Restoration and Renewal — House of Commons, 2020-07-16
Topic: Government Operations
Bernard Christison Jenkin (Conservative, Centre-right): It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who speaks with great passion about this building and great knowledge about the challenges we face. All I plead for is realism. We have a clear objective: that this great building should remain the home of our national democracy. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House did not quite say that in his response to my remarks. It may be so obvious as to be implied, but it would be good if it was explicitly the policy of the Government that they envisage staying permanently in this building—even if we decant for a period, and even if the House of Commons chooses to meet in different parts of the country at different times, with this remaining our national home I mentioned the need for realism. The NAO report published in April highlights an enormous number of problems with this great project, not least a confusion of boundaries about who is responsible for what. In some respects, the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority have been put in charge of a project they do not control, because of us, because of the quirks of public opinion, because of the press and because of all kinds of added political risks I was unambiguously in favour of decant until I went around the basement and learned that, when we took the decision to vote for decant, we did not know nearly enough. I remain open-minded about the question of decant. While we are still learning, the cost of alternative arrangements and security has risen and risen. The opportunities for modularising on an incremental basis are quite apparent, particularly in respect of mechanical services. Sometimes we get a little carried away. We should not conflate the outside of the building with the inside of the building. The outside of the building is capable of being repaired while we are in it—the roof and parts of the walls are being repaired as we speak. It is perfectly possible to deal with the external fabric The problem of capacity is important, and it is the capacity of the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority that we should be most concerned about. They need to develop the capacity, expertise and skill to manage a very large project, and perhaps they should cut their teeth on a series of smaller projects, to build up their track record and expertise I come back to the question of risk. We all want best value for money. When large projects overrun, people often say that it must be due to the incompetence of either the contractor or the people who let or manage the contract. The bigger the contract and the project, the more complexities, the bigger the budget, the more people involved and the more risk. We see that in the procurement of new buildings and of large bits of defence kit. The risks compound and concatenate, and that is what will happen with this project As the NAO report makes clear, there are still so many known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The lesson from many of the cost overruns on the Queen Elizabeth Tower was not just on what could have been known—for example, somebody should have worked out what the scaffolding requirement was and costed it properly, which was a very big component of the cost overrun; there were also a whole lot of unknown unknowns that inflated the cost We have to accept that if this is to be a single big project, it is bound to overrun on cost and time because there are so many unknown unknowns. The question is whether the Sponsor Body should be charged with doing a single great project, or whether we should let it do it in bite-size pieces and learn incrementally; whether we decant is a secondary consideration. I hear strong arguments in favour of decanting, and I remain open-minded about them, but I spent 10 years looking at major projects, as Chair of the Public Administration Select Committee and then the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and everything we learnt about major projects told us one thing: the bigger the project, the more unpredictable it is. If there is one absolute certainty, that is it; it is the law of major projects I will finish with one final thought. Great emphasis is placed on what is known as "the requirement". What is the requirement? Is it simply to preserve the building as it is, with a new set of mechanical services, new windows, a proper roof and without bits of masonry falling off? Or is there a very different requirement, to make this a major statement about what our national democracy is, what it should mean and how it should engage with the British people? One thinks of what the German people did with the rebuilding of the Reichstag after the reunification of Germany Is the country in the mood for a huge national statement about this building and our Parliament, or will that simply add to the risk? I think the British public want us to do a job that makes this building much more relevant to them. I had many differences with the previous Speaker, but the construction of the Education Centre was an act of genius. It has brought tens of thousands of children through here every month and has been a tremendous exercise in the education of our people about the value of our democracy, anchored in this building, which communicates so much about the values of our democracy and its permanence If we want this refurbishment to make that kind of statement, how is that conversation to be conducted? Will there be a competition for different proposals to see what attracts us as parliamentarians? There is a great deal about engagement with parliamentarians; there needs also to be engagement with the people. The danger is that we decide on something and then there is a great national controversy, and one party or another is driven off course as it tries to win an election, and the whole project is thrown into disarray as somebody says they will save some money by cancelling it. We have to engage with parliamentarians and the people and develop a proper vision for this building before we ask the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority to embark on what is an almost impossible job—to manage the risks of this great project.