United Kingdom Internal Market Bill — House of Lords, 2020-10-19
Topic: International Affairs
Patrick Lawrence (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, while listening to the many powerful speeches condemning part 5 of this Bill, I have wondered how the arguments in favour of these controversial provisions might be best presented. First, the phrase "breach of international law" is a loose expression, and the Minister in the Commons might well wish now that he had not used it. What is being contemplated here is better defined as a breach of an obligation arising under an international treaty, which is a better way in which to define the matter. This is a familiar contractual problem of quite a familiar sort: one party to the agreement wants to tear up certain provisions that it does not like Secondly, it is probably accurate to say that the contemplated breach is potential, not actual. The Constitution Committee concluded in paragraph 152 of its report that this is an open question. The actual breach may occur only if the power to disapply parts of the Northern Ireland protocol is exercised. Therefore, it can be argued that there is no current breach of a treaty obligation, only something rather less objectionable: the equivalent of a solicitor’s letter saying: "We intend to continue negotiating in good faith, but you need to know that we reserve all rights and, in particular, the right—if we have it—to tear up parts of the present agreement that we do not like, if it seems to us necessary to do so". This is close to being what English lawyers call a "repudiatory and anticipatory breach of contract", but it is probably on just the right side of the line Thirdly, Article 184 of the agreement requires both parties to use their best endeavours, acting in good faith, to negotiate the agreements referred to in the political declaration. That obligation should be read as being informed by the recitals to the Irish protocol. These repay careful reading. In particular, the parties affirm that the Good Friday agreement "should be protected in all its parts" There is ample scope for argument on what may follow from that. It may be argued, as the Government have already argued, albeit faintly and without particulars, that the EU has in various ways itself been in breach of this good faith obligation. Reserving the right to disapply certain provisions of the agreement at some future point is not properly characterised as an outrageous and unlawful threat to renege. It is something different— namely, making it clear that, if the EU persists in conduct which the UK regards as a breach of Article 184, the UK reserves its right to treat the agreement, or part of it, as terminated or suspended. That, it may be argued, is a right that exists under Article 60 of the Vienna convention, which provides that a material breach of a bilateral treaty entitles the innocent party to terminate the treaty or treat it as suspended, in whole or in part Fourthly, to move away from the law of contract, it might be said that dealings between the EU and the UK over the last four years have shown very clearly, that in zero-sum adversarial contractual negotiations, it is sometimes necessary to play with a hard ball. The speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, displayed hard-headed pragmatism which Mr Keynes surely would have admired. The noble Lord correctly observed that the most complex treaties involve constructive ambiguity and, often, a degree of what might be called "covert bad faith" Those are the arguments. I do not suppose that I have persuaded the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, with whose speeches I agree, and I have not come close even to persuading myself that Part 5 of the Bill is defensible. Clause 47 is an astonishing provision. In that respect, I listened with dismay to the Lord Chancellor’s recent answers to questions put to him by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The Government seem to be largely ignoring the details of exhaustive dispute resolution provisions in the agreement—in particular, in Article 168 —which makes it mandatory to use them. Theyhave not done much more than faintly to sketch a case that the EU has acted in bad faith; if they want to rely on that, they should set it out in detail. This is a very wobbly position from which to launch a case that the counterparty is acting in bad faith. In the absence of such a case, there is no legal justification for threatening to tear up part of the agreement. Accordingly, I regret Part 5 of the Bill, and add that, while this House must act in accordance with its perception of what the rule of law requires, it should also bear in mind the admonition of the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, that we risk weakening the hand of our negotiators.