GHSA-4q6h-8p4v-67vq: Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata
Summary`fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result.Details`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end:`config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable.The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string:The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string.Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase:`packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF).`packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop.`packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`.The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it.Proof of ConceptTested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361).Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase:Server response:Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check.Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range:Server response:The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error.ImpactTwo concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough):**Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply.**IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds.Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it.Recommended FixCall `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`:Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets.*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
CVSS v3.1: 8.5