Digital Economy Bill — House of Lords, 2017-01-31
Topic: Technology
Christopher Suenson-Taylor (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, this amendment brings the Committee to Part 2 of the Bill: digital infrastructure. This introduces, under Schedule 1, the new revised Electronic Communications Code to replace the code assembled in 1984 and revised in 2003. The Government claim that the new code gets the balance right between operators and site providers. Many of our amendments today are intended to challenge and assess that claim and to make the code work better for everyone The code introduces a new no-scheme regime for valuing land sites and access. Under a backstop power there is an element of compulsion—including compulsory purchase, compulsory lease and compulsory contract powers—if agreement cannot be reached. However, the code is distinct from most compulsory purchase powers in that it creates continuing relationships and seeks to impose what would reasonably be agreed. Yet this principle of agreement requires a market value, even a deemed value, rather than compensation for a loss In trying to get this code right, the Government sensibly undertook consultations and asked the Law Commission to come up with a solution. However, they suddenly changed tack and came up with this new interpretation which has caused consternation to many who sense that the Government have listened to only one side, the operators—characterised as huge multinationals made up of only a handful of companies —as opposed to site providers, which are, by contrast, small entities with diverse interests. The National Trust, for example, which is charged with obligations under the European Landscape Convention, has concerns where there is a need to protect landscapes and scenic beauty. Fisher German, meanwhile, which represents around 7,500 clients, not only in rural locations but also land owners and authorities in urban areas, argues that there has been close consultation with the operators only to the detriment of land owners The Government’s new code aims to incentivise investment in infrastructure which will in turn improve coverage and connectivity for everyone. The charge is that infrastructure costs are too high for the operators. The Government wish to change the balance in favour of those larger institutions; that is, the operators. There are certainly problems with the old code but the sector has made it work. The sector has developed more through the market than by statutory imposition. Changing that to imposition sends warning signals that could lead to much greater resistance by those affected BT has claimed that 20% of its costs are tied up with infrastructure. We all want improved coverage and connectivity, yet is it correct that operators blame obstructive landowners blocking development and charging ransom rents? The Government have been convinced by networks regarding these new powers I am grateful to Mobile, which has undertaken an investigation into the true cost of mobile network operators’ rental agreements. Its research covered 184 councils, as well as others, with 52,000 masts in the UK. The data compiled by Mobile relating to both rural and urban sites showed that estimates of the average rent costs were 34% less for rural sites and 18% more for urban sites than the information provided by Deloitte. The average urban rent was £11,346 as opposed to an average rural rent of £4,946. Yet it is the rural and more remote areas of the UK where coverage is poor. These statistics point out that the biggest costs are in the urban areas The Deloitte report, commissioned by the Mobile Operators Association in 2015, concluded that £270 million could be unlocked for investment in improving networks if the new Electronic Communications Code was in place. The Government assume that reducing costs will result in increased investment. Will cutting the costs of city-centre rents result in better rural coverage? Has the Minister seen the site traffic data and income figures for some of these sites? It is claimed that some sites in London could earn £1 million a month, whereas the code seeks to reduce the rent from £30,000 a year to £200. Have the Government considered the other side of the coin, by which I mean the lost income to site providers—the local authorities, hospitals, water-tower owners, sports club charities, and even clubs like Lincoln City in football whose floodlights on football stands host the infrastructure? These amendments put the challenge to mobile network operators and give real incentive to the Government’s backing. If the costs are so significant and constraining to investment, let us see the savings spent on extending and improving that coverage I also speak to Amendment 24 in this group. There is great concern at the concentration of ownership of wireless infrastructure in the hands of huge vertically integrated mobile operators. To encourage an independent network of sites under integrated management, this amendment proposes a threshold of 10 as a minimum size to encourage investment in independent infrastructure. Many of these investments are in alternative structures such as water towers and pylons and often improve connectivity across mainly rural areas. The challenge is whether the rents and returns can support this investment. By clarifying the situation regarding using site provider investments to become ECC beneficiaries, this probing amendment challenges the Minister to say whether he sees this as a further incentive to the sector, and to aggregated site rights in particular, to bring forward efficiencies such as multiple properties on standard terms. I beg to move.