Local Government Finance: Croydon — House of Commons, 2020-12-09
Topic: Government Operations
David Timothy Simmonds (Conservative, Centre-right): The section 114 legal notice that halted all non-statutory expenditure in the London borough of Croydon was the first in the capital in 20 years. The previous two were in Hillingdon, where I serve, to this day, as a councillor—I draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests—and in Hackney. The circumstances today could not be more different, although they may have the eventual similarity of the need for a new Conservative administration to take office in Croydon to sort out the mess—a challenge that I know Councillor Jason Cummings and his opposition colleagues will rise to, and a challenge that was very familiar to us in Hillingdon A section 114 notice starts off as a sign of cash flow distress in a council. Income is insufficient for planned expenditure, so services have to be cut and expenditure halted until the budget is balanced again. We know that it has no direct private sector equivalent, but it has the effect of requiring the organisation’s management to demonstrate that it is a going concern. Today, with councillors and residents across the city seeing what is happening in Croydon with worry, it is important that we address here in Parliament the issues that have led to the situation. Given the unfortunate silence of some of the Labour Members representing them, this debate has the purpose of airing the financial challenges facing our London boroughs and providing some assurance to my constituents and others across our capital that the situation in Croydon will not be replicated elsewhere Local government financial management is a complex, some would say dull and, in many respects, unique process. It is unique in the public sector, in that councils have to balance their budgets every year. Clearly, constituents across the capital will want to know that there is effective governance and effective oversight of decision making. The consequences can be very serious. In Hillingdon, we faced a 14.8% council tax rise, tens of millions of pounds of unspecified cuts and a budget that had only been legal for the duration of the meeting at which it was agreed, as the legacy of a previous administration. Residents in Croydon and across the capital will want assurance that that is not the fate that awaits them Context, of course, is all-important here. Our councillors and constituents want to see evidence that what has happened in Croydon is unique. Further work is under way in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the wider local government sector to establish the detail of what has happened. Certain things are strikingly different about the situation facing Croydon, which should give some assurance to residents in my constituency and elsewhere First, looking at the picture across London, the House may wish to note that the finance report to the London Councils leaders committee of 8 December referenced an overall rise of 4.5% in local authority resources available to London as a result of the spending review. The House may also wish to note that the report highlights the additional resources from the Government to ameliorate the financial impact that covid has had on London’s councils. While that leaves an estimated funding gap in the next financial year, the broad picture from across London and the feedback from my local authorities is that the measures provided by the Ministry have met the costs of covid in terms of service delivery. We all recognise that councils in the capital have done an amazing job of rising to that challenge This adds up to a picture in which the serious impact of covid on the capital’s finances has been substantially mitigated, to the extent that councils’ financial resilience should not be compromised. Given that background, it is clear that the situation in Croydon is not a consequence of covid, so is it a consequence of austerity? Council budgets consist of a number of elements, some of which are ring-fenced, such as the dedicated schools grant, housing revenue account, parking revenue account and public health grant. The main part of the budget that is visible to residents—the general fund—is largely spent on the authority’s day-to-day statutory services, with the bulk of that on social care, but also on resident-visible services such as parks, libraries, waste collection and clearing up litter. The general fund also services any debt finance costs relating to general fund capital expenditure. Good practice and the expectation of auditors is that councils will retain a reserve—known in local authority accounting terms as "balances"—sufficient to cover likely risks in that budget. This is where we begin to see a divergence from the practices of other London councils Financial risk is a part of life for councils, and planning for it is a characteristic of all soundly financially managed authorities. Hillingdon, for example, faced the covid crisis with around £54 million in balances and reserves, sufficient to cover pretty much any financial challenge that the authority might face and ensuring the stable delivery of services to residents—ensuring that libraries, litter clearing, waste collection and potholes being filled would all carry on come what may. Harrow Council, which also serves my constituents, is more financially challenged, but from my regular briefings by its chief executive and finance team, it is clear that it remains on course for a stable and balanced budget. So we need to ask where we see a variance Councils’ involvement in housing development is an essential part of housing delivery in the capital, and it is welcome that council tax payers, rather than developers, will see the upside of the gain where developments take place. However, it is noteworthy in the case of Croydon that, unusually, the local authority has loaned a housing subsidiary of around £220 million of capital—borrowed money—of which a total of zero has been returned against a reported business plan to return £110 million by today Clearly, that knocks a very significant hole in its budgetary position. As it went into the covid crisis with a capital debt of £1.5 billion, by far the highest in London, it is clear that, although capital borrowing to invest in assets and services is no bad thing, it does impose borrowing costs on council tax payers—in this case, about £43 million each year. That is compounded if those business plans go wrong. Using those resources to fund what it appears since 2007 has essentially been a burst of speculative property investments, it is clear that diversion of resources into servicing debts that are not generating their planned returns on such a scale was a significant part of the problem and created a very weak financial position going into the covid outbreak.