Armed Forces Bill — House of Lords, 2021-11-23
Topic: Defense
Roger Thomas (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 23 and support Amendment 27. The issue addressed by Amendment 23 is quite clear: the adequacy of the statutory provisions to protect the independence of the Armed Forces police and, in particular, this new unit I do not think there is any difference about the constitutional principle. It was set out in one of the cases dealing with the Iraq war, Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2), where it was said that the Armed Forces police "must be able to make their decisions entirely independently of the Secretary of State for Defence, any civil servant in that Ministry and, even more importantly, of anyone in the hierarchy of the armed forces." That was the principle applied by Sir Richard Henriques in his report, which set out the practical way in which that principle could be given effect and applied This amendment seeks in particular to fill in the essential areas of protection needed to ensure independence. They are all set out in the proposed new subsections of the amendment. We went into these in Committee, but I will highlight three of them First, the deputy head must be a civilian. It is important to bear in mind that, in the cases that went into the independence of the investigations in Iraq—the Ali Zaki Mousa cases—IHAT had a civilian head, and he brought a different perspective. This is a very important point made by Sir Richard Secondly, there can be no watering down of the principle of the operational independence of the military command. I will come to the provision of the Bill which does water it down Thirdly, there is the establishment of the strategic police board. When you occupy a position where you can be put under pressure, it is very important to have the protection of someone. Within the Armed Forces, the Director of Service Prosecutions has the Attorney-General. The Judge Advocate-General has the Lord Chief Justice. There can be no reason for not putting into statute a very clear provision that the strategic policing board can support the head of the unit if he or she comes under pressure, which he or she no doubt will Why are these statutory provisions necessary? I am grateful to the Minister for her very careful letter, in which she sought to deal with the adequacy of what is in the Bill, which is, essentially, the appointment of the provost marshal of the tri-service unit, the method of his appointment and, if I may say so, a somewhat watered-down expression of the principle of independence, and in particular operational independence. There are three reasons why I urge your Lordships to consider this amendment as important in strengthening the position First, as the Minister, with the assistance of her lawyers, has set out, there are a number of cases, two of them in particular involving Ali Zaki Mousa, that looked at the independence of the way in which the investigation was made of the conduct of the Armed Forces police. But it is critical to remember that in those cases what was put under the microscope was the particular structure that had been carefully set up. There is no case that says that the current position is adequate. Indeed, that must be the position, otherwise would why would Sir Richard have gone to the trouble to which he went in making these recommendations? What is set out in the report, which I have already mentioned, is what is required The second reason why statutory provision is needed is to protect the Armed Forces. Indeed, my principal reason for moving the amendment is to try to protect the Armed Forces from the risks of it being able to be argued that the position of the Armed Forces police is not independent. In the cases that related to IHAT, on which the Ministry of Defence relies, there was a very careful examination. For example, in the Ali Zaki Mousa case there were five days of hearings spread over a considerable period of time, a vast quantity of documents, statements from very senior people across the Armed Forces, and some cross-examination. It is obviously undesirable to have a repetition of that process and it is therefore essential that the position is made clear in statute Noble Lords might say that this is a one-off circumstance. I referred in Committee to something that happened during the Malaysia emergency in 1948 that came up for investigation in the courts many years later in 2011. One of the central issues there was that the investigation had not been independent. Again, issues arose during the course of the Blackman case as to the independence of the investigation. Much more recently, there have been reports in the Sunday Times, of which we are all well aware, that again cast doubt on the independence of the investigation. All I feel it necessary to say is that all these attacks on the independence of an investigation could and should be avoided by putting the matter beyond doubt in legislation. The current legislation simply does not go far enough The third reason for saying that the current legislation is not correct is that it does not reflect the proper constitutional position, and these matters ought to be put on a statutory basis. The duty set out in Clause 12(3), which is to try to ensure operational independence, is not enough. There must be operational independence, and that should be a statutory principle.