Queen’s Speech — House of Lords, 2015-05-28
Topic: Defense
David Brownrigg Craig (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I add my welcome to the noble Earl for his return to the Ministry of Defence, and congratulate him on his new responsibilities as Deputy Leader of your Lordships’ House. I will touch on two key defence issues: the nuclear deterrent and what has been characterised as combat lawfare During the election campaign, the importance of continuing to have a nuclear deterrent was briefly raised. Both major political parties, at the most senior level, stressed their commitment to Trident and to replacing the Vanguard boats at the end of their operational lives. The intention to maintain a continuous at-sea capability appears in the Tory manifesto: "We will retain the Trident continuous at sea nuclear deterrent to provide the ultimate guarantee of our safety and build the new fleet of four Successor Ballistic Missile Submarines" However, possession is only a part of that ultimate guarantee. Deterrence is not just about capability—with a very high threshold of invulnerability—but also about political will. Does all a potential adversary can see or surmise indicate strong political determination about the nation’s deterrent posture Critical to this, when faced with the most serious of threats, is the ability of government first to engage the enemy with all other non-nuclear means available to it, both military and non-military, and to be seen to act stoutly and with determination to defend an absolutely vital national interest. I do not consider that political will about intention regarding or use of nuclear weapons is believable if the choice that the Government of the day must make when faced with a critical national emergency is either virtually immediate use of their nuclear weapons, because they so lack conventional fire-power, or surrender Without further elaboration, my point is that national deterrence—the death sentence of a nuclear deterrent—lacks credibility unless there are available to the Government other military means of demonstrating determination and resolve in a worsening crisis. Robust kinetic action, short of a nuclear response, is required. But surely we need more—much more—non-nuclear capability than we could field today. Platform numbers are so low that even modest loss rates in the early stages might all too soon leave the Government conventionally impotent In years gone by, with troops and aircraft forward-based, with 30 or more combat air squadrons deployed on land or at sea and with the service fleet number treble that of today, different levels or degrees of conventional military response were available to the Government. Such serried steps are vital, visible indicators of a Government’s determination and that they will, if all else is failing, be strong-willed enough to threaten actual use of a nuclear weapon Therefore, I urge the Government to consider what more must be done as the economy improves to bolster and give credibility to their manifesto commitment to sustain continuous at-sea deterrents. I doubt that the pledged 1% increase in the equipment budget will suffice. This year’s SDSR should recommend what strengthening of our conventional offensive capabilities, both platforms and missiles, is essential to the nuclear deterrent posture, what additional protection for those more vulnerable platforms such as aircraft carriers, with dedicated surface and other units for them, must be acquired, and of course what protection is needed for our actual nuclear capability at its most vulnerable when entering or leaving UK coastal waters. If the Government’s manifesto commitment to mount continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence is to be credible, it must be partnered with greater non-nuclear conventional capability than is at present available. Surely it would be folly to spend billions on four successor ballistic missile submarines without providing the conventional contribution essential to sustain a credible nuclear deterrent I turn briefly to combat lawfare. There are growing and welcome signs that the uncertainties about the application of domestic or international law in complex scenarios are to be addressed. As the noble Earl mentioned, it is in the Tory manifesto, which states: "We will ensure our Armed Forces overseas are not subject to persistent human rights claims that undermine their ability to do their job" I do not underrate the difficulties in honouring that pledge. I go back to the debates on the Human Rights Bill in 1998, when I foresaw difficulties—which were dismissed by the then Lord Chancellor, who was leading on the Bill—of incompatibilities between that Bill and Armed Forces legislation. Legislation about the International Criminal Court in 2001 and, more recently, concerning the handling of service complaints have all served to lessen the essential ethos of trust, both political and military, up and down the chain of command—a fundamental requirement of the Armed Forces. I wish the Government well in tackling those combat lawfare issues Now that there is likely to be a delay in bringing forward a British Bill of Rights, which might have been one vehicle for that legislation, I hope that the Government will consider dealing with the issue in the quinquennial Armed Forces Bill, which the noble Earl mentioned and which is due next year.