National Security and Russia — House of Commons, 2018-03-26
Topic: International Affairs
Martin John Docherty-Hughes (Scottish National Party, Centre-left): I was glad that the Prime Minister started this debate by articulating the fact that this Parliament’s argument was not with the Russian nation or the diversity of its peoples. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will forgive me for saying this, but some of the comments from Government Front Benchers over the weekend were perhaps unnecessary as we try to promote dialogue at this extremely difficult time We must acknowledge that there is still no definitive proof that the Salisbury attack was carried out by the Russian regime. There has been no admission of any culpability and nor are we likely to receive any. However, there is no doubt in my mind that it fits a clear pattern of behaviour and threat escalation not only here in the UK, but in a host of other European states, particularly those on the post-Soviet periphery. This is most worrying, especially in a broader geostrategic context, as it has coincided with a defence industry modernisation programme in the Russian Federation that has led many, myself included, to fear that we could be about to enter a new and unwelcome arms race in Europe, which would be in no one’s interest Let us not forget that in President Trump’s first call with Vladimir Putin after his inauguration, the then new President of the United States called the New START treaty, due to last until 2021, one of the worst deals signed by the Obama Administration, saying that it favoured Russia. Let us be clear: if the New START treaty falls, a whole host of other arms control treaties and agreements will begin to unravel. This is, of course, a treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, but the consequences for our own security are immense The evidence suggests that the UK is in a period of unprecedented weakness in terms of its ability to understand and interpret Russian strategy. Whether we like it or not, understanding Russia and its motivations is a fundamental duty of any Administration, yet I would contend that successive UK Governments have made a strategic decision to dismantle infrastructure, to disinvest from the necessary skills and people, and to divert funds that had previously been allocated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the intelligence services and the Ministry of Defence to allow those agencies to understand the Russian Federation and the old Soviet Union, and to help the Government to make informed policy decisions I will give one example of how this capability has been systematically dismantled. The Soviet Studies Research Centre was Sandhurst’s in-house think-tank on Russian military policy. It became the Conflict Studies Research Centre in 1992, but was then changed to a tri-service capability and moved to Shrivenham, with a resultant loss in capacity, in 2005. It then became the Advanced Research and Assessment Group in 2007 before finally folding in 2010. All that remains of the Army’s in-house capability, with its 40-odd years of institutional knowledge, is the Russian military studies archive, which is still based at Shrivenham and is itself struggling for long-term funding.