Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (Criminal Courts Charge) Regulations 2015 — House of Lords, 2015-10-14
Topic: Law and Crime
Jeremy Hugh Beecham (Labour, Centre-left): My Lords, I refer to my interests as an unpaid consultant with the firm with which I was formerly a senior partner A few months ago a 32 year-old woman, Louise Sewell, stole a pack of four Mars bars worth 75 pence from a shop in Kidderminster. She was undergoing a benefits sanction and had not eaten for two days. She pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a criminal courts charge of £150. A man in Newbury who lives in a tent and stole a £2.99 bottle of wine from a supermarket was subjected to the same charge, but was not required to pay the criminal courts charge in the light of his limited means. I am grateful to the Law Society and the Howard League respectively for supplying details of these and other cases—of which there are many—to my old firm and to a magistrate friend who has served for a long time on the Bench and has much experience chairing the Bench in his area A client of my old firm who was addicted to legal highs and is on probation received a summons for littering and was convicted in his absence. The court wished to impose a small penalty or conditional discharge. Either of those would have required the imposition of the £150 court charge. The court decided to order an absolute discharge and thereby avoid the financial penalty. Faced with a similar situation, my magistrate friend presided over a case of minor criminal damage where the fine would have been around £75, costs £85, and victim compensation £20, to which would have been added a criminal charge order of £150. The defendant’s income consists of £115 in benefits per fortnight. The court decided to give him a discharge, which meant not only that the courts charge was not payable but that no victim compensation could be ordered These cases and many like them proceed from the criminal courts charge regulations, which are the subject of this Motion, which among the many dubious legacies bequeathed to Michael Gove by his predecessor as Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, ranks as one of the most misconceived. Those convicted of criminal offences face, rightly, the prospect of fines, contributions to prosecution costs, and payment of compensation to victims. Some contribution to court costs might well be reasonable, but this order, tabled just before the dissolution of Parliament, never having been the subject of consultation, imposes a rigid structure of charges with no judicial discretion as to their amount or any regard as to the defendant’s means. They apply to all cases since 13 April A defendant pleading guilty in the magistrates’ court will be charged £150, which will in many cases exceed the fine, prosecution costs and even some compensation orders combined. If defendants are convicted after a not guilty plea, the charge will be £520 or £1,000 in what is called an either-way case—one that could be heard in either the magistrates’ court or the Crown Court. Guilty pleas in the Crown Court will attract a charge of £900, while £1,200 will be levied where there is a conviction following a not guilty plea. The uniform imposition of these fixed charges is contrary to the courts’ current approach, which is one of totality—taking into consideration the nature of the offence and the effect, including the financial effect of fines and costs already levied. Judicial discretion under these regulations is being displaced by what one might call Ryanair justice, with significant add-ons, often disproportionate to the basic financial penalty Magistrates and others, including the senior judiciary, are concerned not only about the potential impact on those convicted but also about the likelihood that some defendants will plead guilty rather than risk doubling or quadrupling the financial penalty they face. There is of course already something of an inducement to plead guilty in the one-third discount for a guilty plea. But my old firm has experienced a number of cases where charges that could properly have been contested have ended up as guilty pleas, especially—but by no means exclusively—in relation to road traffic matters. Given the number of court closures and the cost of travel and time off work which will increase as a consequence, and is itself a matter of concern, the inducement to plead guilty to less serious offences becomes even greater. The Howard League cites a case in Mansfield, where a defendant changed his plea at the Crown Court upon being advised that if convicted he would face the higher charge described under the order There are other potential difficulties. Where there are a number of charges, to some of which the defendant pleads guilty but not to others, the current practice is to deal with those to which the guilty plea is tendered and set the remainder down for trial. That could mean, in the event of conviction, two criminal court charges; the risk arises that for example the imposition of a probation order, possibly subject to medical treatment, would be delayed. As I have exemplified, some courts have resorted in cases where defendants have limited means to order an absolute discharge which avoids the imposition of the criminal law charge but also nullifies the possibility of a victim compensation order. Such is the concern that at least 50 magistrates are known to have retired from the Bench in protest. Nor can it be assumed that the Ministry of Justice’s estimate of the yield from this process—between £65 and £85 million a year—would be easily achieved. After all, earlier this year it was reported that there is £549 million in uncollected fines and that 61% of this amount will be written off. Can the Minister tell us how much of the £700 million contract for court enforcements for which his colleague Mr Vara announced in July that Synnex Concentrix are preferred bidders, related to the collection of this charge The financial implications for both defendants and the Government may be somewhat qualified by the curious wording of a four-page guide to the new charge published by HM Courts and Tribunal Service which concludes with the following section under the rubric "What else do I need to know?". It states: "If after two years you have made best efforts to keep up with the payment terms of any other financial impositions and the criminal courts charge and you have not been convicted of any other criminal offences during that period you may apply to the magistrates’ court for consideration to write off the criminal courts charge". I am tempted to nominate this remarkable statement, about which nothing is said in the impact assessment, for the Nobel prize for legislative opacity. Perhaps the Minister could enlighten us as to its potential consequences. The House of Lords Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee criticised the timing of the implementation of the order, before Parliament had any chance of considering it—because of the pending dissolution—and, tellingly, added that, "the lack of an updated estimate of the sum likely to be raised" made it, "impossible to take a clear view of how the regulations will serve their intended purpose" We are, moreover, very much in the early days. Most cases where the charge has been levied will have been where guilty pleas have been tendered. We are now at the point where trials will be proceeding and the larger charges will be imposed in both magistrates’ and crown courts It is not surprising that 93% of magistrates surveyed by the Magistrates’ Association thought the charge was set at an unreasonable level, and that 83% thought it should be means-tested "The fact that no account is taken of ability to pay and the lack of discretion mean that the charge as currently constituted is not in accordance with the principles of justice." Those are not my words, but those of the Magistrates’ Association in its response to the Justice Select Committee. The Lord Chief Justice was reported last week to have voiced his criticism of this ill-thought-out measure, among others, and a Crown Court judge in Leicester observed that the charge did not have any merit It is to be hoped that Mr Gove, who has abandoned one ill-conceived project of Mr Grayling’s—the secure college for young offenders—will review and urgently revise these deeply flawed regulations taking into account the concerns of the judiciary at all levels and consulting properly on a revised scheme. The key elements must reflect the concept of totality, have proper regard to the means of the defendant and the nature of the offence and restore judicial discretion. I beg to move.