Brexit: Armed Forces and Diplomatic Service — House of Lords, 2016-12-08
Topic: International Affairs
Donald Anderson (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, we have had a sterling opening speech and a well-reasoned maiden speech. My starting point is this. On 23 June, the people spoke. It is uncertain what they said but the Prime Minister has given the helpful steer that "Brexit means Brexit". At least in the fields of domestic policy, the economy and border control there was quite a substantial pre-referendum debate and areas of concern were revealed However, foreign affairs and defence figured much less. I recall, for example, Mr Farage saying that he was a "Commonwealth man", although all the Commonwealth countries were against leaving, and indeed the only Commonwealth country with a vote—Gibraltar—voted very much to remain. Miss Mordaunt, who is still a government Minister, told us that Turkey, with a teeming population, was about to join the EU. That was not true then and is still less true today. I therefore conclude from this lack of pre-referendum debate that in the areas covered today the Government have a much freer hand in making deals which are clearly in our national interest, and similarly in seeking co-operation in fields such as migration and counterterrorism—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown I make the following reflections. First, for over 40 years we have worked with the EU at every level—from the European Council to constant co-ordination at post level. This has led to harmonisation of policy, which has not prevented divergence, such as we saw at the UN General Assembly in respect of recognition of Palestine, with the EU splitting three ways. This habit of working together has given us more clout—for example, on Iran—and the question is whether we now face the danger of being excluded from a lead position on such issues. With our departure and the likely policies of the Trump Administration, will we not see an increasing fraying, for example—even abandonment—of the sanctions against Russia because of its occupation of Crimea My second reflection is that Brexit should give an enhanced role to our embassies in EU countries and perhaps even to institutions such as the Council of Europe. There will be staff implications. I note that the total FCO budget is only twice the sum of our development aid to Ethiopia, where there is an alarming deterioration in human rights. Presumably our secondees to the EEAS will return. Do we accept any obligations to our other UK nationals in the service? My third observation is that the FCO is, of course, only a part of our representation overseas. On cultural diplomacy, the British Council has shown its concern. Will Erasmus be continued for the UK? On DfID, the 2016 statistics show that we paid 30% of our multilateral ODA to the Commission’s development budget and the European Development Fund. Will these contributions come to an end or be reduced? What new mechanisms will be devised for co-ordination with the European Union, even if we are almost certainly outside the room when priorities are decided Fourthly, there is the security aspect. In the Times of 11 June Sir John Scarlett wrote, concerning Brexit, that, "we risk losing automatic access to counter-terrorist data", and, "exchanges of information becoming less expertly targeted" How will the Government prevent this But have no fear: Boris Johnson told Chatham House on 2 December that the referendum was a country "taking back control", a country "galvanised by new possibilities". History will show whether this is again pure Johnson bluster. His claim of a greater global reach begs the question: what are the constraints now that prevent us, with our allies, having a global reach Similar considerations arise on the defence side. There will be calls, of course, for a new European defence organisation, most stridently from those European countries that make the least credible contribution to defence, such as Belgium, at 0.9% of GDP, and Luxembourg, at 0.4%. What are the prospects for our joining future CSDP operations such as Sophia and Atalante? How will we influence their mandate from outside? Will we continue our relationship with the European Defence Agency? How will Berlin Plus be affected by the change My conclusion is simple. We travel in hope. If there is good will on all sides, and given our flexibility in this field, we may be able to preserve much of the present co-operation—unless the hard-line Brexiteers prevail. What assurances can the Minister give us on these points?