paragraph: On May 29, at Tenet's request, Rice and Tenet converted their usual weekly meeting into a broader discussion on al Qaeda; participants included Clarke, CTC chief Cofer Black, and "Richard," a group chief with authority over the  Bin Laden unit. Rice asked about "taking the offensive" and whether any approach could be made to influence  Bin Laden or the Taliban. Clarke and Black replied that the CIA's ongoing disruption activities were "taking the offensive" and that  Bin Laden could not be deterred. A wide-ranging discussion then ensued about "breaking the back" of  Bin Laden's organization. Tenet emphasized the ambitious plans for covert action that the CIA had developed in December 2000. In discussing the draft authorities for this program in March, CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned for these plans was larger than the CIA's entire current budget for counterterrorism covert action. It would be a multiyear program, requiring such levels of spending for about five years. The CIA official, "Richard," told us that Rice "got it." He said she agreed with his conclusions about what needed to be done, although he complained to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly enough. Clarke and Black were asked to develop a range of options for attacking  Bin Laden's organization, from the least to most ambitious. Rice and Hadley asked Clarke and his staff to draw up the new presidential directive. On June 7, Hadley circulated the first draft, describing it as "an admittedly ambitious" program for confronting al Qaeda. The draft NSPD's goal was to "eliminate the al Qida network of terrorist groups as a threat to the United States and to friendly governments." It called for a multiyear effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts. The State Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda sanctuaries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist financing. The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program including significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups. The draft also tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were found in U.S. budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006. Rice viewed this draft directive as the embodiment of a comprehensive new strategy employing all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda threat. 
question: How many days was it between the original meeting and Hadley's first draft?
answer: 9 days (May 29 to June 7)