UK Special Forces: Iraq and Afghanistan — House of Commons, 2020-01-07
Topic: Law and Crime
John Luther Mercer (Conservative, Centre-right): Let me be very clear with the hon. Gentleman. There have been allegations made by individuals, a very small number of whom worked within the investigative teams. There have been allegations made by a small number of people associated with operational units involved in the incidents that have been alleged. They have made allegations, and investigators who have interviewed them have been persuaded by their case. Those allegations are then investigated and presented to the independent Service Prosecuting Authority, which makes a decision as to whether the threshold of evidence has been breached and a conviction, or even a prosecution, is likely. That decision has been made in a clear-eyed, professional manner without fear or favour, in order to bring this matter to a close. It is in nobody’s interests that this has continued as long as it has. In terms of resource and how we address this, I will come to that towards the end of my remarks, but Members can pick me up if I do not In the case of Iraq, the investigative challenges were compounded by the behaviour of some of the legal firms involved. Public Interest Lawyers waged a long-running campaign challenging the ability of the service police to conduct independent and effective investigations. Having lost that argument, PIL notified approximately 1,200 new allegations, many of which were found upon examination to be seriously misplaced or extremely flimsy I am clear that IHAT could have handled matters much better—I have not changed my view on that since I personally ran the campaign to expose its practices—but I want to make it absolutely clear that there has been no strategic interference whatsoever in individual cases or in the overall Iraq or Afghanistan case loads. That would be completely pointless. Allegations that are not fully investigated will only contrive to extend the process for our servicemen and women. All investigative and prosecution decisions have been made independently by the service police and the Service Prosecuting Authority without reference to the MOD, the chain of command or Ministers. They have also been subject to independent external and periodic independent reviews by subject matter experts The Iraq investigations have been subject to unprecedented court oversight, with extensive, transparent reporting obligations to a designated judge of the High Court. Operation Northmoor has been subject to independent assurance by an experienced senior criminal barrister and a retired chief constable. The allegation that IHAT and Op Northmoor investigations were closed down for political reasons in 2017 is, I am afraid, simply wrong and self-defeating. IHAT’s case load was transferred to Service Police Legacy Investigations, which stood up on 1 July 2017 and is still conducting a small number of investigations. Investigations under Operation Northmoor continued with independent external assurance into 2019 The assertion that the Ministry of Defence exploited the taint that resulted from Phil Shiner’s misconduct to close investigations is also incorrect. The evidence that PIL had paid an undisclosed number of Iraqis, apparently by way of inducement, to bring allegations against our armed forces emerged only after IHAT and the Service Prosecuting Authority had started reviewing the Iraq case load to decide in accordance with the High Court’s direction whether further investigation was warranted in individual cases. IHAT and the SPA informed the High Court of their approach and the rationale for it. The High Court did not express any concern about this review process. None of the investigations under Op Northmoor was affected by Phil Shiner being struck off, as the BBC and The Sunday Times assert, because none of the investigations involved allegations notified by Phil Shiner The Sunday Times and the BBC assert that the closure of IHAT was intended to ensure that the alleged war crimes in Iraq went unpunished. I have outlined why that is simply not credible to the UK’s armed forces, as an institution that prides itself on its ethos and values that set it apart from this nation’s enemies. Factually, they cite two cases in support of this wholly untenable position: the shooting of an off-duty Iraqi policeman and the deaths of Radhi Nama and Abdul Jabar Mousa Ali at Camp Stephen. In fact, both cases were taken over by SPLI when IHAT closed. SPLI’s investigations into both cases only finished in early 2019. This means that the information that forms the basis of comments by former IHAT investigators and by Lord Macdonald, to whom the hon. Member for Glasgow South referred, was incomplete and at least two years out of date. While it has not been possible to attribute the deaths of Mr Nama and Mr Mousa Ali to any individuals, SPLI referred three people to the Service Prosecuting Authority for having committed or failed to prevent, punish or report outrages upon personal dignity. In coming to a decision in this case, the director of service prosecutions obtained independent legal advice from senior external counsel It is a matter of deep personal regret that the original RMP investigations were flawed, and that opportunities to hold those responsible to account may now have been lost. For this, I unreservedly apologise to those who suffered treatment at the hands of UK forces that was simply unacceptable, and I apologise to our servicemen and women who have, as a result, had years of investigations foisted upon them, having more often than not had nothing to do with the incidents in question As the al-Sweady inquiry has already highlighted, the RMP elements deployed to Iraq were simply insufficient to cope with the unexpectedly high number of incidents requiring investigation. This is what led the Provost Marshal (Army) in 2010 to direct IHAT to review nine RMP investigations, including those into the deaths of Mr Nama and Mr Mousa Ali, to ascertain whether all lines of enquiry had been followed. The considerable obstacles to obtaining sufficient evidence to prosecute in historical cases have been recognised by the High Court, which in 2013 ordered the MOD to establish a process of non-criminal quasi-inquests, which have become known as Iraq fatality investigations, to satisfy fully our obligations under the European convention on human rights. These IFIs are similar in form to a coroner’s inquest, and are conducted by an independent, retired judge. They are designed to provide the families of the deceased with answers and to help the armed forces learn lessons for the future While the fact that the 2003 report into Mr al-Musawi’s death contains inaccurate information is deeply concerning, there is insufficient evidence to refer anyone for an offence in relation to this incident. Having exhausted all reasonable and proportionate lines of enquiry, SPLI has uncovered no evidence that conclusively refutes the soldier’s assertion that he acted in self-defence. Indeed, two of the deceased’s brothers told investigations that Mr al-Musawi fired several shots into the air immediately prior to this shooting Today’s debate and previous debates on historical investigations have shown the strength of feeling on this vital issue. I am considering some key policy interventions to learn lessons from over 15 years of investigations and litigation arising from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am not of the opinion that any organisation the size of the UK’s armed forces will not have its challenging individuals. There is no doubt that some of the experiences of those who came into contact with the UK’s armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were completely unacceptable.