GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3: Network-AI missing authentication on MCP HTTP endpoint, which allows unauthenticated privileged tool calls
Security Advisory: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in `Jovancoding/Network-AI`| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Project | `Jovancoding/Network-AI` |
| Repository | https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI |
| Affected commit | `c344f2053eb0d49395988f803bf92f2a86b2a0d0` |
| Affected tested version | `5.1.2` |
| Vulnerability type | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function |
| Severity | High |
| Authentication required | None |
| Default network exposure | Bind address `0.0.0.0` |
| Reporter validation date | 2026-04-21 |SummaryThe MCP HTTP transport accepts JSON-RPC `tools/call` requests with no authentication, session, origin, or token check, and dispatches them directly to the orchestrator's tool registry. The default bind address is `0.0.0.0`. As a result, any party with network reachability to the service can enumerate and invoke privileged management tools — including reading and mutating the live orchestrator configuration, listing registered agents, dispatching agents, creating/revoking security tokens, and adjusting global budget ceilings.Affected Code`bin/mcp-server.ts:75` — server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default.`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:155` — `handleRPC()` dispatches `tools/call` directly to the provider's `call(toolName, toolArgs)`.`lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:379` — `_handlePost()` parses the JSON-RPC body and calls `this._bridge.handleRPC(rpc)` with no auth check.`lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:80` — `config_get` exposes live runtime configuration.`lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:197` — `agent_list` exposes registered agents.`lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:231` — `config_set` mutates runtime configuration in place: `this._config[key] = parsed`.Proof of ConceptThe PoC was executed against a local Docker build of the affected commit, bound to `http://localhost:13001`. **No authentication header was sent.** All inner-JSON excerpts below are decoded from the JSON-RPC `result.content[0].text` field for readability; the raw wire transcripts (which contain the literal escaped JSON-RPC envelope) are in `evidence/`.Step 1 — list exposed tools (unauthenticated)`HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — body returned 22 tools. Privileged tools observed in the inventory include:`config_get`, `config_set` — read and mutate live orchestrator configuration`agent_list`, `agent_spawn`, `agent_stop` — enumerate, dispatch, and stop agents`token_create`, `token_revoke` — mint and revoke security tokens`budget_set_ceiling` — adjust the global token budget ceiling`fsm_transition` — drive finite-state-machine transitions`blackboard_write`, `blackboard_delete` — mutate the shared blackboardFull transcript: `evidence/01_get_tools.txt`.Step 2 — read live configuration (unauthenticated)`HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON:Full transcript: `evidence/02_config_get_before.txt`.Step 3 — mutate live configuration (unauthenticated)`HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON:Full transcript: `evidence/03_config_set.txt`.Step 4 — confirm mutation persisted (unauthenticated)`HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON (relevant key only):This proves the runtime change applied by step 3 is observable on the next read. Full transcript: `evidence/04_config_get_after.txt`.Step 5 — enumerate registered agents (unauthenticated)`HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON:This is a privileged management read; the empty array reflects the test environment, not a control. Full transcript: `evidence/05_agent_list.txt`.Cleanup — runtime state restoredAfter the PoC, `defaultTimeout` was restored to `30000` via the same unauthenticated `config_set` (`previous":12345,"current":30000,"applied":true`). All testing was performed against a local Docker container only.ImpactUnauthenticated network access enables full enumeration and invocation of the orchestrator's management functionality.An attacker can change runtime configuration (e.g., `defaultTimeout`, `enableTracing`), dispatch or stop agents, mutate the shared blackboard, mint or revoke security tokens, and adjust global budget ceilings.The default `0.0.0.0` bind, combined with the absence of any auth gate, increases the likelihood of accidental exposure on any host with a routable interface.Suggested RemediationEnforce authentication inside `_handlePost()` before reaching `handleRPC()`. At a minimum, require a shared secret / bearer token loaded from configuration; reject any request that does not present it.Default the bind address to `127.0.0.1`. Require an explicit configuration opt-in to bind to non-loopback interfaces, and warn on startup when binding outside loopback without an authentication mechanism configured.For tool-level defense in depth, gate state-mutating tools (`config_set`, `agent_spawn`, `agent_stop`, `token_create`, `token_revoke`, `budget_set_ceiling`, `fsm_transition`, `blackboard_write`, `blackboard_delete`) behind an explicit authorization check tied to a verified caller identity.Verification EnvironmentLocal Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.Local build required a minimal Dockerfile fix; the application code path under test was not modified.Runtime state (`defaultTimeout`) was restored to default after the PoC.Attached EvidenceFiles in `evidence/` are raw `curl -i` transcripts captured during the verification sequence above. They are provided as supplementary backup; the key excerpts are already inlined in this report.| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
|[01_get_tools.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950583/01_get_tools.txt) | Step 1 — full `GET /tools` request and 22-tool inventory response |
|[02_config_get_before.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950584/02_config_get_before.txt) | Step 2 — full `config_get` request and live configuration response |
|[03_config_set.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950585/03_config_set.txt) | Step 3 — full `config_set` request mutating `defaultTimeout` |
|[04_config_get_after.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950586/04_config_get_after.txt)| Step 4 — full `config_get` request showing the mutation persisted |
| [05_agent_list.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26950587/05_agent_list.txt) | Step 5 — full `agent_list` request and response |
CVSS v4.0: 8.7