Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2015-07-15
Topic: Government Operations
Susan Williams (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, all these amendments are about overview and scrutiny and the accountability of combined authorities. Making overview and scrutiny as strong and effective as possible is a priority for us. I was pleased in Committee by how clear it was that this is a shared priority across this House. The government amendments reflect the discussions I had with noble Lords from across the House, and I am grateful to them all for the expertise and experience that they brought to the discussions. Effective scrutiny not only ensures better decision-taking by those exercising new devolved powers but can be the safeguard against one-party states developing, and so prevent the loss of public confidence in the process of devolution Before discussing the various substantive issues on overview and scrutiny that have been raised, I turn first to government Amendment 81, which provides that any orders made under the powers in the new Schedule 5A to the 2009 Act will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, rather than negative. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended this, and we accept the recommendation Before turning to the detail of scrutiny arrangements, I shall address Amendment 34A, which would require the combined authority to appoint an audit committee and for that audit committee to have an independent chair. In the case of local authorities, and indeed in the case of such existing combined authorities as the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, the audit committee is appointed by the authority. Audit committees usually comprise senior non-executive members of the authority and, where this is the local choice, may also include one or more independent members. We recognise the importance of audit committees. The role of that committee in any authority includes supporting the authority’s chief financial officer, the Section 151 officer. It is an integral part of the financial controls and internal checks of the organisation Without this amendment, the approach would be to allow combined authorities to appoint, as they see fit, audit committees drawn from the membership of the authority and, where they consider appropriate, include independent members. I am sure that none of us wants unnecessary prescription. However, I can see the case for a combined authority, given its particular structure, which may or may not include a mayor, to be required to have an audit committee appointed by the authority. I can also see the case that it might be appropriate for such a committee to have one or more independent members. I am not persuaded that it would be right to prescribe in every circumstance that the chair of the committee should be an independent member. Accordingly, I am prepared to consider the issue further for Third Reading, have discussions with noble Lords and, if appropriate, return with an amendment on this at Third Reading I will return at the end to questions asked by noble Lords. Turning now to the substantive issues, I first address the question of call-in. Government Amendments 38, 41 and 49 and Amendments 39 and 40 relate to this. The government amendments aim to strengthen the power of call-in for overview and scrutiny committees of combined authorities. With these amendments, combined authorities and their overview and scrutiny committees will be able to set up and operate effective and proportionate call-in arrangements. These come into play when there is a real need, but equally they cannot become a mechanism for delaying or for impeding the efficient conduct of business. Crucially, the call-in arrangements in any authority will be a local matter for the authority and its scrutiny committees to decide and agree.