Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-05-09
Topic: International Affairs
Lindsay Granshaw (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I thank the Minister for introducing these SIs in somewhat more detail than he introduced the last set. I think he was in a considerable hurry last time, which we all appreciated. If we leave the EU, we need to incorporate into UK law the sanctions regimes we have as an EU member. These reflect our support for the rules-based international order to which he has referred There has to be a concern that we may lose influence in this field in the future. When we acted as part of the EU we had greater effect and are credited with playing a leading role. If we end up outside the EU, we lessen our effect. I am sure the noble Lord knows that, even if he is not willing to admit it. In addition, there will be new pressures on the UK from allies such as the US, which may wish us to align more with them, and maybe from the City of London, which may not wish us to take certain actions. Maybe our own economic short-term interest will mean that we are less keen to sanction those who may bring their funds to the UK. That is a completely predictable situation We considered a series of sanctions regimes last week and we now come to another set. I am grateful once more that my noble friend Lord Chidgey will deal with Zimbabwe On chemical weapons, I note that, in answer to a recent Written Question, Sir Alan Duncan stated: "The UK played a key role in EU efforts to establish a new Chemical Weapons sanctions regime, which was adopted on 15 October 2018" This is a case in point. Will the EU be as proactive as it was without the United Kingdom there On 21 January this year, the EU added nine individuals and one entity to the regime, which included those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria and members of Russia’s main intelligence directorate deemed responsible for the Salisbury attack in March 2018. Sir Alan referred to, "This strong collective action". Does the Minister agree that "collective" is key Sir Alan also stated on 7 February, in response to a Question from my honourable friend Jo Swinson: "The UK has actively supported proposals for three new EU thematic sanctions regimes in order to strengthen our international resilience to hybrid threats. These regimes are in different stages of development in the EU" These included the chemical weapons regime. The second was a mandate for work on EU cyber sanctions, and the third followed a Dutch initiative to establish a regime on global human rights. All are important developments but, having supported them, the UK is of course in danger of no longer being able to play such a leading role. Can the Minister update us on how these three strands will be taken forward and what part we might play in them On Belarus, the measures include an arms embargo, financial and immigration sanctions, and restrictions on goods or technology that may be used for internal repression, as the Minister has laid out. The Explanatory Memorandum states: "This sanctions regime is aimed at encouraging the Government of Belarus to respect democratic principles and institutions, the separation of powers and the rule of law in Belarus, refrain from actions, policies or activities which repress civil society in Belarus" The EU is calling for the proper investigation and institution of criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearances of four named people, and for Belarus to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. What effect does the Minister think the sanctions are having in bringing any change in Belarus? Are there any plans to extend or limit sanctions against Belarus? I note that some were removed in 2016 The stated aim of the Syria sanctions regulations is to deter the Syrian regime from, "actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population", and to encourage a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict. The sanctions against Syria have been in place since December 2011. They are reviewed annually and the next review will be on 1 June—just coming up. The sanctions comprised an oil embargo imposed in September 2011, restrictions on trade, a freeze of Syrian central bank assets, export restrictions on arms, weapons and equipment that might be used for internal repression, and a ban on export of equipment and technology for the monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications In April 2013, the EU eased the oil embargo to allow oil exports and oil equipment exports to areas under opposition control to help the civilian population. As of March 2019, 277 Syrians are targeted by a travel ban and an asset freeze. Seventy-two entities are targeted by an asset freeze. Will the UK abide by the results of any EU sanctions review? Is there any plan to share intelligence on such matters? How is the review into oil sanctions to be conducted? What kind of impact assessment was made of sanctions on the civilian population? What actions must the Syrian regime take to get sanctions lifted? Has consideration been given to the difficulties of international development NGOs working in Syria, an issue discussed in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill? However, I note that the much-respected former FCO Minister, the right honourable Alistair Burt, emphasised in the Commons, "the importance of the roll-over of these sanctions, in particular in relation to Syria" He expressed his concern that there was, "a risk of Syria becoming almost a forgotten conflict because it is no longer on the front pages and it needs to be".—[Official Report, Commons, 29/4/19; cols. 78-79.] He is surely right I hear what the Minister said about the sanctions in relation to Russia. I note that the Commons has not debated these and he has given some explanation of why they were separated and not put forward with the others. As he said, the EU sanctions against Russia broadly relate to the aim of bringing about Russian policy change on Ukraine. They followed restrictive measures after Russia’s actions in Crimea. These regimes are reviewed regularly, two on a six-monthly basis and one annually. How will we play a part in that, and will we follow what the EU decides The sanctions regime was most recently strengthened in March 2019, when eight Russian officials were added to the sanctions list after escalation in which Russian forces took Ukrainian sailors into custody. The EU has called for the release of the sailors and their ships, as well as free passage for all ships through the straits in the future. The US and Canada have also adopted similar sanctions in response to the incident. There are currently 170 persons and 44 entities from Russia on the EU’s sanctions list. This will next be reviewed in September 2019. The assets of individuals responsible for misappropriating Ukrainian state funds have also been extended until March 2020. All these review dates will be important for the United Kingdom. Where will we fall in our reaction to those? Do the Government anticipate remaining in line with the EU? Since March 2015, EU leaders have aligned—or sought to align—the economic sanctions with the implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreements but these have not been implemented and many political commentators think it unlikely that they will have an effect. What are the implications for the sanctions regime? The US has generally imposed a harsher sanction regime on Russia and dealt with other issues, such as interference in the 2016 US presidential election. We have not become involved in those. Does the Minister think that we might align ourselves on them too The general effectiveness of sanctions against Russia has been contested. Some have argued that Russian actions demonstrate the failure of EU sanctions to influence Putin and Russian policy. The Minister referred to the separate Magnitsky provisions put into the sanctions Bill by the Commons but there is no sign of them there. The Minister made brief reference to that and said that they might be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. Given that parliamentary time clearly does allow, might they be brought forward sooner rather than later In conclusion, we support these SIs, but are concerned about exactly how we will liaise with the EU down the track, how we align ourselves, and how we will have most effect in the future.