argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Roy Kennedy (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, Amendment 50 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to amend the Bill to allow for a criminal conduct organisation to retrospectively authorise action if it was to save someone from harm. Clearly, the noble Lord speaks with considerable knowledge and experience from his time as a serving police officer. I have great respect for the work that he has done in the past, and I pay tribute to those brave officers whom the noble Lord referred to, who every day put themselves at risk of considerable harm to protect us and keep us safe, and who also work to turn people so that they become informants. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the whole question of child CHISs has been discussed, and we will return to it on Report. These are very serious issues So I see the point that the noble Lord is making, but we should not use this Bill, when it becomes law, to retrospectively authorise conduct. That would not be right. I see the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made, but on previous conduct we have a position now, and that must be the position going forward. I do not see this Bill being used for what the noble Lord seeks to do. I hope that the Minister when he responds will set out the Government’s thinking on this. I hope he will say that they do not support the amendment as it stands, because it would not be the right thing to do, but will set out carefully how the Government will address this issue in the future
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Richard Rosser (Labour, Centre-left): First, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, well in his campaign against skeleton Bills, as that issue is getting worse, not better The Bill provides that the Secretary of State may, by order, prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, Amendments 57 and 74, in his name, would remove those provisions and, as he confirmed, their purpose is to probe the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation Earlier in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, stated that the order-making provisions in the Bill "allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited." He continued: "I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards ... The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they are contained in secondary legislation."—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 676.] When the noble and learned Lord said that the order-making powers could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards, did the Government mean that the wording in the Bill would make it contrary to law to do that, or did they mean only that the intention was not to use the order-making powers to remove any of the existing safeguards? That, of course, is a very different thing, as intentions can change No doubt in their response the Government will address that point and give specific examples of the purposes or intentions for which these order-making powers to prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given would—and, equally, would not—be used by the Secretary of State.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Alfred Dubs (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, I support Amendment 63. I very much agree with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and my noble friend Lady Massey, so I shall be brief Like my noble friend, I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It seems to me that authorisation that goes beyond the police, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office and the intelligence services is a step too far. There has to be clear indication by the Government as to why such authorisations are necessary; so far, that indication has not been forthcoming. The list of agencies covered by this provision is so wide—not just Customs and Excise, the Environment Agency, the Food Standards Agency and many other bodies. There is no justification for extending the provisions of the Bill to that extent I am very concerned about one other matter. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights noted, under Section 35 of RIPA, the Secretary of State will have the power to make an order adding other public authorities to the list of those permitted to authorise covert criminal conduct. I accept that this power has been used sparingly in the past, but—[Inaudible.]—if additional authorities that have little or no relationship to those permitted to make CCAs—[Inaudible.]—regulatory oversight In a previous amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, indicated that using subordinate legislation to extend powers was going rather too far, and it applies in this instance as well. Surely, it is bad enough having a list of these bodies that—[Inaudible]—but adding to them in the future by a parliamentary process that allows for very limited scrutiny. We all know that subordinate legislation can go through, we cannot amend it and it is—[Inaudible]—because of our relationship with the Commons; therefore, this is potentially an abuse of power. For all those reasons, I support Amendment 63.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Shami Chakrabarti (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow all those who have spoken in this group. The size of the group and the number of speakers are indicative of the seriousness with which the length of the list of agencies is viewed by Members of the House. I thank the Minister for her fortitude and patience on this fourth day in Committee on this important Bill, and for her letter earlier today inviting Members of the House to further briefings I repeat that she has made the case for the value of putting this kind of policy on a statutory footing, and I do not think anyone is really disagreeing with that in principle. The problem is that the detail of the Bill, by accident or design, creates a real constitutional over- reach with a grave risk of what the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, called unintentional consequences. That is not to impute the Government with bad motives in this respect but it is to be really concerned about the unintended consequences of the overreach contained in various components of the Bill, in part because it grafts a criminal conduct regime on to what was previously just a surveillance regime, with no extra safeguards to speak of in terms of authorisation; in part because it creates no statutory limits on the types of offences that might be authorised; and of course in part because of this very long list of agencies that do very different work. Ultimately, I say that the real overreach which makes that combination of challenges particularly problematic is that what is at stake is that the status quo, whereby an authorisation leads to a public interest defence—in practice, almost a presumption that the person authorised would not be prosecuted—will be replaced with total landmark immunity, lawful for all purposes, civil and criminal. That is what makes the list of agencies and the ability to amend it by Henry VIII powers so very grave and ripe for abuse well into the future by a Government of any stripe, whether, as I say, by accident or design I ask the Minister to reflect on whether Amendment 63, which is my favourite in this group, can be considered for adoption by the Government. I ask the Government to reflect and adopt some constitutional humility rather than overreach, and to accept that we are genuinely trying to help to improve this legislation so that it can do what it needs to, which is to put criminal conduct on an open, accessible, primary legislative footing, but not create the graver dangers of abuse well into the future.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Richard Rosser (Labour, Centre-left): Two amendments in this group stipulate the action that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must take on becoming aware of unlawful or inappropriate conduct linked to a criminal conduct authorisation, or on becoming aware of an inappropriately granted or unlawful criminal conduct authorisation. I will listen with interest to the Government’s response to these two amendments A third amendment requires a review within six months by a High Court judge that would consider the grant of criminal conduct authorisations in relation to children or vulnerable people, the conduct of covert human intelligence sources, the oversight and monitoring of, and reporting on, such conduct, the oversight of persons allowed to authorise criminal conduct authorisations, and the sanctions available if they misuse those powers Under the terms of the Bill, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has the power to conduct investigations, inspections and audits, but would not appear—I will listen to what the Government say in response—to have the capacity to investigate every time a criminal conduct authorisation is used. The Commissioner also covers the use of the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations in the annual report, which must also be laid before Parliament but which may be redacted. Of course, we do not know how much the annual report will reveal in practice. As an annual report, it will be reporting a long time after any particular issues with criminal conduct authorisations may have arisen It is surely important to have as much transparency as possible in how, and in what kind of circumstances, covert human intelligence sources and criminal conduct authorisations are used and granted, since the powers and activities provided for in this Bill are considerable and potentially wide ranging. They have to be applied appropriately, and the greater the transparency that is possible, the more likely that is to be the case and the greater the public confidence in how the powers are being deployed, and with what objectives in mind The review referred to in Amendment 79, which would be laid before Parliament, would be one way of contributing to that transparency and ensuring public confidence. If the Government are not going to accept the amendment, I hope that in response they will indicate a willingness to look further at the powers, duties and role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to ensure that transparency in how and in what circumstances the powers given in the Bill are exercised is maximised as far as possible. I await the Government’s response.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Shami Chakrabarti (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, not for the first time in consideration of this Bill in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Ashley Abbots, comes to your Lordships’ House with an excellent amendment, a very good idea and an even better speech, which I cannot improve on. Transparency does influence conduct, and the information that he suggests ought to be included in reports speaks to common sense. We ought to know on a regular basis the number and nature of criminal conduct authorisations issued under the new legislation, the operational benefits that have been obtained from those authorisations and, crucially, the kind of damage to property and people—the incidental harm—that has come about as a result of those criminal conduct authorisations I do not want to labour the point—it has been a long Committee—but I want to have one final attempt at putting a question to the Minister to which I do not think I have yet heard the answer. This is my last opportunity to put this in Committee before we go forward to Report Why is it necessary to go further than the status quo in the scheme for this legislation? Why cannot undercover operatives, whether they are highly trained police or MI5 officers, or whether they are—and perhaps they are in greater number—members of the civilian community, including the criminal community, just be subject to the current law, which is that when they are authorised to do this work, including with criminal conduct, they will know that their conduct will be second-guessed after the fact? They currently have the ultimate incentive —and we have the ultimate safeguard—to behave proportionately and as well as possible, which is that they might, just possibly, if they over-step the mark, be subject to legal sanction after the event. That is the law that applies to uniformed police officers and people driving police cars and ambulances at high speed, with a very strong public interest defence. It is probably a presumption against prosecution, but it is that tiny risk of being judged after the fact that makes most people behave well according to the criminal law. Why should that be replaced with a total, advance and blanket immunity from prosecution and civil liability? Why quite go so far and therefore cause some of the greatest concerns that have been excited by this legislation I hope that the Minister will not mind me putting that fundamental, simple question one more time. I look forward to her answer, and indeed to our further work at the next stage of the Bill’s passage.
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Law and Crime
Richard Rosser (Labour, Centre-left): The purpose of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, is described as being to probe the adequacy of information provided to Parliament on criminal conduct authorisations and to probe the efficacy of the authorisations I think that this comes back to the issue of transparency. To be a little more particular, will we be told in advance, during the passage of the Bill, precisely what kind of information about criminal conduct authorisations will be provided to us and to the public by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the annual report or other reports? At the moment, I am not clear about what information will be provided and what it will cover, and whether it will give us a feel for what is happening over criminal conduct authorisations or whether we will be told that the information provided will be limited and that, on grounds of security, it cannot be disclosed. I hope that, at least in their response either to this amendment or on Report, the Government will be prepared to spell out what information will and will not be provided so that we all know where we stand on this issue.
UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: International Affairs
David George Clark (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, all Members of the House are aware that the Isle of Man lies half way between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, yet it has never been a member of the European Union in its own right and is not included in the UK membership of the EU. That relationship is dependent upon protocol 3 of the UK’s Act of accession. That protocol also allows the island to be part of the European Union customs area. Will the Minister double check—or indeed treble check—that the interests of the Isle of Man are covered by and included in this agreement?
UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Transportation
Anthony Gueterbock (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, today the House of Lords EU Goods Sub-Committee has written to Michael Gove, seeking information on government preparedness which, from the evidence the committee received—and I have the honour to be a member of it—appears to be hopelessly late, ineffective and failing on many fronts. The letter lists multiple concerns: IT, communications, transport, and many others. But can I press the Minister today to answer just one small, but very important, question mentioned in the letter? Will he commit the Government to placing toilets at regular intervals adjacent to the queuing lanes on the M20? Everybody thinks they will be needed—deal or no deal.
UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Environment
John Lawrence Whitty (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, the problems for Northern Ireland business are not solely those relating to the ports. For example, on Tuesday we debated an SI amending the REACH arrangements for the use of chemicals. It is clear that businesses both operating in and supplying Northern Ireland will have to engage in a dual process of registration in both the European and British systems. The arrangements announced today do nothing to ameliorate that. What help will the Government give to users of chemicals in Northern Ireland, and indeed in other regimes that require a duality of approach and therefore administrative costs to Northern Irish businesses?
UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement — House of Lords, 2020-12-10
Topic: Agriculture
Jeffrey Rooker (Labour, Centre-left): I am grateful to the Minister. To be honest, listening to him, I can hear that he is in an incredibly difficult situation with things moving outside the Chamber. I will confine myself to a single point. Northern Ireland will be treated differently—as it always has been—on the customs union and the single market, while it is out of the common agricultural policy, as the Statement says. My question is simple: what is the position of the rapid alert system for food and feed? Some eight to 10 notifications are issued per day around the European Union. How does Northern Ireland figure in RASFF? Is it out or will it be part of RASFF after 31 December, irrespective of whether there is a deal? Food production per head of population in Northern Ireland is far more significant than in England or, indeed, in Scotland, so it is an absolutely crucial issue for Northern Ireland industries. Will they be part of RASFF or not?
United Kingdom Internal Market Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-09
Topic: International Affairs
George Foulkes (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, I fear I will not match the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Adonis. I want to say a few words in support of the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who, like me, is a member of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee. In his introduction, the noble Lord, Lord True, praised my noble friend Lady Andrews and the work she and that committee are doing. If the Minister thinks that method is so good, why does he not accept these amendments, since that is exactly what we are suggesting—that it should be done through the kind of procedure that the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee is operating? He argued that case, perhaps without realising it, from the Dispatch Box Yesterday, I heard a very interesting debate. On one side of the argument was the importance of a level playing field for an internal market—I thought the United Kingdom Government were arguing that case in relation to what we are discussing—and on the other was sovereignty. I thought it might have been the Scottish or Welsh Governments arguing that case. Ironically, it was not. It was the European Union arguing the case for a level playing field for a common internal market and the United Kingdom Government arguing the case in relation to sovereignty. The tables were turned; the UK Government were arguing entirely the opposite case in relation to Europe that they argue in their dealings with the devolved authorities. It is about time they got their arguments right on this and accepted these amendments.
United Kingdom Internal Market Bill — House of Lords, 2020-12-09
Topic: International Affairs
Andrew Adonis (Labour, Centre-left): I am not sure how far I should follow the noble Baroness except by making a few obvious points. First, the Good Friday agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol were warmly welcomed in Northern Ireland; this is not being done to Northern Ireland against its will. These provisions are very warmly welcomed because the people of Northern Ireland see them as a guarantor of peace and stability there; this requires an open border with the Republic of Ireland, so I do not follow the noble Baroness on that point I also did not follow the noble Baroness when she said that the House of Lords was standing "in the way" of parliamentary sovereignty. We are part of Parliament and performing our functions as a part of it. In that respect, I pay great tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and—I never thought I would hear myself saying this—the noble Lord, Lord Howard, who have played an absolutely central part in the ability of this House to perform its proper constitutional role to see that the House of Commons is invited to reflect further on provisions that it believes are injurious to the public interest We have reached this point in a very convoluted way, because the Government changed their mind mid-way through the parliamentary process. However, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, likened the noble Lord, Lord True, to the prodigal son, and we welcome all those who have seen the error of their ways and repented. The process by which they do so is not significant; what is significant is the opportunity that this House gives to Parliament at large—including the Government, which operate as a part of Parliament—to consider its view on these big and important matters that are of concern to us. We have reached the right decision on this matter The only point I want to make is about the consequences because, as we now move forward, they are significant. To understand them, we need to understand why the Government did what they did. It was never my view that they intended these provisions to become law; they knew that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and a whole galaxy of the most heavyweight Members of your Lordships’ House would object to them—they knew that.