GHSA-8qm8-g55h-xmqr: WWBN AVideo is missing CSRF protection in objects/commentDelete.json.php enables mass comment deletion against moderators and content creators
Summary`objects/commentDelete.json.php` is a state-mutating JSON endpoint that deletes comments but performs no CSRF validation. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a CSRF/global token, and does not check `Origin`/`Referer`. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` (to support cross-origin embed players), a cross-site request from any attacker-controlled page automatically carries the victim's `PHPSESSID`. Any authenticated victim who has authority to delete one or more comments (site moderators, video owners, and comment authors) can be tricked into deleting comments en masse simply by visiting an attacker page.DetailsVulnerable endpoint: `objects/commentDelete.json.php`No `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, no `verifyToken()`, no token/nonce parameter, no `Origin`/`Referer` validation. The handler accepts `$_REQUEST`, so the request may be delivered as `GET` (e.g. via `<img src>`) or `POST` (e.g. via an auto-submitting form / `fetch`).Authorization inside `Comment::delete()` does not stop CSRFThis check is exactly what CSRF abuses: it asks "is the session user allowed to delete this comment?" In a CSRF attack, the session user is the victim, and yes — the victim is allowed. So the check grants the request.Site-wide cookie policy makes cross-site delivery reliableThe in-source comment is explicit: because AVideo intentionally opts out of SameSite protection, every state-mutating endpoint is responsible for its own CSRF defense. `commentDelete.json.php` forgets to apply it. The canonical example that does get it right is `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18`:A repository-wide grep for `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest` yields only `objects/userUpdate.json.php` and the function definition itself — no shared middleware exists, and no bootstrap in `configuration.php` / `include_config.php` wraps endpoints with a CSRF check.Attacker model / victim value**Site moderators** (any account with `Permissions::canAdminComment()`): full-site comment deletion oracle.**Video creators** (channel owners): deletion oracle for every comment on their own videos.**Comment authors**: only their own comments (self-DoS, low value).The first two classes make this a real integrity/availability attack on community content.PoCAssume the target AVideo instance runs at `https://victim.example.com` and the victim is a logged-in moderator (or any video owner). The attacker hosts:Manual verification of the server-side handler with the victim's own cookie (demonstrates that the endpoint itself performs the delete with no token):The `{"status":true,"error":false}` response confirms the row was deleted; compare with `objects/userUpdate.json.php` under the same Origin/Referer, which returns the "Invalid Request" forbidden page from `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`.ImpactCross-site mass deletion of comments.Against a site moderator (`Permissions::canAdminComment()`), the attacker can permanently delete every comment on the platform — a severe content-integrity and availability hit on the community layer.Against any channel owner, the attacker can wipe all discussion under that creator's videos, a targeted reputation / engagement attack (e.g., silence dissent, silence evidence of prior posts).The attack only requires luring a logged-in victim to any page that can fetch/embed/submit — a forum post, a compromised ad, a link in email, a rogue embed.No credential compromise is required; the attack does not leak data, but it destroys it.Because SameSite=None is a deliberate, documented product decision, browser-side defenses do not intervene.Recommended FixApply the project's own prescribed CSRF pattern to the handler. Two layers are appropriate:Require an authenticated session and reject untrusted-origin requests (same treatment as `userUpdate.json.php`).Restrict the method to `POST` so drive-by `<img>` and navigational `GET` deliveries cannot reach the sink.Stronger (recommended): also require a short-lived global token via `verifyToken()` as the in-source comment in `objects/include_config.php` prescribes, and audit every other `objects/*.json.php` handler that performs a write — the same omission likely affects additional endpoints and should be handled project-wide, ideally through a shared bootstrap that enforces `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` for any `json.php` that mutates state.
CVSS v3.1: 5.4