Queen’s Speech — House of Lords, 2016-05-23
Topic: International Affairs
John Kerr (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I want to follow precisely the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown. The Foreign Office that I joined 50 years ago was taught by the Suez disaster to give up some of our imperial pretensions that had been rebuffed in our ambitions by General de Gaulle. The FCO that I left 15 years ago had learned that being influential in the EU strengthened our voice in Washington, in the UN and in the Commonwealth. The British at last felt at home in Brussels, where English had become the common language, where the Brittans, Kinnocks and Pattens held the key portfolios, where we had more senior jobs in the institutions than any other member state, where the Thatcher single market programme was slowly but steadily becoming reality, and where the wider-world expertise of the British and French was seen as an EU asset. In Washington, we were regarded as good guides to EU outcomes because we were thought capable of delivering on our predictions. Our access reflected respect for our leading role on EU external issues. Some of this has already faded with disaster in the Middle East, cuts in defence and diplomacy, and a certain self-isolation in Europe. But much more is now at risk. We are at a watershed moment and need to be clear about what the referendum fallout effects for foreign policy might be Modern British foreign policy rests on four pillars. Fundamental is the link with Washington. The values set out in Philadelphia in 1787 were those of the English and Scottish Enlightenment—Franklin lived in Johnson’s London and knew Hume’s Edinburgh. That will not change: Britain at its best will always be in step with America at its, and trumpery on both sides will not stop that. However, influence on American policy is a function not just of sentiment but of perceived power. We are useful to the Americans to the extent that we can convince or cajole our other friends to adopt common, or at least congruent, policy. We cut ice in Washington when we are seen to cut ice over here. To cut ourselves off from our continent would see us cut down to size—50 million and no longer 600 million—when we talk in the States; no wonder the transatlantic foreign policy community overwhelmingly hopes that we will vote to stay The second pillar is the Washington treaty, or NATO; the common defence structure to which we would commit all our forces and pool all our sovereignty in time of war. Our defence cuts have gone deep, and lower economic growth post-Brexit could mean that they go deeper still. However, the damage to effective western soft power is more certain. German reticence about armed deployment and French unease about US-led command structures have meant, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, that it has often fallen to this country to forge the link between NATO and soft-power decisions in the Council of EU Governments The key multilateral actors have often been British—we have heard from some of them today: Robertson, Owen and Ashdown. One could also mention Carrington, Patten and Ashton. In the Council that I knew best it was to Douglas Hurd that the Juppés and the Genschers turned at key moments; it was John Major who in a morning swung the whole EU behind his 1991 initiative on safe havens for the Kurds. That cannot happen if we are not there. There would be a growing risk of the North Atlantic Council and the European Council drifting apart. Of course, the EU would still talk to us, but its decisions would be taken in its EU formation with us excluded. No wonder the defence establishments, on both sides of the Atlantic, hope we stay Pillar 3 is built on the lessons of history. Chamberlain was wrong in 1938; it is not in our interests to regard neighbouring states as far-off countries of which we know nothing. Distracted by Suez, we did nothing for Hungary in 1956. We did nothing for the Czechs in 1968. So, later, I was very proud to serve Governments, of both parties, who successfully championed EU enlargement, delivering on the Thatcher 1988 Bruges call for an opening to the east. I am sad that some in her party now seem to have forgotten that stability and prosperity in central Europe are a vital UK interest And I am shocked that a Minister of the Crown, serving in the Ministry of Defence, should this week insult a vital NATO ally, Turkey, claiming that, unless we leave, this country will be overrun by 2020 with Turkish criminals. This is absurd. Surely she must know, as does everyone else, that Turkish accession to the EU is—in my view, sadly—many decades away, depends on Turkey solving myriad internal problems and can be vetoed by any single member state. Why tell such lies? It demeans the debate and it damages NATO But the key point is that an EU without us, or at least without a Britain true to itself, would be less open, less liberal, less secure, less aligned with British values and interests, properly defined. No wonder our true friends in Europe hope we will stay Pillar 4 is the belief that a rules-based, multilateral order built on the rule of law, on the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, on aid and trade structures optimised to support economic development, serves us best. If we left the EU, its aid programmes would be smaller and probably less focused on our friends. More importantly, developing-country access to EU markets would probably grow more slowly, particularly for those with closest ties to us. The free trade agreement with South Africa was negotiated by a British Commission official, backed by London but resisted by much of southern Europe Looking beyond trade, our ability to help defuse threats of conflict, whether on Iran’s nuclear programmes, Indus waters or the South China Sea, would decline. Why should Iran, India, China or the Security Council listen to us if our influence on both sides of the Atlantic had shrunk? No wonder our Asian friends and our Commonwealth friends, most recently Prime Minister Trudeau last week, have said they firmly hope we stay My thesis is that the four pillars of our foreign policy are mutually reinforcing. If one goes, all are weakened. That is why next month’s vote is so crucial, and not just for our prosperity. Our influence across the world would shrink and our friends and allies believe that their interests would suffer with ours if we were to find ourselves with, in Stephen Wall’s phrase, "our noses pressed to the European glass, gesticulating, unheard, to those inside" To quote another historian, perhaps more widely known but less authoritative: "Suppose Britain voted … to come out: what would actually happen? We’d still have huge numbers of staff trying to monitor what was going on in the community, only … we wouldn’t have any vote at all. Now I don’t think that’s a prospect that’s likely to appeal" For foreign policy as well as other reasons, I sincerely hope that you are right, Boris. Yes, that was Mr Johnson, but it was in November 2012. Consistency is the hallmark of small minds, and vaulting ambition can o’erleap itself.