Drones in Conflict — House of Commons, 2015-10-13
Topic: Defense
Andrew William Murrison (Conservative, Centre-right): The hon. Gentleman makes his point in his normal fashion. He will understand that Northern Ireland falls outwith the scope of today’s debate, but those responsible for security in Northern Ireland will no doubt examine all the options open to them to safeguard the people living in Northern Ireland I hope the newly repopulated Intelligence and Security Committee will be assisted by Ministers in applying its forensic skills to investigate the Raqqa killings. I am confident that the action was only taken, as the Prime Minister said on 7 September, as there was "no alternative", so it should be able to reassure the public fairly easily. However, it or others must substantiate or refute the hypothesis that, in the Raqqa case, the availability of drones lowered the bar for intervention under article 51 on 21 August. If the former is the case, UAVs will indeed be a new departure in the tradition of J.F.C. Fuller, and the argument for tailored doctrine and rules of engagement will be overwhelming This is especially important as what may seem like surgical, low-risk interventions have an unnerving history of altogether bigger consequences that are difficult to predict and control. What is more, the use of particular systems by the UK legitimises their use by other states. The quality of our doctrine and our rules of engagement have a direct bearing on those of others. If we are seen to be relaxed about this new departure, we cannot be surprised if others take a similar line The use of drones by the US to eliminate operatives in Pakistan and Yemen is highly controversial. I am one of the greatest admirers of the United States, but its post-war history of what has become known as blowback —provoking sometimes game-changing retaliation through the generation of civilian collateral—is alarming. America’s allies are at risk of being seen as colluding to the point that the Defence Committee has called for a clear demarcation in the operation of drones where, of course, interchangeability of US and UK personnel and airframes is very advanced. The Birmingham Policy Commission was assured that UK personnel releasing a weapon from a United States air force vehicle remain subject to UK rules of engagement. Will the Minister confirm that that is the case, since manned air operations in Syria—despite the express will of this House two years ago, however right or wrong—suggest otherwise? We cannot directly influence our allies’ ROEs, but we can ensure that joint operations are conducted appropriately, that NATO doctrine is acceptable and that UK personnel are not compromised. Will the Minister say how many UK servicemen are involved in the operational use of drones with US or other forces and what arrangements she has made to ensure that the ROEs they are required to use do not fall short of the standards applicable in the UK? What will be done to ensure that data acquired using drones are not then used by allies to act against targets in a way that the UK public might find objectionable? The Defence Committee has suggested that the Intelligence and Security Committee look at this. Without wishing to overburden the ISC, would she agree that that suggestion is sound and do what she can to facilitate it Drones are all controlled by human beings, but concern remains over the development of autonomous airframes and so-called killer robots. Some level of independence already applies to a few of our existing weapon systems, such as Phalanx, but it would be useful if the Minister delineated the bounds of acceptability. Can she confirm that the UK is bound by the missile technology control regime, the Wassenaar arrangement and not least the consolidated criteria? What is her view of the future for unmanned technology exploitation in the UK aerospace and defence sector? Will she confirm that the UK Government would be unlikely to license the export of autonomous weapon systems Can I tempt the Minister to indicate how UAVs will feature in the upcoming strategic defence and security review? It sometimes seems that the only defence policy the Scottish National party has is the restoration of maritime patrol aircraft. Manned airframes for that purpose seem increasingly last century, so will she say whether UAVs—perhaps the US systems Poseidon or Triton, or NATO’s high altitude long endurance proposition —are being actively considered to restore capability taken at risk on withdrawal of Nimrod? Will the MOD now undertake to publish the study we understand is being conducted by the MOD into that matter Will the Minister say where we are with the future combat air system? A joint BAE Systems and Dassault post-Typhoon and Rafael unmanned combat air system concept trailed in the Lancaster House treaties and launched in 2012 appears to have stalled. Will she say what has happened to it and the extent to which the challenges of evolving technology designed for permissive airspace and data feeds to deal with hostile environments and semi-autonomy are delaying progress Will the Minister confirm that the UK has no interest in the European Defence Agency’s medium altitude long endurance remotely piloted aircraft systems project? I remember being distinctly lukewarm about that, as I am with "more Europe" in defence generally, at the Foreign Affairs Council when I was at the MOD. When will the Navy’s maritime UAV strategy paper be finished and published? If drones are relatively cheap, easy to control, low risk and readily deployable, they may well become a weapon of choice for non-state actors. What assessment has been made of this and, while spending on UAVs is bucking the defence spending trend in this country, what investment is being made in countermeasures I would like to consider the implications of emerging technology on military software—on uniformed men and women who serve this country. With the SDSR pending, it is important for Ministers to understand where technological advances are taking not only defence hardware but its software—the human beings who populate the military today and will do so over the next two decades. Air marshals gamely tried to convince us that a drone pilot playing with his joystick in the Nevada desert or Lincolnshire is the lineal descendent of "the few" and of airmen in conflicts since—that is, people who engage directly with or are engaged by the enemy in the air Although the mental challenge to a person who logs off and goes home after a shift in Lincolnshire should not be equated with an infanteer in Basra or Helmand, the psychological implications of killing the enemy at a distance rather than at close quarters merit close examination, particularly since operators lack the unit cohesion and support systems of those physically on the frontline If Fuller is right, military practitioners will increasingly be technicians, not tough men at the end of a bayonet. "Professional spirit" will replace "fighting spirit": it will be as if the Royal Army Dental Corps has taken over from the Black Watch. If so, in the sanitised operations of the future, "fighting spirit" may become a positive disadvantage. The military covenant exists because of the extraordinary risks run by fighting forces. If there are few risks beyond the expectation of routine civilian employment, there is no need for a covenant General Fuller’s prediction of the end of the infantry was premature, but it may yet have its day as we shift from hand-to-hand to hands-off combat in an environment where societal tolerance for taking and inflicting casualties is low. If so, there are profound implications for how we structure our armed forces, the sort of people we recruit to them and the implicit deal struck between servicemen and the nation, reflected in the military covenant.