TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Alexander Lamback
Docket Number: 17709-14S
Judge: Carluzzo
Opinion Type: bench
Filed: 10/21/2015
Pages: 9

RMM UNITED STATES TAX COURT WASHINGTON, DC 20217 ALEXANDER LAMBACK, Petitioner(s), v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) Docket No. 17709-14S ) ) ) ) ORDER Pursuant to Rule 152(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit herewith to petitioner and to respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the trial in the above case before Special Trial Judge Lewis R. Carluzzo at Atlanta, Georgia, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the trial session at which the case was heard. In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered under Rule 155. (Signed) Lewis R. Carluzzo Special Trial Judge Dated: Washington, D.C. October 21, 2015 SERVED Oct 22 2015 Capital Reporting Company 1 Bench Opinion by Special Trial Judge Lewis R. 3 2 Carluzzo 3 October 8, 2015 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Alexander Lamback v. Commissioner Docket Number 17709-14S The Court has decided to render oral findings of fact and opinion in this case and the following represents the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion (bench opinion). Unless otherwise noted, section references made in this bench opinion are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the relevant periods, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. This bench opinion is made pursuant to the authority granted by section 7459(b) and Rule 152. This proceeding for the redetermination of a deficiency is a small tax case subject to the provisions of section 7463 and Rules 170 through 175. Pursuant to section 7463(b) the decision entered in this case shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Except as provided in Rule 152(c), this bench opinion shall not be cited as authority. Alexander Lamback appeared on his own behalf. Jason P. Oppenheim appeared on behalf of 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 respondent. In a notice of deficiency dated July 14, 2014 (notice), respondent determined a $4,081 deficiency in petitioner's 2011 Federal income tax. Following a concession by respondent, the issues for decision are whether petitioner: (1) is entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for A.A.; (2) is entitled to a child tax credit; and (3) qualifies as a head of household. Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. At the time the petition- was filed, petitioner lived in Georgia. Petitioner is the father of Cody Lamback (Cody), born in 1992, and 14 A.A., born in 1995. As best as can be determined 15 16 from the record, A.A.'s mother had custody over A.A. at all times relevant here. Neither A.A. nor A.A.'s 17 mother lived with petitioner during 2011. 18 In a document entitled "Decision of the 19 Magistrate" which includes a section entitled 20 21 22 23 24 25 "Support Order", filed March 4, 1996, in the juvenile division of the Montgomery County, Georgia, Common Pleas Court (support order) petitioner was made obligated to make monthly payments to A.A.'s mother for the support of A.A. According to the support order, petitioner was "granted the right to take the 866.488.DEPO www.Capita1ReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 5 1 income tax exemption, Federal, State and Local," for 2 A.A., "upon the express condition that * * * [he] 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 remain current in child support obligations, beginning in the year 1997". The support order further provides that A.A.'s mother "shall execute the necessary IRS documents to effectuate" the "income tax exemption". The support order is not signed by or on behalf of A.A.'s mother. Cody graduated from high school in 2010; he was not a student during 2011. For the most part Cody lived with petitioner during 2011, although from time to time he stayed with his mother or a friend of his. Cody moved into a rented apartment in late November or early December of that year. Petitioner's timely filed 2011 Federal income tax return (return) shows his filing status as "head of household". As relevant here, on that return petitioner claimed a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. and a child tax credit attributable to A.A. Petitioner did not attach a Form 8332, Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents, to the return. 23 Apparently A.A.'s mother refused to sign. a Form 8332 24 with respect to the child for the year in issue. 25 In the notice respondent disallowed the 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 6 1 2 above-referenced dependency exemption deduction and child tax credit. Respondent also changed 3 petitioner's filing status from "head of household" 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 to "single". Because of its consequence to the other issues in the case, we'll first consider petitioner's entitlement to a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. In general, a taxpayer is entitled to an additional exemption deduction for each individual who is a dependent of the taxpayer for the taxable year. Sec. 151(a), (c). In general, the term "dependent" as used in section 151 and elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code, means the taxpayer's "qualifying child" or "qualifying relative." Sec. 152(a), (c) and (d). Those terms are specifically defined in the statute, but we need not consider those definitions for purposes of this issue. Because petitioner and A.A.'s mother did not live together during 2011, special rules apply to determine which of A.A.'s parents is entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. Those rules are embodied in section 152(e) and its corresponding regulation and, among other things, require identifying petitioner as either A.A.'s "custodial" 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or "noncustodial" parent. Sec. 152(e) (4). (As far as the Court can tell, the word "noncustodial" exists only in the Internal Revenue Code and the Commissioner's regulations). Petitioner agrees that he was A.A.'s "noncustodial" parent during 2011. That being so, A.A. is treated as his qualifying child or qualifying relative for a particular year only if, as relevant here, A.A.'s mother, who at the relevant time was 10 A.A.'s custodial parent, released her right to claim 11 12 13 14 15 16 a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. for that year. That release had to be effectuated through a Form 8332, or its equivalent, see sec. 152(e)(2)(A); sec. 1.152-4(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs., and as noted, A.A.'s mother refused to provide a Form 8332 to petitioner for 2011, even though the support order 17 might have compelled her to do so. Acknowledging the 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 absence of a Form 8332 for the year in issue, petitioner argues that the support order is the equivalent of a Form 8332, but his argument fails for the reasons set forth in respondent's well reasoned and thorough pretrial memorandum. See Armstrong v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 468 (2012); Miller v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 184 (2000), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 8 1 2 3 4 5 1208 (10th Cir. 2002). It follows that petitioner is not entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. for 2011, and respondent's disallowance of that deduction is sustained. Because petitioner is not entitled to a 6. dependency exemption deduction for A.A., it also 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 follows that he is not entitled to the child tax credit here in dispute. Subject to various limitations, section 24(a) provides that a taxpayer is entitled to a child tax credit only with respect to "each qualifying child of the taxpayer for which the taxpayer is allowed" a dependency exemption deduction. We have found that petitioner is not entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for A.A. If only for that reason, he is not entitled to the child tax credit here in dispute and respondent's disallowance of that credit is also sustained. Lastly we consider whether petitioner qualifies as a head of household. Subject to a variety of other conditions, section 2(b)(1) provides that "an individual shall be considered a head of household if, and only if, such individual is not 23 married at the close of the taxable year". Taking 24 25 into account petitioner's credible and candid testimony, we could deny him that status on that 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ground alone, but we'll give him the benefit of the doubt on that point. As relevant here, section 2(b)(1) also requires that the taxpayer must maintain as the taxpayer's home, "a household which constitutes for more than one-half of the taxable year the principal place of abode, as a member of such household" of a qualifying child of the taxpayer. Sec. 2(b) (1)(A). Regardless of A.A.'s status as petitioner's qualifying child, petitioner's home was not A.A.'s principal place of abode during 2011 and he may not rely upon A.A. to support his claim to be a head of household, as suggested by the position taken on his return. During or following the examination of his return, petitioner took the position that he qualified as a head of household because Cody lived 17 with him for more than one half of 2011. Respondent 18 19 disputes petitioner's claim, but we'll give petitioner the benefit of the doubt on this point as 20 well. Assuming, without finding that Cody did live 21 with petitioner for more than one-half of 2011, 22 23 24 25 petitioner does not qualify as a head of household because Cody, who was born in 1992, had attained the age of 19 as of the close of 2011 and was not a student that year. That being so, he does not fit 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com Capital Reporting Company 1 within the definition of petitioner's qualifying 10 child for purposes of section 2 (b) . See sec. 152(c)(1)(C), (3). Petitioner does not qualify as a head of household for 2011 and respondent's determination to that end is sustained. For what it's worth, according to the Court's informal calculations, we note that changing petitioner's filing status from head of household to single increases his 2011 Federal income tax liability by less than $200. To reflect the foregoing and respondent's concession, decision will be entered under Rule 155. This concludes the bench opinion in this case. (Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the above- entitled matter was concluded.) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 866.488.DEPO www.CapitalReportingCompany.com