argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, in moving Amendment 43 I shall speak also to Amendments 44 and 45 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Clause 16 arises out of a recommendation from the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, that, "there should be a statutory bar to the introduction of Schedule 7 admissions in a subsequent criminal trial". I am looking to the noble Lord for assistance because I find this piece of the legislation somewhat impenetrable—but I will give it a go The amendments in this group seek to probe whether the clause does what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, intended. Amendment 43 would ensure that a Schedule 7 admission can be used in subsequent proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 only if the admission relates to an offence committed on the occasion to which that questioning relates. For example, if a person wilfully obstructs a Schedule 7 search and makes an admission relevant to that search, the admission would be admissible. If the admission related to a previous Schedule 7 search at a different time or at a different port, it would not be admissible Amendments 44 and 45 would ensure that paragraph 5A of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 at sub-paragraph (2)(c) does not thwart the former independent reviewer’s intention. Sub-paragraph (2)(c) seeks to make an exception of admissions made during a Schedule 7 encounter if, on a prosecution for some other offence that is not a paragraph 18 offence, the person makes a statement that is inconsistent with what he said during a Schedule 7 encounter. This, on the face of it, seems to me to counter what the independent reviewer intended However—here we are into the realms of the BBC Radio 4 "Today" programme’s puzzle for the day, at least for someone like me who is not legally qualified—sub-paragraph (3) appears to suggest that the admissions under sub-paragraph (2)(c) are admissible only if the defence introduces a Schedule 7 admission or asks a question in relation to a Schedule 7 admission during proceedings arising out of the prosecution. Can the Minister confirm that I am correct, or explain what Schedule 16 actually means? I beg to move.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation that the noble Baroness has given. Obviously, Schedule 7 does not allow a suspect the right to silence that is normally afforded to somebody who is suspected. Safeguards therefore need to be put in place. My query is on new subsection (3), at line 14 on page 20 of the Bill; what does this mean? It says: "An answer or information may not be used by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(c) unless … evidence relating to it is adduced, or … a question relating to it is asked, by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution" I accept that the Minister read that out very slowly and carefully, but it reminds me of my mother, who, when speaking to somebody who does not speak English, speaks loudly and clearly in English again to try to get them to understand, but unfortunately it does not really help. Perhaps the noble Baroness, together with officials, can see whether there is some way in which that can be deciphered for me.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Sally Rachel Hamwee (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, Clause 18, which has just been agreed, and Schedule 2 amend existing powers to retain fingerprints and DNA samples for counterterrorism purposes, and the JCHR has proposed a number of amendments As regards Amendment 47, currently under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act a person who is arrested but not charged or convicted of a terrorist offence may have his data retained for three years for security purposes with the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner. The Bill removes the requirement for that consent. In the view of the JCHR, the oversight of the commissioner is a matter that gives confidence to the public that the powers are used only where "necessary and proportionate", and we are not aware that this oversight impedes the ability of the police to undertake counterterrorism work The Government responded to our first report, stating that they did not agree that, "it would be appropriate or responsible to reduce the powers available to the police", but we did not propose the removal of those powers. We recognise the logic in harmonising the retention periods for biometric data so that cases are treated in the same way, whether an individual is arrested under PACE or under the Terrorism Act, but we were concerned about removing the requirement for the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner, and I have not seen a response from the Government to that point Therefore, the obvious question is: what is the justification for the biometric data of a person unlawfully or mistakenly arrested being exceptionally stored rather than destroyed? If the aim is to align the procedures, why not add to the protection by the commissioner having oversight of both categories of DNA retention under both powers? The JCHR made the comment, and did not make it lightly, that it was concerned about a race to the bottom of human rights protections. I beg to move.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Sally Rachel Hamwee (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, Amendments 48 to 53 would remove the proposed extension of national security determinations, which the Minister has explained, for the retention of biometric material to five years in six existing provisions. The Minister has also explained the role of the chief police officer and the rolling determinations, if necessary, but a review every two years for a fresh determination is required. The Bill will change that to five years. We are not questioning the retention as a legitimate aim, rather we are questioning the period of time and whether five years is proportionate for retaining the biometric data of people who have never been convicted of a crime, particularly in the absence of the possibility of a review. The Government have told us that operational experience has shown that in many cases the two-year period is too short and that cases of national security concern will often pose a more enduring threat. That does not entirely go to answer the point of the initial period The retention of biometric data is a significant intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy. It is lawful as long as it is not blanket and indiscriminate, but is it proportionate without the possibility of a review? We think not. I beg to move.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I rise briefly to support these amendments. Other than for the convenience of senior police officers in having to review these cases every five years as opposed to every three, I do not understand what is to be achieved operationally by extending the period from three years to five when the period of retention can be extended every three years.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Sally Rachel Hamwee (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I support my noble friend. I do not know whether he used the words "confidence", "trust" and "perceptions" but he certainly alluded to them when speaking about the operation of Prevent—that is something we will come to in the next group of amendments. He referred to the public good that comes of transparency. I understand that local authorities that are in receipt of freedom of information requests about the local operation of Prevent are advised by the Home Office to say that they cannot answer, on grounds that include national security, health and safety and—something I was particularly puzzled by—commercial interests When questions are asked about the delivery of Prevent projects, the generic answer is apparently that to disclose information could reveal commercial interests and negatively affect the commercial viability of the organisations that deliver the projects. I am sure that the Committee will be interested in how the Home Office suggests that requests for information of this sort should be answered. I do not expect the Minister to disclaim the way in which the Home Office has been advising, if it has been—or at any rate not without taking some advice. But the issue of commercial confidentiality throws a light on this that I had not expected to see.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Sally Rachel Hamwee (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): This has been an interesting debate. I do not think anyone other than the Minister has opposed the amendment, even if the routes to support it have been slightly different. The amendment is not about scrapping Prevent, nor is it about particular projects. I am sorry that the Minister felt the need to be so defensive. We have rightly been reminded of the breadth of what underlies terrorism by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. We might not always agree on the means, but of course we agree that the Government’s commitment to do all they can to protect the community and divert people from terrorism is a hugely important objective. The Government assert that a review would not lead to a different outcome. I do not know how one can assert that. I prefer to go down the route that we must not miss opportunities, which is in effect what the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, said, and that the strategy is too important not to do it as well as we can, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said The Minister has, perhaps understandably at this point, not responded to the suggestion about extending very slightly the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I wonder whether after today she might be able to respond to that. It seems a very useful opportunity for the Government to consider it. As several noble Lords said, challenge can be useful. The more the Government oppose the proposition of a review, the more worried I become because I do not know what we do not know. I would prefer the reassurance of a review, which is in the circumstances quite a moderate proposal. We are only in Committee, and no doubt there will be some further discussions. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: International Affairs
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment. If, as other noble Lords have suggested, organisations are proscribed for other than legal reasons but to do with foreign policy, the Government should at least be honest enough to say that that is why organisations that meet the legal criteria are still being proscribed.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, although I agree with the amendment in principle, I have a couple of issues with it. First, no country that is not a full member of the European Union participates in the European arrest warrant. It is, therefore, unlikely that the UK would be made an exception. Iceland and Norway, which are both members of the European Economic Area and the Schengen area, applied for membership of the warrant over a decade ago and have still not been granted participation. I understand that there are legal obstacles to a non-EU country’s participation in the European arrest warrant—for example, changes required to the German constitution As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, the European arrest warrant clearly has benefits for bringing criminals to justice, in terms of the speed and cost effectiveness with which this can be done. However, on the positive side, the exchange of counterterrorism intelligence tends to be done on a bilateral basis between the UK and one other country, rather than between the UK and the European Union. Our leaving the European Union will, we hope, not impact on the vital exchange of intelligence data in relation to persons suspected of specified offences, which is separate from the European arrest warrant.
Stop and Search Powers — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I also thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. She talked about government reform of stop and search, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to action taken by the former Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister. Is the Minister aware that there has been a 75% reduction in stop and search since 2010-11, but no reduction in the number of black people stopped and searched, so that black people are now nine times more likely to be stopped and searched for certain offences than white people? The argument is put forward that stop and search tends to be in high crime areas with socioeconomic deprivation, which have a higher percentage of minority groups. Is the Minister aware that the top-ranked forces for black/white disproportionality are Dorset and Suffolk? We are facing a knife-crime crisis in this country. In 2010-11, half of stop and search was for drugs. In 2016-17, almost two-thirds of stop and search carried out by police was for drugs, not for weapons, and the rate at which drugs were actually found was lower for black people being stopped and searched than for white people The Statement that the Minister has just repeated said that stop and search is a valuable tool provided that it is used properly. Does the Minister agree that these statistics tend to suggest that stop and search is not being used properly to deal with the epidemic of knife crime? If so, what do the Government intend to do to address the problem?
Stop and Search Powers — House of Lords, 2018-11-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): As nobody else appears to be burning to ask a question perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness to comment on the fact that the percentage of stop and search that is done to look for weapons is abysmally small and that drugs are the reason given for 75% of stop and search, notwithstanding the link between the two?
Visit of President Trump: Policing — House of Lords, 2018-07-12
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I shall continue the theme of funding. We continue to believe that the police are underfunded, particularly considering that 60% of funding for police services comes from central government and that amount is reducing in real terms. Police officers on mutual aid operations to ensure President Trump’s safety are being housed in gymnasiums. There are hundreds of officers in one space on camp beds. Male officers are having to pass through sleeping areas designated for female officers. Some female officers are being accommodated on the floor of squash courts where there are no beds, simply a mat on the floor for them to sleep on. These officers are having to spend three nights in these conditions and are then expected to work 12-hour shifts. Why has the Home Office not proactively stepped in to ensure that forces have sufficient funds to provide civilised accommodation for these officers? How do the Government expect police officers to treat the public fairly if this is the way the Government treat them?
Jamal Khashoggi — House of Lords, 2018-10-23
Topic: International Affairs
Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, it is difficult to think of a more difficult foreign policy issue that the Government must now face. I cannot think of anything as serious from all my time as either a Member of Parliament or a Member of your Lordships’ House. Difficult circumstances and challenges often give rise to opportunities, however. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, put his finger on it when he said that this is an opportunity to reset our relationship, not just with Saudi Arabia but with other countries in the Middle East to which we have for many years adopted approximately the same attitudes and positions. I shall make two other, perhaps unrelated, points. What could be more sinister than the fact that among the 15 who came to the consulate was a forensic pathologist? What possible purpose was he meant to serve by being part of the 15? I think we could all make a pretty good guess On the other hand, the Minister rightly referred to the intelligence relationship. When he was Prime Minister, David Cameron publicly—surprisingly but, in the circumstances, he thought necessarily—acknowledged that information provided by the Saudi Arabian Government directly prevented an enormously difficult and potentially very damaging terrorist outrage in this country. It is the balancing of these two issues that gives rise to the Government’s difficulty. However, I take the view that as soon as all the necessary information is available a judgment must be made—but I would in no way support the notion that we should conduct a running commentary or offer a step-by-step approach. We need to deal with this matter as a whole, once a proper judgment has been reached.
Jamal Khashoggi — House of Lords, 2018-10-23
Topic: International Affairs
Julie Smith (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, when the full facts are known, would it not be appropriate that we act not just as the United Kingdom working with our friend and ally—as the Minister called Saudi Arabia—but with France and Germany, as we have done previously in negotiations with Iran? We work better as a threesome than individually, and that would enable us to be more influential than if we were simply to act alone.
Voyeurism (Offences) (No. 2) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-10-23
Topic: Law and Crime
Jonathan Marks (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I just wonder whether the noble and learned Lord would consider, between now and Committee, the position in cases such as those mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, where the victim is unaware of the images being taken and is intended to be unaware by the perpetrator. In those circumstances, the intention to provide sexual gratification may be very difficult to prove.
Scotland: European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-06-14
Topic: International Affairs
Donald Thomas (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): May I say that it is unhelpful for the Minister to use language such as "bonkers", "daft" and so on, as was the tone of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth? There is a problem to be addressed. The use of the word "veto" is also unhelpful. That suggests that the ultimate conclusion should be that one of the four entities that make up the United Kingdom should be able to block the other three. Can the Minister say whether any thought has been given to qualified majority voting on issues in setting up the framework? I would have thought that the people of Scotland would, even if they did not welcome it, be prepared to consider a proposal that had the support of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. For example, if it were 3:1, perhaps the Scottish people would feel that their views would be overruled by a majority. However, the problem at the base of it all is that Scotland and Wales, even though they have agreed to the settlement, and Northern Ireland, fear that they will be overruled by English interests I know that Wales was happy to be within the EU frameworks because they applied across the whole of Europe to all the EU countries. Therefore there was a certain parity, without the domination of English interests over Welsh or Scottish interests at that time. But when you bring it all back to the United Kingdom and consider that the United Kingdom Parliament is also the English Parliament, there is concern and fear to be addressed I suggest to the Minister that instead of using emotive language, even though he is supported by members of his own party, he should approach the issue much more calmly and seek a mechanism that would be acceptable. If, ultimately, other mechanisms are simply dismissed by the Scottish Government, perhaps the Sewel convention can come to the Government’s aid and they can pass this legislation without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. But they are building up trouble, not merely by going ahead with this Bill without the consent of the Scottish Parliament but by using the language like "veto", "daft" and "silly" that is being used on the Conservative Benches. I urge the Minister to be more temperate in his use of language.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-10-31
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I do not think that I can answer that question, and I do not think that the noble Lord can answer it either. This is about offences which if they were committed in the UK could lead to people being radicalised or encouraged to join a particular terrorism organisation. That cannot be said about an offence committed in another country. As for Amendment 33, surely it is only common sense that a person commits an offence overseas only if their actions are an offence in that country, or they have sufficient ties to the UK that they should know that their actions would amount to an offence if committed in the UK. I therefore support these amendments.