Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill — House of Lords, 2021-11-30
Topic: Government Operations
Frederick Butler (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I regret that I am going to share the self-satisfaction of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I believed from the outset that the 2011 Bill was misconceived. Partly through the not inconsiderable intervention of my noble friend Lord Pannick, who regrets that he cannot be here today, your Lordships’ House was twice persuaded to send the Bill back to the House of Commons for reconsideration. The concession eventually obtained was that the operation of the Act should be reviewed in 2020 by a Joint Committee. That was conducted under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord McLoughlin, who I think I am right in saying should be congratulated on his birthday today The stated intention of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said, to ensure that the 2010 coalition lasted a full five years. But, with respect to the noble Lord, the Bill was not even sufficiently effective to do that. If either of the coalition parties had wanted to end the Parliament early, it is highly likely that, with the support of the Official Opposition, the necessary two-thirds majority in the Commons to bring the Parliament to an end would have been available A second aim of the Act was to remove from the Prime Minister the alleged advantage of being able to choose the timing of a general election. In my experience, the flexibility that Prime Ministers have is very limited in practice. No Prime Minister is likely to choose to put their Commons majority at risk before the last year of a Parliament unless they judge it essential in order to get their Government’s programme through. Experience also shows that, if the electorate sense that the Government are putting them to the trouble of a general election for opportunist reasons, they punish the party severely through the ballot box, as the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, made clear. That is what Mrs May found in 2017 I believe that the traditional arrangement by which the Prime Minister can ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament so that the Executive can seek a new mandate, in circumstances where they cannot rely on getting their programme through Parliament, is in the national interest. I therefore support this Bill. However, I greatly regret the inclusion of Clause 3. The noble Lord has argued that the Dissolution of Parliament is a matter properly dealt with by the electorate rather than the judiciary, but in my submission, this is a false argument. By the time the electorate have any say, Parliament will have been dissolved, the power will have been used and the Queen will have had to assent to it If the Bill gave a role to Parliament in the Prime Minister’s request for Dissolution, it would, as others have said, be a different matter. But the Bill does not allow any involvement by Parliament. Under the Bill, Dissolution is not something done by Parliament; like Prorogation, it is something done by the Executive to Parliament. Parliament does not authorise it or have any role in it. If the Executive misuse their power, in my view the exercise of that power should be subject to review by the courts But in this case, as has already been pointed out, there is an even more fundamental objection. Let us suppose that the Government do misuse the prerogative power in some way. All commentators agree that, at least in theory, such a situation could happen. What protection would exist if the courts cannot intervene? There is only one source of protection in that circumstance: the sovereign. The sovereign would have to refuse the Prime Minister’s request for Dissolution. That would require the sovereign to do what everyone agrees she should be protected from doing: intervening in party politics, and in the most contentious of circumstances. If it is necessary to have protection against the Prime Minister’s abuse of the power in this Bill, in my view it should be provided either by Parliament or the courts, not by the sovereign I end with a more general point. A recent article in the New Statesman, under the heading "Democracy’s Last Stand", discussed how ex-President Trump’s attempt to subvert the result of a democratic election was thwarted by the courts. The article also pointed out how rapidly Hungary, Turkey and Brazil have seen their democracies strong-armed by repressive Governments. The article asked whether the United Kingdom’s constitutional safeguards are sufficient to prevent a slide in a similar direction. It reminded readers of the politically motivated Prorogation, the demonising of the courts and the BBC, and the attempts to override the findings of independent standards and appointments bodies. One could add the use of the Henry VIII powers to bypass Parliament’s scrutiny, highlighted by two Committees in your Lordships’ House last week, and now, the ouster clause in this Bill I suggest that those of us who value our democratic traditions must stand up against the Government’s attempts to remove oversight of their actions by Parliament and the courts. If Clause 3 is not amended, I shall vote against its inclusion in the Bill.