Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill — House of Lords, 2019-07-15
Topic: Civil Rights
Wallace Browne (Democratic Unionist Party, Right): I thank the noble Lord for his intervention, but I understand that that was on a very narrow case of fatal foetal abnormality. I will address that matter shortly, which should answer his question The chief commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission recognised that the recommendations were non-binding in oral evidence to the Women and Equalities Select Committee in the other place when it was reviewing the law in Northern Ireland. Professor Mark Hill QC wrote an opinion about the CEDAW report, in which he stated: "The Committee does not have the capacity or standing to give a binding adjudication on the United Kingdom’s obligations under CEDAW or on the proper interpretation of CEDAW", made the point that the International Court of Justice had not interpreted CEDAW as providing a right to abortion, and said: "The interpretative function under the CEDAW is reserved, not to the Committee, but to the International Court of Justice." If this is not enough to convince your Lordships that the authority being given to this Committee is flawed, I shall quote from a Supreme Court judgment —R (A and B) v Secretary of State for Health—in which Lord Justice Wilson said: "The conventions and the covenant to which the UK is a party carefully stop short of calling upon national authorities to make abortion services generally available. Some of the committees go further down that path. But, as a matter of international law, the authority of their recommendations is slight" Here we come to the case that the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, referred to. The judgment in that case stated: "If the Supreme Court rules in the case of Sarah Ewart that there is a right in relation to fatal fetal abnormality, then that would create a very strong case for a small but important change to the law. It would not, however, create anything resembling a general right to abortion" Indeed, the basis for thinking that the court might support a right in relation to fatal foetal abnormality is what was said in relation to a case last year, in which the plaintiff did not have standing, so no rule was made. The court also gave another indication, to the effect that there is no human right to abortion on the basis of disability generally—something permitted in Great Britain Secondly, the medium of human rights is normally expressed as a check on the majority expressed through constitutional due process. This is highly ironic, given that the only reason we are here is the complete disregard of constitutional due process manifested last week in the other place, where we saw: dispensing with scope; debate being permitted in relation to out-of-scope issues that should have been the subject of their own Bill, even though the Bill before the House was being fast-tracked; and the imposition of a change on the part of the UK with the smallest population, and thus the smallest number of MPs, by MPs from outside Northern Ireland The ethic that the end justifies the means is the kind of thing that constitutional checks are supposed to guard against, not encourage. If the proponents of Clause 9 press their case on the basis of the end justifying the means, as at present, that will cast a great shadow over the integrity of their human rights pretensions. If we want to live in a functioning union, by all means let us talk about human rights, but do not use them wrongly to suggest that there is a general right to abortion when no such right exists, and do not use them to dispense with the respect for constitutional due process, the presence of which can facilitate a functioning union, whereas disrespect for it will bring about its demise.