Brexit: Deal or No Deal (European Union Committee Report) — House of Lords, 2018-01-16
Topic: International Affairs
Robin Teverson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, perhaps I could point out that neither Mr Juncker nor Mr Barnier write the script; it is written by 27 member states’ Heads of Government. They are the people who decide what is right or wrong, and they are chosen by their electorates I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, that the EU committee should look at the other side of this argument as well. That would be a very useful report. He also said that perhaps we should speak to one of the European Commissioners. However, he is probably aware that, particularly during phase 1 of the negotiations, neither the Commission nor national Governments would enter into any discussion because they were maintaining their one-channel negotiation through the Commission representative. However, I agree with him entirely that perhaps the EU committee could look at the other side of this argument Where I disagree with the noble Lord completely is on negotiation strategy and leverage. The clear thing in my mind and in my analysis is that our Government gave away their position, their negotiating plan and all their advantages at the very beginning of this process because they declared all their red lines. They said to the EU, before it even asked, "We’re not going to be in the single market; we’re not going to be in the customs union; we’re not going to ask for any help from the European Court of Justice; and we are going to be out by 29 March 2019 whether you like it or not. We are setting our own deadline for coming out of this organisation". I ask myself what the European Union would have said to us if it really wanted to punish us. It would have said straight after the referendum, "You’re not going to be in the single market; you’re not going to be in the customs union; we’re not going to give you any resort to the European Court of Justice; we’re going to have a deadline of 29 March 2019; and by the way, if you don’t co-operate, we’re not going to give you any deal at all". That would have been the punishment that the EU would have inflicted on us It is those red lines and declaring that strategy at the beginning that has caused us to self-mutilate in the negotiations that have taken place since. Of course, the EU’s response is, "Okay, guys, if that is what you want, that equals a Canada deal. Done". In fact, I disagree with my colleagues. The Government have not been in any way vague about the outcome that they want. They have been completely clear: they want a Canada deal, which includes a deal on free trade but no services. That is what we have gone for But what have we done in the negotiations? I suggest that we have agreed to everything. First, we have agreed the phased agenda, which we said we did not want. We have agreed that the timetable has to be completed by October this year. We have effectively agreed the financial payments. We have given a completely open agreement on the Irish border—that if we cannot solve it, we will stay in the single market and the customs union ever after. And we have said that we will probably agree to end transition by December 2020 at the end of the multiannual financial framework, rather than give ourselves even two years. I have tried to think of another negotiation that has been more one-sided and the only example that I can think of in history is the Delaware native Americans selling Manhattan island to the Dutch, although at least in that instance they got $24 in goods in return, which is more than we have To be quite honest, the most important thing has been the time pressures. On the day after the referendum, we might as well have sent an email to Mr Barnier saying, "We agree everything. Let’s get on to phase 2 of the negotiations around the final deal". If we carry on with this level of performance, then once we go out into the real outside world and start negotiating with the hard-nosed trade negotiators of the United States, Australia and China, let alone India, we will be like lambs to the slaughter. We have had an atrocious negotiation in which we have given away our strategy and all our cards and have agreed to everything that the Commission has asked of us so far. I do not see that as acceptable, and it has not done our reputation internationally a great deal of good In terms of there being no deal, I am privileged to chair the House’s EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, which looks at agriculture. I remember that when we produced our report on agriculture, we had as a witness one of the main representatives of one of the farmers’ unions, although not the NUF. One of the first things that he said to us was that there is no deal that is worse that no deal. He went on to give a strong justification for saying that, particularly in relation to the agricultural industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, rightly said, if we get no deal, that will not mean going back to the status quo, as would be the case in most other areas of our life; it would mean something far less than that I was also privileged to lead the House’s delegation last year to meet Mr Barnier and Mr Verhofstadt—the first such occasion for this House. One thing that came over to me very strongly was that Mr Barnier is the sort of person who wants a deal, partly because that is his remit but also for the sake of his reputation of being able to do such deals. Particularly in December at the end of the phase 1 negotiations, one thing that was illustrated was that perhaps the Brexiteers were right—that the EU was desperate to get phase 1 sorted out. Despite the shambles of the DUP torpedoing the Prime Minister earlier that week, the EU found a way of dragging the Prime Minister over the finishing line to make sure that we could move on to transition and an overall deal. That is how it seemed to me to work I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that there is now a lesser risk of no deal, but there are potential roadblocks out there. One could be the DUP. Will the DUP support the process all the way through? If it does not like the Irish outcome, will it vote with the Government when the time comes? Will the Cabinet be able to agree on the details into the future? I wonder. However, the issue that I really do question is the Irish deal as decided thus far. As I conclude, perhaps I may remind the House what the agreement on Ireland says: "The United Kingdom remains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border. Any future arrangements must be compatible with these overarching requirements" It goes on to say: "In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement"— effectively an open cheque. As I can see no short-term solution technically to the Irish border issue, that agreement seems to lock us into the single market and the customs union until we can sort it out This has been a shambolic negotiation—a disgrace to this country. A Government who I do not think even understand how to do negotiations gave away all their cards at the beginning of the process, and I can only hope that they can recover. However, as I said, may the Lord help us once we try to negotiate further free trade agreements outside the Union in the wider, real world.