Question: Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States, and the court had previously held in "Batson v. Kentucky" a case in which year?
Context: Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a criminal "defendant" cannot make peremptory challenges based solely on race.  The court had previously held in "Batson v. Kentucky" (1986) that prosecutors cannot make peremptory challenges based on race, but didn't address whether defendants could use them.  The court had already ruled in "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company" (1991) that the "Batson" prohibition also applies to civil litigants because they are state actors during the jury selection process. J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel.  T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that making peremptory challenges based solely on a prospective juror's sex is unconstitutional.  "J.E.B." extended the court's existing precedent in "Batson v. Kentucky" (1986), which found race-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials unconstitutional, and "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company" (1991), which extended that principle to civil trials.  As in "Batson", the court found that sex-based challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) was a United States Supreme Court decision regarding school prayer.  It was the first major school prayer case decided by the Rehnquist Court.  It ruled that schools may not sponsor clerics to conduct even non-denominational prayer.  The Court followed a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause that had been standard for decades at the nation's highest court, a reaffirmation of the principles of such landmark cases as "Engel v. Vitale", 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and "Abington v. Schempp", 374 U.S. 203 (1963) . Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 415 (1793) , was a United States Supreme Court case continuing the case of "Georgia v. Brailsford" (1792).  Here, the court held that "upon a motion to dissolve that injunction, this court held that, if the state of Georgia had the title in the debt, (upon which no opinion was then expressed,) she had an adequate remedy at law by action upon the bond; but, in order that the money might be kept for the party to whom it belonged, ordered the injunction to be continued till the next term, and, if Georgia should not then have instituted her action at common law, to be dissolved." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) , was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the constitutionality of several Pennsylvania state statutory provisions regarding abortion was challenged.  The Court's plurality opinion reaffirmed the central holding of "Roe v. Wade" stating that "matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."  The Court's plurality opinion upheld the constitutional right to have an abortion while altering the standard for analyzing restrictions on that right, crafting the "undue burden" standard for abortion restrictions.  "Planned Parenthood v. Casey" differs from "Roe," however, because under "Roe" the state could not regulate abortions in the first trimester whereas under "Planned Parenthood v. Casey" the state can regulate abortions in the first trimester, or any point before the point of viability, and beyond as long as that regulation does not pose an undue burden on women's fundamental right to an abortion.  Applying this new standard of review, the Court upheld four regulations and invalidated the requirement of spousal notification. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Supreme Court unanimously struck down St. Paul, Minnesota's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance and reversed the conviction of a teenager, referred to in court documents only as R.A.V., for burning a cross on the lawn of an African American family for violating the First Amendment's protections for freedom of expression. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) , was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenge in a criminal case—the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so—may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race.  The Court ruled that this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The case gave rise to the term "Batson challenge", an objection to a peremptory challenge based on the standard established by the Supreme Court's decision in this case.  Subsequent jurisprudence has resulted in the extension of "Batson" to civil cases ("Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company") and cases where jurors are excluded on the basis of sex ("J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.  T.B."). Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991) , was a United States Supreme Court case which held that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on the basis of race in civil trials.  "Edmonson" extended the court's similar decision in "Batson v. Kentucky" (1986), a criminal case.  The Court applied the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as determined in "Bolling v. Sharpe" (1954), in finding that such race-based challenges violated the Constitution. Forsyth County, Georgia v.  The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) was a case in which the United States Supreme Court limited the ability of local governments to charge fees for the use of public places for private activities.  By 5-4, the court ruled that an ordinance allowing the local government to set varying fees for different events violated the First Amendment due to the lack of "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards" governing the amount of the fee. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) , is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court found that a three-judge federal district court panel did not consider all of the requisite relevant factors when it examined whether the 2001 Georgia State Senate redistricting plan resulted in retrogression of black voters’ effective exercise of the electoral franchise in contravention of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  Section 5, which only applies to those states or political subdivisions that are considered “covered” under Section 4(b) of the VRA, requires that before any change in voting procedure can take effect, it must be precleared by the federal government by a demonstration that the change would not "lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”  The Court held that the district court analysis was incorrect “because it focused too heavily on the ability of the minority group to elect a candidate of its choice in the [safe] districts,” without giving proper consideration to other factors such as the state’s creation of additional influence and coalition districts.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to examine the facts using the new standard announced in its opinion.
Answer: 1986