Housing and Planning Bill — House of Lords, 2016-03-08
Topic: Housing
Robert Kerslake (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 59ZA, which proposes a new clause after Clause 63. We now move in earnest to the issue of financing the extension of right to buy. We have had a long debate about the extension of right to buy under the voluntary scheme for housing associations and we now consider how this will be financed. In moving this amendment, I should declare again my interest as president of the Local Government Association and chair of Peabody The issue we have been grappling with is that, whatever people may feel about the extension of the right to buy, there is deep disquiet, as we have heard from all parts of the House, about the mechanism for financing that extension. This is a crucial issue because it concerns a lot of people. Given a choice, everybody, including perhaps the Minister, would want to decouple these two policies that have been put together: the extension and the high-value sales. My amendment would enable that to happen without a huge additional burden on the government deficit My amendment would replace grant funding of the discount in voluntary right to buy with an equity loan. That equity loan would sit alongside the current right-to-acquire discount that is available for housing association purchases. The loan would be similar in kind to that of Help to Buy for private, newbuild sales: it would be a loan that stands behind the mortgage as security and is interest-free for five years, after which a lower rate of interest is paid. The right-to-buy loan would be funded by the Government. As we discussed in the last Committee day on this Bill, equity loans are regarded as financial instruments and therefore score as debt in the Government’s accounts but do not count towards the annual deficit, in contrast to direct funding from government. The coalition Government approved a budget of just under £10 billion to support Help to Buy up to the year 2020, so already a significant amount of money has been set aside to cover equity loans. In this instance, the equity loan would be up to the discount that is available under the current right-to-buy policy for local authority stock. Therefore, it would replace the grant funding that is currently proposed I put forward this amendment for the following reasons. First, under the current proposals, as a number of noble Lords have already said, a central government policy is being funded by a levy on local government. The recent report of the House of Commons DCLG Select Committee, an all-party committee, rightly took exception to this, arguing that if the Government want to do something, they should pay for it. Funding the discount in the way proposed in my amendment would address this issue: local government would no longer be required to fund a central government policy Secondly, the amendment would address the fact that, incredibly, even at this late stage, we do not have a set of numbers that add up in terms of the receipts that would be achieved, the replacement of local authority sales, the two-for-one policy in London, the funding of the discount as well as a contribution to the £1 billion brownfield regeneration fund. Indeed, an independent report from the Chartered Institute of Housing suggests that this is not possible. Shelter has calculated that there would be a shortfall of £2.45 billion in the financing. If it is correct that the numbers do not add up—as I have said, this late in the process, we still do not have a set of figures that demonstrate that they do—a number of things are likely to happen. First, demand may be managed through restricting eligibility. In the current pilot, a person has to have been a resident for 10 years. So the first potential option is to restrict demand by eligibility. The promise that people could have a "right" to buy will no longer be a right; it will be a right if they have lived in their property for 10 years. The second option for managing this imbalance in funding is essentially to have a policy of saying, "If we’ve run out of money for a given year, you can’t buy in that year, or even the year after", so there will be a waiting-list policy to make the sums balance. That is equally problematic as far as potential purchasers are concerned. A third option is for the levy on local authorities to be set high—higher than would truly be acceptable and eating not just into absolutely higher-value properties, as a number of noble Lords have said, but into relatively higher-value properties; in other words, into the very core of stock that becomes vacant for local authorities. So a third way in which demand might be managed is essentially by levying a very high sum that goes beyond what any of us would reasonably call high-value properties. The last option, which I suspect will form part of the policy, is that instead of local authorities being truly funded on a like-for-like basis, they will get a proportion of the value of the new property and will have to borrow the rest. In the current right-to-buy policy, that is a third—the proportion may or may not be the same. Local authorities will then need to borrow. One reason why a number of local authorities struggle with the replacement policy is that they do not have the borrowing capability within their caps I suggest to noble Lords that any one of these options will be problematic. If we restrain demand, we will cause very unhappy housing association tenants. If we put a huge charge on local authorities, we will denude them of even the very limited remaining capacity for re-lets they have on vacant properties. So we start with a policy where, at the moment, any analysis in the public domain that I have seen suggests that the numbers do not add up. The alternative of the equity loan would avoid this difficulty.