Integrated Rail Plan: North and Midlands — House of Lords, 2021-11-22
Topic: Transportation
Richard Rosser (Labour, Centre-left): This integrated rail plan is in reality about backtracking on government promises to build the eastern leg of HS2 and Northern Powerhouse Rail. The Government know that HS2 and full delivery of Northern Powerhouse Rail would have given a major boost to the economies of our northern cities, because that is what the construction and pending completion of HS2 have already done and will continue to do for the economy of the West Midlands and Birmingham in particular. Leeds and the local West Yorkshire economy will now be denied the full £54 billion of estimated economic benefits of their HS2 link, with Leeds becoming a less attractive venue than it would have been for new and expanding businesses. Northern Powerhouse Rail delivered in full, with a new high-speed line through Bradford, was also set to deliver an estimated £22 billion for northern economies. The integrated rail plan does not address the impact of backtracking on the eastern leg of HS2 and Northern Powerhouse Rail on the economies of our northern cities and towns, and there was no government answer when I asked about it last Thursday. Typically, this Government are now seeking to silence opposition to their watered-down plan, since Transport for the North, which is overseen by all the northern mayors and council leaders, has just been told that it will no longer be financed by central government to develop Northern Powerhouse Rail and that in future this work will be funded directly, and thus controlled directly, via Network Rail by the Department of Transport, a reflection of the Government’s centralising tendency and lack of enthusiasm for real devolution of power and decision-making The Government’s integrated rail plan, which incidentally says very little about rail freight at all, places great weight on the virtues of upgrades of existing lines and the time in which they can be completed and the costs incurred. In doing so, though, the rail plan and the Secretary of State fail to reflect the very different experience of recent major upgrades. The west coast main line was upgraded at a cost of £9 billion, nearly four times the original cost estimate of £2.5 billion. Despite costs ballooning nearly 400%, the upgrade still had to be reduced in scope from 140 mph top speed to 125 mph with moving block signalling, in-cab signalling, being abandoned; otherwise, the cost would have been up by nearly 600%. The project led to substantial upheaval to existing services over a period of years and was not completed until 2009, very late and 10 years after it started Work on the Great Western electrification commenced in June 2010 and was due to be completed in 2016-17, but was not completed until 2019-20. The project ran into major difficulties, causing repeated extensions to deadlines and costs to increase by more than 300%, to around £2.8 billion in 2018 from £874 million in 2013. Despite this dramatic increase in costs, the project still had to be scaled back to keep cost increases merely in excess of three times the original figure. Electrification from Didcot Parkway to Oxford, Cardiff to Swansea, Chippenham to Bath and Bristol Parkway to Bristol Temple Meads, as well as branches to Henley and Windsor, were also deferred indefinitely by the Government in November 2016, with the Cardiff to Swansea electrification being cancelled outright in July 2017 The message is clear: upgrading routes is not as straightforward as the Government suggest. The hard evidence shows that costs will be very much higher than projected and the time taken to do the work a great deal longer than projected. Statements plucked out of the air about being able to deliver a watered-down version of what was promised a decade earlier than projected fly in the face of the facts and experience. Such statements also fly in the face of the Government’s own document, which indicates that the new lines on part of the watered-down Liverpool to Leeds route will not come into service until the 2040s—the same timescale within which the Prime Minister, in his foreword to the plan, says that high-speed lines under the original plan will have reached the east Midlands and Yorkshire Further, on costs, there is no breakdown of costings for each separate project within the plan, or a breakdown of any large figures within each separate project. There is also a further issue: the watered-down schemes outlined in the rail plan are dependent for delivery, on both projected capacity and speeds, on digital signalling. But I believe, perhaps mistakenly, that there is not yet a substantial tried and tested digital signalling scheme as envisaged by Secretary of State already in full operation. Indeed, people have so far been working on trying to develop such a scheme for more than 20 years. If there is a delay in the projected timescale for bringing such an as yet untried signalling development to fruition, even the watered-down schemes as projected in the rail plan will be severely compromised in respect of capacity, speed and timescale In the past decade, the north of England received £349 per person in transport spending, while London got £864. If the north had received the same level of spending as London, it would already have had £86 billion more since 2010. Yet this rail plan, worth £96 billion, some of which is in the south at the southern end of HS2, will take well into the 2040s at best to complete, considerably over two decades away. This plan, with its backtracking on previous pledges and reductions in previously stated future levels of expenditure, continues, not addresses, regional investment inequalities. So much for the Government’s levelling up and delivering HS2 in full, including the eastern leg, and Northern Powerhouse Rail.