argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-07-04
Topic: Transportation
Jennifer Elizabeth Randerson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my Amendment 67 raises in relation to bus users the same issue of principle that was raised earlier. Before I briefly explain in detail, may I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for the assurances he gave earlier today? We are very grateful to him for the progress we have made on this issue In the case of franchising, before an authority publishes or withdraws a franchising notice, the Bill specifies that, quite reasonably, it has to consult "persons operating local services in the area to which the scheme relates" According to the Bill, it also has to consult, "other persons whom, in their opinion, it would be appropriate to consult" What is wrong with saying that it is right to consult bus users? It is obviously right to consult bus operators and it is clearly right to consult bus users. Greater prominence and guarantees simply must be given to the views of bus users, whether they choose to make their views known either locally, through small and informal groups, or nationally—for example, through Transport Focus. I urge the Minister to encompass this amendment with the other amendments which relate to bus users.
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-07-04
Topic: Environment
Jennifer Elizabeth Randerson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 74 tabled in my name. Before I address it specifically, I will say that we are supportive of Amendment 70. It deals with air quality data, which I have addressed on several occasions in discussions on previous amendments. However, we would certainly not be supportive of the noble Earl’s Amendment 72. For a start, it is about information that any reasonably good operator will have at their fingertips. We are not asking operators to do a great deal of work to find these data; they are all easily available. Secondly, the noble Earl states that this is a reasonable request but this information is publicly available as regards the railways, for example, and there is no reason why we should have this level of information about the railways but not about bus services.
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-07-04
Topic: Transportation
Jennifer Elizabeth Randerson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I will be brief as I am very conscious of the hour. This amendment is another of those which seeks to replace "may" with "must", this time in relation to advanced ticketing as part of franchise schemes Research by Greener Journeys shows that smart ticketing across all services would improve bus journey times by 10% at a time when congestion is a very serious problem on our roads. Some 90% of buses on our roads nowadays have smart ticket readers, so there is very little practical reason why schemes such as this should not be part of franchising. We want to encourage advanced ticketing in all arrangements for the provision of bus services. I believe it is a reasonable expectation that it should be required above all in franchising services The Bill makes some very admirable attempts at future-proofing in certain respects, for example, in relation to information. We live in a time when I can order a theatre ticket online and take my phone along to the theatre as proof that I have bought the ticket. My Oyster card is rapidly being overtaken by the ability to use a credit card or a smartphone. Tickets for flights, trains or whatever you mention are rapidly being converted to smart applications. In that respect, the Bill is downright unimaginative and unambitious because it does not maximise the potential that is growing, literally by the month, for advance ticketing schemes. On that basis, I urge the Minister to give serious consideration to the amendment. I beg to move.
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-07-04
Topic: Transportation
Jennifer Elizabeth Randerson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, as ever, I appreciate the understanding of the Minister, but I hope that he will give serious consideration to a more even approach towards advanced ticketing throughout the Bill. On that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Turkey — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: International Affairs
Meral Hussein-Ece (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I also welcome the noble Baroness to her new post and wish her well, and thank her for repeating the Statement. It is clear that none of us can predict what will come next—which is the important factor. Just today, there have been reports that 14 navy ships, along with the admiral and commander of the Turkish Navy, have gone missing. Nobody seems to know what has happened. Every day there are purges of judges and other personnel across Turkey, which is destabilising the civilian population and bringing greater divisions The final line of the Statement said that: "The UK stands ready to assist Turkey to take forward the reforms to which it has committed itself and to help the democratically elected Government" What does that involve? Would it involve, for example, working closer with our EU foreign affairs partners who have a greater relationship vested in Turkey because of the talks they have previously held on Syrian refugees and on visas? What can we do here to influence that and to promote greater democracy, bearing in mind that all the opposition parties, including the Kurdish HDP, came out and opposed the coup and showed support for the ruling AK Party and the President? How can we capitalise on that and promote greater democracy?
Turkey — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: International Affairs
Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I also congratulate the noble Baroness on her appointment. I would ask her to draw a distinction between the rule of law and human rights. Law can be changed, as indeed Mr Erdogan has eloquently demonstrated in recent times. Human rights, on the other hand, are fundamental and some might say immutable. It is therefore essential that in our dealings with Turkey and the present Administration we should draw that distinction, and in particular emphasise the latter.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, the restrictions on using internet connection records set out in these amendments are welcome. However, we intend to propose the removal of internet connection records from the definition of communications data that the Secretary of State can require a telecommunications operator to retain when we come to debate Clause 83. The intended effect of that amendment would be to make it impossible to obtain internet connection records unless they were retained by the telecommunications provider for its own business purposes. I will leave any further comment on internet connection records until we reach Amendment 156A to Clause 83.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 116 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We also have our names to Amendments 154 and 235 in this group These amendments relate to a government commitment not to require telecommunications operators to retain third-party data. On 4 November 2015 in a Statement in the other place, the then Home Secretary said that the Bill, "will not include powers to force UK companies to capture and retain third party internet traffic from companies based overseas".—[Official Report, Commons, 4/11/15; col. 969.] However, Clause 58(5)(c) states: "An authorisation … may, in particular, require a telecommunications operator who controls or provides a telecommunication system to obtain or disclose data relating to the use of a telecommunications service provided by another telecommunications operator in relation to that system" Surely this means third-party data. Amendment 116 would alter Clause 58(5)(c) to read, "may not require". The key point here is that telecommunications companies should not be forced to obtain third-party data. The draft code of practice on communications data states at paragraph 2.61: "A data retention notice can never require a CSP to retain the content of communications or third party data" Paragraph 2.66 states: "A CSP cannot be required to retain third party data as part of an ICR" Amendment 154 would add a new subsection to Clause 83(2)—the clause headed "Powers to require retention of certain data"—to make explicit that a retention notice may, "not require a telecommunications operator to retain any third party data, unless that data is retained by the telecommunications operator for its own business purposes" This is to distinguish between communications data that the telecommunications operator may have and being forced to acquire third-party data that it does not have Amendment 235 would restrict the definition of communications data in Clause 233(5) so that it relates to the provision of the service by that operator and not a third party. I beg to move Amendment 116.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation and am encouraged by the promise of government amendments on Report. I have to say that I am still a little confused. The former Home Secretary, in her commitment, said that third-party data of telecommunications operators from abroad would not be required to be retained by UK telecoms operators. If the third-party data are of a different UK telecoms operator, surely the Secretary of State can make an order to get the data from that operator. But I will read carefully in Hansard what the Minister has said. As he has made a commitment, we will come back to this on Report. For the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Government Operations
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendment 126 in this group. It attempts to challenge the fact that the size of the relevant public authority, which may make it difficult to find a senior officer independent of the investigation to which the authorisation relates, makes it an exceptional circumstance, which it would be if the Bill is accepted as drafted.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Government Operations
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way. We entirely accept that some public authorities will be so small, or some investigations so important, that there cannot be someone independent of the investigation who can give the authority. As the Bill is drafted, however, simply the size of the public authority is seen as an exceptional circumstance. It is not an exceptional circumstance and the amendment attempts to allow the size of the authority to be a reason why an independent senior officer cannot give the authority without making it an exceptional circumstance.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Government Operations
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I would just add that we do not disagree that a public authority may be so small that there is no independent senior officer who can grant the authority; the problem is whether that situation would amount to an exceptional circumstance. However, I would be very happy to discuss that situation with the noble Earl between now and Report.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Paul Strasburger (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I shall speak briefly on the amendments on the request filter. Along with internet connection records, the request filter is another power that first appeared in the draft Communications Data Bill and which died along with that ill-fated Bill. The view of the pre-legislative Joint Committee on that Bill, on which I sat, was that, "the Request Filter introduces new risks, most obviously the temptation to go on ‘fishing expeditions’. New safeguards should be introduced to minimise these risks" The request filter was described as, "essentially a federated database of all UK citizens’ communications data" I dare say that the committee would be even more worried when it said that in 2012 if it had seen how this Bill expanded the range of data to which the request filter can be applied. That expansion comes from the proposed introduction of internet connection records, which would reveal every detail of a person’s digital life and a very large part of their life in the real world. The effect of the request filter will be to multiply up the effect of intrusion into those data by allowing public authorities to make complex automated searches across the retained data from all telecoms operators. This has the potential for population profiling and composite fishing trips. It is bulk surveillance without the bulk label Use of the request filter would be self-authorised by the public authority without any judicial authorisation at all. The concept that the Government promote for bulk data is that they are passive retained records, which they say sit there unexamined until someone comes to the attention of the authorities. That concept is negated by the request filter. The data become an actively checked resource and are no longer passive. Will the Minister confirm that the request filter is not yet in existence and is not yet being used The request filter is a bulk power masquerading as an innocuous safeguard to reduce collateral intrusion. Unless and until the Government come forward with proposals to strictly limit use of the request filter through tighter rules and judicial approval for warrants, as is the case with other bulk powers, Clauses 63, 64 and 65 should not stand part of the Bill.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Government Operations
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am grateful for the noble Earl’s explanation. The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, raised this important concern that people have about the range of public authorities that will be able to access this data. There is a real concern that the Secretary of State by regulation can simply add to the list included in the Bill. As a general principle, to have provisions in a Bill in order—to quote the noble Earl —to future-proof it, even if those are unlikely to be used, is not the ideal way forward. However, the enhanced affirmative procedure does give some reassurance on that issue On the other matters, I will read carefully what the noble Earl has said, but at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am grateful for the chance to clarify my position. That is my position: we disagree with the conclusions of the Joint Committee. We believe, on balance, that the retention of internet connection records is disproportionate and unnecessary Technology experts recommend that companies should plan on the basis of their security measures having been breached, not just plan for the security of their databases. This makes highly intrusive personal data potentially available to criminals and hostile foreign powers. If a criminal establishes that a married man is accessing gay websites, or a hostile foreign Government establish that an intelligence officer is accessing lonely hearts websites, that could increase the risk of blackmail or entrapment. Knowing from ICRs when someone is not at home can increase the risk of burglary Internet connection records are hugely expensive to analyse and store. Based on estimates from Denmark, where the storage of internet connection records has already been explored extensively, the set-up costs alone in the UK could be around £1 billion. As in the UK, the cost estimates provided by the Government and telecommunications providers in Denmark varied widely. The Government therefore asked independent management consultants to establish the true cost, which confirmed that the telecommunications service providers’ estimates were the correct ones. Extrapolating from the independently verified Danish costs using the relative populations of both countries would take the set-up costs alone for internet connection records in the UK to more than £1 billion. For those who think that this cannot be right, I should say that 80% of all the data ever created since the beginning of time has been created in the last two years. That is the rate of increase, and, with more and more devices being connected to the internet, such as those controlling our central heating, and with even refrigerators and ovens being connected to the so-called internet of things, the number of internet connection records is set to increase exponentially. Apart from not being able to see communications in among all these other internet connections, the storage costs alone will be enormous Taking all these arguments together, the storage of the internet connection records of everyone in the UK for 12 months, whether they are suspected of wrongdoing or not, fails the proportionality test. I quote the RUSI report again, this time on proportionality. It states: "Intrusion must be judged as proportionate to the advantages gained, not just in cost or resource terms but also through a judgement that the degree of intrusion is matched by the seriousness of the harm to be prevented" The advantages gained through the storage of internet connection records are limited, the costs are prohibitive, the degree of intrusion is huge and serious harm can be prevented through other means.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I did not say that. Perhaps I can assist the Committee. What I said was that the security services—MI5, MI6 and GCHQ—have told me, in my visits to those agencies, that they do not require the retention of internet connection records for them to carry out their very important work around national security and serious crime. It is not the case, nor did I state, that the National Crime Agency does not support this measure. The National Crime Agency has supported it in its presentations to me. I have been to the National Crime Agency twice, because it failed to convince me the first time, and I am sad to say that it did not convince me the second time either.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): This Committee is part of the process of the scrutiny of legislation, and therefore this House should have respect for noble Lords who wish to use it to challenge what the Government are proposing. With regard to the greater success that the UK has had compared with, say, Germany in the prosecution of paedophiles, will the Minister confirm that that is using existing legislation without the use of internet connection records On the question of an evidential basis, why, in the operational case for internet connection records, is the need for evidential material not included in any of the examples provided by the National Crime Agency? Why, when I visited the NCA on a couple of occasions, was none of the examples that it gave of a need for evidence that could be presented in court? Indeed, the case studies presented to me at GCHQ confirmed that the work done by GCHQ in conjunction with the NCA was sufficient for the NCA to bring successful prosecutions, notwithstanding that the interception of content is not acceptable in giving evidence in court.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Jonathan Oates (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): The Minister may have given an impression, which I am sure he did not intend, that by scrutinising the Bill and seeking to do so, noble Lords were somehow not cognisant of the history of the development of these proposals and of the various bits of scrutiny. He should correct that. I myself spent five years in the coalition Government very much involved in these discussions, and one reason I am sceptical about many of the things I hear about why we must do things is because I have heard them before. For example, on the third-party data issue, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation David Anderson said in his report that it was unnecessary and no operational case had been made for it. So I want the Minister to be clear on that. Noble Lords are concerned not because they have not studied or are not aware of these things but because they are very much aware of them.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Technology
Paul Strasburger (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I thank the House for an interesting and lively debate, which this subject absolutely deserves. I am somewhat disconcerted by an assertion made by the Minister and one or two other noble Lords. Just because the Bill has been heavily scrutinised—I fully recognise that, and if it is the most scrutinised Bill in the history of this House, so be it—it does not mean that we should abandon our role in this House. We have six days in Committee; are we wasting our time attempting to honestly and genuinely scrutinise the Bill before the House? I do not think so. I will save most of my responses to the debate for Report. I will just say quickly to my noble friend Lord Carlile that there is a world of difference between communications data on mobile networks and internet connection records. I will leave it at that for now, and I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, perhaps this is a bit of light relief. Clause 77(1) defines what conduct is lawful when it comes to obtaining communications data, and Clause 77(2)(a) goes on to say that someone cannot be sued if what they do, "is incidental to, or is reasonably undertaken in connection with", the lawful conduct defined in subsection (1). So far, so good. Clause 77(2)(b) goes on to say that someone cannot be subject to any civil liability in respect of conduct that, "is not itself conduct for which an authorisation or warrant … is capable of being granted", under various acts set out in subsection (3) and, "might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question" If I understand this correctly—and I am sure I have not—if that conduct could and should have been authorised but was not, they can be sued, but if it was not something that could or should have been authorised, no civil liability arises. Either that cannot be right, or it is capable of misunderstanding and should be changed. Can the Minister put the provision in plain English? Our amendment is probing to ensure that we know what we are dealing with. I beg to move.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-19
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I thank the noble and learned Lord for what he has said. However, we tabled this probing amendment in order to understand what the provision means. Unfortunately, simply saying that it replicates legislation that is already on the statute book does not really help our understanding. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord can say whether the provision has been applied in the past under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.