United Kingdom Internal Market Bill — House of Lords, 2020-11-25
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Martin Callanan (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank noble Lords who participated in the debate, particularly for their brevity. This is, I suspect, a simple difference of opinion, but I will give it a go anyway In previous groupings we have discussed the detail of how the office for the internal market would be governed, including the composition of its board, and so noble Lords will be delighted that I am not going to go through all that again. I have set out consistently in this House why the CMA was chosen as, in our view, the most appropriate body to undertake the new UK internal market oversight functions. The CMA has an outstanding international reputation as an independent regulator and is already equipped with highly relevant economic expertise, necessary to undertake its new functions in the context of the operation of the UK market. Moreover, the CMA has well-established relationships with all the Administrations, with offices in London, Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff. This UK-wide presence will help ensure that the OIM will work in the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom However, we have made it clear that some bespoke arrangements for the OIM will be necessary, in recognition of the focus on devolved matters. As provided for in the Bill, the OIM will be able to benefit from the CMA’s existing expertise and operate within its overall framework, while having its own functions and powers, including distinct governance arrangements such as the OIM panel and task groups. The Government have recognised that some degree of separation is vital and have developed proposals for the OIM accordingly. I wish to strongly emphasise that the distinct statutory objective for the OIM, and for the targeted adaptation in the Bill of the CMA’s statutory framework, enshrines this separation from the outset On Monday, we had a good debate on the composition of the board and the role of the devolved Administrations in appointments. The Government have taken a number of reasonable and pragmatic steps to secure the appropriate balance between ensuring that the devolved Administrations have a real say and that the appointment process is not held up unduly—that would, of course, be risked by the amendment Finally, I would like to discuss in a little more detail how this amendment would seek to propose a new role for the OIM regarding subsidy control. I recognise that the amendment reflects a desire for reassurance on the enforcement of any future UK subsidy control regime. However, we believe that it risks undermining and prejudging the outcome of the forthcoming consultation that we have announced. This consultation will inform our future approach to subsidy control, including the role of oversight and enforcement The Government have been clear that the UK will have its own approach to subsidy control; we want a modern system for supporting British business in a way that fulfils our interests. The amendment is therefore premature, as it seeks to confer specific regulatory functions on the OIM in respect of subsidies before the wider details of any legislative UK domestic subsidy control regime, including the appropriate mechanism for oversight and enforcement, have been developed and brought before this House or the other place On another point that we will discuss in more depth in our next debate, the Government’s view is that state aid—the EU’s approach to subsidy control—is a reserved matter. Therefore, the effect of the amendment’s provisions for consent from the DAs would be to create unacceptable uncertainty over the extent to which subsidy control is a reserved or devolved competence. As an issue of national importance, it should be treated in the same way as other nationally significant areas of economic policy, which are reserved. Having a single unified approach to subsidy control across the United Kingdom is vital to ensure that we continue to have fair and open competition across our internal market Finally, proposed new subsection (4) would require a review of the OIM’s competences within two or three years after Clause 30 enters into force. I recognise the need to ensure that the CMA’s new functions are undertaken effectively, but the broadness of this proposed review is unprecedented and unhelpful For the reasons that I have set out, therefore, I am obviously unable to support this amendment. I ask—perhaps more in hope than in expectation—the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.