Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill — House of Lords, 2021-11-30
Topic: Government Operations
Nicholas True (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, I always seek to be brief, but one always aspires to be better briefed in your Lordships’ House. I anticipate that this will be the subject of some discussion in Committee, and I wanted to make some progress in this speech, but to answer the noble Lord, which is my duty, purported exercises of power or decisions refer to things that would be considered by a court to be invalid or a nullity and therefore not a real exercise of power or decision because they have been done on the basis of an error of law. The courts have noted that this could arise where, for example, a decision is made outside the limits of relevant power or without taking into account a relevant consideration The reference has been included to make it clear that all elements of the Dissolution and calling of Parliament process fall to the political and not the judicial sphere. The drafting takes account of previous judicial decisions, which I have no doubt we will discuss at some length in Committee. In particular in the case of Privacy International, the Supreme Court said that those drafting legislation should make clear whether such purported decisions are intended to be outside the jurisdiction of the courts. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, and I look forward to discussing this matter at some length—I hope not at some length—and I have no doubt that we will have a lively discussion in Committee, so I would like to make some progress, if I may Clause 4 provides a maximum parliamentary term of five years, calculated from the date of the first meeting of Parliament. This will ensure that elections are held at regular intervals by providing a longstop of five years, a maximum term which is of course still guaranteed by your Lordships through an explicit exception in the Parliament Acts. By reviving the prerogative powers, the Government could call an election either to resolve political deadlock, to seek a fresh mandate from the electorate or after a defeat on a major policy issue As I have set out, a Prime Minister will take a number of factors into account when choosing to call a general election. But of course, this would include— I can offer reassurance here—scheduled elections to the devolved legislatures. We recognise the practical administrative challenges of holding elections which are conducted under different arrangements simultaneously or in close proximity. A Prime Minister choosing to call an election would undoubtedly wish to take these matters into account Clause 5 introduces the Schedule, which sets out minor and consequential amendments. Clause 6 confirms that the territorial extent of the Bill is the UK, except for a very small number of amendments in the Schedule where the extent is more limited. The Schedule contains a number of minor and consequential changes, including to the parliamentary elections rules in the Representation of the People Acts 1983 and 1985, concerned also with the demise of the Crown and the Recall of MPs Act 2015. I would be happy to explain any of these in detail if your Lordships wished between now and Committee The Bill has undergone pre-legislative scrutiny. The Government are indebted to the work of the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We have carefully considered the committee’s findings and amended the Bill in two respects, the first being the Title of the Bill. This small but significant change ensures the purpose and effect of the Bill is clear, reflecting its precise remit and its constitutional significance. Secondly, having reflected on the Joint Committee’s report, the Government agree that the trigger for the election process should be the Dissolution of Parliament. This amendment will give legal certainty that the election period will automatically follow on from Dissolution, providing a clear timetable leading to a defined polling date Let me conclude with the conventions which provide the flesh on the bones of the Bill. In restoring the status quo ante, conventions will once more govern the operation of the revived prerogative powers. Conventions can operate effectively only where there is shared understanding of them. That is why the Government published in draft their understanding of those conventions alongside the Bill for scrutiny—not only by the Joint Committee but by Parliament as a whole. We set out in that document: "The circumstances in which a Prime Minister might seek a dissolution are underpinned by two core constitutional principles." First: "The Prime Minister holds that position by virtue of their ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons and will normally be the accepted leader of the political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons." Secondly: "The Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process to ensure that remains the case. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls particularly on the incumbent Prime Minister." We recognise that the conventions on Dissolution are part of an interlocking picture. Therefore, in our response to the Joint Committee, we have provided fuller explanations of the conventions on confidence Motions, Dissolution and Government formation. It is intended to provide the basis for discussion and debate among parliamentarians, building our shared understanding in and across both Houses and all those represented in them The value of conventions is not that they should cover every single hypothetical scenario but that they provide guiding principles and are an effective deterrent —in particular, the imperative not to involve the sovereign in politics. We welcome further discussion in your Lordships’ House on the conventions. That is the best way to develop our shared understanding This Bill will deliver increased legal, constitutional and political certainty around the processes for the dissolution and calling of Parliament. It will restore tried-and-tested constitutional arrangements which have been understood by the electorate for generations and are underpinned by the core constitutional principle that the Government of the day draw their authority by commanding the confidence of the elected House I hope these constitutional arrangements that have served us well in the past will continue to serve future Parliaments and Governments of all parties, whatever they may be. The ability of a Prime Minister to call a general election for reasons of political or public necessity, to turn to the people to give their judgment, is an essential feature of our democracy. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act disrupted that relationship. This Bill, we submit, will restore the proper balance to our constitutional arrangements I look forward to a constructive debate on not only the Bill but the conventions. I commend the Bill to the House.