argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Macroeconomics
Antoinette Geraldine Sherratt (Sandbach) (Conservative, Centre-right): I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. We are told by the Treasury Front Bench that these are existing rights which apply now, and that they are rooted in legislation from before the European Court. Given that those are rights that are applied now, why does she not wish to protect them and ensure that they continue?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Theresa Anne Villiers (Conservative, Centre-right): That was certainly the stated intention when the charter was originally drafted, but the judicial activism of the ECJ has seen the scope of the charter expanded. Essentially, what we are talking about is the division of power between our courts and our legislature. I do not believe that we have the national consensus to deliver such a significant change to our constitution as to enable our domestic courts to strike down our laws.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Theresa Anne Villiers (Conservative, Centre-right): Of course, the key expansion as far as the United Kingdom is concerned was the confirmation by the European Court of Justice in the Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson case that the charter did actually apply to the United Kingdom and that the opt-out that was supposedly obtained by Tony Blair was not valid That brings me to my final reason for scepticism about the charter and the amendments. I was an MEP during the period when the charter was drafted in the EU constitutional convention with a view to inserting it in the abortive EU constitution.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Charles Geoffrey Cox (Conservative, Centre-right): It does make sense, because all that does is restore us to a position pre 2009 in the European Union. The general principles will still apply. There is no inconsistency by allowing the general principles—subject to amendments, which I am not speaking on; I have some sympathy with the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield —but I am convinced that incorporating the charter would be wrong and unwise. As a matter of policy, I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends and Opposition Members not to vote for that.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Anna Mary Soubry (Conservative, Centre-right): There is genuine concern across this House about this matter, because it cannot be right that people cannot raise a claim on EU law "retrospectively", as the hon. Lady puts it. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) has raised this problem, so I hope the Government will examine it and come up with proposals that will satisfy this concern from right across the House.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Oliver Letwin (Conservative, Centre-right): Oddly enough, I was going to say that, so I will not do so now. I agree with that. While we are at it, I hope that the Solicitor General will also tell us that paragraph 3(1) of schedule 1 will be similarly adjusted, because, clearly, we need the same principle to apply to a private right of action as applies to the quashing of an enactment. Provided that those changes are made, I think that the basic articulation of clause 5 and schedule 1, unlike clause 6, is in reasonably good shape and therefore I hope that, as well as the very splendid offer of a full analysis of the rights, we will get a very clear statement from the Minister about the kind of amendments that will be brought forward on Report. That would certainly make me more than willing to support the Government tonight.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Mark Gino Francois (Conservative, Centre-right): This situation has evolved over a number of years, and it continues to do so. I do not want to introduce too much of a partisan element into the debate, but I want to give an example of how the situation has changed over the past few years. When we debated the Lisbon treaty in this House in 2008—something that I was actively involved in at the time—the policy of the then Labour Government was that the charter should not be justiciable in the United Kingdom’s courts. In fact, the then Government were at great pains to stress—
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Dominic Charles Roberts Grieve (Conservative, Centre-right): I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. While the Government have made an argument that there is a problem because of the international law aspect in such a piece of litigation going all the way to the European Court of Justice, there can be no argument that the same rules that applied when we were in the EU should apply to any such piece of litigation, even if the end-stop is our own Supreme Court. It is perfectly easy to do, and the Bill has to be altered to allow that to happen.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Robert James MacGillivray Neill (Conservative, Centre-right): I think the most important principle is legal certainty. It may well be very sensible for us to start to remove, as soon as possible, bits of retained law that we do not want to keep, but it seems to me to be equally implausible to retain something without following through on the logic from whence it comes. I recognise my hon. Friend’s point, but the issue, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) pointed out, is one of the Bill’s own making. I hope that the Government will table an amendment—before the Report stage—to remove these internal contradictions sooner rather than later. I think we all want to be in the same place, but justice requires not only independence of the courts but a proper framework in which it can operate. Above all, it requires certainty. The Bill as it stands runs the risk of creating uncertainty, and that cannot be in anybody’s interest I have been struck by the tone of the responses we have had from the Government Front Bench so far, but it is really important to stress that this is a matter of very significant principle. We wish to give the Government the best possible fair wind. I have no doubt whatever about the intentions, credit and integrity of the Solicitor General, who will reply to the debate shortly. What he says will weigh very heavily with many of us. I am sure he will do something that is constructive and helpful, and will help to improve the Bill. This is an important point that I wish to put on the record, because if there is not something of that kind, we will have to return to the issue as the Bill progresses. I hope that that will not be necessary. I believe it will not be necessary, but it is important to stress how fundamentally significant it is. These matters may seem technical, but they are vital to the underpinning of a sound piece of proposed legislation going forward.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): If I may, I will move on to amendment 10, which would remove paragraphs 1 to 3 from schedule 1. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) earlier drew the attention of the Committee to these important matters, and I am grateful to him for the constructive way in which he has sought to approach this issue. First, we cannot agree to the removal of paragraph 1 because the effect would be to create huge uncertainty. How would our domestic courts approach the task of assessing challenges to the validity of converted law? That is a job that they have never had before. Who would defend those challenges? What remedies would be available to the courts? How could converted law that was found to be invalid be replaced? The amendment does not deal with any of those vital questions Similarly, we cannot accept that paragraph 2 should be removed from the schedule. There is no single definitive list of the general principles. They are discovered and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Paragraph 2 in its current form maximises certainty by specifying a clear cut-off point and stating that a general principle needs to have been recognised by the Court before we exit. Without that, it would be completely unclear which general principles could be used as the basis for a challenge. It is not even clear whether post-exit CJEU jurisprudence could be taken into account, and so whether new principles couldbe discovered after exit. That would be completely inappropriate.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Dominic Charles Roberts Grieve (Conservative, Centre-right): I would like gently to point out that I did not propose deleting the interpretation provision 5(2). Admittedly, it does not interpret anything because the rest is gone, but it nevertheless made it pretty clear that we were talking about retained EU law and that such law was created prior to the date of our exit.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): I think that my right hon. and learned Friend has answered his own point. Without sub-paragraph (2), paragraph 5(2) becomes rather difficult to apply. I want to get to the nub of his concern, however, which is paragraph 3 of the schedule. We recognise the strength of the views that he and other Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed on this issue, many of whom have spoken this afternoon. We are listening, and we are prepared to look again at this issue to ensure that we are taking an approach that can command the support of the Committee Simply removing paragraph 3 in its entirety, however, is not something that we could agree to. It would result in an open-ended right of challenge based on the general principles of EU law, however they are defined, after exit. It would mean that domestic legislation, both secondary and primary, rules of law and executive action could be disapplied or quashed if found to be incompatible with those actions. Currently, the general principles apply when a member state is "acting within the scope of EU law", so after exit the circumstances in which the general principles could be relied upon would not be clear Allowing courts to overturn Acts of Parliament, outside the context of EU law, on the basis of incompatibility with these principles would be alien to our legal system and would offend against parliamentary sovereignty.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Kenneth Clarke (Conservative, Centre-right): We are making some progress, but I point out that I am the second name on the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and I shall inquire of the Chair between now and the end of the debate whether I have a right to call for a vote on those amendments, which I think I may have. I am extremely glad to hear the Solicitor General say that he will bring forward a Government amendment, because he has vigorously rejected just about every argument that my right hon. and learned Friend has used throughout the debate and has stuck rigidly to the interpretation of the Bill as it stands—with which we started. Will the Government’s amendment at least seek a compromise if it does not move completely towards my right hon. and learned Friend’s arguments? It is no good fobbing us off with more discussion if the amendment will not actually change the policy.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): With respect to my right hon. and learned Friend, I have talked in detail about the various paragraphs of schedule 1, and I have been looking in particular at paragraph 3. In response to the clarifications sought by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), I made sure that all of paragraph 3 would be the subject of that clarification and the tabling of an amendment. Neither my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe nor I are fans of having our cake and eating it when it comes to EU withdrawal and, with respect, I am offering something substantial here that will certainly satisfy him this evening.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Government Operations
William Nigel Paul Cash (Conservative, Centre-right): I hope that the Solicitor General will be good enough to look at the deficiencies in amendment 10. Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 deals with interpretation and therefore also applies to paragraphs 1 to 3. As he quite rightly said before he took the intervention, the matter is being scrutinised. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, we have it on our agenda, and we are scrutinising all such matters and will continue to do so, because we want to be sure that this House is not overridden by disapplication.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): I make it clear that, in the words of both the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, today and, previously, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, we are seeking to publish such details. If there are any further concerns, we can have a continuing dialogue to ensure that the information is in a comprehensive form that seeks to address the issues raised today and elsewhere. The publication on 5 December will therefore be a meaningful event that assists everybody in greater understanding and assists greater progress on getting this process right On the question of general principles, I emphasise that there are good reasons to say why it would not be appropriate to incorporate the constitutional and administrative principles of the EU as free-standing principles in our law by inserting a specific right of action, or to incorporate the remedy of striking down domestic legislation based on incompatibility with EU law principles, when we are no longer a member of that institution. First, some of these principles will, indeed, cease to make sense when we have left, except for the purpose of interpreting retained EU law, whereas other principles are already, and will continue to be, reflected elsewhere in our domestic law anyway.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Dominic Charles Roberts Grieve (Conservative, Centre-right): Has not the Solicitor General, again, just answered his own question? I appreciate that some of the general principles will evaporate because they cease to be relevant, but those that are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law must still be relevant because they will be used as a tool and aid to interpretation. In those circumstances, why should an individual or a business be deprived of raising them as arguments for saying that, in fact, this law is supposed to be supreme, and therefore able to overcome our own domestic legislation, and ask why the general principles cannot be used to have that bit of offending domestic legislation set aside? I just do not understand the rationale.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): The rationale is quite straightforward in the sense that, in seeking to achieve maximum certainty, there is danger in allowing the system to create a situation in which the law might rapidly degrade in a way that does not achieve such stability and certainty. I accept it is almost reverse logic, but there is logic in trying to make sure that we have an identifiable and pretty understandable body of retained EU law I give the example of the EU principle of good administration, which will not have any relevance to our UK law after exit because, of course, the bodies vested in EU agencies will be returned here and all the normal domestic rules about the exercise of such powers by public bodies will apply. Another example is the principle of subsidiarity, which does not make sense outside the concept of EU membership Secondly, the Bill will, of course, take a snapshot of the law as it stands at the moment we leave. Retaining a right of action based on general principles of EU law, which will of course change in the future, would lead to uncertainty for businesses and individuals about their rights and obligations if we end up in a situation where pre-exit legislation could be struck down, or where administrative decisions could be challenged, on the basis of those principles In other words, that is an echo of what I was just saying to my right hon. and learned Friend. This is particularly the case given the uncertainty about the way in which principles could develop or about the circumstances in which they would apply after exit. It would make no sense to bind ourselves to such an imprecise, open-ended and uncertain set of principles—it does not mitigate legal uncertainty, but increases it. It makes no sense, once we are no longer an EU member state, to bind ourselves to a set of principles that are the EU’s judge-made constitutional principles, when we have our own constitutional and common-law principles. Such an approach risks duplication and confusion Perhaps more fundamentally, outside the context of EU law, the ability for courts to disapply primary legislation is just inconsistent with the way our constitution works and the balance of powers that has to exist between the legislative and judicial branches.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Victoria Grace Ford (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank the Solicitor General for saying that he is going to look seriously at these points during the Committee stage. The point of bringing EU law into the UK law is to give certainty. Each of those European regulations has strict articles—the letter of the law—and the recitals, which give guidance as to how it is to be interpreted and implemented. Will he assure me that he will seek to ensure that our judges will look at not only the articles, but the recitals—the principles behind it?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): I can assure my hon. Friend that that will be the case. We had a debate about this in a slightly different context earlier in Committee, but I can assure her that all that material is relevant for any court that might have to interpret it.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): The hon. and learned Lady has a keen memory and she will not have forgotten the Government’s commitment to a separate withdrawal agreement Bill, within which will be provisions relating to the implementation, the interim, the transition period— call it what you will. It is to that period that the Prime Minister was addressing her remarks. The fact that this Bill is taking a particular course on legal exit is nothing to do with the transition period, which has to be a separate matter, and the Government have rightly made it clear that they will bring legislation to this House in order for it to determine the law when it comes to the transitional period I really must press on now. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) made the most important reference to the data protection amendment that stands in his name, but the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara) also spoke well about this. Let me just make these observations: the UK does not have to be subject to the charter in order to benefit from adequacy decisions on data protection once we leave the EU, because the charter applies to EU institutions and EU member states when acting within the scope of EU law. Countries that benefit from adequacy are third countries and are not required to be subject to the charter. There are many examples of countries that have adequacy by virtue of the data protection directive of 1995, including Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, Argentina and the Faroe Islands I must also deal briefly with the further effects of amendments 101 and 336, which specifically seek to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill to include principles as they are recognised in any EU legislation as well as case law.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Environment
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): I am sorry but I must press on. The first point to make on the amendments is that whereas some of the general principles are now set out expressly in the EU treaties, the general principles were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They were and are judge-made law, and all the principles ultimately have a basis in case law We debated the inclusion of article 191 of the Lisbon treaty on the functioning of the European Union at length on day two of Committee, so I will not repeat those arguments here. That said, though, I wish to re-state that the inclusion of article 191 would risk going further than the existing principles that are set out in EU and UK law today. The requirements that the amendments set out do not exist today in either EU or domestic law. If the amendments were made, they would require the courts to interpret all legislation compatibly with the environmental principles. Given that the Bill’s purpose is to bring into effect the law that we have currently, the amendments regrettably risk generating a measure of uncertainty and a degree of confusion about the legal position.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: International Affairs
Anna Mary Soubry (Conservative, Centre-right): May I return to clause 5(1)? It states: "The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day." Will the Solicitor General please look at that in light of the Government’s excellent determination that we will still effectively be subject to the ECJ during the beginning of the transition period, because if that is to be the case, it is not consistent with clause 5(1)?
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Robert James Buckland (Conservative, Centre-right): No, I will not give way, as I need to develop my point For example, in 2015, in their legal challenges to the domestic legislation standardising the packaging of tobacco products, the tobacco companies reserved their right to claim Francovich damages should they succeed on the substance of their claims against the Government. I make this point because any suggestion that removing the Francovich procedure reduces access to justice for the average citizen is not reflected in the UK experience.
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Commons, 2017-11-21
Topic: Law and Crime
Dominic Charles Roberts Grieve (Conservative, Centre-right): I am very grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. I understand everything that he is saying. He knows what I have said about Francovich damages and their disappearance being inevitable, but the point about the transition is key. I have to say to him that it is not a comfortable argument for a Law Officer of the Crown to make to suggest that just one person, or one business, being deprived of a legal right is an acceptable circumstance, because it plainly is not.