Immigration Bill — House of Commons, 2015-12-01
Topic: Immigration
James Peter Brokenshire (Conservative, Centre-right): I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. That is what we have done. We must also ensure public confidence more generally about where costs should lie, and ensure that understandable concerns about access to healthcare are framed rightly. That is why we introduced the immigration and health surcharge in the last Parliament Amendment 39 seeks to restrict the power of immigration officers to examine someone in-country. As my hon. and learned friend the Solicitor General—he is sitting alongside me—said in Committee, the power to examine someone in-country is essential, for example when immigration officers are questioning persons who have been seen climbing out of lorries on motorways or at service stations, and who are therefore suspected of having entered the UK illegally Officers working in immigration enforcement do not conduct speculative spot checks. To examine a person after the point of entry, an immigration officer must have information that causes them to question whether someone has the right to be in the UK, as set out in the 1987 case of Singh v. Hammond. Our published guidance reflects that judgment, and makes clear that when conducting an in-country examination, immigration officers must first have reasonable suspicion that a person is an immigration offender, and they must be able to justify that reasoning. If the power of examination is limited only to the point of entry, the ability to conduct in-country enforcement operations would either be severely hampered, or it could risk unnecessary arrests Government amendments 3 and 4 are minor and technical, and replace "strip search" with "full search" to allay concerns that the person is stripped completely naked during such a search when that is not the case. We judge that the term "full search" more appropriately reflects the nature of the power Amendment 36 seeks to remove the power to conduct such searches from detainee custody officers, prison officers and prisoner custody officers when they are searching for nationality documents. As the Solicitor General said in Committee, the reality of detention is such that items are often concealed below clothing. It may therefore be necessary in some cases to remove the detainee’s clothes to locate documentation and other items. Of course, such a power must be governed by appropriate safeguards, and used only when necessary, and it may not be exercised in the presence of another detained person or a person of the opposite sex. Removing altogether the ability to search in that way would create an easy way for detainees to thwart removal efforts Amendments 27 and 28 are to clause 34. Section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 allows human rights claims and deportation cases to be certified to require an appeal to be brought from outside the UK, where to do so would not cause serious irreversible harm or otherwise breach human rights. Clause 34 extends that power to apply to all human rights claims, but amendment 27 would remove that clause from the Bill. Extending such a power to all human rights claims is a Government manifesto commitment and builds on the success of section 94B, which was introduced by the Immigration Act 2014 and has resulted in more than 230 foreign national offenders being deported before their appeal The Court of Appeal recently considered two cases concerning the operation of that power. It held that the Government are generally entitled to proceed on the basis that an out-of-country appeal is a fair and effective remedy. The amendment would prevent the Government from meeting their manifesto commitment to extending that successful power, the operation of which has recently been endorsed by the Court of Appeal Amendment 28 relates to the best interests of children. It seeks to impose an obligation on the Secretary of State to conduct a multi-agency best-interest assessment for any child whose human rights may be breached by the decision to certify. The amendment is unnecessary because, before any decision to certify is made, the best interests of any child affected by that decision must already be considered. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 imposes a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to consider the best interests of any child affected by a decision to certify. Where the person concerned makes the Secretary of State aware of the involvement of a child who may be affected by her decision, the Secretary of State will ensure that the best interest of that child is a primary consideration when deciding whether to certify. That consideration is supported by published guidance and will take into account all the circumstances of the case.