Telecommunications (Security) Bill — House of Commons, 2021-11-08
Topic: Technology
Chinyelu Susan Onwurah (Labour, Centre-left): I thank colleagues in the other place who have worked hard to improve the Bill. National security is the first duty of any Government and Labour will always put our country’s security first The pandemic has shown how important telecommunications networks are. I declare an interest as a former telecoms engineer, but I am sure I speak for the whole House in thanking all those who have kept our networks going during the pandemic. We have been dependent on them to work from home or to keep in touch with family and friends. This House could continue its important work thanks to telecommunications networks, as well as the hard work of House staff and the Speaker’s support A secure network is of the utmost importance. Labour welcomes the Bill’s intention while recognising its limitations. I am pleased that the Lords amendments that we are discussing reflect issues that Labour has been raising Lords amendment 1 seeks to improve transparency in the use of the Secretary of State’s powers to issue codes of practice to communications providers through the negative procedure. It reflects amendments that we tabled in Committee in response to the sweeping powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State and Ofcom. As the Comms Council UK said, "the Minister will be able to unilaterally make decisions that impact the technical operation and direction of technology companies, with little or no oversight or accountability." The House has a duty to ensure that those powers are proportionate and accountable, so we are happy that the Government have bowed to pressure from Labour to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, even if, in our view, it does not go far enough. Two consequential amendments to Lords amendment 1 set out the conditions for the 40-day scrutiny period and ensure that that time cannot be disrupted by recess or Prorogation so that this House and the other place have sufficient time to scrutinise the code Lords amendment 5 is cross party and designed to ensure that the Government review a vendor that is banned in a Five Eyes country. We support the amendment and find the Government’s opposition concerning, as we believe it could threaten our national security I find the Minister’s arguments against the amendment somewhat confused. She claims that the amendment is unnecessary because we already monitor Five Eyes countries and would always respond to the actions of our closest intelligence partners, but if that is true, why not formalise it? We are stronger together, specifically with our Five Eyes allies. Instead of putting forward further arguments, I turn to the eloquent explanation of Conservative peer Lord Blencathra: "All it asks the Government to do…is to review the security arrangements with a telecoms provider if one of our vital, strategic Five Eyes partners bans its equipment. We are not calling for a similar immediate ban, or an eventual ban, we are just saying let us review it and come to a conclusion."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 October 2021; Vol. 815, c. 99.] We will support the amendment Lords amendment 4 requires the Secretary of State to report on the diversification strategy’s impact on the security of telecommunications networks. It would also allow for a debate in this House on the report to further strengthen parliamentary scrutiny. Labour supports the removal of high-risk vendors from our telecoms networks, and given the grave situation into which successive Conservative Governments have allowed our networks to fall, it is essential that the Government have the powers to remove Huawei at speed. However, we are left with only two providers, and as we heard repeatedly at every stage of this Bill’s progression, two providers is not diverse, is not resilient and is not secure We cannot ensure national security without a diverse supply chain, but I fear that the Government still just do not get it. Let me just take two of the Minister’s arguments. The first argument seems to be, as far as I could comprehend it, that requiring reporting would be "restrictive and premature", but surely if the Government’s intention is to diversify the supply chain—and we have heard that we cannot have a secure network without a diversified supply chain—the only way a reporting requirement would be limiting is if the Government have no actual intention of doing anything about diversifying it The Minister’s second argument seems to be that this is too technologically specific. Lords amendment 4 says: "The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the impact of progress of the diversification of the telecommunications supply chain on the security of public electronic communication networks and services." Would the Minister tell me what in that is specific as to the technology? Indeed, the only specific aspect of technology is a requirement to include future technologies that may be used as a platform, such as cloud computing. I find the Minister’s reasons for not supporting this amendment concerning. I fear that the Government are just not serious about diversifying our supply chain, and that they do not really have a plan for it The Minister mentioned asking parliamentary questions. Just last week, I asked her what funding was available for 5G diversification, and she talked about "a Future RAN Competition (FRANC) and opening the doors of the SmartRAN Open Network Interoperability Centre (SONIC Labs)." I want to know how diversification is being achieved and how local sovereign UK capability is being built, not an acronym soup that is ad hoc, hard to digest and dangerously complacent.