Freedom of Establishment and Free Movement of Services (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — House of Lords, 2019-10-23
Topic: Immigration
David Anderson (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, the main issue from a legal perspective is how the use of delegated legislation can be justified, contrary to past undertakings, for a significant policy change that reduces, or appears to reduce, acquired rights. I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and my noble friend Lord Pannick have said about that, and I need not weary your Lordships with any more, but I shall address two other points. The first relates to the practical effect of what the Minister in the Commons accepted on Monday is the potential disapplication of rights. The Government must accept that those rights have some value, as my noble friend Lord Pannick said, because of the position that to maintain these rights in favour of EU-plus nationals might violate the most favoured nation principle of the WTO. Indeed, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee records BEIS as saying that those rights afford a guarantee against, "additional restrictions or barriers that may apply to nationals and businesses from other countries" I am puzzled by the suggestion that the removal of these directly effective rights, in particular the right not to be discriminated against in the delivery of services or in owning or managing businesses, will have limited or no practical impact The Minister has said, no doubt rightly, that our law will be in accordance with EU law on exit day, but because the rights have direct effect they afford protection, by definition, over and above that contained in domestic law. Without these rights, where are the equivalent entitlements and remedies not to be discriminated against to be found in our law? Nor am I entirely clear whether the right of all EU nationals to apply for settled or pre-settled status, even if that right is successfully exercised by the end of 2020, is a full substitute for the right of residence derived from the directly effective right of establishment under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016. Will he explain further whether it is the case—and if so, why—that the removal of these important rights, leaving aside the special issue of satellite decoders, will have only de minimis impact in the respect I have identified My last point relates to the specific power under which these regulations are made, Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which is available only where there is a failure of retained law to operate effectively, or some other deficiency in retained EU law, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I make another point in relation to that: deficiencies in retained EU law are exhaustively defined in Section 8(2) and (3) of the Act, but I cannot find any definition there that fits the present case. There is some suggestion in the Explanatory Memorandum that the deficiency consists of lack of reciprocity, but it is not clear, certainly to me, how a deficiency could arise from the possibility that others might choose to withhold equivalent rights in their own law. If that were the case, then the scope of Section 8 would be very broad indeed. Can the Minister say any more about which provision of Section 8 is relied upon as a sufficient basis for these regulations and, if so, how?