Smart Meters Bill — House of Commons, 2018-02-05
Topic: Energy
Alan Patrick Vincent Whitehead (Labour, Centre-left): My hon. Friend gives a very important qualification to that figure of 250. I must admit that when I heard that figure from the head of the DCC, it struck me as being pretty shocking in its own right. It is interesting, to say the least, to hear that the 250 figure is on the optimistic side, and that the number that are actually on the wall and working—in the homes of friends and family, as my hon. Friend says—is only about a third of that figure The slippage is reflected in the latest cost-benefit analysis, which is from last year. It shows the cost-benefit gap narrowing, at least in part because of the SMETS 1 and 2 hiatus. The analysis indicated a high spike in proposed installations at the end of 2019, with some 15 million meters needing to be installed at that point. That is a substantial shift in the predicted curve of installations, and an enormous increase in the rate of installations since the time of the 2014 cost-benefit analysis. Sticking by the timetable under these circumstances becomes fairly heroic. Perhaps it can be done, but it is clearly a daunting task That is the context in which the change in the date for Government oversight is important—the process of changing the date by which licensable activities will have ceased from 2018 to 2023. Whether or not it was a wholly wise idea, the 2004 and 2008 Energy Acts and subsequent regulations specified a date for licensable activities to end, which means that as things stand at the moment, the Government will have no control over what goes on after 2018. Everybody knows that we will still be at a relatively early stage of the roll-out in 2018, so it is impossible to conceive that it would be wise to continue with the original timetable. We therefore support the idea of specifying a more satisfactory date in the statute book The Bill specifies a date of 2023, but that does not appear to coincide with the Government’s publicly stated ambition for the end of the roll-out. I say that with caution, because while their statements about the roll-out have changed over time, they have always revolved around the idea of ending it in 2020, and there has been a lot of talk from the Government about the installation of 53 million smart meters by then. Indeed, the frequently asked questions page of the Smart Energy GB website states: "By the end of 2020, around 53 million smart meters will be fitted in over 30 million premises (households and businesses) across Wales, Scotland and England." That is also the basis on which Ofgem is working in terms of its licence enforcement. However, the Government have changed their position, as they now saying that, by the end of 2020, 53 million customers "will have been offered a smart meter" That is a very different proposition. We could interpret that as 53 million people being offered a smart meter by 2020, but only 10 million having them installed, although I assume that that is not what the Government mean. The statement might be meaningless or meaningful, depending on what happens before the end of 2020 and a variety of issues that will appear along the road. I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify those matters today. We surely cannot mean that the whole obligation for the roll-out would be discharged by doors being knocked on and someone saying something. If the smart meter installation programme is pursued on the basis of just making a desultory offer, the result will be way below the critical mass necessary for the overall aggregate data to work properly and lead to decent decisions. At that point, £11 billion or some such amount would have been wasted on nothing much The smart meter installation programme is voluntary. But, at the same time, we need a proportion—not 100%, but getting close to it—of smart meters installed in order to make the programme work by having worthwhile aggregated data. Some people have said that we need 70% of smart meters installed and others have said 80%; we need something to make the overall aggregated data significant. We clearly need to put a lot of effort into ensuring that the benefits of the programme are explained to the public The evidence suggests that the public overwhelmingly like smart meters when they are introduced and they want to have them in their homes. We therefore need to make a lot of effort over the given period to ensure that the two ends—the voluntary nature of the programme and the need for substantial roll-out—can be reconciled. What do we need to do that has perhaps not yet been done to ensure that the roll-out programme gets its output properly organised and smart meters installed? That is the purpose of new clause 4, which would require the Secretary of State to publish a report to keep us firmly on track. But, of course, much of the progress towards the target at the end of 2020 now depends on how SMETS 2 meters can be rolled out and how the DCC performs It was always necessary for the DCC to start its roll-out to enable smart meters that have been installed and those that will be installed to connect with it, and therefore to go live at the earliest possible date. However, the DCC systematically failed to go live when it should have done. It repeatedly announced delays and eventually went live in autumn last year under circumstances in which eyebrows were raised substantially by most of the industry. That was because it went live just before the point at which it would have faced penalties for not going live. It also only went live in part of the country and did not go live with some of its peripheral activities. Indeed, it is still having problems as far as its liveness is concerned. However, the DCC is not a stand-alone company. It was set up in order to run all these things and was then successfully auctioned out to a company that could drive it. And that successful bidder was Capita plc. As far as running the system is concerned, the DCC is effectively a subsidiary of Capita plc. The rest of the smart meter programme now crucially depends on this company. If we look at the timeline of what was supposed to have happened, we see that it presents a really sorry picture According to the joint industry level 1 plan, the start of the mass installation of SMETS 2 meters was supposed to be in October 2014, and the DCC was supposed to go live in December 2015. The then Secretary of State approved the DCC re-plan to go live on 1 April 2016, but received a contingency request from the DCC to delay going live until July 2016, and even then to split into core functionality and remaining functionality, which was not supposed to go live on the new date. A further contingency request was made by the DCC for a delay until August 2016, and there were even further contingency requests for delays. The DCC finally went live, in the way I have described, in October 2016. But it was actually only live for central and south England in November 2016 and went live for the north of the country later that month. The remaining functionality eventually went live, but not until 20 July 2017 I looked at the plans that were put forward when the DCC went live, and they were accompanied by pages and pages of so-called workarounds—that is, things that did not really work. That is still a problem today. A lot of the industry is saying that the DCC is not really live to the extent that it had anticipated, which remains a considerable problem for the end-to-end testing of SMETS 2 meters. That is why, among other reasons, there are currently only 250 or 80 on the wall, depending on whose figures are right.