Domestic Politically Exposed Persons: Money Laundering Rules — House of Commons, 2016-01-20
Topic: Law and Crime
Charles Ashley Rupert Walker (Conservative, Centre-right): It is a great honour and privilege to have secured tonight’s debate. I note that it follows on from the proceeds of crime debate, so it is both appropriate and timely It is a truism that international money laundering is a serious crime, and the UK Government are right to want to both persecute and prosecute those responsible. The legislation contained in both the third money laundering directive and the soon-to-be-introduced fourth directive is wide in its scope and is being aggressively applied by the banks. Although my debate deals specifically with politically exposed persons, my concerns can be more widely read across to the many law-abiding professional people in this country who are experiencing difficulties with their bank or in opening a new bank account In setting out the scene for tonight’s debate, I thought it would be helpful if I defined what a politically exposed person is in relation to the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. The regulations transpose the third money laundering directive into UK law. I will quote from the 2005 report of Joint Money Laundering Steering Group. This is a direct quote from its guidance: "Senior political figure is a senior figure in the executive, legislative, administrative, military or judicial branches of a government (elected or non-elected), a senior figure of a major political party, or a senior executive of a government-owned corporation. It includes any corporate entity, partnership or trust relationship that has been established by, or for the benefit of, a senior political figure Immediate family typically includes the person’s parents, siblings, spouse, children, in-laws, grandparents and grandchildren where this can be ascertained Close associate typically includes a person who is widely and publicly known to maintain a close relationship with the senior political figure and includes a person who is in a position to conduct substantial domestic and international financial transactions on his or her behalf." Those definitions are reflected in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which were introduced pursuant to the third money laundering directive 2005. Importantly, however, although banks are choosing to apply the legislation to holders of domestic UK office, these people are specifically excluded from its scope Schedule 2 to the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 defines a PEP as being an individual, including their immediate family members or associates "who is or has, at any time in the preceding year, been entrusted with a prominent public function by: (i) a state other than the United Kingdom; (ii) a Community institution; or (iii) an international body." It therefore specifically excludes Members of Parliament serving in the United Kingdom Parliament. In addition, the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group guidance for the UK financial sector states that the definition of a PEP used by banks "only applies to those holding…a position in a state outside the UK". However, UK banks have consciously chosen to adopt a broader definition of a PEP, which also includes customers who hold political office within the UK. Banks argue that this is desirable in advance of the introduction of the fourth money laundering directive, due to come into force in 2017, which, unless amended, will apply to domestic politically exposed persons The rules around money laundering are a mess. I know this; the Government know this; the Chair of the Treasury Select Committee knows this; and the principals of many small and medium-sized businesses in my constituency and in others know this. The position of the UK banking sector, in its aggressive application of money laundering rules to domestic politicians, to their extended families and—I now fear—more widely to many of our law-abiding constituents, is known, in banking parlance, as de-risking What are the practical consequences of de-risking? In regards to the teenage children of MPs, it amounts to intrusive demands for information. One 18-year-old was recently contacted by her bank demanding that she produce personal information or face losing her banking facilities. This demand included information about her occupation, her employer’s name and address, details of any residential addresses she used and how much time she had spent at each address and information about regular sources of funds, such as income, student loans and funds from her parents A Back-Bench colleague, who agreed to be interviewed by his bank, was required to answer questions about his account dating back 25 years. This colleague is yet to turn 50.