GHSA-pmwg-cvhr-8vh7: Axios: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2025-62718 — NO_PROXY Protection Bypassed via RFC 1122 Loopback Subnet (127.0.0.0/8) in Axios 1.15.0
**1. Executive Summary**
This report documents an **incomplete security patch** for the previously disclosed vulnerability **GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 (CVE-2025-62718)**, which affects the `NO_PROXY` hostname resolution logic in the Axios HTTP library.**Background — The Original Vulnerability**
The original vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5) disclosed that Axios did not normalize hostnames before comparing them against `NO_PROXY` rules. Specifically, a request to `http://localhost./` (with a trailing dot) or `http://[::1]/` (with IPv6 bracket notation) would **bypass NO_PROXY matching entirely** and be forwarded to the configured HTTP proxy — even when `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` was explicitly set by the developer to protect loopback services.The Axios maintainers addressed this in **version 1.15.0** by introducing a `normalizeNoProxyHost()` function in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`, which strips trailing dots from hostnames and removes brackets from IPv6 literals before performing the NO_PROXY comparison.**The Incomplete Patch — This Finding**
While the patch correctly addresses the specific cases reported (trailing dot normalization and IPv6 bracket removal), **the fix is architecturally incomplete**.The patch introduced a hardcoded set of recognized loopback addresses:However, **RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3** explicitly defines the **entire 127.0.0.0/8 subnet** as the IPv4 loopback address block not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. On all major operating systems (Linux, macOS, Windows with WSL), any IP address in the range `127.0.0.2` through `127.255.255.254` is a valid, functional loopback address that routes to the local machine.As a result, an attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request can substitute 127.0.0.1 with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range (e.g., `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, `127.1.2.3`) to **completely bypass** the `NO_PROXY` protection even in the fully patched Axios 1.15.0 release.**Verification**
This bypass has been **independently verified** on:**Axios version:** 1.15.0 (latest patched release)**Node.js version:** v22.16.0**OS:** Kali Linux (rolling)The Proof-of-Concept demonstrates that while `localhost`, `localhost`., and `[::1]` are correctly blocked by the patched version, requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` are **transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server**, confirming that the patch does not cover the full RFC-defined loopback address space.**2. Deep-Dive: Technical Root Cause Analysis**
**2.1 Vulnerable File & Location**| Field | Detail |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| File | lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js| 
| Primary Flaw| isLoopback() — Line 1–3 |
| Supporting Function | shouldBypassProxy() — Line 59–110 |
| Axios Version | 1.15.0 (Latest Patched Release) |**2.2 How Axios Routes HTTP Requests  The Call Chain**
When Axios dispatches any HTTP request, `lib/adapters/http.js` calls `setProxy()`, which invokes `shouldBypassProxy()` to decide whether to honour a configured proxy:`shouldBypassProxy()` is the **single gatekeeper** for NO_PROXY enforcement. A bypass here means all proxy protection fails silently.**2.3 The Original Vulnerability (GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5)**
Before Axios 1.15.0, hostnames were compared against `NO_PROXY` using a **raw literal string match** with no normalization:Both `localhost.` (FQDN trailing dot, RFC 1034 §3.1) and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6 literal, RFC 3986 §3.2.2) are **canonical representations of loopback addresses**, but Axios treated them as unknown hosts.**2.4 What the Patch Fixed (Axios 1.15.0)**
The patch introduced three changes inside `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js`:**Fix A `normalizeNoProxyHost()` (Lines 47–57)**
Strips alternate representations before comparison:**Fix B Cross-Loopback Equivalence (Lines 1–3 & 108)**
Allows `127.0.0.1` and `localhost` to match each other interchangeably:**Fix C Normalization Applied on Both Sides (Lines 81 & 90)****2.5 The Incomplete Patch Exact Root Cause**
The fundamental flaw resides in Line 1:***RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 is unambiguous:**"The address 127.0.0.0/8 is assigned for loopback. A datagram sent by a higher-level protocol to a loopback address MUST NOT appear on any network."This means all addresses from `127.0.0.1` through `127.255.255.254` are valid loopback addresses on any RFC-compliant operating system. On Linux, the entire `/8` block is routed to the `lo` interface by default. The patch recognises only `127.0.0.1`, leaving `16,777,213` valid loopback addresses unprotected.**2.6 Step-by-Step Bypass Execution Trace**
Environment:**Annotated execution of shouldBypassProxy("http://127.0.0.2:9191/internal-api"):****2.7 Why the Patch Design Is Flawed**
The patch addresses the **symptom** (two specific alternate representations) rather than the **root cause** (an incomplete definition of what constitutes a loopback address).| Aspect | Original Bug | This Finding |
| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| What was wrong | No normalization before comparison | Incomplete loopback address set|
| Fix applied | Added normalizeNoProxyHost() | None set remains hardcoded |
| RFC compliance | Violated RFC 1034 & RFC 3986 | Violates RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3 |
| Bypass method | Alternate string representation | Alternate valid loopback address |
| Impact | NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF | NO_PROXY bypass → SSRF (identical) |Real-world services that commonly bind to non-standard loopback addresses include:Internal microservices and admin dashboards using dedicated loopback IPsDevelopment environments with multiple isolated service instancesDocker and container bridge network configurationsTest infrastructure allocating sequential loopback IPs across services**3. Comprehensive Attack Vector & Proof of Concept****3.1 Reproduction Steps**Step 1 — Create a fresh project directory**Step 2 — Initialize the project with the patched Axios version**
Create `package.json`:Install dependencies:Verify the installed version:**Step 3 — Create the PoC file (`poc.js`)****Step 4 — Execute the PoC****3.2 Observed Output**
The following output was captured during testing on Kali Linux with Axios 1.15.0:**3.3 Analysis of Results**
The output conclusively demonstrates the following:**Patched cases behave correctly:** Requests to `localhost`, `localhost.` (trailing dot), and `[::1]` (bracketed IPv6) all result in a direct connection, confirming that the existing patch in Axios 1.15.0 correctly handles the cases reported in GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5.**Bypass cases confirm the incomplete patch:** Requests to `127.0.0.2`, `127.0.0.100`, and `127.1.2.3` all of which are valid loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet as defined by `RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3` are transparently forwarded to the attacker-controlled proxy server. The proxy receives the full request including the HTTP method, target URL, and `Host` header, demonstrating that any response from an internal service bound to these addresses would be fully intercepted.This confirms that the `NO_PROXY` protection configured by the developer (`localhost,127.0.0.1,::1`) fails silently for the entire `127.0.0.0/8` address range beyond `127.0.0.1`, providing a reproducible and reliable bypass of the security control introduced by the patch.**4. Impact Assessment**
This vulnerability is a **security control bypass** specifically an incomplete patch that allows an attacker to circumvent the `NO_PROXY` protection mechanism in Axios by using any loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` subnet other than `127.0.0.1`. The result is that traffic intended to remain private and direct is silently intercepted by a configured proxy server.**4.1 Who Is Impacted?**Primary Target — Node.js Backend Applications
Any Node.js application that meets **all three of the following conditions** is vulnerable:**Affected Deployment Environments**
| Environment | Risk Level |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| Cloud-hosted applications (AWS, GCP, Azure) | Critical| 
| Containerised microservices (Docker, Kubernetes) | Critical| 
| Corporate networks with mandatory proxy | High| 
| CI/CD pipelines with proxy environment variables | High| 
| On-premise servers with internal proxy | High|**Scale of Exposure**
Axios is one of the most widely used HTTP client libraries in the JavaScript ecosystem, with over **500 million weekly downloads** on npm. Any application in the above categories using Axios 1.15.0 is affected, regardless of whether the developer is aware of the underlying proxy routing logic.**4.3 Impact Details****Impact 1 Silent Interception of Internal Service Traffic**When an application makes a request to an internal loopback service using a non-standard loopback address (e.g., `http://127.0.0.2/admin`), Axios silently routes the request through the configured proxy instead of connecting directly.The developer receives no error or warning. From the application's perspective, the request succeeds normally.**Impact 2 — SSRF Mitigation Bypass**
Many applications implement SSRF protections by configuring `NO_PROXY` to prevent requests to loopback addresses from being forwarded externally. This bypass defeats that protection entirely for any loopback address beyond `127.0.0.1`.An attacker who can influence the target URL of an Axios request through user-supplied input, redirect chains, or other SSRF vectors can exploit this gap to reach internal services that the developer explicitly intended to protect.**Impact 3 — Cloud Metadata Service Exposure**
In cloud environments (AWS, GCP, Azure), SSRF vulnerabilities are particularly severe because they can be used to access the instance metadata service and retrieve IAM credentials, enabling full cloud account compromise.While the AWS IMDSv2 service is reachable at `169.254.169.254` (not a loopback address), many cloud deployments run internal metadata proxies, credential servers, or service discovery endpoints bound to non-standard loopback addresses within the `127.0.0.0/8` range. An attacker reaching any of these services through the bypass could:Retrieve temporary IAM credentialsAccess environment variables containing secretsEnumerate internal service configurationsPivot to other internal services via the compromised credentials**Impact 4 — Confidential Data Exfiltration**
Any internal service binding to a `127.x.x.x` address other than `127.0.0.1` is fully exposed. This includes:| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data |
| ------------- | ------------- |
| Admin panels / dashboards | User data, configuration, logs | 
| Internal APIs | Business logic, database contents | 
| Secret managers / vaults | API keys, tokens, certificates | 
| Health check endpoints | Infrastructure topology | 
| Development services | Source code, environment variables |**Impact 5 — No Indication of Compromise**
A particularly dangerous characteristic of this vulnerability is that it is **completely silent** neither the application nor the developer receives any indication that requests are being routed incorrectly. There are no error messages, no exceptions thrown, and no changes in application behaviour. The proxy interception is entirely transparent from the application's perspective, making detection extremely difficult without active network monitoring.**4.4 Comparison with Original Vulnerability**| Internal Service Type | Exposed Data | Exposed Data |
| ------------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| Attack method | Use localhost. or [::1]| Use any 127.x.x.x ≠ 127.0.0.1 | 
| Patch status | Fixed in 1.15.0 | Not fixed in 1.15.0 | 
| CVSS score | 9.3 Critical | 9.9 Critical or (equivalent) | 
| Attacker effort| Trivial | Trivial | 
| Detection by developer | None | None | 
| Impact | SSRF / proxy bypass | SSRF / proxy bypass (identical) |The severity of this finding is equivalent to the original vulnerability because the attack conditions, exploitation technique, and resulting impact are identical. The only difference is the specific input used to trigger the bypass, which the existing patch completely fails to address.**5. Technical Remediation & Proposed Fix****5.1 Vulnerable Code Block**The vulnerability resides in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` at lines 1–3. The following is the exact code extracted from Axios 1.15.0:This hardcoded `Set` is subsequently used at line 108 during the final NO_PROXY match evaluation:**Why this is dangerous:** The `Set` performs a strict membership check. Any IPv4 loopback address outside the three hardcoded entries returns `false`, causing `shouldBypassProxy()` to return `false` and silently route the request through the configured proxy.**5.2 Proposed Patched Code**
Replace lines 1–3 in `lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js` with the following RFC-compliant implementation:**5.3 Diff View — Before vs After**All other code in `shouldBypassProxy.js` remains unchanged. No other files require modification.**5.4 Why This Fix Must Be Applied****Reason 1 — RFC 1122 Compliance**The current implementation violates **RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3**, which defines the entire `127.0.0.0/8` block as the IPv4 loopback address range not just the single address `127.0.0.1`. The proposed fix aligns Axios with the standard, ensuring that all valid loopback addresses are recognised and handled consistently.**Reason 2 — The Existing Patch Has Already Failed Once**The patch for GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5 was released with the explicit intent of securing NO_PROXY hostname matching for loopback addresses. Within the same release (1.15.0), the protection can be bypassed by substituting `127.0.0.1` with any other address in the `127.0.0.0/8` range. Leaving this gap unaddressed means that the patch creates a **false sense of security** developers believe their loopback traffic is protected when it is not.**Reason 3 — Real Operating System Behaviour**
On Linux the dominant platform for Node.js server deployments the kernel routes the **entire `127.0.0.0/8` subnet** to the loopback interface `lo` by default. This means any address in that range functions identically to `127.0.0.1` at the networking level.Axios's current implementation does not reflect this operating system behaviour, resulting in an inconsistency between what the OS considers loopback and what Axios treats as loopback.**Reason 4 — The Proposed Fix Has Zero Performance Impact**
The existing solution uses a `Set.has()` lookup an O(1) operation. The proposed fix replaces this with:Two direct string comparisons (`'localhost'`, `'::1'`) — O(1)A `split('.')` and array validation — O(1) with a fixed-length array of 4 elements
The computational cost is **equivalent or lower** than the current approach, and the fix introduces no new external dependencies.**Reason 5 — The Fix Is Minimal and Surgical**
The proposed change modifies only **3 lines** of a single file. It does not alter:The `parseNoProxyEntry()` functionThe `normalizeNoProxyHost()` functionThe `shouldBypassProxy()` main function logicAny other file in the codebaseThis minimises regression risk and makes the fix straightforward to review, test, and backport to older supported branches.**Reason 6 — Resilient to Alternative IP Encodings**
Because Axios normalises the request URL using Node's native `new URL()` parser before passing it to `shouldBypassProxy()`, alternative IP encodings (such as octal `0177.0.0.1`, hex `0x7f.0.0.1`, or integer `2130706433`) are already resolved into their standard IPv4 dotted-decimal format. This means the proposed `.split('.')` validation logic is completely robust and cannot be bypassed using URL-encoded IP obfuscation techniques.**5.5 Additional Recommendation — IPv6 Loopback Range**While the primary bypass demonstrated in this report targets the IPv4 `127.0.0.0/8` range, the Axios team should also consider validating the full IPv6 loopback representation. The current implementation recognises only `::1`. A more complete check would also handle the full-form notation:Normalising these representations before comparison would make the NO_PROXY implementation comprehensively RFC-compliant across both IPv4 and IPv6 address families.
CVSS v3.1: 7.2