Environment Bill — House of Lords, 2021-06-07
Topic: Environment
Mark Schreiber (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, first, I declare my interest in the register as a Suffolk farmer This Bill has had a pretty troubled history over the past two years. It reveals some confusion, not just semantic, between what can be legislated for and what, however desirable, can only remain a policy aim to be striven for. Thus the phrase "to set long-term, legally-binding environmental targets", which was used very much in the Explanatory Notes and in the comments during the Commons period, is really an aspiration rather than a practical measure There are of course targets for which we can legislate. An example would be to say that all diesel vehicles will be forbidden to use Britain’s roads after 2030. However, there are other targets that we might well welcome but which the Government have only a direct influence over. For example, we might like Britain’s hedgehog population to be restored to the numbers that we would wish. Any farmer knows that virtually no production target can be legally binding; nor can a great majority of business targets. This does not mean that there is not much more scope for statutory regulation, as we have heard today. While regulations must be targeted, the targets themselves can seldom be legally binding I want to focus on one important and particularly fallacious part of the Bill: Clause 109 in Part 6. It deals with making commercial corporations responsible for not importing agricultural commodities that have been derived from the loss of forests from the world. It is a futile way of dealing with a most important and urgent problem, for one simple reason: it is seldom, if ever, practical to monitor and identify the international movement of commodities, especially if there is money to be made by muddying the trail In my few moments, I want to suggest a much more practical alternative, taking the protection of the Amazon rainforest as an example. The best way of achieving that is by financial incentives for the Governments concerned. My scheme would have to be organised and administered by the IMF and the World Bank. It would involve setting a commercial value on the areas of rainforest to be protected. That sum would then be multiplied by a factor to make its protection an offer that no Government could afford to resist. It might be a multiple of 10, 20 or even, in the crucial cases, as much as 100. Payment of these sums would not in any way involve taking over the ownership of the rainforest. Nothing would be taken from the nations or their Governments. Payments would involve taking over the debt liabilities of the countries concerned. The deal would be a simple one: provided the rainforest is not interfered with, the debt would become interest-free and not required to be repaid at term. The original lenders would be repaid by the World Bank, which would take the debt on to its own balance sheet The attraction for the country is that, if it could increase its own borrowing, it could then, without fear of any default, develop more rapidly itself. Also, of course, the monitoring of such an agreement would be straightforward using satellite technology. Not a single tree could be felled without it being spotted by a satellite or drone of some sort. The penalty for breaking the deal would be obvious: the debt would come back again, being obliged to be repaid with the accumulated interest. Very few Governments would feel that they could afford to risk that I originally put this idea forward at a Ditchley conference some 20 years ago. Its time has now come. I offer it and hope that my noble friend considers it.