Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill — House of Commons, 2021-07-06
Topic: Government Operations
Craig Whittaker (Conservative, Centre-right): I want to put on the record what an honour it was to be part of the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which was superbly and ably led by Lord McLoughlin. Our task was to look at the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which, as history has shown, has become totally unfit for purpose Although there was much debate and much evidence was taken on the Committee, it is important to say that the Committee’s report was an accurate reflection of the general views of the Committee. That does not mean that we did not have a robust debate and discussion of some of the elements of the draft legislation put before us, but the end result was that everyone agreed that the legislation needed to be the change before us, and restoring the status quo prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act seemed to be the logical thing to do for the majority I want to talk today on two elements of the Bill that drew alternative views and evidence from our panels of witnesses. The first is the so-called ouster clause. That proposal brought much scrutiny, views and evidence not just from our panel but from the members of the Committee. The Committee recognises that views differ as to whether the Government’s approach on justiciability is the best one. A minority of Committee members, as we have heard today from my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Mr Wragg) , and I may say grunted quite loudly from a sedentary position by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Jackie Doyle-Price), believe that a House of Commons vote on a dissolution would be a protection against impeaching and questioning by the courts because of article 9 of the Bill of Rights of 1688. Such a vote would, in their view, give us a better guarantee than an ouster clause against unwarranted judicial involvement, and would avoid setting a precedent for ouster clauses in future legislation. That was one view Some members of the Committee have expressed doubts as to whether the belt and braces, or sledgehammer, approach of an ouster clause is really necessary if the courts will not in practice entertain legal challenges to dissolution. Provided it is clear that dissolution and calling of Parliaments are a personal prerogative, and that the Monarch’s veto over requests is real rather than ceremonial, they are satisfied that the courts would never—almost never—grant an application for judicial review of a decision to dissolve Parliament The majority view of the Committee, however—I am one of that majority—accepts that the general presumption is that Parliament does not intend to oust the jurisdiction of the courts; the Executive should be accountable to both the courts and to Parliament, too. None the less, in principle, the majority believe that Parliament should be able to designate certain matters as ones that are to be resolved in the political, rather than the judicial sphere, and that Parliament should accordingly be able to restrict and, in rare cases, entirely exclude the jurisdiction of the courts. This position, of course, is not inherently incompatible with the rule of law, even if ousting the courts’ jurisdiction will often be in tension with it, so that a [Inaudible] ouster would rarely be appropriate. In this case, when the power in question is to enable the electorate to determine who should hold the power, we consider the ouster to be acceptable. It also sends a very clear message to the courts what the spirit of the Bill intends My second and final point on the Bill is on the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013, which extended the length of the electoral timetable for UK elections from 17 working days to 25 working days. At the time, it was done to ensure the smooth and effective running of our elections. It also recognised the complexity of elections, in so far as the current Bill is compatible with ensuring that the register is up to date and that proxy and postal votes, including those of overseas voters, are possible. This Bill retains the 25 working day period between dissolution and polling day to ensure the supposedly continued operability of our electoral system. However, the lengthening of the election period has meant that the time between the dissolution of Parliament and its return is also lengthened. Although we consider that the country should be without Parliament for as short a time as possible, this must be balanced with the need to ensure that as many citizens as possible can register to vote and exercise their democratic right to vote in elections We had, if my memory serves me correctly, a unanimous feeling that we would like to see a significant reduction in the election timetable, as this 25-day period is for the benefit of the administrators rather than the electorate. Our proposal in the report is that a cross-party working party should be established by the Government to examine how the general election campaign period could be shortened from 25 days without compromising voter participation, including through the increased use of technology and increased focus on year-round voter registration. This would be a better approach to seeing how we can have a robust and transparent approach to democratic elections for the benefit of those who participate, rather than for the benefit of those who administer I support the Bill before us, which genuinely appears to have taken note of the plethora of robust debates and evidence from many quarters of this House, and that is before it has been subjected, from today, to the scrutiny of the House as well. My only request is that the Government look again at my final point on reducing the 25 working day requirement for the electoral timetable. I believe that, with modern-day technology and amended processes, that can be achieved quite easily, without compromising voter participation, in an open and transparent way. It would also future-proof our electoral system further around technological advances, which in my view should be embraced.