TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Arlene L. Pollock
Docket Number: 17755-07
Judge: Holmes
Opinion Type: reported
Filed: 02/12/2009
Pages: 27

UNITED STATES TAX COURT . ARLENE L . POLLOCK, Petitioner v . . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Responden t Docket No . 17755-07' .- Filed February 12,'2009 . P sought relief from joint liability-for unpai d taxes under sec . 6015, I .R .C . R sent her a notice o f determination' denying relief,' but at'a time befor e Congress gave the Tax Court jurisdiction to review suc h denials .. 'R then sought to collect the taxes in a lienenforcement action . This prompted the District Cour t hearing the lien-enforcement action to invoke th e doctrine of equitable tolling and give P 90 days t o file a petition with the-Tax Court . P filed her . petition within the time limit set by the Distric t Court's order . R moved to dismiss for . lack o f jurisdiction because, .P filed her petition more than 9 0 days after R . had mailed the notice of determination t o her . , District Court's order . SERVE, FEB 12 2009 Held , further : Sec . ° 6015, I .'R .C ., sets a , jurisdictional time limit which may not be equitably tolled . The Tax .Court has no, jurisdiction :to 'revie w P' s petition . :.. Jason Grimes , for petitioner .', . 11 - Leonard Provenzale , for respondent . HOLMES, Judge : The IRS sent Arlene Pollock a notice~o f determination denying her request for innocent-spouse relief o n April 27, 2006 . She filed .a petition seeking review of that notice more then a year later .on.August 9, 2007 The Code give s taxpayers only 90 .days to file . Pollock waited 469 days . Do the- math, the Commissioner tells us, and dismiss her petition fo r lack of jurisdiction . Not so fast, says Pollock . On the . day that the . Commissione r mailed his notice of determinatio n that the Tax Court . lacke d j .uris di.ction,to position had'already been endorsed,by th e would be again five days later,.by the Eight h The Court acknowledges the outstanding petitioner s counsel in this case . ' 'Commissioner v . Ewing , 439 F .3d .1.009 (9th Cir' Feb . 28, 2006) revg . . 118 T .C ., 494 :1(2002),' vacating - ;122 T .C . 32' F(2004) 3' Bartman v. . Commissioner , 446 ' F .3d .:785 (8th Cir .,May 2 , (continued . 25, 2006, two days before,Pollock's . 90-day window would .'shut, we ourselves decided that we had no jurisdiction .4 And on-Augus t 25, 2006 , the Chief Counsel of the IRS . told° his lawyers to move to dismiss any such petitions still pending before us for lack of jurisdiction'., Congress later amended the Code ' to-give us jurisdiction and made-the change effective for all taxes " arisin g orremaining,unpaid on or after [December 20, 2006] ."5 Pollock' s taxes-remain .unpaid to this day . How can the usual 90-day limi t apply to her?-- , The question presented :- Must we dismiss Pollock's case for failure to file a petition with us when we would have had no- ~Backaround Pollock married in'~1986, and had two children . She .has a n eighth-grade education and was a stay-at-home .mom for most of the, marriage . Differences between her and her husband grew and . became irreconcilable, and they (cid:127)divorced in-November 2000, with Pollock getting the family's home . Left behind from the marriage was an enormous tax debt--for the years 1995-99, the,Pollocks jointly owed 'a total of $183, 3 31, which with interest has grow n . . . continued ) 2006), affg . in part,vacating in part T .C . Memo . 2004-9 Billings v . Commissioner (cid:127)127wT .C .. 7 (2006) . -5 Tax Relief„and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) ..,'Pub . 109-432, div . C, sec . .408 (a) , (c), 120 Stat . 3061, .,-3062 . to ;_over,$400,000 . Neither;,Poilock ;paid-and, between August 2001 , and May 2002 ; the IRS :sent them notices-that, it had filed federal tax liens (NFTLs) .again.st them . .It is from this debt that Pollock- seeks ' relief . Tha t liability is hers because the Code makes . who sign" a'join .t return jointly and severally, liable-,for .any tax due . Sec . 6013 (d) (3)' .6 But relief is available in some cases under . section,,- 6015 . . And one way, fora spouse to win r .elief.,under that section . . is to show that,'"taking into account all the,; facts and circumstances, : it is inequitable' to hold, .[:her-] ,liabie .:tfor an y unpaid tax or any deficiency (or : any ;,port on, of either) .,"= Sec . 6015(f)(1) . Our jurisdiction over, such nondef_iciency'stand-alon e petitions' brought under section . 6015-(f) was unclear in 2006 . Even before,that,- back in 2002 when the Commissioner sen t his last NFTLxto the Pollocks, .we were already.analyzing-.our- jurisdiction over such cases . In Ewinq(cid:127)'v :-Commissioner , 118 :T .C . 494-'(2002) ( Ewing; I -) , we . held- .-at, the suggestion of ,the ° 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are t o the Internal Revenue Code . "Nondeficiency'' because : the IRS accepted,t-he retur n computing the unpaid tax as filed and asserted no deficiency, an d "stand-alone" because the,claim,fordinnocent-spouserelief wa s -made under section 6015 and not as"part of a deficiency action . or . as part of a collection due, .process,hearing,under section 6320 o r 6330 . See Billings ', .'127- T C .,# at 7 ., government--that we did have .jurisdiction .8 Our initial analysis did not go unnoticed . In 2004 the Second Circuit expressed doubt . Maier v . Commissioner ; 360 F .3d 361, .363 n .1'(2d Cir . . 2004), affg . 119 T .C . .267 (2002) . The Government then changed its, mind and argued that we . had no jurisdiction when Ewing I ,was appealed . In February 2006, the'Ninth Circuit agreed with(cid:127)the . Government's new position . - Commissioner' v . Ewina; 439-F .3.d 1009 (9th,Cir . 2006), revg .. Ewing I , vacating 122 T . C . 32 . ( Ewina II) .- .Pollock began'the process that would lead to'this case sometime between Ewing I and the Ninth Circuit's,reversal by-.filing a For m 8857 with the IRS . On April 27, 2006, four months after the Ninth .Circuit°.ruled in Ewina , the IRS mailed a notice of determination- denying innocent-spouse relief,to' .Pol'lock . Prominently featured on. its first page was.~a- warningthat she 'had only 90, days to .file a . .._ petition : challenging it . But where? The notice said Tax Court , but just days after the Commissioner . mailedthe notic e 8 IRS litigation policy at the time was to concede our ability to hear all claims for relief under- section: 6015 ,( f) . See IRS. Chief . Counsel Notice N(35)000 - 338 (June 5 , 2000) .. 9 Form 8857 , Request for Innocent Spouse Relief,''~ is filed by a spouse seeking relief from joint - and several liability and .related penalties . Pollock claims she submitted Form 8857 in August 2002 . The Commissioner claims that .. she first requested innocent - spouse relief - in December 2005 , and then . amended her Form 8857 in January 20.06 . it would not affect our analysis of"-the Commissioner 's motion to' dismiss . We sidestep this dispute ; resolving Pollock, the Eighth- .Circuit,-in Bartman v°. Commissioner, 446~F .3 d 785, 787 , (8thm Cir . 2006) , :. .affg . in "part . vacating in part T . C :. Memo . .2004-.93, adopted the Ninth)'Circuit' .s position . The final, blow came on July 25, : 2006, when we' . .revisited the question and .agreed with ,these circuit courts that,we_did not :hav e .jurisdiction over cases like3Pollock's .,See Billings-v . Commissioner ; .127 T C . 7, (2006 ).. Two days , later , Pollock' s .9 0 day deadline for filing' with us,, expired .,: She had at . this point never filed a petition contesting the IRS .'s .denial,of relief- with.-us or any, other, cour t Later that summer, the IRS's Office of Chief-Counsel . notified IRS attorneys-about how they should handle section 6015(f) nondeficiency .stand-alone cases after Billings .' IRS Chief Counsel- .Notice CC-.2006-020, .(Aug. ., :25, ,2006) . This ..notic e .instructed IRS .attorneys .to file motions .: to dismiss-for lack of . jurisdiction in, all :nondef i, ciency,stand- alone .-cases . . Id . Although this was' already' happening ., with success(as .the'. , Ninth , Circuit's ruling in Ewing proved) ., this notice .coordinated the effort and changed, the IRS's previous official stance that we ha d jurisdiction over these cases . IRS Office of Chief '.Counsel ; Notice CC-2006-020 (Aug . 2006) ; ;see supra n .8 . A month later, the Department , Justice began 'a collecti o- n suit against the Pollocks by filing a lien-enforcement action "i n the' Southern District of Florida . The Government'-s goal was collect more than $378,000 in income-tax debt from both Pollocks, and more than $318,000 in an unpaid trust-fund-recovery penalty owed by Pollock's former-husband alone .10 If the Government won ; it would be able to foreclose on the home transferred to Pollock during the divorce settlement . On December 20, 2006, Congress amended section 6015 to grant us jurisdiction to hear-section 6015(f) nondeficiency stand-alone cases ., TRHCA,div . C, sec . 408(a), (c) ; sec . 6015(e)(1)(A) . The amendment was effective for tax liabilities "arising or remaining unpaid on or after the date of the enactment . In 2007, the Commissioner moved for summary judgment against Pollock and her former husband in District Court . Pollock argued that she is entitled to innocent-spouse relief under sectio n 6015(f), but everyone now acknowledges that this is not a defense to a lien-enforcement action ." On July 9,2007, the Distric t 10 Taxes that employers withhold from their employees' wages are known as "trust fund taxes" because they are deemed a special fund in trust for the United States under sec . 7501(a)'. Th e Commissioner may collect unpaid employment taxes from a "responsible person" within the company ; that is, someone who wa s required to pay over the tax . The money that is collected i s called a trust-fund-recovery-penalty tax . Bennett v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2008-251 . Sec . 6672 ; see als o " This mayor may not be .corre.ct United States V . Shanbaum , 10 F .3d 305, 310 (5th Cir . 1994) and United States v . Haag , 94 AFTR 2d 6665, 2005-1 USTC par . 50,131"(D . Mass .2004) , affd . 485 F .3d 1 (1st Cir . 2007), don't question the jurisdictio n of Article III courts to(cid:127)entertain innocent-spouse defenses, while in both cases rejecting them on other grounds . 'States v . Bovnton ,_99 AFTR 2d 920, 2007-1 USTC par . 50,328 (S .D . United (continued . . .) Court granted summary judgment agains t But-on July :12 the same court staye d the case against Pollock and , granted .her 3 6 days .to .bring,a claim for relief, before . our . Court . In-its order, the District Court .explained that .the- special;.. circumstances of this case--namely, the disordered state of th e law in 2006- :-justifiedtolling the 90-dayilimit : Ms . Pollock' s ; failure to file ., a petition in the , ninety-day window is excusable, given the uncertaint y in(the law over this issue ., I,findthat the :%ninety-day review period for 6015(f)„petitions is analogous to th e ninety- day ; window for filing .,a complaint . with- the EEO C in Title VII cases . In .that situation, the Suprem e Court has held that thefiling .window<isia "requiremen t subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable . tolling . Zipes v .~ 'TWA, 455 U . S .,. 385, 393 (1982) . Waiver and equitable tolling should also be available to thos e ,,seeking review of-a . denial of innocent spouse relief, although like-the Title VII cases,„ it should be granted sparingly . _See ;Baldwin ; County Welcome Center . v . Brown ; 466'U .S . 147, 151 (1984) . , Ms . Pollock's situation merits either a waiver or tolling of the ninety - day„ time period~ for filing .,a ; petition for review with the tax court . ; The uncertai n state of the law on . the jurisdiction"of the , tax .,,cour t at the time she would have' .had to 'file the petitio n excuses her - failure to file . 11 ( . . continued ) Cal . 2007 ),- foil-owing United States v . Feda , 97 AFTR , 2d .1985, 2006 - 1.: USTC , par . . 50 ,3 30 ;(N'. D . ,Ill ., 20,06 )_,, ' does question the jurisdiction of District =.: Courts to „ hear the merits _of i-nnocent-- spouse defenses'-raised as a defense against enforcement .actionsI .', It concludes that section "6015. limits jurisdiction to reviewin g denials . of relief in cases ,before ;the Tax . Court,, sec . 6015 (e), (1 ) and refund suits .before a District, Court . or the Court of Federa l Claims,, sec . 6015 .(e) (3) United States v . Pollock , . No . 06-80903 (S .D .,Fla ., .July 12, 2007) (order staying case, granting defendant Arlene :POllock 30 days to file for .Trelief in .United States Tax Court) : Pollock filed her : .petition'with us by the deadline set in the District Court's order, and we must now' decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear her case . She has'been a Florida resident ..-throughout ; and we held oral argument'in, ;Miami on the Commissioner's-motion to dismiss thiscase°for lack o f Discussion Our Court is one of limited .-jurisdiction, and(cid:127)we hear onl y tho.s:e cases Congress tells- ;,us we . can . Sec . 7442 ; Kluger v ." .: Commissioner , 83 T .C . 309, ~ 314 (1984) Like' other,. federal .,, courts, however, we do have :jurisdiction in- .all cases to decide whether we have jurisdiction . Kluger , 83 T .,C'. "at 314-15 . . ' a:And in . this particular case we look-at four questions- What weight do ; 'we give to the . District Court's order ? Is section 6015 .(e)'s deadline for filing petitions wit h us a jurisdictional .limit or a statute of limitations? Can we construe section 6015(e) to give us jurisdiction over this case ? Does the effective date ofthe law granting us jurisdiction apply to Pollock's case in a way tha t would,give .us jurisdiction? I- . The 'District Court's Order 'and ,Law+ ; of the Cas e We _ begin . by,, asking if the . Distr'ict' Court has .. answered- the' . .question ' of our jurisdiction -for us . Ther legal doctrine„ ;tha t seems to±be involve'd}is "law_ofthe case"- namely, that one . court's decision over' a .'legal ,question . generally;, governs . °late r stages of litigation in; the same case . Christianson .°v . Colt Indus . Operating Corp . , 486 U :S :f :800 , 815-16k ( 19.88) Polleil v = Commissioner ;' 94 T .C . . 595, -60 .1°'(1990 )) Law of °the case .,promotes ,finality and efficiency by treating an issue as .settled'once,it's . been decided . Christianson ; 486 (cid:127)>U .°S 'a,t 816 . We, frankl y acknowledge, however, that, law .-of-.the-case doctrine may' no t the right source of .3law here,because .courts-generally appl .y,the ' doctrine .: where there's a ; single ;.-case- being, swatt ed' from . 'one- court; ' to the . next . But the District ,Court, here . did not transfer the entir e of whether Pollock deserves innocent-spouse, . relief . Still, if we :: ultimately' resolve the . innocent-spouse issue in . Pollock's favor , her .lien :.case would go away .,, This makes us .= .tentativelyrthin k that transfer of the'innocent-spouse issue is sufficientl y similar to .other case transfers discussed in ,thi"s corner- of th e law to.at .least consider thedoctrine here . Courts also commonly apply law of, the case . .,vertically-- between inferior and superior courts where . obedience and no t deference has to'be the rule . Id . ; Covell v . Heyman , 1 .11 U .S . 11 176, 182 ( 1884 ) . But law of the case also constrains courts at the same level--"coordinate courts" as the caselaw calls them : A court has the power to revisit . prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was . "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustic e Christianson , 486 U .S . at 817 (quoting Arizona v . California , 460 U .S . 605, 618 n .8 (.1983)) . Law of the case in this situation i s a guide to exercising discretion, not a limit on a court' s power--making it something of an "amorphous concept ." ' Arizona , 460 U .S . at 618 . The Eleventh Circuit, which would be the venue for an appea l in this case, described law-of-the-case doctrine--and in a context more like ours, between two coordinate courts--in Jenkins Brick Co . v . Bremer , 321 F .3d 1366 (11th Cir . 2003) . A District Court in Alabama had transferred a case to a District Court in Georgia . The choice to transfer, rather than dismiss, the case meant that Alabama law would still govern the outcome--and the parties were convinced that Alabama's and Georgia's law differed in decisive ways . The Eleventh Circuit recognized and applied the law-of-the-case rule established for coordinate courts in Christianson , 486 U .S . at 817 .. It clarified the . phrase "clearly erroneous." and outlined the standard of deference given to a coordinate court : - 1 2 Courts must, .rarely invoke the, "clear,' error" exception, lest the . exception swallow the rule . . With this principle in mind, the . .exception can . be restated .f this way: in a close : case , a court must defer to the legal conclusion of,-a coordinate court'in the .,same case ; only when the,legal error, is beyond :-the scope-of reasonable debate should-the courts disregard the prior' , ruling : Jenkins Brick, 321 F . 3d ats 1370 .71 . Jenkins Brick also briefly explained that "manifest . injustice" existed because applying Alabama law would violat e Georgia's public policy . Id . at .1371 . We likewise hold that expanding our jurisdiction beyond the bounds set by Congres s would violate federally established public policy . We thus . turn : the delicate question of whether the District Court' s conclusion that th e fact s of Pollock's case justi"fy .an equitabl e tolling of the usua l 90-day limit is a "close case " or'a "clea r error . II . . Section 6015's 90-Day Limit : Jurisdictional or a Statute of °, . Limitations? .The- Commissioner argues that no :court has,: the power to . equitably toll the .90-day 'limit He contends that when Congres s expanded our, jurisdiction to include nondeficiency,-, .stand7alone, .,-..~I cases , it . did not specifically provide . for equitable, tolling, of the' existing°90-day . limit for potential petitioners like Pollock- ..that,the 90-day limit is : jurisdictional -not a, r .. x ' And he says- statute of limitations--so we can't ex'tend . :it-even i'f we wanted t 13 Pollock-contends that section 6015 invokes-equity 'on'it s face and should therefore allow for-'equitable'tollin'g . (cid:127)She also argues that equitable tolling is especially appropriate in her case, . given the very peculiar situation she . faced . This las t ar ument we can, g quickly reject--the possibility, of equitabl e tolling isn't .dependent on the underlying'facts .'of a particular, case, but rather on whether the language ofa particular time limit can be extended .as a :matter of law .,-See John R . . San d 753-54 (2008) ; Zipes v . Trans World Airlines Inc . ,'455 U .S . 385 , .1281S .' Ct . 750 , 393-(1982) . This'gets us directly to the Commissioner ' s most compelling point --that- the District Court misconstrued section 6015 ' s 90-day deadline to be a statute of limitations .ratherthan a jurisdictional requirement . This-distinction is crucial : A statute'of limitations simply prescribes a period in whic h .,court may enforce certain rights . Young V . United States ,-53.5 U .S .: 43, 47 (2002) . Courts may equitably .toll them .unlessit :, : would be inconsistent with the particular terms'of the relevant statute . Id . -at ;.49 ; John R . Sand 2&' Gravel Co . , 128 S ._Ct at 753 . They "protect a_defendant's".case-specific interest in .- ' -timeliness," John R . Sand & Gravel Co . , '128S . Ct . at 753, and . courts may be able to look past delay because a . limitations period is, like other affirmative defenses, subject to exceptions 14 ;. - such °as, waiver ,,, . estoppel -- or equitable ! tolling, ,. Zipes , ,, 455 U . S . at 393 ; In re .Int' .l . Admin . Servs . ; tInc .,, 408 ,F . 3d 689 , 701=_ (11th . , Cir .2005) . But jurisdictional time limitshave ;altogether different , consequences . . .If.a .deadline is ;.ju-risdictional, a~court ;may no t use .equitable tolling to extend it . Cooley v . Dir . Officeaof Workers' Comp . . Programs, 89,5 : F .2d 13;0 .1, 1303 (11th ; C r ;. 1990 ) (citing- Shendock,v . Dir ., Office of Workers' Comp .aPrograms , 893 F .2d .1458, 1466 (3d,Cir . 1990)) . And this is true even if th e result is harsh : ¢'The . age,=old rul.e,,-that a court may not) in :any- case , even in the interests of justice, extend its .jurisdiction', where none .exists has,.alwaysworked injustice in particular cases ." ; Christianson , .486 U :S .at 811 In a black .-lung benefits case , for,example,,,a court ; received a petit-ion i n Atlanta one day{after the expiration of the,,limitationsiperiod-7 1 even though it was mailed ,eight days earlier from Birmingham, ; _ Alabama ., The Eleventh Circuit held that it, could ., not grant .relief despite .the - unusual .;delay in del .ivery ., because ' "[j]urisdictional,l-imitations and the . : policies-which they embody . must . be honored even in the face of .. apparent injustice'. or an administrative agency's obvious misapplication or-violation'o f 12 But it's possible that, in close cases , harshness in .result itself may affect a court's inquiry into the-statute's character . See Albillo-De Leon v . Gonzales', 4'10'F .3d' 1090, 1096 (9th Cir . 2005) 15 - substantive-law . " Brown v .-Dir ., Office of Workers' Comp . Programs , 864 F2d 120, 124 (11th Cir . 1989) . In United States v . Brockamp , 519 U .S .°,347 .(1997), the Supreme Court similarly . held that, although a taxpayer's mental disability might be'a valid reason for equitable tolling, the Court could not equitably toll section 6511's deadline for filing(cid:127)a refund claim because it contained no "implied equitable tolling" exception . Id . at 348- 49, 354 .13 In other cases, courts have held that mistakes made by 'a pro se litigant or an agency's miscommunications about the proper appeals process cannot justify equitable tolling of a jurisdictional deadline . " We distinguish statutes of limitations from jurisdictional deadlines by applying the normal rules of construction . We start with the words of the statute and their context . See Pugh v . Brook (In re Pugh) , 158 F .3d 530, 534 (11th Cir . 1998) . We look past plain meaning to determine congressional intent only if th e 13 Congress later amended section 6511 to add subsection (h), which allows equitable tolling in certain circumstances when the taxpayer is disabled . IRS Restructuring 'and Reform Act of 1998, Pub . L . 105-206, sec . 3202(a), 112 Stat . 740 . 14 See, e .g .,, Cooley v . Dir ., Office of Workers', Comp Programs, 89.5 F .2d 1301 (11th Cir . 1990) (relief denied where appeal timely mailed but sent to wrong office) ; . Shendock , 893 F .2d 1458 (3d Cir . 1990) (no relief for pro se litigant who file d appeal with'wrong office on attorney's advice) ;. Pomper v . Thompson , 836 F .2d 131 (3d Cir . 1987)-(relief denied where petitioner filed within time instructed by agency but,later than the law allowed) . - 1 6 language"is ambiguous, applying the plain meaning would lead'to , an absurd result, .or .(maybe) where-there°_is clear evidence .o f contrary-legislative intent . In re Int'l Admin ., Servs . Inc . , .,_ 408 F .3d °at 707 . . , ,,We begin,with-the=Code : SEC . ,:6015 (e) .3; Petition . for Review; by Tax Court .,-.. (1) In, . --In the case of * * * :._ a n individual who requests equitable relief unde r subsection- (f) -- (A) In general, .--In addition to any other- remedy provided by law, the individual ma y petition the Tax Court (,and the Tax, Court shall , have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriat e relief available to the individual under thi s section if such petition is filed-- (i) at any time after the earlier of- .(I) the date the Secretary mails , by certified or , registeredmail to the taxpayer's last known address, notice o f the Secretary's final determination of relief available to the individual, or, . (ii) ._not later than the close of the '90th day after the 'date 'described'"in "claus e (1),(I) . [Emphasis added . ] The most 'important-point to notice' is that, tie . Code her e Statutes granting a' court "jurisdiction"" if 'a case ' is"'filed by - 1 7 stated deadline . look more like jurisdictional time limits . Zipes , 455 U . S . at'393-94 . We ourselves have already analyzed a very similar question about section 6330's 30 -day deadline for filing petitions to challenge the Commissioner ' s determinations on how to collect unpaid taxes . In Boyd v . Commissioner , 124 T . C . 296 , 303 (2005), affd . 451 F . 3d 8 (1st Cir . 2006 ), we affirmed our decision in Jones v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2003-29 , holding that section 6330 ( d)(1) is a jurisdictional deadline that can ' t be extended . And that section has language quite similar to sectio n 6015(e) (1) (A)'s : SEC . 633 .0(d) . Proceeding After Hearing .-- (1) .Judicial review of determination .--The person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, appeal such determination to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter) . [Emphasis added . ] Courts also commonly distinguish statutes of limitation from jurisdictional deadlines by the complexity of a statute's language . Brockamp , 519 U .S . at 350-51 . Finding that sectio n 6511--a statute that on its face doesn't contain the word "jurisdiction" .or other jurisdictional terms--did not allow for equitable tolling, the Supreme Court stated tha t [o]rdinarily limitations statutes use fairly simple language, which one can often plausibly read as containing an implied "equitable tolling" .exception . * *, But § 6511 uses language that is not simple . Its sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed 18 - technical manner, that,, linguistically speaking,, cannot .- easily be read as containing implicit exceptions * * * Id . at 350 (citation omitted) . The Court also pointed'out tha t section 6511 ."sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic tim e limits,"'a list which doesn 't include equitable tolling . Id . at ' 351 . The presence of such detailed statutory rules is a sign- that "Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, k 8 . . i s open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that i t wrote ." Id . at 352 . Statutes of limitation, on the other hand, have no such jurisdictional identifiers, and courts construe them with a presumption that they were written against a backdrop of legal default rules and doctrines that they can legitimately apply whe n the statute is silent and the facts of a particular case war-rant it .15 And one of these default rules, as the Supreme Cour t .recently clarified, is a rebuttable presumption in favor„o f equitable'tolling's .availability in suits brought .by,,a privat e 15 See Young , 535 U .S . at 49-50, 52 (holding that an express equitable tolling provision is not needed for the doctrine's ; availability in a bankruptcy statute) ; Albillo-De Leon , 410 F .3d ,at .1098 the absence of any language clearly proclaiming the filing deadline as 'jurisdictional' suggests that' the statute is'' not,jurisdictionalbut a statute of limitations") ; cf . Doe V . KPMG, LLP , 398 F .3d 686, 689 (5th Cir . 2005) ("Because Congress prefers to provide explicit tolling exceptions ''to the 'limitations . periods contained in federal tax law, by implication, it'does no t .intend courts'to"invoke equitable tolling to alter th e. plain text of the statutes at issue") . 19 , - party against the . Government . John R . Sand & Gravel Co . , 128 S . Ct . at 755-56 . For example, the Supreme Court has . ruled that the limitations period--found at 42 U .S .C . sec . 405(g) - for those appealing a denial of Social Security benefits is-a statute of limitations and courts may use equitable tolling . when appropriate . Bowen v . City.. of New York , 476 U .S . 467, 480 (1.986) . But the statute being . construed there .,did .not use any jurisdictional terms, explicitly provided discretion to the Commissioner of .Social Security-to extend the 60-day filing deadline, and lacked any other indication that Congress wouldn't . want courts to apply equitable-tolling doctrine . Id . ; see Jackson v . Astrue , 506 F .3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir . 2007-). We think that section 6015 is more like section 6511 or 6330 than the statute at issue in Bowen --as we've noted, section 6015 uses the word "jurisdiction" and it's part of a system of, detailed rules on requests for relief and appeals from their- denial . There are also no explicit reservations of discretion to extend the deadline . We conclude that this is not a "close . case," and hold instead that section 6015(e)(1)(A)'s 90-day .limit is jurisdictional and therefore doesn't allow for equitable tolling, even though such a result may be very harshfor Pollock . We need not . comment on whether the underlying circumstances of Pollock's situation merit equitable-tolling--"Tax law, after all, 20 - is not normally characterized by case -specific exceptions,, . reflecting individualized equities ." Brockamp , 519 T.S . at 352 . . III . Liberal-Constructio n Having decided that~s :ection .6015( e)'s time limit is ., jurisdictional makes°Pollock's position . even more'difficu.lt . ., But'.. she correctly points out that, at the time herpetition was due, , she .actually had no forum in which to bring , her ,,claim, . meaning , that .the Commissioner is . arguing not just that she-failed to, file , timely petition, . but that she failed to file a timely peti-tion° " in a court .that at the time was without . jurisdiction to ;hear her : :case "By the time Congress amended the Code to give u s jurisdiction, her 90-day window had-already closed , This leads us .to -an' important question--how flexiblewe-,can ., be"in°construi~ng section 6015-to provide her with .'a forum , for he r ,,case under these :unusual circumstances ? [W]"e lack, general equitable powers to ;expand "our. . statutorily prescribed . jurisdiction ." Woods'y .- Commissioner , 92-- T . C . 776, 7..85 ('1989) . And though we can apply . equitabl e principles, to decide a case over which we do have' ;jurisdiction-,l 6 our inability to-apply those principles to expand our . , jurisdiction : to cases where we otherwise wouldn't .have- it i s 16 For example, we can apply equitable principles such as waiver, , duty' of consistency, estoppel, substantial compliance', ' abuse of discretion, lache .s, and the tax-benefit rule . . Woods, 92. T .C . at'784-85 21 - really .nothing more . than a fancy way of saying we can't override statutory limits-o .n our power . Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v . .Commissioner , .165 F .3d 572, 578 (7th Cir . 1999) We are_similarly reticent in our refusal to create deductions, credits, or exclusions out of a desire for a fairer outcome--we understand that this would be legislation, and legislation belongs exclusively to Congress . Paxman-v . Commissioner , 50 T . C . 567, 576-77 (1968), affd . 414 F .2d-265 (10th Cir 1969) ; Farmer v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1994-342 . We have nevertheless decided cases involving .the limitations period found in section 6213(a) . (establishing our deficiency jurisdiction) that, at first glance, may seem to speak to the issue .s .in this case choosing to give the language of that section a "broad, practical-construction rather than . a ;narrow, technical- meaning ." Lewy v . Commissioner , . 68 T .C . 779, 781 (1977) . "Where . the statute is capable of two interpretations, we are inclined to adopt a construction which . will permit us . t retain jurisdiction without doing violence to the statutory language ." Id . ; see also Loyd v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1984- 172 . Section 6213(a) has two requirements that must be met : First, the IRS must issue .a valid notice of deficiency, an d second, the taxpayer must timely file a petition with our Court . Frieling v . Commissioner , 81 T- .C . 42,',46 (1983) . The 22 - Commissioner's mailing,of the notice of deficiency'starts .a,,90- day (or, 150-_day,,if . the notice is addressed to a : person outside the United States) . period : in which the taxpayer may ;,petition :Your ;. Court for redetermination . Sec . 6213(a) . The S IRS,,may . send ,the :. notice ,to the,,,taxpayer' s last known address,, .. and' as long as i does , the .notice .; is valid- whether or not he - receives . it . ~ L fte r v . Commissioner, 59 .T .C . 818, .820-21,(1973) . If . the SIRS uses,the,,, wrong .address;°,theinotice is still valid as°long as the'taxpaye r receives it in time to file a timely petition .- Pugsley v . Commissioner , , 74-9'F . 2d, 691, 692-93 (11th Cir . 1985 ) ; Frieling , 81 ; .T . C . at°~ 5 :3 . This has led . to a number of cases in . which we have had .to decide how long is enough time for a taxpayer to .:file,,with this Court ..'7 But even this flexibility doesn'tMead to th e tolling Pollock s .eeks . Instead, the result of,a decision in , favor of' the' taxpayer in such a . case is that the notice (cid:127)o . deficiency itself is invalid," See ,. e ..g. ., Sicker, v . . ' Commissioner ; 815 F .2d 1400, 1401 (11th Cir . 1987) .- But see .Gaw 17 See, e .g ., Lindstrom v . Comm issioner , T .C . Memo . 2007- 243 ; Fileff v . Commissioner , . T .C . Memo . 1990-452 ; Loftin v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 1986-322 . 16Cf . Kuykendall v . Commissioner , 129 T .C . 77 (2007) . Since thetaxpaYers received their notice of deficiency'with,onhy ., 12 days remaining before the limitations period expired, we held :. that they could . contest . their underlying tax liability at their collection due process-hearing because section 6330(c)(2)(B) contemplates actual receipt of the notice of deficiency5by,the See sec . 301 .6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, Proced''r& Admin . taxpayers. Regs . 23 - v . Commissioner , 45 F .3d 461, 468 (D .C . Cir . 1995) (failure to address notice to last known address tolls 90-day .or 150-day period until actual receipt), revg . T .C . Memo .,1993-379 . Within this same line of cases, we have had to decide how strictly to apply the language of section 6213(e) allowing 150 days to file a petition "if ;the notice is addressed-to a person outside the United States ." In Lewy, the taxpayer was a resident of France with an office and an apartment in New-York City . Although the IRS sent the notice to his New York address, the taxpayer left for. France. the next day and didn't receive the notice until day 81 . We held that he was a "person=outside the United States" and so had 150 days from the time of mailing to file' with,this Court--even though he was actually . in the United States on the day the Commissioner mailed-the notice of deficiency--because "petitioner's absence resulted as a natura l and probable consequence in his del,ayed,.receipt of the notice . " Lewv , 68 T .C . at 784 . We can find no such wiggle room in section 6015(e) as applied to this case . Its language is clear and is not capable of more than one interpretation . Pollock is right that the 2006 amendment of section 6015(f) gave us jurisdiction over claims arising from-liability remaining ' unpaid 'as of the amendment' s effective date . But the Commissioner is correct that the unamended language of 6015(e) limits our new jurisdiction to ;claims 'filed within 90 days of the IRS's issuing itsr notice aof . determination . IV . The Effect of,the Effective Dat e Pollock makes one more-sally at the Commissioner's defense s amendment .to section 6015(e) was effective-wit h respect to liability for taxes "arising or remaining,-unpaid .,onlor, after"''December 20, 2006 . Pollock asks us whether .Congress really intended to create a cause, of action only t o simultaneously,";foreclose-the opportunity to sue-for someof thos e potential litigants . Could it really be that the,90- d y limitations ;-=Period'in section 6015(e) became effective-for-her .' .only".after it had already expired? tells us that the statute has some retroactive reach .19 But ho w much? There are other possible cases falling into- the -same .', . ' ;jurisdictional gap as -,Pollock' s claim--cases where-the IRSI,-issued . a notice of determination but the taxpayer never petitioned-the . " 19 In Landgraf v . USI Film Prods . , 511 U .S . 244,-'274'(1994)- (quoting Hallowell v . Commons , 239 U .S . 306, 308 (1916)),,, the .-Supreme (ours notea : We have' regularly applied intervening statute s conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or no t jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurre d or when the suit was filed . * * * Application of a new, jurisdictional rule usually "takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hea r the case" ,tl 25 Court, cases that . .we .dismissed for lack of . jurisdiction after Billings but before the amendment (at least those where we didn't vacate our order of dismissal), or cases where we denied relief on the merits after Ewing I but before Billings . In all of these situations, it's conceivable that,the requesting spouse's .tax liability remained unpaid as of the TRHCA's effective date .. .There is a reasonable amount of caselaw construing statutes that extinguish live claims . Looking to general principles of statute-of-limitations-jurisprudence,(cid:127)theThird Circuit recently held that "where ashortened limitations,,period would bar .pre- accrued claims, other circuits have provided .claimants the shorter of : (1.) the pre-shortened limitation,period, commencing at the time the action accrued ; or (2) the shortened limitation period, commencing from the date . the statute became .,effective ." Kolkevich v . Attorney General , 501 F, .3d 323, 337 (3d C.ir . 2007) see also Ruiz-Martinez v . Mukasev , 1 516 ..F .3d 102, 117 (2d .Cir . 2008) . So even if we--were to hold that a grace period was appropriate, these case-s suggest there would .still ;be .a limit of no more than 90 days after the amendment's-enactment .' Pollock didn't raise an innocent=spouse defense until-May 2007 . And it's important for us to note that these cases arise from situations where a court undoubtedly had jurisdiction befor e Congress changed .the law by imposing a new .or shorter deadline . Texaco, Inc . v . Short , 454 U .S . 516, 529 (1.982) (taking 26 - property) ;, Ruiz=Martinez , 516 F .3d at 115 (habeas-,corpus) : ; Kolkevich , 501 F .3d at 335-36 (habeas corpus) ; Ross'v . Aftuz ,".15 0 F .3d 97, '100 „a(2d Cir, . 1998) (habeas corpus) . 5a'Pollock' .s= case- is different : We had nojurisdiction-tv,hear section ."6015-(fnondeficiency stand-alone cases before th e amendment,'so="the amendment to section 6015 was Congress creating= jurisdiction for nondeficiency stand-alone claims where there had been none' .before . It's within-Congress's power to cr(cid:127)eate° ax~I .cause' ~ of'actionbut limit those-who may petition their cause . And :wer' think,.that''s what happened'here--although Pollock falls within the large'set,of potential petitioners whose tax liability remained unpaid ;"she falls outside the smaller subset ;of 'potential petitioners whose tax liability . remained unpaid and"to ;' whom,thev'Commissioner had either mailed a notice of,determination : within the" 90 days preceding the amendment or-who had,- .filed .,, undismissed :petitions with us when we had no jurisdiction . recogniz'e this to'be an odd result, but it follows fro m Congress±'s failure to tinker with the 90-day deadline when its ' amended the Code tb'give us jurisdiction . Congress simply ,provided people in Pollock's situation with no window of- opportun"ity~'to petition our Court and no grace period . to do 'so .20 20Certainly Congress could have decided not to_act at all , thereby providing no forum under section 6015(e) for section 6015(f) relief.. See Graham v . Goodcell , 282 U .S . . 409, 431-32- (1931) ("the'broad discretion of the Congress in° the"'exercise o f . . (continued . We therefore have no jurisdiction ., to hear her claim, and2 1 27-- An order of dismissal fo r lack of jurisdiction will b e entered . 20( . .. .continued) its constitutional power as to taxation * * * necessarily extends to the whole field of supervision and control of the processes of enforcement . * * *-In its selection the Congress dealt with an appropriate class and was not bound to include others ." ) 21Perhaps .not all hope is lost--the . Commissioner conceded at oral. argument, that if she filed,a refund action in District Court after her home was seized. and sold, Pollock could try to make her case that she is an innocentspouse . .