European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-02-26
Topic: International Affairs
Graham Stirrup (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 12. The issues which it raises are of crucial importance to a post-Brexit UK, but they have only recently begun to achieve any prominence in the Westminster debate and have had very little visibility at all on the wider national stage EU Sub-Committee C of your Lordships’ House has recently concluded an inquiry into sanctions policy after Brexit and is currently conducting an inquiry into the UK’s future relationship with the European Union in the fields of security and defence. In both cases, the Government have expressed an intention to act in close concert with our European partners—the Government; not the movers of this amendment—but they have not so far explained how this is to be done There are some very clear difficulties. The EU’s policy regarding specific sanctions regimes and its common security and defence policy are agreed at ministerial level within the Foreign Affairs Council. However, the arguments through which final proposals are hammered out take place at lower levels, in the engine rooms of the EU. If one is not present in the engine rooms, one has no influence over the formulation of policy proposals. This means that if the UK wishes, post Brexit, to act in concert with the EU in particular sanctions matters, or if it wishes to participate in common security and defence missions—for both of which it has expressed some enthusiasm—it risks having to do so on the EU’s terms. It would have to do so having had no input to the formulation of policy, and with little or no input to subsequent strategic direction. This is not a position with which I, for one, would feel very comfortable The question, therefore, is: what arrangement can the UK reach with the EU that would allow it a suitable degree of influence in these matters? Why should the EU be interested in such an arrangement at all? Perhaps because in those areas in particular, the UK brings capabilities which, in scale and nature, are of an order that few, if any, other European countries possess. However, that does not alter the fact that a non-EU member is unlikely to be given the kind of locus in decision-making that is available to a member. The position of current non-members that align with the EU in these matters is not one that, in my view, would be appropriate for the UK. We need to argue for a separate, tailored arrangement Sanctions policy and common security and defence missions are, of course, offshoots of wider foreign policy. If we wish to have a close relationship with the EU in these specific areas, then we will need some mechanism for discussing and agreeing with it in advance the wider international issues and objectives involved. We need an architecture that brings the UK and the EU together to formulate foreign policy in pursuit of shared objectives, and that places UK personnel in those engine rooms of the Union where the specific proposals on individual issues are debated and evolve. We need to agree a modus vivendi for these people that protects the status of EU members while providing for outcomes that are in the best interests of the Union and ourselves. That is a very tall order, and all the more reason, then, for pursuing such an outcome much more vigorously and urgently than has been the case so far Amendment 12, and indeed several associated amendments, calls for such arrangements to be not just negotiated but approved by both Houses of Parliament before the provisions of the current Bill are implemented. I do not go so far: I do not believe that the amendments as set out should be agreed. However, I do believe that they provide welcome exposure to issues that are of crucial importance to this nation, that have been largely ignored for far too long and that should at last be accorded the priority they deserve. I hope that the Government will now act accordingly.