GHSA-mm5f-8q57-4fc4: Video: Reflected XSS in plugin/Meet/iframe.php via Unescaped user and pass Parameters in JavaScript String Literal
Summary`plugin/Meet/iframe.php` echoes the attacker-controlled `user` and `pass` query parameters unescaped into a JavaScript double-quoted string literal inside a `<script>` block. An attacker who sends a victim to a crafted URL can break out of the string and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser in the context of the AVideo origin. No authentication is required if a public Meet schedule exists on the target.DetailsRoot cause is a two-step reflection with no escaping applied at the HTML/JS sink.**Step 1 — `User::loginFromRequestToGet()` at `objects/user.php:3363-3373`** returns the raw concatenation of `$_REQUEST['user']` and `$_REQUEST['pass']` with no URL-encoding, HTML-escaping, or other sanitization:**Step 2 — `plugin/Meet/iframe.php`** builds `$readyToClose` from that string and emits it into a JS string literal without escaping:Note that `xss_esc()` IS applied a few lines earlier to the adjacent `nameIdentification` parameter (line 45) — the developer knew about XSS here but missed `$userCredentials`. No call to `json_encode`, `htmlspecialchars`, `xss_esc`, or `rawurlencode` is applied to `$readyToClose`.**Reachability to unauthenticated users.** `plugin/Meet/validateMeet.php` gates on `Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason()` and `Meet::validatePassword()`:`Meet::canJoinMeetWithReason()` (`plugin/Meet/Meet.php:399-402`) returns `canJoin=true` for any visitor when the meet is public (`getPublic() == "2"`):`Meet::validatePassword()` (`plugin/Meet/Meet.php:595-618`) returns `true` when the meet has no password set.`validateMeet.php:27` only blocks unauthenticated users when `getPublic()` is empty.So an unauthenticated attacker can reach the sink against any public, no-password Meet schedule (the most common configuration). With a known password or moderator/admin role, all Meets are reachable.**Payload construction.** With `user=";}alert(1);function a(){"` and `pass=x`, the rendered script becomes:Parse flow:`document.location = "CHANNEL_URL?user=";` — assignment completes.`}` — closes `_readyToClose`.`alert(1);` — executes immediately at script parse/run time (does NOT require `_readyToClose` to be called).`function a(){"&pass=x";}` — declares a harmless function that absorbs the trailing garbage.PoC**Precondition:** one public Meet schedule with no password (or the attacker supplies `&meet_password=<known>` / is moderator/admin).Attacker sends victim the following URL:URL-decoded `user` payload: `";}alert(1);function a(){"`Server reflects the parameters unescaped into the script block on line 116.Victim's browser parses the script; `alert(1)` fires immediately on page load.Verification:The injected `";}alert(1);function a(){"` sequence appears verbatim in the response, closing the JS string and function and executing `alert(1)` at parse time.Realistic exploitation replaces `alert(1)` with a cookie-exfiltration payload:ImpactReflected XSS in the AVideo origin. An attacker who tricks a logged-in AVideo user into clicking a crafted link can:Steal the victim's session cookies / CSRF tokens (cookies are scoped to the AVideo root, not just `/plugin/Meet/`).Perform arbitrary authenticated actions as the victim (upload/delete videos, change profile, post comments, change email/password → account takeover).Pivot to admin takeover if the victim is an admin (admin endpoints are same-origin).Deliver phishing content under the trusted AVideo domain.The attack is unauthenticated on any install that has at least one public, no-password Meet schedule — which is the default configuration when a moderator creates an open meeting. Scope is Changed because XSS in a plugin subpath can exfiltrate session cookies of the broader AVideo application.Recommended FixApply JSON encoding at the sink in `plugin/Meet/iframe.php:116` so the string is always a valid JS literal regardless of its contents:Additionally, harden `User::loginFromRequestToGet()` (`objects/user.php:3363-3373`) to URL-encode the components so downstream sinks cannot be broken out of with `"`, `<`, or other control characters:Audit every other caller of `loginFromRequestToGet()` (and any other function that returns raw `$_REQUEST['user']` / `$_REQUEST['pass']`) for similar sinks.
CVSS v3.1: 6.1