Defence Supplementary Estimate 2021-22 — House of Commons, 2022-03-09
Topic: Defense
David Michael Doogan (Scottish National Party, Centre-left): I wish to thank the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) for securing this debate. It is an important debate, focusing as it does on the state’s ability to defend the people of these islands, albeit under the current constitutional arrangements. Sovereignty is the precious prize that elevates countries from the ignominy of sub-state status. We see the value of that with the brave actions of Ukrainians, fighting with everything at their disposal to protect their sovereignty, their independence and the freedom of their people, and all power to them in that battle Value in defence terms can be for some an abstract concept, especially in times of prolonged peace at home, but in so far as that has generally been the case for the past 75 years, we should wake from that complacency now, as democracy fights for its very survival in the cities of Ukraine. We see in that conflict the criticality of having the right equipment at the right time in the right place. That necessarily turns the spotlight on the institutionally incompetent defence procurement dynamic with which the UK is encumbered. Even the Treasury does not trust the Ministry of Defence to manage its finances effectively, and categorises it in the third quartile of Government Departments for financial management and capability. I can only assume, therefore, that there is nobody in the fourth quartile Any one of the MOD’s headline failures would represent a multi-billion pound betrayal of the taxpayer, but the Ministry of Defence has a veritable conveyor belt of these debacles, from Nimrod to Chinook, through Warrior to Ajax. There will be a lot more said about Ajax tomorrow, but it really takes the biscuit in terms of absolute dysfunctional defence procurement. Creative accounting with rose-tinted projections, which plan for undetermined savings to accrue to the MOD’s balance sheet at some unspecified point in the future, is the culture that manifests claims that we will see the plan come in £4.3 billion under budget—no detail, no plan The National Audit Office report on the equipment plan states that the MOD has been "over-optimistic in their assumptions…of targeted savings" and has identified a number of costs savings that have no plan as to how they will be achieved—£4.2 billion of extra spending that the MOD has not included. The MOD’s own Cost Assurance and Analysis Service produced an independent assessment of the cost of projects making up 58% of the plan’s costs this year and concluded that they are likely to cost £7.6 billion more than projected. It is expected that the Dreadnought programme—the largest one in the plan—which is already delayed by six years, will cost an additional £2.6 billion. Early business cases for the new medium-lift helicopter and Future Commando Force show that those programmes are currently underfunded. In the case of the new medium-lift helicopter, Industry primes are currently waiting for the MOD to behave like a procurement organisation that has a clue about what it wants, or even when it wants it—but that is in vain. Despite the taxpayers’ large budget increase to the Ministry of Defence, the equipment plan will go over budget in the next few years of the plan. Ministers are fooling nobody when they discuss how they will make savings somewhere, somehow, over the next 10 years On personnel, currently the Army’s target strength will be cut from 82,000 to 73,000 by March 2025, and other top-level budgets must make savings by 2030 equivalent to reducing their count by 6,350, while the cost of the MOD’s civilian workforce needs to be lowered by 10% by March 2025. That finger-in-the-air cost cutting is consistent with neither basic resource management principles, nor the new threat environment faced by the west. The Department’s financial plans once again assume further unspecified workforce cuts of £2.5 billion by 2030, but it has not yet announced how it intends to achieve that, and that almost certainly does not take into account inflationary pressures on either pay or costs of remaining staff Armed forces housing is in a shocking state, as other right hon. and hon. Members have stated. Of the armed forces members inhabiting single accommodation blocks, just under half are satisfied with their accommodation and 36% live in poorer-grade accommodation. Despite that, the MOD has failed to invest in adequate housing, and the NAO described its planned investments as not sufficient even to prevent further deterioration in the estate, much less to improve conditions for personnel. If the MOD truly wishes to make the Army smaller but more efficient, it needs to invest in making it a more attractive destination for potential recruits, and shabby accommodation is not a particularly good place to start Scotland currently has 2,000 fewer soldiers stationed there than we could expect given our population share, which is doubtless a function of the recruitment issues facing the Army. The range of causal factors is not limited to accommodation, but includes remuneration. Scotland’s progressive tax system mitigates that to some extent, with rank and file often paying less tax in Scotland, while those who live off estate in Scotland pay less council tax on average, and of course they all benefit from free prescriptions The financial chaos leading to flip-flopping on base closures and disposals, selling off land at RM Condor in my Angus constituency and then back-pedalling on that, is not helpful either. What is the future for Redford barracks, Fort George and HMS Caledonia, and how long will the MOD stick with today’s vague disposal plans? This culture leaves communities reeling from uncertainty and saving plans that are volatile and not credible Scotland has 32% of the UK’s landmass and 63% of its maritime area, yet only 7% of the defence personnel, and no surface warships are stationed in Scotland. That means that when Russia comes knocking on Scotland’s door, the Royal Navy is busy at the other end of this island and takes fully a day to engage.