Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill — House of Commons, 2022-01-10
Topic: Energy
Alan Patrick Vincent Whitehead (Labour, Centre-left): It would not be irresponsible to support the Bill on Third Reading, but it would be responsible of the Government to take a little more notice of these particular problems with the RAB process and possibly, as we move forward with its development, bring in mechanisms that can protect the bill-paying public in a rather better way than is suggested at the moment. That is essentially what the amendments do The arrangement for the RAB to be put into place is that a series of considerations are entered into to give an agreed expenditure cap for what is considered to be the proper use of the collection fund that will provide assistance to the company producing the new nuclear power plant. It can properly draw on that, up to a certain ceiling, from the general public. That is if everything goes well with the nuclear power plant, but of course that may not necessarily be the case. Of 176 nuclear power plants across the world, 175 went substantially over time and over budget, so we need to be very clear that we should not commit the general public to fund these proposals completely open-endedly. We are saying in these amendments that should there be a cost overrun or a time overrun, the Secretary of State should seek an increase in the agreed revenue ceiling without further recourse to customer funds. That may be by producing bonds or it may be by further state funding if that is the choice the Government wish to make, but they should not increase the ceiling for customers to pay exponentially at the same time These are very simple and straightforward amendments saying that, should there be such cost overruns or time overruns and there is a suggested further call on customer bills through RAB, the Secretary of State will have to think of something else to fund the system. Let us be clear that, with the RAB arrangements at the moment, it is suggested, I think very optimistically, there will be an increase of about £10 to £20 in customer bills. That is a really current topic at the moment, but a cost overrun would substantially increase such a levy on customer bills, and we just think that should not be part of the RAB arrangements for the future The third set of changes we wish to put in place are to part 3 of the Bill, which sets out what should happen and what arrangements should be in place if a company, despite all the investment from the public in the construction of a nuclear power plant, essentially goes bust. In this part, the Government have in effect lifted the provision in the Energy Act 2011 for a special administration regime. Again, that is rather current because it is precisely such a special administration regime that was used to rescue Bulb Energy when it went bust a little way ago. It was placed in such a regime under the 2011 Act—the wording is identical to that in this Bill—to allow it to continue trading for the time being, subject to the company being disposed of However, I would suggest that a nuclear power plant the size of Sizewell C, for example, is not remotely the same as an energy company the size of Bulb. It would be quite possible to dispose of Bulb or disperse its customers according to the special administration regime, but that would not be the case for a large nuclear power station. We are saying in amendment 5 that there should be an additional backstop so that, in the circumstances of a special administration regime, it would not be possible to pass the company on—to sell it on or to reintroduce it as a going concern through allocation to a subsidiary—and that the Government should have a plan to introduce a public company to take it over, provided it is working as a nuclear power station. That would not be the case—some Members may think the amendment means this—if the power station could not continue because the reactor head had exploded or the power plant was otherwise non-operational. If it is an operational power plant, we think that such a backstop should be available Hon. Members have mentioned what I think is the salutary case of the North Carolina energy plant that was conceived under RAB arrangements, or something very similar. Some $9 billion of customer money went into that plant, but the plant went bust, not because it was not operational, but because it was unfinanceable. Customers lost $9 billion of money, and there is no power station at the moment.