argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Cities and Local Government Devolution [Lords] Bill — House of Commons, 2015-10-21
Topic: Health
Alistair James Hendrie Burt (Conservative, Centre-right): I take the hon. Gentleman’s point. I am not sure, however, that we can be more prescriptive on the face of the Bill. The hon. Gentleman is describing the process by which an area says, "We think that, in addition to the functions already devolved, other things need to be devolved to help local health services work together", but it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which NHS England would say, "Well, no you can’t". At the moment, most are working collectively in any case, so this is a matter for local decision making and agreement between the parties involved. I do not think we can say more than that directly in the Bill at this stage. The whole process of devolution will fall into disrepair if there is continual conflict between an area that says, "Look, we think we can do this", and a central authority that says, "No, you can’t, there’s no point in that given the process we are going through". The provision of safeguards is about ensuring that NHS England can be confident of devolving powers, because ultimately the regulatory powers and the safeguards should ensure that patients and constituents are protected by national standards remaining the same. That is how I envisage it working.
Cities and Local Government Devolution [Lords] Bill — House of Commons, 2015-10-21
Topic: Health
Alistair James Hendrie Burt (Conservative, Centre-right): Yes, in that the regulatory powers of the CQC and the safeguarding inspection regime will be retained for the social care element that is covered by a devolution deal. Again, the whole point is to give as much flexibility as possible to areas that want to exercise their powers to deliver services differently, with the reassurance that there will no compromise in relation to key standards—not that that would be wished for in a local area, and not that it would be anticipated by any of the devolving powers Following discussions with Greater Manchester and other local areas, we are now taking the opportunity to make available further options in legislation for combined authorities and local authorities to work together with clinical commissioning groups and NHS England across a wider area—such as Greater Manchester—to improve the integration of services. Those options will sit alongside the powers provided by the Bill to devolve a range of powers and functions that are currently exercised by Whitehall departments or bodies such as NHS England to a combined authority or a local authority. Crucially, wherever responsibility for NHS functions is delegated or shared in this way, accountability will remain with the original function holder, whether that is NHS England or a CCG. The original NHS function holder will continue to be accountable via the existing mechanisms for oversight, which ultimately go to the Secretary of State, who retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service.
Cities and Local Government Devolution [Lords] Bill — House of Commons, 2015-10-21
Topic: Health
Alistair James Hendrie Burt (Conservative, Centre-right): I have read the report of the debates in the House of Lords on exactly this topic, because there was a lot of confusion. My understanding is that it depends on precisely what the breakdown is. Let us suppose that the breakdown, or failure, is in the way in which services have been put together by the combined authority. This is purely off the top of my head, and does not refer to anything of which I have any current knowledge. Let us suppose that there was a dispute between two constituent areas of Greater Manchester, one of which claimed that there was some inequity between the service that it was receiving and the service being received by the other. It might be claimed, for instance, that the combined authority’s decision was somehow disadvantaging Ramsbottom in favour of Bramhall. In the event of such a dispute, the buck would stop with those who were making the decisions locally, and that is the combined authority. The matter would not go anywhere near the Secretary of State. What the Secretary of State retains responsibility for is the standards and whether or not there has been a breach of NHS duties in relation to anything that falls within his own overall responsibility. So the buck still stops with the constituent authority that is delivering the service. In relation to a CCG that is not performing properly, the buck will stop with the CCG, not the combined authority. If there is a lapse of standards in anything connected with the NHS, ultimately the regulators govern that and the Secretary of State would be responsible. But if it is a decision being taken by those who are responsible for the new combined authority to do with where services go and it is within their remit, it will be a matter for them—the buck will stop with them. The short answer, therefore, is that where ultimately responsibility lies depends on where the breakdown is, but it is clear in relation to each of the services and it does not mean anyone can evade their responsibilities.
Cities and Local Government Devolution [Lords] Bill — House of Commons, 2015-10-21
Topic: Health
Alistair James Hendrie Burt (Conservative, Centre-right): If the mayor was to have responsibility for the services—that is not the proposal for Greater Manchester—the mayor would only have responsibility for the services within the combined area. Anything beyond that would still fall within the remit of those who commissioned services in that area. The decision as to—[Interruption.] That is right: the hospital in that circumstance may well have two bosses because the CCG would be responsible for the whole lot and it would have to come, by agreement, to a decision as to what was being provided within the combined area as well as outside the combined area. So the CCG remains responsible for what it is delivering, but it decides as normal with those to whom it is answerable—in one area it has become a different authority and in another it remains the original one—what services they should provide. The overall security for the quality of what the CCG is providing is maintained by the national regulator, which supervises, and it is ultimately for the Secretary of State to make sure the NHS guidance and duties are not breached, but it is a matter for local decision how this coterminosity is dealt with, because it will occur in more than one area. Certainly, however, I cannot see that legally a CCG outside a combined authority could have any direct line of responsibility to somebody inside the combined authority who is making decisions not about their area. That is how that would work.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): This is something not only that I do not want to do, but that I think would be a mistake if we did it. The argument was made to us by the Iraqi Government that the presence of western ground troops can be a radicalising force and can be counterproductive, and that is our view. I would say to the hon. Gentleman, and to colleagues behind me who are concerned about this issue, that I accept that this means that our strategy takes longer to be successful, because we rely on Iraqi ground troops in Iraq, we rely on the patchwork of Free Syrian Army troops in Syria, and in time we hope for Syrian ground troops from a transitional regime. All of that takes longer, and one of the clear messages that has to come across today is that, yes, we do have a strategy, and although it is a complex picture and it will take time, we are acting in the right way.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Everyone in this House can speak for themselves. What I am saying is that, when it comes to the risks of military action, the risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of what I propose Next there are those who ask whether Britain conducting strikes in Syria will really make a difference.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Let me make my argument, and then I will take the hon. Gentleman’s question This point has been raised in briefing after briefing. I believe that we can make a real difference. I told the House last week about our dynamic targeting, our Brimstone missiles, the Raptor pod on our Tornadoes and the intelligence-gathering work of our Reaper drones. I will not repeat all that today, but there is another way of putting this, which is equally powerful. There is a lot of strike capacity in the coalition, but when it comes to precision-strike capability whether covering Iraq or Syria, let me say this: last week, the whole international coalition had some 26 aircraft available, eight of which were British Tornadoes. Typically, the UK actually represents between a quarter and a third of the international coalition’s precision bombing capability. We also have about a quarter of the unmanned strike capability flying in the region. Therefore, we have a significant proportion of high-precision strike capability, which is why this decision is so important.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise this issue, and I pay tribute to his constituent’s son. We will be part of the de-confliction process that already exists between those coalition partners flying in Syria and the Russians. Of course, our own aeroplanes have the most advanced defensive air suites possible to make sure that they are kept safe. The argument that I was making is one reason why members of the international coalition, including President Obama and President Hollande, who made these points to me personally, believe that British planes would make a real difference in Syria, just as they are already doing in Iraq.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): We are going to vote either way tonight—either vote is an honourable vote. I suggest that we get on with the debate that the country wants to hear In many ways, what I have just said helps to answer the next question that some Members have asked about why we do not simply increase our level of airstrikes in Iraq to free up coalition capacity for strikes in Syria. We have the capabilities that other members of the Coalition want to benefit from, and it makes absolutely no sense to stop using these capabilities at a border between Iraq and Syria that Daesh simply does not recognise or respect.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Let me make some progress. Let me turn to the question of whether there will be ground forces to make this operation a success. Those who say that there are not as any ground troops as we would like, and that they are not all in the right places, are correct. We are not dealing with an ideal situation, but let me make a series of important points. First, we should be clear what airstrikes alone can achieve. We do not need ground troops to target the supply of oil which Daesh uses to fund terrorism. We do not need ground troops to hit Daesh’s headquarters, its infrastructure, its supply routes, its training facilities and its weapons supplies. It is clear that airstrikes can have an effect, as in the case of Khan and Hussain that I just mentioned. Irrespective of ground forces, our RAF can do serious damage to Daesh’s ability right now to bring terror to our streets and we should give it that support.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): What the hon. Gentleman says is right. Of course Daesh has changed its tactics from the early days when airstrikes were even more effective, but that is not an argument for doing nothing. It is an argument for using airstrikes where we can, but having a longer-term strategy to deliver the necessary ground troops through the transition. The argument before the House is simple: do we wait for perfection, which is a transitional Government in Syria, or do we start the work now of degrading and destroying that organisation at the request of our allies, at the request of the Gulf states, in the knowledge from our security experts that it will make a difference?
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): Let me make a little progress, then I will take interventions from both sides As I said last week, the full answer to the question of ground forces cannot be achieved until there is a new Syrian Government who represent all the Syrian people—not just Sunni, Shi’a and Alawite, but Christian, Druze and others. It is this new Government who will be the natural partners for our forces in defeating Daesh for good. But there are some ground forces that we can work with in the meantime. Last week I told the House—
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
David William Donald Cameron (Conservative, Centre-right): That is what our constituents want to know. What are we doing to strengthen our borders? What are we doing to exchange intelligence information across Europe? What are we doing to strengthen our intelligence and policing agencies, which the Chancellor spoke about so much last week? We should see all of this through the prism of national security. That is our first duty. When our allies are asking us to act, the intelligence is there and we have the knowledge that we can make a difference, I believe that we should act Let me take an intervention from the leader of the Liberal Democrats.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
John Luther Mercer (Conservative, Centre-right): I speak as someone who was a member of the military but has left. It seems to us that the Leader of the Opposition is making a fundamental point, namely that this is about national security. It is extremely difficult to deal with all the conflicting arguments and complex situations, but this comes down to national security, and the need to inhibit what these people are trying to do on the streets of this country.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Alan James Carter Duncan (Conservative, Centre-right): As all of us are trying to show responsibility and duty, I do not think there is anybody on either side of the House who in any way relishes the decision we are being asked to take today. It is not straightforward, like the response to the invasions of Kuwait and the Falklands. It is a very difficult decision we are being asked to take, and in taking it we must have two issues at the forefront of our thinking: first, the security of our own country and, secondly, the desperate need to restore stability in the middle east But rather than rehearse all the arguments, I would just like to emphasise a few points which I would ask the House solemnly to consider. The question of whether to commit our armed forces has over the last few years become seriously muddied both by the painful experience of past decisions and by the complexity of the unfolding disorder across the Arab world. The experience of Afghanistan in part—to which the Leader of the Opposition referred—and of Iraq more significantly, has led to growing reticence, and indeed distrust, in this House and outside it about any proposal for military action. So the first point I would like to emphasise is that we must take the decision today based on the merits of today; we must base it on today’s facts and not on yesterday’s mistakes and regrets.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Daniel Robert Kawczynski (Conservative, Centre-right): My right hon. Friend will know of concerns that Daesh fighters are leaving Syria for Libya in greater numbers. Does he believe that when we are tackling Daesh in Syria, we will have to confront it in Libya at some stage as well?
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Giacomo Lopresti (Conservative, Centre-right): I have huge respect for my hon. Friend and for his military record. He makes eloquent points about the complexity of the situation and seeking a political solution in the end, but the protection of our people and their safety on our streets have to come first.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Julian Murray Lewis (Conservative, Centre-right): Hon. Members are being asked to back airstrikes against Daesh in order to show solidarity with our French and American friends, yet a gesture of solidarity, however sincerely meant, cannot be a substitute for hard-headed strategy Most Defence Committee members probably intend to vote for such airstrikes, but I shall vote against airstrikes, in the absence of credible ground forces, as ineffective and potentially dangerous, just as I voted against the proposal to bomb Assad in 2013. Indeed, the fact that the British Government wanted to bomb first one side and then the other in the same civil war, and in such a short space of time, illustrates to my mind a vacuum at the heart of our strategy At least we are now targeting our deadly Islamist enemies, rather than trying to bring down yet another dictator with the same likely results as in Iraq and Libya. Daesh must indeed be driven out of its territory militarily, but that can be done only by a credible force that is ready and able to do the fighting on the ground. So who will supply that force, without which airstrikes cannot prevail The failure of the ineptly named "Arab spring" in so many countries shows the two most likely outcomes: a victory for authoritarian dictatorship on the one hand, or a victory for revolutionary Islamism on the other. Moderation and democracy have barely featured in the countries affected, and Syria seems to be no exception. I am genuinely sorry to say that we face a choice between very nasty authoritarians and Islamist totalitarians; there is no third way Our Government, however, are in denial about that. They do concede that airstrikes must be in support of ground forces, and they have come up with a remarkable figure, from the Joint Intelligence Committee, of 70,000 so-called moderate fighters with whom we can supposedly co-ordinate our airstrikes. It is very doubtful, however, were such an alliance to be successful, that the territory freed from Daesh would cease to be under Islamist control.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Julian Murray Lewis (Conservative, Centre-right): It is certainly true that there have been well documented cases of such weapons ending up in the hands of Daesh, although I would not wish to tar the entire Free Syrian Army with what some of its factions might have done, or in fact have done, as the hon. Lady rightly suggests.
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
Julian Murray Lewis (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank the hon. Gentleman for that contribution. It is not only ridiculous but highly dangerous. I will insert at this point something I was going to leave out, and say in passing that to have separate conflicts going on within the same battlespace, without reaching a proper agreement, can lead us into all sorts of nasty confrontations—the worst of which would be if we ended up eyeball to eyeball with the Russians when they and we share the same common enemy in ISIL/Daesh The second expert I consulted was our former ambassador to Syria, Peter Ford, who describes the Free Syrian Army as "a ragbag of 58 factions (at the last count) united mainly by a desire to use the FSA appellation in order to secure Gulf, Turkish and Western funding…most of the factions, which are extremely locally based, have no interest whatsoever in being drawn into battles against groups which basically share their sectarian agenda hundreds of miles away in areas with which they are unfamiliar." So instead of having dodgy dossiers we now have bogus battalions of moderate fighters Once Daesh has been driven out, as it must be driven out—if, eventually, we get an overall military strategy together, which adding a few bombing raids does not comprise—there arises the question of the occupying power, because an occupying power will have to remain in control for many years to come if other Islamists are not going to take over from Daesh. That occupying force must be a Muslim one, and only the Syrian Government army is likely to provide it. Indeed, as the Prime Minister himself acknowledged in the Commons, "in time the best ground troops should be the Syrian army".—[Official Report, 26 November 2015; Vol. 602, c. 1501.] Airstrikes alone are a dangerous diversion and distraction. What is needed is a grand military alliance involving not only the west but Russia and, yes, its Syrian Government clients too. We need—
ISIL in Syria — House of Commons, 2015-12-02
Topic: Defense
James Whiteside Gray (Conservative, Centre-right): The hon. Gentleman and I visited Iraq together last year. The fact of the matter is that the Iraqi army is totally destroyed. There were no ground forces in Iraq, leaving aside the peshmerga, any more than there are ground forces in Syria.