Taxation (Post-transition Period) Bill — House of Commons, 2020-12-15
Topic: International Affairs
William Nigel Paul Cash (Conservative, Centre-right): Because what section 38 does is reaffirm the capacity of Parliament to be able to make such provisions in other enactments should it be necessary to do so. Because of the complexity of the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill and the issues it raises—for example, as I have said in a previous speech this afternoon, with respect to the Northern Ireland protocol itself—there remain a number of matters that are still subject not only to the negotiation over in Brussels going on right now, but to the operation of the internal market of this country. I support that Bill, but I still believe it was a mistake to withdraw the "notwithstanding" clauses, because I think we are going to find that we will need them and we may yet need to reintroduce them on a future occasion. However, it will be section 38, which is explicit with regard to the withdrawal agreement, that will give us the authority and the statutory basis for doing that, and the same applies to the provisions I am referring to here. With regard to this Bill, we had expected that the "notwithstanding" clauses would be included in it and they were not, so I have taken the opportunity—in, one might say, my usual manner—to ensure that we have an opportunity to debate this issue today I now turn to the reasons why I am so clear in what I have said about state sovereignty in the context of international law. The United Kingdom as a state retains its sovereign right, and it was always capable of doing this, to withdraw from the EU. The EU is an international organisation; it is not a sovereign state. On the basis of state sovereignty, it would actually be contrary to the legal position under international law that the UK would require EU consent or agreement to leave the EU, but we do have article 50 and we did implement that in the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 State sovereignty is paramount to international law. As has been said: "If States were not sovereign, no international law would be possible" It is quite an interesting idea. International law would be impossible if states were not sovereign, because they combine together to create the circumstances in which it applies. Each state has internal supremacy over how governmental functions are run and is shielded from external interference without consent. The UK as a sovereign state has a right to withdraw from an international organisation, and this right is recognised by the EU treaties themselves. This is evident from the words of article 50: "Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements." It could not be clearer from what I have said and from what everybody knows, as they have been through this passage or on this journey, that we have been through enactment after enactment. Nobody could possibly say that we have not done it lawfully. It has been done completely in the sight of the world, and I am astonished that anyone would even consider that we had not done it in the proper manner—we have done so, lawfully and in accordance not only with our constitutional law but with international law. In short, the UK’s right to withdraw from the EU is approved and agreed by international law, and only limited by UK constitutional law and thus by our own discretion, which we have exercised Following the Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom exercised its sovereign right to leave the EU and, as far as I am concerned, I believe this cannot be disputed. It is quite clear that we have done what was required under our own constitutional requirements and also, in my judgment, with regard to the question of international law itself. That was confirmed, for example, by the German federal constitutional court in the Maastricht treaty constitutionality case—I am now speaking about the Germans’ view of this, but it is interesting to observe—in which it said: "Because the German citizen entitled to vote exercises his right to participate in conferring democratic legitimacy on the institutions and bodies entrusted with the exercise of sovereign authority principally through the election of the German Bundestag,"— this is the same point I was making about our voters being represented by our Members of Parliament who passed the enactments in question— "that parliament must also decide what is to be done about Germany’s membership of the European Union, its continuance and development" In other words, the principle is a common one between us and the German constitutional court That is of great importance in our understanding the context in which we must have the right to legislate ourselves in accordance with what our voters expect of us. We are entitled to do that in relation to the UKIM Bill or the Taxation (Post-transition Period) Bill, and we are entitled also to have a "notwithstanding" clause if we so decide. It is not for unelected persons—whether they are distinguished or otherwise, and whether they are numerous in the House of Lords or otherwise—to interfere with that The UK Parliament, being the supreme body in the British constitution, has the right to enact legislation inconsistent with the withdrawal agreement—I have already dealt with section 38—thereby explicitly reversing the direct effect option under article 4 of the withdrawal agreement. That is crucial, because article 4 says that, but for the fact that we are entitled to do that, it would have direct effect. That position has been set out on the UKIM Bill, which was published in September, and it was specifically stated that we would ensure that we had a "notwithstanding" clause. That has been unwisely removed, but we may come back to that on a future occasion The next question is, what is the position regarding the EU’s own attitude towards international law? I am afraid to say that it is guilty of recurring double standards. Article 3(5) of the treaty on European Union states: "In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall…contribute to peace, security…and the protection of human rights…as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter." But in the Kadi case, it was held that EU law is an autonomous legal order, meaning that in order for an international agreement to form part of EU law, it must not call into question the constitutional structure and values on which the EU is founded In the second Kadi case, the European Court of Justice, confirming its previous findings in the first case, ruled that the EU Courts "must…ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European Union legal order, including review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." It is worth pointing out that the Security Council resolutions in question were adopted under chapter VII, which meant that those resolutions were adopted for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security and had to be carried out by members of the United Nations directly. Article 103 of the charter states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." It is clear that our capacity as a sovereign nation is endorsed by the United Nations charter as well What is the position regarding the necessity of these "notwithstanding" clauses in principle? I have already explained the general power to override treaties, particularly by reference to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. In the Miller case, a majority in the Supreme Court said that Parliament, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is free to legislate in any way it sees fit, including contrary to the UK’s international obligations, thus "the sovereign power of the Queen in Parliament extends to breaking treaties" That was confirmed in a series of other cases, such as in Salomon, in EN (Serbia) and in the Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada. The Supreme Court has unambiguously stated that this power is a corollary of parliamentary sovereignty. I have already referred to what Lord Bingham said in chapter 12 of "The Rule of Law", so I do not need to repeat that.