European Union (Withdrawal) Bill — House of Lords, 2018-05-08
Topic: Government Operations
John Kevin Sharkey (Liberal Democrats, Centre to centre-left): My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Hansard Society, whose work on delegated legislation will be familiar to many of your Lordships. I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 70—the sifting amendment—to which I have added my name. I will also speak briefly to introduce Amendment 71. The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has set out very powerfully the case for Amendment 70—for the sifting committees’ decisions to be binding on Ministers—as has the Delegated Powers Committee in its reports When we debated an equivalent amendment in Committee, the Government’s argument against the proposal relied chiefly on their assertion that they were in any case likely to accept the sifting committees’ decisions and that, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, said, ignoring them would be, "hopefully, very rare". This is a very weak argument. It is not based on principle. It is based on a suggestion of compliance, except in undefined, unexampled and no doubt exceptional circumstances. What it really means, of course, is that the Government, at their absolute discretion, will be able to impose the negative procedure on SIs, denying Parliament the more robust and intensive scrutiny provided by the affirmative procedure There is simply no case for allowing the Executive this unfettered and unqualified discretion. If Parliament is properly to exercise its scrutiny function in the face of the tsunami of SIs coming our way, it must be able to decide conclusively which SIs deserve higher levels of scrutiny and which do not. That is the whole raison d’être of the sifting committees: they allow Parliament itself to decide which SIs merit what level of scrutiny Not only have the Government demonstrated no real need for this override power, they have not even hinted at any harm that might be done by making the sifting committees’ decisions binding. In any case, throughout this Bill we must guard against the unnecessary transfer of power to the Executive. What the Government propose is such an unnecessary transfer of power. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, will press his amendment to a vote. If he does, we will support him I turn very briefly to Amendment 71, which is in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, and the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Norton of Louth. The Government expect this Bill to generate between 800 and 1,000 SIs. There will be many others generated by other Brexit Bills. As things stand, we have only two options for dealing with these SIs: we can accept them or we can reject them. A regret Motion has no practical effect In the past, this House has shown an understandable and very deep reluctance to reject affirmative SIs. We have rejected just six in the past 68 years. We have used our "nuclear option" very infrequently. This entirely understandable reluctance to reject will certainly continue for withdrawal SIs. But given the enormous volume of such SIs and the delicate and sensitive areas they will deal with, this proper reluctance to press the red button will almost certainly lead us to approve marginal cases or cases about which we retain serious misgivings. This would be an unsatisfactory outcome for the quality of created law and potentially damaging to the balance of power between the Executive and Parliament Amendment 71 proposes an additional method of dealing with affirmative SIs—and it is an additional method; it does not in any way affect our current powers. We would retain unaltered our powers to approve or reject, exactly as at present. Amendment 71 would simply allow us to do what we so frequently do: to ask the Commons to think again. Where we believe that asking the Commons to think again would be desirable, we simply co-ordinate scrutiny so that the Commons can pronounce first. If it rejects the SI, that is the end of the matter. If it approves, Amendment 71 would allow us to ask the Commons, with reasons, to think again. This mechanism would not frustrate the will of the Commons. If it chose not to reconsider within 10 days, the Lords would be deemed to have approved the instrument Amendment 71 would give Parliament more flexibility and room for more discussion in dealing with those SIs where real concern exists but where we are properly reluctant to reject. It simply allows a conversation with the Commons, after which the Commons will decide the matter. I commend it to the House.