Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill — House of Lords, 2020-06-16
Topic: Government Operations
Alan Thomas Howarth (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, as a fellow member of the Constitution Committee, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I also endorse warmly the powerful points made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover Amendment 66 would enable Parliament to "keep … under review"—a phrase we hear endlessly—the manner in which the Secretary of State keeps under review the use of the very broad Henry VIII powers to change the law on corporate insolvency by regulations which Clause 18 empowers him to make. As many noble Lords have said, if we are to have Henry VIII powers, which are in principle constitutionally offensive, a special and convincing case must always be made for their creation by the Government. If they are to be legislated for, they should be as narrow as possible to meet their specific purpose and they should not last a minute longer than—as far as this legislation is concerned —the emergency requires As has been noted, the powers in Clause 18 expire on 30 April 2021, but regulations already made under that power can be extended. Moreover, the Henry VIII power itself can be extended by regulations under Clause 22 for another year, and again and again thereafter. That being so, these clauses give the Government a blank cheque. So Amendment 70, which sets a final expiry date, is the very least that is required. I am very attracted to the robust and no-nonsense approach of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe: simply abolish the clause. Clause 39, to which she spoke, is a wicked piece of legislation in constitutional terms. It creates a power for the Secretary of State to change the duration of temporary provisions and to keep on doing so, ad infinitum. It is the most self-indulgent of Henry VIII powers. It is constitutionally offensive, and it really should not stand part of the Bill I accept, as do members of the Constitution Committee and, I think, all other noble Lords, that there is an emergency which needs urgent legislative action and that, as long as the emergency persists, we will need provisions in place to protect as far as we can businesses that are vulnerable to the coronavirus crisis and of course the jobs of those employed by them or dependent on them indirectly. However, as has been noted also by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in an emergency—and this applies especially in a prolonged emergency—the more important it becomes for Parliament also to be vigilant and to protect the principles of the constitution The Bill, which the Government are fast-tracking, is huge. It has 47 clauses, 14 schedules and 234 pages. Like Henry VIII clauses, fast-tracked legislation should be rare. It should be specifically and convincingly justified and its scope should not extend beyond the minimum necessary to achieve its purposes, although the scale of this legislation makes even more questionable the appropriateness of the fast-track process The Government are tracking the Bill so fast that the House of Commons barely saw it. Its Second Reading and remaining stages all took place on the same day; the remaining stages were transacted in half an hour. The Bill was gone in a blink and the House of Commons did not perform its proper responsibility, I regret to say, of scrutinising it. If the House of Lords steps in where the House of Commons fears or has failed to tread, and if we seek to advise and to do so by way of passing amendments, Ministers and even Back-Bench Members of Parliament are wont to express some resentment. But we have a responsibility to scrutinise and improve important legislation. What else is Parliament for? Noble Lords have made a large number of important observations and criticisms of flaws in the Bill today, particularly in the very long debate on the first group. What we need to do, I suggest, is to separate policy for the emergency from policy for the long term This brings me to my second objection, beyond the inappropriate fast-tracking of some of this legislation. As many noble Lords have noted, the Government should not smuggle in permanent changes to policy and law via fast-track emergency legislation. There are three sets of permanent changes, as I understand it, in the Bill. There is a procedure for a new moratorium on enforcement action against companies in financial distress, even though this procedure may be detrimental to creditors and investors, and therefore be potentially as damaging as allowing the debtor companies to go to the wall. The Bill also provides for permanent new arrangements for restructuring companies that are in financial distress, and for restrictions on contractual supplier termination clauses. In winding up on the first debate the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued that the Government had previously consulted on the permanent measures. Indeed they did, but that is no excuse for seeking to bypass full parliamentary scrutiny of important changes to the law on insolvency. We are not making a fuss about the dignity of Parliament. We are complaining about the Government outflanking a process which actually enables them to get difficult changes right and give democratic legitimacy to changes in the law. In another context, the Minister was very keen to restore full law-making rights to this Parliament. I wonder how he justifies what I would regard as this two-fold abuse of Parliament: fast-tracking such a vast law and using emergency legislation to enact permanent changes If the Covid-19 effects should, unfortunately, persist in a very damaging form, Parliament should return in new primary legislation to the question of what emergency powers the Government should continue to be able to exercise. I was attracted by the proposal made earlier by my noble friend Lord Liddle: that there should be post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, put it to us that delegated powers are essential in the emergency. Yes, they may be, but there should be proper sunset clauses attached to all the powers that the Bill creates, and especially the ones that are intended to be permanent, which should never have been in a Bill creating powers for an emergency. At the least, as the DPRRC has recommended, these powers should be amended to limit their use to a period only so long as the Secretary of State judges that the effects of Covid-19 require them.