Vanhæft kerfi úthlutar verðmætum til vina og gæðinga

Hér er geysilega forvitnileg grein um íslenska efnahagshrunið, skrifuð á ensku af Georg Brynjarssyni sem stundar háskólanám í Kaliforníu. Þess má geta að Georg hefur verið mjög virkur í starfi innan Sjálfstæðisflokksins.

Georg rekur hrunið meðal annars til óheilbrigðs sambands milli stjórnmála og viðskipta á Íslandi, gallaðs stjórnmálakerfis, úthlutunar fiskveiðikvóta, einkavæðingar banka í hendur vildarvina sem kunnu lítið fyrir sér í bankarekstri, vanhæfs embættismannakerfis og lélegs eftirlits. Hann telur að margt sé líkt með útdeilingu auðsins á Íslandi og í Rússlandi á sínum tíma– og segir allt benda til þess að stjórnmálamenn á Íslandi hyggist rannsaka sjálfa sig.

- - -

„The problem was, and still is, that Icelands political culture and the legacy of heavy state intervention in the economy had created a dangerous nexus of politics and business, exemplified by the adoption of the individually transferable quota system in fisheries. Its adoption was completed in 1990, before the economic liberalization policies were introduced. In essence the political elite decided to give selected fishing vessel owners fishing rights within the Icelandic Exclusive Economic Zone, a de facto ownership of a public good, free of charge. The stated aim was to increase efficiency and make the fishing companies stakeholders in the management and sustainable development of fishing stocks (that aim was reached, but could have been reached as well with a more equitable system). It also made a select group of people, the fishing vessel owners and their political sponsors fabulously rich. All political parties took part in this greatest wealth transfer in the history of Iceland and every political party got a cut. It was not an unforeseen consequence. It was clear from the beginning that this would be the result and the political elite got away with it.

The privatization of banks and state-owned companies was supposed to put an end to the cozy relationship between politics and business and make the division transparent and permanent. The government failed in that task, very much like the Russian government in the 90s. The most valuable assets, primarily the banks, were handed over under market value to a small number of politically connected insiders who did not have much experience of running banks. The original aim of selling state assets to a diverse group of small investors and encouraging foreign access to the process was abandoned. That was a political decision with fatal economic consequences down the road.

It is not surprising that the political elite repeated the politicized fishing quota allocations when the most valuable state assets, the banks, were privatized starting this century. There are many similarities between the privatization of natural resources and state assets in Russia and Iceland. The privatized banks in Iceland were quick to buy media assets and use their ownership to create a favorable media environment and fight battles against critics and competitors. Both countries suffered from the same lack of an efficient regulatory and supervisory framework and democratic deficiencies. The Icelandic civil service has for a long time suffered from nepotism and political allocation of jobs. It has led to high level of incompetence. Talent and merit have not been the guiding principles in the civil service, except on paper. To demonstrate the danger of the high level incompetence is the misunderstanding that seems to have taken place between the Finance Ministers of Iceland and the Finance Minister of the UK. It led the UK to apply Anti-Terrorist legislation to Landsbanki and delivered the final blow to the Icelandic banks. Another example is the announcement by the Central Bank governor of a USD 5 billion loan from Russia, which turned out to be a misunderstanding. The credibility of the Icelandic civil service and political system plunged to new lows.

Icelands incomplete democracy has failed to create an effective division of power. Executive power has dominated legislative and judiciary power. Checks and balances have been weak. It is interesting to note that no verdict in the judicial system went against the state until the mid-90s and is still a rare occurrence. In a mature democracy a former prime minister, lawyer by education, could not have had himself appointed as the head of the Central Bank without Parliament raising objections and without media criticism; that a veterinarian would become the Minister of Finance; that political leaders and their associates could enrich themselves through their own policies.

It is a telling fact of Icelands political culture and democratic deficit that neither the government, individual ministers or the Central Bank governor have resigned despite public pressure. They have also refused to assume responsibility for the greatest economic catastrophe in the history of the republic. 10 weeks after the collapse no official enquiry has been launched into the crash. The idea of an independent investigation led by foreigner specialist has been brushed aside. The government intends to investigate itself.“