BHS — House of Commons, 2016-10-20
Topic: Domestic Commerce
Jeremy Mark Quin (Conservative, Centre-right): I suppose the answer depends on the quality of the report. Frankly, having read it, I find that it contains a series of straw men that have been set up for demolition. In my view, it does not help Members, the pensioners or anyone to understand the circumstances of the demise of BHS To put at rest the minds of learned counsel, the joint Committees did not object to a dowry being provided on the sale of BHS, and certainly did not question its legality. However, we questioned the sufficiency of the cash and the choice of partner in the circumstances that BHS faced. We did not question the concept of a company being sold for £1. Clearly, that is a matter for Taveta Investments (No. 2) Ltd, the selling company, which received the £1. It is unfortunate that TIL2, which is ultimately controlled by Lady Green, is still paying back to Lady Green the £200 million consideration for its acquisition of BHS in 2009. This consideration was satisfied by £200 million of loan stock provided to three overseas companies controlled by Lady Green, with a coupon of 8% We would need a much longer debate—I am very mindful that other Members wish to participate—to draw out all the straw men contained in the joint opinion of learned counsel, but several others are produced in the context of corporate governance. A rare point on which the joint Committees’ perspective seems to be shared by learned counsel is on the—in our view, lax—governance of the sale, as was so eloquently described by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford. However, learned counsel state that that is an irrelevance, because the shareholders in TIL could in any event provide a direction, so the directors were in no position to prevent the sale of BHS to any party. That may be true legally, but it should raise questions for this House. Learned counsel tell us that TIL is 88%-owned by Taveta Ltd, a company registered in Jersey, and 12% by six minority shareholders. We are informed that the ultimate beneficial owner of the Jersey company is Lady Green, and that under the articles, Lady Green, acting with any one of the minority shareholders, could have directed the sale of BHS at any time and on any terms The right to own and dispose of property under English law is absolutely fundamental, and Parliament would be wise to tread very softly, but I am concerned in this context about checks and balances—not only on the sale, but more generally. What is the value of a section 172 provision, telling directors to have regard to other stakeholders, in these circumstances? What is the role and purpose of non-executive directors, especially when the 88% shareholder is not present around the boardroom table To my mind, it is not appropriate for directors serving private companies to decide that they can take an approach different from what is good corporate governance, purely because they can ultimately be directed. That would make it more important, especially on major or related transactions and on honouring commitments to pensioners, that they should bend over backwards to adhere to strong and demanding codes and be prepared to call out owners if they feel actions are taken that do not have sufficient regard to other stakeholders. There are thousands of very successful large and medium-sized private companies employing millions, and for those millions, ownership should be as transparent as good corporate governance There are other issues, from which I fear I have been sidetracked by the legal opinion, that the House should consider. As the hon. Member for Hartlepool mentioned, corporate governance codes should be applied not only to listed companies, but to those owned privately. On related party transactions, independent valuations or independent opinions are important when such transactions exceed de minimis levels. There is the issue of the utility of the requirement to have regard to other stakeholders in section 172 and how directors can be expected to do so when they owe responsibility elsewhere. There is the question of the appropriateness of dividend payments above certain thresholds, particularly if a pension scheme is in serious deficit. I was challenged on that point by the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) There is the issue of the requirement for courts to be cognisant of pension deficits, as well as of creditors, when considering applications for corporate restructurings and capital reductions. In private mergers and acquisitions, where pension problems may be less transparent than in the listed market, consideration should be given to compulsory engagement with the Pensions Regulator and with the trustees. For both directors and advisers engaged in sale processes in respect of a company in which the Pensions Regulator has already expressed concern and a sale is not being pre-cleared by the Pensions Regulator, all parties should be very aware of the actuality of the counterparty to whom they are selling. English law requires no due diligence to be done on the buyer—nor, in my mind, should it do so—but common sense suggests a certain wariness to be wise In conclusion, there are lessons to be learned from this sad story. Above all, however, we are all focused on the loss of a well-loved icon, the employees who have been made redundant and the pensioners who are rightly worried, but whose plight may yet be mitigated by Sir Philip. Such an act would, indeed, be honourable and very welcome. I understand from the radio this morning that he is, not for the first time, planning to meet the regulators in the next few days. Time will tell whether pensioners have been waiting for a result or have been made to endure a particularly poorly directed "Waiting for Godot".