GHSA-375f-4r2h-f99j: Bandit trusts client-supplied URI scheme on plaintext connections
SummaryBandit reflects the client-supplied URI scheme into `conn.scheme` without verifying the actual transport. Over a plaintext HTTP/1.1 connection (or h2c), an unauthenticated attacker can send an absolute-form request target like `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1` and the application observes `conn.scheme = :https` even though no TLS was negotiated. Any downstream Plug logic that trusts `conn.scheme` as a security signal — `Plug.SSL`'s "already secure, don't redirect" branch, `secure: true` cookie flagging, audit logging, CSRF/SameSite gating — is silently misled into treating an attacker's plaintext connection as encrypted.The vulnerability was introduced on Jun 8, 2023: https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/ff2f829326cd5dcf7335939aef9775269d881e28DetailsThe bug is in `lib/bandit/pipeline.ex` at `determine_scheme/2` (around line 89). The function takes the request target's scheme and the transport's `secure?` flag and produces the URI scheme used to build the `%Plug.Conn{}`. The third match clause is `{_, scheme} -> scheme` — i.e. whenever the client supplies *any* scheme on the request target, the function returns that scheme verbatim and discards `secure?` entirely.Two attacker-controlled inputs reach this code path:HTTP/1.1 absolute-form request targets (RFC 9112 §3.2.2), e.g. `GET https://victim/path HTTP/1.1`.HTTP/2 `:scheme` pseudo-header, which is a free-form string sent by the client.Neither value is constrained to match the actual transport. On a plaintext TCP listener (or h2c), a client can declare `https` and Bandit will pass `%URI{scheme: "https"}` into `Plug.Conn.Adapter.conn/5`, producing `conn.scheme == :https`. There is no guard in `determine_scheme/2`; the discarding of `secure?` is deliberate.**Suggested fix:** when `secure?` is `true`, force the scheme to `"https"`; when `false`, force it to `"http"` — or reject the request with `400 Bad Request` if the supplied scheme disagrees with the transport's actual security state. Do not trust the client-supplied scheme.PoCA self-contained reproduction script is available below. It starts plaintext Bandit 1.10 on `127.0.0.1:4321` with a Plug that echoes `conn.scheme`, opens a plain TCP socket, and sends:A correctly-behaving server would either coerce `conn.scheme` to `:http` or return `400 Bad Request`. Bandit 1.10.4 returns `:https`, confirming the spoof.ImpactTransport-state spoofing. Any unauthenticated client speaking plaintext HTTP/1.1 or h2c to a Bandit endpoint can cause the application to treat the connection as if it had been TLS-protected. Concrete consequences in real Phoenix/Plug stacks include:`Plug.SSL` skipping its HTTP→HTTPS redirect because the request "already looks secure", letting plaintext requests bypass the redirect entirely.Cookies emitted with `secure: true` on a plaintext response, where a network attacker could capture them.Audit logs recording requests as having arrived over HTTPS when they did not, breaking forensic and compliance assumptions.Application code that uses `conn.scheme` to gate CSRF/SameSite policy, OAuth redirect URIs, or HSTS-related decisions making the wrong call.The vulnerability is unauthenticated and trivially automatable; severity is medium because exploitation requires the deployment to expose a plaintext Bandit listener (or h2c) and to have downstream code that branches on `conn.scheme`.Script and Logs
CVSS v4.0: 6.3