GHSA-ph8x-4jfv-v9v8: Dagu has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27598: path traversal via %2F-encoded slashes in locateDAG
The fix for CVE-2026-27598 (commit e2ed589, PR #1691) added `ValidateDAGName` to `CreateNewDAG` and rewrote `generateFilePath` to use `filepath.Base`. This patched the CREATE path. The remaining API endpoints - GET, DELETE, RENAME, EXECUTE - all pass the `{fileName}` URL path parameter to `locateDAG` without calling `ValidateDAGName`. `%2F`-encoded forward slashes in the `{fileName}` segment traverse outside the DAGs directory.Vulnerable code`internal/persis/filedag/store.go`, lines 508-513:`findDAGFile` resolves the path with `filepath.Abs` and checks only that the file exists with a YAML extension. No containment check against `baseDir`.Chi v5 routes using `r.URL.RawPath` when set. The pattern `/dags/{fileName}/spec` captures `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Ftarget.yaml` as a single path segment. The oapi-codegen runtime calls `url.PathUnescape`, producing `../../etc/target.yaml`. This decoded string reaches `locateDAG` with the `/` separator intact.Go's `net/http.ServeMux` would normally redirect paths containing `..`, but dagu binds the chi mux directly to `&http.Server{Handler: r}` (server.go:833-834), so no path cleaning fires.Affected endpointsThe three confirmed impacts via `locateDAG`:| Endpoint | Impact |
|----------|--------|
| `GET /dags/{fileName}/spec` | Arbitrary `.yaml`/`.yml` file read (`os.ReadFile`) |
| `DELETE /dags/{fileName}` | Arbitrary `.yaml`/`.yml` file delete (`os.Remove`) |
| `POST /dags/{fileName}/start` | Load arbitrary YAML, execute as workflow |Same pattern affects all other `{fileName}` endpoints: `/dag-runs`, `/dag-runs/{id}`, `/rename`, `/start-sync`, `/enqueue`, and webhook handlers. `UpdateDAGSpec` is incidentally blocked by DAG name validation during YAML parsing - not a security check, just data integrity validation that happens to reject `/`.PoC**Store-level** (dagu v2.0.2, Go 1.26, macOS; `locateDAG` unchanged through v2.3.0):Output:**HTTP-level** (chi v5.2.2):Output:Chi captures `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` as one path segment via `RawPath`, oapi-codegen decodes `%2F` to `/`. Confirmed with chi v5.2.2.Affected versionsv2.0.0 through v2.3.0 (current latest, checked 2026-03-18).The `locateDAG` function with the `filepath.Separator` code path was introduced in commit 1557b14f (PR #1573) as part of the v2.0.0 rewrite.The CVE-2026-27598 fix (e2ed589) also landed in v2.0.0 - it patched `CreateNewDAG` but didn't address the new `locateDAG` code path that was introduced in the same release.Suggested fixAdd path containment to `locateDAG` rather than sprinkling `ValidateDAGName` across every handler. Reject names containing path separators for HTTP-facing callers. If the separator code path is needed for internal worker communication (PR #1573), split `locateDAG` into a validated public method (HTTP handlers) and an internal method (trusted callers only).ImpactAn authenticated user (or any user if `auth.mode=none`) can read or delete any `.yaml`/`.yml` file on the server filesystem that the process can access. K8s secrets stored as YAML, app configs, other DAG files.The execute endpoints also traverse via `locateDAG`, loading the target YAML as a DAG definition. If the file contains valid DAG syntax with shell commands, those commands execute as the dagu process user. I haven't verified this end-to-end since it requires a target file with DAG-compatible structure, but the code path is the same `locateDAG` call confirmed above.Auth is enabled by default since PR #1688 (v2.0.0), but exploitable by any authenticated user regardless of role - the DAG read/delete paths don't enforce RBAC granularity. Pre-v2.0.0 deployments or those with `auth.mode=none` are exploitable without credentials.
CVSS v3.1: 8.1