argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Other
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I know that we will discuss the sunset clause later. It does not mean that the statutory instruments created under this legislation die after two years, it means only that the powers in the overarching legislation will die. However, those two years are the critical period, so the sunset clause does not have the consequence that I think the Minister might suspect it does.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that every alarm bell went off in my head when I heard the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, basically argue that this would be a route to get naked short selling on AIM. This is essentially a mechanism that will allow people to enter into contracts which they know if they had to fulfil they would be very unlikely to fulfil—talk about risk. That general underlying principle worries many of us who think that a less speculative financial services industry is, in the long run, much more sustainable than a far more speculative financial services industry. That is exactly the point. It is people selling short shares that they will not be able to buy if they are ever forced to close on the contract.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I thought that the noble Lord described naked short selling, which I thought I just defined. Anyway, I am nervous about the idea of policies such as this. There will be enormous pressure to use this opportunity, where the Treasury alone is the decision-maker, basically to loosen the regulatory structure that we have in the UK. That issue is a fundamental one for Parliament I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who talked about the need to find the appropriate place and that it is good that we can have those discussions with the Treasury, to have them with Parliament because there is another side to the argument. One reason why the UK been spectacularly successful as a financial centre is because the regulatory environment in which it functions is considered by many to be a global gold standard. If the noble Lord goes to countries such as China, India or other places, the level of trust and respect in financial institutions that are framed within those EU parameters—he could say it is foolish or sensible—is very high. It annoys the United States to heaven and beyond because so often it has loosened its regulatory standards but has not seen the business shift out of the EU into the US If you talk to companies, part of that reason is the reputational issue. For many companies, to be able to turn to clients and say, "I operate in the gold standard regulatory environment which means that you can trust me and what I do", is so key to the future of their business that clients will reply, "If there is a significant loosening of standards, it might in the short term increase my profits but in the long term it will damage my regular relationship with my client base and I will need to move to the place that carries that gold standard kitemark". Losing the kitemark is significant. That is something that this House and the other House should consider and should not be simply left to a conversation between the industry and the Treasury. It backs up our whole argument that this Bill, by transferring all those decisions simply to statutory instruments, is running into very dangerous territory.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Mixed Topics
Sharon Bowles (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, a couple of interesting points have been made in the context of this amendment. As it reads, it looks reasonably acceptable as we do not want gold-plating, which could potentially happen. I echo that the Commission has been particularly good at dealing with smaller companies and businesses. My experience is that that has not always been reflected in the UK when the dispensations have been a matter for the member state. On more than one occasion, I have written to regulators and others about that One of the points was about asymmetric effects and the fact that when we are no longer a member state the law will bear down on us when we replicate it, or nearly replicate it, in a different way from when we were a member state. It is not only in financial services legislation that this could potentially happen. It happens with contractual obligations. When we replicate Rome I and Rome II, if the other party is in, say, New York, the penalty for breach of contract will be different in the UK from what it would be in France because we no longer tick the member state box. It essentially means that the higher New York penalty will apply rather than it being limited I sit on one of the secondary legislation scrutiny committees, and there have been various occasions when asymmetries have come up. There have sometimes been attempts to balance them, but sometimes not. It depends. These judgments about asymmetries already appear to be going on under the withdrawal Act. From the ones that I have seen, by and large it has not looked as though we could have dealt with them differently, but the issue is worth investigating. To say that the Treasury should do what it can for small businesses is a good thing, whether or not we say that we should not be put in a worse competitive position. Our markets are bigger and, because we have bigger global markets, we may have to regulate in a way that looks stronger rather than weaker. There may be other ways that it does not suit the specificities. I would be a little worried about "no worse competitive position" taken to its extreme, but in the general sense it is possibly more acceptable.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Other
Sharon Bowles (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I certainly was talking in terms of what was delegated and how it was dealing with the things that it then had to deal with. I am not sure that that was the same as the mover’s view, but mine was in the category of doing what was within its power.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Sharon Bowles (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I have Amendment 16 in this group. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, I added my name to his amendments and I thank him for trying to bring some better order to the reports and to increase the frequency with which they are produced. Amendment 16 says that the reports must include a table setting out which provisions of the financial services legislation have been transposed into domestic legislation, and under which statutory instruments. I ask for that because it is awfully difficult to know where things have been put. The Minister will recall that on several occasions when we have been discussing statutory instruments under the withdrawal Bill, I have had to go hunting for the articles of the legislation that has been transposed, and they have popped up in a different instrument and sometimes been dealt with at rather different times If that kind of thing is going to happen again, we need the safeguard of knowing where things have been put. In European parlance, this was called a "coronation table", which showed where the European legislation ended up. One does not necessarily need to do that going forward, once we are amending under our own rules, but something like it would be a first step to obtaining equivalence, because we will also have to demonstrate to the EU where everything has been put. Therefore, this seems a useful addition to these reports, thereby keeping Parliament informed about how things are progressing.
Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2019-01-08
Topic: Domestic Commerce
John Kevin Sharkey (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, given the debate so far I can be very brief. If the Bill proceeds as currently drafted, it will enable the Treasury to create a new set of laws and policies for our financial services industry, all via secondary legislation. These new laws and policies will not have been exposed to proper parliamentary scrutiny and will not have been amendable. This stands in extreme contrast to the careful, detailed and very lengthy scrutiny given to all previous changes in the laws and policies for our financial services industry—scrutiny which has frequently resulted in very significant amendments. This is an entirely unsatisfactory state of affairs, and I know we will come back to this on Report But if we are to have legal and policy changes introduced by SI, then we should at the very least have the opportunity to review them after the fact. That is what my amendment proposes. The Bill as it stands contains a sunset provision for the powers in Clause 1. My amendment proposes a sunset provision for the regulations created by the powers in Clause 1. The sunset provision for the powers extends for two years after we leave the EU. My amendment proposes that the new regulations expire two years after that This would have two effects. It would give time to assess how the new regulations were working in practice. It would also mean introducing primary legislation to reinstate and/or modify or add to new regulations. This would guarantee what we do not have in this Bill: a means of proper, full parliamentary scrutiny of new laws governing a critical part of our national and economic life. My amendment would restore to Parliament the ability to debate and amend these new laws in the proper context of primary legislation. I beg to move.
Further Discussions with the European Union under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union — House of Lords, 2019-02-27
Topic: Mixed Topics
Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): He might care to have regard to the frontispiece of the document issued yesterday by the Government, which reads: "Implications for Business and Trade of a No Deal Exit on 29 March 2019" Someone in the Government seems to think that there is such a thing as a no-deal exit.
EU Withdrawal — House of Lords, 2019-02-13
Topic: Other
William John Lawrence Wallace (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I did. Those of us on this side notice, I suppose I should say, the ironic expression which often flits across the noble Lord, Lord Callanan’s eyes. I hope that that is a little more polite.
Civil Procedure (Amendment) (EU Exit) Rules 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Mixed Topics
Donald Thomas (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): The reason these regulations have come forward is the passing of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which was the very first piece of Brexit legislation to be brought before Parliament. Section 40 gives the Minister the right to make rules of court in order to carry out the procedures set out in that section, which are based upon the Counter-Terrorism Act. So it is a change of rules that these regulations are dealing with. The actual discussion about whether they should apply to sanctions was appropriate when the Bill was going through this House last year.
Money Market Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Domestic Commerce
John Kevin Sharkey (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I was grateful for the clarity of the Explanatory Memorandum and the impact assessment for this SI. I understand that the changes are necessary for the proper continuation in business of UK MMFs in a no-deal scenario. I also understand the importance of the temporary marketing permissions regime in allowing continued UK access for existing EEA MMFs, and I note the £250 billion of UK investment in these funds I also note that, as set out in paragraph 157 of the consolidated impact assessment, "this SI transfers the European Commission powers to make delegated acts and implementing acts to HM Treasury, as a power to make regulations" This refers, I think, to Regulation 18 of the SI, which states: "Any power to make regulations conferred on the Treasury by this Regulation is exercisable by statutory instrument … Such regulations may … (a) contain incidental, supplemental, consequential and transitional provision; and (b) make different provision for different purposes" It also states that such regulations will all follow the negative procedure. I was not sure of the purpose of the phrase, "make different provision for different purposes", or to what extent it extends the Treasury’s latitude in drawing up these SIs. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why this additional power is necessary and whether its scope is as unlimited as it might seem at first sight. I would also be grateful if the Minister could explain the use of the negative procedure for the SIs generated by the power. Is there not a case for using the affirmative procedure to allow Parliament more rigorous scrutiny in this obviously critical area of our financial services industry?
Money Market Funds (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, like my colleagues on these Benches, I support this statutory instrument. It is necessary: to put it in technical terms, British investors in money market funds would be in a right pickle if we did not pass it, because, as the Minister has said, the domestic market is tiny However, I want to raise an issue which is repeated in many of the other statutory instruments before us. Paragraph 2.8 of the Explanatory Memorandum states: "When the UK is no longer a member of the EU single market for financial services, it would not be appropriate for UK authorities to be obliged to share information or cooperate with the EU on a unilateral basis, with no guarantee of reciprocity" I understand the emotional tag behind all this, but there is a wise old saying which goes: "An eye for an eye and we all go blind". The 2008 financial crash and many of the other problems that we have had have come through fragmentation of regulation and the lack of information transfer between regulators in different locations and countries. I really do not understand why we are not seeking to do everything in our power to make sure that information flows continue. A money market fund that is being regulated by the FCA under the new statute following any kind of no deal might well be in the same family as other such funds being marketed in the EU 27. Therefore, something that flags up an issue or concern with one may well reflect through to the other, because it could be core to the administration and deep within the overarching family. Will the Minister explain the consequences of putting up any kind of barrier to existing information transfer and what risks we might be taking on? I am exceedingly concerned about fragmentation.
Uncertificated Securities (Amendment and EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Susan Kramer (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I concur with all the comments made by my colleagues on these Benches. I want to raise again the issue that I picked up in relation to the earlier statutory instrument: namely, the responsibility or duty to exchange information between the UK regulators and the EU regulators. As far as I am concerned, this gets even worse in these two statutory instruments. I will not comment much on the first statutory instrument because, to me, it is a combination of in-flight and onshoring, and I can see why it is essential. Obviously, I am also not going to object to the second statutory instrument However, I want to draw the House’s attention to the significance of regulating CCPs. Following the crash of 2008, the G20—quite appropriately, most of us think—realised that to underpin financial stability in the future it would be necessary to require that derivatives be cleared through central counterparties rather than just exchanged between institutions, because in the financial crash it was impossible to work out who owed money to whom, and that caused much of the system to freeze up and undermined liquidity. But everyone has also recognised that, by running all derivative contracts through a limited number of central counterparties, we are cumulating risk in one location. A mistake by a CCP in understanding a risk, in requiring margins and in recognising the creditworthiness of various players has potentially huge consequences because so much is now gathered in the one location—it has become absolutely critical.
Employment and Support Allowance Payments — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Immigration
Celia Marjorie Thomas (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, from the Lib Dem Benches, I thank the Minister for making this important Statement. The issue of passported benefits is extremely important. I wonder how the department has learned from this mistake so that it does not slip up on migrating claimants from ESA to universal credit. Will she use the upcoming managed migration pilot to consider alternatives to the hard stop, so that vulnerable claimants do not have their benefits cut off if they do not make a universal credit application on time?
Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Mixed Topics
John Kevin Sharkey (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I have only one brief question, which is to do with the transparency SI. I accept that we should approve both the SIs before us, but I regret that there has been no consultation on either instrument. As I remarked earlier, the engagement noted in both EMs is not a satisfactory substitute. However, I was happy to hear the Minister’s response to my suggestion of a more informative account of engagement becoming part of future EMs Reading the EM and the impact assessment for the transparency SI highlights one issue: the usual question of reciprocity. The EM for the transparency SI makes it clear that the Treasury can decide which third-country entities can access data on SFTs held in UK trade repositories. I assume that this provision means that all EEA entities currently with access will be allowed continued access. But what about the other way round? As things stand, if we crash out of the EU with no deal, will the UK still have access to data held in the three EEA trade repositories? If not, would it have significant implications for our financial services industry? Have the Government made any estimate of what the consequences of non-reciprocity might be? What assurance have the Government had from the EU, if any, that the UK would be allowed continued access after 29 March?
Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-02-25
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Sharon Bowles (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I declare my interests, as set out in the register, as a director of London Stock Exchange plc and of Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) Europe ASBL, which is the Belgian not-for-profit parent company of third-party verification entities. I have no comments on the usual way in which the onshoring has been done, switching to the regulators being UK rather than EU ones, or the way in which infrastructure is dealt with in that However, one thing on securitisation caught my eye. Sometimes what is not there, or has been crossed out, is more interesting than what remains. I noted that there was some removal of draft regulatory standard criteria in Article 6.7(a) and (b) of the EU regulation, covering, "the modalities for retaining risk … including the fulfilment through a synthetic or contingent form of retention", and measurement of the level of risk retention. I can fully understand why it might not be desired to go into those, or have them dangling as an invitation for people to lobby. It may make no difference, because those were just examples; they could perhaps be brought in again. However, I was curious about why they had been specifically deleted, or has something else which I have missed taken care of it Article 45, regarding a feasibility report on a simple, transparent and standard synthetic securitisation and the subsequent action relating to it, is also omitted. I can see that, in the case of Article 45, the report date—2 July 2019—is close, but I would have thought that there were ways other than deletion to retain the policy that one investigates synthetic securitisation. The deletion of synthetic criteria from both the list and the article makes me question whether a policy decision has already been taken not to have synthetics within STS at all in the UK in future. I can understand that some might wish that to be the case, but this instrument is not the place to make such a policy decision. Is there some other explanation? I see no reason why the criteria for binding technical standards, in Article 6.7(a) and (b), should be removed nor why we could not have some kind of report, even at a later date.