Defence Industry and Shipbuilding — House of Commons, 2018-07-11
Topic: Defense
Paul John Sweeney (Labour, Centre-left): I shall do my best to keep my remarks brief, Mr Speaker, although this is a subject close to my heart. I have grown up around the shipbuilding industry my entire life, and I had the privilege of working in it as a new graduate in 2010-11 and through to 2016. Through that time, I have learned the bitter lessons of failed and deeply flawed MOD procurement practices. Through the 1990s, my dad had to travel around the country following shipbuilding orders, as Type 23 frigate orders were drip-fed and we were usually in a race to the bottom with the Irish shipbuilders and Swan Hunter to build them. That was a recipe for disinvestment and unemployment, and that was the harsh lesson learned. That is why the Labour Government turned away from the policy after 1997 and promoted a defence industrial strategy, which was well regarded in all parts of the House. That was followed up by a terms of business agreement that would have guaranteed a stable pipeline of work, with one ship built every 12 months in a six-year design cycle for complex warships. That was extinguished in 2014 by the MOD, in pursuit of an utterly wrongheaded policy on shipbuilding procurement Let me make it clear: the capacity to award this contract to a British shipyard is entirely at the MOD’s discretion, under the terms of article 346 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Indeed, it is common practice to have done this; France, Germany, Italy, Spain and US do it. Most recently, Canada has pursued a similar policy with its national shipbuilding strategy. Its big ship construction will be focused on Vancouver and complex warship construction will be focused on Halifax, with a new purpose-built frigate factory there. Sounds familiar, does it not? Only the Canadians have actually achieved it and we have not The Govan shipyard is now the mainstay of British shipbuilding capacity, with the largest steelwork capacity in the UK and by a considerable margin. It is represented by the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens), and I had the privilege of working in it for several years. The yard is also the only one capable of building complex warships in the UK—to date. That shipyard exists today only because it was saved in 1999 by a UK Labour Government who made it clear that they would save it by providing a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship, the Wave class, and then another, the Bay class, to that yard. That enabled it to be match fit to build the Type 45 destroyers, the aircraft carriers and, subsequently, as we see now, the River class ships and the new Type 26 frigates. That yard exists today only because that Government took a conscious decision to ensure capacity was maintained at those shipyards Today, we see a new crunch point emerging. The current Royal Navy shipbuilding capacity plan for 2020 to 2040 shows a large UK ship-construction gap, primarily focused on Rosyth, which will have a 15-year gap in work between the completion of the HMS Prince of Wales and the first refit of the Queen Elizabeth or, indeed, the build for the new future amphibious capability. It is the only facility in the UK that is currently capable of building large-beam vessels wider than 20 metres. The new FSS vessels are 29.5 metres and the new future amphibious vessels will be wider than 20 metres, so to ensure that the pipeline of capability is maintained in the UK, we must build the FSS in the UK. To ensure that we have our future amphibious capability—as the Minister conceded, the amphibious capabilities are regarded as sovereign shipbuilding capabilities—we must secure that pipeline of work to enable future amphibious-vessel construction Let us be clear about the economic benefits, which the Minister dusted over somewhat in his rather flimsy analysis. According to the Royal United Services Institute, naval shipbuilding work offers a return of 36p in the pound. Some £285 million would be returned to the Exchequer, but that is just a quarter of the overall industrial and economic benefit to the UK. A recent Institute for Public Policy Research report, which took into account welfare savings and greater GDP growth, found that naval shipbuilding activity in the UK offered a return of 40% to the Treasury. That must be taken into account when we consider the awarding of public procurement contracts. Some 70% of shipbuilding contracts are derived from the supply chain, which was worth £2.8 billion in 2015. That is a huge industrial benefit to the UK Overseas shipyards like Daewoo in South Korea are not bidding out of altruism; they are aggressively pursuing state-backed support efforts to pump-prime their own industrial base. Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering in South Korea invested $6 billion in 2017. Sir John Parker’s report, which the Minister lauded, said: "Overseas build brings its own challenges including potential denial of opportunities for the UK supply chain, higher costs of overseas supervision and potential foreign exchange risks"— as we saw in the recent RFA build in Korea. The report went on: "Nor does the foreign build of ships make the direct prosperity contribution to the UK economy that an onshore build would achieve." If the Ministry of Defence is to stand by its convictions and its ideological position on this issue, I urge it to demonstrate the economic and social impact of domestic production versus offshore production, instead of the flimsy assertions that Government Members have made today, which have been utterly at odds with the truth If the Government define a Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship as not a complex warship in respect of being fitted with armaments, do they class the River class batch 2 as complex warships? The proposed FSS ships will contain far more armaments than the River class patrol ships—[Interruption.] Yes, so are the patrol ships, so why do the Government define them as sovereign build but not the FSS? Their logic does not stack up; it is based on flawed analysis. We must have a virtuous cycle of investment, not a vicious cycle of disinvestment. The harsh lessons of the 1990s were learned: stop throwing away 20 years of coherent and proper defence procurement planning in this ridiculous pursuit of an ideological vanity that is going to utterly fail our shipbuilding industry.