Extradition Treaty: UK and the State of Kuwait — House of Lords, 2018-10-30
Topic: International Affairs
Lindsay Granshaw (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, for initiating this debate. It is important that treaties like this are scrutinised. This treaty was initialled by UK and Kuwaiti Ministers in November 2015, signed in December 2016, ratified by the Kuwaiti parliament in April 2017, but only laid before the UK Parliament in July 2018. I guess we had various other things that we were thinking about We know that there has been much engagement with Gulf states in recent years. In fact, the UK offered to host the first-ever meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council outside the region. I understand that this is on hold because of the Saudi/UAE dispute with Qatar. The UK has put effort into increasing exports to the region. Exports to Kuwait rose 23% from 2017 to 2018, with goods and services valued at £1.7 billion. Perhaps we should pay tribute here to the Prime Minister’s trade envoy to Kuwait, the noble Baroness, Lady Morris. If the UK leaves the EU, the Government have made it clear that they wish to have a free trade agreement with the GCC states. That has been made particularly difficult in relation to Saudi Arabia, with its involvement in Yemen, the blockade of Qatar, and of course, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi Set against some of its neighbours in the Gulf and the wider Middle East, Kuwait has often been seen by the Government as an example of moderation and political reform. A House of Commons Library paper from 2016 notes that Kuwait has, "one of the liveliest and most influential parliaments in the region, with the power to cross examine ministers and significant influence over legislation" It is obviously good to hear that Nevertheless, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, has pointed out, concerns have been expressed, most notably by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, about human rights and freedom of expression in Kuwait. Thus, Amnesty reports that in March, the UK-based writer and blogger Rania al-Saad was sentenced in her absence to three years in prison on charges of "insulting Saudi Arabia" on Twitter. Former MP Musallam al-Barrak was released in April after serving a two-year prison sentence for criticising the Government but continues to face other charges. Amnesty further reports that the authorities have prosecuted and imprisoned government critics and online activists under penal code provisions that criminalise comments deemed offensive to the Emir or damaging to relations with neighbouring states. Human Rights Watch noted in its 2017 report: "Provisions in Kuwait’s constitution, the national security law, and other legislation continue to restrict free speech, and were again used in 2017 to prosecute dissidents and stifle political dissent" It was noted, however, that Human Rights Watch was allowed access to and dialogue with the Government of Kuwait As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, also mentioned, Kuwait has recently used the death penalty. As he explained, in January 2017 Kuwait executed seven people, though it had not, as he pointed out, carried out any such executions since 2013. This is obviously a very worrying development, as he emphasised. There are, in addition, concerns about the independence of the judiciary and prospects for a fair trial. Thus, for example, in the case of the "al-Fintas group", 13 men were charged in connection with WhatsApp discussions about video footage that appeared to show government members advocating the Emir’s removal from power. This case obviously causes concern. Amnesty concluded: "The trial was marred by irregularities" Concern has also been expressed about the 2016 electronic media law which, as Amnesty argues, "criminalises … criticism of the government, religious figureheads or foreign leaders" The Government’s overseas business risk assessment for Kuwait describes it as a "semi-democratic" country, which is an interesting way of putting it. Political parties are prohibited, or as the Government document carefully puts it: "Political parties have not been legalised" The Emir "reserves the right" to dissolve the 50-member National Assembly. Criticism of the Emir is illegal. These are serious issues which must be considered when assessing this extradition treaty We understand that the Kuwaitis have been keen for the treaty to be implemented, arguing that corrupt former officials have relocated to London. Kuwait’s Minister of Justice commented when the extradition treaty was signed: "it supports efforts to bring convicts and fugitives to justice, which in turn will help ameliorate Kuwait’s ties with the UK" The Speaker of the parliament stated: "Kuwaitis will no longer see embezzlers of public funds roaming the streets of London and Britain" Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, mentioned, in 2017 Britain arrested the former head of the social security fund, who was wanted on corruption charges. Although the extradition treaty had not yet been ratified, the extradition request was acceded to and the judge in this case ruled that the extradition could proceed. This case in fact showed that an extradition treaty was not required for individual extradition requests to be agreed by the Home Secretary In the light of this background, I have a number of questions for the Minister. What considerations in the UK-Kuwait relationship made this treaty a priority for the UK? In what context was this treaty discussed, both bilaterally with Kuwait and internally within the UK Government? Were linkages made to progress on political reform and human rights? Are the Government generally using extradition treaties as a way of encouraging political reform? How have the Government kept the wider political situation in Kuwait under review since first initialling this treaty in 2015, with the changes that have been noted? Did commercial considerations, particularly if the UK were to leave the EU, play a part In addition, given that our international partners in some cases do not appreciate that our judiciary is genuinely independent, what potential fallout could we see for the relationship with Kuwait if extradition requests are refused on human rights grounds? What are the Government’s options to revoke or suspend a treaty if they see violations of human rights in the judicial system or have systemic concerns around freedom of speech and fair trials? Will they keep the extradition treaty under review? There is no bilateral extradition treaty now with Saudi Arabia, Oman or Bahrain. Are any such treaties in the pipeline Setting aside Kuwait-specific concerns, there has been concern around extradition policy over the last few years. As the Lords Extradition Law Committee stated in 2015, "the system of seeking, accepting and monitoring assurances during the extradition process cannot guarantee the UK is meeting its human rights obligations" What review have the Government made of their policy in the light of those comments? The UK does have extradition treaties with countries where there are significant limitations on human rights and dubious judicial systems—for example, Uganda, Libya and Russia. It is important, therefore that this extradition treaty should be adequately scrutinised, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Collins, again for ensuring that we are doing so. I look forward to the noble Baroness’s responses.