Financial Services Bill — House of Lords, 2021-01-28
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Jitesh Gadhia (Non-Affiliated, Unknown): My Lords, I congratulate my noble friends Lord Hammond of Runnymede and Lady Shafik on their maiden speeches. Their choice of debate is especially appropriate, and the quality of their contributions demonstrates how much they will enrich your Lordships’ House. I look forward to their future active participation I turn to our main topic. I welcome this omnibus Financial Services Bill in the spirit in which it is intended: as an entrée to the main course that will follow once the Government have consulted on the future regulatory framework. We should therefore calibrate our expectations of the Bill accordingly and not attempt to boil the ocean. Instead we should keep our powder dry to tackle the more fundamental issue of the accountability framework between the Government, regulators and Parliament, with a potential role for an independent body, which I will come on to First, some personal context. I started my own career in financial services 30 years ago this year at a City merchant bank in the aftermath of the big bang. I have therefore seen my fair share of trials and tribulations over three decades. During this period the City—and financial services more broadly—has constantly reinvented itself, sometimes by choice and more often through necessity. So, if I bring a bias to this debate, it is as someone who has seen the financial services sector overcome its challenges to not just survive but thrive Apart perhaps from our life sciences sector, there are not many globally significant industries where the UK plays such a world-leading role. An effective regulatory framework is clearly one of the key ingredients to sustain this position. The financial crisis and now Brexit have forced us to re-evaluate the regulatory architecture in quick succession. The onshoring of powers from the EU has triggered an inevitable debate between those who would like to see the UK take full advantage of its new-found freedoms to simplify and reduce the burden of regulation and those who fear that we might embark on a race to the bottom, to the detriment of consumers and society. That debate is illusory. However much some of us might dream of radically streamlining regulation, we are simply not destined for a bonfire of rules. To quote Treasury Minister John Glen, speaking in the other place during its Second Reading debate, "we have no intention of needlessly, ideologically or recklessly diverging from EU legislation. Instead, we will maintain existing regulations where they make sense for the financial services industry in this country."—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/20; col. 669.] It is not surprising to hear that strong statement, since the UK has played an active role in shaping much of the EU legislation. It is therefore increasingly unbelievable for the EU to maintain that it is seeking assurances about our future intentions before making an equivalence decision. We should recognise that the equivalence process is being used as a political lever, not a technical determination. I therefore agree with Andrew Bailey’s sentiments, expressed in recent evidence to the Treasury Select Committee, that we should not hold our breath for a quick decision and should treat trade equivalence as a bonus if and when it comes We should also recognise that the EU is unusual in drawing up such detailed rules and incorporating them into legislation. This is not the norm around the world. Other jurisdictions rely more heavily on the expertise of independent regulators to translate legislative objectives into detailed rulebooks. Delegating responsibility for technical areas of financial regulation is necessary, but also brings important accountability and scrutiny issues This subject requires more than a six-minute speaking slot, so I shall make three brief points. First, we need to be strategic in the scope of powers we delegate and the risk of concentration—what Sir Paul Tucker, in his excellent and thoughtful book Unelected Power, calls an "over mighty citizen". Another of his observations is the importance of having a clear objective that can be monitored. He warns against having three or four objectives in statute that are ranked equally and are vague, which is relevant to the new "have regard" clauses incorporated in the Bill. While I would hope we can manage primary and secondary objectives, we should consider this input from a respected former front-line practitioner Secondly, while we decide upon the new architecture, the show must go on and Parliament needs to have a role in the process. I suggest a relatively simple fix: the next set of remit letters from the Chancellor to the PRA and FCA should be published in draft form and offered for consultation and debate in both Houses, either in the Chamber or through Select Committees. It could also make sense to look at a Joint Committee of both Houses, drawing on the considerable expertise available across Parliament Thirdly, we need a more permanent body to help the Executive and Parliament scrutinise and streamline regulation more systematically. I suggest we look at creating an independent office for financial regulation, which draws on the examples of both the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Office of Tax Simplification and whose remit is a hybrid of the two. It would report annually on whether the statutory objectives of the financial regulators have been met and systematically review regulation to propose how it could be simplified. A continuous series of incremental improvements appear more feasible than a one-time reform package. The cumulative impact could be significant over time, and more enduring In conclusion, we must now deal with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. If we can be as fleet of foot in financial regulation as we have been in vaccine procurement, then I am confident that the financial services sector can remain a strategic national asset, supporting jobs and prosperity. This Bill provides a start on that journey.