Identity and Language (Northern Ireland) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2022-07-06
Topic: Government Operations
Nigel Dodds (Democratic Unionist Party, Right): My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 28, 29 and 36 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Empey, but I will first deal with Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from with this amendment, which we also discussed in Committee. Part of the reason for it is to allow decisions to be made if there is no Northern Ireland Executive in place, but from my reading of it—I stand to be corrected—if it were to be agreed, these powers to act after 30 days would apply whether there were a Northern Ireland Executive or not. In other words, even if the Assembly and the Executive are in place but a period of 30 days elapses between the trigger point and a decision being made, it is open to the Secretary of State to intervene. That seems a quite draconian suggestion. I have been in the Northern Ireland Executive, like the noble Baroness and others, and many decisions take longer than 30 days, for all sorts of good reasons and considerations of all sorts of circumstances. It seems an amazing proposition that the Secretary of State would be compelled to act if the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister could not agree something within 30 days. I can think of nothing more designed to undermine the principle of devolution than that. From my reading of the amendment, it clearly would apply not just to the circumstances where there was no Executive but even if the Executive were in place The other thing I point out is that the amendment would apply only to the appointment of the Irish language commissioner, so there is no compulsion for the Secretary of State to act if there is a failure to appoint the Ulster Scots/Ulster-British commissioner. It seems one-sided in that approach. Nor indeed would it apply to appointments relating to the office of identity and cultural expression. It seems to be very much overstepping the mark. It would not fulfil the purposes it purports to and would create a one-sided approach in relation to appointments. For those reasons, I trust that the Government will maintain their position from Committee and not support the amendment Amendments 28, 29 and 36 in the names of my noble friend Lord Morrow and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, would remove the override powers from the Bill. In his opening remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, made the very important point that the Bill is designed to stick as closely as possible to the NDNA agreement. That is what we are about. On a number of occasions, the Minister cited in support of his arguments in knocking down some amendments that we must reflect the NDNA agreement and that those provisions were not in it. It is certainly not in the NDNA agreement that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would be given override powers, as the Minister admitted in Committee If it had been suggested that this would be part of the agreement, I do not think there would have been an agreement. If we had set up a series of checks and balances, and requirements for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister to agree, and then said, "If they can’t agree, don’t agree, or it appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate then he can intervene and take on all the powers of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in this respect", which is a devolved matter, there would not have been an agreement. It so undermines the NDNA agreement and devolution itself that I find it hard to see how the Minister can justify it. He cannot do so on the basis that it is a faithful replication of the agreement, or on the grounds that it faithfully adheres to the devolution arrangements throughout the United Kingdom. It is clearly in breach of the Sewel convention and it acts as a clear disincentive to find agreement This is one of the many areas where the First and Deputy First Minister—and, indeed, the Executive—are required to reach agreement without the fallback that if they do not then the Secretary of State will intervene. That forces agreement to be made in the vast bulk of cases. If it is clear to some people that the Secretary of State will intervene if they simply dig in their heels and do not agree, then that is likely what will happen. I think this is a very misconceived part of the Bill. I understand that the argument may well be that it is a difficult area and we need contingency powers, as the Minister set out in Committee, but, again, contingency powers to avoid this problem arising were not part of the NDNA I come back to the basic principle. This Bill is about implementing that agreement. We are all agreed on that. These clauses were not part of the agreement. They are unilateral actions on the part of the Government to reserve unto themselves powers to override the Executive. We have seen this in a number of areas recently and I have raised with the Secretary of State and with others within government that we are going down a very dangerous path with this selective overriding of the devolved settlement. We have seen it in relation to the abortion issue, in relation to this issue and in relation to the protocol issue, where the voting mechanism of the Assembly, which is meant to be cross-community and cross-party agreement—there has to be a majority of unionists, nationalists and an overall majority—has been set aside arbitrarily. Where does this end? What criteria do the Government apply for where they respect devolution and where they set it aside? Can the Minister tell us what are the overall considerations as to when powers are taken by the Secretary of State to override devolution, the Belfast agreement or the NDNA agreement? Is it on a case-by-case basis? What is it? I think it raises very serious questions I hope that when this matter is dealt with in the other place, the Government will reconsider this approach because, as I say, it is not a faithful replication of the NDNA agreement.