argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Peter Lilley (Conservative, Centre-right): Does my right hon. Friend agree that there are lessons for every Member of the House, and every member of the media, regarding how we assess evidence? We can no longer take refuge in the pretence that we did not know the evidence about the non-existence of weapons of mass destruction. The reports states: "The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons" or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. That evidence was set out in the dossier, and as I showed in evidence to the Chilcot report, someone who read the dossier line by line could not fail to reach the same conclusion as Robin Cook, which was that there were no weapons of mass destruction. The fact that largely we did not reach that conclusion is because we have ceased to look at evidence and we rely on briefings from spin doctors and those on our Front Benches. If the House is to get a grip on issues in future, it must go back to looking at the evidence, and so should journalists.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): A lot of things have changed since that evidence was produced in the way it was, and one of the most important things is the renewed independence and practices of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Ministers still see individual pieces of intelligence, and one wants to have a regular update, but the process of producing JIC reports and assessments is incredibly rigorous. I do not think that what happened could happen again in the same way, because the reports that we get from that Committee are now much clearer about what it knows, and what it thinks or conjectures, rather than anything else. I think we can avoid that situation. However, that does not solve the problem for the House of Commons, because it is impossible to share all that intelligence information widely with every Member of Parliament.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for what he says. On the specific issue of equipment, money for our armed services is not infinite, but we have got rid of the black hole in the defence budget so that resources and commitments are more in balance. By having a security and defence review every five years—we have had two since I have been Prime Minister—we are matching what we are spending to the things that our forces and security require. That is a big improvement, but it depends on having the resources. I have tried to explain why the National Security Council architecture helps to solve some of those problems, but I am not standing here saying, "You can completely reduce any risk of mistake, planning, and all the rest of it", because these things are by their nature very complicated.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): My right hon. and learned Friend is right that the way legal advice is produced and considered today is very different to then. We have the National Security Council, on which the Attorney General sits, and before such decisions are made a well-thought-through piece of written legal advice is produced. The Attorney General is not suddenly called on to do this; he is in the room while these vital meetings take place. That is something he did brilliantly and his successor is doing brilliantly My right hon. and learned Friend’s point on the collation of evidence and whether we are getting it right is a more difficult question to answer. There is no doubt that, post-Butler, the Joint Intelligence Committee is incredibly rigorous about reaching judgments: testing them around the experts in Whitehall, confirming them often with the Americans and others, and not pretending to know things that it does not know. On how well we test that, there is a role for the Intelligence and Security Committee in thinking about whether we have got judgments right after they have been made, but perhaps more thinking can be done on that I would just emphasise that for all the intelligence, briefing and information in the world, at the end we still have to make a decision. We never have perfect information on which we make that decision: we are weighing up a balance of risks. That is often the case, whether we are going to take action against terrorists or to try to help secure a particular national interest. In the end, we have to decide and then defend in this House the decision we have made.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): My memory of the debate is that it was about the balance of risks between action and inaction. The case made by the then Prime Minister was that there was a real risk of inaction against someone who had been defying the UN, had done terrible things to his people and threatened his neighbours. The danger was of that coming together with a potential programme of weapons of mass destruction and the other instabilities in the world post-9/11. We have to remember that it was post-9/11 when we were considering all this. That is what I think I felt, as a relatively young Back Bencher, we were voting on. Weapons of mass destruction were a part of the picture, not the whole picture On the right hon. Gentleman’s question about deliberate deceit, I think we have to read the report very carefully. I cannot see in here an accusation of deliberately deceiving people, but there is certainly information that was not properly presented. Different justifications were given before and subsequently for the action that was taken, and there are a number of other criticisms about processes, but deliberate deceit—I can find no reference to it.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Edward Julian Egerton Leigh (Conservative, Centre-right): I do not think the Prime Minister or the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), who voted for this war, should in any way feel ashamed of what they did or indeed be apologetic. As usual, the Prime Minister has acted with honour and dignity, as he always does. The fact is that we believed the Prime Minister of the time—I was sitting on the Opposition Benches, too—about weapons of mass destruction. Frankly, with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), some of us walked into the No Lobby, but it was a narrow decision. I do not think there is any point in recriminations, because I think everybody in this House acted in good faith at the time. However, can we draw a lesson for the future? Surely, we must distinguish between unpleasant authoritarian regimes, such as those of Assad and Saddam, which we must deter and contain, and totalitarian terrorism movements, such as Daesh, which we must be prepared to seek to destroy?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
John Charles Baron (Conservative, Centre-right): In the hope that we all accept that war should always the measure of last resort once all other possible options have been exhausted and given the publication of the Chilcot report, will the Prime Minister now do something that no Government have done since 2003: finally and unequivocally admit that this intervention was both wrong and a mistake?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David Anthony Andrew Amess (Conservative, Centre-right): It may be unusual for anyone in this place to change the way they vote following a speech made here, and I cannot prove that I did so; but that is what I did on the night of the debate, because of what was said about weapons of mass destruction. I now have to listen and wrestle with my own conscience, and shame on me. The then Prime Minister must wrestle with his own conscience. Does my right hon. Friend agree with me that the then Prime Minister must take full responsibility for encouraging this House to take the decision it did, which had disastrous consequences that destabilised the world?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Robert Alexander Stewart (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank my right hon. Friend for pledging on behalf of this House that our soldiers who suffered life-changing injuries in the Iraq war should be looked after for the rest of their lives. May I remind the House that we have an equal duty to soldiers who suffered life-changing injuries in previous conflicts, including some of my 35 men who were so badly wounded at Ballykelly on 6 December 1982, as well as others in the Regular Army, the Territorial Army, the Ulster Defence Regiment and members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary who suffered so grievously in previous conflicts?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): With his military background, my hon. Friend is absolutely right to make that point. Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to be an enormous change in tempo for the British Army. We have seen not only a large number of people tragically losing their lives, but a very large number of people suffering from life-changing injuries—people who lost limbs but want to live full and active lives. Just as after previous major conflicts, the country came together to help make sure that happened, so it is important that we continue to fund and support facilities such as Headley Court and all the work that charities do. That will help others who suffered life-changing injuries in other conflicts.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Giacomo Lopresti (Conservative, Centre-right): In respect of the structure of government, does my right hon. Friend agree that the national security adviser should, rather than being a civil servant, be a Cabinet Minister? That would help to bring all the different strands of government together, provide more accountability and transparency, and perhaps more focus and better decision making. While we develop the convention that we come to this place to debate, discuss and vote on taking military action, is it not the case that ultimately any Prime Minister needs to retain the authority to deploy military force and take the military into action? We do not know what the future holds, and there might be circumstances in which it is impractical for Parliament to do so or we do not have the time to do so.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): My hon. Friend is absolutely right on his second point. Prime Ministers do need to be able to deploy force or take action without parliamentary sanction if it is urgent and then to report to Parliament straight afterwards. Where there is a premeditated decision to take action, that convention has grown up, and I am happy to repeat it from the Dispatch Box As for the national security adviser, I think it is right to have an expert. It does not have to be someone who is currently a civil servant—an expert could be brought in from outside—but it does need to be an expert who is garnering together the military, civilians, the intelligence and all the different parts of Whitehall. It needs to be someone who is full time, rather than a politician who is also running a Department.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Andrew William Murrison (Conservative, Centre-right): Our troops shouldered the burden of Mr Blair’s disastrous Iraq war and paid the price in blood. On a gentler note and speaking as an Iraq veteran, I commend the Prime Minister for the work he has done for our troops, our veterans and their families by improving their lot. Does my right hon. Friend share my hope and expectation that his successor will do the same?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank my hon. Friend for his kind remarks and for all the good work he has done, not least in commemorating the battles of the first world war 100 years ago. We have now set up, with the military covenant written into law and with the covenant support group, a mechanism in Whitehall so that every year we can try to go further in supporting armed forces, veterans and their families. This provides a mechanism for ideas to come forward. Whether by providing help through council tax, the pupil premium, free bus passes or better medical assistance, there is a forum for those ideas to be properly considered in a way that I do not think they were in the past.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): My hon. Friend is right: one of the most powerful points in the report is that Blix should have been given more time. That argument was advanced at the time, but the way in which it is expressed by Sir John gives it even more force I do not think I can stand here and honestly say that all the changes we put in place make mistakes like that impossible. At the end of the day, Governments and Cabinets must make judgments on the basis of the evidence in front of them. The National Security Council, given the way in which it is set up, provides a better forum when it comes to making decisions, listening to arguments and hearing expert advice. I think that that makes it more difficult to press ahead if you cannot take expert opinion with you, although, of course, in the end Cabinet Ministers can decide.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
John Luther Mercer (Conservative, Centre-right): Today is a dark day for the United Kingdom Government, a tragic day for Iraq, and a desperate day for the families of our servicemen and women, who I know are watching today. War is not a sport. This should be a time for deep reflection and humility, throughout the Government and throughout the upper echelons of the military who advise the Government I pay tribute to those who fought, and to their families. They are the best of us, they are the true patriots, and they made the greatest possible sacrifice for the liberties that we enjoy in the House. Does the Prime Minister agree that we must ensure that how we say we want to look after these people and how we actually look after them are the same thing?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): As ever on these matters, my hon. Friend speaks with great clarity. He is right to say that this is a moment for deep reflection. He is also right to say that as we think of our armed service personnel and those who serve, we should be proud of what they did. We should be proud of their bravery and their courage. They were obeying the command of this House, and serving in the way in which we would expect them to. My hon. Friend is right to think of it like that. He is also right to say that we must ensure that the promises of the armed services covenant are kept in reality as well as on paper.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman will have to read the report in order to answer those questions in full, but, in shorthand, let me say this. First, the report makes clear that No. 10 and the Prime Minister did not wrongly alter the dossier that was produced. I think that there are some comments about how the report did not necessarily reflect all the things that were in other papers from the Joint Intelligence Committee, but that is a different point On the issue of whether the war was legal or illegal, Chilcot does not take a stand. Perhaps I will read out later exactly what he says, but he says that there was legal advice, that the legal advice made a legal case for a war, and that that is how the Government proceeded. However, he is not saying that he is taking a position On the issue of misleading Parliament, there is nothing in the Chilcot report that I can see that points to deliberate deceit, but there were clearly occasions when more information, or better information, could have been presented. I think that the report must be read carefully, but those are my shorthand answers to the hon. Gentleman’s questions.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Richard Grosvenor Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. I gather from what I have heard so far that there will be no political recriminations, for reasons that I understand, but will he assure me that, as there will no recriminations against those who sent our armed forces to war, there will be no recriminations against our armed forces who are being chased by ruthless lawyers for doing our bidding and looking after our nation?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): I very much agree with what my hon. Friend has said. We are doing everything we can to get through and knock down these wholly unjustified inquiries, because by and large, as we would expect, British forces behaved entirely properly.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
James Stephen Heappey (Conservative, Centre-right): It has been sobering this afternoon to hear the reflections of those who took the decision here in 2003. I went to Iraq in 2007 to deliver on that decision; it was a difficult and dangerous time. During that summer and the rest of the campaign, many of my friends and colleagues were sent home dead or injured The Prime Minister has spoken about the SDSR process, which now addresses the armed forces equipment requirements, but the threat evolves more quickly than that on the battlefield, particularly in an insurgency. Can the Prime Minister reassure the House that the urgent operating requirement process is now quick enough so that we will never again send troops into battle in vehicles that are not fit for purpose?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): May I thank my hon. Friend for his service, and thank all who served on operations after 2003 all the way through to when we withdrew? I will never forget going to Iraq and meeting some of the soldiers, some of them on their second or third tour, and their sense that the situation was extremely difficult One of the positive things that has come out of this and Afghanistan is that the urgent operational requirement system means we have commissioned some fantastic kit for our soldiers, sailors and airmen more quickly, and responded to their needs. By the time our troops were coming out of Afghanistan—I had been there, I think, 13 times over a period of six or seven years—they were saying that our equipment was now better than the Americans’, that they had things more quickly and that new bits of kit could be produced for them. There are some positive lessons to learn from all of this, as well as, obviously, the negative ones.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
Oliver Newton Colvile (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank my right hon. Friend for giving such an excellent statement on this war. As he knows, my Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport constituency includes 3 Commando Brigade, whose wives and families will have played a significant part in this whole conflict. Will he ensure that MPs representing other garrison cities are also given the names and details of the families so that we can communicate with them in order to talk to them about the impact this conflict will have had on their lives, too?
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Let me join the hon. Gentleman, who himself served in our armed forces, in paying tribute to what our armed forces did in Iraq. They should be proud of the work they did; they were acting on behalf of this House of Commons and the Government who took that decision, and they behaved bravely and courageously, and we should remember that—and we should remember those who gave their lives and who were wounded On his question about how we share intelligence information with this House, I would just give him two reflections. One is that we have tried: in the case of Libya, and I think in the case of Syria, we tried to publish JIC-like assessments cleared for the House of Commons—and cleared, I might add, by officials rather than Ministers. The second point is to get the Chairman of the JIC to read the statement or speech made by the Prime Minister to make sure it accurately reflects the intelligence information. Those are two things we should try to do. Sometimes time is very short, and sometimes the picture is changing—the intelligence is changing—but those are good things to try to do. But I say again that there is no perfection in all this: we can receive and share as much intelligence as we like, but in the end we have to make a decision and make an argument for that decision, and then defend it if it is right or if it is wrong.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): My hon. Friend, who served in at least one of those missions, has made this point before and it is set out in the report as well. There was a policy of deterrence and containment, and I think Sir John Chilcot argues quite persuasively that that situation should have continued for longer, with more UN action and more inspector action, before the last resort of military action. He makes that point very clearly.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): These are all interesting ideas and I am prepared to consider them. The Attorney General does answer questions in Parliament and is accountable to Parliament. The National Security Council’s members are accountable to Parliament and now there is this Committee of both Lords and Commons, in front of which I have appeared, that scrutinises the national security strategy. As I have said, our intelligence services are far more accountable than they have ever been, including giving speeches, openly, about what they are doing and then answering questions at ISC meetings in some considerable detail. I am always happy to consider other things, but we have come a huge way on accountability.
Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-06
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Questions like that probably need to wait for the debate, because they need longer answers. The only point I will make now is that in the case of Libya obviously we decided not to put in ground troops. That had the advantage of ensuring that there were not UK military casualties, but of course it had the disadvantage that we were less able directly to put in place a plan on the ground. The point I have tried to make today—maybe not as clearly as I should—is that these things are very difficult, by their very nature. We can have the best military plan and the best post-conflict plan—those are definitely needed—but even then there is no certainty that we will ultimately be successful. We should not pretend that there is some perfection that we can achieve. We can do a lot better than was done in the past, but we will never be perfect.