Iraq Inquiry — House of Lords, 2016-07-12
Topic: International Affairs
Thomas Jopling (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, speaking towards the end of this debate, and finding myself squeezed between two of the most highly regarded and admired Mandarins of the Foreign Office, I feel rather like orange juice, if I can put it that way. The noble Baroness, Lady Hilton, referred to the fact that during the second Iraq war I was chairman of Sub-Committee C of the European Union Committee, which dealt with defence and foreign affairs. A few weeks before the war, we were in Washington. As a consequence of what we saw and heard, I returned and spoke in the same debate on 18 March 2003 to which the noble Lord, Lord Wright, has just referred. In that speech I dissociated myself from the Labour Government, my own Front Bench and from the United States’s plans for war. We had no vote but, if we had had one, I would have voted against the war. Looking back on it, then and now, I had, among many reservations, particular reservations about WMDs, the intelligence, the legality and the United States’s new arrogance which I noticed at that time, although I had no reason then to doubt the intelligence that we were getting. Like most people, there was no reason to do that However, tonight I want to concentrate especially on what I regard as the wicked lack of preparation for the post-military phase. It is a separate chapter, reflecting an astonishing lack of planning by all concerned, together with what seems to me an apparent lack of interest in preparing for that phase. It reflects a period of political leadership which I think marks the lowest point in competence in both the United States and the United Kingdom that I have ever lived through. In the United States, George W Bush, who I believe one can argue is the worst United States president in my lifetime, left two unwinnable wars and a major financial crisis behind him. In the United Kingdom, we had a Government led by a Prime Minister who allowed himself to be led by the United States into supporting its policies like a pet sheep, and who, having agreed to go to war, consistently failed to plan for the post-military phase. I may say that my own party at that time had the most unconvincing leadership I have ever known in my lifetime I draw attention to a few of the facts which come out of the Chilcot report which demonstrate that crucial lack of planning for the post-military phase, which, of course, has led to the current chaos. I give a few examples from either the main report or the summary As early as 9 September 2002, Mr Hoon went to meet Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington, armed with a departmental briefing on the post-conflict phase. Chilcot tells us there is "no indication" that he raised it at all A little later, on 17 January, Mr Straw sent a paper to the Prime Minister about the aftermath of the military phase. Chilcot says: "Mr Straw did not give due consideration to what might constitute a satisfactory plan for the UK and whether UK participation in military action should be conditional on such a plan" Following that report—it is all connected—Sir David Manning is quoted as saying to the Prime Minister: "I don’t think they affect your decision in principle", to which the Prime Minister replied, "Agreed" Moving into 2003, I was again struck to read the quote from the memoirs of the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson. He says that in January 2003, he asked Mr Blair, "‘What happens after you’ve won? … You can go in there, you can take out Saddam but what do you do with Iraq? You’re going to have a country on your hands. I don’t know what your plan is. I don’t know how you are going to do it. Who is going to run the place?’ Tony replied: ‘That’s the Americans’ responsibility. It’s down to the Americans’" Moving on to 19 February, Chilcot says: "There is no indication that, when Mr Blair discussed Iraq with President Bush on 19 February, he raised either post-conflict planning or the post-conflict role of the UN" These are damning comments on the preparation for that war, and are, if I may say so, exactly the things that bothered me so much and which caused me to dissociate myself from the mood at that time Moving on to 6 March, Chilcot says: "On 6 March, Mr Blair chaired the first"— mind that, the first— "Ministerial meeting convened solely to address humanitarian and other post-conflict issues" He goes on, in Paragraph 781, to say, "No decision was taken" In the same Cabinet meeting, on 6 March, it says in the Chilcot report: "For the first time, Mr Blair requested a consolidated UK plan for post-conflict Iraq, including the key decisions for Ministers to take" That is on 6 March, days before the war began. On 21 March, shortly after the debate in this House, Chilcot says: "The Inquiry has seen no evidence that a cross-government humanitarian plan for Iraq was ever produced" Moving on to 12 March, the report says: "The draft objectives and guiding principles for post-conflict Iraq were resubmitted to Mr Blair for approval on 12 March. No decision was taken and there is no indication that Mr Blair discussed the objectives and principles with Ministers. In the absence of a decision from Mr Blair, post-conflict planners remained without clear Ministerial guidance on the nature and extent of the UK’s post-conflict commitment" These are, quite honestly, dreadful indictments of what happened at that time. You may say, "This was all the British side of things", but, to be truthful, the Americans were no better. In the report, on 18 March, when Major General Cross came through to London on his way to the region, he is quoted in Paragraph 1075 as saying: "I was as honest about the position as I could be, essentially briefing that I did not believe post-war planning was anywhere near ready. I told him that there was no clarity on what was going to be needed after the military phase of the operation, nor who would provide it. Although I was confident that we would secure a military victory I offered my view that we should not begin that campaign until we had a … more coherent post-war plan" The Americans are equally culpable on this. In the speech—I am sorry I am taking so long—that I made on 18 March, I made the point when I said: "When we were in Washington", with that committee, "several people admitted that too little thought has been given, and too late, to what will happen afterwards".—[Official Report, 18/3/03; col. 171.] On 23 February, there had been an article in the New York Times regarding the Bush Administration’s new office of post-war planning, which held a secret session, "to assess the government’s plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if Saddam is overthrown". This last paragraph is, I think, crucial. I reminded the House at that time that the, "office will be directed by", General Garner. That was only a few weeks before the conflict started. The post had already been refused by Dr David Kay, "a former chief nuclear weapons inspector in Iraq, who had considered taking it. He was quoted as complaining that promoting democracy had too little priority in the new office and that the mission itself was under-financed and poorly staffed".—[Official Report, 18/3/03; col. 171.] The American approach to the post-military phase is lamentable It is a sorry and outrageous story of political leaders ignoring advice and pressing ahead with foolish and ill-prepared military adventures. They were consistently warned, on both sides of the Atlantic. Now we are harvesting the whirlwind. Is Iraq a better place? I have to say to my noble friend who opened the debate that a number of us in this corner of the Chamber rather raised our eyebrows when we heard him say that it is a better place. There is chaos in Iraq and in the region, and terrorism is rampant. What should our lessons be? Our lesson is a simple one—political leaders should not take on these sorts of adventures purely on their own. They must do so in an infinitely more democratic way in the future.