Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee — House of Commons, 2017-03-16
Topic: International Affairs
Bernard Christison Jenkin (Conservative, Centre-right): (Select Committee Statement): I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for providing time for me to present our 10th report of this Session, entitled "Lessons still to be learned from the Chilcot Inquiry". The decision to invade Iraq has left an indelible scar on British politics. It continues to be as controversial today as it was at the time, not least because it became apparent after the invasion that it was to become a protracted and bloody affair, costing the lives of 179 UK servicemen and women, as well as those of our allies and of thousands of people in Iraq. The consequences of the decision to invade Iraq remain profound, not only for domestic politics but for our foreign and security policy and the stability of the region The Chilcot inquiry was established in 2009 to provide some closure to the controversy. However, in the minds of many, it was already far too late. I am reminded that the House of Commons first voted on the question of whether to have an inquiry in 2002, on a Conservative Opposition motion. For many, the length of the inquiry that was eventually established has itself has been subject to extensive criticism. Most of the reporting and discussion of the Chilcot inquiry has been preoccupied with the substance of the decision to go to war, its legality, and what happened in the aftermath of the invasion. Yet there are also lessons still to be learned regarding the machinery of government and how it operated and regarding the conduct of public inquiries, and that is what Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee therefore agreed to focus on PACAC’s report, launched today, examines the striking extent to which Cabinet government and collective decision making were sidelined by the then Prime Minister in the run-up to the Iraq war. As was made clear in the Chilcot report, significant decisions on Iraq, pre-conflict, were taken without sufficient consultation of Cabinet colleagues. Chilcot concludes that there were 11 decision points prior to the invasion on which there "should have been collective discussion by a Cabinet Committee or small group of Ministers on the basis of inter-departmental advice agreed at a senior level between officials" A worrying finding of PACAC’s report is that, if so inclined, a future Prime Minister could override the proper procedures of collective decision making without obstacle. Beyond making representations to Ministers and to the Prime Minister, and short of resignation, a Cabinet Secretary does not have any formal recourse to object if a Prime Minister chooses to disregard the procedures for decision making set out in the Cabinet manual. PACAC is in no doubt that this absence of safeguards cannot persist, and this leads to perhaps the most important conclusion in our report We recommend, in line with a proposal from the Better Government initiative, that the Cabinet Secretary and/or senior officials should be able to require a formal letter of direction if they are being instructed to carry out the wishes of the Prime Minister disregarding the normal procedures set out in the Cabinet manual. That would both safeguard the Cabinet Secretary’s independence and clarify their responsibility. It would also make clear to Ministers the vital importance of following proper procedure The second key finding of PACAC’s report relates to the establishment, role and conduct of the Chilcot inquiry itself and builds on the work of PACAC’s predecessor committee, the Public Administration Committee, which carried out a number of inquiries into the conduct and effectiveness of public inquiries. PACAC recommends that in future, before an inquiry is established, Parliament should set up an ad hoc Select Committee to take evidence on the proposed remit of the inquiry and to present formal conclusions and recommendations to the House. There should then be a full debate and vote in Parliament on an amendable motion setting out the precise terms of reference and an estimated timeframe and proposed budget for the inquiry. That should ensure that, in future, expectations are much clearer at the outset of an inquiry PACAC has not sought to reopen all the issues explored by Chilcot; nor has it explored whether Parliament was deliberately misled by the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Tony Blair. However, by highlighting what the Chilcot inquiry revealed about the weaknesses in the Government’s decision-making procedures, and by exploring what lessons can be learned from the inquiry for the conduct of other public inquiries, I hope that we can ensure that the processes are in place that may enable such controversies to be avoided in future. I commend the report to the House.