Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Commons, 2016-03-15
Topic: Law and Crime
David Michael Davis (Conservative, Centre-right): When I was listening to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) talking earlier about steaming open letters, I was reminded of the fact that, in 1929, the then American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, shut down the State Department’s code breaking department with the words: "Gentlemen do not read other gentlemen’s mail." That was quaint even then, and the action was quickly reversed. Today, everybody recognises the vital importance of targeted surveillance of dangerous criminals of all sorts I think everyone in this House wants to see our intelligence agencies and police forces equipped with effective measures that will help them to do their job. I do not think that there is any difference between us on that issue. However, the presentation of this Bill has required the Home Office publicly to avow a vast range of surveillance powers that to date have existed in secret. These powers seem to be rather greater than those used by our allies—certainly greater than those used by America or Germany. Some of them would have been struck down as unconstitutional in both those countries What seems to have happened is that these powers have been developed over the past 20 years using a vast thicket of existing legislation, largely without the knowledge of Parliament. Many of the agencies’ current capabilities were never considered when the legislation that underpins them was created. I can say with absolute certainty that that is true of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which as a Minister I took through Parliament. It was never envisaged, for example, that that legislation would provide for the acquisition of bulk personal datasets I could give the House many further examples, but time is short so I shall give a single example of how, with the best of intentions, the creep of surveillance has happened. It relates to the erosion of legal privilege. Until the late 1990s, when an intercept or bug was recording a criminal suspect, the bug was turned off the moment the suspect started talking to his lawyer. That is what used to happen; the position was absolutely clear. Then in 2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act was introduced. RIPA was silent on legal privilege. It was simply not mentioned in the Act at all. However, the Government of the day chose to interpret that silence as acquiescence that RIPA did allow for the surveillance of privileged communications. So we went from a situation in which recording equipment was switched off in those circumstances to one in which privileged conversations were recorded and kept in a separate, red-flagged database. That was how it worked. This matter eventually came out in 2009, when two Law Lords, Lord Phillips and Lord Neuberger, expressed their incredulity that the Government had in effect been "sanctioning illegal surveillance". At least in those initial stages, however, the illegally collected information was red-flagged and kept from being allowed to pervert the judicial process. Then, either during or before 2014, the rules were changed to allow the Government lawyers to see the intercepts. This is extremely dangerous to the operation of justice. It could destroy equality of arms, which in turn could undermine perfectly proper cases against terrorists, leading to their being freed on the basis of an improper prosecution That single example of the actions of the agencies and the Home Office is important in its own right, but I cite it here as a demonstration of what has been happening over the past 20 years. Owing to the difficulty of the counter-terrorism task and the opportunities afforded by technology, the agencies in particular, but also the police and other organisations, have quite understandably sought to extend their powers, using, in this case, the silence of RIPA to erode legal privilege. We have seen that again and again. We saw it in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which I mentioned, and in the Telecommunications Act of, ironically, 1984, which followed the decision to privatise British Telecom. That is why this Bill must be drafted incredibly precisely and carefully As it stands, the language in the Bill is designed to confuse. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, a previous Home Secretary, and I were talking about this and both of us had trouble understanding its 250 pages. That must be put right and that is why I am concerned about the Report stage. There are many other significant flaws in the Bill that must be put right, such as the lack of sufficient privacy protections, the collection of ill-defined bulk personal datasets, wide and too-easy access to retained communications data, the prime ministerial appointment of judicial commissioners—it goes on and on. I have about a dozen items here, but I do not intend to go through them all In my final couple of minutes, I want to touch on the bulk capabilities. The House should be under no misapprehension as to how broad and potent the powers are, even though the Chairman of ISC, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is quite right to say that the agencies do try to be as economical as they can in using them. The powers allow for the interception of vast quantities of foreign and domestic communications and the acquisition of the entire nation’s phone and internet records, and permit industrial-scale exploitation of phones and computers. The fundamental question is whether those powers are effective In the US, the bulk collection of citizens’ data has been heavily curbed as it was considered to be "not essential to preventing terrorist attacks" Most damningly, the American President’s privacy and civil liberties oversight board said that it was "aware of no instance in which the" NSA’s bulk records programme "directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack." There are genuine concerns that the collect-it-all approach actually makes things worse, which goes back to the point about Bill Binney referred to by the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick). I say this to the House and to the ISC: the Senate intelligence committee, the ISC’s more powerful equivalent in the US, was initially persuaded that bulk data collection had prevented over 50 terrorist attacks. The staff of the Senate judiciary committee then went through the claims one by one and found only one case, and it was not a terrorist attack but an $8,000 money laundering case. That is how useful the powers were and that is why they have been curbed This Bill, or something like it, is absolutely necessary. It replaces 66-plus other statutory mechanisms, so, in the interests of transparency, we need something to put in their place, but it grants sweeping powers with insufficient safeguards and not enough consideration of privacy. I ask all parts of the House to press for more time on Report to allow for reasonable amendments to the legislation that will put in place a world-standard law I will finish on this point. Other countries, in particular the most unpleasant ones, are always happy to use Britain as an example for something that they should not be doing. That is why I opposed 90-day detention and many other illiberal things that too many Governments have done.