Welfare Reform and Work Bill — House of Lords, 2015-12-14
Topic: Social Welfare
Colin MacKenzie Low (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 62. At Second Reading I spoke about two issues that had been highlighted for me by my work as chair of an independent commission which had been considering the future of advice and legal support on social welfare law in England and Wales: how to protect the most vulnerable from the worst effects of sanctions, and how claimants might get the advice and support they need to adjust to the changes brought about by welfare reform legislation. Amendment 58 deals with the first of these and Amendment 62 with the second Operational guidance has been developed over a number of years to build some minimum safeguards into the application of conditionality-based decision-making—for example, in dealing with claimants with serious mental health problems or cognitive impairments. It has been evolved in a piecemeal fashion around certain minimum requirements covering, in broad terms: the identification of claimants with mental health conditions or a background of mental illness and liaison with social and mental health services, with such cases referred to a higher managerial decision-maker before a benefit withdrawal decision is made; the requirement for the DWP to consider any good cause as to why a claimant may not have met a particular condition; and a requirement for the DWP to attempt to contact the claimant, conduct a face-to-face discussion about the conditionality and, if necessary, arrange a home visit if they do not accept that good cause Welfare reform legislation and new policy on sanctions since the 2012 Act in particular has complicated matters, although the same guidance on minimum requirements carries over to a significant extent. The guidance is, however, piecemeal and scattered over several different operational guidance manuals, each with subtle differences in language and terminology, leading to application and practice that is far less consistent than it should be. Overall, this has meant that the guidance is weaker in its application to new JSA claims—in fact, there is no JSA-specific guidance—universal credit claimants and clients of Work Programme providers Welfare rights workers can also point to numerous cases where the DWP has failed to apply safeguards correctly, especially following ESA work capability assessments. The consequences for vulnerable claimants can be devastating. In its inquiry on benefits sanctions beyond the Oakley review, the Work and Pensions Select Committee concluded that: "Given the complexity of the existing legislation, there is a strong case for a review of the underpinning legislative framework for conditionality and sanctions, to ensure that the basis for sanctioning is clearly defined, and safeguards to protect vulnerable groups clearly set out" The Select Committee further recommended strengthening and clarifying guidance around the protocols and purposes of home visits or core visits. It also recommended better guidance on vulnerability specifically directed to Jobcentre Plus staff in identifying vulnerable JSA claimants, including those with mental problems and learning difficulties who may face difficulties in understanding and/or complying with benefit conditionality I have a number of cases that illustrate the need for a stronger legal framework to protect vulnerable claimants in situations where they potentially face sanctions. Given the time, I will mention only one, but it graphically makes the point. Mr D had his ESA stopped after failing to attend a work capability assessment. The DWP was aware of his history of mental ill health and that he was receiving support from his local NHS mental health service. However, it did not carry out safeguarding procedures and did not attempt to contact his local NHS mental health service to find out more about the risks to Mr D’s health if his income were to be stopped. After benefit was stopped, Mr D’s mental health deteriorated and he became suicidal. His psychiatrist assessed that the benefits stopping was a stressor that put Mr D at severe risk of suicide. Mr D was assisted in contacting the advice service by his psychiatric nurse. After the advice service challenged the DWP on its handling of the case, benefit was reinstated and Mr D was placed in the support group of ESA Amendment 58 would address the state of the guidance and the recommendations of the Select Committee by inserting a new clause in the Bill which would provide a clear statutory underpinning and codification for all safeguarding procedures and guidance; put all the guidance in one place, which should make it more accessible, user-friendly and easier for professionals to use; require consistency and robustness of application, especially consistency between new and legacy benefits systems; and require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the operation of the safeguarding procedures. As the language used in the amendment is drawn from existing guidance—for example, as regards the approach to vulnerability—it does not attempt to impose a higher threshold of safeguarding requirements in relation to conditionality but rather to ensure that existing standards are made more effective, consistent and transparent. The amendment is therefore consistent with the scope of the Bill, and the 2012 Act and its predecessor legislation Amendment 62 addresses the question of how claimants might get the advice and support they need to adjust to changes brought about by welfare reform legislation. The universal credit support service framework is a DWP-led collaborative project with the Local Government Association to deliver local support for more vulnerable claimants and to assist those who might be unable to use the digital claims process or who may need help budgeting, given the transition to monthly payments. The DWP drives a lot of the demand for advice as a result of delays and failures within the system, so it is only right that it should have an obligation to support and fund welfare rights advice. It therefore needs to be engaged in directly supporting the advice sector to help vulnerable claimants transition to new benefit regimes and/or adjust to new entitlement rules, as well as helping to challenge the system when it gets decisions wrong Amendment 62 would insert a new clause in the Bill providing that the Secretary of State shall publish guidance for local authorities about their role in developing schemes to support claimants, especially claimants with additional needs or indicators of vulnerability, and report annually to Parliament on the operation of the universal credit local support service framework. It provides that guidance shall specify, among other things, the role of local authorities in developing partnerships to deliver support and a priority role for independent local advice agencies. Finally, it provides that the Secretary of State shall ensure that the universal credit local support service framework is appropriately resourced so that it can be rolled out to all local authority areas. It is difficult to establish how far the DWP intends to roll out its local universal credit support services beyond the initial UC pilot areas and how the funding for this works. Therefore, it would be helpful if the Minister told us what the department’s plans are in this regard and what the relationship is between the universal credit local support service funding and other grants to local authorities, such as the troubled families programme, and the information and advice strategies required by the Care Act. I beg to move.