Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Bill [HL] — House of Lords, 2020-02-10
Topic: Transportation
Charlotte Vere (Conservative, Centre-right): I again thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for introducing this group. I shall start with Amendment 12 and then move on to matters relating to Clause 5 stand part As noble Lords have already noted, airspace modernisation is complex: it is a long-term programme and will require close oversight from the CAA in its co-sponsor role and the expert capability of its regulatory teams to assess airspace change proposals. These will be submitted by sponsors under the master plan which is being produced by the Airspace Change Organising Group, ACOG. That all makes sense but it is complicated It is crucial that the CAA has the resources to carry out these important functions. I can reassure the Committee that the CAA already reports on its resourcing through multiple channels and these reports are in the public domain. In December 2019 the CAA published its annual report on progress against the airspace modernisation strategy. The CAA is required to produce this report every year through the directions made by the Secretary of State. This report includes an overview of CAA’s resourcing position against the strategy. The next one will be published towards the end of this year. The CAA also produces an annual report covering all of its activity, including its resourcing position and its top-level risks to the organisation. Again, this information is available publicly and is provided as part of its annual consultation on its charging scheme On the timing of the report specified in Amendment 12, it is unlikely that the Government, or indeed the CAA, would know within six months of the Bill coming into force whether it will be necessary to use any of powers in the Bill, when it might be necessary to do so and how many airspace change sponsors may need to be directed. Therefore, in addition to those already produced, a report on a specified day would probably not add much to what is already in the public domain. However, I will share the most recent CAA report on airspace modernisation of December 2019 after the debate On Clause 5 stand part—this is an important consideration which is worth time—the clause gives the Secretary of State powers to delegate the Secretary of State’s functions under Clauses 2 to 4 to the Civil Aviation Authority and for a notice in writing of this to be published by the CAA. It would provide another means for the airspace changes identified to help deliver the strategy to be delivered, but only if it appeared desirable for this to do so in the future. The CAA is the nation’s airspace regulator and has the expertise to take on this role if required. Given that both the Secretary of State and the CAA have various roles in relation to airspace change, appropriate internal governance structures would need to be put in place, an issue mentioned by a number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Goschen This is important because the CAA carries out many different functions—it is a policymaker, a policy implementer, a regulator and a decision-maker—and, as noted by my noble friend, it is able to manage these kinds of conflicts of interest. I frowned earlier when the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, tried to liken the CAA to an investment bank, but the comparison is not a valid one The CAA is an entirely different sort of organisation. The incentives for going against what would be put in place are simply not the same. For example—again, it is not proposed that this would be done, but it is to provide flexibility—if the Secretary of State decided to delegate these powers to the CAA, the Secretary of State and the CAA would need to put in internal governance structures. For example, the DfT would need to make internal governance arrangements to separate the teams for discharging the new powers of direction, deciding on whether to call in an ACP and making recommendations to Ministers on that called-in ACP. This is rather like what the DfT does already on decisions on DCOs where one Minister decides and another Minister is kept well out of the process, and it works. The CAA would make similar internal governance arrangements to separate the CAA teams tracking ACPs, advising on when to use the power, deciding on an ACP and discharging any new powers to direct ACPs if delegated to the CAA. The CAA has already created the internal governance structure that separates the first and second items there because that happens already One of the things I wish to press home to your Lordships today is that ACPs are already being considered and are successfully reaching the other side. So when the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, was talking on the previous group about possible challenges that will occur between airports and asking how they are going to be resolved, we are already resolving them. This process has been going on for quite some time. It is only because of the new aviation modernisation strategy and its requirement to do it on a much more complex area, according to the master plan, that we have decided to take these powers. However, in normal circumstances without these powers airports are perfectly capable of sitting down, talking to each other and coming up with an equitable agreement. In this case, a CAA team would be tracking and advising an ACP, and another team would be making the decision. I believe that the CAA is well used to making these sorts of decisions, if it were to need to do so in future, and to creating those Chinese walls between the different functions it is expected to carry out.