CVE-2022-50661: seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

seccomp: Move copy_seccomp() to no failure path.

Our syzbot instance reported memory leaks in do_seccomp() [0], similar
to the report [1].  It shows that we miss freeing struct seccomp_filter
and some objects included in it.

We can reproduce the issue with the program below [2] which calls one
seccomp() and two clone() syscalls.

The first clone()d child exits earlier than its parent and sends a
signal to kill it during the second clone(), more precisely before the
fatal_signal_pending() test in copy_process().  When the parent receives
the signal, it has to destroy the embryonic process and return -EINTR to
user space.  In the failure path, we have to call seccomp_filter_release()
to decrement the filter's refcount.

Initially, we called it in free_task() called from the failure path, but
the commit 3a15fb6ed92c ("seccomp: release filter after task is fully
dead") moved it to release_task() to notify user space as early as possible
that the filter is no longer used.

To keep the change and current seccomp refcount semantics, let's move
copy_seccomp() just after the signal check and add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
free_task() for future debugging.

[0]:
unreferenced object 0xffff8880063add00 (size 256):
  comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.914s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ................
  backtrace:
    do_seccomp (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/seccomp.c:666 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffffc90000035000 (size 4096):
  comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    __vmalloc_node_range (mm/vmalloc.c:3226)
    __vmalloc_node (mm/vmalloc.c:3261 (discriminator 4))
    bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (kernel/bpf/core.c:91)
    bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
    bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
    do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888003fa1000 (size 1024):
  comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats (./include/linux/slab.h:600 ./include/linux/slab.h:733 kernel/bpf/core.c:95)
    bpf_prog_alloc (kernel/bpf/core.c:129)
    bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1414)
    do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888006360240 (size 16):
  comm "repro_seccomp", pid 230, jiffies 4294687090 (age 9.915s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    01 00 37 00 76 65 72 6c e0 83 01 06 80 88 ff ff  ..7.verl........
  backtrace:
    bpf_prog_store_orig_filter (net/core/filter.c:1137)
    bpf_prog_create_from_user (net/core/filter.c:1428)
    do_seccomp (kernel/seccomp.c:671 kernel/seccomp.c:708 kernel/seccomp.c:1871 kernel/seccomp.c:1991)
    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
unreferenced object 0xffff888
---truncated---