Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2020-06-17
Topic: Mixed Topics
Jonathan Marks (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which I support wholeheartedly. I will be relatively brief because I set out my reasons at some length in Committee, and because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and all other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken have argued the case so persuasively To give private international law treaties the force of domestic law is not a trivial rubber-stamping exercise. It may involve significant and complex law in relation to treaty implementation and enforcement provisions. Those were points well made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. It is not just the breadth of the possible future treaties that might be affected by this clause but the sheer unpredictability of such treaties that we may consider in future. There is no way that that is defined or limited satisfactorily by the provisions of the Bill There is also a strong argument that this clause would open the way to the Executive further usurping the role of Parliament in an extension of what has been widely and rightly criticised as a thoroughly unwelcome trend for Parliament to have its role circumscribed by delegation of powers to the Executive. This type of argument is often dismissed as a "floodgates" or "thin end of the wedge" argument, because it is said to ignore the detail of the particular case under consideration. However, these arguments are real and, given the respect that we rightly pay to precedent in our constitutional discussions and in the context of our having an unwritten constitution, such arguments deserve to be taken seriously. If private international law treaties today, why not other international treaties tomorrow and a still less constrained role for the Executive further down the line No matter how often Ministers say that the availability of the affirmative resolution procedure or even the super-affirmative procedure gives Parliament a right to scrutinise and vote down delegated legislation, we all know the reality: that unamendable regulations are extremely difficult in practice to get changed, withdrawn or rejected as a result of parliamentary scrutiny. That is why removing this clause from the Bill is so important A particularly pernicious aspect of this clause is the power to create new criminal offences by regulation, even those carrying sentences of imprisonment. One can foresee that enforcement in particular of international treaty obligations may indeed involve criminal sanctions against non-compliant individuals. We may return to this with Amendment 10, if that turns out to be necessary. However, it would be far better for us to get rid of Clause 2 altogether—a change we may just succeed in holding when the Bill goes to the Commons I also remind the House of the important point, made in the Constitution Committee’s report, that regulations are amenable to judicial review and so could be challenged in the courts. Clause 2 would risk the unattractive position that, having entered into international obligations by treaty and Ministers having passed regulations to give them the force of domestic law and to enable compliance and enforcement, the courts would then be entitled to quash those regulations if they were challenged. That would be seriously unsatisfactory The Constitution Committee rested its argument on the valid ground of legal uncertainty. I add that such a position would undermine us internationally, further damaging our reputation for being good for our word and bringing our democratic legal processes into disrepute. This is an important point, but I wind up by saying that it is a subsidiary reason for removing Clause 2. The central point is the point of principle on which I suggest the House has a constitutional duty to vote this clause down.