argyrotsipi/train-dataset huggingface dataset:
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-06-29
Topic: Transportation
William Bradshaw (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): This amendment applies both to people employed on buses and to the vehicles. We can return to the issue of the vehicles when we discuss the duties of traffic commissioners At Second Reading, a number of disabled Members spoke passionately about the Bill. One of the things they said was that it was so important that bus drivers got out of the bus, took down the ramp, put it back and helped disabled people to their places. It occurred to me that most operators give only a one-off spell of disability awareness training to their drivers at some stage after they commence employment. Nothing in the law states that such training has to be given or that it has to be repeated so that drivers know what they are doing The bus industry is characterised by a lot of people who do not work for very long. It is an extraordinarily unsociable job involving coping with bad-tempered drivers of other vehicles and bad-tempered passengers who often abuse the bus drivers. It is not a job that people want but they must be adequately trained. The purpose of the amendment is to make it clear, whether we are talking about franchises or advanced quality partnerships, that some provision is made for disabled people to be properly helped on to and off a bus, and to manipulate their wheelchairs, sometimes buggies, into place. I know that a court case about who should have priority between wheelchairs and buggy users is pending, but the driver needs to know what he has to do. This ought to be spelled out in the Bill. I beg to move.
Bus Services Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2016-06-29
Topic: Transportation
Jennifer Elizabeth Randerson (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My view is that bus drivers are greatly undervalued. They do a hugely complex job. They do not just have to drive the bus safely; they also have to manage the passengers, not all of whom are easy people to deal with. Training and refresher training for drivers is essential. It is very important in dealing with disability and with customers as a whole. At the moment, bus drivers undertaking training do not have to achieve anything. They have to attend, but they do not gain a qualification as a result of achieving a set standard. It is time that we empowered bus drivers, if I can put it that way, with further information, knowledge and skills by making sure that they get regular training of sufficient standard and quality that it enables them to do their difficult job better. They deserve to have the very best possible skills and training to do their job. I support my noble friend’s amendment.
Schools: Special Educational Needs and Disabilities — House of Lords, 2016-05-26
Topic: Education
Dominic Hubbard (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I thank the Minister for what was as good an attempt as I have had at answering my questions—of late, certainly. We had a great deal more clarity about the role of the local authority. The Minister said that teachers have a duty to teach everyone, but she did not say what that duty involves in terms of training for specialist teaching. The learning process of those we are talking about is going to be different, which means that what comes out of Carter is going to be important. Unless you get that straight, accessing support becomes almost irrelevant because you are unable to identify the problem. I talked about dyslexia and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, spoke about autism. My noble friend has shown me a list of other conditions set out in two nice long columns on a piece of A4. I identified some of them as subsets of other conditions. This is complicated and difficult, and I am talking about commonly occurring conditions only. Unless you get into initial teacher training, CPD or something a good base of awareness about the types of problems so that every teacher will get it, you are going to miss large numbers and put a great deal of stress on your support structures. There is no other way around it Therefore, before I thank everybody, I shall say that unless we all commit to making sure that the Carter review is converted into real, solid action, we will miss a huge opportunity. I give formal notice that I will not be letting this go, and I will continue to press it. I have a Private Member’s Bill on this subject. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than not to have to introduce it or not to have to bring it back next Session if I do not get enough time now, but I will unless we get something that says that we are going to address this in the near future, because we have waited too long already. Carter is merely following up the work of Lamb, Rose and dozens of other academic studies.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 16, 20, 21, 22 and 84 in this group Amendment 16 concerns the offence of unlawful interception, but in the Bill as drafted that applies only to public telecommunications systems, private telecommunications systems and public postal services. It does not apply to private postal services. Examples of those could be the postal services used by the legal profession such as Legal Post and DX. Can the Minister inform the Committee why private postal services are not included in that provision Amendment 20 relates to the provision that, "Conduct which has lawful authority for the purposes of this Act … is to be treated as lawful for all other purposes" Presumably, this provision is to avoid the problem we have had in the past where, while interception or equipment interference was allowed under one piece of legislation, it was an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Presumably, that is why this provision has been included, but surely it should apply to existing legislation—and it should state that it should apply to existing legislation—not to legislation in the future Amendment 21 is again about any other conduct under the Bill being treated, "as lawful for all purposes" Surely this should not be as broad as that. It should be restricted to what is lawful only for the purposes of this Bill Amendment 22 concerns the service of monetary penalty notices. Paragraph 4(4)(g) of Schedule 1 allows for an oral hearing before the commissioner, but the amendment would add that the person who applies for and is granted an oral hearing before the commissioner can be legally represented Returning to something that I referred to in my opening remarks, Amendment 84 is about restrictions on unauthorised disclosures which as written would prevent the Secretary of State from disclosing the existence and contents of a warrant. The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to disclose the existence and details of a warrant if she felt it was necessary in order for Parliament to carry out its functions. As I mentioned before, I do not see how the argument can be made that the Secretary of State should be involved in the authorising of warrants because she can be held to account, when she is not able, under the terms of the Bill as drafted, even to admit that such a warrant exists.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): Can the Minister clarify whether it is not then an offence for the Secretary of State to disclose the existence or content of a warrant to the ISC? That is not our understanding of the Bill.
Article 50 — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: International Affairs
Sarah Ludford (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I thank the Minister for his responses. He seemed to make rather a joke of "enjoyable and highly paid" disputes among the lawyers, but surely it is much bigger than that. For a referendum which was fought largely on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, and on such a major issue as the terms on which this country is supposed to leave the EU, surely it is inconceivable that a decision to trigger Article 50 should not be taken on the basis of a parliamentary decision. After all, Article 50 says that it is up to British constitutional requirements. So this is not about legal formalities; this is fundamentally about democratic principles. We need clarity in a time of huge turbulence. We need to know the evidential basis on which the negotiations will be conducted. We need to know the timing, before and after negotiations, for triggering Article 50. This is about the national interest, not about the convenience of the Conservative Party. I think that we deserve greater respect for Parliament on this decision.
Article 50 — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: International Affairs
Alexander Carlile (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I thank the noble Lord for being the third Minister now to say very clearly that Parliament will have a role to play in the Article 50 process. Can he confirm that the role that Parliament plays will be a matter for discussion between the usual channels and that we will be able to have a debate on the real merits of what is proposed so that a proper democratic judgment can be made by Parliament on these matters?
Prisons: Staff Safety — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Navnit Dholakia (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, our prisons are overcrowded and understaffed, with the result that prisons are now less safe and less secure than ever before. Does the Minister accept that the root cause of the problem, as has just been mentioned, is the unacceptably high level of the prison population? This makes some of our prisons almost unmanageable. Now that Mr Gove has fewer things on his mind, could we have clarity about how he intends to reduce the numbers so that the prisons’ objective of rehabilitation is met?
Prisons: Staff Safety — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Alan Beith (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): The Minister has recognised that the present numbers are a barrier to the Government achieving the rehabilitation objectives. However, will they not remain high if we continue to regard the length of a prison sentence as the only measure of the seriousness of an offence and until we put sufficient resources into alternative punishments?
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Alexander Carlile (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I do not want to prolong the debate, but does the Minister not think that it might be preferable to put these words in the Bill rather than face the inevitable consequences of legal discussions in the courts as to the role of codes of practice and their enforceability? Putting the words in the Bill at least provides certainty.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate, and very grateful to the Minister. On Amendment 19, I think that I am right in saying that the issue around phone hacking was on whether a voicemail that had not yet been listened to was still in the course of transmission, whereas a voicemail that had already been listened to was not in the course of transmission. That was a reason that the police gave at one stage for not investigating some of the phone hacking. I find the wording rather curious. I should have thought that it would be sufficient to say that communication included communication stored prior to or following transmission. But I am not a lawyer—I accept that I accept what the Minister says on written consent, on Amendment 66, but surely there are other ways in which consent can be explicitly given. For example, if a telephone conversation was being recorded, both parties to that conversation could say on tape, as it were, that they consented to the interception of that conversation. Perhaps we could give that some further consideration. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, the amendment is in relation to the mandatory use of equipment interference warrants. The wording of the relevant section says that security services must secure an equipment interference warrant if the "intelligence service considers that" the conduct would constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. Surely, it must be something more than just whether the particular intelligence officer considers that the conduct would constitute an offence under that Act. Surely, an equipment interference warrant must be obtained because, otherwise, it would constitute an offence, rather than simply if the intelligence service considers that it is Amendment 24 makes a similar point about restrictions on the use of Section 93 of the Police Act 1997. In this case it states that a "targeted equipment interference warrant" is required, "if the applicant considers that the conduct would … constitute", an offence under the "Computer Misuse Act 1990". I would argue that exactly the same considerations apply as with Amendment 23. I beg to move.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am very grateful for that explanation. I understand that it may not be certain that something constitutes an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. Where it is an offence under the Computer Misuse Act, does the Bill allow a Security Service agent or law enforcement officer to ignore that provision?
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my name is to this amendment and I very much support it. As a former police officer, I feel I have to speak on both aspects of this. The noble Lord, Lord Black, spoke clearly and in detail about the need for very specific safeguards because of the experience that we have had with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Police have clearly not used legislation in the way that Parliament intended it to be used—that is, to establish who confidential journalistic sources are. I also support what the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said about the danger to journalists, particularly camera operators in serious, spontaneous public order situations. This is an area where I have some expertise. At the moment there is a balance as experience has shown that media footage has, in certain circumstances, been useful to demonstrators in terms of misuse or excess use of force by police officers. If this were to change, and the demonstrators felt that material gathered by media operators was under the control only of the police, because of inadequate provisions in the Bill, it could tip the balance and journalists would become a target for violence in such situations.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 26 to 31 in this group. Under Amendment 31, we have concerns about the breadth of warrants. These warrants are described as targeted interception warrants or targeted examination warrants. Noble Lords will no doubt recall that targeted examination warrants relate to where a bulk interception has resulted in coming across content that belongs to a UK citizen and, therefore a targeted examination warrant is required in those circumstances. Clause 17(1)(a) provides that a targeted interception warrant or a targeted examination warrant may relate to, "a particular person or organisation" An organisation could cover hundreds, if not thousands, of people. I am indebted to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who tells me that it could, in fact, relate to the National Trust—I am not sure about horticultural terrorism, but they have more than 1 million members. We are probing whether it is appropriate to have a targeted interception warrant that is targeted at an organisation, particularly when in Clause 17(1)(b), it says that such warrants can only apply to, "a single set of premises" The potential contrast between the number of people who might be affected in terms of an organisation being targeted by a targeted interception warrant but only a single set of premises seems stark Similarly, Clause 17(2)(b) says that such a warrant may relate to, "more than one person or organisation", so again it is very broad. The number of people––potentially innocent people––caught up in such a targeted interception could be extremely large Amendment 27 relates to Clause 17(2)(a), whereby, "a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or may carry on, a particular activity", can be targeted by an interception warrant. To narrow the potential for this to affect a large number of individuals, the amendment would require each person to be named or identified using a unique identifier. While we accept that with, for example, members of a gang involved in drug dealing, one may not know the names of the individuals concerned, one might from surveillance footage be able to accurately describe the individual whom one wants to target by means of that warrant. A similar argument is suggested by Amendment 29 in relation to Clause 17(2)(b) Amendment 30 relates to Clause 17(2)(c) and queries the issuing of warrants for "testing or training activities". While Clause 17(3) defines what such activities are, it does not seem clear to us why it would be necessary to issue a targeted interception warrant to test equipment or train individuals in its use. One would have thought that, if it was a training or testing exercise, it could be done with the consent of whoever is being targeted by the training or testing activities. Amendment 31 therefore suggests that Clause 17(3), in relation to "testing or training activities" be deleted. I beg to move.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Paul Strasburger (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I should mention that this subject was covered extensively in the Joint Committee on the Bill. It seems that the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that in order to be able to monitor a gang when we do not know if it is made up of three or four people, the language of the clause should be this open. Perhaps I may quote from some of the evidence that was given to the committee. The clause fails to, "exclude the possibility that everyone who belongs to a certain trade union, political party or book club; visits a certain shop; attends (or has friends or family members who attend) a certain house of worship; subscribes to a certain publication; participates in a lawful and peaceful demonstration; celebrates or may celebrate a certain religious or national holiday", and so on and so forth. All those activities seem, perhaps as an unintended consequence, to be swept up by this provision. Recommendation 38 made by the committee states that, "the language of the Bill be amended so that targeted interception and targeted equipment interference warrants cannot be used as a way to issue thematic warrants concerning a very large number of people".
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation and I am reassured to some extent by, for example, some of the provisions he highlighted in Clause 29(8) and (4). I understand that in fast-moving situations such as a kidnapping it may be necessary to add people to the warrant or to encompass additional individuals who are not specifically named on the warrant. However, I wonder whether some safeguards can still be provided in slower-moving situations, or whether, as in the case where there are provisions for the urgent issuing of warrants, those provisions could be used in these cases As for the strict limits on the targeting of organisations, I accept, as I notice the Labour Front Bench also accepts, that these warrants must be necessary and proportionate, and that they provide some safeguards against overreaching in the use of these warrants. I am still puzzled about training and testing warrants. I accept that new equipment and individuals need to be trained in real, live situations, but I am a little concerned about who the individuals and organisations are that might be targeted in these training exercises, bearing in mind that the whole suggestion is that the normal provisions of proportionality and necessity, in terms of suspicions that these individuals are up to no good, would not apply in these situations. Therefore, what is learned? What privacy is being intruded into in the course of these training and testing activities My concerns remain about some of those areas, but I am reassured by other things that the noble and learned Lord has said and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Investigatory Powers Bill — House of Lords, 2016-07-11
Topic: Law and Crime
Brian Paddick (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 32 to 36 in this group. These amendments seek to probe the Government’s position and how far they might be prepared to go in adopting, for example, the recommendations that David Anderson made in his report about removing the Secretary of State from the issuing of targeted interception and examination warrants and replacing the Secretary of State, as the person who decides on these warrants, with a judicial commissioner. The volume of warrants that the Home Secretary, for example, has to sign amounts to as many as 10 a day. We are relieved that she does not now have the additional burden of having to run for leader of the Conservative Party, but one can imagine that to give proper consideration to 10 warrants a day is a significant undertaking, in addition to her other responsibilities In non-contentious cases, where there is no political aspect, such as law enforcement warrants, where one is dealing with serious crime—with drug dealers, for example—it is difficult to understand why one would need the Secretary of State to consider these issues. We obviously accept that there may be cases where there is political sensitivity, even in the case of serious crime, and it may be that the Bill can be amended to allow either for the judicial commissioner or even the applicant for the warrant to refer the matter to the Secretary of State in those cases. I also accept that in cases of national security—in cases where the security services, for example, are seeking a warrant, particularly where they may be looking at interception of foreign communications, even foreign diplomatic communications—there is a definite need for the Secretary of State’s involvement. However, as I say, the thrust of this group of amendments is to explore why the Government insist on the Secretary of State being involved in 75% of the warrants that, for example, the Home Secretary signs when those warrants appear to be non-contentious and not politically sensitive but simply to do with law enforcement and serious crime. I beg to move.