Immigration Bill — House of Lords, 2016-02-01
Topic: Immigration
Michael Bates (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I have a couple of amendments in the group, so I shall speak to those first and then turn to the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick The government amendments in this group relate to the Secretary of State’s powers to make regulations governing the detention of vehicles used in committing the new offence of driving when unlawfully in the UK and to the criminal justice procedure for the offence in Scotland. Amendments 165 to 168 remove unnecessary references to the procedure applicable to solemn criminal procedure in Scotland, as opposed to summary procedure, since the offence is a summary-only offence in Scotland. Clause 18 provides a regulation-making power covering the destination of any proceeds from a vehicle being forfeited and disposed of. Amendment 170 extends this power to enable regulations to specify the destination of the proceeds of charges made for detaining a vehicle. This is necessary to ensure that it is possible for the charges to cover the cost of detaining the vehicle to be paid either to the police or to a private contractor who is detaining a vehicle on behalf of the police. Clause 18 provides that all premises and multi-entry warrants can be applied for in Scotland by an immigration officer. Amendments 174 and 175 remove this possibility to ensure compliance with the Scottish criminal justice system, which does not currently include provision for either all premises or multiple entry warrants. I invite noble Lords’ support for these amendments at the point when they are moved I turn to the issues raised in the other amendments. Amendment 163 would have the effect of introducing a presumption that ignorance of immigration status provides a defence against conviction. The overwhelming majority of illegal immigrants will be fully cognisant of their status, having entered the country unlawfully or deliberately overstayed their visa. The requirements imposed by the amendment are open to vague and inconsistent interpretation and may provide a perverse incentive for some migrants to avoid communication with the Home Office and/or their legal representatives in order to establish the necessary doubt as to whether they could "reasonably" be expected to have known they were required to leave the UK Not all those who have entered the UK illegally or attempt to remain illegally in the UK have a history of communication with the Home Office. These are arguably the types of illegal migrant that this legislation is intended to deter. It would be a bizarre outcome should this group be better protected as a result of this amendment than those who have engaged with the authorities Where a migrant honestly believes that they have lawful status—for example, because they have been misled by a rogue legal adviser—this will be taken into account in considering whether prosecution would be appropriate in the public interest, and clear guidance to that end will be provided. Should a migrant be able to genuinely evidence that they believed themselves to be legally present, it is highly unlikely that it would be in the public interest to prosecute In light of these points, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, will feel able to withdraw their amendment. Given the concerns about the strict liability nature of this offence, I may reflect further on this matter before Report The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which are also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, represent a significant potential weakening of the powers necessary to enforce the law and realise the intended benefits of this part of the Bill. Amendment 164 would require that a decision whether to charge a person with this offence or institute criminal proceedings be taken within a month of the arrest date. It is right that decisions on whether to prosecute a person for a criminal offence should be taken promptly, but the proposed amendment would introduce an arbitrary time limit and create an additional, and in our view unnecessary, administrative burden on the relevant agencies Amendment 169 would have the effect of disallowing the detention of the vehicle if it was under the person’s control. This would defeat the principal purpose of the clause, which is to prevent illegal immigrants driving on our roads. I understand that noble Lords may have intended to probe how the legislation will operate where an illegal migrant is apprehended driving a vehicle belonging to someone else, and that vehicle is detained by the police. That is not an unusual scenario in the context of motoring offences, and the Bill provides appropriate safeguards to deal with just that situation. I draw noble Lords’ attention to new Section 24D(8), which provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the release of a vehicle that has been detained. This power covers the circumstances in which a vehicle should be released to a third party who has an interest in it, such as the vehicle’s owner. Where a person has been convicted of the new offence created by Clause 18, the courts will have the power to order the forfeiture of the vehicle used in the offence. However, a third party with an interest in the vehicle may apply to the court to have the vehicle returned to them Amendments 171 to 173 would significantly reduce the potential success of a search for a motor vehicle by removing the ability to apply for an all-premises warrant to search multiple premises. The power contained in the clause to apply for an all-premises warrant, which allows any premises occupied or controlled by a specified person to be searched, is consistent with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which applies in England and Wales, and the equivalent order in Northern Ireland The provisions within the clause and within wider immigration legislation specify that the search power may be exercised only to the extent that it is reasonably required. In order to issue an all-premises warrant, the justice of the peace needs to be presented with reasonable grounds that it is necessary. Limiting the scope of searches to premises specified at the outset of an inquiry negates any possibility of using evidence gained during the initial inquiry that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a further search of additional premises would be successful. In the context of this clause, for instance, this might have the perverse effect of preventing officers who have searched one vehicle lock-up from also searching the one next door, despite information suggesting that the vehicle is kept there.