Judicial Review and Courts Bill — House of Lords, 2022-02-07
Topic: Law and Crime
David Pannick (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I declare my interest as a barrister who has practised in the field of judicial review for 40 years, representing clients as diverse as asylum seekers, the Reverend Moon and the noble Lord, Lord Howard. I fear I am at least partly responsible, wearing that hat, for what the noble Lord described in his most entertaining and provocative speech as the discordant note he expressed about judicial review. I had the pleasure, though rarely the success, of frequently acting on his behalf when he served as Home Secretary in the 1990s and was—how shall I put it—a regular customer in the judicial review courts. Your Lordships will recall that the Government announced in last year’s Queen’s Speech that they would be bringing forward legislation to "restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts."—[Official Report, 11/5/21; col. 3.] I am therefore surprised that Clause 1 seeks now to confer on the judiciary a very wide new power to absolve unlawful acts. This includes, as expressly stated in proposed new Section 29A(4) and (5), a power for the court to say that an act unlawful when it was carried out shall be treated as if it were lawful at that time. This is a remarkable power to confer on the judiciary I am not sure about the metaphysics of nullity to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, referred. I am more concerned about the nuts and bolts of this. If exercised, this power would mean that people who have suffered loss and damage by reason of unlawful government action would be denied compensation or damages for that wrong. It would mean, as the organisation Justice has pointed out in its very helpful briefing paper, that people who have had to pay tax under an unlawful regulation would be unable to require a refund. It would mean that people who had been prosecuted under an invalid statutory instrument, perhaps for a driving offence or a breach of the coronavirus regulations, would be unable to have their criminal record altered It cannot be right that a court should have a power to decide that something that is unlawful shall be treated as lawful despite such implications. That is why the Faulks committee, to which the Minister rightly paid tribute, recommended only what would be new Section 29A(1)(a)—that is, a power for the court to suspend a quashing order for the purpose of allowing time for Parliament to intervene if it thinks fit; no constitutional vandalism there By contrast, to give the judge a discretion to say that what was unlawful shall be treated as lawful is to encourage judges to enter into very treacherous waters. It requires the judge to assess the merits of competing policy factors that it is entirely inappropriate for the judiciary to assess. In his opening speech, the Minister rightly emphasised that judicial review is not concerned with judges deciding the merits of a decision or a policy. This new power will encourage and require judges to do precisely that. All of this is even more objectionable when one takes into account the fact that there is to be a presumption of "no retrospective effect" for the quashing, as some noble Lords have mentioned I say to my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich that I am not minded to look more favourably at this "no retrospective effect" power, because, as he rightly points out, the Court of Justice of the European Union has claimed, and sometimes exercised, such a power. I have less experience of that court than my noble friend Lord Anderson, but I have enough experience to know that its practices are far from a model to be copied I look forward to debating the Bill, Clause 1 and other points that have been raised with the Minister and other noble Lords in Committee.