Judicial Review and Courts Bill — House of Commons, 2021-10-26
Topic: Law and Crime
Jeremy Paul Wright (Conservative, Centre-right): It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), although, unlike her, I find much to welcome in this Bill, particularly the parts of it that deal with sensible reforms to court processes, subject, of course, to the safeguards to which my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chair of the Select Committee, quite sensibly referred I want to concentrate my remarks on part 1 of the Bill, which focuses on judicial review. It is worth stressing at the outset, as others have done, just how important judicial review is to our constitutional balance. Judicial review is not, of course, there to be used as a route by which judges can run the country, and its limitations are not widely understood. Its focus in on the way a decision is made, not on the wisdom of the decision itself, which means that those whose decisions are ruled to be unlawful in the exercise of judicial review are, in fact, seldom precluded from reaching the same conclusion subsequently via a revised process Judicial review has practical, as well as constitutional, benefits. It can improve decision making retrospectively, as it obliges badly made decisions to be made again, but also prospectively, as the shadow of judicial scrutiny tends to encourage Government Departments to give more thought to the rationale for decisions before they are made. The lawfulness of Government decisions is not just important for its own sake, but because it enhances their effectiveness by making it more likely that those subject to them will accept them. Surely that has rarely been more important than when the Government have sought to curtail our liberties during a pandemic for the sake of public health Fundamentally, as a matter of constitutional principle, judicial review demonstrates that no one—not even Governments—is above the law. For me, nothing summed that up more clearly than when the Government of which I was part contested a judicial review case in the Supreme Court, on the hugely significant political question of whether the Government could initiate our departure from the European Union without further parliamentary sanction. When the Government lost that case, I—the Government’s Attorney General—could walk out of Court and confirm without hesitation or reservation that the Government accepted the Court’s judgment and would act accordingly. That is this country’s commitment to the rule of law in action The fact that judicial review can be irritating to Governments is not only no reason to erode it; it may, in fact, be a positive reason not to. Changes to judicial review should be approached with caution and this Bill seeks to change it in two specific ways. Let me say just a little about each of them. I will start with judicial reviews against the class of decisions identified in the case of Cart. In those cases, clause 2 seeks to exclude what are, in effect, further appeals by another name. I have sympathy with the Government’s objective, although I do not find the argument of cost and inconvenience to the legal system persuasive. I am much more persuaded by the argument that the current situation undermines another fundamental principle of our constitutional settlement—that of parliamentary sovereignty It is clear that Parliament intended there to be no appeal against the upper tribunal’s decision itself to refuse an appeal from the lower-tier tribunal. Constructing what is, in effect, a back-door route to such an appeal is a clear challenge to Parliament’s intent. I would therefore support a proportionate measure to exclude such replacement appeals as a matter of routine, but it is important for Parliament to reach a considered view on what it really wants to exclude. Having another go at the same argument is what Parliament has said it does not want, but I am not convinced that it said with clarity that it also wishes to exclude challenge to an upper tribunal acting in excess of its powers. I am not convinced, either, that Parliament should say that, but I fear that it may be what the current wording of the clause would achieve This is no time for the fascinating arguments about the merits and demerits of ouster clauses, you will be relieved to hear, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I do think that if the Government seek to use the mechanism set out in clause 2 they must be rigorous in excluding only what is necessary to give effect to Parliament’s direct will and not to prevent a check on acts beyond the upper tribunal’s mandate or powers as given to it by Parliament. Such acts would be rare, but, if they happened, would constitute a challenge to what Government legislated for and therefore to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, too. The wording of clause 2 will therefore need further discussion. I now come to the additional provisions on judicial review in clause 1. Although it may well be arguable that the court already has power to suspend the effect of a quashing order, I can understand the Government’s wish to make that clear, as I can see that a suspended quashing order is, at the very least, a more elegant option than making a declaration of illegality but stopping short of quashing a decision because of the potential administrative chaos it would likely cause. I have more concerns, though, about removing or limiting the retrospective effect of quashing an unlawful decision—not, in itself, a recommendation of the independent review of administrative law. In particular, I am concerned about the suggestion that this would be routine and not exceptional. Finding a decision to be unlawful but then saying that that unlawfulness applies only to those affected by it in the future and not in the past puts the court in a strange position The general premise of judicial review has, for some time, been that if a court finds a decision to have been made in such a flawed way that it was made unlawfully, it is saying that, in effect, the decision was not made at all. Those adversely affected by its making, from the point of its making, are then entitled to rely on the court’s ruling to pursue redress for the effect on them of a decision that has been made void. Removing the opportunity for those individuals or organisations to do so may constitute a significant detriment to their interests and should not be done without consideration for those interests. In passing, I observe that others have said that it also gives considerable power to judges to keep unlawful decisions alive for some, which one might think jars with the apparent premise that some use for judicial review reform, justified or otherwise—that judicial review judges have too much power Removing retrospective effect also presents a logical conundrum. A quashing order will be made only if the court believes that the decision was taken in such a defective way as to require it to be deemed unlawful and therefore of no effect. But removing retrospective effect requires the same court, at the same time, to determine that the decision was not so defective as to require all those subject to it up to the date of judgment to be protected from its impact. There may be circumstances where it is appropriate for the court to decide to do those two conflicting things at once, but they must be rare The difficulty with the way in which clause 1(9), in particular, is constructed is that it suggests that in fact those circumstances should represent the norm. I do accept that clause 1(9) requires the court to regard such an order as offering adequate redress as well as giving the opportunity for the court to do otherwise if there is good reason to do so. However, the clause still creates a presumption in favour of limiting or removing retrospectivity. As I say, I am not convinced that that is the right approach, but, at the very least, Ministers will need to assure us that in the consideration of whether non-retrospective quashing orders offer adequate redress, the interests of those who would have relied on that retrospectivity, as well as those who may benefit from prospective effect, should be given particular weight in the balancing exercise the court must conduct before making the order. I finish where I began, with the fundamental importance of judicial review in our constitutional settlement. It is that importance that should cause us to be very slow to tamper with it, unless we are convinced first that there is a real need to do so that goes well beyond irritation with Government losses and, secondly, that any changes we make are well judged, thought through and do not cause collateral damage. Although I have no wish to impede the Bill’s Second Reading, given the positive effect of other parts of it, I am not convinced that part 1 on judicial review is yet in the right place to meet those objectives.