National Policy Statement (National Networks) — House of Commons, 2015-01-13
Topic: Transportation
Lilian Rachel Greenwood (Labour, Centre-left): I am sure that Members on both sides of the House are glad finally to debate the national policy statement on national networks, which is a direct consequence of the Planning Act 2008. Its introduction should ensure that decisions on major infrastructure projects are faster, fairer and more transparent, and it will be judged against those criteria When the Planning Bill was introduced, the then Government said that it would ensure "more timely and predictable decisions on infrastructure projects which are key to economic growth" and international competitiveness. Although this Government’s response may be predictable, it is, unfortunately, anything but timely. The Rail Freight Group told the Transport Committee that the national policy statement "has been overdue since the Planning Act, and that has caused particular concerns for the people who are developing rail freight interchanges." Other policy statements came and went, but the Government’s guidance for our transport networks remained stuck in the sidings. The initial draft of the statement received criticism from many quarters; I will return to that point. The final version was published on 17 December, the last day before Parliament broke up for Christmas, and the text of today’s motion was only published last Thursday What is the significance of the document we are being asked to approve? Even on that, the Government cannot get their line straight. The Treasury has described it as a national transport policy, but the Department for Transport insists, on the contrary, that it is not a policy document, but a compilation of technical planning guidance. The national policy statement is delayed and over-spun. In that respect, it is a reflection of this Government’s transport policies as a whole The Government would have us believe that the NPS builds on a careful synthesis of the rail investment strategy and the road investment strategy, but their commitment to integration seems to extend only as far as giving road and rail the same acronym. It could be worse—the Transport Secretary initially wanted to call this paper the "rail investment programme", until an official pointed out that that would become RIP. As passengers are hit by stealth fare rises and season ticket cost increases of more than 30% since 2010, and as the Government’s flagship electrification programme comes off the rails, perhaps the Transport Secretary’s initial suggestion was the more accurate description. The text of the NPS reveals a total absence of co- ordinated thinking. As the Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation told the Transport Committee: "The needs case…appears not to consider integration of modes, other than in very simplistic terms." Let us look at those claims in detail. Several critics have described the Government’s roads policy as outlined in the national policy statement as a return to "predict and provide". Well, the Government are failing to provide, having scrapped £3.9 billion of planned capital investment in the strategic roads network. I suggest that the decision to axe roads investment is the true significance of the Prime Minister’s ill-fated "road to nowhere" A view shared by many is that the Department for Transport is not effective in predicting demand. The Campaign For Better Transport, among many other organisations and experts, has argued that the Department has historically overestimated road traffic demand, but those criticisms have not been adequately addressed by Ministers. On the other side of the coin, rail received the opposite treatment in the NPS. Network Rail has said that there was a "significant difference" between the Government’s initial estimates for rail demand, and industry projections. Incredibly, the Department used more conservative estimates for future rail demand in the NPS than it did for Network Rail’s 2012 high-level output specification, and the consequences of that are potentially very serious. Network Rail has warned: "If it meant that investment did not get consent because of overly conservative forecasts, we would have more crowding and punctuality issues than might otherwise be the case" The Minister may say that the NPS has been revised in light of those criticisms, but central forecasts for rail demand growth remain unchanged. In addition, the separate network modelling framework estimates have undergone a suspicious evolution. An original estimate of 36% to 46% growth by 2030 has been replaced by a 50.1% growth estimate by 2033. How does the Minister explain that change? Was the uncertainty in the original estimate removed and the date range simply extended by three years to reach 50.1%? Has a new method been used, or has the Department moved the goalposts?