Brexit: Financial Services (European Union Committee Report) — House of Lords, 2017-02-09
Topic: Foreign Trade
Kishwer Falkner (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I am delighted to introduce this European Union Committee report. In doing so I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, on her recent appointment to the Treasury and on her role as Minister in charge of "EU exit financial services". I hope to have a very positive interaction with her in the future In the wake of the referendum of 23 June last year, the EU Select Committee agreed to undertake a series of short, co-ordinated inquiries into the implications of Brexit for various policy sectors. The Financial Affairs Sub-Committee began by looking into the impact on financial services. The committee took evidence from nine panels of witnesses—21 in total—during September, October and November 2016 and received written evidence. We are extremely grateful to all those who contributed to our work At this juncture it is customary for a chair to thank the members of the committee, but I do so today with particular emphasis, because we all, as a committee, worked at a frantic pace to produce this report in a timely manner so that the Government might take our views into account in setting their strategy for Brexit and financial services. So far we have not had sight of their response. I also want to single out for particular thanks the committee clerk, John Turner, who with depleted resources—as our policy analyst had been recruited by the Treasury—heroically managed to get us to this point. He was periodically assisted by Pippa Westwood, on loan from the EU Select Committee, and we owe her thanks as well From the outset we were aware of the huge importance of the financial services industry to the UK economy. The UK is the world’s leading exporter of financial services, with net exports in 2013 of $71 billion. The industry employs more than 1.1 million people—double that if related professional services are included—and contributes around 7% of UK GDP. The implications of a change to our trading status with the EU are potentially enormous. The consultancy Oliver Wyman estimated that £40 billion to £50 billion of the sector’s annual revenues—around a quarter of the total—were related to its business with the EU The relationship between UK-based financial services providers and the EU is underpinned by a system of so-called "passports", which grant rights to do business across borders. This system is not as straightforward as it first appears: passporting rights are provided for by different pieces of EU legislation, affecting the provision of different services, and their use does not map onto the business models of firms in a straightforward manner. Unpicking the reliance on passports is therefore complicated—we were told that even the firms themselves did not have firm grasp of their own reliance on passporting—but it was clear that UK-based firms were likely to suffer from loss of access to the single market and the passporting rights that came with it. That has become more evident since our report was published As we were undertaking our inquiry it was not clear what model of engagement with the single market the UK would seek. The Prime Minister, in setting out the UK’s negotiating aims on 17 January, and in the subsequent White Paper of 2 February, said that the UK would seek a free trade agreement to allow for, "the freest possible trade in goods and services between the UK and the EU’’, but she ruled out, "membership of the Single Market" This would also rule out any automatic passporting rights: they would need to be negotiated as part of the bespoke agreement she is aiming for If the UK were unable to negotiate a bespoke deal on access, it would have to fall back on third country equivalence provisions. However, we found that these were, "patchy, unreliable and vulnerable to political influence" They are patchy because they do not cover the full range of activities in which businesses engage: a bank might be able to rely on provisions under MiFID II for its investment activities but could not carry out traditional banking services because the relevant legislation underpinning that, CRD IV, does not include equivalence provisions. Third country equivalence provisions are unreliable because financial regulation is liable to change: as EU legislation evolved, the UK would have to adapt its own regulation in order to remain equivalent, and be assessed to be so every single time. They are vulnerable to political influence because the European Commission has a role in deciding whether a country is equivalent We concluded that any bespoke deal should seek a deal to bolster the current equivalence arrangements, to cover gaps in the regime and to ensure the continuation of equivalence decisions as regulation develops. There was, and still is, considerable uncertainty over the level of access to the single market that the UK will retain. Our witnesses were consistent in advocating a transitional period during which businesses could plan for and adjust to the new circumstances. We were told that a "cliff edge", with regulation and market access changing suddenly and without sufficient warning, would represent a grave threat not only to the business interests of the firms involved but to financial stability more generally. So the "new deal" scenario might prove extremely damaging I therefore welcome the Prime Minister’s reassurance that the Government will seek a "phased process of implementation". An early declaration on this transition period by both parties—the UK and the EU—would help allay the fears of businesses and possibly prevent them moving operations out of the UK on the basis of a worst-case scenario. I draw noble Lords’ attention here to the advice prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, which found that it would take banks between two and four years to put in place contingency plans for a hard Brexit The UK has been Europe’s dominant financial centre for some time. It has been particularly dominant in recent years in derivatives clearing through central counterparties. In April 2013 the UK accounted for half the world’s turnover of interest rate derivatives, and one-third of foreign exchange derivatives. It was even more dominant in euro-denominated interest rate derivatives, accounting for nearly three-quarters of world turnover This has drawn unwelcome attention from our EU partners. In 2011 the European Central Bank launched its location policy, which would have required euro-denominated trades to be cleared in the eurozone. The Government successfully resisted this at the European Court of Justice, but it is possible that the scheme could be revived—with appropriate legislative changes. It was notable that the President of France, François Hollande, made such a suggestion on 28 June, just five days after the referendum So the political incentive is there, and so are the legal means, with some tweaking. But would it be wise to remove London’s ability to clear euro-denominated trades? Clearing works through counterparties posting a margin, or collateral, with the clearing house. Because this is done centrally, the margin can be netted across multiple trades in multiple currencies, reducing the amount of collateral required. Research by Clarus Financial Technology suggests that disaggregating the euro component of one clearing house’s operation—LCH.Clearnet’s, for example—would cost the financial services industry $77 billion in additional margin, which would then not be available to lend to the real economy. Our witnesses expressed doubts about whether a clearing operation comparable to that in London could be migrated to another European city. Some suggested that New York was the only plausible alternative location for such a service. Of course, any revival of the location policy would also apply to New York. This suggests that the benefits of the UK’s clearing system currently enjoyed by businesses throughout Europe would be lost or greatly diminished. Ultimately, it would not be in the EU’s economic interest to repatriate euro clearing. We hope that pragmatism will prevail This leads me to my final point. The real economy in the EU benefits from the financial services provided in the United Kingdom to an extent that militates against any large-scale attempt to prevent UK-based firms doing business with the EU. We heard a lot in our inquiry about the financial services "ecosystem": the various services provided in the UK that interconnect in such a way that the effects of unpicking the ecosystem would be unpredictable. Unless another European centre could replicate that system, real businesses in the EU would lose out London has recently been ranked as the world’s number one financial centre again. Nowhere else in the EU comes close. Luxembourg is 12th and Frankfurt is 19th. We were not convinced that another EU location could step up and provide the services as efficiently and effectively as the UK currently does. If the economic argument trumps the political one, the EU should be willing to do a deal—but deals are ultimately dependent on rationality as well as goodwill. We hope that the UK Government will approach these negotiations with enormous goodwill and pragmatism, as the costs to the real economy of both the UK and the EU—and to real people’s lives—could be very high indeed. I beg to move.