Trade Bill — House of Lords, 2021-01-06
Topic: Mixed Topics
Andrew Lansley (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, said, this short debate follows on from the debate that we had in this House on the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill on 17 December. Like the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am most grateful to the Minister for his letter of 4 January There are just two things that I want to say following on from that. The first is that I am grateful, but not surprised, that in his letter the Minister said that, although the wording in the amendments that we are now making to the Trade Bill varies slightly from the wording of the clauses in the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Act, the legal effect is exactly the same. I do not think we ever thought that the legal effect would be different. What we find somewhat surprising is that, to achieve the same effect at virtually the same time in two pieces of legislation, the wording is not the same. That was a slightly surprising aspect of the drafting that we were presented with when we saw the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Bill last month. Secondly, I raised the question of what is meant by, and what is the purpose of, the amendments that put into the Bill the saving provision in Clauses 8 and 9 —that "nothing in this section authorises the making of a disclosure which … contravenes the data protection legislation" or aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act. The purpose of the government amendments is to ensure that, when these pieces of legislation and their constraints on disclosure are considered, Ministers can also take into account the powers conferred in this clause The Minister’s letter refers to the Supreme Court case of the Christian Institute and others v the Lord Advocate in 2016. I have had the chance to read the judgment and it does indeed refer to the situation where there is in effect, under legislative provisions such as the data protection legislation, a statutory gateway that allows those provisions to be escaped from in circumstances where there are powers for disclosure in other enactments. In the absence of these provisions, the data protection legislation and the Investigatory Powers Act might well make it very difficult for the necessary disclosures to be made in certain specific circumstances. Therefore, it allows for them to be seen together Paraphrasing, I think, the language of the Supreme Court, it is necessary for anyone wanting to understand the effect of this clause to have this legislation in one hand and the data protection law—indeed, I would add the Investigatory Powers Act—in the other. It does not tell you how any particular instance would be resolved but it does tell you that both must be considered together, and that is entirely reasonable The only issue that one is left with when one reads both the legislation and the Supreme Court judgment is that the clauses we are looking at do not say that the disclosures made by public authorities must be necessary and proportionate. Therefore, I think that it would finally close the gap and make matters very clear if the Minister would confirm that, where these disclosures are made, or indeed where further public authorities have information disclosed to them for their trade functions, the disclosures must be necessary and proportionate to meet those functions.