Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill — House of Lords, 2018-12-17
Topic: Law and Crime
Elspeth Howe (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, in introducing Amendment 46, I would like to put on the record my thanks to the Minister for the very useful meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I had with her at the beginning of the month. As a result of that meeting, I have decided not to re-table one of my Committee stage amendments. However, I think it is important to revisit the concerns I addressed in Committee through my Amendments 89 and 91, hence why I am speaking to Amendment 46 today. The basic problem addressed by my amendment is that the guidance documents that are likely to inform the implementation of the duties set out under Section 36 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, as amended by Clause 19 of the Bill before us today, uphold an inconsistent approach to the crucial question of whether—and if so, when—considerations regarding non-violent extremism are relevant The wording of Section 36 is very clear that it requires local authorities to assess whether people are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Section 36 does not ask for an assessment to be made regarding whether people will be drawn into any other activity and, specifically, no reference is made to non-violent extremism. In this context, there must be a concern that any suggestion in the guidance that these panels should assess people for anything other than the risk of being drawn into terrorism would involve their acting beyond the parent legislation At this point, some might say, "So what? If a Section 36 panel assesses and sanctions interventions relating to people who engage in extremism as well as terrorism, is that such a bad thing?" To my mind, it all depends what you mean by "extremism". If you mean violent extremism, this clearly falls within the parameters of terrorism and Section 36. Clearly, making an intervention at that point is wholly justified. However, extremism is a potentially much wider concept than violent extremism and is very much a subjective reality in the eyes of the beholder. One person’s extremism will be another’s common sense and vice versa Part of the genius of the British political tradition over centuries has been its capacity to make room for people with different world views, some of them more peculiar than others. In this context, it is vital that the guidance that informs the application of Section 36, as amended by Clause 19, does not encourage local authorities to stray into a general assessment of extremism in the round, because this clearly overreaches what is mandated by the legislation and because we must jealously guard our commitment to free speech In highlighting this concern, I am not arguing that there is an absolute divide between violent and non-violent extremism, such that it is not legitimate to consider non-violent extremism in implementing Section 36. The proper relationship between non-violent extremism and terrorism for the purposes of Section 36 has been set out very clearly by Mr Justice Ouseley in his judgment in the 2017 case of Mr Salman Butt. He says that intervention on the basis of Section 26, and thus clearly by implication Section 36, can be only in response to, "active opposition to fundamental British values", which, "must in some respect risk drawing others into terrorism before the guidance applies to it. If there is some non-violent extremism, however intrinsically undesirable, which does not create a risk that others will be drawn into terrorism, the guidance does not apply to it" In other words, non-violent extremism is a relevant consideration only to the extent that it creates a risk that others will be drawn into terrorism. Non-violent extremism that does not sustain this relationship to terrorism is not engaged A number of counterarguments have been made in response to my highlighting these concerns. In the first instance, it has been said that the Prevent duty guidance and counterterrorism guidance are not relevant because the guidance that had been specifically developed for implementing Section 36 is the Channel duty guidance. I accept that the Channel duty guidance has been specifically drafted with Section 36 in mind. I expect that local authorities would turn to this in the first instance. What I do not think stands up to scrutiny, however, is the suggestion that local authorities will not consult other guidance documents. I will not repeat everything I said on this in Committee, but I remind the House that the Channel guidance encourages its readers to look at the Prevent duty strategy and the counterterrorism strategy under the heading "Other Useful Guidance" In the second instance, it has been suggested that the Channel duty guidance, the Prevent duty guidance and the counterterrorism strategy all adopt a clear and consistent approach to the relationship between terrorism and non-violent extremism, such that one can be confident that there will be no confusion about when, on the basis of Section 36, it is appropriate for a local authority to intervene. I have acknowledged that parts of these documents are clear on this question. My difficulty is that other parts are far from clear, and this is leading to confusion For instance, in the Prevent duty strategy, the glossary definition of extremism does not depend on any necessary connection to terrorism. It says that for the purpose of the strategy, extremism is, "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our Armed Forces, whether in this country or overseas" Although there is a reference to calling for the death of members of the Armed Forces, that is not necessary to fulfil this definition of extremism, and so it does not reflect what the law says as set out by Mr Justice Ouseley The counterterrorism strategy, meanwhile, provides a definition of terrorism specifically for the Channel programme that is completely beyond Mr Justice Ouseley’s definition of the law. Paragraph 124 of the strategy states: "Channel is … run in every local authority in England and Wales, and addresses all types of extremism" The suggestion that Channel interventions can be made with respect to all types of extremism clearly suggests that this provides a basis for intervention in relation to non-violent extremism where there is no relationship to violent extremism and terrorism The Channel duty guidance is also confused. Part 4 makes the necessary connection to terrorism very clear. It states: "Preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist and non-violent ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology" In other words, content that the state deems extreme but is itself non-violent must be connected with terrorism in that it must be part of terrorist ideology to be a relevant consideration. However, paragraph 5 then uses a different definition of extremism, in which there is no necessary connection with terrorist ideology. This seems to open the door to anything the state deems extreme without needing to be part of a terrorist ideology. This confusion is further reflected in the more detailed definition of what extremism is that is provided in paragraph 51, where again we see no necessary connection to terrorism The lack of any consistent clarity about when consideration of non-violent extremism is appropriate in discharging Section 36 responsibilities with respect to terrorism is a real problem, because the resulting confusion is impacting on practice, as noted by Mr Justice Ouseley in paragraph 29 of his judgment. Here he is not simply saying that he thinks there is a risk of confusion. He is saying that he is encountering that confusion as people misapply a felt obligation to prevent people being drawn into non-violent extremism. The paragraph says: "However often that phrase is used, it starts, in my judgment, from a fundamental misreading or misunderstanding of the guidance. The guidance is about the s26 duty; it is therefore about preventing people being drawn into terrorism through non-violent extremism. Non-violent extremism which carries no risk of drawing people into terrorism is not subject to the guidance. Once the risk is established that a non-violent extremist does pose such a risk, the guidance applies. It is not at issue that preventing people being drawn into terrorism is a legitimate aim".