UK Defence Spending — House of Commons, 2021-06-24
Topic: Defense
Richard James Shannon (Democratic Unionist Party, Right): First, it is a pleasure to speak in this debate, and I thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for calling me. Yesterday we were debating the Armed Forces Bill, and we discussed many things. Today I want to focus specifically on the size of our forces, recruitment and their capability to respond. I make my comments in a constructive fashion, and I look to the Minister for a response to some of the points of view I will put forward on capability to respond. It is important that those are aired and spoken about today During the debate yesterday, we sought to firm up our treatment of the armed forces, and I would like to focus on an aspect of that: defence spending on personnel levels. It is my belief that we must address the shrinking numbers of personnel and set aside funding to build them back up. I understand the Government’s aim to build up cyber sectors, and that is right and proper, but we also need feet in boots, on boats and in the air. We need to ensure that we in the United Kingdom and our policy can respond not just here but across the world when we are called and where the demands are many Perhaps the largest and most controversial sleight of hand is the definition of trained strength. Up until 2016, Army manpower was judged on the basis of personnel who were trained—that is to say, they had completed phase 1 and phase 2 training. The waters have now been muddied by including phase 1 trained personnel in the total Army trained strength. As one service personnel member has said—and I say it very gently— "This is a fudge, as it falsely inflates the numbers but hides the fact that phase 1 personnel are trained in only the very basic rudiments of soldiering." For example, phase 1 armoured corps and infantry soldiers are unable to deploy on their vehicles; they are not trained to use radios; they have only very basic first aid training; they can only fire a rifle, not other weapons systems; they cannot use drones; they cannot conduct cyber operations; they cannot do public duties; they cannot carry live, armed weapons to guard their own camps, and many of them will not even have driving licences, so they are unable to deploy overseas and certainly cannot deploy on operations I say that respectfully, because I hope that, in response, the Minister will be able to say, "Well, here’s what we’re going to do to recruit them, train them and get them to that level of capability." Again, I ask this with respect: is it not true that those soldiers are not able to do all that many of the duties that are requested because of their capabilities and their training, and that we should not be using them in an attempt to mask—I hope that is not what it is—the scandal of chronic undermanning? Will the Minister clearly outline whether the new figure of 72,500 will be based on trade-trained personnel and confirm that it will not be fudged or adjusted Another area of huge concern is the availability of trained military manpower. Is it not true that as much as 15% of the trade-trained strength—that is, those who have completed phase 1 and phase 2—is unable to deploy owing to temporary and permanent medical downgrading, attendance on career courses, maternity and paternity leave, career breaks and so on? I believe that is further exacerbated by large numbers of personnel being unavailable to deploy because they are in training roles already or in full-time reserve service roles, or they are in the MOD office—civil service personnel—on loan service embedded in other countries’ military, seconded to international bodies or serving in embassies around the world. Those are things that they are doing that reduce the number of personnel capable to respond.