TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Michael L. Conn
Docket Number: 4422-07L
Judge: Marvel
Opinion Type: memo
Filed: 07/11/2011
Pages: 21

-T.C.,Memo. 2011-166 UNITED STATES TAX COURT 3 MICHAEL L. CONN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ReŠpondent Docket No. 4422-07L. Filed July 11, 2011. Eric Johnson for petitioner. Derek B. Matta, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION MARVEL, Judge: Pursuant t·o section 6330 (d) ,1 petitioner has petitioned for a revièw of respondent' s deteräinations (1) to file a notice of Federal tax 1 en (NFTL) with rpspect to petitióner's unpaid Federal income tax liability for 1993 and (2) Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) , as amended; and all Rulereferences are to the Tax Court Rules of Practipe and Procedure. SERVED JUL 1 1 2011 - 2 to proceed by levy to collect that liability. After concessions,2 the issue we must decide is whether respondent abused his discretion in determining that the proposed levy mãy proceed and that the NFTL filed with respect to the unpaid liability was appropriate. To resolve this issue, the partiés contend we must consider the following questions: (a) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider petitioner's unperfected and untimely claims that he overpaid his tax liabilities, for years after 2003 (nondetermination years) and that the overpayments should be applied to reduce or eliminate thk unpaid liability for 1993 (determination year) ; and (b) whether the mitigation provisions of sections 1311-1314 enable us to consider petitioner' s overpayment claims with respect to the nonnae terminat ion years . Background The parties submitted this clase fully stipúlåted ÿursuani- to Rule 122. The stipulation of facts is incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Louisiana when the petition was filed Petitioner and his wife, Patricia A. Conn,, timely- filed the ir 19 93 Form 1040 y . U . S . , Individual Income Tax Re turn Subsequently, petitioner was indicted for making, uttering and 2Petitioner concedes his claim for interest abatement and agrees that collection alternatives are no longer at issue. possessing forgeel securities. The charges arose from petitioner's misappropriation of funds from the Police - ' ? Association of New Orleans . On September 5, 1996, petitioner pleaded guilty to making, uttering, and possessing a forged security with the intent to deceive under 18 U.S.C. sec. 513(a). As part of petitioner's sentence, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ordered him to pay .$185,248.86 in restitution and sentenced him to 15 to 21 months' imprisonment . On the basis of the criminal case, respondent determined that petitioner was required to include the misappropriated 'funds in his income for 1993 but that he failed to do so. On April 8, 1997, respondent mailed to petitioner a notice of deficiency for 1993. At that time, petitioner was serving his sentence in a Federal penitentiary in Texas Conn v. Commissioner, T.C. 'Memo. 2008-186. Although respondent mailed a joint notice of T deficiency to petitioner and his wife at their last known address, petitioner did not receive the notice or file a timely petition to contest it because of his temporary residence in the Federal penitentiary.3 Id. On September 9, 1997, respondent assessed an income tax deficiency of.$14,445, a section 6663 penalty of $9,639, and 3Mrs. Conn f:.led a separate petition in response to the notice of deficie acy. Before ltrial that under sec. 6315 Mrs. Conn was not and we entered a decision reflecting the settlement. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-186. Conn v. the Commissioner conceded liable for the deficiency, - 4 - interest (collectively, the -1993 liability) against petitioner for '1993. Respondent, subsequently filed two NFTLs acjainst petitioner' s property in Louisiana and mailed, petitioner a Notice of Federal Tax «Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing, dated January 16; 2003. On February 7, 2003, resp'ondent-miiled tce e petitioner a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice ofs Your Right to a Hearing with respect to the 1993 liabilit'y:" * Petitioner timely submitted a Form *12153, Request' for a Collection Dues Process Hearing, to contest the lien and levy notices . In the ,Form 12153 and throughout the hearing process petitioner specifically requested the right to challenge the 1993 liability. Jettlement Officer Brenda Esser (Settlement Officer Esser)3 conducted a section 6330 hearing on November 14, 2006. She 'did not permit- petitioner to contest- the 1993 liability becau'se respondent had.mailed a -notice of 'deficiency to hïm- for 1993. In a notice of .determination dated January 18, 2007, respondent' s Appeals Office determined that the lien and levy action were proper and sustained them. On February 23 2007, petitioner timely filed a petition for review of respondent' s determinations . In the resulting case this Court found that Settlement Officer Esser had improperly denied petitioner-the right to raise the 1993 liability issue Cònn v. Commissioner*, supra. We held that, under section - 5 - 6330(c) (2) (B), petitioner could challenge -the 1993 liability because he never-received the notice of deficiency. Id. We remanded the case to responde!nt to conduct a supplemental hearing under section 63:10 at which petitioner could challenge the 1993 liability. The case on remand was assigned to Settleaent Officer Doris Augustine (Settlement Officer Augustine), who conducted the supplemental hearing on March 3, 2009. Settlement Officer Augustine concluded that respondent had properly determined petitioner's 1991 liability. Respondent's App als Office issued a Supplemental Notice of Determination'Concerning Collection Actions Under Sections 6320 and 6330 again upholding the collection actiors. The case was set for trial -in New Orleans on November 20, 2009.3 Before the trial date petitioner- and respondent reached a settlement on the 1993 liability issue.4 In a stipulation of settled issues the parties agreed that petitioner was liable for a $5,778 deficiency and a section 6663 penalty of $3,855 for 1993 plus interest (the stipulated liability). In a second stipulation of settled issues, the parties agreed that petitioner had failed to rep>rt $17,872 of income for 1993. 4Petitioner ook the position that althoug he was convicted of embezzlement, he did not direct the embezzled funds to himself br use the funds Ëor personal purposes. Commissioner, supra. See Conn v. - 6 - On January 19, 2010, respondent filed a motion for remand to consider coll:ection alternatives . We granted the motion and remanded the case for another supplemental hearing to be held by April .26 , 2010 . The second remand was assigned to Settlement Officer James Feist (SettlementeOfficer Feist) . On February 4, 2010 Settlement Officer Feist requested that petitEoner subinit specified information and documents before the hearing including an updated Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Tarners and Self-Employed Individuals, financial documentatiún supporting that 'form,. and a plan to satisfy the stipulated liability. Petitioner did not submit. any of the requested finanbial information. Instead, petitioner submitted unsigned Forms 1040X Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, cl'aiming" that he h d overpaid his taxes for 1998 through -2004 and 2006 through 2008;. The overpayments were attributable to restit'ution paymenti that petitioner had made to satisfy the .restitution component of. liis sentence in the criminal caise . Beginning in November 1996, petitioner made festitution payments. As of January 41'9, 2010 petitioner had made restitution payments totaling $50,827.22 Petitioner claimed deductions for the restitution payments on sAfter the hearing petitioner restricted his claini to * offsets arising from overpayments made through 2004 - 7 - Schedules C, Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Proprietorship), attached to the ansigned Forms 1040X. On February.18, 2010, Settlement Officer Feist held a telephone conference with petitioner and petitioner's c'ounsel. Petitioner argued that the overpayments shown on the unsigned Forms 1040X for the nondetermination years should be offset against the 1993 liability. However, Settlement Officer Feist did not consider the Forms 1040X because petitioner had not signed or filed t hem. Furthermore, Settlement Officer Feist 'determined that he could not consider the overpayment claims because (1) the ' overpayment claims were for nondetermination years and petitioner's assdrtion that he was entitled to offsets from' nondetermination years was not an appropriate èollection 'Petitioner claimed the f:ollowing amounts on his Forms For 1998, a business expense deduction of $1,625 and an 1040X: overpayment of $454; $1,200 and an overpayment of É400; deduction of $4,042 and an overpayment of $1,334; business expense deduction of $2,875 and an overpayment of $947; for 2002, a business expense deduction of $1,650 and an overpayment of $463; $575 and an overpayment of $165; deduction of $5,580 and an overpayment of $1,801; business expense deduction of {$6,500 and an overpayment of $1,753; overpayment of, $2,661; and, deduction of $6,030 and an overpayment of $1,949. expense deductions on the Schedules C equal restitution that petitioner paid to the Department of Justice, except for 2004, deducted only $5,580 on his 2004 Form 1040X. for 2004, a business expense for 2006, a for 2007, a business dxpense deduction of $6,500 and an hen petitioner paid $7,985 in restitution but The business th amounts of for 2008, a business expenses for 1999, a business expense deduction of for 2000, a business expense for 2001, a for 2003, a business expense deduction of 8 - alternative, and (2) the overpayment - claims were not timely asserted during the section 6330. hearing Petitioner also claimed that he was entitled to interest abatement for the period from his hearing request until receipt of a response from the, Appeals Office. Settlement OfficetFeist denied this request, concluding that petitioner's interest abatement claims .exceeded the scope of the hearing Finally, Settlement- Officer Feist, concluded that petitioner presented no viable collection alternative, largely because of his failure to provide pertinent financial information or to suggest ans appropriate alternate method of-spaying the- lïability On March 11, 2,010/ respondent's Appeals Office issued a supplemental notice ,of determination denying petitioner' serequest foi collection alternatives, finding that all legal and procedural requirements had been met as required by section In concluding that the Forms 1040X and»ãttached Scheduleš C could not . be considered, Settlement Of ficer Feist stated: Requesting adjustments of tax in periods outside ;of subject tax period is not a collection afternative. Requesting adjustments -is a liability is'sue for periods dther than the one subject period and this issue not part of could have been and should have been raised and addressed no elater thah immediately after the time that the current assessment was sustained by Appeals Officer Augus tine . -In my opinion, this issue the the scurrent remand. 2 , "As noted supra note .2, petitioner subsequently waitred his claims' for interest abatement and for consideration of collectiion alternatives 6330 (c) (1) and determining that the lien and levy actions could - 9 - proceed. I. Collection Hearing Procedure Discussion A. Filing of NFTL, and Related Hearing Rights - Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States on all property and property rights of a taxpayer liable for taxes after a demand foc the payment-of the taxes has been made and the taxpayer fails to pay those taxes. The lien a išes when the assessment is made. Sec. 6322. Section 6323(f) generally requires the Secretary" to file an NFTL with the appropriate State office for the lien to be valid against certain third parties. Section 6320 (a) requires the Secretary to notify the taxpayer in writing of the fil.ing of an NFTL and of the taxpayer' s right to an administrative hearing on the matter. Section 6320 (b) affords the taxpayer the right to a heäring. Section 6320 (c)' requires that the administrative hearing be conducted pursuant- to section 6330 (c) , (d) (othe r than paragiaph (2) (B) theree>f ) , and (e) . I. 9The term "Se cretary" mea s "the Secretary. of the Treasury the Treasury sec. 7701(a) (11) (B) , and the term "or his or his delegate" delegate" means "any officer, employee, or agency of Department duly a thorized by the Secretary of Ethe Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority, context", sec. 7701(a) (12) (A) . to per orm the function mentioned or described in the - 10 - a ¡B.. + ;Notice of Intent- To -Levy and Related Hearing Rights Section 6331(a) authorizes the Secretary to levy upon"all:s property and property rights of a taxpayer liable for taxes who faïls to pay those taxes within 10 days afte anotice and demand for payment. Section -6330 (a) provides that no levy may be made on any property" or rights to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such .person in writing of the *right to a hearing before theslevy is made. Section 6330(b) affords the taxpayer the right .to a hearing. Section 6330 (c) specifies the matters to be -considered at the administrative hearin nl sets forth the hearing sprocedures . C. The Section 6320/6330 Hearing If a taxpayer -requests a hearing in response to eit her a NFTL or a notice of- levy pursuant to.section 6320 or ~6330, a hearing shall be held before an impartial officer or eñiployee of the IRS Of f ice of Appeals . Sec . 6330 (b) (1) , (3) . Atithe hearing the taxpayer may raise any relevant issue,tincluding appropriate spousal defenses; challenges to the appropriateness of the collection ac tion, and collection alternatives . Sec . 6330 (c) (2) (A) . A taxpayer may also contest the existènce or amount of the underlying tax liability if he did note receive s a- notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an op rt ity t dispute the tax liability. Sec." 6330 (c) (2) (B) ; see also Sego v Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000) . 1- 11 - Following the hearing, the Appeals Office must determine whether the propo ed collection actiòn may proceed. In making that determinatio , the Appeals Office is required to take into consideration: ( ) Verification presented by the Secretary during the hearing process that the requirements of applicable law and administr tive procedure have been met, (2) relevant issues raised by :he taxpayer, and (3) whether the proposed lien or levy action ap>ropriately balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the taxpayer's concerns regarding the intrusiveness of the proposed ilevy action. Sec. 6330(c) (3). Section 6330'd) (1) grants this Court jurisdictioñ to review the determination made by the Appeals Office in connection with the section 6330 hearing. Where the underlying tax liability" is þroperly at issue we review the taxpayer's'liability de novo. See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). We review all other eterminations for abuse of discretion. Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001); Sego v. Commissioner,.sup a at 610; Goža v. Commissioner, supra at 182. An abuse of discretion occurs if the Appeals Office exercises its discretion "arbitrarily, capriáiously; or withoùt sound basis in fact or law."' Wocdral v. Commissioner, 112 T.Cs 19, 23 (1999). "We have int rpreted the phrase "underlyi g tax liability" (in sec. 6330(d) (1) pursuant and interest. Kaiz v. Commissiioner, 115 T.C. 3629, 339 (2000). to the tax laws such as deficiencies, additions to tax, to include any amounts owed by a taxpayer - 12 - II. -Petitioner''s -Challenges to the Notice of Determination The parties ~have stipulatedethe amount of the unreported income petitioner embezzled that must be included in his income for 1993 The .parties have also stipulated the resulting ïnaome tax deficiency and penalty amounts. Consequently; the parties agree-in,effect:to the amount of the-underlying tax liability for 1993 before any adjustments ; for overpayments in noridetermination years. The fundamental dispute focuses on alleged overpayments nade in nondetermination years sthat petitioner asserts should be determined in this section 6320/6330 case and,then applied to offset the agreed-upon liability <for 1993. Petitioner did. not file refund álaimsowith respect to the alleged overpayments as required by the refund provisions of the Code ands srelated regulations within the applicable period of limitations set forth in section -6511(a) . - Petitioner attempts to overcome this problem by introducing into evidences unsigned Forms 1040X claiming the overpayments ,and asserting that we have jurisdiction in this proceeding not only to determine overpayments butoalso' tordecide that the, mitigation provisions of sections 1311-1314 permit us to do so: Petitioner thus.attempts to use this proceeding as a "one stop shop" for dispensing his brand of tax justice. We decline to do so for the reasons set forth herein. 13 - III. Jurisdiction in Section 6320/6330 Proceedings To Determine Overpayments in Nondetermination Years Under sectio 6330(d) (1) (A), we have jurisdiction over the determination made by the Appeals Office and our jurisdiction is defined by the scope of that determination. Freiie v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14, 25 (2005). Under section 6330(c) (3), the determination of the Appeals Office must take into account the verification :required by section 6330(c) (1), any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed collection action that was raised by the taxpayer under section 6330(c) (2), nd the balancing considerations required by section 6330(c) (3) (C). " inc an 'unpaid tax' is the sine qua non of the Commissioner's au hority to levy", a claim directed at the status f the tax as "unpaid" is a relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed collection action. Id. at 26. We have stated in this recard as follows: Meaningful review of a claim that a tax sought collected by levy has been paid, by means of a remittance or an available credit, will typically require cons'deration.of facts- and issues in nondetermination years, as those years may constitute the years to which a remittance was applied or from which a credit originated. omitted.] [Id. at 26-27; to be fn. ref. In Frieje we held that we had jurisdictionsto consider a taxpayer's claim that a payment made in the.determination year was misapplied to an earlier nondetermination year insofar as the facts and issues with respect to the nondetermination year were - 14 - relevant to computing the unpaid.tax for the determination year. After examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the remittance, we concluded that the Commissioner' s application of the remittance to the earlier nondetermination year .was proper Our jurisdiction to consider relevant issues raised in a section 6320 or 6330 proceeding is not unlimited, however. If a taxpayer asserts that an overpayment from a nondetermination year should be applied to an unpaid tax liability for a determination year, the taxpayer must demonstrate that he has acted timely sin asserting his claim to the refund or credit. - In Landry v Commissioner, 116 T.C. 60 (2001) , we held that overpayments from nondetermination years that were first claimed on delinquent returns f iled more than 3 years late did not reduce the amount of unpaid tax due for the determination years because the refund claïms made on the delinquent returns were barred by the applicable period of limitations governing refunds and credits . See secs. 6511, 6513. In Brady v. Commissioner, 136 T,.C. (2011) , we held that galleged overpayments for nondetermination years that the taxpayer had asserted on refund claims disallowed by the Commissioner could not be credited against the unpaid tax for the determination year because the taxpayer did not file a refund suit sto contest the disallowance within therperiod of limitations set forth in section: 6532. These cases establish that if we tassume our jurisdiction in cases governed, by ssection - 15 - 6330 may permit un to consider overpayment claigs arising from a nondetermination years, we may not credit against unpaid tax owed for a determination year any alleged overpayment that is not timely asserted or litigated as required by the refund provisions of the Code. Petitioner made restitution payments during years after 993, but he did not claim a deduction for: the restitution payments on his original returns for those years. After respondent initiated -collection activity with respect to the unpaid 1993 liability, petitioner belatedly attempted to claim I that he was entit]ed to deduct the restitution payments and that he had overpaid his tax liabilities for years in which he made restitution paymedts. Petitioner did not file formal refund claims with respect to the alleged overpayments) however. nstead, he introduced into evidence unsigned and unfiled Forms | 1040X with respect -to the nondetermination years in which he had paid restitution, arguing that he is entitled to credits against his 1993 liability for the overpayments. - i Like the taxpayers in Landry and Brady, petitioner did not ¢ake timely action to obtain credit or refund of overpayments, with respect to the nondetermination years. Petitioner, howéver, attempts to avoid the limitations problem by claiming that the mitigation provisi2ns of sections 1311-1314 apply. As we dnderstand petitioler's argument, he asserts that the provisions - ,16 -- apply because: t (1) Thesparties entered into a stipulation a regarding the amount of embezzlement income that was includable in petitioner' s income for 1993 and that stipulation constitutes a determinat ion within the . meaning of sec t ion. 1313 (a) ; - (2) the determination adopts a tax treatment of the embezzlement : income that is-inconsistent with a different and erroneous tax-position involving the embezzlement incomet (3) ther connection. between the two inconsistent positions· is described in section 1312; and (4)4 the other tax years are closed for adjustment -under the applicable -period of -limitations Respondent disagrees Respondent asserts thats petitioner does not correctly state the conditions for mitigation;- and that even ifrhe did accurately state, the conditions, she failed to demonstrate that he mét all of the required conditions for mitigation to apply under sections 1311-1314 . 3 Congress enacted the mitigation provisions, -presently codified as sections 1311-1314, to provide relief for spécified errors and inconsistent positions int very limited circufútances Bradford v. Commissioner, 34- T.C. 1051, 1054 (1960) ; see alsô Fong V-. -Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-181. The mitigation provisions are detailed, and any party claiming the benefit the provisions must carry the burden of sproving that the provisions apply. Bradford v. Commissioner, supra at 1054. Section 131-1 a) eprovides: 17 - SEC. 13:.1(a). General Rule.--If a determination is described in one or the deternination, correction of the effect of the the paragraphs off section 1312 and, on the date (as defined :.n section 1313) more of of error referråd to in the applicable paragraph of section 1312 is prevented by the operation of any law or rule of section 7122 (relating to compromises), of in the amount and in the manner specified in section 1314. the error shall be corrected by an adjustment made law, other than this part and other than then the effect Under section 1313 (a), a determination is (1) :a decision by the Tax Court or a judgment, decree, or other order by any court of ompetent jurisdiction, which has become final; (2) a~closing ágreement made uncer section 7121; (3) a final disposition by the Secretary of a claim for refund; or (4) under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, an agreement for purposes of this part, signed by the Secretary and by any person relating to the liability of such person (or the person for whom he acts), in espect of a tax under this subtitle for any taxable period. The circumstances under which-an adjustment under section 1311 is authorized are set forth in section 1312 and include such things as the double inclusion of an item of gross income and the double allowance or double disallowance of a deduction for credit. Sec. 1312(1)-(7). Petitioner coatends that the determination in question is the parties' stipulation that he was required to include in his - 18 - 1993 taxable income $17, 872 of embezzlement income, " which petitioner asseits will ultimately be incorporated into a decision and that it qualifies as a decision of the Tax Court under section 1313 (a)-(1) . Petitioner also appears, to coritend that the inconsistent position requiring mitigation is respondent' s failure to allow deductions in the nondetermination years for the amounts of restitution paid and to credit the resulting overpayments against the s1993 liability., We reject petitioner's mitigation argument for several reasons. First, petitioner has, fa:iled to prove .that a qualifying determination within the meaning of section 1313 (a) has been made. Second, petitioner has failed to demonstrate any circumstances . described in section 1312- under which th'e adjustment provided by section 1311 is authorized. Third, petitioner has . failed to prove that the alleged overpayments resulting from restitution payments made in the nondeterminatiorn years are the' result of any error in the prior tax treatment of those .payments or in the prior tax treatment, of the embezzlement income that generated the obligation to make'the paymentst We elaborate below. The only determination that petitioner identifies is the stipulation of the parties regarding the amount of embezzled "Par. 1 of the second stipulation of settled issues , erroneously states that the taxable year, is 2003, not 1993, but the -introductory language confirms that the correct yea is 1993 - 19 - income sincludable in his 1993 income . The stipulation has not - yet resulted in a y decision, and it does not reflect a final substantive decis i.on on the :merits of the case. Ordinarily, in order to qualify s a court decision, judgment, decree, or order that has-become final within the meaning of section 1313(a) (1), a court action must involve a substantive decision on the merits. See, e.g., Cotter v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 506,: 507-509 (1963). An administrative settlement agreement is not a. determination for purposes of section 1313 (a) (1) . See Fruit of the Loom, Inc . v. Commissioner, 72 1.3d 1338 (7th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 994-492; Rasmussen v. United States, 811 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1987) . However, decision incorporating a stipulation of settlement that s ecifies the tax treatment of an adjustment on hich mitigation ' s sought may qualify as a determination under section 1313 (a) (1) . See Shields v. United States, 265 F. Supp. 770 (N:.D. Ohio 1965) , affd. 375 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1967) . Petitioner relies on Shields to support his argument that the stipulation constitutes a determination within the meaning of section 1313 (a) (1) . Unlike the stipulation in Shields, the stipulation in que 3tion has not been incorporated in any decision, nor has here been a binding determination by this Court that is final." We conclude that the stipulation is not a "Although neither party addressed this problem, it does not ppear that mitigation relief can be obtained in the same (continued. t . ) qualifying determination under section 1313 (a) (1) on the facts of - 20 - this case. We. also reject petitioner' s contention that a circumstance of adjustment described in section -1312 exists in this" case . Petitionèr has not demonstrated that there has béen an erroneous double inclusion of the income embezzled by him, nor has he proven that there has been ariy double disallowance of a proper deduction with respect to the embezzled income. Petitioner's position stated simply. is that he has been'required by the teriñs of his sentence in :the criminal -case to pay restitution with respect to the income he embezzled, he has paid somesof the required restitution, and he is entitled to deduct the restitution payments, thereby generating overpayments -in other years ,that should offset his liability for the embezzled incoine Petitioner' s position does not reflect any inconsistency'or e inequity in the tax treatmentrof either the embezzled :income or the restitution payments that can be cured by recourse to the mitigation provisions. We so hold. Bedause"the mitigation provisions of sections 1311-1314 do not apply, -we hold that petitioner' s time-barred overpayment T claims for nondetermination years are not allowable as credits againstathe 1993 liability. Petit*ioner has raised rio other 4 ( . . continued) proceeding as: that - United States, 385 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1967) . in which a deterinination is made . Benenson - 21 - issues under section 6320 or 6330 with respect to the NFTL or the roposed levy action. We conclude, therefore, that the Appeals Office did not ab se its discretion in determining that the collection action may proceed|, and we sustain the determination. We have considered the remaining arguments of both parties for results contr ry to those discussed herein, and to the extent ot discussed abo e, conclude those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit. To reflect the foregoing, Decision will be entered f or re spondent . I