Report of the Iraq Inquiry — House of Commons, 2016-07-13
Topic: International Affairs
Philip Hammond (Conservative, Centre-right): I suspect that right hon. and hon. Members would have been dismayed if they had not had an opportunity to put on record their reactions to the Chilcot report, albeit necessarily initial reactions. We will no doubt hear in the course of debate whether the concerns that my right hon. Friend expresses are widely shared The words of the very first paragraph of the executive summary of the report spell out the enormity of the undertaking and thus the gravity that should have attended all aspects of its preparation and execution: "In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an opposed invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State–Iraq." A reading of Sir John’s report, however, suggests that flaws, errors and omissions abounded. If the House will allow me, I will try to summarise the key findings that he makes First, on the question of why the United Kingdom went to war, the two issues central to the case that Tony Blair put forward were Saddam’s failure to comply with the obligations imposed by the UN Security Council between 1991 and 1999, and the message that the international community would send if those obligations were not enforced, and the threat to international peace and security from the weapons of mass destruction that, he argued, were at Saddam’s disposal The report identifies an "ingrained belief of the Government and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein’s regime retained chemical and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and if possible enhance its capabilities . . . and was pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and concealment." There were good reasons for this belief, given the past actions of Saddam’s regime. His past use of chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians and Iranian military forces, his refusal to comply with the demands of weapons inspectors, and his refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions all pointed in that direction. As Sir John set out: "As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them." However, as Sir John also says: "It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments." He finds that "At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined" by either the Joint Intelligence Committee or the wider intelligence community In the case that he set out to the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair also argued that there was a link between international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and that—I quote from the then Prime Minister’s statement— "the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life."—[Official Report, 18 March 2003; Vol. 401, c. 767.] Sir John finds that "While it was reasonable for the Government to be concerned about the fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat." When it comes to the use and presentation of intelligence, in particular the Government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction published on the day of the Commons debate on 24 September 2002, Sir John finds that "There is no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No.10 improperly influenced the text" and that "The JIC accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content." However, he also finds that the judgments presented in Mr Blair’s statement to the House that day and in the dossier "were presented with a certainty that was not justified." The Joint Intelligence Committee, he finds, should have made it clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical or biological weapons, or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued On the much debated question of the legality of the war, the inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal. As Sir John says, that could "only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court."