argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-10-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Colin MacKenzie Low (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 294 and 295, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady O’Neill, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Falconer and Lord Wallace. The noble Baronesses very much regret that they cannot be present in the House today, and they have asked me to speak to their amendments. I will be brief, as I understand that, without prejudice to the Government’s ultimate position, the Minister is not seeking to divide the House, and we are all most grateful to him for that The amendments would have no impact on the security measures in the Bill, nor would they affect the other measures in the Bill in any way. Their sole purpose is to bring into force automatically after Royal Assent Clause 8 and the new clause that was added to the Bill by this House last week by a large majority The amendments would deliver cost protections in hacking cases, which Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was enacted to provide for all publication torts. Section 40 is a key part of the Leveson recommendations that the Government promised to implement but has not been commenced. Non-commencement frustrates the will of Parliament and is a breach of the 2013 cross-party agreement. The commencement of these clauses automatically after Royal Assent is necessary to ensure that the device of non-commencement is not employed again on the amendments that the House passed last week. For these reasons, I commend Amendments 294 and 295 to the House.
Housing and Planning Bill — House of Lords, 2016-05-11
Topic: Government Operations
Robert Rogers (Crossbench, Unknown): Even as the farewell symphony is playing, I will just trespass on your Lordships’ patience briefly. My concern is the possibility, even if remote, that the further exchange with the House of Commons that followed the vote last night might lead to an overreaction, rather in the way that led to the Strathclyde report. Regardless of the remaining imperfections in the Bill, the exchange yesterday and today may has been one too many. For the record, it is important that the understanding in your Lordships’ House of the practical application of Commons privilege is clearly demonstrated. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for quoting in extenso from the paper that I wrote in 2012 It is very important to realise that financial privilege operates on something of a hair trigger; you do not need very much to engage it. As an example, when, a few years ago, as Clerk of Legislation in the House of Commons, it fell to me to take a view on the designation or otherwise of amendments coming from your Lordships’ House, I had to examine an amendment to the Bill which became the community land tax Act. Your Lordships had amended it in the sense that a period of consultation would be required before the Act could be commenced. I took the view that designation was appropriate because there was a risk that the consultation would delay the receipt of payments under the Act. Your Lordships—those noble Lords in the House at the time—were outraged and the decision to designate was roundly condemned on most sides of the House. I have a very clear memory of that. Indeed, I think I still have the Hansard. But it makes the point that at the heart of this is the phrase, which is in all three reasons in front of us: "Because it would alter the financial arrangements made by the Commons" It is therefore wholly irrelevant whether your Lordships’ amendment would cost more or less or the same, however powerful the policy advocacy may be. I cannot finish without adding my thanks to those of other noble Lords to the Minister and her colleagues for their patience, forbearance and help throughout the proceedings.
Hillsborough — House of Lords, 2016-04-27
Topic: Law and Crime
Geoffrey Dear (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, my question concerns Lord Justice Peter Taylor, whom noble Lords may remember was later appointed Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and who sadly died in office in 1992 or 1993. It was Peter Taylor who conducted the first inquiry into the Hillsborough disaster. He published his report only three and a half months after the disaster had taken place. Although he laid blame in a number of directions, he was quite clear in the main thrust of his report that he wanted to focus on three issues: first, that the fans were absolutely blameless; secondly, that South Yorkshire Police had largely caused the disaster by their lack of control of the crowds at the Leppings Lane end; and thirdly, in fulsome manner, he criticised South Yorkshire Police for the then emerging criticism from South Yorkshire, who were trying, as he put it, to shift the blame from themselves on to the fans. His clear findings were largely submerged by the growing flow of lies, half-truths and misinformation that occurred before, during and after the first inquest. Bearing in mind that what he said and what he found was entirely mirrored and repeated by the inquiries carried out by the Lord Bishop of Liverpool and by Lord Justice Goldring in the current and shortly to be concluded inquest, will the Minister do everything possible on every appropriate occasion to reflect on the fact that it was Lord Justice Taylor who got to the truth first, even though that truth was later obscured? He was the man who spoke the truth and gave the signpost. In making this statement, I remind the House that it was I who led his inquiry and produced to him the evidence on which he based his findings.
Hillsborough — House of Lords, 2016-04-27
Topic: Law and Crime
David Alton (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, during the 27 years that have elapsed since the Hillsborough disaster, the double spectre of loss and injustice has hung over the people of Liverpool. Among the 96 who died were former constituents of mine, including a child. Those deaths of loved ones were compounded by the denial of criminal negligence, callous indifference, the subversion of our justice system, collective character assassination and demonisation. If the Minister has had a chance to read the material I sent him this morning, including the letter I sent before the game was played at Hillsborough which questioned the safety of the ground, he will realise that there are still many unanswered questions. I would be grateful if he told us more about the timetabling of the continuing inquiry, which is being held with great diligence and meticulousness at Warrington; I have had a chance to visit it and talk to the people about the way they are going about their work. Will he also answer the question which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, put to him a few moment ago about the further judicial proceedings that will be necessary and the timetabling for decisions? We certainly cannot wait another three decades.
Armed Forces Bill — House of Lords, 2016-04-27
Topic: Law and Crime
James Hope (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I shall say something about the Scottish system of justice. If one is talking about convergence, which part of the United Kingdom one comes from may be relevant to a consideration of the issues. I did my national service in a Scottish regiment and I live in Scotland. The Scottish system of justice differs from the English in relation to verdicts The Scottish system at the moment depends on the simple majority. There is a jury of 15 and someone can be found guilty so long as eight on the jury are in favour of guilty. Verdicts are from time to time returned by a simple majority as narrow as that, although most majority verdicts are much more in the area of 13 to two. The fact is, however, that a simple majority verdict is enough for a conviction to be recorded. So far as the question of lingering doubt or confidence in these verdicts is concerned, my experience as a prosecutor and a judge in Scotland is that that system is accepted without question. There is, of course, an additional element in the Scottish system in that there are three verdicts, not two, and a jury of 15, not 12. I am not concerned to explore the size of the jury or the use of the not proven verdict. The important point is that a simple majority verdict is good enough The system has one feature that I think is absent from the proposal in Amendment 1. There is never a question of a failed trial because no verdict has been reached. A Scottish jury always reaches a verdict. There is no question of a failure to reach the required majority because a simple majority will do. If it is not achieved, there is an acquittal. It may be that an acquittal is good enough. When the jury comes to return its verdict, it is either not guilty or not proven. If it is guilty, the jury is then asked, "Is that unanimous or by a majority?" and the foreman will say whether it is a majority or unanimous verdict. The real point and the value of the system for the Scots is that retrials are not required because there is a failure to reach a verdict. If the required figure is not reached, acquittal follows. There is some value in that I do not know how far one takes the principle of convergence, but it might be relevant to consider how it applies to those who come from Scotland to serve in any of the three services, who in their domestic system do not have the system which applies in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland.
Armed Forces Bill — House of Lords, 2016-04-27
Topic: Law and Crime
Michael Berkeley (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I have been listening with great interest to this debate and been persuaded by what has been said on all sides of the Chamber, but one thing occurred to me when we were debating Amendment 2. The Minister said he was not really aware of a lack of confidence in the system but I have to say that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is right. It is not just in the Daily Mail. Whenever you read about Deepcut or any of these scandals, the people whose families are affected do not have total confidence in the system. They think there are cover-ups. Only on the radio on the way here, I heard the families of people who were at Hillsborough saying they were let down and a chief constable has been sacked because there was a cover-up. It really is not good enough to say that the public have trust and the Minister is not aware of mistrust. I can assure noble Lords that there is mistrust among the general public, who feel that organisations that inspect themselves when there is a problem are deeply suspicious. I am not saying that the military does not often do things very well—or the police or any other organisation—but the general public are concerned about this issue.
Libraries, Bookshops and Booksellers — House of Lords, 2016-10-13
Topic: Education
John Bird (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, that was a very interesting trawl through all the reasons why libraries and bookshops are not fluffy. They are not some little thing that you can add to society when you have a few bob in your back pocket. It is interesting that, as was explained by all speakers today, we see libraries and bookshops as the very intellectual backbone of society. I will be carrying on, in my itchy sort of way. I would like to think from what the Minister has said that we will see a turnaround and a reversal of their slow decline. I thank noble Lords.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Jonathan Evans (Crossbench, Unknown): I apologise if I misunderstood the reference to GCHQ and the National Crime Agency and the way in which that was phrased. I ought to declare that I am a former non-executive director of the National Crime Agency. I have been very affected in my thinking on this by the extent to which every law enforcement agency that I have spoken to, in particular the National Crime Agency, seems to believe that this is a very necessary power to enable it to have the evidential ability to pursue serious crime. That is where the distinction lies between the intelligence agencies, which are not seeking this as an evidential tool, and the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement bodies, which see it as an evidential necessity. Depending on a relationship between the NCA and GCHQ within the National Crime Agency seems an unlikely way around this. If there is an evidential requirement, we should put that in the Bill and provide it to law enforcement, rather than relying on GCHQ to provide it by some particular piece of machinery within the NCA, because that would not then be available to all those who might need it within law enforcement This is also relevant in terms of why, or the extent to which, other countries have not gone down this road. There is plenty of evidence that the United Kingdom has been considerably more successful, particularly in the pursuit and prosecution of paedophile crime online, than a number of other jurisdictions. That is partly because we have provided appropriate powers to law enforcement to be able to pursue this. The UK has been much more successful in terms of prosecution figures for very similar situations to those facing some European countries. We should continue to provide the powers that enable the UK to pursue those sorts of crimes, which are at the moment an absolute wave hitting the law enforcement community. If we do not provide it with the powers, we will leave a situation where very many people who have committed online paedophile crime are not prosecuted. From my point of view, that certainly does not seem a satisfactory way forward I am also slightly cautious about the argument that people can always get round this and that anyone applying their best security would not get caught. Almost all investigation, whether intelligence or criminal, relies on those who are criminals or threats to our security not being as good at what they are doing as they hoped. To say that we should not introduce powers because they are not infallible and that if someone applied all security measures they might be able to get around them would mean that we would provide very few powers to either the intelligence services or law enforcement agencies, because someone somewhere might be able to avoid them. Most people, most of the time, do not apply all the security that they could when they are undertaking either national security threats or crime. That is why we can catch them. We should provide as many powers as we can to catch these people before they damage us, and prosecute them afterwards.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Ann Butler-Sloss (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I have not spoken at all on this Bill so far but I should like to make a practical point following what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and previous speakers have said. I speak as a former family judge who over the years has been very involved in safeguarding. One of the most important things is to be sure that the police—it is really the police that we are talking about, rather than the security services—have all the tools that they can possibly have to be able to convince a jury, on a prosecution, that a really serious crime has been committed. If this is going to catch even more paedophiles I endorse it, and I hope the House will agree with me.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-10-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Sheila Clare Hollins (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their support and understanding. I am, frankly, unconvinced by the Minister’s words. The Public Bill Office agreed the amendment as within the scope of the Bill. I am not just frustrated at the delay to commence Section 40; I am somewhat dismayed that Ministers are not yet up to speed on this issue. Perhaps I can help by briefly reviewing some of the past assurances and agreements Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act was part of a package. This agreement was reached in March 2013, to avoid the Government being defeated in both Houses over delays in implementing the Leveson recommendations. We are being asked to consider a further delay. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, reminded us, several other Bills were not then amended. I will not go through them again because I appreciate that time is short in this House. The amendment does nothing to weaken this Bill or affect security measures in any way. All the Government need to do is honour their commitment and commence Section 40. So many times over the past three years we have heard assurances that have come to nothing. It would be an injustice to victims if I passed up this chance to progress the intentions previously enshrined in the Crime and Courts Bill. Peers would not need to use this Bill to do the job if the Government had not used the device of non-commencement I assure noble Lords that I strongly support a free press, but freedom comes with responsibilities and claimants have rights, too. I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-10-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Frederick Butler (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, Amendment 58 and others in this group are also in the names of my noble friend Lord Janvrin and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. Amendments 58 and 59 are in fact consequential amendments. The substance is in Amendments 195, 203, 217 and 241, the purpose of which is to introduce specific penalties for misuse of powers concerned with bulk collection of data. Amendment 195 introduces penalties for the wrongful examination of material collected under bulk interception; Amendment 203 for the wrongful examination of bulk collection of communications data; Amendment 217 for the wrongful examination of data obtained from bulk equipment interference; and Amendment 241 for the wrongful examination of datasets collected in bulk. I make it clear that I do not believe that these powers are needed to deal with current abuse of powers by the intelligence agencies, nor because I expect the agencies to abuse the powers in the Bill in the future. I know enough of the agencies to know that their standards in these matters are high The reason for introducing these clauses is that the Bill gives exceptional powers, and the powers in respect of bulk collection have given rise to the greatest public concern. There are already specific offences for the misuse of other powers in the Bill; for example, targeted interception and access to communications data. Penalties for the misuse of equipment interference are covered by other legislation; for example, the Computer Misuse Act. However, at present there is no specific offence on powers which cause most concern to the public—the powers for bulk collection. For misuse of these powers, reliance would have to be placed on the general purposes in the Data Protection Act, on internal discipline or on the very general offence of misconduct in public office. There is clearly an unevenness here. The misuse of information collected under bulk powers should be subject to specific penalties like the misuse of other powers in the Bill. This matter was raised in Committee and I am glad to say that the Government have listened; we are very grateful for the discussions that have taken place I also make clear that it is no part of my intention that members of the intelligence agencies should be inhibited in their legitimate searches by fear that they may accidentally incur these penalties. Amendments 195, 203, 217 and 241 restrict the offence to cases where persons deliberately choose to examine material which they know or believe is not authorised under the Bill, so only deliberate misuse would be caught by these provisions I believe that these amendments are justified and that they introduce a proper balance into the Bill. I also believe that they satisfy the intentions of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, which drew attention to this unevenness. I am very grateful to the staff of the ISC and to the government Bill team for their help in formulating the amendments. I beg to move.
Immigration Bill — House of Lords, 2016-05-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Simon Denis Brown (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I, too, support Motion A. I will confine myself to three comparatively brief points. First, as has been made plain, the Government have already moved from the earlier proposal of six months down to four. Yesterday, as those who have read the debate in the other place will know, there was barely a voice and no vote whatever against that proposal The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has few greater admirers than I in this Chamber but, as I suggested earlier, his amendment goes altogether too far. One defect is that it is internally inconsistent. I mentioned this on Report but did not think it necessary to do so in the last round of ping-pong, though I rather regret that now. On its face, it refers in new subsection (1) to detention under any of the relevant powers. These are defined in new subsection (6) and include two dealing with detention pending deportation. However, looking at new subsection (4) of Amendment 84, it does not apply in cases where the Secretary of State is determined that there will be deportation. This is an internal inconsistency. I suggest that four months properly protects against any risk of what can seriously be called arbitrary detention. One must remember that it is a safeguard over and above the intrinsic ability of those who are detained to seek bail—a safeguard I acknowledge to be appropriate and necessary, not least in the case of those with mental health problems. The proposal in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that there should be exceptional circumstances to justify detention beyond 28 days, is unworkable. The Minister gave reasons and illustrations, as did the noble Lord, Lord Pannick A shorter period, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—of whom, again, I am a great admirer—is, frankly, impracticable. Tribunals are already hugely busy and overworked. They really must not be overwhelmed.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-09-05
Topic: Law and Crime
Merlin Hay (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I have been listening to the debate and realised that of course people are concerned because they do not know what information is held. Sometimes people get into trouble because something is held on file and they do not know what it is. Only the subject knows what affects them and what does not. To take the example just given, where data may have been gathered by someone who is subsequently fired, that information may have been quite sensitive if revealed to someone in another organisation, and only the individual who was the subject of those unauthorised requests would know that. Therefore, this area bears examination. I am not sure how we should deal with that, but to rely just on the commissioner to know exactly how this would affect everyone would be difficult as well. It is worth thinking about this further.
Exiting the European Union — House of Lords, 2016-09-05
Topic: International Affairs
Dafydd Elystan-Morgan (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, does the Minister agree that there are three technical realities that we should very much bear in mind in connection with this? First, although it is not mentioned in Article 50, we cannot be rushed at all into giving notice. It is a matter for us to select the timing and nobody can accelerate that process Secondly, in paragraph 2 of Article 50 there is a provision for negotiating an agreement for leaving and that agreement should be concluded by the Council on behalf of the European Union. There is nothing at all in the article which sets out what those conditions should be—nor, specifically, what the timing should be The third paragraph of Article 50 ordains that the final leaving should be either the date set in the negotiations or two years. It does not say whether it should be the longer period. But it goes on to say that that period can be extended by the unanimous decision of the Council and the agreement of the leaving state. I am sorry to have taken such a long time, but I am sure that the Minister will agree that these are matters of the utmost, supreme importance.