Telecommunications (Security) Bill — House of Lords, 2021-11-15
Topic: Technology
Stephen Parkinson (Conservative, Centre-right): My Lords, noble Lords will recall that this Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world and ensure the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications networks and infrastructure Amendment 4, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Fox, would insert a new clause into the Bill. The clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the impact of the Government’s diversification strategy on the security of telecommunication networks and services, and would allow for a debate in another place on the report I ask that this House do not insist on its amendment for two reasons. Our first objection to this amendment relates to the flexibility necessary for diversification. The reporting requirement, which is based on the risks as we find them today, is restrictive and premature for a market and technology that is evolving and rapidly changing. Policy work is at an early stage, and the criteria for how we measure its success is evolving in line with our policy. It would not be suitable to set out specific reporting criteria in legislation The diversification strategy and any reporting on its progress must be flexible so that we can focus on achieving the greatest impact. As we hope diversification to be a short-term problem, enshrining it in legislation—a long-term solution—would be counterintuitive and unnecessary. We are currently focused on diversifying radio access networks, for instance, but that may change in the future The Government take diversification seriously. I reassure noble Lords that mechanisms are already in place, through Parliamentary Questions and Select Committees, to thoroughly scrutinise the strategy and its progress now and in the future. This is the appropriate method of scrutiny for an evolving, time-limited strategy Secondly, this is principally a national security Bill intended to strengthen the security and resilience of all our telecoms networks. The Government’s 5G telecoms diversification strategy has been developed to support that objective but it is not the sole objective of the strategy. In addition, the strategy is focused on a specific subset of the telecoms supply market, not the security of public networks as a whole From debates in your Lordships’ House so far, it is clear that this amendment intends to hold the Government to account on the impact of the diversification strategy on the security of public networks. We will be happy to provide updates on the strategy’s progress through existing channels, and are encouraged by the developments that we have seen since the strategy’s launch. The amendment would extend the Bill beyond its intended national security focus and creates an inflexible reporting requirement on a strategy that, as I say, will evolve as it fulfils this important work. That is why I ask your Lordships’ House not to insist on Amendment 4 I shall also speak to Motion B, which asks that this House do not insist on its Amendment 5, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5A. As noble Lords will recall, Amendment 5 was tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool, Lord Coaker and Lord Fox, and my noble friend Lord Blencathra. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to review decisions taken by Five Eyes partners to ban telecommunications vendors on security grounds. In particular, it would require the Secretary of State to review the UK’s security arrangements with that vendor and consider whether to issue a designated vendor direction or take similar action in the UK As I said on Report, I welcome the intention of the amendment. It demonstrates that noble Lords across the House take the security of this country and its people incredibly seriously. However, while we support the spirit of the amendment, we cannot accept it for four reasons First, this amendment is unnecessary as the Bill already allows the Secretary of State to consider the policies of Five Eyes countries. Clause 16 includes a non-exhaustive list of factors that the Secretary of State may take into consideration when issuing designation notices regarding high-risk vendors. That list illustrates the kinds of factors we will be considering proactively and on an ongoing basis as part of our national security work. A decision by a Five Eyes partner or indeed any other international partner to ban a vendor on security grounds could be considered as part of that process. The amendment asks the Government to do something that has been part of the Bill from the outset. We believe that our existing approach is the right way to continually consider the decisions of all our international allies and partners Secondly, the amendment is unnecessary because we are already committed to a close and enduring partnership with the Five Eyes countries. We engage with our partners regularly and, where relevant, consider their actions when developing our own policies. The Five Eyes intelligence and security agencies maintain close co-operation, which includes frequent dialogue between the National Cyber Security Centre and its international partners. This dialogue includes the sharing of technical expertise on the security of telecoms networks and managing the risks posed by high-risk vendors. Engaging with our partners in this way is at the very core of our national security work In another place, members of the Intelligence and Security Committee agreed that the amendment was not necessary as the existing intelligence relationship with the Five Eyes, and other international parties, is strong. The chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Dr Julian Lewis, said: "We looked at Lords amendment 5 and we understood the temptation to flag up the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. We agreed ... whenever a serious objection is raised on security grounds by one of the Five Eyes partners, we take that with the utmost seriousness."—[Official Report, Commons, 8/11/21; col. 119.] The chairman of the DCMS Select Committee, Julian Knight MP, agreed and said that "any Government worth their salt would take very seriously the approach of our closest security partners."—[Official Report, Commons, 8/11/21; col. 117.] Our third reason is that naming individual countries in legislation would be restrictive to the development of wider international relations and set an unhelpful precedent on national security legislation. The Five Eyes alliance was not created through legislation and it has not required legislation for us to develop and strengthen that relationship in the past. Moreover, we need to consider the policies of a wide range of countries, including those of our European neighbours such as France and Germany, and those of other nations such as Japan, South Korea and India, to name but a few. It is highly unusual to refer to specific countries in legislation in this way, and the amendment would set an unhelpful precedent for future legislation Finally, the amendment is impractical because of the many different ways other countries operate their national security decision-making. It may not be immediately clear when a country has taken a decision to ban a vendor, particularly if it relied on sensitive intelligence. It also may not be clear why a country has taken this decision, and it may not always be based on national security grounds. So, while I welcome the intentions behind the amendment, we cannot accept it and that is why I ask that the House does not insist on Amendment 5 either. I beg to move.