Question: Did Brandenburg v. Ohio occur prior to Miranda v. Arizona?  
Context: Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) , is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that clarifies what constitutes "interrogation" for the purposes of "Miranda" warnings. Under "Miranda v. Arizona", police are forbidden from interrogating a suspect once he has asserted his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  In "Innis," the court held that interrogation is not just direct questioning but also its "functional equivalent"; namely, "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) , was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court.  In a 5–4 majority, the Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them. Advocacy and incitement are two categories of speech, the latter of which is a more specific type of the former directed to producing imminent lawless action and which is likely to incite or produce such action.  In the 1957 case "Yates v. United States", Justice John Marshall Harlan II ruled that only advocacy that constituted an "effort to instigate action" was punishable.  In the 1969 case "Brandenburg v. Ohio", the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a statute that punishes mere advocacy and forbids, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action, falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Justice Louis Brandeis argued in "Whitney v. California" that "even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) , upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule "Miranda v. Arizona" (1966). In U.S. law, the bad tendency principle is a test which permits restriction of freedom of speech by government if it is believed that a form of speech has a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity.  The principle, formulated in "Patterson v. Colorado", (1907) was seemingly overturned with the "clear and present danger" principle used in the landmark case "Schenck v. United States" (1919), as stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Yet eight months later, at the start of the next Term in "Abrams v. United States" (1919) the Court again used the bad tendency test to uphold the conviction of a Russian immigrant who published and distributed leaflets calling for a general strike and otherwise advocated revolutionary, anarchist, and socialist views.  Holmes dissented in "Abrams", explaining how the "clear and present danger test" should be employed to overturn Abrams' conviction.  The arrival of the "bad tendency" test resulted in a string of politically incorrect rulings such as Whitney v. California (1927), where a woman was convicted simply because of her association with the Communist Party.  The court ruled unanimously that although she had not committed any crimes, her relationship with the Communists represented a "bad tendency" and thus was unprotected.  The "bad tendency" test was finally overturned in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and was replaced by the "imminent lawless action" test. "Imminent lawless action" is a standard currently used that was established by the United States Supreme Court in "Brandenburg v. Ohio" (1969), for defining the limits of freedom of speech.  "Brandenburg" clarified what constituted a "clear and present danger", the standard established by "Schenck v. United States" (1919), and overruled "Whitney v. California" (1927), which had held that speech that merely advocated violence could be made illegal.  Under the imminent lawless action test, speech is not protected by the First Amendment if the speaker intends to incite a violation of the law that is both imminent and likely.  While the precise meaning of "imminent" may be ambiguous in some cases, the court provided later clarification in "Hess v. Indiana" (1973).  In this case, the court found that Hess's words did not fall outside the limits of protected speech, in part, because his speech "amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time," and therefore did not meet the imminence requirement. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) , was a United States Supreme Court case involving the First Amendment which reaffirmed and clarified the imminent lawless action test first articulated in "Brandenburg v. Ohio". " "Hess" continues to be cited by the courts to protect speech that threatens future lawless action." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) , applied the rule first announced in "Edwards v. Arizona" (1981) and clarified the manner in which a suspect may waive his right under "Miranda v. Arizona" (1966) to have counsel present during interrogation by the police. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) , 130 S.Ct.  2705, was a case decided in June 2010 by the United States Supreme Court regarding the USA PATRIOT Act's prohibition on providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations (18 U.S.C. § 2339B).  The case, petitioned by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, represents the only time in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence that a restriction on political speech has passed the "Brandenburg v. Ohio" test. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) , was a landmark United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The Court held that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."  Specifically, it struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence.  In the process, "Whitney v. California" (1927) was explicitly overruled, and doubt was cast on "Schenck v. United States" (1919), "Abrams v. United States" (1919), "Gitlow v. New York" (1925), and "Dennis v. United States" (1951).
Answer: no