Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill — House of Lords, 2022-03-24
Topic: Energy
Martin Callanan (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debates. As all the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord McNicol, Lord Vaux, Lord Oates and Lord Stunell, are linked, I will address them together I start with those tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McNicol. As the noble Lord has described, the amendments seek to create an obligation for the Secretary of State to bring forward a list of foreign powers and entities that should not be allowed to invest in nuclear projects, and to use this as the basis for a new designation criteria under the Bill. I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment but, as the noble Lord will understand, I cannot agree to it for a number of reasons. The amendment is too broad; it does not specify the range of companies that it could cover or the reasons that a foreign power or entity could be included on a list, and the excluded activities are extremely wide—all participation in all projects. This is an extremely broad-brush approach which could severely affect our ability to bring in finance and to deliver new nuclear projects. We would expect the amendment to have a chilling effect on investment, ultimately leading to a higher cost for consumers In addition, I am concerned about the further impacts of the amendment. In the noble Lord’s explanation of the amendment, he mentions that the list should act "in a similar way to the Financial Action Task Force’s list of high-risk countries." However, the main focus of that list is to encourage enhanced due diligence in respect of these countries, rather than to provide an outright ban as this amendment seeks to do There is also an inconsistency between the amendment to Clause 2 and the proposed new insertion after Clause 3. While Clause 2 is targeted at preventing listed entities from having full or partial ownership of a nuclear company under the RAB model, the proposed new clause discusses barring entities’ involvement in the whole civil nuclear sector. If this wider approach were taken, it could limit our options for international co-operation on this sensitive issue, including obtaining technical advice By highlighting these problems, I do not suggest that I disagree with the sentiments behind the amendments. Indeed, as the noble Lord will know from the numerous discussions that I have had with him, the Government know that the protection of our national security must be the top priority. The Government already have strong oversight of foreign ownership in nuclear projects as a result of the NSI Act 2021, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, reminded us, which includes the ability to call in for assessment any qualifying acquisition if the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that it may give rise to national security concerns Importantly, certain acquisitions of entities operating in the civil nuclear sector require mandatory notification and clearance before the acquisition can be completed. This is set out in Schedule 4 to the notifiable acquisition regulations made under the Act, which specifically include entities which hold, or are in the process of applying for, a nuclear site licence or development consent under the Planning Act 2008 in relation to a nuclear reactor To provide an illustrative example, this means that if a new entity wanted to acquire over 25% of the shares in a nuclear project company, this would have to be notified to the Secretary of State and could not be completed until, or if, the Secretary of State agreed it. Indeed, the Secretary of State could require that the transaction was not progressed, assuming the relevant tests in the Act were satisfied. If the acquisition was completed without first being approved by the Secretary of State, or in breach of an order from the Secretary of State, it would be void and not legally effective.