Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2015-11-11
Topic: Government Operations
John Kevin Sharkey (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, this is essentially a probing amendment and I shall be brief. Clause 21(3)(c) amends Section 64B of FSMA 2000—the responsibilities of authorised persons in relation to rules of conduct—by omitting subsection (5). The subsection to be omitted says: "If a relevant authorised person knows or suspects that a relevant person has failed to comply with any conduct rules, the authorised person must notify the regulator of that fact" This seems a perfectly straightforward, reasonable and clear duty to impose on the relevant authorised persons. Who could imagine or want a regime in which misconduct was known or suspected and there was no obligation to report the fact I asked the Minister at Second Reading why this obligation to report to the regulator was being abolished, and I wondered, of course, whose interest was being served by its abolition. The impact assessment helps here, in that it notes that, "the removal of the SM & CR obligation to report breaches of rules of conduct should result in savings (mainly for larger banks and building societies) … This cost reduction should mainly benefit larger firms because of the large numbers of staff they employ" There is no mention of any other impact as to conduct or misconduct. The only impact listed is a financial benefit, mainly for larger banks and building societies. The Minister addressed the question in his letter to me of last week. He said that, "the requirement for firms to report all suspected or confirmed breaches of the rules of conduct has proved to potentially be a very costly obligation for firms, especially the larger firms which employ large numbers of staff, as they have to put in place detailed systems and controls to ensure compliance …The regulators can ensure that they are notified of any information about employee misconduct in a more proportionate way in their rules" This raises more questions than it answers. How does the Minister know that the obligation to report misconduct is, "proving potentially very costly"? Who has told him so? What evidence have they provided? How was this evidence assessed? How did he guard against the obvious danger of special pleading? What independent views were solicited? Critically, how did he assess the cost benefit of removal of the obligation to report misconduct against the cost of unreported misconduct? Can the Committee see the evidence base for all this I note that the Minister defends the removal of the obligation to report misconduct by saying that there are other non-statutory ways the regulators can assure they are notified of misconduct. Does he mean the FCA general notification rules, SUP 15.3.1(3)? Do not these rules impose a non-statutory burden equal to that imposed by the statutory obligation that the Bill removes? If they do not, does that not suggest they are weaker, or has the Minister in mind new rules What all this means is that we are being asked to repeal a statutory safeguard without knowing what its non-statutory replacement may be. That seems an unsatisfactory situation. In addition to answering the questions that I have just asked, could the Minister at least postpone activation of this measure until Parliament has had a chance to assess whether the current FCA rules are likely to be as effective as the current statutory obligation—or, if there are to be new rules, could he introduce them via statutory instrument to give Parliament a chance to scrutinise them? I beg to move.