "3019", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3181", "ID": "63085", "name": "The Dutra Group v. Batterton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-266", "docket": "18-266", "term": "2018", "first_party": "The Dutra Group", "second_party": "Christopher Batterton", "facts": "Respondent Christopher Batterton was a deckhand on a vessel owned and operated by the the petitioner, Dutra Group. While Batterton was working on the vessel, a hatch cover blew open and crushed his hand. The hatch cover blew open because the vessel lacked a particular exhaust mechanism, the lack of which made the vessel unseaworthy as a matter of law.
\nThe district court denied Dutra Group\u2019s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, and the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.\u00a0
\nIn Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit held that \u201cpunitive damages are available under general maritime law for claims of unseaworthiness,\u201d as distinguished from Jones Act claims, where punitive damages are unavailable. Dutra Group argues that Evich is implicitly overruled by the US Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990), which holds that loss of society damages are unavailable in a general maritime action for wrongful death and lost future earnings are unavailable in a general maritime survival action.
\nThe Ninth Circuit found unpersuasive Dutra Group\u2019s argument, finding that the Court in Miles considered only damages for loss of society and of future earnings, not punitive damages. While Miles does limit recovery for \u201cpecuniary loss,\u201d punitive damages are not \u201cpecuniary loss,\u201d which means simply loss of money. Thus, Miles left undisturbed the Ninth Circuit\u2019s opinion in Evich.
", "facts_len": "1604", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3182", "ID": "63084", "name": "PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1705", "docket": "17-1705", "term": "2018", "first_party": "PDR Network, LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.", "facts": "Petitioner PDR Network is a company that \u201cdelivers health knowledge products and services\u201d to healthcare providers and is perhaps most known for publishing the Physicians\u2019 Desk Reference, a popular reference book with information on various prescription drugs. In December 2013, PDR Network sent by fax to Carlton & Harris, a chiropractic office in West Virginia, an advertisement for a free eBook version of the 2014 Physicians\u2019 Desk Reference. The material advised that the recipient had received the offer \u201cbecause you are a member of the PDR Network.\u201d
\nOn behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated recipients of faxes from PDR Network, Carlton & Harris sued PDR Network in federal court under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (\u201cTCPA\u201d), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, which generally prohibits the use of a fax machine to send \u201cunsolicited advertisement[s].\u201d Under that statute, the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement can sue the sender for damages and recover actual monetary loss or $500 in statutory damages for each violation. If a court finds the sender \u201cwillfully or knowingly violated\u201d the TCPA, the recipient is entitled to triple damages.
\nAs a preliminary matter, the court found that the Hobbs Act does not require the court to defer to the FCC\u2019s interpretation of an unambiguous term. Substituting its own definition of \u201cunsolicited advertisement\u201d for the FCC\u2019s definition of the term, which was promulgated by rule in 2006 (\u201c2006 FCC Rule\u201d), the court found that PDR Network\u2019s fax was not an unsolicited advertisement because it lacked a \u201ccommercial aim.\u201d Moreover, the court found that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, the fax would not be an \u201cunsolicited advertisement.\u201d For this reason, the district court granted PDR Network\u2019s motion to dismiss.
\nCarlton & Harris appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court\u2019s decision, finding that the Hobbs Act disallows district courts from considering the validity of orders like the 2006 FCC Rule, and that the district court\u2019s interpretation of the rule is at odds with the plain meaning of its text.
", "facts_len": "2199", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3183", "ID": "63090", "name": "New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-280", "docket": "18-280", "term": "2019", "first_party": "New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "City of New York, New York, et al.", "facts": "The State of New York law prohibits the possession of firearms without a license. To obtain a handgun license, an individual must apply with a local licensing officer\u2014which, in New York City, is the police commissioner\u2014and the application process involves an investigation into the applicant\u2019s mental health history, criminal history, and moral character. There are two primary types of handgun licenses: \u201ccarry\u201d licenses and \u201cpremises\u201d licenses. This case involves the latter, which permits the licensee to \u201chave and possess in his dwelling\u201d a pistol or revolver. The premises license is specific to a particular address, and the handguns permitted by the license may not be removed from that address except in limited circumstances prescribed by law. One such circumstance is to \u201ctransport his/her handgun(s) directly to and from an authorized small arms range/shooting club, unloaded, and in a locked container, the ammunition to be carried separately.\u201d All small arms ranges/shooting clubs authorized under the rule are located in New York City.
\nThree individuals with premises licenses sought to transport their handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City\u2014which is prohibited by the rule. One of the individuals sought to transport his handgun between the premises in New York City for which it was licensed and his second home in Hancock, New York\u2014which the rule also prohibits. The three individuals and petitioner New York State Rifle & Pistol Association filed a lawsuit in federal district court, asking the court to declare the city\u2019s restrictions unconstitutional and to enjoin the city from enforcing them.
\nThe district court found the rule \u201cmerely regulates rather than restricts the right to possess a firearm in the home and is a minimal, or at most, modest burden on the right\u201d and thus did not violate plaintiffs\u2019 Second Amendment rights. The district court also held that the rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment right of expressive association, or the fundamental right to travel. Reviewing the district court\u2019s decision de novo, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "2188", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3184", "ID": "63091", "name": "Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-281", "docket": "18-281", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Virginia House of Delegates, et al.", "second_party": "Golden Bethune-Hill, et al.", "facts": "This civil action first arose in 2014, when 12 Virginia voters alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That case ultimately went before the US Supreme Court, and in 2017, the Court held that a lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating the challengers\u2019 claims of racial gerrymandering. The Court upheld one of the districts and remanded the case for the lower court to reconsider the districting in the remaining 11 districts.
\nIn June 2018, the lower court struck down the 11 districts as unconstitutional, finding that race was the main factor used to determine the boundaries for the districts. The court found that the legislature failed to prove that the districts as drawn, which attempted to put the exact same percentage of African American adults in each district, were necessary to comply with federal voting-rights laws.
\nThe Virginia House of Delegates appealed the district court\u2019s decision to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed to review the case, as well as the preliminary question whether the House of Delegates has judicial standing to appeal.
", "facts_len": "1169", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "dismissal - other", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3185", "ID": "63086", "name": "Mitchell v. Wisconsin", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-6210", "docket": "18-6210", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Gerald P. Mitchell", "second_party": "State of Wisconsin", "facts": "In May 2013, Gerald P. Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He became lethargic on the way to the police station, so the arresting officers took him to a hospital instead. An officer read him a statutorily mandated form regarding the state implied consent law, but Mitchell was too incapacitated to indicate his understanding or consent and then fell unconscious. Without a warrant, at the request of the police, hospital workers drew Mitchell\u2019s blood, which revealed his blood alcohol concentration to be .222.
\nMitchell was charged with operating while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. He moved to suppress the results of the blood test on the ground that his blood was taken without a warrant and in the absence of any exceptions to the warrant requirement. The state argued that under the implied-consent statute, police did not need a warrant to draw his blood. Many states, including Wisconsin, have implied consent laws, which provide that by driving a vehicle, motorists consent to submit to chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine to determine alcohol or drug content. The trial court sided with the state and allowed the results of the blood test into evidence. Mitchell was convicted on both counts.
\nMitchell appealed his conviction, and the court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin with respect to the issue \u201cwhether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin\u2019s implied consent law...violates the Fourth Amendment.\u201d The Supreme Court of Wisconsin accepted the certification and upheld the search 5\u20132, but without any majority for the rationale for upholding it.
", "facts_len": "1710", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3186", "ID": "63092", "name": "Rucho v. Common Cause", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422", "docket": "18-422", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Robert A. Rucho, et al.", "second_party": "Common Cause, et al.", "facts": "A three-judge district court struck down North Carolina\u2019s 2016 congressional map, ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the map and that the map was the product of partisan gerrymandering. The district court then enjoined the state from using the map after November 2018. North Carolina Republicans, led by Robert Rucho, head of the senate redistricting committee, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "431", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3187", "ID": "63096", "name": "Yovino v. Rizo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-272", "docket": "18-272", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Jim Yovino, Fresno County Superintendent of Schools", "second_party": "Aileen Rizo", "facts": "The facts giving rise to this case are not immediately relevant to the issue on which the Court ruled.\u00a0Aileen Rizo, an employee of the Fresno County Office of\u00a0Education, filed a lawsuit against the superintendent of\u00a0schools, claiming, among other things, that the county was\u00a0violating the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision on the basis of binding Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the statute. The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and issued an opinion authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt with a new, purportedly binding interpretation of the statute.
\nJudge Reinhardt died after he had finished writing the opinion but 11 days before it was officially filed. Without Judge Reinhardt, the opinion authored by him would have been approved by only 5 of the 10 judges sitting en banc, and those judges concurred on the judgment but not the reasoning.
", "facts_len": "998", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3188", "ID": "63104", "name": "Kansas v. Garcia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-834", "docket": "17-834", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Kansas", "second_party": "Ramiro Garcia, et al.", "facts": "The controversy before the Court arises from three cases presenting the same issue.
\nIn State v. Garcia, Ramiro Garcia was stopped for speeding in Overland Park, Kansas. When asked why he was speeding, he told officers that he was on his way to work. A records check revealed that he was already the subject of an investigation, and police contacted his employer to obtain employment documents. Among the documents was his federal Form I-9, which listed a social security number belonging to another person. Further investigation revealed that Garcia had used the same number on other federal and state forms. On the basis of this information, Garcia was charged with identity theft under state law.
\nIn State v. Morales, a special agent with the Social Security Administration determined that Donaldo Morales was using a social security number issued to another person. The agent reviewed Morales\u2019s employment file, which included a federal Form I-9 as well as various federal and state tax forms. Morales was charged with identity theft and two other state-law offenses.
\nIn State v. Ochoa-Lara, federal and state officers determined that Guadalupe Ochoa-Lara was using a social security number issued to another individual to lease an apartment. On further investigation, officers reviewed the Form W-4 that Ochoa-Lara had completed for employment and found he was using the same social security number that belonged to another individual. On this basis, Ochoa-Lara was charged with two counts of identity theft under state law.
\nAll three defendants were convicted of at least one related charge, and all three appealed their convictions.
", "facts_len": "1701", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3189", "ID": "63102", "name": "Rotkiske v. Klemm", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-328", "docket": "18-328", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Kevin C. Rotkiske", "second_party": "Paul Klemm, et al.", "facts": "Kevin Rotkiske accumulated credit card debt between 2003 and 2005, which his bank referred to Klemm & Associates for collection. Klemm filed a collections lawsuit against Rotkiske in March 2008 but was unable to locate him for service of process. Klemm refiled its suit in January 2009 and attempted to serve Rotkiske at the same address. Unbeknownst to Rotkiske, someone at that address accepted service on his behalf, and Klemm obtained a default judgment against him. Rotkiske only discovered the judgment when he applied for a mortgage in September 2014.
\nRotkiske filed the present action against Klemm alleging that its actions violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Klemm moved to dismiss the claim as time-barred, and the district court granted the motion to dismiss. The FDCPA provides that any action under the Act must be brought \u201cwithin one year from the date on which the violation occurs.\u201d Rotkiske argued that the statute incorporates a \u201cdiscovery rule,\u201d which is recognized in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and which \u201cdelays the beginning of a limitations period until the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.\u201d The district court rejected this argument, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, the limitations period begins at the time of injury. Rotkiske appealed, but before the appellate panel issued its opinion and judgment, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment of the district court.
", "facts_len": "1554", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3190", "ID": "63095", "name": "County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-260", "docket": "18-260", "term": "2019", "first_party": "County of Maui, Hawaii", "second_party": "Hawaii Wildlife Fund", "facts": "The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits for the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from point sources, which the CWA defines as \u201cdiscernible, confined, and discrete conveyances.\u201d In contrast, all other sources of pollution are characterized as nonpoint sources and are controlled through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other non-CWA programs. The CWA also distinguishes between groundwater and navigable waters, the latter being \u201cwaters of the United States\u201d and exclusive of the former.
\nConstructed with funding by the EPA in the 1970s, the County of Maui\u2019s Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility treats wastewater generated by homes and business in the western part of Maui by injecting treated wastewater (called \u201ceffluent\u201d) into underground injection control (UIC) wells\u2014a common method used by municipalities to dispose of effluent. Before injection, effluent is treated to meet R-1 water standards, Hawaii\u2019s highest standards for recycled water. Some of the treated effluent is used for resort and golf course irrigation. Upon injection, effluent immediately mixes with groundwater and disperses vertically and horizontally, eventually migrating to the ocean. Over 90% of the effluent/groundwater mixture enters the ocean through diffuse flow, with no identifiable entry point. Reports from 1973, 1991, and 1994 indicate that both the EPA and the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) understood that the wastewater entered the ocean, and neither agency suggested that this result required NPDES permitting.
\nThe district court at summary judgment held that the County violated the CWA by discharging effluent through groundwater and into the ocean without the NPDES permit required by the CWA, and that the County had fair notice of its violations. The court based its ruling on findings that the County \u201cindirectly discharged[d] a pollutant into the ocean through a groundwater conduit,\u201d (2) the groundwater is a \u201cpoint source\u201d as defined by the CWA, and (3) the groundwater is a \u201cnavigable water\u201d under the CWA. The County appealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court.
", "facts_len": "2202", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3191", "ID": "63093", "name": "Department of Commerce v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-966", "docket": "18-966", "term": "2018", "first_party": "United States Department of Commerce, et al.", "second_party": "State of New York, et al.", "facts": "Secretary of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross issued a decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 Census questionnaire. The decision was challenged in federal court by a coalition of states, cities, and counties, with the challengers alleging that the question could cause a significant undercount because some households with individuals who are unlawfully present in the country would be deterred from responding. The challengers claim the Secretary\u2019s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that it violates various regulatory, statutory, and constitutional provisions.
\nAs part of its challenge, the challengers sought\u2014and the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the venue for their action, authorized\u2014depositions of high-ranking Executive Branch officials to determine Secretary Ross\u2019s subjective motivations in making the decision at issue.
\nOn October 5, 2018, Justice Ginsburg denied the government\u2019s previous stay application without prejudice, \u201cprovided that the Court of Appeals will afford sufficient time for either party to seek relief in this Court before the depositions in question are taken.\u201d The court of appeals denied mandamus relief to quash the deposition of Secretary Ross and the deposition of other high-ranking officials, so the government renewed its application for a stay. The Court then blocked the deposition of Secretary Ross but allowed others to proceed.
\nThe government filed a petition for mandamus asking the Court to direct the trial court to exclude fact-finding beyond the official records, or, in the alternative, review the appellate court decision itself. Treating the petition for mandamus as a petition for certiorari, the Court granted the petition to review the decision of the court below.
\nBefore the Court could rule, however, the district court issued its decision enjoining the Secretary from reinstating the question at issue. That action rendered the original case moot but presented an additional question whether the district court properly issued the injunction.
", "facts_len": "2080", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3192", "ID": "63106", "name": "Ramos v. Louisiana", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-5924", "docket": "18-5924", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Evangelisto Ramos", "second_party": "State of Louisiana", "facts": "Evangelisto Ramos was charged with second-degree murder and exercised his right to a jury trial. After deliberating, ten of the twelve jurors found that the prosecution had proven its case against Ramos beyond a reasonable doubt, while two jurors reached the opposite conclusion. Under Louisiana\u2019s non-unanimous jury verdict law, agreement of only ten jurors is sufficient to enter a guilty verdict, so Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
\nRamos appealed his case, and the state appellate court affirmed the lower court. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied review.
", "facts_len": "614", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3193", "ID": "63113", "name": "Lamone v. Benisek", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-726", "docket": "18-726", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Linda H. Lamone, et al.", "second_party": "O. John Benisek, et al.", "facts": "This is the second time this case regarding partisan gerrymandering in Maryland comes before the Supreme Court. In Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __ (2018), the Court heard the case and issued a per curiam (unsigned) opinion that did not resolve the substantive legal questions. Rather, in that opinion the Court emphasized that the case was in its early stages and that the Court was reviewing the district court\u2019s decision under a lenient standard\u2014abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the Court found that the district court\u2019s ruling (denying the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction barring the state from enforcing the redistricting plan and requiring it to implement a new map for the 2018 midterm elections) was not unreasonable.
\nAfter the Court decided Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. __ (2018)\u2014holding that the Democratic voter plaintiffs in Wisconsin had failed to demonstrate Article III standing based on claims of statewide injury due to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering\u2014the district court in the Maryland case held another hearing. This time, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and ordered the state to draw a new map for the 2020 election. Maryland appealed to the Supreme Court.
", "facts_len": "1358", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3194", "ID": "63115", "name": "Kansas v. Glover", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-556", "docket": "18-556", "term": "2019", "first_party": "State of Kansas", "second_party": "Charles Glover", "facts": "While on patrol, a Kansas police officer ran a registration check on a\u00a0pickup truck with a Kansas license plate. Upon running the check, the officer learned that the truck was registered to Charles Glover, Jr., and that his license had been revoked. Acting on suspicion that the owner was unlawfully operating the vehicle (based on the assumption that the registered owner of the truck was also the driver), the officer stopped the truck. The officer confirmed that Glover was the driver and issued him a citation for being a habitual violator of Kansas traffic laws.
\nGlover moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Glover, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pull him over. The state argued that a law enforcement officer may infer that the owner of a vehicle is the one driving the vehicle, absent information to the contrary, and the knowledge that the owner has a revoked license combined with that inference gives rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.
\nThe state trial court concluded that it is not reasonable for an officer to infer that the registered owner of a vehicle is also its driver and granted Glover\u2019s motion to suppress. The appellate court reversed, and the Kansas Supreme Court granted review. The supreme court reversed the lower court, holding that the inference impermissibly \u201cstacked\u201d assumptions and would relieve the state of its burden of showing reasonable suspicion for a stop.
", "facts_len": "1586", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3195", "ID": "63121", "name": "Altitude Express v. Zarda", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1623", "docket": "17-1623", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Altitude Express, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Melissa Zarda, as Executor of the Estate of Donald Zarda, et al.", "facts": "Donald Zarda worked in 2010 as a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.
\nZarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's \u201con the basis of sex\u201d language necessarily includes discrimination \u201con the basis of sexual orientation.\u201d In light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), and Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).
\nZarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda\u2019s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn Simonton and Dawson, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and expressly overruled Simonton and Dawson, finding, consistent with the EEOC\u2019s position, that Title VII\u2019s prohibition on discrimination because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation.
\nThis case is consolidated for oral argument with Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618.
", "facts_len": "2882", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3196", "ID": "63107", "name": "Kahler v. Kansas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135", "docket": "18-6135", "term": "2019", "first_party": "James K. Kahler", "second_party": "Kansas", "facts": "Kraig Kahler enjoyed a happy marriage and valued his family for many years. However, in 2008, his marriage began to falter, and his wife began an extramarital affair. By the next year, the formerly happy couple was heading toward divorce, and Kahler allegedly became abusive toward his wife and estranged from their children. Kahler increasingly suffered from depression and obsessive compulsive disorder, and though he saw several psychologists and psychiatrists who prescribed antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, and sleep aids, he refused to take his medications as directed.
\nIn November 2009, Kahler went to his wife\u2019s grandmother\u2019s house, where his family was visiting, and shot and killed his wife, his two daughters, and the grandmother. Kahler was arrested, charged, and sentenced to death for the four killings. Experts for the defense and the prosecution agreed that Kahler exhibited major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive, borderline, paranoid, and narcissistic personality tendencies. The defense expert testified that, in his opinion, due to Kahler\u2019s mental illness, he did not make the rational choice to kill his family members and indeed had at the time of the shooting temporarily \u201ccompletely lost control.\u201d
\nUnder Kansas law, a jury cannot consider mental disease or defect as a defense to a crime except insofar as it shows \u201cthat the defendant lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged.\u201d In effect, this law makes irrelevant \u201cwhether the defendant is unable to know the nature and quality of his actions or know the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions.\u201d
\nThe Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
", "facts_len": "1734", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3197", "ID": "63123", "name": "Barton v. Barr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-725", "docket": "18-725", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Andre Martello Barton", "second_party": "William P. Barr, Attorney General", "facts": "A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges.
\nBarton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual \u201chas resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.\u201d This residency requirement is subject to a \u201cstop-time rule\u201d which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual \u201cinadmissible\u201d or \u201cremovable.\u201d The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be \u201crendered inadmissible\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 1229b(a).
\nThe immigration judge ruled in the government\u2019s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge\u2019s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be \u201crendered inadmissible.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2406", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3198", "ID": "63122", "name": "Bostock v. Clayton County", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1618", "docket": "17-1618", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Gerald Lynn Bostock", "second_party": "Clayton County, Georgia", "facts": "Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock\u2019s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock\u2019s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for \u201cconduct unbecoming of its employees.\u201d
\nWithin months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock\u2019s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting\u00a0 procedural deficiencies in Bostock\u2019s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel\u2019s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision.
\nThis case is consolidated for oral argument with\u00a0Altitude Express v. Zarda, No. 17-1623.
", "facts_len": "2206", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3199", "ID": "63125", "name": "R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-107", "docket": "18-107", "term": "2019", "first_party": "R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.", "second_party": "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.", "facts": "Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home\u2019s owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.
\nStephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen\u2019s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.
\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home\u2019s termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
", "facts_len": "1178", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3200", "ID": "63124", "name": "CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-565", "docket": "18-565", "term": "2019", "first_party": "CITGO Asphalt Refining Company, et al.", "second_party": "Frescati Shipping Co., Ltd., et al.", "facts": "In 2004, CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. and related companies contracted with Frescati Shipping Co. and others for a shipment of crude oil from Venezuela to Paulsboro, New Jersey. Frescati owned and operated the oil tanker, which had nearly completed its 1,900-mile journey to its destination berth on the Delaware River. To reach its intended berth, the tanker needed to pass through Federal Anchorage Number 9, a federally designated section of the river in which ships may anchor. That area is periodically surveyed for depth and dredged by the Army Corps of Engineers, but no government agency is responsible for preemptively searching for obstructions. Anyone who wishes to search for obstructions in that area may do so, but dredging requires a permit from the Corps of Engineers.
\nAs it passed through this section of the river, the tanker hit an abandoned anchor, causing approximately 264,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into the river. The cleanup cost was $143 million.
\nFrescati originally paid for the cleanup and was then reimbursed $88 million by the federal government, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Frescati and the United States filed a lawsuit seeking a portion of costs from CITGO, the intended recipient of the oil.
\nAt the beginning of what turned out to be extensive litigation, the district court initially found that CITGO was not liable under contract or tort law. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the decision in part after determining that Frescati was a third-party beneficiary of CITGO\u2019s safe berth warranty and that CITGO had a duty of care to Frescati (thus implicating liability under both contract and tort theories). On remand, the district court found CITGO liable under both contract and tort. However, the court also found that the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Army Corps of Engineers misled CITGO into believing the anchorage was free of obstructions and reduced CITGO\u2019s liability by 50%. The government, CITGO, and Frescati all appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the contract claim, vacated the negligence claim, and affirmed in part other claims.
", "facts_len": "2197", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3201", "ID": "63134", "name": "Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-483", "docket": "18-483", "term": "2018", "first_party": "Kristina Box, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Health, et al.", "second_party": "Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Indiana legislature passed two laws at issue in this case.
\nThe first related to the disposition of fetal remains by abortion providers. This law changed the definition of infectious and pathological waste, thereby preventing abortion providers from incinerating fetal remains with surgical byproducts. The law also authorized simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, which Indiana law does not allow for human remains.
\nThe second provision of Indiana law barred the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers.
\nPlanned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky challenged the laws on constitutional grounds but notably did not make the argument that either law burdened a fundamental right.
", "facts_len": "762", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "3202", "ID": "63135", "name": "Allen v. Cooper", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-877", "docket": "18-877", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Frederick L. Allen, et al.", "second_party": "Roy A. Cooper, III, Governor of North Carolina, et al.", "facts": "In 1996, a private researcher hired petitioner Frederick Allen and his company, Nautilus Productions, LLC, to document the recently discovered shipwreck of Blackbeard\u2019s Queen Anne\u2019s Revenge, which ran aground at Beaufort, North Carolina, in 1718. Allen documented the shipwreck for nearly twenty years in photographs and videos and registered his works with the U.S. Copyright Office.
\nAt some point before October 2013, the state of North Carolina posted various of the copyrighted works of Allen online without his permission. In October 2013, the state and other involved parties entered into a settlement agreement with Allen and his company, paying him for the infringement of his works and agreeing not to infringe the works going forward. At the time, the state removed its infringing works, but shortly afterward, it again posted and published Allen\u2019s works. The state then passed \u201cBlackbeard\u2019s Law,\u201d which purportedly converted Allen\u2019s works into \u201cpublic record\u201d materials that the state could use freely.
\nAllen sued the state for copyright infringement, and the state moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Allen argued that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA)\u2014which defines potential infringers of copyright to include \u201cany State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity\u201d\u2014abrogates state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement claims.
\nThe district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding persuasive Allen\u2019s arguments regarding the CRCA\u2019s abrogation of sovereign immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity via the CRCA.
", "facts_len": "1808", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3203", "ID": "63137", "name": "Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1165", "docket": "18-1165", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Retirement Plans Committee of IBM, et al.", "second_party": "Larry W. Jander, et al.", "facts": "In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. __ (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), fiduciaries to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) are not entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their decisions to buy or hold employer stock. Rather, for a plaintiff to state a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence based on inside information, the plaintiff need only \u201cplausibly allege that a prudent fiduciary in the defendant\u2019s position could not have concluded that [an alternative action] would do more harm than good to the fund.\u201d Thus the Court established a \u201ccontext-specific\u201d pleading standard rather than a generalized presumption standard.
\nIBM offers as a benefit to its employees an ERISA-qualified ESOP, invested predominantly in IBM common stock, with Retirement Plans Committee of IBM as the fiduciary. In 2015, two substantially similar lawsuits were filed against IBM and its officers, one under securities laws and the other under ERISA. Both lawsuits alleged that IBM fraudulently concealed problems with the company\u2019s microelectronics unit, thereby artificially inflating IBM\u2019s reported value. By continuing to invest in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing that the market price was artificially inflated due to the fraudulent scheme, the plaintiffs in the ERISA lawsuit argued that the ESOP\u2019s fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence under Section 404 of ERISA.
\nThe district court dismissed the ERISA lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the pleading standard established in Fifth Third, as they had not alleged facts showing that the fiduciaries \u201ccould not have concluded\u201d that publicly disclosing the alleged \u201cfraud\u201d or halting further investments in IBM stock would be more likely to harm the fund than to help it.
\nThe plaintiffs amended their complaint to add generic allegations that disclosure of the alleged fraud was \u201cinevitable\u201d and that the magnitude of the stock price correction resulting from a delayed disclosure would increase over time. The plaintiffs also added a claim that the fiduciaries could have avoided doing more harm than good by instead purchasing a \u201clow-cost\u201d hedging product.
\nThe district court again dismissed the lawsuit for failing to meet the Fifth Third pleading standard and because a prudent fiduciary could reasonably find their proposed alternative likely to cause more harm than good. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that \u201cwhen a \u2018drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund\u2019 is inevitable, it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock\u2019s artificial inflation on the ESOP\u2019s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2931", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3204", "ID": "63136", "name": "Holguin-Hernandez v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-7739", "docket": "18-7739", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Gonzalo Holguin was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law, and sentenced to 24 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. Holguin was again arrested for possession and intent to distribute, and after that arrest the government filed a petition to revoke the supervised release term. Before the revocation hearing occurred, Holguin pleaded guilty to the second set of charges.
\nAt the revocation hearing, the district court explained the allegations of the revocation petition to Holguin and asked how he pleaded. Holguin answered \u201cTrue.\u201d Holguin\u2019s attorney argued for a concurrent sentence on the revocation, but the court issued a 12-month consecutive sentence instead. Holguin appealed the reasonableness of his sentence, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding Holguin had failed to make a formal objection after the announcement of his sentence.
", "facts_len": "968", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3205", "ID": "63138", "name": "Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, et al.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1498", "docket": "17-1498", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Atlantic Ritchfield Company", "second_party": "Gregory A. Christian, et al.", "facts": "This case arises from Montana\u2019s Anaconda Smelter site\u2014the location of a large copper concentrating and smelting operation that started in 1884 and expanded to other nearby areas in 1902. In 1977, Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda Smelter, and it shut down smelter activities in 1980. The smelter operations over the almost-century of operations caused high concentrations of arsenic, lead, copper, cadmium, and zinc to contaminate soil, groundwater, and surface water. In 1983, the EPA prioritized the Anaconda Smelter site as a Superfund site, working with Atlantic Richfield to address the contamination. Since then, Atlantic Richfield has worked with the EPA for 35 years to remediate the site, at a cost of approximately $470 million.
\nIn 2008, landowners within the Anaconda Superfund site sued Atlantic Richfield in Montana state court, alleging that the smelter operations between 1884 and 1980 had caused damage to their properties. Atlantic Richfield raised no objections to the plaintiffs\u2019 claims of loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminution of value, incidental and consequential damages, and annoyance and discomfort. However, it did object to the common-law claim for \u201crestoration\u201d damages.
\nTo establish a claim for restoration damages in Montana, plaintiffs must prove that they will actually use the award to clean up the site. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that restoration of their property requires \u201cwork in excess of what the EPA required of Atlantic Richfield in its selected remedy.\u201d Atlantic Richfield moved for summary judgment, arguing that the restoration claim constituted a \u201cchallenge\u201d to the EPA\u2019s remedy and thus was jurisdictionally barred by CERCLA \u00a7 113, which deprives courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to EPA-selected remedies. Atlantic Richfield also argued that the landowners are \u201cpotentially responsible parties\u201d and thus must seek EPA approval under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9622(e)(6) of CERCLA before engaging in remedial action. Finally, Atlantic Richfield argued that CERCLA preempted state common-law claims for restoration.
\nThe trial court held that CERCLA permitted plaintiffs\u2019 claim for restoration damages, and Atlantic Richfield sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court, which the court granted. Over a dissent, the Supreme Court of Montana rejected all three of Atlantic Richfield\u2019s arguments, affirming the trial court\u2019s decision permitting the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial on their restoration claim.
", "facts_len": "2529", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated in-part/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3206", "ID": "63140", "name": "Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1116", "docket": "18-1116", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, et al.", "second_party": "Christopher M. Sulyma", "facts": "In 2015, Christopher Sulyma, a former Intel employee and participant in the company\u2019s retirement plans filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly investing retirement funds in violation of Section 1104 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets forth the standard of care of fiduciaries. Sulyma alleged that the funds were not properly diversified and that as a result, they did not perform well during his employment (and thus investment) period of 2010 to 2012.
\nIntel moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1113(2), which provides that an action under Section 1104 may not be commenced more than \u201cthree years after the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach or violation.\u201d The district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and ordered discovery for the question of the statute of limitations. After discovery, the district court found no genuine dispute as to any material fact that Sulyma had actual knowledge of the investments more than three years before filing the action, and it granted summary judgment for Intel. Sulyma appealed.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that \u201cactual knowledge\u201d does not mean that the plaintiff knew that the underlying action violated ERISA or that the underlying action even occurred, only that the plaintiff was actually aware of the nature of the alleged breach. For a Section 1104 action, this means the plaintiff must have known that the defendant had acted and that those acts were imprudent. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
", "facts_len": "1713", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3207", "ID": "63139", "name": "McKinney v. Arizona", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1109", "docket": "18-1109", "term": "2019", "first_party": "James Erin McKinney", "second_party": "State of Arizona", "facts": "By way of relevant background, James McKinney\u2019s childhood was \u201chorrific\u201d due to poverty, physical and emotional abuse\u2014all detailed in the court filings. Around age 11, he began drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and he dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He repeatedly tried to run away from home and was placed in juvenile detention.
\nIn 1991, when McKinney was 23, he and his half-brother Michael Hedlund committed two burglaries that resulted in two deaths. The state of Arizona tried McKinney and Hedlund before dual juries. McKinney\u2019s jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder (without specifying whether it reached that verdict by finding premeditation or by finding felony murder), and Hedlund\u2019s jury found him guilty of one count of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder.
\nAt McKinney\u2019s capital sentencing hearing (before a judge), a psychologist testified that he had diagnosed McKinney with PTSD \u201cresulting from the horrific childhood McKinney had suffered.\u201d The psychologist further testified that witnessing violence could trigger McKinney\u2019s childhood trauma and produce \u201cdiminished capacity.\u201d The trial judge credited the psychologist\u2019s testimony, but under Arizona law at the time, the judge was prohibited from considering non-statutory mitigating evidence that the judge found to be unconnected to the crime. Because McKinney\u2019s PTSD was not connected to the burglaries, the judge could not consider it mitigating evidence and thus sentenced him to death.
\nThe Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney\u2019s death sentence on appeal. In 2003, McKinney filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court denied relief, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and held that the Arizona courts had violated the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider McKinney\u2019s PTSD. In Eddings, the Court held that a sentencer in a death penalty case may not refuse consider any relevant mitigating evidence. A violation of Eddings, the Ninth Circuit held, required resentencing. Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the federal district court to either correct the constitutional error or vacate the sentence and impose a lesser sentence. Arizona moved for independent review of McKinney\u2019s sentence by the Arizona Supreme Court; McKinney opposed the motion on the ground that he was entitled to resentencing by a jury under the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), which held that juries, rather than judges, must make the findings necessary to impose the death penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, finding that McKinney was not entitled to resentencing by a jury because his case was \u2018final\u2019 before the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring.
", "facts_len": "3021", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3208", "ID": "63141", "name": "Monasky v. Taglieri", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-935", "docket": "18-935", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Michelle Monasky", "second_party": "Domenico Taglieri", "facts": "Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky\u2019s parental rights.
\nThe Italian court ruled in Taglieri\u2019s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri\u2019s petition, finding that Italy was the baby\u2019s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky\u2019s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.
\nThe International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights \u201cunder the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.\u201d To determine the child\u2019s habitual residence, a court must look \u201cto the place in which the child has become \u2018acclimatized,\u2019 or as a back-up inquiry, \u201cshared parental intent.\u201d Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents\u2019 shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court\u2019s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1697", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3209", "ID": "63142", "name": "Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1171", "docket": "18-1171", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Comcast Corporation", "second_party": "National Association of African American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studio Networks, Inc.", "facts": "Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by African American actor and comedian Byron Allen, and the National Association of African American-Owned Media, an entity created by Allen, sued Comcast over the latter\u2019s decision not to carry ESN\u2019s channels. ESN alleged that Comcast\u2019s decision not to carry ESN\u2019s networks was based, at least in part, on racial animus against ESN, which is the only 100% African American-owned multi-channel media company in the United States. At the time of Comcast\u2019s decision, several other large distributors\u2014 including Charter Communications, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and AT&T\u2014had also declined to enter into carriage agreements with ESN.
\nThe district court dismissed ESN\u2019s original complaint and several subsequent amended complaints against Comcast and other defendants for failure to plead facts that state a plausible claim for relief. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit held in a related case involving Charter Communications that \u201cmixed-motive claims are cognizable under \u00a7 1981,\u201d meaning that \u201ceven if racial animus was not the but-for cause of a defendant\u2019s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that decision.\u201d Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ESN had stated a valid Section 1981 claim based on its assertions that the carriers had entered into contracts with \u201cwhite-owned, lesser-known networks during the same period.\u201d
\nThe Ninth Circuit declined petitions for rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "1574", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3210", "ID": "63143", "name": "Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-938", "docket": "18-938", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Ritzen Group, Inc.", "second_party": "Jackson Masonry, LLC", "facts": "Ritzen Group contracted to buy a piece of property from Jackson Masonry, but the sale was never completed. Ritzen claims that Jackson breached the contract by providing erroneous documentation about the property just before the deadline, while Jackson claims Ritzen breached by failing to secure funding to purchase the property by the deadline.
\nRitzen sued Jackson for breach of contract in Tennessee state court, and just before trial, Jackson filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the litigation under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 362. Ritzen filed a motion to lift the stay, which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ritzen did not appeal the denial. Instead, Ritzen brought a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Jackson, finding that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract.
\nAfter this adverse ruling, Ritzen filed two appeals in the district court. The first appeal arose from the bankruptcy court\u2019s order denying relief from the automatic stay (which Ritzen did not appeal at the time). The second appeal arose from the bankruptcy court\u2019s determination that Ritzen, not Jackson, breached the contract. The district court ruled against Ritzen on both appeals; the first appeal was untimely filed, and the second one failed on the merits.
\nRitzen appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reviewed the bankruptcy court\u2019s findings of fact under the abuse of discretion standard and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Ritzen had missed two deadlines: the contract deadline, leading to its breach, and the appeal deadline, leading to its waiver of appeal.
", "facts_len": "1678", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3211", "ID": "63148", "name": "Banister v. Davis", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6943", "docket": "18-6943", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Gregory Dean Banister", "second_party": "Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division", "facts": "Gregory Dean Banister was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years\u2019 imprisonment. He filed a habeas petition asserting numerous constitutional violations, which the district court denied on the merits on May 15, 2017. He also requested a certificate of appealability (COA), which the district court also denied in the same order.
\nOn June 12, 2017, Banister filed a motion to \u201camend or alter\u201d the judgment of the district court pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court denied on the merits on June 20, 2017.
\nOn July 20, 2017, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA, which the district court \u201cconsidered\u201d despite its previous order denying the COA, but again denied on July 28, 2017. Banister then sought and received from the Fifth Circuit an extension of time to file a COA application. He filed a petition for a COA with the Fifth Circuit on October 11, 2017, and the court denied his petition, citing lack of jurisdiction, on May 8, 2018. The Fifth Circuit held that Banister\u2019s purported 59(e) motion was, in fact, a successive habeas petition, which would not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), the Fifth Circuit noted that \u201calleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1636", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3212", "ID": "63147", "name": "Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1150", "docket": "18-1150", "term": "2019", "first_party": "State of Georgia, et al.", "second_party": "Public.Resource.Org, Inc.", "facts": "The Official Code of Georgia Annotated is a compilation of Georgia statutes accompanied by various annotations, \u201cconsisting of history lines, repeal lines, cross references, commentaries, case notations, editor\u2019s notes, excerpts from law review articles, summaries of opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia, summaries of advisory opinions of the State Bar, and other research references.\u201d Although the Code itself states that the annotations are part of the official code and that the statutory portions \u201cshall be merged with annotations,\u201d Georgia law says that the annotations themselves do not have the force of law. The annotations are prepared pursuant to an agreement between Mathew Bender & Co., an operating division of the LexisNexis Group, and the State of Georgia, under which the state exercises pervasive supervisory control by way of its Code Revision Commission, a body established by the Georgia General Assembly. The Commission is comprised of the Lieutenant Governor, four members of the Georgia Senate, the Speaker of the Georgia House of Representatives, four additional members of the Georgia House of Representatives, and five members appointed by the president of the State Bar of Georgia.
\nPublic.Resource.Org (PRO) is a non-profit organization with a mission of improving public access to government records and primary legal materials. In 2013, PRO purchased all 186 volumes of the print version of the OCGA and its supplements, scanned them, and uploaded them to its website to be freely accessible to the public. It also distributed digital copies to Georgia legislators and other organizations and websites.
\nThe Commission sent PRO several cease-and-desist letters on the grounds that publication infringes on the State of Georgia\u2019s copyright in their work, but PRO persisted. The Commission sued PRO in 2015 in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief. PRO acknowledged its publication and dissemination of the OCGA but denied that the State of Georgia holds an enforceable copyright in the Code. The district court ruled for the Commission, finding that because the annotations of the OCGA lack the force of law, they are not public domain material. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that because of the way they are written and integrated into the \u201cofficial\u201d code, the annotations in the OCGA are attributable to the constructive authorship of the People and are thus intrinsically public domain material. To reach this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit examined the identity of the public officials who created the work, the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was created\u2014finding that each of these markers supported the conclusion that the People were constructively the authors of the annotations.
", "facts_len": "2845", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3213", "ID": "63145", "name": "Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-916", "docket": "18-916", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Thryv, Inc.", "second_party": "Click-to-Call Technologies, LP and Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office", "facts": "This case arises out of a complex procedural history involving a patent dispute between several parties and concerns not the merits of the proceedings but a procedural aspect of it.
\nThe America Invents Act created \u201cinter partes review\u201d as a way of challenging a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. One provision, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 315(b), precludes the institution of inter partes review more than one year after the petitioner \u201cis served with a complaint\u201d alleging infringement of the patent. The parties disagree over whether this one-year time bar applies when the underlying patent infringement suit has been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
\nThe Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, held that it does apply. The court rejected the argument that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice restores the parties to their positions as though no legal proceedings had ever begun, concluding instead that a defendant served with a complaint remains \u201cserved\u201d even if the civil action is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice and thus does such a dismissal does not toll the statute of limitations.
\nFurther, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 315(d) provides that \u201cthe determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.\u201d Notwithstanding this provision, the en banc Federal Circuit held that a decision to institute an inter partes review after finding that the \u00a7 315(b) time bar did not apply was appealable.
", "facts_len": "1497", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3214", "ID": "63146", "name": "Maine Community Health Options v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1023", "docket": "18-1023", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Maine Community Health Options", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Congress, in order to persuade the nation\u2019s health insurance industry to provide insurance to previously uninsured or uninsurable persons, the legislation creating the Affordable Care Act provided that insurance losses over a designated percentage would be reimbursed, and comparable profits would be turned over to the government.
\nIn reliance on the government\u2019s commitment to reimburse them, the nation\u2019s insurance industry provided the designated health insurance. However, when some carriers experienced significant losses, the government refused to appropriate the funds to pay the statutory shortfall and prohibited existing funds from being used for this purpose. As a result, the insurers did not receive reimbursement.
\nSeveral of these insurance carriers filed suit against the government seeking reimbursement. The courts denied them the relief they sought, in part relying on the \u201ccardinal rule\u201d disfavoring implied repeals, which applies with \u201cespecial force\u201d to appropriations acts and requires that repeal not to be found unless the later enactment is \u201cirreconcilable\u201d with the former.
", "facts_len": "1121", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3215", "ID": "63144", "name": "Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-776", "docket": "18-776", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla", "second_party": "William P. Barr", "facts": "Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in 1986 as a legal immigrant but was removed in 1998 due to felony drug convictions. In September 2016, Guerrero filed a motion to reopen, claiming that the 2014 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of Abdelghany rendered him eligible to seek relief under former Immigration and Nationality Act \u00a7 212(c). The immigration judge denied Guerrero\u2019s motion to reopen, finding it not timely filed. Given that Abdelghany was decided in 2014, the immigration judge found the two-year delay in filing the motion to reopen indicated Guerrero had not diligently pursued his rights as required for equitable tolling.
\nOn appeal, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge\u2019s denial of the motion to reopen, finding that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision. And the BIA agreed with the immigration judge that equitable tolling did not apply to extend the 90-day deadline. Guerrero argued that he could not have filed his motion to reopen until the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations if he establishes \u201cthat he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.\u201d).
\nOn appeal, the Fifth Circuit found it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA\u2019s determination that equitable tolling did not apply. Within the Fifth Circuit, under Penalva v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 2018) the question whether a litigant acted diligently in attempting to reopen removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling is a factual question, not a question of law, and thus is not reviewable.
", "facts_len": "2130", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3216", "ID": "63149", "name": "Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1334", "docket": "18-1334", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico", "second_party": "Aurelius Investment, LLC, et al.", "facts": "Since it was ceded to the United States in 1898, Puerto Rico has accumulated substantial debt, in large part due to its ambiguous legal status as a protectorate of the United States and the economically detrimental policies the United States has enacted over the decades. Exacerbated by a series of governmental financial deficits and a recession, Puerto Rico\u2019s debt crisis came to a head in 2015, when its governor announced that the Commonwealth was in a \u201cdeath spiral\u201d and was unable to pay its debt. In June 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act of 2016 (PROMESA), which gave him authority to appoint a seven-member Financial Oversight and Management Board that would have control over Puerto Rico\u2019s budget and would negotiate the restructuring of its $125 billion indebtedness. President Obama appointed the seven-member board in August 2016 based on lists supplied by Republic and Democratic lawmakers.
\nA number of creditors and elected officials of Puerto Rico have been dissatisfied with the board and its decisions and brought a lawsuit challenging President Obama\u2019s authority to appoint the board members. The challengers alleged that the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that the Senate confirm high-level federal officers and that the board members were within the scope of this Clause. The federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled against the creditors, finding the board is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth government established pursuant to Congress\u2019s plenary powers under the Territorial Clause and that the board members are not \u201cOfficers of the United States.\u201d
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the Territorial Clause does not supersede the application of the Appointments Clause in an unincorporated territory and that the board members are \u201cOfficers of the United States\u201d because: (1) they occupy \u201ccontinuing positions,\u201d (2) exercise \u201csignificant authority\u201d that is the same or more than that exercised by other officers the U.S. Supreme Court has found to be \u201cOfficers of the United States,\u201d and (3) exercise their authority \u201cpursuant to the laws of the United States.\u201d Moreover, these officers are \u201cprincipal\u201d officers subject to the Appointments Clause because they are answerable to and removable only by the President and are not directed or supervised by others who were appointed by the President with Senate confirmation.
", "facts_len": "2513", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federalism"}, {"": "3217", "ID": "63151", "name": "Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1712", "docket": "17-1712", "term": "2019", "first_party": "James J. Thole, et al.", "second_party": "U.S. Bank, N.A., et al.", "facts": "Named plaintiff James Thole and others brought a class action lawsuit against U.S. Bank and other over alleged mismanagement of a defined benefit pension plan between 2007 and 2010. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated Section 404, 405, and 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by breaching their fiduciary duties and causing the plan to engage in prohibited transactions with a subsidiary company. The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these prohibited transactions, the plan suffered significant losses and became underfunded in 2008.
\nThe defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted in part. However, the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim that the defendants engaged in a prohibited transaction by investing in a subsidiary. In 2014, with the parties still in litigation, the plan became overfunded; that is, it contained more money than was needed to meet its obligations. The defendants raised the argument that the plaintiffs had not suffered any financial loss and moved to dismiss the remainder of the action. The district court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked a concrete interest in any monetary relief the court could award to the plan if the plaintiffs prevailed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1396", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3218", "ID": "63153", "name": "Babb v. Wilkie", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-882", "docket": "18-882", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Noris Babb", "second_party": "Robert Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs", "facts": "Petitioner Noris Babb worked as a pharmacist for the Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Bay Pines, Florida, since 2004. While there, she helped to develop the Geriatric Pharmacotherapy Clinic (GPC), which serves older veterans with diseases or disabilities common to individuals of advanced age with military service. In 2009, Pharmacy Management gave Babb an advanced scope (full practice authority) to prescribe medications without a physician, which was necessary for her position. In 2010, the VA rolled out a nationwide treatment initiative similar to the GPC Babb had helped develop. Against recommendations by Human Resources and despite requests from doctors, Pharmacy Management rejected applications by several current module pharmacists\u2014all females over 50\u2014and granted applications of two pharmacists under 40.
\nTwo of the female pharmacists who were denied advancement filed Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints, and Babb provided statements and testified in support of their EEO claims. The pharmacists claimed that their non-selection purportedly for lack of advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination and that any justification for denying advanced scopes was pretext for discrimination as well.
\nBabb alleged that as a result of her participation in the EEO process, she was denied opportunities to participate in the new program and that Pharmacy Management required her to agree to a schedule that was unworkable for her department. Unable to meet this requirement, Babb\u2019s advanced scope was removed and was consequently disqualified from promotion. A female pharmacist under 30 without an advanced scope was selected for the promotion.
\nBabb brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) alleging that she was the victim of gender-plus-age discrimination and that the VA retaliated against her for participating in protected EEO in violation of those laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the VA. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Babb argued that the district court erred in part by not allowing her to prove that illegal discrimination or retaliation was a \u201cmotivating factor\u201d behind the VA\u2019s refusal to promote her. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding itself bound by precedent that federal sector employees\u2019 claims under ADEA and Title VII require that the plaintiff show discrimination or retaliation is a \u201cbut for\u201d factor in the adverse personnel action.
", "facts_len": "2571", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3219", "ID": "63154", "name": "GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA LLC", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1048", "docket": "18-1048", "term": "2019", "first_party": "GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. a Foreign Corporation Formally Known As Converteam SAS", "second_party": "Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al.", "facts": "Outokumpu operates a steel plant in Alabama that contains three \u201ccold rolling mills,\u201d which are required for manufacturing and processing certain steel products. In November 2007, while Outokumpu\u2019s plant was under construction, the company\u2019s predecessor, ThyssenKrupp, entered into three contracts with F.L. Industries (\u201cFives\u201d) to provide three different-sized mills. Each of these three contracts contains an arbitration clause that, among other things, requires that arbitration take place in Dusseldorf, Germany, and that the forum apply the substantive law of Germany.
\nThe contracts define the parties to each as Outokumpu and Fives and provide that any mention of either party also includes any subcontractors of that party; appended to the contracts is a list of subcontractors, including petitioner GE Energy Conversion France SAS (\u201cGE Energy\u201d), formerly known as Converteam SAS.
\nFives contracted with GE Energy to provide three motors for each of the three mills, for a total of nine motors, which were manufactured in France and delivered and installed in Alabama between 2011 and 2012. By June 2014, the motors began to fail, and by August 2015, motors in all three mills failed. It came to light that Fives and GE Energy had entered into a separate agreement with another party that designated Fives to represent the interests of all three parties in the event of a dispute.
\nOutokumpu filed a lawsuit against GE Energy in Alabama state court in 2016, and GE Energy removed to federal court and moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court granted GE Energy\u2019s motion to compel and dismissed the action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed and remanded as to the motion to compel, holding that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards requires that the arbitration agreement be signed by the parties before Court or their privities, and only under Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not expressly restrict arbitration to the specific parties to an agreement) can parties compel arbitration through the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
", "facts_len": "2161", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3220", "ID": "63157", "name": "Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1195", "docket": "18-1195", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen Anderson and Jamie Schaefer", "second_party": "Montana Department of Revenue, et al.", "facts": "Petitioners Kendra Espinoza and others are low-income mothers who applied for scholarships to keep their children enrolled in Stillwater Christian School, in Kalispell, Montana. The Montana legislature enacted a tax-credit scholarship program in 2015 to provide a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donate to private, nonprofit scholarship organizations. Shortly after the program was enacted, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated an administrative rule (\u201cRule 1\u201d) prohibiting scholarship recipients from using their scholarships at religious schools, citing a provision of the state constitution that prohibits \u201cdirect or indirect\u201d public funding of religiously affiliated educational programs.
\nEspinoza and the other mothers filed a lawsuit in state court challenging Rule 1. The court determined that the scholarship program was constitutional without Rule 1 and granted the plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Department of Revenue argued that the program is unconstitutional without Rule 1. The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the Department and reversed the lower court.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1140", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3221", "ID": "63156", "name": "Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1086", "docket": "18-1086", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Lucky Brand Dungarees Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Marcel Fashions Group, Inc.", "facts": "Marcel and Lucky Brand are competitors in the apparel industry, and this dispute arises over Marcel\u2019s allegation that Lucky Brand is infringing on its \u201cGet Lucky\u201d trademark through its use of \u201cLucky\u201d on its merchandise in violation of an injunction entered in an earlier action between the two parties.
\nIn 2003, the two parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a trademark dispute in which Lucky Brand agreed not to use \u201cGet Lucky\u201d and Marcel agreed to release certain claims it might have in the future arising out of its trademarks. The two parties contest the scope of Marcel\u2019s release of claims, with Marcel contending that it only released claims as to infringement that occurred prior to the 2003 execution of the agreement and Lucky Brand arguing that it released any future claim Marcel may have in relation to any trademark registered prior to the execution of the agreement. Further litigation ensued.
\nIn litigation between the two parties over substantially the same trademark disputes, Lucky Brand argued for its interpretation of the 2003 settlement agreement. It moved to dismiss on the basis that because the marks at issue were registered prior to the settlement agreement, Marcel released any claim alleging infringement of those marks. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was premature to determine which claims were subject to release in the 2001 agreement. However, the district court noted that Lucky Brand was \u201cfree to raise the issue . . . again after the record is more fully developed.\u201d Lucky Brand raised the defense again in its answer and as an affirmative defense, but not again during the litigation. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Marcel, declaring that Lucky Brand infringed on Marcel\u2019s \u201cGet Lucky\u201d trademark and enjoining Lucky Brand from using the \u201cGet Lucky\u201d mark. Lucky Brand did not appeal.
\nIn 2011, Marcel filed another lawsuit against Lucky Brand alleging that the latter continued to use \u201cLucky Brand\u201d mark after the injunction. Lucky Brand moved for summary judgment on the basis that Marcel\u2019s claims were precluded by res judicata in light of the final disposition of the previous action. The district court agreed, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding the allegedly barred claims \u201ccould not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.\u201d On remand, Marcel filed a second amended complaint, which Lucky Brand moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the 2001 agreement barred Marcel\u2019s claims. The district court granted the motion and rejected Marcel\u2019s argument that Lucky Brand was precluded from raising those claims.
\nThe Second Circuit vacated, concluding that the doctrine of claim preclusion (or more precisely, defense preclusion) applied in situations as this one and that it barred Lucky Brand from invoking its release defense again in this action.
", "facts_len": "2907", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3222", "ID": "63158", "name": "Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1233", "docket": "18-1233", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Romag Fasteners, Inc.", "second_party": "Fossil, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Petitioner Romag Fasteners, Inc., sells magnetic snap fasteners for use in wallets, handbags, and other leather goods. Respondent Fossil designs, markets, and distributes fashion accessories, including handbags and small leather goods. In 2002, Fossil and Romag entered into an agreement to use Romag fasteners in Fossil\u2019s products, and Fossil\u2019s manufacturers purchased tens of thousands of Romag fasteners between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, the president of Romag discovered that certain Fossil handbags sold in the United States contained counterfeit snaps bearing the Romag mark. Romag sued Fossil in 2010 for patent and trademark infringement. Romag alleged that Fossil knowingly adopted and used the Romag mark without Romag\u2019s consent.
\nA jury found that Fossil had infringed Romag\u2019s trademark and patents but that none of the violations were willful. The jury awarded Romag trademark damages under two theories: over $90,000 in profits \u201cto prevent unjust enrichment\u201d and over $6.7 million in profits \u201cto deter future trademark infringement.\u201d For the latter award, the jury found that Fossil had acted with \u201ccallous disregard\u201d for Romag\u2019s trademark rights. However, the district court struck the jury\u2019s award, finding that \u201ca finding of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendants\u2019 profits in this Circuit.\u201d On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that within the Second Circuit, a showing of willfulness was required for an award of profits. Romag petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. In light of its decision in SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 580 U.S. __ (2017), that affected the patent infringement claims in this case, the Court granted the petition, vacated the Federal Circuit\u2019s decision, and remanded the case. On remand, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the district court\u2019s judgment declining to award Fossil\u2019s profits.
", "facts_len": "1992", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3223", "ID": "63155", "name": "Kelly v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1059", "docket": "18-1059", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Bridget Anne Kelly", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "This case arises from the scandal that became known as \u201cBridgegate.\u201d Defendants William E. Baroni, Jr. and Bridget Anne Kelly conspired to create major traffic jams in Fort Lee, New Jersey, after Fort Lee\u2019s mayor refused to endorse the 2013 reelection bid of then-Governor Chris Christie. The defendants and others limited motorists\u2019 access to the George Washington Bridge, the world\u2019s busiest bridge, for four days during the first week of Fort Lee\u2019s school year, resulting in extensive traffic delays.
\nIn 2015, a grand jury indicted Baroni and Kelly for their roles in the scheme. Each was charged with seven counts, including conspiracy to obtain by fraud, knowingly convert, or intentionally misapply property of an organization receiving federal benefits, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 371, and the substantive offense underlying that conspiracy, 18 U.S.C \u00a7 666(a)(1)(A). A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction as to four of the seven, including the two at issue here. In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that the defendants had defrauded the Port Authority of its property by citing a \u201ctraffic study\u201d as the purpose for the lane closures rather than their \u201creal reason\u201d of political payback.
", "facts_len": "1314", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3224", "ID": "63159", "name": "Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1269", "docket": "18-1269", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Simon E. Rodriguez", "second_party": "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation", "facts": "United Western Bancorp, Inc. (UWBI) was in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings when it received a tax refund check from the Internal Revenue Service that was the result of net operating losses incurred by one of UWBI\u2019s subsidiaries (United Western Bank). UWBI and its subsidiaries had entered into a tax allocation agreement in 2008 that was the source of the present ownership dispute. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) alleged that, as receiver for the Bank, it was entitled to the federal tax refund that was due because the refund stemmed exclusively from the Bank\u2019s business loss carrybacks. Simon Rodriguez, in his capacity as the Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of UWBI, initiated a bankruptcy adversary proceeding against the FDIC, alleging that UWBI owned the tax refund and thus that it was part of the bankruptcy estate.
\nThe bankruptcy court agreed with Rodriguez and entered summary judgment. The FDIC appealed to federal district court, which reversed the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. Under federal common law, \u201ca tax refund due from a joint return generally belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund.\u201d Applying this rule and noting that the agreement\u2019s intended treatment of tax refunds mandates the same result, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax refund at issue belonged to the Bank and thus that the FDIC, as receiver for the Bank, was entitled to summary judgment.
", "facts_len": "1546", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "3225", "ID": "63160", "name": "Shular v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6662", "docket": "18-6662", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Eddie Lee Shular", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides in relevant part that a person who has three previous convictions for a \u201cviolent felony\u201d or a \u201cserious drug offense\u201d shall serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. In recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a \u201ccategorical\u201d approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a \u201cviolent felony\u201d within the ACCA. Under this approach, the sentencing court must look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense and not to the particular facts underlying the prior convictions. At issue in this case is whether the categorical approach applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction constitutes a \u201cserious drug offense\u201d as well.
\nEddie Lee Shular qualified as an armed career criminal on the basis of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses\u2014five for sale of cocaine and one for possession with intent to sell. None of these offenses required that the government prove that Shular had \u201cknowledge of the illicit nature of the substance,\u201d that is, that the substance possessed or sold was cocaine. Under the categorical approach, none of Shular\u2019s Florida convictions would qualify as a \u201cserious drug offense\u201d because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues under federal law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the categorical approach to serious drug offenses, holding that the plain language of the ACCA definition \u201crequires only that the predicate offense involve certain activities related to controlled substances.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1601", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3226", "ID": "63165", "name": "United States v. Sineneng-Smith", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-67", "docket": "19-67", "term": "2019", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Evelyn Sineneng-Smith", "facts": "Evelyn Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting firm in San Jose, California. Her clients were mostly natives of the Philippines, who were unlawfully employed in the United States and were seeking to obtain legal permanent residence (green cards). Sineneng-Smith purported to help her clients obtain permanent residence through the Labor Certification process, but that program expired on April 30, 2001. Sineneng-Smith knew that the program had expired but nonetheless continued to tell clients that they could obtain green cards via Labor Certifications.
\nFederal law prohibits encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the country, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such residence is in violation of the law. Sineneng-Smith was indicted, charged, and convicted by a jury of violating this law. She appealed her conviction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals solicited supplemental briefing on several constitutional questions presented in the appeal. The court held that the statute was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, criminalizing a \u201csubstantial amount of protected expression in relation to the statute\u2019s narrow legitimate sweep.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1190", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3227", "ID": "63162", "name": "Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-587", "docket": "18-587", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Department of Homeland Security, et al.", "second_party": "Regents of the University of California, et al.", "facts": "In 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a program\u2014known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)\u2014to postpone the deportation of undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children and to assign them work permits allowing them to obtain social security numbers, pay taxes, and become part of \u201cmainstream\u201d society in the United States.
\nIn 2017, after the national election, when the Trump administration replaced the Obama administration, DHS began a phase-out of DACA. The parties do not dispute the authority of a new administration to replace old policies with new policies, but the plaintiffs in this and related challenges allege that the new administration terminated DACA based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law. Specifically, the Trump administration terminated DACA based on a conclusion that the Obama administration had created DACA \u201cwithout proper statutory authority and with no established end-date\u201d and thus that it was an \u201cunconstitutional exercise of authority by the Executive Branch.\u201d
\nThe plaintiffs in this case and the related cases challenged this conclusion of law, alleging that the recission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it was arbitrary and capricious, and because it was a substantive rule that did not comply with the APA\u2019s notice-and-comment requirements. The challengers also alleged that the recission deprived DACA recipients of constitutionally protected liberty and property interests without due process of law and violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was motivated by discriminatory animus.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the DACA recission was not \u201ccommitted to agency discretion by law\u201d and that there was \u201claw to apply.\u201d Further, the Ninth Circuit granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction restoring DACA, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits of their arguments, they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs\u2019 favor, and the injunction is in the public interest.
", "facts_len": "2255", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3228", "ID": "63161", "name": "Hernandez v. Mesa", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-1678", "docket": "17-1678", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Jesus C. Hern\u00e1ndez, et al.", "second_party": "Jesus Mesa, Jr.", "facts": "Sergio Adri\u00e1n Hern\u00e1ndez G\u00fcereca, a 15-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends in the cement culvert between El Paso, Texas, and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on the scene and detained one of Hern\u00e1ndez\u2019s friends on U.S. territory. Hern\u00e1ndez ran into Mexican territory and stood by a pillar near the culvert. From U.S. territory, Mesa fired at least two shots across the border at Hern\u00e1ndez, one of which struck Hern\u00e1ndez in the face and killed him.
\nHern\u00e1ndez\u2019s parents filed a lawsuit against the officer and various other defendants alleging violation of their son\u2019s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and part and reversed in part. The Fifth Circuit held that Hern\u00e1ndez lacked Fourth Amendment rights, but his parents were entitled to a remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action against federal government officials who have violated the plaintiff\u2019s constitutional rights), and the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the full Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the parents\u2019 claims, holding that they had failed to state a claim for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not \u201cclearly established\u201d that it was unconstitutional for an officer on U.S. soil to shoot a Mexican national on Mexican soil.
\nThe U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and reversed the en banc Fifth Circuit as to qualified immunity. The Court remanded the case so the lower court could determine whether the shooting violated Hern\u00e1ndez\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights and whether his parents could assert claims for damages under Bivens. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit once again affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint, holding that the excessive force claim was unlike any that had been decided previously and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to any remedy under Bivens. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit applied the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __ (2017), in which the Court held that for a new type of claim to be cognizable under Bivens, there must be some special factor makes the judiciary better suited than the legislature to recognize such a claim.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "2619", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3229", "ID": "63173", "name": "Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-8369", "docket": "18-8369", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Arthur James Lomax", "second_party": "Christina Ortiz-Marquez, et al.", "facts": "Arthur J. Lomax is a Colorado prisoner at the Limon Correctional Facility. While at a different prison, he filed a lawsuit against several prison employees and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (without paying the usual court fees) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915. Upon direction of the district court, Lomax amended his complaint to allege violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The same district court dismissed without prejudice three of Mr. Lomax's previous actions on the grounds that they failed to state a claim. The district court further noted that these dismissals were \u201cstrikes\u201d under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(g), which bars inmates from filing or appealing a federal civil action without paying the associated fees if they have filed three or more cases or appeals that were dismissed because the lawsuits were frivolous or malicious or did not properly state a legal claim for relief.\u00a0
\nBecause of the previous strikes, the court ordered Lomax to show cause before proceeding in forma pauperis. In response to the show cause order, Lomax argued (among other things) that because the prior dismissals were without prejudice, they do not count as strikes.
\nThe district court denied Lomax\u2019s motion as barred by the three-strikes provision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1375", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3230", "ID": "63163", "name": "June Medical Services LLC v. Russo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1323", "docket": "18-1323", "term": "2019", "first_party": "June Medical Services L.L.C., et al.", "second_party": "Stephen Russo, Interim Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals", "facts": "In June 2014, Louisiana passed Act 620, which required \u201cthat every physician who performs or induces an abortion shall \u2018have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.\u2019\u201d
\nSeveral abortion clinics and doctors challenged Act 620, and while that challenge was pending in the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a \u201cnearly identical\u201d Texas law in Whole Women\u2019s Health v. Hellerstedt (WWH), finding that the Texas law imposed an \u201cundue burden\u201d on a woman\u2019s right to have an abortion while bringing about no \u201chealth-related benefit\u201d and serving no \u201crelevant credentialing function.\u201d The district court hearing the challenge to Act 620 accordingly declared Act 620 facially invalid and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
\nThe district court made detailed findings of fact and determined that \u201cadmitting privileges also do not serve \u2018any relevant credentialing function,\u2019\u201d and that \u201cphysicians are sometimes denied privileges \u2026 for reasons unrelated to [medical] competency.\u201d The district court further determined that the law would \u201cdrastically burden women\u2019s right to choose abortions.\u201d
\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the panel majority reviewed the evidence de novo and concluded that the district court erred by overlooking \u201cremarkabl[e] differen[ces]\u201d between the facts in this case and in WWH. The panel concluded that \u201cno clinics will likely be forced to close on account of the Act,\u201d and thus, the law would not impose an undue burden on women\u2019s right to choose abortions. A divided Fifth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "1803", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "3231", "ID": "63164", "name": "United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1584", "docket": "18-1584", "term": "2019", "first_party": "United States Forest Service, et al.", "second_party": "Cowpasture River Association, et al.", "facts": "The Appalachian Trail spans over 2,000 miles, from Maine to Georgia, with approximately 1,000 miles of the Trail crossing through lands within national forests. Under the National Trails System Act, the Secretary of the Interior has the responsibility to administer the trail and that responsibility may not be transferred to any other federal agencies. The Mineral Leasing Act grants the U.S. Forest Service the authority to grant certain rights-of-way through lands in the National Forest System, but no federal agency has the authority to grant equivalent rights-of-way through lands in the National Park System.
\nIn 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission granted Atlantic Coast Pipeline LLC (Atlantic) authorization to construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas pipeline that would cross the Appalachian Trail at points located within the George Washington and Monogahela National Forests. After a review process, the Forest Service authorized Atlantic to proceed with construction of the pipeline, finding it had authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant a right-of-way for the pipeline and that the pipeline \u201cwould have no long lasting impacts\u201d on the Trail.
\nCowpasture River Preservation Association and others filed a petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of the Forest Service\u2019s record of decision and special use permit. The court granted the petition, vacated the record of decision and special use permit, and remanded to the Forest Service. Notably, the court determined that the Forest Service lacked authority to grant the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act because the Appalachian Trail is a \u201cunit\u201d of the National Park System. The court determined that the Mineral Leasing Act \u201cspecifically excludes\u201d the Trail \u201cfrom the authority of the Secretary of the Interior \u2018or appropriate agency head\u2019 to grant pipeline rights of way.\u201d
\nThe Court consolidated this case for oral argument with\u00a0U.S. Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association, No. 18-1584.
", "facts_len": "2076", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3232", "ID": "63172", "name": "Nasrallah v. Barr", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1432", "docket": "18-1432", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Nidal Khalid Nasrallah", "second_party": "William P. Barr, Attorney General", "facts": "Nidal Khalid Nasrallah, a native and citizen of Lebanon, was 17 years old when he entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2006. He became a lawful permanent resident the following year.
\nIn 2011, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Nasrallah pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property in interstate commerce. An immigration judge determined that one of those convictions made Nasrallah subject to removal as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). However, the judge also found Nasrallah had established a clear probability that he would be tortured and persecuted in Lebanon by groups such as Hezbollah and ISIS because of his Druze religion and western ties, so the judge granted him a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Both the government and Nasrallah appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). On appeal, the BIA held that the immigration judge erred in granting Nasrallah a deferral, and it ordered his removal.
\nNasrallah appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Reviewing the BIA\u2019s conclusions of law de novo, the Eleventh Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Nasrallah\u2019s petition for review. Specifically, Nasrallah had asked the court to reweigh the factors involved in the removal order, but under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2), the courts lack jurisdiction to review the factual findings underlying the denial of removal relief. The court therefore dismissed Nasrallah\u2019s claim for lack of jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1578", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3233", "ID": "63187", "name": "Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/18-956", "docket": "18-956", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Google LLC", "second_party": "Oracle America, Inc.", "facts": "When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google\u2019s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).
\nOracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google\u2019s petition for certiorari.
\nUpon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law.
", "facts_len": "1128", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3234", "ID": "63188", "name": "United States v. Briggs", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-108", "docket": "19-108", "term": "2020", "first_party": "United States of America", "second_party": "Michael J.D. Briggs", "facts": "In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be \u201ctried and punished at any time without limitation.\u201d In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations.
\nRelying on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not \u201cpunishable by death\u201d and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1489", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3235", "ID": "63190", "name": "Tanzin v. Tanvir", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-71", "docket": "19-71", "term": "2020", "first_party": "FNU Tanzin, et al.", "second_party": "Muhammad Tanvir, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national \u201cNo Fly List,\u201d despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (\u201cRFRA\u201d), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, \u201c[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.\u201d\u00a0
\nThe U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges.
", "facts_len": "1211", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3236", "ID": "63174", "name": "Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-7", "docket": "19-7", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Seila Law LLC", "second_party": "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau", "facts": "The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was investigating Seila Law LLC, a law firm that provides debt-relief services, among others. As part of its investigation, the CFPB issued a civil investigative demand to Seila Law that requires the firm to respond to several interrogatories and requests for documents. Seila Law refused to comply with the demand, so the CFPB filed a petition in\u00a0the district court to enforce compliance. The district court granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to comply with the CID. Seila Law appealed the district court\u2019s order on two grounds, one of which was that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured.
\nSpecifically, Seila Law argued that the CFPB\u2019s structure violates the Constitution\u2019s separation of powers because it is an independent agency headed by a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the President only for cause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed.
\nThe court found two Supreme Court decisions on separation of powers controlling: Humphrey\u2019s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). According to the Ninth Circuit panel, those cases indicate that the for-cause removal restriction protecting the CFPB\u2019s Director does not \u201cimpede\u00a0the President\u2019s ability to perform his constitutional duty\u201d to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1405", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "3237", "ID": "63199", "name": "Carney v. Adams", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-309", "docket": "19-309", "term": "2020", "first_party": "John C. Carney, Governor of Delaware", "second_party": "James R. Adams", "facts": "James R. Adams is a resident of Delaware and member of that state\u2019s bar. Adams considered applying for a judicial position but ultimately decided not to because the state required the candidate to be a Republican, and Adams was neither a Republican nor a Democrat.
\nAdams filed a lawsuit against the governor, challenging the provision of the Delaware Constitution that limits judicial service to members of the Democratic and Republican Parties. First, the district court held Adams had Article III (\u201cconstitutional\u201d) standing as to some, but not all of the provisions, but that because he had prudential standing to the other provisions, it would consider his challenge as to all of them. Turning to the merits, the district court noted that under the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s precedent in Elrod v. Burns and Branti v. Finkel, a government employer may not make employment decisions based on political allegiance except with respect to policymakers. The court found that a judge\u2019s job is to apply, rather than create, the law, and thus that judges do not fall within the policymaking exception of Elrod and Burns. As such, the court found the provision unconstitutional in its entirety.
\nOn appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed only as to the provisions for which Adams lacked Article III standing.
", "facts_len": "1491", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3238", "ID": "63175", "name": "Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-161", "docket": "19-161", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Department of Homeland Security, et al.", "second_party": "Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam", "facts": "Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam is a native and citizen of Sri Lanka and a Tamil, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. Thuraissigiam entered the United States via its southern border, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers arrested him and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. Thuraissigiam indicated a fear of persecution in Sri Lanka, but an asylum officer determined he had not established a credible fear of persecution and referred him for removal. A supervisor affirmed the officer\u2019s finding, and an immigration judge affirmed it as well in a check-box decision.
\nThuraissigiam filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that his expedited removal order violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(e) did not authorize jurisdiction over Thuraissigiam\u2019s claims and rejecting his argument that the removal process to which he was subjected effectively suspended the writ of habeas corpus, in violation of the Suspension Clause.
\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. Because the administrative scheme governing credible fear determinations in this context is \u201cmeager,\u201d and \u00a7 1252(a)(2) disallows judicial review of whether DHS complied with the procedures, the process does not meet minimum constitutional requirements.
", "facts_len": "1457", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3239", "ID": "63176", "name": "Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-1501", "docket": "18-1501", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Charles C. Lui, et al.", "second_party": "Securities and Exchange Commission", "facts": "Charles Liu operated an EB-5 fund, which is a fund that offers lawful permanent residence opportunities to foreigners who make significant investments in the United States. However, Liu misappropriated millions of dollars that had been invested in the fund, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the making of false statements in the context of a securities offering.
\nThe district court ordered Liu to \u201cdisgorge\u201d (pay back) $26 million, the amount investors had paid into the EB-5 fund, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In petitioning the Supreme Court\u2019s review, Liu argued that the SEC lacked the authority to obtain disgorgement, under the Court\u2019s 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, which held that disgorgement awarded under the court\u2019s equitable power is a penalty, not a remedial measure.
", "facts_len": "882", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3240", "ID": "63182", "name": "U.S. Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-46", "docket": "19-46", "term": "2019", "first_party": "United States Patent and Trademark Office", "second_party": "Booking.com B.V.", "facts": "Booking.com operates a website on which customers can make travel and lodging reservations and has used the name BOOKING.COM since at least 2006. In 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) four trademark applications for the use of BOOKING.COM as a word mark and for stylized versions of the mark.
\nUnder the Lanham Act, marks must be \u201cdistinctive\u201d to be eligible for protection, and generic terms are not distinctive. The USPTO examiner rejected Booking.com\u2019s applications, finding that the marks were not protectable because BOOKING.COM was generic as applied to the services for which it sought registration (online hotel reservation services, among others).
\nThe Lanham Act also allows protection for \u201cdescriptive\u201d terms that have acquired secondary meaning, or a mental association in the minds of consumers between the proposed mark and the source of the product or service. In the alternative, the USPTO concluded that the marks were merely descriptive and that Booking.com had failed to establish that they had acquired secondary meaning as required for trademark protection.
\nBooking.com appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, which affirmed the rejection of Booking.com\u2019s applications. The Board found that BOOKING.COM was a generic term for these types of services and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. Because \u201cbooking\u201d generically refers to \u201ca reservation or arrangement to buy a travel ticket or stay in a hotel room\u201d and \u201c.com\u201d indicates a\u00a0commercial website, the Board reasoned that consumers would understand the resulting term \u201cBOOKING.COM\u201d to refer to an online reservation service for travel\u2014the very services proposed in Booking.com\u2019s applications.\u00a0The district court reversed, ruling Booking.com had acquired secondary meaning.\u00a0A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the district court's reversal.
", "facts_len": "1933", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3241", "ID": "63210", "name": "Torres v. Madrid", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-292", "docket": "19-292", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Roxanne Torres", "second_party": "Janice Madrid, et al.", "facts": "In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle.
\nIn October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres\u2019s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court\u2019s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1046", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3242", "ID": "63211", "name": "City of Chicago v. Fulton", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-357", "docket": "19-357", "term": "2020", "first_party": "City of Chicago, Illinois", "second_party": "Robbin L. Fulton, et al.", "facts": "The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton\u2019s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton\u2019s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton\u2019s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City.
\nThe bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor\u2019s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s judgment denying the City's request.
", "facts_len": "1026", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3243", "ID": "63192", "name": "Thompson v. Hebdon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-122", "docket": "19-122", "term": "2019", "first_party": "David Thompson, et al.", "second_party": "Heather Hebdon, Executive Director of the Alaska Public Offices Commission, et al.", "facts": "Alaska law imposes certain limits on political contributions. Specifically, it limits contributions made by individuals to political candidates, contributions made by individuals to election-related groups, political party-to-candidate contributions, and the total funds a\u00a0candidate may receive from out-of-state residents.
\nThree individuals and a division of the Alaska Republican Party challenged these four provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment. The district court upheld all four provisions. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group limits, as well as the political-party-to-candidate limit. However, it reversed as to the out-of-state resident limit. The court reasoned that the first three limits are narrowly tailored to prevent actual or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption and thus do not impermissibly infringe constitutional rights. In contrast,\u00a0 the nonresident limit does not target an \u201cimportant state interest\u201d and therefore violates the First Amendment.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3244", "ID": "63212", "name": "Pereida v. Wilkinson", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-438", "docket": "19-438", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Clemente Avelino Pereida", "second_party": "Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General", "facts": "Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida\u2019s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida\u2019s petition for review.
", "facts_len": "1115", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3245", "ID": "63206", "name": "Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-715", "docket": "19-715", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Donald J. Trump, et al.", "second_party": "Mazars USA, LLP, et al.", "facts": "The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform issued a subpoena to Mazars USA, the accounting firm for Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and several of his businesses, demanding private financial records belonging to Trump. According to the Committee, the requested documents would inform its investigation into whether Congress should amend or supplement its ethics-in-government laws. Trump argued that the information serves no legitimate legislative purpose and sued to prevent Mazars from complying with the subpoena.
\nThe district court granted summary judgment for the Committee, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding the Committee possesses the authority under both the House Rules and the Constitution.
\nIn the consolidated case, Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 19-760, two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives\u2014the Committee on Financial Services and the Intelligence Committee\u2014issued a subpoena to the creditors of President Trump and several of his businesses. The district court denied Trump\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent compliance with the subpoenas, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in substantial part and remanded in part.
", "facts_len": "1288", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "3246", "ID": "63205", "name": "McGirt v. Oklahoma", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-9526", "docket": "18-9526", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Jimcy McGirt", "second_party": "Oklahoma", "facts": "Jimcy McGirt, a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation was convicted of sex crimes against a child by the state of Oklahoma within the historical Creek Nation boundaries. He argued that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over him because under the Indian Major Crimes Act, any crime involving a Native American victim or perpetrator, or occurring within recognized reservation boundaries, is subject to federal jurisdiction, not state jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "461", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3247", "ID": "63207", "name": "Trump v. Vance", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-635", "docket": "19-635", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Donald J. Trump", "second_party": "Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., in His Official Capacity as District Attorney of the County of New York, et al.", "facts": "The district attorney of New York County issued a grand jury subpoena to an accounting firm that possessed the financial records of President Donald Trump and one of his businesses. Trump asked a federal court to restrain enforcement of that subpoena, but the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction and dismissed the case based on Supreme Court precedent regarding federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions. The court held, in the alternative, that there was no constitutional basis to temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin the subpoena at issue.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court with respect to the alternative holding, finding that any presidential immunity from state criminal process does not extend to investigative steps like the grand jury subpoena. However, it found that the Supreme Court precedent on which the lower court relied did not apply to the situation and vacated the judgment as to that issue and remanded the case to the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1044", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3248", "ID": "63215", "name": "Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-199", "docket": "19-199", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Manfredo Salinas", "second_party": "United States Railroad Retirement Board", "facts": "In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (\u201cthe Board\u201d) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board\u2019s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007.
\nNearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas\u2019s petition.
", "facts_len": "1380", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Unions"}, {"": "3249", "ID": "63208", "name": "United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-177", "docket": "19-177", "term": "2019", "first_party": "United States Agency for International Development, et al.", "second_party": "Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Alliance for Open Society International and other organizations receive funding from the U.S. government to help with their mission of fighting HIV/AIDS abroad. The government provides the funds on the condition that \u201cno funds be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.\u201d In U.S. Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International Inc., decided in 2013, the Court held that the condition compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. Although the government consequently did not apply the condition to Alliance for Open Society International, it continued to apply the condition to the organization\u2019s foreign affiliates. The organization sued, asking for permanent injunctive relief. The district court granted the requested relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "950", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3250", "ID": "63191", "name": "Glasser v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/30", "docket": "30", "term": "1940-1955", "first_party": "Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Alfred E. Roth", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Petitioners Daniel D. Glasser, Norton I. Kretske, and Alfred E. Roth were Assistant United States Attorneys in the Northern District of Illinois, specializing in liquor and revenue offenses. They, along with Anthony Horton, a professional bondsman, and Louis Kaplan, an automobile allegedly engaged in illicit alcohol trafficking around Chicago, were found guilty and sentenced for conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to bribery.
\nIn a joint trial, Glasser was represented by William Scott Stewart and George Callaghan. Kretske was originally represented by the firm \u201cHarrington & McDonnell, but Kretske was dissatisfied with the firm, and the trial judge proposed appointing Stewart to represent Kretske (in addition to Glasser, whom Stewart was already representing). Glasser objected to the appointment, arguing (through Stewart) that that there would be a conflict of interest in representing both defendants. The judge appointed Stewart to represent Kretske over Glasser\u2019s objection.
\nA jury of 11 men and one woman convicted all five defendants of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and the judge denied the defendants\u2019 motion for a new trial.
\nThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions.
", "facts_len": "1251", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3251", "ID": "63219", "name": "Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-368", "docket": "19-368", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Ford Motor Company", "second_party": "Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.", "facts": "In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch.
\nThe personal representative of Gullett\u2019s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.
\nFor a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant\u2019s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff\u2019s claims \u201carise out of or relate to\u201d the defendant\u2019s activities within the state.
\nFord Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana.
\nThe district court denied Ford\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding a \u201cconnection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.\u201d The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there.
\nThis case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question.
", "facts_len": "1837", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3252", "ID": "63209", "name": "Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-267", "docket": "19-267", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Our Lady of Guadalupe School", "second_party": "Agnes Morrissey-Berru", "facts": "Agnes Deirdre Morrissey-Berru was an teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School and brought a claim against the school under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school on the basis that Morrissey-Berru was a \u201cminister.\u201d In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court first recognized a ministerial exception, which exempts religious institutions from anti-discrimination laws in hiring employees deemed \u201cministers.\u201d
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that Morrissey-Berru was not a \u201cminister\u201d; she had taken one course on the history of the Catholic church but otherwise did not have any religious credential, training, or ministerial background. Given that she did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister, the court declined to classify her as a minister for the purposes of the ministerial exception.
", "facts_len": "1001", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3253", "ID": "63224", "name": "Fulton v. City of Philadelphia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-123", "docket": "19-123", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Sharonell Fulton, et al.", "second_party": "City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.", "facts": "In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children.
\nThe district court denied CSS\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City\u2019s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion.
", "facts_len": "869", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3254", "ID": "63228", "name": "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-547", "docket": "19-547", "term": "2020", "first_party": "United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.", "second_party": "Sierra Club, Inc.", "facts": "Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action.
\nThe Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA\u2019s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the \u201cdeliberative process privilege.\u201d The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court\u2019s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records.
", "facts_len": "1478", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Privacy"}, {"": "3255", "ID": "63229", "name": "Borden v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-5410", "docket": "19-5410", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Charles Borden, Jr.", "second_party": "United States of America", "facts": "Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions\u2014reckless aggravated assault\u2014did not qualify as a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under the \u201cuse of force\u201d clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the \u201cuse of force\u201d clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden\u2019s aggravated assault victims constituted \u201ccrime[s] of violence\u201d under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1143", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3256", "ID": "63230", "name": "California v. Texas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-840", "docket": "19-840", "term": "2020", "first_party": "The State of California, et al.", "second_party": "The State of Texas, et al.", "facts": "In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate.
\nThe federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be \u201csevered\u201d from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California\u2019s petition for review, as well as Texas\u2019s cross-petition for review.
", "facts_len": "1298", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3257", "ID": "63235", "name": "Brownback v. King", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-546", "docket": "19-546", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Douglas Brownback, et al.", "second_party": "James King", "facts": "Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges.
\nKing then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a \u201cjudgment bar\u201d provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the \u201csame subject matter\u201d as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim.
\nThe district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King\u2019s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King\u2019s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
\n\u00a0
", "facts_len": "2321", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3258", "ID": "63233", "name": "Jones v. Mississippi", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/18-1259", "docket": "18-1259", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Brett Jones", "second_party": "Mississippi", "facts": "When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole \u201cfor all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.\u201d The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility.
", "facts_len": "1321", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3259", "ID": "63246", "name": "Niz-Chavez v. Garland", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-863", "docket": "19-863", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Augusto Niz-Chavez", "second_party": "Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General", "facts": "Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
\nAfter a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge\u2019s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under \u00a71229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge\u2019s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez\u2019s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board.
", "facts_len": "1563", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3260", "ID": "63247", "name": "CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-930", "docket": "19-930", "term": "2020", "first_party": "CIC Services, LLC", "second_party": "Internal Revenue Service, et al.", "facts": "In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (\u201cIRS\u201d) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any \"reportable transactions.\" IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors.
\nOn November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain \u201cmicro-captive transactions\u201d as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties.
\nOn March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (\u201cAPA\u201d). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits \u201cfor the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.\u201d The district court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
", "facts_len": "1678", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Federal Taxation"}, {"": "3261", "ID": "63248", "name": "Edwards v. Vannoy", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-5807", "docket": "19-5807", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Thedrick Edwards", "second_party": "Darrel Vannoy, Warden", "facts": "Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards\u2019s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards\u2019s conviction became final in 2010.
\nOn April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana.
", "facts_len": "816", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3262", "ID": "63250", "name": "Johnson v. Guzman Chavez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-897", "docket": "19-897", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.", "second_party": "Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez, et al.", "facts": "Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings.
\nThe respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231, and bond hearings were denied.\u00a0
\nThe noncitizens argued that 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention \"pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States\" and allows for discretionary release on bond.
\nThe district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that \u00a7 1226 applied. The court held that \u00a7 1231 does not come into play until the government has \u201cthe present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.\u201d A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1446", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3263", "ID": "63216", "name": "Barr v. American Association of Political Consultants Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-631", "docket": "19-631", "term": "2019", "first_party": "William P. Barr, Attorney General; Federal Communications Commission", "second_party": "American Association of Political Consultants, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to address intrusive and unwanted phone calls to Americans. One provision of that Act\u2014the automatic call ban\u2014prohibits phone calls to cell phones that use \u201cany automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.\u201d As passed, the Act recognized two exceptions to the ban: automated calls \u201cfor emergency purposes\u201d and those made to a cell phone with \u201cthe prior express consent of the called party.\u201d In 2015, Congress amended the Act to add a third exception for calls made to cell phones \u201cto collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.\u201d Moreover, automated calls made by the federal government itself are not barred by the automated call ban.
\nThe American Association of Political Consultants, Inc. challenged this third provision of the Act, alleging that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on speech. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, finding unpersuasive the free speech argument. The district court applied strict scrutiny review (testing whether the government had demonstrated the law is necessary to a \"compelling state interest,\"\u00a0that the law is \"narrowly tailored\" to achieving this compelling purpose,\u00a0and that the law uses the \"least restrictive means\" to achieve that purpose) to the debt-collection exemption and ruled that it does not violate the Free Speech Clause. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that strict scrutiny review applied but concluded that the debt-collection exemption does not satisfy that level of review. Finding that the provision was severable from the Act, the Fourth Circuit struck down only that provision.
", "facts_len": "1802", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3264", "ID": "63220", "name": "Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-431", "docket": "19-431", "term": "2019", "first_party": "The Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home", "second_party": "Commonweath of Pennsylvania and State of New Jersey", "facts": "The Women\u2019s Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that women's health insurance include coverage for preventive health care, including contraception. The rule provided that a nonprofit religious employer who objects to providing contraceptive services may file an accommodation form requesting an exemption to the requirement, thereby avoiding paying for or otherwise participating in the provision of contraception to its employees.
\nIn Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme Court held that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), closely-held for-profit corporations were also entitled to invoke the exemption if they had sincere religious objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage. Then, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, (2014), the Court held that an entity seeking an exemption did not need to file the accommodation form; rather, its notification to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was sufficient to receive the exemption. HHS and the Departments of Labor and Treasury promulgated a final rule in compliance with these rulings.
\nThen, in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __ (2017), the Court considered another challenge to the rule, which asserted that merely submitting the accommodation notice \u201csubstantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion,\u201d in violation of RFRA. In a per curiam opinion, the Court declined to reach the merits of that question.
\nIn 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services under the Trump administration promulgated regulations that greatly expanded the entities eligible to claim an exemption to the requirement that group health insurance plans cover contraceptive services. The new rules, which the agencies promulgated without issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking or soliciting public comment, expanded the scope of the religious exemption and added a \u201cmoral\u201d exemption.
\nPennsylvania and New Jersey challenged the rules in federal district court, alleging that they violate the Constitution, federal anti-discrimination law, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After a hearing and reviewing evidence, the district court issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the rules\u2019 enforcement, finding the states were likely to succeed on their APA claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
\nThis case is consolidated with a similar case,\u00a0Trump v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-454, presenting the same legal question.
", "facts_len": "2621", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "2", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3265", "ID": "63252", "name": "Collins v. Yellen", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422", "docket": "19-422", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Patrick J. Collins, et al.", "second_party": "Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.", "facts": "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President \u201cfor cause.\u201d
\nUpon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs\u2019 dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the \u201cThird Amendment,\u201d which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs\u2019 net worth minus a specified capital reserve.
\nCollins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government\u2019s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA\u2019s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA\u2019s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment.
", "facts_len": "2527", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3266", "ID": "63221", "name": "Chiafalo v. Washington", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-465", "docket": "19-465", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Peter Bret Chiafalo, Levi Jennet Guerra, and Esther Virginia John", "second_party": "State of Washington", "facts": "Under Washington State law, each political party with presidential candidates is required to nominate for the Electoral College electors from its party equal to the number of senators and representatives allotted to the state. Nominees must pledge to vote for the candidate of their party, and any nominee who does not vote for their party candidate is subject to a fine of up to $1,000. Washington, as is the case with all but two other states, has a \u201cwinner-take-all\u201d electoral system, which means that all of a state\u2019s electoral votes go to the winner of the popular vote in that state.
\nIn the 2016 Presidential Election, petitioner Chiafolo and others were nominated as presidential electors for the Washington State Democratic Party. When Hillary Clinton and Tim Kaine won the popular vote in Washington State, the electors were required by law to cast their ballots for Clinton/Kaine. Instead, they voted for Colin Powell for President and a different individual for Vice President. The Washington secretary of state fined the electors $1,000 each for failing to vote for the nominee of their party in violation of state law.
\nThe electors challenged the law imposing the fine as violating the First Amendment. An administrative law judge upheld the fine, and a state trial court on appeal affirmed.
\nThis case was originally consolidated with a similar case arising in Colorado,\u00a0Colorado Department of State v. Baca, No. 19-518,\u00a0but is no longer consolidated as of the Court's order of March 10, 2020.
", "facts_len": "1544", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3267", "ID": "63253", "name": "AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-508", "docket": "19-508", "term": "2020", "first_party": "AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Federal Trade Commission", "facts": "Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker\u2019s loan business violated \u00a7 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (\u201cFTC Act\u201d)\u2019s prohibition against \u201cunfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.\u201d The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme.
\nThe court granted the Commission\u2019s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct \u201cas much money as practicable\u201d to \u201cdirect redress to consumers,\u201d then to \u201cother equitable relief\u201d related to the practices described in the Commission\u2019s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker\u2019s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter \u201cinjunctions,\u201d and that the district court\u2019s order to pay \u201cequitable monetary relief\u201d is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that \u00a7 13 of the FTC Act \u201cempowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1658", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3268", "ID": "63254", "name": "Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-511", "docket": "19-511", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Facebook, Inc.", "second_party": "Noah Duguid", "facts": "Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account.
\nDuguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (\u201cATDS\u201d), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid\u2019s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook\u2019s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity \u201cto store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.\u201d Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS \u201cneed not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,\u201d only that it \u201chave the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.\u201d
", "facts_len": "1315", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3269", "ID": "63255", "name": "Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-968", "docket": "19-968", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Chike Uzuegbunam, et al.", "second_party": "Stanley C. Preczewski, et al.", "facts": "In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC\u2019s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC\u2019s \u201cFreedom of Expression Policy,\u201d which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them.
\nLater, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford\u2014another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs\u2014have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus.
\nUzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school\u2019s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its \u201cFreedom of Expression Policy\u201d to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot.
\nThe district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1814", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3270", "ID": "63237", "name": "Colorado Department of State v. Baca", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-518", "docket": "19-518", "term": "2019", "first_party": "Colorado Department of State", "second_party": "Micheal Baca, et al.", "facts": "Michael Baca, Polly Baca, and Robert Nemanich were appointed as three of Colorado\u2019s nine presidential electors for the 2016 general election. Colorado law requires presidential electors to cast their votes for the winner of the popular vote in the state for President and Vice President. When Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in that state, instead of casting his vote for her, Mr. Baca cast his vote for John Kasich. The Colorado Secretary of State discarded his vote and removed him as an elector. As a result, Ms. Baca and Mr. Nemanich voted for Hillary Clinton, despite their desire to vote for John Kasich.
\nThe three presidential electors sued the Colorado Department of State, alleging that the law requiring presidential electors to vote for the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in that state violates their constitutional rights under Article II and the Twelfth Amendment of the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed the action, finding the electors lacked standing to bring the lawsuit, and in the alternative, because the electors failed to state a legal claim because the Constitution does not prohibit states from requiring electors to vote for the winner of the state\u2019s popular vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court as to Mr. Baca\u2019s standing, but reversed as to the standing of the other two electors who did not cast their votes in violation of the law. On the merits, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, finding the state\u2019s removal of Mr. Baca and nullification of his vote were unconstitutional.
", "facts_len": "1611", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3271", "ID": "63258", "name": "Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-351", "docket": "19-351", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Federal Republic of Germany, et al.", "second_party": "Alan Philipp, et al.", "facts": "In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (\u201cSPK\u201d), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then.
\nIn 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers\u2014respondents in this case\u2014participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the \u201cAdvisory Commission\u201d). In what the heirs describe as a \u201cpredetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,\u201d the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection.
\nThe respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when \u201crights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,\u201d as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany\u2019s and SPK\u2019s argument based on principles of international comity.\u00a0
", "facts_len": "1914", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3272", "ID": "63259", "name": "Nestl\u00e9 USA, Inc. v. Doe I", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-416", "docket": "19-416", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Nestl\u00e9 USA, Inc.", "second_party": "John Doe I, et al.", "facts": "The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case).
\nNestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate \u201cwith the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,\u201d resulting in a \u201csystem built on child slavery to depress labor costs.\u201d The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor.
\nThe children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are \u201cuniversal and absolute\u201d can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is \u201cuniversal.\u201d It did not address the defendants\u2019 argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS.
\nIn the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute.
", "facts_len": "2783", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3273", "ID": "63260", "name": "Republic of Hungary v. Simon", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/18-1447", "docket": "18-1447", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Republic of Hungary, et al.", "second_party": "Rosalie Simon, et al.", "facts": "Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law.
\nThe district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary.
\nOn remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) \u201csquarely rejected\u201d the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction.
", "facts_len": "1739", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3274", "ID": "63271", "name": "Texas v. New Mexico", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/65-orig", "docket": "65-orig", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Texas", "second_party": "New Mexico", "facts": "Texas and New Mexico entered into the Pecos River Compact to resolve disputes about the Pecos River, which traverses both states. A River Master performs annual calculations of New Mexico's water delivery to ensure it complies with its Compact obligations. A party may seek the Supreme Court's review of the River Master's calculations within 30 days of its final determination.
\nIn 2014 and 2015, after heavy rainfall, a federally owned reservoir in New Mexico retained large amounts of flood waters in the Pecos Basin. When the reservoir's authority to hold the water expired, it began to release the water. Texas could not use the released water, so it also released the water to make room for water flowing from New Mexico.
\nWhen the River Master calculated and reported New Mexico's obligations for 2014 and 2015, it did not reduce Texas's rights to delivery based on the evaporation of water stored in the federal reservoir in New Mexico that Texas could not use. The 30-day review period lapsed, and New Mexico filed no objection. However, in 2018, New Mexico filed a motion challenging the River Master's calculations. Rather than dismiss the untimely objection, the River Master modified the governing manual to allow retroactive changes to final reports, gave that modification retroactive effect, and amended the 2015 report to credit New Mexico for the evaporative loss.
", "facts_len": "1402", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3275", "ID": "63274", "name": "Garland v. Dai", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1155", "docket": "19-1155", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General", "second_party": "Ming Dai", "facts": "Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai\u2019s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge\u2019s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility.
\nThis case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156.
", "facts_len": "797", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3276", "ID": "63275", "name": "BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1189", "docket": "19-1189", "term": "2020", "first_party": "BP P.L.C., et al.", "second_party": "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore", "facts": "In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore\u2019s motion for remand back to state court.
\nThe defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit.
", "facts_len": "818", "majority_vote": "7", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3277", "ID": "63277", "name": "Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1257", "docket": "19-1257", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.", "second_party": "Democratic National Committee, et al.", "facts": "Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) \u201cearly voting\u201d whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location.
\nArizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona\u2019s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter\u2019s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona\u2019s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens.
\nArizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official\u2019s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite \u201cno evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,\u201d Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person\u2019s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent.
\nAfter a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court \u201cclearly erred.\u201d
", "facts_len": "2740", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3278", "ID": "63276", "name": "FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1231", "docket": "19-1231", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Federal Communications Commission, et al.", "second_party": "Prometheus Radio Project, et al.", "facts": "The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote \u201ccompetition, diversity, and localism.\u201d In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC\u2019s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation.
\nIn 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC\u2019s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities.
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did \u201costensibly\u201d consider this issue, its analysis was \u201cso insubstantial\u201d that it cannot provide a \u201creliable foundation\u201d for the FCC\u2019s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency\u2019s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
", "facts_len": "1551", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3279", "ID": "63278", "name": "United States v. Arthrex, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1434", "docket": "19-1434", "term": "2020", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Arthrex, Inc., et al.", "facts": "The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a \u201chybrid proceeding\u201d with \u201cadjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.\u201d\u00a0
\nArthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem.
", "facts_len": "1270", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "plurality opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Miscellaneous"}, {"": "3280", "ID": "63293", "name": "Carr v. Saul", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1442", "docket": "19-1442", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Willie Earl Carr, et al.", "second_party": "Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security", "facts": "Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (\u201cSSA\u201d), but an administrative law judge (\u201cALJ\u201d) denied his claim and the agency\u2019s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court.
\nWhile his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are \u201cinferior officers\u201d under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency.
\nIn response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA\u2019s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.
\nThe district court agreed, vacating the SSA\u2019s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1443", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3281", "ID": "63294", "name": "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-107", "docket": "20-107", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Cedar Point Nursery, et al.", "second_party": "Victoria Hassid, et al.", "facts": "In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (\u201cALRA\u201d), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (\u201cthe Board\u201d). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances.
\nCedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union (\"the UFW\") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not.
\nSometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice.
\nCedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court\u2019s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court.
", "facts_len": "1950", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}, {"": "3282", "ID": "63281", "name": "Lange v. California", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-18", "docket": "20-18", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Arthur Gregory Lange", "second_party": "California", "facts": "A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car \u201cplaying music very loudly,\u201d and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange \u201cfailed to yield.\u201d Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction.\u00a0
\nLange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer\u2019s warrantless entry into Lange\u2019s garage. Lange\u2019s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange\u2019s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction.
\nIn the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the \u201chot pursuit\u201d doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies.
\nBased on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
", "facts_len": "2377", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3283", "ID": "63296", "name": "Trump v. New York", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-366", "docket": "20-366", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.", "second_party": "New York, et al.", "facts": "On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of \"aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status.\" The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number.
\nImmediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs\u2014a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the \"Governmental Plaintiffs\"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations\u2014challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws.
\nThe federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as \u201cpersons in\u201d a \u201cState\u201d as Congress used those words.
", "facts_len": "1911", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3284", "ID": "63295", "name": "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20a87", "docket": "20A87", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York", "second_party": "Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor of New York", "facts": "In an effort to curb rising infections of COVID-19, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued an executive order identifying clusters of COVID-19 cases and restricting the surrounding area. The area immediately around a cluster was classified as a \u201cred\u201d zone, where attendance at worship services is limited to 10 people. The concentric area around a red zone was an \u201corange\u201d zone, where attendance at worship services there is limited to 25 people. And the area around an orange zone was a \u201cyellow\u201d zone, where attendance was limited to 50% of the building\u2019s capacity. In contrast, certain secular businesses deemed \u201cessential\u201d were permitted to remain open in these zones, subject to different restrictions.
\nThe Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and two Orthodox Jewish synagogues sued to block enforcement of the executive order as it affected them. The organizations claimed that the order violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, particularly as secular businesses in the same areas remained open.
", "facts_len": "1078", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "per curiam", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3285", "ID": "63297", "name": "Caniglia v. Strom", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-157", "docket": "20-157", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Edward A. Caniglia", "second_party": "Robert F. Strom, et al.", "facts": "Edward Canaglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Canaglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of \u201cshoot me now.\u201d Fearing for her husband\u2019s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself.
\nKim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Canaglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Canaglia agreed to. While Canaglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Canaglia\u2019s guns, despite knowing that Canaglia did not consent to their seizure.
\nCaniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia\u2019s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized \u201ccommunity caretaking\u201d as an exception to the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court\u2019s decision.
", "facts_len": "1891", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3286", "ID": "63308", "name": "Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-222", "docket": "20-222", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al.", "second_party": "Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al.", "facts": "Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company\u2019s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman\u2019s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman\u2019s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption.
", "facts_len": "1100", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3287", "ID": "63309", "name": "TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-297", "docket": "20-297", "term": "2020", "first_party": "TransUnion LLC", "second_party": "Sergio L. Ramirez", "facts": "In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. \u201ca terrorist list\u201d). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez.
\nOn behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company\u2019s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a \u201cpotential match\u201d for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party.
\nThe jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million.
\nTransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first.
", "facts_len": "1521", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3288", "ID": "63310", "name": "National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-512", "docket": "20-512", "term": "2020", "first_party": "National Collegiate Athletic Association", "second_party": "Shawne Alston, et al.", "facts": "In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA\u2019s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports.
\nSeveral Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on \u201cnon-cash education-related benefits,\u201d violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as \u201ccomputers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.\u201d However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA\u2019s interest in \u201cpreserving amateurism,\u201d but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law.
", "facts_len": "1407", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3289", "ID": "63314", "name": "Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-255", "docket": "20-255", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Mahanoy Area School District", "second_party": "B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy", "facts": "B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption \u201cFuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.\u201d The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.\u2019s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year.
\nB.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.\u2019s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1195", "majority_vote": "8", "minority_vote": "1", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3290", "ID": "63313", "name": "Greer v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-8709", "docket": "19-8709", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Gregory Greer", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was \u201cpunishable as an Armed Career Criminal\u201d based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months\u2019 imprisonment.
\nIn 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the \u201cresidual clause\u201d of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA\u2019s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
\nIn 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif.
\nOn remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.
\nThe Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer\u2019s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review.
", "facts_len": "2067", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3291", "ID": "63312", "name": "Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-251", "docket": "19-251", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Americans for Prosperity Foundation", "second_party": "Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California", "facts": "The California Attorney General\u2019s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General\u2019s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law.
\nIn response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state\u2019s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations\u2019 motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government\u2019s filing demands were not the \u201cleast restrictive means\u201d of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy \u201cstrict scrutiny.\u201d
\nA panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that \u201cexacting scrutiny\u201d rather than \u201cstrict scrutiny\u201d was the appropriate standard, and \u201cexacting scrutiny\u201d requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
\nThe Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc.
", "facts_len": "2110", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "First Amendment"}, {"": "3292", "ID": "63315", "name": "Sanchez v. Mayorkas", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-315", "docket": "20-315", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Jose Santos Sanchez, et al.", "second_party": "Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.", "facts": "Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General.
\nIn 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was \u201cstatutorily ineligible\u201d for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets \u00a7 1255(a)\u2019s requirement that an alien must be \u201cinspected and admitted or paroled\u201d to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding\u00a0 no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally.
", "facts_len": "1294", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3293", "ID": "63316", "name": "San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-334", "docket": "20-334", "term": "2020", "first_party": "City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities", "second_party": "Hotels.com, L.P., et al.", "facts": "In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the \u201ccost of occupancy\u201d and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel.
\nToward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for \"an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties.\" The OTCs\u2019 proposed order stated that \"costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39.\" San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC\u2019s proposed order.
\nThen the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for \u201cpost-judgment interest\u201d and \u201cpremiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.\u201d San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite.
", "facts_len": "1555", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Judicial Power"}, {"": "3294", "ID": "63318", "name": "Guam v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-382", "docket": "20-382", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Territory of Guam", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam\u2019s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an \u201cunincorporated territory of the United States.\u201d
\nIn the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean.
\nIn 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill.
\nIn 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011.
\nIn 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump\u2019s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam\u2019s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a \u201ccost-recovery\u201d action and Section 113(f) allows for a \u201ccontribution\u201d action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam\u2019s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.
", "facts_len": "2405", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3295", "ID": "63319", "name": "Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc.", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-440", "docket": "20-440", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Minerva Surgical, Inc.", "second_party": "Hologic, Inc., et al.", "facts": "Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding.
\nBoth of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States.
\nTruckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic\u2019s NovaSure system.
\nIn 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva\u2019s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent\u2019s seller from attacking the patent\u2019s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement.
", "facts_len": "1656", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3296", "ID": "63321", "name": "HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-472", "docket": "20-472", "term": "2020", "first_party": "HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al.", "second_party": "Renewable Fuels Association, et al.", "facts": "Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation\u2019s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship.
\nThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA\u2019s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011.
", "facts_len": "879", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed", "issue_area": "Economic Activity"}, {"": "3297", "ID": "63322", "name": "Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-543", "docket": "20-543", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury", "second_party": "Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al.", "facts": "For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs).
\nIn 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to \u201chelp Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.\u201d ISDA defines an \u201cIndian tribe\u201d as \u201cany Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.\u201d
\nIn 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any \"Indian Tribe\" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds.
\nSix federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not \u201cIndian Tribes\u201d within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition.
\nThe district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not \u201crecognized\u201d as Indian tribes.
", "facts_len": "2340", "majority_vote": "6", "minority_vote": "3", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3298", "ID": "63324", "name": "United States v. Palomar-Santiago", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-437", "docket": "20-437", "term": "2020", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Refugio Palomar-Santiago", "facts": "Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013).
\nPalomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a \u00a7 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all.
\nThe district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government\u2019s claims.
", "facts_len": "2054", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3299", "ID": "63323", "name": "Terry v. United States", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/20-5904", "docket": "20-5904", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Tarahrick Terry", "second_party": "United States", "facts": "Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a \u201cdetectable\u201d amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months\u2019 imprisonment with 6 years\u2019 supervised release.
\nTerry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of \u00a7 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a \u201ccovered offense\u201d and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend \u00a7 841(b)(1)(C), Terry\u2019s offense was not a \u201ccovered offense.\u201d
\nThe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
", "facts_len": "1027", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "affirmed", "issue_area": "Criminal Procedure"}, {"": "3300", "ID": "63331", "name": "United States v. Cooley", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1414", "docket": "19-1414", "term": "2020", "first_party": "United States", "second_party": "Joshua James Cooley", "facts": "Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley\u2019s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley \u201cseemed to be non-Native.\u201d\u00a0
\nCooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (\u201cICRA\u201d). The district court granted Cooley\u2019s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native.
", "facts_len": "1309", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "vacated/remanded", "issue_area": "Civil Rights"}, {"": "3301", "ID": "63332", "name": "Florida v. Georgia", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/142-orig", "docket": "142-orig", "term": "2020", "first_party": "Florida", "second_party": "Georgia", "facts": "This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.
", "facts_len": "297", "majority_vote": "9", "minority_vote": "0", "first_party_winner": "False", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "none", "issue_area": ""}, {"": "3302", "ID": "63335", "name": "PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey", "href": "https://api.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-1039", "docket": "19-1039", "term": "2020", "first_party": "PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC", "second_party": "New Jersey, et al.", "facts": "The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 717\u2013717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government\u2019s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast\u2019s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state\u2019s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA.
\nThe district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government\u2019s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast\u2019s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
", "facts_len": "1059", "majority_vote": "5", "minority_vote": "4", "first_party_winner": "True", "decision_type": "majority opinion", "disposition": "reversed/remanded", "issue_area": "Due Process"}] \ No newline at end of file