GHSA-r399-636x-v7f6: LangChain serialization injection vulnerability enables secret extraction
ContextA serialization injection vulnerability exists in LangChain JS's `toJSON()` method (and subsequently when string-ifying objects using `JSON.stringify()`. The method did not escape objects with `'lc'` keys when serializing free-form data in kwargs. The `'lc'` key is used internally by LangChain to mark serialized objects. When user-controlled data contains this key structure, it is treated as a legitimate LangChain object during deserialization rather than plain user data.Attack surfaceThe core vulnerability was in `Serializable.toJSON()`: this method failed to escape user-controlled objects containing `'lc'` keys within kwargs (e.g., `additional_kwargs`, `metadata`, `response_metadata`). When this unescaped data was later deserialized via `load()`, the injected structures were treated as legitimate LangChain objects rather than plain user data.This escaping bug enabled several attack vectors:**Injection via user data**: Malicious LangChain object structures could be injected through user-controlled fields like `metadata`, `additional_kwargs`, or `response_metadata`**Secret extraction**: Injected secret structures could extract environment variables when `secretsFromEnv` was enabled (which had no explicit default, effectively defaulting to `true` behavior)**Class instantiation via import maps**: Injected constructor structures could instantiate any class available in the provided import maps with attacker-controlled parameters**Note on import maps:** Classes must be explicitly included in import maps to be instantiatable. The core import map includes standard types (messages, prompts, documents), and users can extend this via `importMap` and `optionalImportsMap` options. This architecture naturally limits the attack surface—an `allowedObjects` parameter is not necessary because users control which classes are available through the import maps they provide.**Security hardening:** This patch fixes the escaping bug in `toJSON()` and introduces new restrictive defaults in `load()`: `secretsFromEnv` now explicitly defaults to `false`, and a `maxDepth` parameter protects against DoS via deeply nested structures. JSDoc security warnings have been added to all import map options.Who is affected?Applications are vulnerable if they:**Serialize untrusted data via `JSON.stringify()` on Serializable objects, then deserialize with `load()`** — Trusting your own serialization output makes you vulnerable if user-controlled data (e.g., from LLM responses, metadata fields, or user inputs) contains `'lc'` key structures.**Deserialize untrusted data with `load()`** — Directly deserializing untrusted data that may contain injected `'lc'` structures.**Use LangGraph checkpoints** — Checkpoint serialization/deserialization paths may be affected.The most common attack vector is through **LLM response fields** like `additional_kwargs` or `response_metadata`, which can be controlled via prompt injection and then serialized/deserialized in streaming operations.ImpactAttackers who control serialized data can extract environment variable secrets by injecting `{"lc": 1, "type": "secret", "id": ["ENV_VAR"]}` to load environment variables during deserialization (when `secretsFromEnv: true`). They can also instantiate classes with controlled parameters by injecting constructor structures to instantiate any class within the provided import maps with attacker-controlled parameters, potentially triggering side effects such as network calls or file operations.Key severity factors:Affects the serialization path—applications trusting their own serialization output are vulnerableEnables secret extraction when combined with `secretsFromEnv: true`LLM responses in `additional_kwargs` can be controlled via prompt injectionExploit exampleSecurity hardening changesThis patch introduces the following changes to `load()`:**`secretsFromEnv` default changed to `false`**: Disables automatic secret loading from environment variables. Secrets not found in `secretsMap` now throw an error instead of being loaded from `process.env`. This fail-safe behavior ensures missing secrets are caught immediately rather than silently continuing with `null`.**New `maxDepth` parameter** (defaults to `50`): Protects against denial-of-service attacks via deeply nested JSON structures that could cause stack overflow.**Escape mechanism in `toJSON()`**: User-controlled objects containing `'lc'` keys are now wrapped in `{"__lc_escaped__": {...}}` during serialization and unwrapped as plain data during deserialization.**JSDoc security warnings**: All import map options (`importMap`, `optionalImportsMap`, `optionalImportEntrypoints`) now include security warnings about never populating them from user input.Migration guideNo changes needed for most usersIf you're deserializing standard LangChain types (messages, documents, prompts) using the core import map, your code will work without changes:For secrets from environment`secretsFromEnv` now defaults to `false`, and missing secrets throw an error. If you need to load secrets:**Warning:** Only enable `secretsFromEnv` if you trust the serialized data. Untrusted data could extract any environment variable.**Note:** If a secret reference is encountered but not found in `secretsMap` (and `secretsFromEnv` is `false` or the secret is not in the environment), an error is thrown. This fail-safe behavior ensures you're aware of missing secrets rather than silently receiving `null` values.For deeply nested structuresIf you have legitimate deeply nested data that exceeds the default depth limit of 50:For custom import mapsIf you provide custom import maps, ensure they only contain trusted modules:
CVSS v3.1: 8.6