GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r: Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php
Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosureTargetDolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)SummaryA Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`. By manipulating the `objectdesc` parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function `restrictedArea()`, an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as `.env`, `.htaccess`, configuration backups, or logs…).Vulnerability DetailsThe vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in `/core/ajax/selectobject.php` where dynamic file inclusion occurs **before** any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.**Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization:** The endpoint parses the `objectdesc` parameter into a `$classpath`. If `fetchObjectByElement` fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like `A:conf/.htaccess:0`), the application falls back to `dol_include_once($classpath)` at **line 71**. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens *before* the application checks any user permissions.**Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open):** At **line 102**, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling `restrictedArea()`. Because the object creation failed, the `$features` parameter sent to `restrictedArea()` is empty (`''`). Inside `security.lib.php`, if the `$features` parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the `$readok` variable at `1`. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like `.htaccess`, `.env`, `.json`, `.sql`) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.Steps to ReproduceLog in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the `conf/.htaccess` file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message.*(Optional)* Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:ImpactAn attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (`.env`), infrastructure configurations (`.htaccess`), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.Suggested Mitigation**Input Validation & Whitelisting:** The `$classpath` must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to `dol_include_once()`.**Execution Flow Correction:** The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified.**Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs:** Modify `restrictedArea()` in `core/lib/security.lib.php` so that if the `$features` parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied (`$readok = 0`) instead of allowed by default.Disclosure Policy & AssistanceThe reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.Best Regards,
Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)Video PoChttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844PoC Script
CVSS v3.1: 6.5