GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f: TinyIce: Missing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthorized stream injection
TitleMissing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthenticated stream injection in TinyIceEcosystem / Package**Ecosystem:** `Go` (or "Other" — TinyIce is shipped as a Go binary, not a Go module published to a registry)**Package name:** `github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice`Affected versions(Introduced 2026-02-21 in commit `e2b60d6` — "debug: add Go Live connection tracing and backend data flow logging" — when `handleWebRTCSourceOffer` was registered at `/webrtc/source-offer` without an authentication check. Every tagged release from `v0.8.95` through `v2.4.1` ships the vulnerable handler.)Patched versionsSeverity**CVSS 3.1 base score:** 7.4 (High)**CVSS vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`**CWE:** [CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html)DescriptionTinyIce's WebRTC source-ingest HTTP endpoint, `POST /webrtc/source-offer?mount=<mount>`, accepted any inbound WebRTC SDP offer with no authentication check. The handler routed the offer to `WebRTCManager.HandleSourceOffer`, which then accepted whatever audio/video tracks the peer published and broadcast them on the named mount as if they were the legitimate source.The other ingest paths (`POST /<mount>` over HTTP/1 with the icecast `SOURCE` / `PUT` verb, RTMP, SRT) all require the per-mount source password, falling back to `default_source_password` from the config. The WebRTC ingest path didn't.ImpactA network attacker who can reach the TinyIce HTTP port can:Identify a target mount (mount names are public — they appear in the directory listing, the player URL, and the YP listing).Negotiate a WebRTC peer connection with the server.Publish arbitrary Opus / H.264 to that mount.Have it broadcast to every listener on the mount.This is a high-integrity-impact issue: an attacker can replace a radio's broadcast with their own audio (silence, noise, malicious content, branded competitor content, etc.). Listeners hear what the attacker sends, not what the legitimate publisher intended.The legitimate publisher can re-establish their session — TinyIce's source-takeover handshake gives the new offer priority once it arrives, with a 3-second drain of the previous pump goroutine — but the attacker can in principle re-connect immediately after, producing a sustained broadcast hijack until the operator manually intervenes (block at firewall, rotate source passwords once the patch is applied, restart the service).There is no direct confidentiality impact through this endpoint: the attacker doesn't gain access to listener data or other mounts' content.WorkaroundsIf users cannot upgrade immediately:**Recommended:** block `POST /webrtc/source-offer` at the reverse proxy in front of TinyIce. The endpoint has no production use case for clients outside the operator's own administration — disabling it loses no functionality unless the consuming application specifically use the browser-based "go-live" feature.Restrict TinyIce's HTTP port to a trusted network (VPN, internal LAN). Listener access can still be served via a separately-firewalled CDN if the application needs public listening.DetectionTo check whether an application's deployment is exposed, run from outside the network:If the response is `400 Bad Request` with a JSON body containing an SDP-parsing error from `pion/webrtc`, **a consuming application is vulnerable** — the server tried to negotiate the (malformed) offer without asking for credentials.If the response is `401 Unauthorized` (Basic auth challenge), the consuming application has been patched.Authenticated log lines on a patched server will look like:FixUpstream commit: [`8067d6b`](https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice/commit/8067d6b) "fix(api): require source password on /webrtc/source-offer + CSRF/access on /go-live-chunk".The handler now:Requires either HTTP Basic auth or a `?password=` query parameter.Compares the supplied password against the per-mount source password (or the `default_source_password` fallback) using bcrypt.Hooks into the existing brute-force IP rate-limiter (5 failed attempts per IP within 15 minutes triggers a lockout).Rejects requests for mounts in `disabled_mounts`.The same release also tightens an adjacent endpoint, `POST /admin/golive/chunk`, which previously required session authentication but did not verify the session user's per-mount access nor check the CSRF token.Timeline2026-02-21 — Vulnerable handler introduced (`e2b60d6`).2026-05-09 — Vulnerability identified during a maintainer-led audit.2026-05-09 — Patched in commit `8067d6b`, released as `v2.5.0`.2026-05-09 — GitHub Security Advisory published, CVE assigned.
CVSS v3.1: 8.2