Environment Bill — House of Lords, 2021-06-30
Topic: Environment
David Anderson (Crossbench, Unknown): My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, whom it is a pleasure to follow, that the risk of penalty fines concentrates the mind wonderfully. When I used to defend Defra from the attentions of the European Commission in urban waste-water cases, I suspect the prospect was quite useful in concentrating the mind of the Treasury when money was requested for the Thames super-sewer and other mitigations. The Minister will say that no fining mechanism is necessary when the OEP has at its disposal a sufficiently intimidating set of judicially enforceable remedies. In the abstract, he may have a point, but, when looking at the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Duncan of Springbank, said at Second Reading, it is important not to confuse a full set of teeth with a flashy set of dentures. My Amendments 105 to 108 seek, in particular, to equip environmental review, the only route generally available to the OEP, not with dentures but with teeth The crucial amendment, to which the noble Baroness has already referred, is Amendment 107. In any case likely to prove contentious, it will be worthwhile for the OEP to pursue environmental review only if strong and enforceable remedies—notably, the power to quash unlawful decisions—are available at the end of the road. Clause 37(8), which is without precedent in any Act of Parliament, removes the court’s power to grant such remedies, no matter how much or little time may have elapsed, and no matter how serious the damage to the environment or public health, unless the court can satisfy itself that the grant of a remedy would not be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person. This is, though disguised in the drafting, a rebuttable presumption against the grant of any remedy at all There is a yet further hurdle: the court would have to be satisfied also, before granting a remedy, that a remedy would not be "detrimental to good administration"—although how good administration could be founded on policies and decisions that are unlawful is certainly an interesting conundrum. Take the example of an air quality case: just the sort of systemic issue of national importance that is identified in Clause 22(7) as particularly suitable for the OEP. Let us say that the court hearing an environmental review finds that a public authority has failed to produce legally compliant air quality plans and, to ensure that the law is enforced, wishes to require it to do so. Clause 37(8) would stop it from doing so unless the court was satisfied that no one would be likely to suffer substantial hardship or prejudice as a result. The evidence of one taxi driver who had recently sunk his savings in a non-compliant vehicle would be not only relevant but determinative of the issue, no matter serious the breach of law and no matter how many lives might be saved by a compliant plan. Indeed, even if there were no such evidence, the court could still not grant a remedy without, in effect, proving a negative: that there is nobody out there who could suffer the requisite substantial hardship or prejudice Similarly, an unlawful failure to designate a nitrate-vulnerable zone could not be corrected unless the court could be sure that no affected landowner would meet those thresholds. An unlawful permit for an oil refinery would have to stand if the owner had invested on the strength of it, whether in good faith or otherwise. A future judgment that new gas boilers are incompatible with statutory net-zero obligations would be unenforceable too. Irrespective of the benefits, there always would be people with something substantial to lose. In short, the more significant the issue and its environmental impact, and the more it is capable of impacting on private or even administrative interests, the more likely it is that the grant of any remedy will be automatically excluded by this clause Of course there will be cases, including some cases decided long after the event, in which a private interest is so strong, and the environmental interest so relatively weak, that a court would be justified in refusing a remedy in respect of unlawful conduct. That is precisely why the grant of remedies by courts of judicial review is, and always has been, discretionary and flexible. Amendment 107 would do no more than replicate that orthodox and unobjectionable position in the context of environmental review. It does not even require the normal remedy of damages to be available. Clause 37(8) places private and bureaucratic interests in the perpetuation of unlawful decisions on one side of the balance, and decrees that even the heaviest public interests will never outweigh them. The twin attributes of justice are her scales and her sword; Clause 37(8) would remove them both. All we ask if that she should be allowed to keep them, so that public authorities can be kept to their legal obligations in this most vital area Amendment 108 would give the OEP an alternative to environmental review by opening up a wider range of cases in which the OEP could pursue the established route of judicial review. Clause 38(1) uniquely handicaps the OEP as a claimant in judicial review by requiring it to surmount two extra hurdles of seriousness and urgency—nobody else faces those. By removing at least the second of those hurdles, which was only inserted in the Commons, we would go some way towards redressing the OEP’s disadvantage and putting it on the same footing as any other interested group or individual Amendments 105 and 106 address further points on environmental review. The point of 105 is to reduce the scope for procedural game-playing by lawyers. It is the nature of things that unlawful practices may spread, or be repeated, during the course of the OEP investigation that is a precondition for the commencement of environmental review. It is surely sensible that the scope of any environmental review should not be frozen at the time, months or even years earlier, when the investigation began. If later conduct raises the same issues, there should be no obstacle to putting it before the court. I hope the Minister will agree with that, and also that Clause 37(2) is too narrowly drafted for this subject to be adequately dealt with by assurances from the Dispatch Box Amendment 106 focuses on the statement of non-compliance, a concept introduced to the law by Clause 37. As the department has accepted in its FAQs, published on Monday, such statements may have reputational or political effects but are not in themselves a legal remedy. So they are not a prize to which the OEP is likely to feel justified in devoting its limited resources. This amendment would remove the most obvious statement of their legal powerlessness—that they do not affect the validity of the conduct in respect of which they are given—but would not, I freely accept, be a substitute for the remedies whose full application would be restored by Amendment 107 Finally, and in response to a concern I raised at Second Reading and in person, the Minister has been good enough to write in an all-Peers letter that it is the Government’s view that OEP complaints and enforcement functions will not affect the rights of other persons to bring legal challenges against public authorities by way of judicial review. It would be the final irony if the imperfect mechanisms of environmental review were to be advanced in the courts by public authorities as a reason for withholding access to what remains, at least for now, the gold standard of judicial review. I accept that such decisions are ultimately for the courts, but the Government’s view is significant and I would be grateful if the Minister could repeat his assurance from the Dispatch Box so that it appears in the official record.