GHSA-r7g9-xpmj-5fcq: LiquidJS Vulnerable to ReDoS via Quadratic Backtracking in `strip_html` Filter Regex
SummaryThe built-in `strip_html` filter in liquidjs uses a regex containing four lazy-quantified alternatives. When the input contains many `<script`, `<style`, or `<!--` opener tokens without matching closers, the V8 regex engine performs O(N²) backtracking, blocking the Node.js event loop. A single ~350 KB request (`'<script'.repeat(50000)`) stalls the process for ~10 seconds; cost grows quadratically with input size. The default `memoryLimit: Infinity` does not bound regex CPU, and even when configured `strip_html` only charges `str.length` to the limit — the regex itself runs unbounded.DetailsThe vulnerable filter is at `src/filters/html.ts:45-49`:The regex contains four lazy patterns:`<script[\s\S]*?<\/script>``<style[\s\S]*?<\/style>``<.*?>``<!--[\s\S]*?-->`For an input like `'<script'.repeat(N)`, the engine encounters N starting `<` positions. At each one it must lazily expand `[\s\S]*?` (and `.*?`) all the way to end-of-input searching for a closer that never appears, then fail and backtrack. Because each of the O(N) starts performs O(N) lazy-expansion work, total work is O(N²).Reachability:`strip_html` is a default-registered filter (exported from `src/filters/html.ts`, wired up via `src/filters/index.ts`), invocable from any template via `{{ x | strip_html }}`.The filter calls `String.prototype.replace` with the vulnerable regex directly on the caller-supplied string, with no length cap and no timeout.The default `memoryLimit` is `Infinity` (`src/liquid-options.ts:198`); the filter only charges `str.length` against memory (line 47), which does not bound CPU work for regex backtracking.This is distinct from `GHSA-45rm-2893-5f49` (prototype property leak, CWE-200) and from any prior `replace`/`strip_html` issues — the mechanism here is regex backtracking CPU consumption on a different filter.PoCEmpirical scaling confirmed against a freshly built `liquidjs@10.25.7` bundle on Node 22 / Linux:Verified output:A larger payload extrapolates straightforwardly:The same pathology applies to `<style` and `<!--` openers.Impact**Single-request DoS:** A 350 KB request body stalls the Node.js event loop for ~10 seconds; 700 KB takes ~40 s; 1.4 MB takes ~160 s. All other requests on the process queue behind the regex.**Trivial amplification:** Quadratic scaling means small attacker bandwidth produces large server CPU consumption. A handful of concurrent requests fully saturates the worker.**No authentication required:** The typical use case for `strip_html` is sanitizing untrusted input (comments, posts, profile bios, product descriptions). Any endpoint that renders user content through `strip_html` is exposed.**memoryLimit doesn't help:** Even applications that opt into `memoryLimit` are not protected, because (a) the regex CPU runs to completion before any output is produced, and (b) only `str.length` is charged, not the cost of the regex traversal.Recommended FixReplace the backtracking regex with an atomic / non-overlapping pattern, and/or perform a single linear pass.Option 1 — anchor each alternative so lazy expansion fails fast on chunked content (no `[\s\S]*?` over the full tail):This unrolls each lazy quantifier so each `<` is visited at most a constant number of times overall — linear total work.Option 2 — single-pass tokenizer in plain code; iterate over the string once, tracking whether you are inside `<script>`, `<style>`, comment, or generic tag, and emit nothing for those ranges.Either fix should be combined with charging the regex output cost honestly to `memoryLimit` and (defensively) capping input length up front:
CVSS v3.1: 7.5