Defence — House of Commons, 2018-01-11
Topic: Defense
Paul John Sweeney (Labour, Centre-left): Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for the opportunity to contribute to this magnificent debate in which we have heard a series of robust, resilient and passionate contributions, not least from my immediate predecessor in speaking, my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock). He represents a fine shipbuilding town that has a critical stake in the future of the defence equipment programme I think it is fair to say that there has been consensus, and that it is a source of great dismay, among everyone present today that every year of this Government has seen a steady decline in defence spending as a percentage of GDP, from 2.4% in 2011 to 1.9% in 2016. Not only has it declined in every year of this Government, but it is lower than in any year of the previous Labour Government. Those figures, damning as they are about the Government’s real commitment to defence, belie the true criticality of the situation. A letter published by former defence chiefs during the general election last year called the 2% target "an accounting deception" and added: "Most analysts…agree core defence expenditure for hard military power is well below 2%." Not only is real defence spending well below the purported 2% target minimum, but its effective purchasing power is being eroded year on year; as many Members will know, the defence rate of inflation runs well above the national rate. In 2015-16, for example, the defence inflation rate was 3.9%, the highest since 2010, while the national GDP deflator was just 0.8%. That relentless pressure on defence resources explains the litany of cuts stemming from the 2010 and 2015 strategic defence and security reviews. Most notable in its absurdity has been the scrapping of the Nimrod MRA4 programme mere months before it entered service, squandering £3.4 billion and leaving the UK with no maritime patrol aircraft for at least a decade In recent months, the Army has been cut by a fifth, wages have been frozen for a sustained period and no Royal Navy ships have been on patrol in international waters over Christmas for the first time in history. That is an absurdity and a really depressing situation. We continue to see the playing out of chaotic and wrong-headed thinking on procurement of defence, most notably in the recent national shipbuilding strategy. Yesterday, I had the privilege of chairing the latest meeting of the all-party parliamentary group on shipbuilding. We heard further testimony about the urgent need to improve key elements of the strategy if we are to achieve the best effects possible for our national shipbuilding sector Key themes seem to be emerging from the ongoing process of discussion with key stakeholders in industry and in the defence community. The national shipbuilding strategy must both define and outline measures to safeguard key industrial capabilities. It is breathtaking that the strategy has taken no steps to define the minimum sovereign capabilities that we need to sustain as a nation in the shipbuilding industry or to prescribe how we achieve and sustain those capabilities The strategy must also commit to investment that will ensure that those key industrial capabilities, once defined, are modernised to be world class. That was the case under the previous defence industrial strategy created by the Labour Government in 2005; it designated that the Clyde shipbuilding industry would be the key deliverer of the nation’s complex warships and prescribed a solution that would allow that industry to become world class by developing what was called a frigate factory or modern dock facility. That would deliver an integrated, consolidated site achieving the efficiencies necessary to deliver the defence capability for the Navy at an effective value for money cost We also recognise as a result of this process that a distributed block build strategy as defined by the national shipbuilding strategy is not suitable for frigates such as the Type 31E as it will actually drive up unit costs to manufacture; they would best be built in that consolidated world-class facility, with the benefits from learning curves and efficiency from integrated production. The national strategy must also recognise clearly that there is a huge opportunity for that distributed block build strategy in the next tranche of royal fleet auxiliary ships to be procured: the three fleet solid support vessels with a displacement of 40,000 tonnes—a scale suitable for such a strategy. No one site in the UK would be capable of building such a ship alone. That is the key opportunity: to use that distributed block build strategy to sustain shipbuilding capacity across all the multiple sites in the UK and maintain the resilience of the defence supply chain. I would like to insist that the Minister consider applying the treaty on the functioning of the European Union article 346 protection in the case of the new solid fleet support ships to ensure that there is a UK-only competition to build those new complex royal fleet auxiliary ships.