Scotland Bill — House of Lords, 2015-11-24
Topic: Government Operations
Ian Bruce Lang (Conservative, Centre-right): The double detriment point. To do so would be to the detriment of my speech A similar problem attaches to the shared powers over welfare, whereby the House cannot assess how the vital intergovernmental relations will operate without the revised memorandum of understanding and joint ministerial committee structure now still being negotiated. Our report has therefore suggested that, as with the Economic Affairs Committee’s concern about the lack of a fiscal framework, a delay in the progress of the Bill may be necessary to allow for proper scrutiny of the welfare provisions I agree with my noble friend the Minister about the desirability of calming things down, but I hope that in his winding-up speech he can reassure me and the Constitution Committee on a number of points. Clause 1, on enshrining the permanence of the Scottish Parliament, seems simple, straightforward and declaratory, but it could have profound constitutional significance. The Government now appear to seek to compromise the United Kingdom Parliament’s competence with regard to the devolved institutions, first by stating their permanence in statute and secondly by creating conditions involving a referendum that have to be met before the UK Parliament could move to abolish them It is of course completely implausible to suggest that such a course would ever be contemplated, but the concept of parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the United Kingdom’s constitution and it has long been understood that no Government can bind their successors. In seeking to limit Parliament’s powers in this manner, the Government are introducing confusion and uncertainty about the nature of parliamentary sovereignty where once there was none Clause 2 compounds this concern. By giving the Sewel convention a statutory basis, the Bill opens the door to judicial intervention on the right of Parliament to legislate. It risks creating a route through which the courts might be drawn—inappropriately but perhaps inescapably—into an area hitherto within the jurisdiction of Parliament alone: its competence to make law. That is serious enough, but it seems to me that the original meaning and purpose of that convention may have already mutated, with no debate or authority from Parliament, into something much more far-reaching, which could breach the whole principle of devolution: that power devolved is power retained. Even the word "normally" in the clause raises clouds of uncertainty and the prospect of judicial involvement Our committee believes that it is now vital that the Government clarify the purpose and reach of the Sewel convention as stated in Clause 2. Can my noble friend confirm that the guidance note GGN2, issued in 2005, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred, did not change the purpose of the convention in any material way? In addition, the combined impact of Clauses 1 and 2 could be dangerous and no thought seems to have been given to this. These two clauses might not be just declaratory and, taken together, could have far-reaching consequences. Will my noble friend also confirm that in the final analysis, no devolved Parliament or Assembly is entitled to veto legislation passed by the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament?