apol/agency-transfer-policy-atlas huggingface dataset:
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Demonstrates a direct model-service trigger based on influence and mobilisation capability
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Enhanced review of cloud–frontier-model partnerships is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: implemented case-by-case
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Enhanced review of cloud–frontier-model partnerships targets Scrutinise equity, exclusivity, control, information sharing, compute commitments and preferential distribution in AI partnerships at compute and capital concentration → cloud–model alliance → model and distribution control → dependent firms and publics → concentrated epistemic power; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Limits vertical structures that concentrate compute, models, distribution and safety evidence in the same actors
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Mechanism): Model and cloud portability, interoperability and anti-lock-in rules targets Reduce egress barriers, support model switching and multi-provider interfaces, and prevent self-preferencing or coercive tying at platform dependency → dominant provider → default model and assistant → organisations and citizens → infrastructural reliance → agency concentration; expected agency domain: Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Preserves contestability and reduces dependence on one provider’s model, safeguards and epistemic defaults
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Public-interest compute for independent evaluation and safer alternatives is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: CalCompute planning mandated; other public programmes operational
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Public-interest compute for independent evaluation and safer alternatives targets Fund public compute capacity for evaluators, academia, civil society and public-interest model development at compute concentration → limited independent evidence → provider dominance → weak oversight → concentrated model and epistemic power; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Makes external APE, MASK, agentic and open-weight evaluation technically feasible and supports plural model supply
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Open benchmark commons and standardised public evaluation registry is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: partially implemented
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Open benchmark commons and standardised public evaluation registry targets Publish versioned evaluation code, model metadata, scoring specifications, uncertainty and reproducible release-level results at opaque provider testing → public benchmark infrastructure → comparable evidence → procurement and regulatory decisions → reduced information asymmetry; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Model behavior / capability
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — mechanism or proposal only. Expected effect if the control works: Makes capability and safeguard trends independently auditable across closed, open and modified models
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Plausible hypothesis because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Election-specific systemic-risk assessment and mitigation for very large platforms and search engines is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: In force; guidelines are the current compliance benchmark
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Election-specific systemic-risk assessment and mitigation for very large platforms and search engines targets Require VLOPs and VLOSEs to assess election-specific risks from service design, ranking, advertising, generative AI, coordinated manipulation and local context; deploy mitigations before the electoral period, maintain an incident mechanism and publish a post-election review. at AI-enabled campaign or state actor → platform design and ranking → voter exposure and salience → belief, attention or trust change → agency transfer to campaign and platform → concentrated agenda-setting → electoral distortion.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Attentional; Evaluative; Decisional; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Moves governance upstream from takedowns to product design, staffing, language coverage, recommender controls and election readiness.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Recommender-system transparency for online platforms is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: DSA Article 27 recommender transparency for online platforms; the Article 38 non-profiling option is separated into I-084.
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Recommender-system transparency for online platforms targets Disclose in clear language the main recommender parameters and users' options to modify or influence them under DSA Article 27. The non-profiling option is coded separately under I-084. at Platform optimisation → personalised feed → repeated political exposure → attention and preference shaping → agency transfer to platform → concentrated control of the decision environment.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Attentional; Evaluative; Decisional; Relational.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Creates an exit from inferred-vulnerability targeting and gives users some control over how political attention is allocated.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Ban on manipulative interface design and dark patterns is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: In force
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Ban on manipulative interface design and dark patterns targets Prohibit online-platform interfaces that deceive, manipulate, or materially distort users' ability to make free and informed decisions. at Platform or campaign-controlled interface → deceptive choice architecture → reduced reflection or coerced disclosure → behavioural or dependency change → agency transfer → platform power concentration.; expected agency domain: Evaluative; Decisional; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Human immediate outcome
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): In a 40-participant United States within-subject field experiment using injected cookie-consent notices during normal browsing, removing the first-page Reject all button increased acceptance by 22.0 percentage points for barrier notices and 23.1 percentage points for banner notices.
Endpoint: Binary acceptance of injected cookie-consent notices under a first-page button-prominence manipulation.
Evidence origin: External empirical
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-13
Notes: The study did not test a regulatory ban or causally estimate whether button prominence changed alignment with participants' ideal privacy preferences, actual data disclosure, legal compliance, political behaviour, or agency transfer; the published confidence interval for the banner estimate is internally inconsistent.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Online-platform ad transparency and sensitive-data targeting limits is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: DSA Article 26 ad transparency and sensitive-data targeting limits for online platforms; Article 39 repositories are VLOP/VLOSE-only.
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Online-platform ad transparency and sensitive-data targeting limits targets Identify advertisements and sponsors, disclose key targeting parameters, and prohibit ad profiling using special-category data under DSA Article 26. The DSA Article 39 repository is VLOP/VLOSE-only; the broader political-ad repository is coded under P4-049. at Campaign or proxy → opaque paid targeting → selected vulnerable voter → preference or turnout change → agency transfer to campaign and ad platform → unequal political power.; expected agency domain: Evaluative; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Makes paid influence more observable and reduces direct use of sensitive traits for personalised persuasion.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Vetted researcher access to non-public platform data is coded Binding — limited scope / Applicable. Scope: Conditional Article 40 data access for designated VLOPs/VLOSEs, subject to reasoned requests and safeguards.
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Vetted researcher access to non-public platform data targets Allow qualified independent researchers to request necessary VLOP and VLOSE data to identify systemic risks and evaluate mitigation, through Digital Services Coordinator vetting and a common portal. at Opaque platform data → weak external detection → unchecked optimisation and influence → hidden agency transfer; researcher access interrupts this by making exposure, coordination and mitigation auditable.; expected agency domain: Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Enables measurement of recommender exposure, cross-account coordination and whether safeguards work, closing the central evidence gap in Part 3.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Annual independent audits of systemic-risk and code commitments is coded Mixed / Applicable. Scope: In force; Code commitments auditable from 2025-07-01
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Annual independent audits of systemic-risk and code commitments targets Require annual independent audits of VLOP/VLOSE compliance, including risk controls and, for adherents, auditable Code of Conduct on Disinformation commitments. at Platform self-governance → unverified safeguards → persistent manipulation capacity → agency transfer; external assurance raises the cost of superficial controls.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Evaluative; Relational.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Creates recurring scrutiny of whether claimed election safeguards are implemented and effective.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Pre-election stress tests, readiness dialogues and regulator election toolkits is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Operational best practice; used in EU elections and Moldova
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Pre-election stress tests, readiness dialogues and regulator election toolkits targets Run scenario exercises with platforms, election bodies, regulators, security actors and civil society; test escalation paths, local-language capacity and platform responses before voting. at Emerging AI-enabled incident → fragmented detection and authority → delayed response → rapid belief or turnout effects → temporary agency seizure; stress tests pre-wire coordination.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Executive; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Reduces coordination latency and exposes gaps before a late-breaking deepfake, coordinated network or false voting claim appears.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Mandatory labels, sponsor notices and an EU repository for political advertising is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: Applicable since 2025-10-10
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Mandatory labels, sponsor notices and an EU repository for political advertising targets Require each paid or targeted political ad to be labelled and linked to a notice naming the sponsor, election, remuneration, spend and targeting; transmit online ads to a European repository and accelerate complaint handling near elections. at Sponsor or proxy → covert paid communication → voter → hidden persuasion → agency transfer to sponsor → concentrated political influence; disclosure restores source contestability.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Evaluative; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Makes who paid, how much and why a voter was reached visible to voters, regulators and researchers.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Restrict personal-data political-ad targeting and prohibit special-category profiling is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: Regulation 2024/900 restricts personal-data political targeting and prohibits special-category profiling; it is not a blanket microtargeting ban.
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Restrict personal-data political-ad targeting and prohibit special-category profiling targets Permit personal-data-based political targeting only when data were collected from the person and separate explicit consent was obtained; prohibit profiling using special-category data and targeting known near-voting-age minors. at Campaign data broker → vulnerability inference and microtargeting → individual voter → tailored pressure or preference shaping → agency transfer to campaign → asymmetric democratic power.; expected agency domain: Evaluative; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Cuts the Cambridge Analytica pathway from intimate or political data to personalised influence without meaningful voter consent.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Three-month pre-election ban on political-ad services for third-country sponsors is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: Applicable since 2025-10-10
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Three-month pre-election ban on political-ad services for third-country sponsors targets Prohibit political advertising services for sponsors outside the EU during the three months before an election or referendum in a Member State. at Foreign state or proxy → paid distribution → domestic electorate → agenda or trust change → agency transfer abroad → external concentration of electoral influence.; expected agency domain: Evaluative; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Raises the cost of overt foreign paid influence during the highest-risk period.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Machine-readable marking of AI-generated content and visible deepfake disclosure is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: Binding Article 50 duties from 2026-08-02; voluntary code is an implementation route. Limited transition to 2026-12-02 for Article 50(2) pre-existing generators.
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Direct
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Machine-readable marking of AI-generated content and visible deepfake disclosure targets Require providers to mark synthetic outputs in machine-readable form and deployers to disclose deepfakes and certain AI-generated public-interest text; use an EU code and common icons to standardise compliance. at Generative model or campaign → synthetic impersonation → voter → false source belief or trust shock → agency transfer to fabricator → electoral harm; provenance and disclosure restore source knowledge.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Supports cross-platform detection and visible disclosure of synthetic candidate or election content.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Auditable platform commitments on demonetisation, bots, fake accounts, impersonation, deepfakes and recommender integrity is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Integrated into DSA framework in 2025; commitments auditable since 2025-07-01; first co-regulatory reports published 2026-03-24
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Auditable platform commitments on demonetisation, bots, fake accounts, impersonation, deepfakes and recommender integrity targets Commit signatories to cut disinformation revenue, label and archive political ads, detect fake accounts and bot amplification, address impersonation and malicious deepfakes, support fact-checkers, improve recommender transparency and report service-level indicators. at Malicious actor → coordinated accounts and monetised amplification → platform audience → repeated exposure and trust erosion → agency transfer to network controller → concentrated narrative power.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Attentional; Relational.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Targets distribution infrastructure and coordinated behaviour rather than adjudicating every political claim.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Time-bound election Rapid Response System for platform escalation is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Operational since the 2024 European Parliament election and reused in later elections
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Time-bound election Rapid Response System for platform escalation targets Allow authorised non-platform signatories, fact-checkers and civil society to rapidly flag severe, time-sensitive content, accounts or trends and discuss response with platforms under their policies. at Late-breaking synthetic or coordinated incident → rapid spread → no time for ordinary review → belief, turnout or legitimacy shock → temporary agency transfer; an escalation lane compresses response time.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Creates a trusted, fast channel for the final hours when ordinary notice systems are too slow.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, European Centre for Democratic Resilience and reinforced election coordination is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Launched 2026-02-24; operational design still maturing
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): European Centre for Democratic Resilience and reinforced election coordination targets Pool Member State, EU and civil-society expertise to anticipate, detect and respond to FIMI and disinformation; connect election networks, DSA data access, political-ad data and operational response. at Cross-border actor → fragmented national signals → delayed attribution and response → accumulating trust and agenda effects → agency transfer to hostile actor; pooled awareness reverses the asymmetry.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Addresses cross-platform and cross-border coordination gaps and can turn dispersed signals into a common operational picture.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Mandatory digital imprints on paid political material and specified organic campaign material is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: In force since November 2023; guidance updated in 2026
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Mandatory digital imprints on paid political material and specified organic campaign material targets Require covered digital material, including social posts, online ads, podcasts and publicly distributed messaging-app content, to state who promoted and on whose behalf it was published. at Campaign or third party → unattributed digital communication → voter → mistaken source trust → agency transfer to hidden promoter → opaque political power.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Preserves contestability by letting voters and regulators identify the responsible campaign actor.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Systemic platform duties for criminal foreign-interference content is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: Illegal-content duties in force from 2025-03-17
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Systemic platform duties for criminal foreign-interference content targets Treat the National Security Act foreign-interference offence as a priority offence, requiring in-scope services to assess risk, prevent users encountering illegal material and minimise its availability; Ofcom can impose major fines and disruption measures. at Foreign power or proxy → covert online conduct → UK voters and institutions → trust, behaviour or legitimacy change → agency transfer abroad → democratic harm.; expected agency domain: Decisional; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Creates a systemic duty to act on covert hostile-state operations rather than relying only on voluntary moderation.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Election-authority deepfake detection and impact-monitoring pilot is coded Voluntary / private / Pilot. Scope: Pilot ran around the May 2026 elections; full findings due autumn 2026
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Election-authority deepfake detection and impact-monitoring pilot targets Monitor online audio and video for false candidate depictions or election-process claims, track reach, coordinate corrections or requested takedowns, and refer serious content to police or other bodies. at AI generator → candidate or authority impersonation → voter → false belief or suppressed participation → agency transfer to fabricator; detection and authoritative correction interrupt spread.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Model behavior / capability
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — mechanism or proposal only. Expected effect if the control works: Gives the election authority an early-warning picture and a route to authenticate candidate or process claims.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Plausible hypothesis because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Mechanism): Statutory political-ad libraries and regulator/researcher access to platform exposure data targets Require every platform carrying political ads to maintain a comprehensive library with sponsor, targeting, actual reach and spend, and create meaningful data access for regulators and independent researchers. at Opaque platform ads and ranking → unobservable targeting and amplification → voter influence → agency transfer → no accountability; access makes the pathway measurable.; expected agency domain: Attentional; Evaluative; Decisional; Relational.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Would close the UK's reliance on voluntary, inconsistent libraries and make algorithmic political reach auditable.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Treat AI-cloned voices in robocalls as artificial voices requiring consent is coded Binding / Applicable. Scope: In force; applied in the New Hampshire robocall matter
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Treat AI-cloned voices in robocalls as artificial voices requiring consent targets Apply TCPA consent and identification rules to AI-generated or cloned voices classified as artificial or prerecorded voices, subject to statutory exemptions. at Campaign operative → cloned candidate voice → mass calls → false instruction or turnout suppression → agency transfer to caller → electoral harm.; expected agency domain: Multiple / context-dependent.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Uses mature robocall law to impose consent and enforcement costs on a high-risk impersonation vector.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Apply federal fraudulent-misrepresentation rules to AI that falsely claims campaign authority is coded Binding / Partial / verify. Scope: Interpretive rule adopted; broader AI rulemaking declined in 2024
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Apply federal fraudulent-misrepresentation rules to AI that falsely claims campaign authority targets Clarify that existing law can cover AI communications where a candidate or agent falsely purports to speak, act or fundraise on behalf of another candidate or party; it does not generally prohibit false depictions with a truthful disclaimer. at Candidate or agent → AI impersonation of rival campaign authority → voter or donor → source deception → agency transfer to impersonator → electoral or financial harm.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Executive.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): None — legal existence only. Expected effect if the control works: Protects authentic campaign authority and donations from a limited class of AI impersonation.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Open question
Directness: None
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Open question because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Mechanism): On-air and political-file disclosure of AI-generated content in broadcast political ads targets Require radio and television political ads using AI-generated content to carry an on-air notice and a written disclosure in the station's political file. at Campaign → synthetic broadcast ad → mass audience → false authenticity belief → agency transfer to advertiser → electoral influence.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Evaluative.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Would make synthetic content visible in legacy mass media and create an inspectable record.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Mechanism): Platform duty to remove or label materially deceptive election deepfakes during a defined election window targets California AB 2655 required large platforms to block specified deceptive election content or label it, provide reporting channels and respond within short timeframes. at AI creator → viral candidate or election deepfake → voter → false belief → agency transfer to creator → electoral harm; platform action attempts to stop distribution.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: The intended effect was rapid reduction of deceptive synthetic reach; the actual contribution is a warning that broad platform-liability designs can collapse under intermediary-liability and speech law.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, End-to-end cryptographic provenance and interoperable Content Credentials is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: C2PA 2.2 published May 2025; adoption expanding but incomplete
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): End-to-end cryptographic provenance and interoperable Content Credentials targets Bind signed assertions about origin and edit history to media, preserve or recover credentials across transformations, and display provenance at consumption. at Creator or model → media asset → platform and voter → uncertainty about source and edits → exploitable trust asymmetry; provenance restores verifiable history and contestability.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Decisional; Relational.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Authenticates known-good media and carries origin information across the supply chain, stronger than unreliable deepfake detection alone.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Election-specific human-rights risk assessment for digital platforms is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Published and being used in implementation initiatives
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Election-specific human-rights risk assessment for digital platforms targets Require or encourage platforms to perform an election-cycle risk assessment, engage election administrators and civil society, assess design changes and take enhanced measures during elections and crises. at Platform product decision → altered amplification or access → electoral public → rights and agency effects → power concentration; assessment inserts rights review before deployment.; expected agency domain: Attentional; Decisional; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Offers a rights-based baseline for countries without a DSA-style regime and frames elections as a heightened-risk period.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Political-party code for ethical digital campaigning and AI use is coded Voluntary / private / Partial / verify. Scope: Signed by European political parties in 2024; model available for national adaptation
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Political-party code for ethical digital campaigning and AI use targets Secure public commitments by parties not to create, use or disseminate deceptive synthetic content or manipulative campaign techniques, to label AI use, protect cybersecurity and disclose campaign practices. at Party or campaign → AI-enabled content or targeting → electorate → preference or trust change → agency transfer to campaign → electoral advantage; party commitments constrain the controller directly.; expected agency domain: Evaluative; Relational; Collective / institutional.
Endpoint: Mechanism / agency
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Plausible hypothesis
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.
Claim (Control effectiveness): Indirect / mixed. Expected effect if the control works: Reaches party behaviour that platform rules cannot fully observe and establishes a public norm against agency-undermining tactics.
Endpoint: Control effectiveness
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Do not upgrade this claim from Strong inference because a legal duty or risk mechanism exists.
Claim (Legal status / scope): As of 2026-08-11, Forwarding limits and forwarded-message friction in encrypted messaging is coded Voluntary / private / Operational voluntary. Scope: Operational
Endpoint: Legal existence
Evidence origin: Legal / operational precedent
Epistemic status: Strong inference
Directness: Indirect
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Legal status never implies control effectiveness.
Claim (Mechanism): Forwarding limits and forwarded-message friction in encrypted messaging targets Limit forwarding to five chats and restrict already or highly forwarded messages to one chat at a time, while attaching forwarded labels. at Campaign network → encrypted mass forwarding → trusted peer groups → belief and mobilisation change → agency transfer to network organiser → concentrated hidden reach.; expected agency domain: Epistemic; Attentional; Relational.
Endpoint: Human immediate outcome
Evidence origin: Normative proposal
Epistemic status: Established evidence
Directness: Conditional
As of: 2026-08-11
Notes: Mechanism claim is distinct from evidence that the control works.