EU Exit Day Amendment — House of Commons, 2019-03-27
Topic: International Affairs
William Nigel Paul Cash (Conservative, Centre-right): The first point I would like to raise is about the ministerial code and the actions of the Prime Minister. It is quite clear under the ministerial code—I am glad to see the Attorney General sitting on the Front Bench—that the Law Officers must be consulted in good time before the Government are committed to critical decisions involving legal considerations. Even if I was prepared to concede, which I am not, that the Law Officers do not necessarily have to divulge their opinions—actually, the Attorney General was obliged to do so by a resolution of the House on 4 December 2018—the question is whether, as a matter of fact, the Prime Minister, who today and two days ago resolutely refused to answer me, had consulted the Law Officers. I asked her that, but she twice refused to tell me, and the inference is that she did not do so. Is this not misleading the House? That question worries me intensely Having dealt with that serious issue, I also have to say that I take the strongest possible exception, as do many other distinguished lawyers, QCs and former judges, to the Government’s action in entering into a binding agreement in international law, which purportedly alters the UK’s exit date from the European Union in advance of the votes in each House on the draft regulations, the effect of which would alter exit day in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It has been suggested that the Act provides that the draft regulations can only be submitted to each House for affirmative resolution once the date of exit has been altered at international level. That is simply not correct. The provision for approval by affirmative resolution is free-standing in paragraph 14 of schedule 7, under which a draft instrument is to be submitted to both Houses. It was incumbent on the Government to respect the normal practice of allowing Parliament to approve any legislative changes before entering into a binding international obligation I was the shadow Attorney General during the Iraq debacle. On that occasion, it became apparent that there should have been consultation with Parliament on a matter of the gravest national importance. If I may say so, I obliged, or created the circumstances in which the then Attorney General submitted his opinion to the House. More recently, we had a similar situation with regard of the bombing of Syria. The idea that Parliament is not required to postpone approval of any legislative changes until we enter into a binding international obligation is well established in recent precedent The course that the Government have taken seeks to present Parliament with a fait accompli whereby Parliament is pressured to approve the draft regulations because, the Minister alleges, failure to do so would cause disconformity between the UK’s international obligations and domestic law Under our constitutional law, the power of the UK Government to conclude binding agreements with states and other international actors such as the European Union exists under the royal prerogative. It is a basic principle of our constitutional law that the royal prerogative may only be exercised consistently with the intention of Parliament. Any purported exercise of the royal prerogative that is inconsistent with the intention of Parliament is unlawful and of no effect in our internal legal order I am troubled by what could be the outcome of the meeting of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments today. That is why I intervened on the Minister. I asked whether there was proper consideration of whether the matters before it were intra vires or ultra vires. I do not know the answer because I have not been given the information. I ask the Minister to check whether the Committee considered the question of vires in relation to the issues before it today The intention of Parliament is to be found solely in Acts of Parliament. It is not shown by resolutions of the House of Commons. Unless an Act of Parliament says otherwise, such resolutions do not have effect. Under the principles of public international law, in article 46 of the Vienna convention, a state is entitled to invoke the fact that its apparent consent to be bound by an international agreement has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law, if that violation is manifest, which is defined as "objectively evident", and concerns a rule of internal law of fundamental importance. Those criteria are clearly satisfied, so there is manifest violation of our internal constitutional law. The Government’s actions are completely unlawful It is abominable that we should be faced with having to vote on the specious ground of so-called uniformity, which the Minister has presented. I do not blame him personally. I ask him to forgive me for suggesting that he is taking advice from other persons who purport to be learned in the law. I am afraid that they are entirely wrong Only yesterday, Lord Pannick himself raised those very questions. Lord Pannick, of course, is a most distinguished lawyer. In fact, he was the lawyer for the plaintiff Gina Miller in the case that resulted in the requirement for the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. Lord Pannick knows what he is doing. In fact, I and others instructed him in relation to the Rees-Mogg case back in 1993, so I know a little bit about the brilliance of Lord Pannick. He said: "The legal concern which some lawyers have expressed is that a power to specify the day and time when the treaties are to cease to apply is not satisfied by identifying two possibilities; it is not possible, if this SI is enacted, to identify exit day simply by reading it."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 March 2019; Vol. 796, c. 1721.] It is worth considering the fact that Lord Pannick is not to be taken for granted and that he has raised serious doubts about the matter.