GHSA-xcqx-9jf5-w339: SearXNG MCP Server: Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit in `web_url_read`
Unbounded Response Body Read Bypasses URL Size Limit in `web_url_read`SummaryThe `web_url_read` MCP tool in mcp-searxng enforces its 5 MiB response-size limit exclusively by inspecting the `Content-Length` header of a preliminary HEAD request. When a server omits `Content-Length` — a standard HTTP practice — `checkContentLength()` returns `null`, the guard condition short-circuits to `false`, and `response.text()` loads the entire response body into memory without any byte cap. An unauthenticated attacker who controls or can redirect to an HTTP endpoint can force the server process to consume unbounded memory and CPU, leading to a Denial of Service.Details`web_url_read` is the entry point (`src/index.ts:226-240`). It passes the caller-supplied URL directly into `readUrlContent()` in `src/url-reader.ts`.**Size-limit check (bypassed)**`checkContentLength()` (`src/url-reader.ts:243-245`) returns `null` when the HEAD response carries no `Content-Length` header. Because the guard uses the `!== null` conjunction, a `null` result causes the entire check to evaluate as `false`, and execution falls through without enforcing the configured 5 MiB ceiling.**Unbounded sinks**A full GET request is then issued (`src/url-reader.ts:367`) with no streaming byte cap:The full HTML string is subsequently passed to `NodeHtmlMarkdown.translate()` (`src/url-reader.ts:429`), which amplifies CPU consumption proportional to the body size.**Default exposure**`web_url_read` is enabled by default. In HTTP transport mode, authentication is disabled by default, so `AV:N/PR:N` applies unconditionally. In stdio mode, an attacker can trigger the path via prompt injection to cause the AI model to call the tool with an attacker-controlled URL.PoC**Prerequisites**Docker installed.Build context: the repository root (`npmAI_249_ihor-sokoliuk__mcp-searxng/`).**Build the image****Run the PoC**The container starts two processes:A malicious HTTP server on `127.0.0.1:9799` that responds to HEAD with HTTP 200 and **no `Content-Length`**, then responds to GET with a 6,291,456-byte HTML body and **no `Content-Length`**.mcp-searxng in HTTP mode (`MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=true` enables loopback URLs for local reproduction).The PoC script initializes an MCP session and calls:**Observed output (Phase 2 confirmation)****Remediation**Replace both `response.text()` calls with a streaming reader that aborts once the byte counter exceeds `maxContentLengthBytes`:ImpactThis is an **Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (DoS)** vulnerability. Any network-reachable attacker who can supply a URL to the `web_url_read` tool can force the mcp-searxng process to allocate memory proportional to an arbitrarily large HTTP response body and burn CPU during HTML-to-Markdown conversion. The attack requires no authentication in the default HTTP transport configuration. In stdio mode, the attack surface is accessible through prompt injection targeting the AI agent. Repeated or concurrent invocations can exhaust process memory and render the MCP server unavailable to all legitimate users.Reproduction artifacts`Dockerfile``poc.py`
CVSS v3.1: 7.5