argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: International Affairs
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her very helpful reply. Perhaps this is an example of another kind of adjustment—to return to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, picking up my use of that word. Rather than taking out or adding in, it is a case of refinement. I appreciate exactly what the noble Baroness meant in her reference to frameworks. In regard to tertiary legislation, it might be that a slightly less blanket provision could be used; that is, replacing the blanket restriction on competence with something more targeted to the particular needs to create and preserve the internal market that we are all looking forward to within the UK. What I take from what the Minister has said is that she will look carefully at this and consider to what extent she can come back on Report with something which meets the points that I have been making The noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord McConnell, referred to the reasoning behind the reference to EU law in the original statutes. EU law shared something in common with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In both cases, when the Scotland Act was being designed, it was appreciated that the obligations which gave rise to convention rights and rights and obligations under EU law were based on treaties. So far as those treaties were concerned, in the framing of the Scotland Act and the Wales Act it was thought necessary to preserve the obligations that the United Kingdom had under the treaties and make sure that they were protected in the way that we found in the statute as originally framed; in other words, there was no competence to deal with matters which were the subject of those important treaties. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was that once we leave the EU, that treaty fetter disappears completely; what we have is retained EU law, which is a completely different creature from EU law as we know it today. That is why it is important to appreciate that retained EU law is not a mirror image of EU law, although the subject matter and the detail are no doubt exactly the same I shall come back to that in the next group of amendments, to which I shall speak in a moment, because they raise the same issue. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Law and Crime
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, this is the first amendment in a very much larger group, not all of which is composed of amendments in my name. Although the matter is lengthy and rather complicated, I can deal with it comparatively briefly and, I hope, in a way that is intelligible to your Lordships and in particular to the Minister Amendments 274 and 275 are related to paragraphs 9 and 10 in part 1 of Schedule 2, the former dealing with Scotland and the latter with Wales. I am concerned about the provision which states: "A provision is within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers for the purposes of this Part if … (a) it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament (ignoring section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 so far as relating to EU law and retained EU law)" As I understand that provision, it excludes from competence provisions relating to retained EU law. That is a theme that runs through most of the amendments in this group. It is exactly the same point as we have been discussing in the earlier groups, the question being whether it can possibly be right that the devolved institutions should be prohibited from dealing with retained EU law when they work through the exercises with which part 1 of Schedule 2 is concerned. All the amendments in this group that are in my name raise that issue, except Amendment 363, which I will come back to in a moment. Some of them will require to be superseded in light of the Government’s amended version of Clause 11. I would have thought it was a fairly simple exercise for the Minister and her team to go through these various amendments, which I need not enumerate, just to be sure that the various passages to which I have drawn attention are corrected in light of the revised version of Clause 11 Amendment 363 relates to the right of the Advocate-General to take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to an issue as to whether legislation or an act of a Scottish Minister is incompatible with convention rights or EU law. Of course, the interest of the Advocate-General, if he wishes to enter the proceedings, is to ensure that the devolved institutions act within their competence in relation to these matters. What we have in paragraph 18 is a simple substitution of a reference to "retained EU law" for the reference that is in the statute at the moment to "EU law". The competence restriction on EU law will of course be removed when we leave the EU, but once again I make the point that simply to substitute a reference to "retained EU law" is not the right thing to do: it is not a mirror image of EU law. Indeed, the fetter that applied to EU law should not apply to retained EU law. The amendment is simply designed to delete from the relevant section of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which would no longer have any relevance. I leave that point with the Minister to look at along with all the others.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: International Affairs
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): In a sense, retained EU law is simply repeating what is to be found in EU law. The point is that the treatment of it, from the point of view of the competence of the Parliament and the Ministers, is different. Under the Scotland Act as it is, Ministers have no power to legislate or deal with EU law, because that is subject to the restriction in Section 29 of the Scotland Act, and also in Section 53, so far as Ministers are concerned. My point is that that restriction disappears because we are no longer bound by the treaty arrangements that gave rise to the restriction in the first place. I think the noble Lord is pointing out that much of retained EU law is already part of our law because it has already been built in to our legal system. The point is that I am suggesting that the Parliament and the Ministers should be able to deal with retained EU law in the same way as they can deal with any other domestic law, as long as it is not reserved.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: International Affairs
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): If the noble Lord will forgive me, I was suggesting that we deal with that issue when we look at Clause 11 and the government amendments. The noble Lord raises a very important point, but it does not really relate to my amendments. I think it is much more fundamental and we will need to discuss it in light of the discussion of the reform of Clause 11. I hope I have answered the noble Lord’s question. There is a basic difference between the competence arrangements relating to EU law, which does not apply once we leave the Union, and retained EU law, either domestic or direct, as it comes in under Clauses 2 or 3 Having digressed somewhat in my reply, I again thank the Minister for her helpful reply. I will be happy to withdraw the amendment in due course; however, there are others in the group that others may wish to speak to.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Government Operations
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to, "make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation", which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Foreign Trade
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, this is the last of my little groups of amendments. I will also speak to Amendments 284, 298 and 300 in this group, which all relate to what one finds in Schedule 2. This point goes back to what we discussed a little earlier about the difference between "consent" and "consult". In the existing provisions in paragraph 16 in Part 2 and paragraph 25 in Part 3, which deal with the power of devolved authorities to make provision, "for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO Agreement", that power may be exercised only with the consent of a Minister. The simple point I make in my amendment is—I am sorry: it is rather important that the Minister hears what I am going to say. I will be happy to wait for a moment, if the noble Lords would like to confer. Would it help? I can wait for a second.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Anthony Grabiner (Crossbench, Unknown): The amendment includes the proposition that if the panel "consider it necessary", they may refer the matter to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. I am not aware that there is any mechanism that could possibly enable that to happen. Moreover, even if it were possible, I suspect that the court would not be very grateful to receive what essentially would be a highly political rather than a purely legal question. If I may respectfully say so, it is rather an unrealistic proposal.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Law and Crime
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): Will the noble Lord allow me to take the opportunity to say that, as he will remember, there is provision in the Scotland Act and in the Government of Wales Act for a reference to the Supreme Court on issues of law—about the competence of legislation and whether something is within the competence of the legislatures? The problem with the situation that we are contemplating now is that the issues that remain in debate are not really issues of law, and I do not see how the Supreme Court could possibly deal with them. In fact, it is very anxious not to get involved in politics. There was a germ of good sense in the scheme suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, but it breaks down at that point. I am sorry to intervene, but it is worth mentioning that issue.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-21
Topic: Government Operations
Charles Hay (Crossbench, Unknown): I did. I will send my job application in I feel that we must have regard to that issue. I have been through the document pretty carefully, and I feel—this is why my support for the government amendments is so strong—that a good balance has been struck in those amendments regarding the point that I have just made. There is a chance that the devolved assemblies can exercise those powers properly, but if we tip too many in then I feel we will be letting down the citizens of Wales and Scotland.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Technology
Ilora Gillian Finlay (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, much has been said in support of the amendment. I do not see how the Government can argue against us going along with the flow of modernising regulation I hope that in responding the Minister might consider what we will lose if we do not go down this route. Quite apart from losing the ability to attract pharma here and so on, it is important to record that many research groups that currently collaborate with European researchers know that their only future to pursue research—and want to do so under the new, better framework—means that they will effectively have to move, either to Dublin or Amsterdam. Those are the two main university hubs currently being looked at, although others in other parts of Europe are too. It becomes very easy for very high-powered researchers to move into different academic units, yet if we do not have biological and life sciences research here as new discoveries are made, we will not reap any economic rewards from those discoveries—quite apart from then not having the industries to produce whatever has been discovered I hope the Minister will consider very carefully that the amendment is absolutely essential going forward. Irrespective of what we think of Brexit, we need to be part of this group. If we are not, we will massively become a loser.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: International Affairs
Norman Warner (Crossbench, Unknown): Can I ask for clarification on the subject which we discuss fairly frequently in this House: the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice? Is it the Minister’s understanding that any disputes under this new regulation, when it is in operation, would be settled under that jurisdiction whether or not the UK was in the EU? Would she therefore accept that there is a risk that we might not always be able to benefit from the advantages in this set of regulations?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: International Affairs
David Hugh Alexander Hannay (Crossbench, Unknown): Could the noble Baroness answer the question that was posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern? She seems to think that this will be a matter for negotiation. However, if the Government were to rule that we would bring within the scope of the Bill European laws which had been adopted but whose date of entry into effect fell after the exit date, you would not need to negotiate at all. Have not the Government enough things to negotiate about?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: International Affairs
Alexander Carlile (Crossbench, Unknown): Can the noble Baroness clarify her constant references to Clause 7? As I understand the clause, it is intended to allow Ministers for a period of two years to introduce regulations to remedy deficiencies that come to light during that two-year period. But if we know patently, as has been illustrated in this debate, that there is a severe deficiency that we know about before Brexit, Clause 7 is not designed for that at all and the noble Baroness should not be relying on it. She should instead accept an amendment of this general kind.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Andrew Turnbull (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I regret that I was unable to attend all of Wednesday’s Committee stage, thereby missing a number of important speeches, but I have the opportunity now to speak on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell. I hope that your Lordships will accept that one Treasury ex-Permanent Secretary is a fair swap for another I particularly admired the speech of my immediate predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, who set out the proliferation of players and organisations who could have the right to make secondary legislation out of this Bill and the low hurdle they have to get over. These amendments raise important issues on the scope of secondary legislation, some of which has important constitutional implications The report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has pointed out that it is a long-standing principle—of some 330 years—that the introduction of taxation or its increase should not be permitted simply by secondary legislation. Amendments to Clauses 7, 8 and 9 rightly insist that levying of taxes and increasing them should not be covered by these powers. They also point out that some fees and charges are equivalent to taxation and should be subject to the same constraints One can break down taxes, fees and charges into different categories. There are those that simply cover the costs incurred in administering a particular service—for example, passports. One can test this principle by looking at the annual trading account that an organisation produces to ensure that no surplus is generated. Secondary legislation may be appropriate for fees or charges which satisfy this condition.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Andrew Turnbull (Crossbench, Unknown): I am about to get to that. There are other fees and charges which, as a matter of policy, raise more than enough to cover costs and these should be treated as taxes. I think that in the national accounts, even if the words "fee" or "charge" or "levy" are used, statisticians look at the facts of the case. If there is this surplus generated beyond the simple covering of costs, then it would be classified as a tax.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Andrew Turnbull (Crossbench, Unknown): If something generates a surplus, it is equivalent to a tax and should be covered by the same legislative understandings about taxes There is a third category, where a conscious policy relates the fee not according to how much it costs to administer that piece of service to a business or a household but to something like wealth or income. The most egregious example of this was the recently introduced change in the schedule of probate charges, where larger estates are being asked to pay not what it costs to administer the probate but according to the size of the estate, producing charges many times greater than the pure costs. We need to decide in this amendment whether all fees and charges should be treated as taxes—that would be the simplest thing—or whether it is possible to make a distinction between those fees which are purely covering costs and those which go beyond, either in the total or in their social distribution. I hope that the Minister will agree to come back to this House with amendments which make that distinction The issue will resurface when we get to Amendments 348 and 349, which deal with Schedule 4, where we have the possibility that secondary legislation could be used to introduce fees and charges by a body that was itself created by secondary legislation. I should say that that would put us not just in double jeopardy but jeopardy squared. We are going to have to deal with the problem of these two points in our work on the Bill.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Robert Rogers (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and I shall speak to Amendment 126, which is in my name and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Amendment 126 would bring Clause 8 into line with Clauses 7 and 9 Taxation matters can be dealt with by statutory instrument. For example, they can restrict relief from Customs and Excise duties or VAT under the Customs and Excise Duties (General Reliefs) Act 1979. But taxation, as it is normally and properly understood, is undoubtedly a matter for primary legislation. What is troubling here is the potential width of these powers and the lack of indication of how the Government intend to use them The Delegated Powers Committee’s 12th report says: "At committee stage in the House of Commons, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Mr Robin Walker) indicated that the power to tax by statutory instrument in clause 8 was needed because the power was not available under clause 7"— that is true enough. It continued by saying that, "furthermore, taxation might be needed to ‘comply with international arrangements’" The committee then pointed out, and I entirely endorse what it said: "The question which remains unanswered is why taxation by Ministers in statutory instruments is an acceptable alternative to taxation", approved by Parliament, with the normal rigour of the process, in primary legislation The Minister will need to give your Lordships some very hard examples of why a statutory instrument would be used and not primary legislation. If that is not known at this stage, the withdrawal and implementation Bill we are promised might well be the vehicle for making those changes in primary legislation, if the precise requirements are known at that stage. But this potentially wide power to tax by statutory instrument is, as I say, more than troubling. I am not suggesting that indications of how a power is expected to be used will in themselves suffice, although they should give your Lordships a clue to why the power is required, which is perhaps a more important question to address. What matters, of course, is what ends up in the Act. The use of the power then will not be trammelled by reassuring indications of how, at this stage, it is expected to be used Perhaps I may finish by enlarging on my noble friend Lord Turnbull’s masterly catalogue of fees and charges and their various characteristics, to add another category. In the financial procedure of the House of Commons, a fee that is levied and then applied for the good of the industry as a whole is not treated as a tax, so it does not require ways and means cover. As I say, that is merely a footnote to my noble friend’s excellent speech.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Alexander Carlile (Crossbench, Unknown): May I throw another word into this taxation Scrabble? What about the word "contribution"? Most of us in this House have paid national insurance contributions for most of our lives. Is that a tax, a charge, a fee or a contribution?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Igor Judge (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, my name is to Amendment 126. I do not want to say very much. I can think of another word to add to that great list and I could give my view of the history of how taxation became the weapon for democracy, ultimately. Taxation is the ultimate control that the Commons has over the Executive. Just reflect on the set-to in the United States of America a few weeks ago: Senate and President at odds over money. These issues must be resolved at parliamentary level and House of Commons level—not by regulation.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: Macroeconomics
Robert Rogers (Crossbench, Unknown): Before the Minister responds to that point, could he also answer my question? He has sought to make a distinction between a fee and a charge. Could he explain why, at page 761 of the latest edition of Erskine May, there is no distinction made between fees, charges, impositions, contributions or anything else of that sort? The test which is set out there, and is reflected in the current practice note from the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel—available on its website—is whether or not those payments are, "akin to taxation in their effect and characteristics" I suggest that an additional test needs to be applied to the template which the Minister has offered.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-03-12
Topic: International Affairs
David Hugh Alexander Hannay (Crossbench, Unknown): There is a different eventuality using the same example that the noble Lord gave—namely, the eventuality of the Government’s proposal for what I think is called an implementation phase; most of us call it a transition or standstill phase—lasting about two years. Is he suggesting that we might be in breach of our WTO obligations if we reach an agreement with the European Union on that basis, because it is about to be reached, is it not?