Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2020-02-10
Topic: Transportation
Denis Tunnicliffe (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, we come to our most important amendment. The Minister will no doubt tell me that it is unnecessary; none the less, we feel it is important. The essence of Amendment 13 is that the Secretary of State must take responsibility for this process—and it must be personal responsibility I have very little faith in the process. I have suffered personally from this sort of situation in delivering a large project. We set down in all the project agreements that parties must co-operate, but they did not. Technically, we had various enforcement mechanisms but these run into the courts and the courts run into delay—and you cannot afford delay. It is pretty weak. The structure requires all participants to behave benignly. Unfortunately, these organisations are in the business not of being benign but of making profits. They are large organisations owned by shareholders, and the shareholders expect profits. I am afraid that the history is not terribly good. There was a project called the London Airspace Management Programme—LAMP, the stated aim of which, according to the CAA, was "to redesign the airspace network over the whole of London and the south-east"— not unlike the master plan. The CAA says: "Initial plans were to consult on a complete package of network changes and 'swathes' and follow this up with airport-specific consultations, prior to a phased implementation at single, or groups of, airports. However initial design work and programming issues meant that this plan was revised so that LAMP design and consultation was to be addressed in two main phases. The first centred around London City and Gatwick (referred to as LAMP Phase 1A) and the second around Luton, Stansted and Heathrow" This comes from a report by the CAA; I would like to make sure that the correct document is quoted —it is in CAP 1692, on the end phase. The rest of the programme was essentially abandoned. I have just read out paragraph 23, but this is also set out in paragraph 24 and 25 et cetera. In a sense it is a sorry tale, but not one that we should be surprised about. It requires the miracle idea that individual entities in this process are able to maximise their own position and, at the same time, that of the whole. When one thinks about it logically, that is fairly improbable So, one looks to how we are going to do it this time. The Minister’s answer will probably quote CAP 1711b, which is the airspace modernisation governance. I hope she had more success in understanding it than I did. I got to paragraph A7, which followed a flow diagram headed "Governance structure for airspace modernisation" that I did not understand, showing the roles for delivering airspace modernisation. I thought, "Is there something tangible here?" Paragraph A7, under the heading "Airspace Strategy Board", says: "The Aviation Minister-chaired Airspace Strategy Board (ASB) is the first tier of the governance structure." I thought, "I’m there. That is where it must happen." But the next sentence says: "The Airspace Strategy Board is not a decision-making board, but will engage stakeholders on the policies that will govern the strategy and will advise DfT on potential changes to the overarching policy, regulatory, legal and funding framework if these are required to address delivery issues." So it is not decision-making, it is just a talking shop.