argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Education
Michael Morris (Conservative, Centre-right): I raised a point on the specifics of the universities superannuation scheme, which is really very large. I do not expect a concrete answer this afternoon, but could my noble friend cover it for me in writing or make sure that it comes back in some form so that the universities can be reassured?
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Education
Howard Emerson Flight (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I am pleased to hear the Minister advise that Clause 39 will be used for further consultation, and that he is certainly minded to introduce a carve-out for AVCs. I would like to push the case for NAME as well, particularly as regards the arguments made by the university schemes. However, I understand the Government’s reservations here. Considerable further discussions with the industry are needed. On the basis of such constructive use of Clause 39, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
David Freud (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for tabling these amendments. Amendments 4, 16 and 26 relate to the question of how non-money purchase benefits in a master trust are dealt with and affected by the new regime, and Amendment 17 raises the question of the appropriate parliamentary procedure for regulations under Clause 8 I will first deal with the question of non-money purchase benefits, as we have given a great deal of thought to it in developing the Bill. Amendment 4 seeks to amend Clause 1(2) so that the provisions apply to non-money purchase benefits in master trust schemes. Amendment 16 seeks to ensure that the Pensions Regulator does not take account of resources which relate to non-money purchase benefits in assessing whether the scheme has sufficient financial resources Amendment 26 seeks to ensure that master trusts set out the protections for non-money purchase benefits in their continuity strategy. Many master trusts will be money purchase schemes—that is, they will provide only money purchase benefits. However, a number provide both money purchase and non-money purchase benefits, and we therefore need to make provision to take account of this. As we have previously discussed, it is important that we do not create a loophole for schemes that offer mixed benefits. However, the policy intent is to specifically address certain risks that apply to members in master trusts related to the nature of the structure and funding of these schemes. These types of risk are managed in different ways in relation to non-money purchase benefits, and it is the risks around money purchase benefits that the Bill is focused on addressing.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Howard Emerson Flight (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I support Amendment 8. It is disappointing that reference to the master trust assurance framework was not already in the Bill, particularly given that the accreditation procedure confirms the rigour in the administrative procedures within the master trust. It is right that that should be added My Amendment 9 is a probing amendment to ask whether a continuity strategy not be the ongoing responsibility of the trustees rather than something which the regulator determines.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
George Young (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, this group of amendments relates to the nature of the authorisation regime, the requirement to meet the criteria, the information provided in the application and the regulation-making powers to vary the scope of the regime in respect of specified characteristics Amendment 7, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, would modify the central tenet of the authorisation regime: the prohibition on a person operating a master trust scheme unless the scheme is authorised. It would amend Clause 3(1) so that it read: "A person may not operate a Master Trust scheme unless the scheme is authorised under all of the provisions of Part 1" The prohibition on operating a master trust scheme has been drafted so that a person may not operate a master trust unless it is authorised and that, to become authorised, the master trust must satisfy the Pensions Regulator that it meets the authorisation criteria. As is set out in the Bill, these are that the persons involved are fit and proper, that the scheme is financially sustainable, that the scheme funder meets certain requirements, that the scheme has sufficient systems and processes to run the scheme and that the scheme has an adequate continuity strategy All the criteria must be met in order for the master trust to be authorised. They must continue to be met on an ongoing basis, with the Pensions Regulator having the power to withdraw authorisation if it ceases to be satisfied that all the criteria are met. It is these criteria that are relevant for determining whether a master trust should be authorised. For that reason, I am happy to be able to reassure the noble Lord that all the authorisation criteria must be met for the scheme to be authorised and for the master trust to be allowed to operate. I hope that he will agree that the amendment is not necessary.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
George Young (Conservative, Centre-right): The noble Baroness has accurately summarised what I said. We would use this clause to disapply only if we did not think that it was proportionate to apply the regime due to other existing protections in place.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
George Young (Conservative, Centre-right): If I may respond briefly to the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, we are rolling out auto-enrolment, where employers have to enrol employees into a policy. Very substantial sums of money are in the process of being invested and it is crucial that there should be public confidence in the regime. I accept entirely what he said about the responsibility of trustees but we want to go beyond that and have a statutory framework in which people can have confidence that their master trust, which is getting their money and the employer’s money, is robust, has been approved and ticks all the boxes that we have outlined in earlier clauses. This is not to take away from the responsibilities of trustees but to give an added bonus of public endorsement and confidence in an area of public policy.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
Rosalind Altmann (Conservative, Centre-right): First, I support my noble friend’s remarks about the master trust assurance framework under the previous amendment, because that framework already exists and there are a number of shortcomings in it, so I could not support including it in the Bill’s requirements However, in these amendments we are dealing with member engagement—and, indeed, employer engagement, because with a master trust, the employer has in a number of ways handed over responsibility to the trustees. Many of the smallest employers who are currently joining auto-enrolment and using master trust schemes are not fully aware of all the implications and intricacies of pension arrangements. Therefore, it is important to have member engagement and information requirements as part of an authorisation process In particular, this might help to address one of the big injustices that your Lordships’ House has not yet addressed. Members who earn less than £11,000 a year who join a pension scheme—in particular, a master trust—which happens to use a net pay arrangement, are charged about 25% more for their pension than they would be if their master trust used a different scheme. I have to mention that that is apart from the NOW: Pensions master trust, which has itself made up the extra money that those low earners are unable to receive from tax relief they are due because of the administration of their scheme If there were proper member engagement and information that told both members and employers that this particular complicated administration arrangement denies low earners a significant amount of money, perhaps the operation of the schemes would work better in members’ interests and the employers themselves would be better informed.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Howard Emerson Flight (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, should Amendment 12 be in the Act? Generally the Government and the Secretary of State have responsibility to see that something like TPR is funded and it is not solely a master trust issue. I question whether this should be in the Bill.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
David Freud (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, these amendments all concern the resources, financial or otherwise, which will be required to ensure that the Pensions Regulator can implement and operate the master trust authorisation regime Amendment 11, tabled by my noble friend Lord Flight, would change the wording of Clause 4 so that subsection (5)(b) reads: "The Secretary of State may make regulations setting out … any application fee payable to the Pensions Regulator", instead of "the" application fee The current provision in the Bill does not require the Secretary of State to set an application fee but it is important for the Government to be clear to the industry about their intentions now—and the Government intend to make regulations that specify an application fee. It is also important for the Secretary of State to have the ability to change the application fee in the future. That is one reason for specifying this fee in regulations. The master trust industry is developing, and will continue to do so, as it adapts to the new requirements of this regime. As the industry changes, it is entirely feasible that the cost to the regulator of assessing applications for authorisation may change too. The fee serves two key purposes. First, it ensures that the Pensions Regulator can recover the costs of processing applications from master trust authorisation without indirectly placing those costs on the wider pensions community it regulates. Without an authorisation fee it would have to recover these costs through the funding provided by the general levy, and this would not be fair given that a large number of the schemes which pay into this levy are not master trust schemes. Secondly, the fee ensures that schemes seeking to become authorised submit carefully considered applications by acting as a deterrent to submitting multiple applications As I hope I have explained, it is important to make provisions for regulations to specify an application fee and that the industry is clear that the Government intend to use this power. The Bill as it stands achieves this intent Both Amendments 12 and 82 require that a report on the subject of the Pensions Regulator’s resources is laid before the Houses of Parliament before the provisions within Part 1 of the Bill are commenced. Amendment 82 would additionally require that Parliament is presented with a report about the impacts of the master trust authorisation regime. The additional report required by Amendment 82 is described as, "a comprehensive assessment of the impact of Part 1" The other report is, "a report demonstrating that sufficient resources are available to the Pensions Regulator to carry out the requirements on the Regulator pursuant to", this Act. The focus of Amendment 12 is very similar, but it requires that the resources report should address the resources required to conduct the regulator’s functions under Clause 5.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
David Freud (Conservative, Centre-right): One of the things I have committed to do is to go back and think about how we make these regulations in the context of the noble Lord’s own suggestion of perhaps looking at the balance between the affirmative and negative procedures. In that context, the exact way in which the Government decide to present the regulations would clearly change. Regulations made under the negative procedure tend to be less of a set piece, while affirmative regulations do tend to be more of a set piece for obvious reasons. The answer to the noble Lord’s question will depend on our reflections on what we do with his proposition.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, with the leave of the House I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement the Answer to an Urgent Question delivered by my honourable friend Sarah Newton MP, the Minister for Vulnerability, Safeguarding and Countering Extremism. The Statement is as follows: "The inquiry was set up to look at the extent to which institutions in England and Wales failed to protect children from sexual abuse. We know the terrible impact that abuse has on survivors, sometimes for many years. As the House knows, following the resignation of the previous chair, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary appointed as chair Professor Alexis Jay. She has a distinguished career in social work and a long-standing dedication to child protection. She led the independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham where she scrutinised the work of social workers and proved her capability to uncover failings across institutions and professions. She is the right person to take this work forward Taking the work forward is vital for creating a sense of certainty for victims and survivors. The inquiry has set up 13 strands of investigation and made 250 formal requests for information from over 120 institutions, with 164,000 documents now having been submitted. It has referred roughly 80 cases a month to the police. It has rolled out the Truth Project, providing survivors with the opportunity to tell the inquiry what has happened to them, and more than 500 people have come forward so far The inquiry has adequate resources to undertake its work and we will support the inquiry with what it reasonably needs. The inquiry remains independent, which means that it is not part of government and is not run by a government department. Professor Jay is mindful of both the scale of the task and the need to move forward at a pace. That is why she instigated an internal review of the inquiry’s approach to its investigations, exploring new ways to deliver its investigative work while remaining faithful to its terms of reference. She has made it clear that if any changes are proposed, the views of those affected by them will be sought. We expect the outcome of this review soon It is crucial that we now give the inquiry the space and the support it needs to get on with its job, getting to the truth for victims and survivors. I urge everyone in the House to do just that".
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, the Home Secretary has no plans to review the remit of the inquiry, which was originally set out with the support of the survivors. The chairman has also stated that she is happy with the inquiry’s remit and has no plans to change it. However, a review will be published in due course on the operation of the inquiry. That was laid out the last time I answered a question on this subject On the Home Secretary meeting the chair of the inquiry to discuss the way forward, or indeed the survivors, this is an independent inquiry. I cannot stress that strongly enough. It is for the chair, together with the panel and the survivors’ group, to work through the inquiry in the way it sees fit It is indeed sad that Shirley Oaks has chosen to step outside the inquiry, but the door is always open for it to return. I hope it does in due course. On the chair meeting the survivors, I assume that that either has happened or will happen in due course—I assume it has happened already. The survivors are at the heart of the inquiry; it is important that the chair not just listens to the panel, but hears from the survivors themselves.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, all reasonable resources are being provided for the inquiry’s purposes. I underline the point that lack of resource is not an issue. Resources are there to meet the needs of the inquiry. Last year it underspent slightly. I do not think there is any question that there is not sufficient resource in money and manpower The Government have confidence in the chairman, having appointed her, but I must underline again that this is an independent inquiry. It is not for the Government to interfere in the inquiry and we have every confidence that it will proceed with pace and clarity, as the chair outlined herself.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Daniel Finkelstein (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank the Minister for the Statement. It is obviously massively premature to suggest the chairman of the inquiry stand down, but I have questions about the remit. Given that it took 10 years or more for the Savile inquiry to inquire into a single institution on a single afternoon, how long does the Minister estimate it will take the inquiry to inquire into every institution in the country over 50 years?
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): My noble friend asks a perfectly reasonable question. We are not holding the inquiry to a timescale, but the chair has indicated that by 2020 she should have concluded a large element of her work. We have absolute confidence in the chairman. She was appointed in view of the fact she had led such a successful inquiry into some of the terrible things that happened in Rotherham.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): On the noble Lord’s second point, the entire point of the inquiry is that it is a full and proper inquiry into what happened in the past, both in Scotland and in England and Wales. I am sure there will be sharing of information across the piece. I am pleased he mentioned Professor Jay because she has shown in her past work into Rotherham what an outstanding chairman she is and how she got to the heart of what was a very difficult, complex issue. I am pleased to hear the noble Lord make that point. The Government also have full confidence in her.
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Edward Faulks (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend will appreciate a suggestion pursuant to the internal review as to how the inquiry might be somewhat more focused. Rather than deciding who abused who when, which would involve a trial of some sort, would it not be better to focus on the complaints system so that there is an examination of when a complaint was made, why it was not heard, and, if a complaint was not made, why it was not made so that we can learn about the systems that will protect children in the future? The ambit of that would be much smaller and it should be possible to report much more closely. In asking that question, I declare an interest as being instructed on behalf of the estate of Lord Janner.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
George Young (Conservative, Centre-right): I take the point that the noble Lord has just made. I hope to be able to reassure him that other provisions in the Bill will satisfy him that the regulator will have the necessary information to withdraw authorisation if something happens that requires it. I will come to that shortly As a public body, the regulator must exercise its general functions reasonably and consistently with its duty to be satisfied that the scheme meets, and therefore continues to meet, the authorisation criteria. With respect, a specific regulation-making power to require the regulator to review fitness and propriety is not necessary I turn to other clauses, which I hope shed some light on the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. Clause 14, requiring the submission of annual accounts, Clause 15, requiring the submission of a supervisory return and, crucially, Clause 16, which creates a duty to notify the regulator of significant events, all serve to ensure that the Pensions Regulator can take an ongoing view of risk in relation to whether it remains satisfied that the scheme continues to meet the criteria Additionally, the regulator also has its information-gathering powers to bring to bear, so it can ask schemes for information to assist in assessing whether it remains satisfied that a scheme continues to meet the criteria and inquire for more information about reported events or information provided. The duty to notify the regulator of significant events, which is provided for in Clause 16, will be supplemented by regulations which specify the events which must be reported. Although we intend to consult on the regulations, our current thinking is that such events will include a change in status of anyone subject to a fit and proper test and any change in the personnel who are subject to the fit and proper test. The use of the significant events regime in Clause 16 to achieve this end is not set out in express terms in the Bill because of the detail which will follow in regulations, but I hope that my outlining of the intent above has helped to clarify this. I have no doubt that later we will return to Clause 16 for further debate Amendment 15 would change the regulation-making procedure in Clause 7 from the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure. I note that in an otherwise critical report, the Delegated Powers Committee acknowledged that this clause was one where the negative procedure might be appropriate. None the less, I refer to what my noble friend said in earlier debates about wanting to stand back and look at the totality of procedures, affirmative and negative, and then come to a conclusion at the end on whether we strike the right balance. On that basis, I hope the amendment might be withdrawn.
Pension Schemes Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-11-21
Topic: Labor
Howard Emerson Flight (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, it is actually extremely unlikely—in fact, virtually impossible—that members will suffer if the manager of a master trust gets into difficulties. The assets attributable to the pension fund members are segregated from the assets of the manager. How valuable or otherwise they are will depend upon how well they have been managed and, if there is more than one fund choice, which fund people have chosen Secondly, it is clear that the Pensions Regulator will and is intended to play the brokerage role. If it perceives that a master trust manager is in trouble, it will quickly sort out who is going to take over that business. It has value because fees are attached to managing the money, which other master trusts will happily pay. There is even some source of revenue coming back to the master trust in trouble as it is bailed out I am afraid that this sort of plaintive request for a compensation fund does not have my support. I thought we had collectively agreed that we did not want another compensation fund. Adding it at the end, almost out of principle, when the chances of it ever being used are virtually zero, is not particularly constructive.