Ukraine — House of Commons, 2022-05-25
Topic: International Affairs
Tobias Martin Ellwood (Conservative, Centre-right): It is a real pleasure to participate in this important debate. I begin by commending the Ministers on the Treasury Bench for the regular drumbeat with which they bring this subject to the House to allow us to understand what is happening, to take stock and to comment on the clearly very difficult situation in Ukraine If invading Ukraine was an effort to rekindle Russian superpower status, it has been a complete flop. There was no clear initial strategy, no effective command and control, no logistical support and absolutely no appreciation of the Ukrainian people’s fearless desire to stay and fight. For Russia, this has been a dismal campaign. The body bags returning to Russia have piled up in their thousands, and dozens of wrecked Russian T-72 tanks now litter Ukrainian roadsides after a failed attempt to take the capital. With international sanctions starting to bite and countries such as Britain replenishing the arsenal of the brave Ukrainian forces with NLAWs and the like, surely Putin knows he cannot win. But sadly, this is far from over. With little care for the accepted rules of war or even for the loss of Russian life, Russian forces have now regrouped in the south-west of the country and have begun bombing entire towns and cities from afar, carrying out barbaric war crimes to gain territory, specifically in the Donbas region, and exploiting the west’s timidity about getting directly involved As NATO leaders head to the Madrid summit in June, there are lessons for the west to learn. Step back from events in Ukraine and we begin to realise that this is not just about Ukraine; it is another turning point in our history—indeed, in European security. We have had it quite easy over the last 30 years, since the end of the cold war, but the next few decades will be extremely bumpy indeed. State-on-state aggression is clearly back. If we do not help to put this fire out in Ukraine, it will spread to other parts of Europe, yet today it seems we are doing only enough to ensure that Ukraine does not lose, and not enough to guarantee that Ukraine can win. Putin may have misjudged Ukraine’s resolve to hold ground and fight, but he was spot-on in believing that NATO would have no appetite for getting directly involved Putin’s invasion did not come out of the blue. His vice-like grip on his own media has, over decades, convinced the majority of Russians that the west—specifically NATO—is a threat and must be confronted. He has publicly expressed a desire to regain control of those countries that were once governed by Stalin. And now, he is sidling ever closer to China, which shares Russia’s disdain for western standards and values This is indeed a dangerous turning point in our history, and the threat picture is certainly beginning to change fast. I put it to the House that how we conduct ourselves over the next few months—how we regroup and how we choose to stand up to this growing authoritarianism across the world—could have major implications for how things play out over the next decade. I recall speaking when Parliament was recalled after we decided to withdraw from Afghanistan. I made the statement that our departure could well be the high-tide mark of western liberalism since the second world war. I fear that if we do not get Ukraine right, I might be right in that analysis If we are to do things correctly, we face three big tasks, which I put to the Minister today. First, on Ukraine itself, we must agree on what exactly victory looks like. Even in the debate so far this afternoon, there has not been disagreement, but there have been different views on what success actually is. For me, it is the flushing out of all Russian forces from mainland Ukraine—I park Crimea, because it is a more complex issue to be revisited at a later date. Ultimately, I encourage President Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces to clarify that that is what they want to do, because that then makes clear how we can fully support them There must be clarity of that mission, because there seems to be a little disagreement taking place across our European allies. France and Germany are suggesting that a chunk of the Donbas could remain in Russian hands. We need to agree what that mission is, because that then helps to define operations, tactics and the equipment that is required. Eastern Ukraine, for those not familiar with it, is open, flat, tank terrain. It is perfect for that form of mobility and firepower. That indicates the sort of equipment we need to give The second task—slightly bigger, and stepping back from Ukraine—is to rekindle those cold war statecraft skills and the ability to react robustly to events without assuming that we will lose control of the escalatory ladder and trigger a nuclear war when dealing with Russia. NATO, let us not forget, remains the most formidable military alliance in the world. It is no wonder Sweden and Finland both want in. Yet future generations may ask why NATO formally sat on its hands while a democracy on its doorstep was partially destroyed. Let us remember what happened in 1938 when we hesitated. Too often, we have been spooked by Putin’s rhetoric. We should be shaping events, not reacting to them In fairness to the west and in particular to Britain, we have come a long way since our initial hesitance to answer President Zelensky’s pleas for help. Thankfully, NATO allies are catching up with the scale of Britain’s military support for Ukraine, which actually began way back in 2014. However, NATO refuses to formally get involved. It is consensus-driven, and it is clear that some countries do not want to lean forward. It is time therefore to form a coalition of like-minded nations, working together to better co-ordinate military support for Ukraine, increasing the quality and quantity of equipment and assisting with supply chains and training, all united by a mission to see Ukraine push Russian forces entirely out of its mainland We must be proactive in limiting the economic harm that Russia is causing. We should establish a humanitarian corridor around the key port of Odesa, so that the grain that much of the world depends on can continue to reach international markets. That is in our interests, because it will help directly tackle the cost of living crisis affecting us here, too Our final task is to form a strategy to handle an ever-assertive Russia-China axis that is attempting to exploit our fragile world order. Putin would not have invaded Ukraine if President Xi had not given his backing and support. Both countries share a common goal of building an illiberal alternative world order where authoritarian states can flourish, and Ukraine is just the start of that new axis of autocracy flexing its muscles. We must recognise that the last 30 years have been a walk in the park compared with what lies ahead. All NATO countries must increase defence spending to a minimum of 3% and the recent cuts to our troop numbers, fighter jets and ship numbers must be reversed.