Offensive Weapons Bill — House of Lords, 2019-03-04
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, we return to the argument that the Bill is full of unnecessary new legislation that has clearly not been thought through and which is already adequately covered by existing legislation. The Bill is being used simply to send a message that the Government are taking the issues of knife crime and corrosive liquids seriously, instead of investing in those things that really make a difference, such as youth services and community policing In Committee I raised the fact that the offence of affray was almost identical to the proposed changes to the existing offences of threatening with an article with a blade, a pointed article or an offensive weapon. Section 1A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that: "A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an offensive weapon with him or her in a public place … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the weapon, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person" Subsection (2) says: "For the purposes of this section physical harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861" Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states: "A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an article to which this section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the article, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person" Again, serious physical harm means grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The main differences proposed by the Bill concern the nature of the risk, which is changed from, "immediate risk of serious physical harm"— GBH— to the person threatened, to a much wider definition of, "a reasonable person ("B") who was exposed to the same threat as A", that is, the person being threatened, "would think that there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B", that is, the reasonable person So we go from an immediate risk of GBH to the person being threatened to a much vaguer concept of a reasonable person—is that a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner—thinking that there was an immediate risk of physical harm. Does that mean common assault, ABH or GBH In Committee, the Minister and I engaged in an intellectual and legalistic argument over the technical differences between the offence of affray—in Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986—and the proposed new offences. That section states: "A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety" So in affray we have, "uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another", instead of, "unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person" In affray we have, "his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety", instead of, "a reasonable person ("B") who was exposed to the same threat as A would think there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B" Can the Minister really tell the House that there is a practical difference between a "person of reasonable firmness" fearing for their personal safety and a "reasonable person" thinking there was an immediate risk of physical harm? I would be grateful for an example. Indeed, the affray definition does not rely on the extremely vague concept of a "reasonable person" but instead refers to, "a person of reasonable firmness"— not a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner but what we are really talking about: a person of reasonable firmness This legislation also adds further education premises to school premises in the 1988 offence, but affray can be committed in private as well as in public, so all premises are covered. Therefore, the only substantive difference between affray and the new offences is the maximum sentence on indictment: three years for affray and four years for the 1988 offence. This amendment addresses the one outstanding issue by increasing the maximum penalty for affray to four years for an offence in which a corrosive substance or bladed article has been used. I beg to move.