Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill — House of Lords, 2021-11-30
Topic: Government Operations
Sheila Masters (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, in my time in your Lordships’ House, two periods stand out as painful memories, and both are addressed by the Bill. The first is of the period of coalition government between 2010 and 2015. While these Benches rejoiced at the end of the period of Labour rule, many of us found it hard to support the coalition wholeheartedly. In particular, the coalition agenda had a disproportionate focus on constitutional reform, which inevitably sapped energy away from more important things. I was very sorry to hear my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, who is leaving his place at the moment, claiming some credit for that. Of course, there was Nick Clegg’s futile attempt to reform the House of Lords, which fortunately ran into the sand and never got past a Second Reading in the other place. The time of both Parliament and the country as a whole was wasted on a referendum on the alternative vote system. The wheels came off that when the British public had their say At the time, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act did not seem to be the worst of the constitutional measures that sailed under the convenience flag of the coalition, but its weaknesses emerged over time. As we have heard, it has produced only one five-year fixed-term Parliament, and that was in order to hard-wire the coalition in. Whether or not that was, on balance, a good thing for the country is a moot point at best. After 2015, we had two elections in less than five years—so the Act failed in its initial purpose The 2017 election was an act of self-harm by my own party—I freely admit that—but the second, in 2019, is the source of my second painful memory. Its final result, when it was finally called, was a triumph for democracy and the good sense of the British people, whose message was clear, and that included getting Brexit done. But the journey to that election was truly painful and laid bare the flaws of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act The requirement for a supermajority and the narrow path laid out for a no confidence Motion in the other place before an election could be called led to chaos in Parliament in 2019. The Government could not get their business through, could not call a general election and were harried at every turn by both Houses of Parliament, set on defying the outcome of the 2016 referendum. I still bear the scars of what happened in your Lordships’ House, as I am sure my noble friend the Minister does, and I certainly hope never to experience its like again in my remaining time here. For these reasons, the Bill has my wholehearted support. We must never again risk the mayhem of late 2019. That is why I fully support Clause 1, which removes the Fixed-term Parliaments Act from the statute book—it can be written out of our history The logical next step is to reinstate the status quo ante. As we have heard, Clause 2 does this through the revival of the royal prerogative. I believe that anything that diverts from that straightforward aim, including fettering the royal prerogative with parliamentary processes, runs the risk of unintended consequences. It is conceivable that a Government might not have a majority, could not get a vote through the other place and could be held to ransom, as they were in 2019, by a Parliament set on thwarting their will. That year showed us that the unthinkable can indeed happen. The previous system worked well for Governments of all parties, and I am confident that it will work well again. We should simply revive the royal prerogative and not invent something else around it I also support Clause 3 of the Bill, which expressly provides for non-justiciability. I do not believe that it should be seen as an ouster clause, because it is generally accepted that the likelihood of the courts challenging the monarch’s personal prerogative is very small. There should be nothing to oust. But a small likelihood is not a zero possibility, and recent judgments should make us wary of where the courts might want to go in future—we clearly cannot rule out future judicial activism. I believe that we should put that question beyond any doubt by enacting Clause 3 The other place has already expressed its clear view on this short and simple Bill. When it debated it, it did so in the light of all the relevant issues that were surfaced by the excellent Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, its report and the Government’s response. It also did so in the light of the points raised by the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the other place, and I do not believe that any new issues have been raised by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee in its recent report, although I look forward to hearing the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, in due course Your Lordships’ House is always entitled to ask the other place to think again, but I suggest very gently to noble Lords that doing so when the result is not likely to change is not a good use of your Lordships’ time. I hope that this House will not impede the Bill’s journey to Royal Assent.