Hong Kong — House of Lords, 2019-10-24
Topic: International Affairs
David Clive Wilson (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I come at the end of a long list of distinguished speakers. Two things are evident from that. In your Lordships’ House there is great personal experience of Hong Kong—people who have lived there and people who have worked there. There is also a universal affection for Hong Kong and its people, and there is universally deep concern about what has been happening there over the past few weeks. That can surely be no surprise. There were weeks of demonstrations, which started peacefully, with a majority of young people who were clearly well-intentioned and concerned about their own future. They were possibly not well informed about what they might reasonably achieve, but they had good intentions. There was then an increasing amount of violence. That is distressing to see, and not at all the way in which Hong Kong usually acts. It will be totally counterproductive and should not be tolerated There has been no occurrence of that degree of violence in Hong Kong that I can think of for some 50 years: in 1967, during the Cultural Revolution, there was serious violence. Then, the Hong Kong police behaved with great steadfastness. At the end of that year, so well had they behaved that they were given the accolade of being called the Royal Hong Kong Police There has been a good deal of criticism of the police recently, some of which your Lordships have shared. I noticed that my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe could see how difficult it is to carry out such operations and probably how mistakes could be made. Such mistakes need to be remedied, but it is worth remembering not only that the police have been under enormous strain week after week, weekend after weekend, but that their families have also been threatened—their children going to school have been threatened—and their position has been extremely difficult I think it is clear enough that all of what has been going on is a consequence not just of the so-called extradition Bill, or the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, as it is properly called. That has been widely misunderstood. I think that a majority of those taking part in the demonstrations sincerely believed that they might be picked up for something that they had said about the Chinese leadership and sent to mainland China for trial Of course, it was for extradition for alleged offences in mainland China, not picking up somebody who had allegedly done something in Hong Kong. The people who were, in a way, rightly concerned were business people going into China who feared that there might be some artificial accusation against them by rivals that would enable there to be a demand for them to be extradited to China. It was an ill-conceived measure; it was in the "too difficult" box, to put it mildly, and was not a sensible idea to put forward What it showed was that there was a great pile of dry timber in Hong Kong. The extradition Bill was the light that set that on fire, and it has remained on fire. Noble Lords have referred to a number of the concerns that young people have about housing, job opportunities and their freedoms, and simply what will happen to them in the future and whether they will lose some of the privileges that they have at the moment. Behind a lot of that has been a growing concern and worry about the extent of mainland China’s involvement in Hong Kong. It is not a simple issue. My impression is that what tends to happen is that, when there is a period of confusion in Hong Kong and uncertainty about what is happening, all sorts of different organisations in mainland China send their representatives into Hong Kong to find out what is happening—and to influence what is happening, if they can. That begins to build up into a picture of much greater involvement in Hong Kong than should be the case At the time of the signing of the joint declaration, there was a strapline, or a slogan that was often put out from Peking: "gang ren zhi gang", which I will translate as, "Hong Kong people running Hong Kong". That seems to me to be an admirable objective. That was what it was said would be the future of Hong Kong after the implementation of the joint declaration and the transfer of sovereignty. But it needs the Hong Kong Government to be effective in what they are doing, the Hong Kong Legislative Council to be effective in backing up or questioning the Hong Kong Government, a mechanism for putting into effect laws and decisions, and for the Hong Kong people to show that they are capable of running Hong Kong. It is now more than 22 years since Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty. It is now a special part, a unique part—but a part nevertheless, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said—of the People’s Republic of China There have been a number of references made by noble Lords to the joint declaration. My impression, like that of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, is that the only clear-cut case of the breaking of the joint declaration has been the bookseller in Hong Kong, Lee Bo, who was, without doubt, taken out of Hong Kong without legal process; he was kidnapped and taken to China. It would be interesting if the Minister could say whether the British Government think that there have been other straightforward occasions of the breaking of the joint declaration It is worth saying that, although it is possible to say, as some Chinese officials have said, that the joint declaration is no longer applicable, that is only the case if you refer to the joint declaration as being just that bit that says that Britain will return to China sovereignty over Hong Kong. The vast bulk of the joint declaration is in its annexes, which lay down in terms the policies of the People’s Republic of China towards Hong Kong for 50 years. That is where what that means is written down precisely and in great detail. Those are Chinese policies laid down there. That remains applicable; it cannot not remain applicable I will revert, if I may, to our own role. Since we no longer administer—