TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Whistleblower 14106-10W
Docket Number: 14106-10W
Judge: Thornton
Opinion Type: reported
Filed: 12/08/2011
Pages: 43

137 T C. No. 15 UNITED STATES«TAX COURT WHI£TLEBLOWER 14106-10W, Petition r v. COMMISE IONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 14106-10W. . Filed December 8, 2011. a fo Emer senior execütive X, whistleblowe: award under sec . . 7623 (b) , that X had u:2derpaid ïts taxes . R inÜesÙigated P' s claim but, did not open an administrative or judicial proceeding against X and did not collect any additional thei basis of P s information. basis that an award determination could not be made under sec. 7623(b), R denied P's claim on the I . R . C. , alleging I.R.C. iled d claiÈfor a tax from X on P's ide2tity thus far has been kept confidential. Asserting that disclosing P's identity in this judicial proceeding would result in retaliation and professional ostracism, P filed a motion for a protective order, requestîng t 2at that P be grinted anonymity. the record be sealed or alternatively . While P's motion for a protect.ive oËder wa pending, R f Lled a motion for summary judgment. opposes R' s notion on the grounds that it is premature because P s notion for a protectivegorder is pending and discovery has not commenced. P . $$VED OEC - 8 201 Held: Summary judgment may properly be rendered even the thre¼hold requirements for a further, because P further] because the potential harm from though a.motion for a protective order is pending and discovery has not commenced. Held, failed to meet whistleblower award, R' s motion for summary judgment will be granted. Held, disclosing P's identity§ as a confidential outweighs the public interest in knowing P' s identity in this case decided on summary judgment, P' s request for anonymity will be grantèd. Held, be ordered to redact and any identifying information about P and X. Held, further, because. granting P's request for ánonymity and redacting identifying i formation adequately protect P's - legitimate privacy interests as a confidential P's request the record will be denied. the parties will from the record both P's and X's names informant further, to seal informant, ,' for petitioner. David A Ingold an Rutl Mary Spadaro, (cid:16)042for respondent OPINION TI RNTON, Judge: This s an action pursuant to section 7623 (b) (4) to review respondent' s denial of pétitibber' s älaim for a whistleblower award. his matter is*befo e the Court. on respondent's motion for summ ry judgment and petitioner's motion to seal the rècord and proceed anonymouslý. 1The name of petitioner counsel has been omitted in furtherance of protecting pet itionef's identity. 2Unless otherwise noted,4 all section referenceä are to the Internal. Reve ue Code, as amÊnded, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure . - 3 - Background Petitioner' s. Whistleblower Claim n On March. 3, 2008, petitioner-submitted. to the Internal: - Revenue'Service Whistleblower Office (Whistleblower Office) «Form 211, Application for'Award for' Original Information: This submission indice ted that 'while employed as a senior executive in a particular company (X) , petitioner had become aware of a tax code violation that resulted in X' s underpaying its Fe^deral income tax by 'a substintial; amount. ' By letter dated Mar'ch 11', - 2008,. -resporident a~cknowledged receipt of pe~titionér' s claim. After various written communications'between *the parties, by lett'er to petitibner date-d M'arch 13, '2010) the 'Whistlebl#ower Office adv©ised that petitioner did not qualify for a¯n award because the subm3 tted information did not identify a Federal tax issue upon which the Internal- Revenue Service (IRS)~ would take . action ånd therefore did'not lead to the ^detection of> an underpayment of tax for which' an- award could be made" under section 7623 (b) .^ Petitioner 'timely' petitioned thi^s Court pursuant"to sedtnon 7623 (b) (4) . Petitioner's Mot: on for a' Protedt^ive 'Order - ' ' Petitioner ¿tlso filed, along ^with the petitiori, a motion to seal identity,icaise, and- accóm'panying' dócuttients (som'etimes'- · referred to here:.nafter as petitioner's motion for a protective order) . The Court; temporarily sealed the record and, af,ter . receiving respondent 's respo se and petitioner' s supplements to the motion, held a hearing on petitioner's motion. At theï hearing petitioner's counsel clarified that petitioner= sóught. to have the record sealed or, alternatively, sought-permission to proceed anonymously . Petitiðner submitted an af f idavit alleging the ;basis in support of the motion to seal or proceed anonymous ly . According to the affida it,'-while employed at X, petitioner became aware3 of| the alleged tax underpayment referenced in petitioner's,application for a whistleblower.award. Petitioner submitted the whistleblower claim to the IRS. . Petitioner'is , identity as a whistleblower 1as been kept confidential throughout the administrative proceedings and thus far in this judicial_ : action. At some point after filing the whistleblower claim, petitioner obtained new semplòyment.,in a company other than X. - According to the affidavit petitioner fears "economic and professional ostracism, harm, and job-related harassment if my identity is revealed because my new employer and other potentiial employers will not .want to hi e or employ a known tax whistleblower." Petitioner a so asserts that -X may suffer financia:11y if the details ,of petitioner's claim are .made public. 3Withóut objection, petit ioner's affidavit was received into evidence as petitioner's testimony. Respondent's Mot.ton for Summary Judgment - 5 - On June 6, 2011, while petitioner's;motionjfor a protective order was still pending, respondent filed×a.motion for summary judgment. On July 6, .2011, petitioner filed an;opposition to the granting of respöndent' s smot'ion for summary judgment Neither party has request.ed a hearing o&respondent s motion fore summary judgment, and we conclude that none is necessary. , Discussion e I . Background: Judicial Review of Tax Whistleblower Claims Since 1867 t he Secretary has had legal .authority to make discretionary payments for information .that 'aids in detecting tax underpayments and fraud. See History òf the (cid:16)042 Whistleblower/ Inf ormant Program, ht tþ:>//www . irs . gov/ compliarice/ article/0, , id=18 294, 00 . html . In 2006 Congress substantially amended the whist leblówer proIgr'am by enacting sect-ion -7623 (b) . Under this provi ion, "If the Secretafy proceeds *ith any administrative or judicial action" on the basis of information provided .by a wh stleblower, then, subject to various conditions, the whistleblower shall be entïtled to an award o l(cid:0)540. to 30 4The pre-2006 version of the tax whistleblower .law, former sec. 7623, survives with minor changes às sec. 7623f(a) percent of -the collected pro$eeds .5 Sec . 7623 (b) ; see also Cooper v. . Commissioner, 135 T . C. 70, 73 (2010) . _ Before .2006 there was.no express statutory provision for judicial review of tak whist eblower claims . . See Colman v} United States, 96eFed. Cl. 633,^,638 (2011). (stating that the pre- 2006 tax whistleblower law "Èannot serve as the substantive law on which to predicate" jurisdiction of the,Court of; Federal Claims) .' This situation cha ged with the enactment of section 7623 (b) (4) which provides tlfat t he Tax Court shall have urisdiction with respect , to tany determination (cid:16)042regarding. ·an eaward under isebtión, 7623 (b) (1)t, (2) , or (3).. -See DaCosta v Uni'ted States, 82 Fed. Cl. 549, 553 555 (2008) (holding that claims under section 7623 (b) are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax . Cöurt) . This Court as held that pursuant to section 7623 (b) (4) a letter from the Whistleblower Office, denying a claim on the grounds that no award determination could be mmade under $To quálify for an award under sec. 7623 (b), the tax, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in penalt~ies, dispute must exceed $2 millicn., Sec. 7623 (b) (5) (B) . Additionafly,' if the subject Ê>f individual, the year at the subject's gross income must exceed $200,000 for issue . the Ñhistleblower claim is an Sec . 7623 (b) (5) (A) . Judicial review of claims arising under the pre-2006 , version of sec. 7623 has been confined to contractual claims brought under 'the Tucker Act,(28 U.S.C. sec. 1491(a) (1) Supp. 2005), IRS had entered into a binding agreement by negotiating and fixing a specific amount Merrick v. United. States, 846 F.2d 725,- 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Colman v. United_States, 96 F d. Cl. 633, 637-638 ,(2011) . for á whistleblower award. in limited circumstances where the informant and the See, e.g., (2000 & section 7623 (b) onstitutes andetermïnation conferring jurisdictioncon hisnCourt. Cooper v. Commissioner, supra at. 73. II. Respondent Motion for Summary Judgment we may grant summary s judgment i f there i s eno +genuine i s sue as to any material fact and acdecision may =be rendered as a matter of . law. Rule 121 (b) ;- see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98.,TeC 518, 520 (1992)e, affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir . 1994) ; Zaent.zrv: Commissioner,. 90 T . C. 753, 754 (1988) . The movi-ng party hears othe burden-of proving -that ithere is no sgenuine issue of omaterial vfact, and factual inferences wilbbe read in a manner most favorable ,to sthe ;party opposing summary judgment . Dahlstrom v. "Com tissi~oner, 85oT:C: 8127; 821 (1985) ; Jacklin v. Commi'ssioner, L79 T;.C.434.0;c 344 (1982)r.' When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly . supported, the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations. or denials of the. pleadings but must set forth -specific ifacts :showing that; there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 121(d) . _ If. the adverse party does not- so respond, t hen .a decision. may be entered against asuch party. Id. Respondent; asserts ethat he is entitled- to summary judgment because petitioner does not meet theï threshold requirements for an award under section 7623 (.b) . Along with his motion foru summarycjudgment respondent efi^led the affidavit of- Chief Counsel Attorney sDavid ~A iIngold, declaring, on the; basis .of his review of respondent' s administrative and. legaluf ileszand xon the' basis of conversations swith relevant IRS personnel, that the information petitioner provided resulted in respondent's taking no administrative or judicial action against X or collecting from X any amounts of tax, intere(cid:0)541t,or penalty. Petitioner's opposition3does not address the substantive merits of respondent's motion for summary judgment but suggests that respondent's motion is premature because petitioner's·motion for a protective order is stïll pending and because formal" discovery has not yet commended. We disagree that respondent's motion.for siimmary judgment is premature. Dursuant -to Rule 121(a) a party may move for summary judgment "at any time commencing 30 days after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." And pursuant to Rule 121(b), the Court may grant summary udgment if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions, and other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if any, show that -there is. no genuine .issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. The pendency of petitioner's motion for a protective order is immaterial to respondent's filing or the Court's ruling pon the motion for summary judgment. Contrary to Rule 121(d), petitioner's opposition does not set forth, by affidavits or otherwise, any specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Nor, pursuant to Rule 121(e), has,peti ioner otherdise made tany shöwincl t(cid:0)540liattlie facts' set f orths in ^Mr . ngold' s af fidavit afe genifinelý. di'sput'ed Rule il21(e) is" modeled in 'largedpart aft'erj formëf rule 5 f) of ^the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (rede¼i§ hatled rûle 56 (d) .nL2009 wit-h nönaubstäntive changes) . In Kéebléf Co. v MuÈray Bakery Prods., 856 F.2d 1386 -(Fed".1Cir 1989), pplyin) förine rule 56(È), the ourt held thät?the þlaint iff coul'd no ic summary judgment by keqüestingtdiácovery. he oûzt characterized;th plaintiff opposition»as sayingi in effect we have .ncF fact al basis for opposing summãéyijüdgnient; buta if you staysproceed ngs, vwe mightifind somethin " I_d2 at 1389 The court sobserved: "If allSone 'had to do to óbtáifi cjrant of Rule 56 (f) motio wère t o¾llege Jossés ion9by mö ant of ce t n inf ormat ion'gnd othe r evidencie eve r uninîä ùdgt nt Rule 121(e) provides . P If it appears from If ît appears from the then3the Court mahdengthe rmit affidavits thãt such ,party cannot för reasons When Affidayit Are Unava lable the affidavi.ts of a pai-ty opposing the motion [for summary ^judgment] stated present by affidavit. facts essential to justify such party' Lopposition, motion .or may of-der a continuánce to to be obtained or other ste s to be takenaar may'make sùch.otiher order as is just. ÷affidavits f a»party opposing the ,motiondhat such pårty' s on17 legally available method of contravening the facts s t forth, in- the supporting affij:lavits ofvthe moviÛ part affiants: or the testimony of third partiestfrom whom affidavìts annot be s cifred, beideemed sîfficient to establish that,the facts set forth in such supporting affidavits are genuinely disputed. s t-hrough cro©ss -examination bf such then such a·showing may e - 10 - decision would hav:e to be delayed while the non-movant goes fishing in the movant's files." Id. For similar reasons, summary judgment for respondant. is not inappropriate simply because petitioner has not commenced discovery. On the substantive meritis of respondent's motion for summary judgment, Cooper v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. .597 (2011), is controlling. In that case, decided after respondent moved for summary judgment in the case before us, this Court held in closely analogous circumstances that the Commissioner was entitleci to summary judgment As this Court stated, under section 7623 (b) (1) "a whistléblower award is . dependent upon both the initiation of an administirative or judicial action and collection of tax proceeds. at 600. "If the Secretary does not proceed, there can be no whistleblower award." Id. at 601. According to the affidavit filed in support of respondent's motion for summary judgment, hese preconditions for an award have not been met. Consequently, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment. III. Petitioner's Motion for a Protective Order Although we have held that respondent is entitled to summary judgment, we still'need to rule on petitioner's motion for a protective order, since our ruling will af fect any further proceedings in this case and will govern future public access to information in the record. Pêtitioner's request to seal the _ 11 - record orfalterratively lt'o ];>róceed anonymously pÊesents novel issues of balancing "the public s interests in open court proceedings againsti pe^tit±íoner's privacy inte sts-as a conf ident tal inf ormant . A. Openness of Court Proceedings This countî has a lòng traditioh of ope rials anÈ public . access to courtdecords . This* tra litiòrr is emi ddàd in the common law, theOtätutory laid and the U.S. CÂnstitution. See Nixondv. Warner Commcnsï Inc.', *435 U.S. 589, 5 7 (1978); Washington Legal iound. i. U S. Sentènding Comäri , 89 F.3d 897, 902 (D. C Cir . 1996) ; *Willie 1\Telson Ñusi Co Comm s ione , 5 T . C. 914, 9·17 (1985) .* Open tfials' and' publi access to court records prosote Táirness and thé seàrch fòr t t h, help enlighten public"opinion, ind désure co'nfidence in the j diciel^ proc ss. See i Richinond Newspapers , luc . Ý. Virginia 448 U. S . 555, -5 5 (1980)v;1Gannett Co. Inc. v. D Êasqilal 443 U. . 68, 383 (1979) But'.the fight tö acbess judici reNö ds has neve beeh 8The Supreme Court has ,held that there is a guaranteed right of the public under the First Amendment to attend criminal trials see.Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U S. 555 (1980) , but has not expressly ruled on whether there is a First Amendment(right; ofcaccess toscivil proceedings and documents. The Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue agree that there is such a constitutional,right Pyramld Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124-127 (2d Cir. 2006); Rushford v. New -Ybrker .Magazïne, Inc. , 846 F.t2d 2497 ^253 (4th Clr . 1988) ; Publibker Indus . 1070 (3d Cir. 1981;) ; 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1163, 1178-1179 (6th Cir. 1983) . Ill Sec. Litig. , 732 F 2d See, e.g., Lugosch , Inc . v. Cohen, 733: F . 2d 1059, 1067 - In re Contl - 12 - considered absolute. To the contrary, courts always have asserted the power to seal t eir records when deemed necessary." United States v. Mitchell, 5(cid:0)540lF.2d 1252·, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) revd. on other grounds sub n m. Nixon v. Warner Commcns., AInc., supra. Consistent with these pfinciples, section 7,458 provides that hearings before the Tax Court shall be open to the public. And section 7461(a) provides generally that all reports of the Tax Court and all evidence recei ed by the Tax Court shall be ublic records open to the inspection of the public. But the Tax Court is authorized to "make any p ovision which is necessary to prevent the disclosure of tr de secrets or other confidential information, including a pro ision that any document or information be placed under s al to be opened only as directed, by the Court . " Sec. ,7461(b) (1) . Under Rule 103(a), upon motion by a party or any other affected person and for good cause shown, the Court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or other person from arinoyance,. embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including but not limited to ah order that a trade secret or other information not be disclosed år be disclosed on1y in a designated way. Hence, this Court, like other courts, has broad discretionary authority to control and seal, if necessary, records and files in its possession. See Anonymous v. Comm1ssloner, 127.T.C. 89,. 91 (2006); Willie Nelsðn - 13 - Music9Co. v: Com issioner,1supra at 920. In additiòn, where appropriate, thin Court may permit a petitioner to proceed anonymously. Anonymous v. Conimissioner, supra at 91. Section 762 does not expressly address privacy interests of tax whistleblowe3 s or other affected persons. When it promulgated Title XXXIII of its Rules of Practice and Procedure, relating to tax whistleblower actions, this Court observed that in appropriate cases it might permit a petitioner to proceed anonymously and rtight seal the record in that case. Explanatory Note to Rule 340 130 T.C. 586. The Court stated that it contemplated that generally applicable statutory provisions Rule 103 related caselaw while *they do not require the Court s records * * * to be sealed or require the Court to permit all petitioners in those cases to7proceed nonymously,* do provide authority for the Court to allow a petitioner to and In,2007. the Senate passed a bill with this provisi n that would have authorised the Tax Court seal portions, of the record in tax whistleblower cases: in new sec. 7623 (b) (4) (B) to the Té.x Court may,. in order to preserve the PUBLICITY OF APPEALS--Notwithstanding sections 7458 and 7461, anonymity, privacy, oriconfidentiálity of any person under this dubsection,9 provide by rules 'adopted under section 745T that portions of filings, hesrings, testimony, evidence,7 and reports in connection with proceedings'under this»subsection may be closed to the public or ir spectiori by the±public. Readiness, Veterans' Health, *and Iran Accbuntability Act, 2007) K.R. 1591, 110th Cong., sec. 543 (c) passed by Senate, Mar. 29, 2007) . [U.S. Troop (as This proviäionk which ultimat~ely was nöt enacted,. substantially id ntical to sec. 6110 (f) (6) . is See infra note 11. proceed anonymously and to seal in whistleblower actions. [Id.] the 'record when appropriate . B. Considering the Les Drast ic Option First Petitioner has requeste in the first instance that we seal the: record and, alternativel , that we permit petitioner to proceed anonymously. Before granting a request to seal the record, however, it is appro riate to consider the less dfastic option of permitting the requesting party to proceed anonymously.1° Stone v. Univi of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. , 855 F.2d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1988); see Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmtv. Hosp. Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1278 (I5.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that if the trial court determines that some type of sealing order is warranted, it should be "no broader than is necessary to protect those specific interests iderîtified as in need of protectibn") ; In re N.Y. Times Co., 585 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that protecting an informant's identity. did not require sealing of documents but could be accomplished thrbugh the redaction of the informarit's name) . Permitting a litï ant to 1°The Judicial Conferenc of the United States has recently adopted a national policy that encourages Federal courts tþ seal entire civil case files only when sealing is "required by htatute or rule or justified by a showing of extraordinary circumstances and the absence of narrower feasible and effective alternatives such as sealing discrete docuinents or redacting informatioh, ÷so that sealing. an entire case f ile is a last resort . " the U.S. Courts, Conference Release, Administrative Office of Approves Standards & Procedurés for Sealing Civil - Cases (Sept . 13, 2011), available. at http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-09-13/Conference_Approves_Standards_Procedures_For_Sealingj_Civil_ Cases.aspx. News . (cid:16)042 .. 15 - proceed anonymot sly, unlike sealing the record, presèrves in large measure tl e pubiic''s abili y tÊ s$rÈtidize üdiciai functioning sihce "Party anonymity does not obstruct th^e public's view of the issues joined or bh'e court's performance in resolving them." Doe v. Stegall> 653 .2d i80, 18s (Éth Cir. 1Si81) .' C. Petitioner's Request. for Anonymity . 13 Ge1eral Colfsidera'tions "A party may generally proceed anonymously when the trial court reasonably determines 4that the need for anonymity^ outweighs the prejudice to the "opþósing party Ånd the gefleraÉ p(cid:0)570esumption that the partie identities ar'e public informahl . " Anonymous v. Commissioner supra at 94 i The decision whéÊher Êo allow a party to prodeed anoùymoùsly rests w hin the souncÍ dis retion of the trial cöurt. Id. ; see James v. Jacobson, 6 F.'3d 233, 2(cid:0)5408 (4 th Cir . 1993) ; see al so sec . 7461 (b) (1) . In raret instancès this Court has permitted taxpayers in deficiency 'cases to proceed anohytàÊusly upon finding "that the need for anonymit(cid:0)570outweighed prejudi e to thei op osing barty and the genéï-al presumption that th parties identitie are public informatìon." See Anonymous v. Commissióner, supra at 94; Under Rule 227, promulgated pursuant to sec. 6110 (f) (3) petitioners 'and intervenór may also proceed anonymopsly, if appropriate, Anonymous~v." Òommi.ssioner, 1$4 T.C. 13 disclosure action are^genefally sealed pursuant promulgated pursu nt in disclosure actions in the Tax Court. to sec . 6110 (f) (6) . (2010) See, e.g The. records in to Rule 228, -· 16 - Anonymous v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-87. .In these ¼ deficiency cases the taxpaye s demonstrated risks of severe physical harm if their identities were revealed. No court has . previously .considered the ci cumstances under which tax whistleblower suits under se tion 7623 (b) may be prosecuted anonymously. Consequently, e shall consider in some detèil the various factors that courts have applied in determining whether litigation should proceed anónymously or pseudonymously.. Seven Courts of Appeals have adopted or endorsed multifactor tests to govern the trial co rt's exercise of discretion i determining whether litigati n should be permitted to proceed anonymously or pseudonymousl . See Lozano v. City . of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 195 (3d Cir. 2 10), vacated and remanded on öther grounds 563 U. S . _, 131 S . t . 2958 (2011) ; Sealed Plaintif f v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 1 5,,190-191 (2d Cir. 2008); Doé v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6t h Cir. 2004); Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. , 214 F. 3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. . 20009) ; M. M. . v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir.. 1998); James v. Jacobson, supra at 238; Doe v Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (lilth Cir. 1992) ; Doe v. Stegall, upra at 184-186; see also Anonymous v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. .at 94.12 12Any appeal of this cas would likely lie with the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. language). addressed the propriety of ps udonymous or anonymous litigãtion, like the Supreme Court, has not expressly That court, See sec. 7482 (b) (1) (flush 3 (continüed2 . . ) - 17 - Relatively cecently, the ..Conrt of Appeals t for the Secbnd Circuit canvasse<i the caselaw to compile what that court described as a, "non-exhaustive" list of 1Ó factòrs that a trial court should consider in balancing a litigant s intei-est in anonymity agaiñs the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice1to the opposing party: . . party [seeking to tov (3) whether identification (1) whether the litigation involves matters that are "highly sensitive and [of a] personal nature"; "whethei-.identification poses9acrisk of. retaliatory physical or mental harm to the . proceed"anonymously] orueveh moie'àritically, innocent non-parties"; presents other harms and*the Tlikely:severityxof those harms, would be incurred as a result of plainti f f ' s ident ïty" ; particularly vulnerablet tó the possible harms:of disclosure, particularly in light of his + age; (5) whether sthe suit is challenging the actions òf the government or that of private parties; defendant press his c:.aims anonymously, whether the nature of that prejud: ce (if any) differs at any particular stage including whether "the injury litigated against the is prejudiced bynllowing the plaintiff to (4) whether the plainti f f . is the disclosure of (2) e (6) i whether the *(:. . continued) although on öccanlon these courts have permit'ted without comment,spseudonymous litigation to pröceed. Wade, 410 U.S Cir. 1991); Dóe (1973); Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370* (Il.C. Weinberger, 820&.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See, e.g., Roe 1 3 . In ualls v Rumsfeld, 228 F.R:D.î 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2005), writing for the District Court: Judge Lamberth observed tliat neither the Courttof Appeals for-the*D.C. Circuit nor the U.S. District ~Courth for :tihe aDistrict of Cölúmbia. had "tackled the propriety of pseudonymous litigation head on". He indicated that the District Courtahad developed an "ad-hoc-process", whefeby the chief judge may .strant lèave tio fille a complaint uñder a pseudonym if the requestinçf litigant "makes a colorable argument in suppört of moving quickly, litigation at' adäter date." the request" Lnd that this process ser es to "getRthe case leaving the issue open to full, ádverse Id. (7) whether the (8) whethèr the public's interest in the the litigation, and ûhether any pr'ejudice can be of mitigated by.the district court; plainti f f ' s identi ty has thus f ar been kept confidential; litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his identity; purelyslegal nature of otherwise, in knowing the litigants' identities"; and (10) whether there are any alternati(cid:0)570emechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of [Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, supra at 190; omitted.P] (9) tihe issues presented-or there is an stypically weak public interest "whether, because of internal citations the plaintiff. the . As another court has aptly nöted, the multiplicity of factors to be considered "suggests the breadth of the discretion to l$e exercised."« Doe v Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 157 n.4 (S.DáN.Y. 2006) . To a significant degreed these various factors are intermingled and overlapping For instance, . the first three factors listed above address collectively the .single most An additional factor sömetimes mentioned by courts but not is .whethe the listed factors) to inhere in some of See, e . g. , Lozano v. Cïty of request to proceed anonymously might be expressly included in this 10-factor list (although it might be thought either the party seeking anonymity or the .opposing party is motivated by illegitimate mot ives . Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 47 , 513 (M.D. Pa. 2007) that plaintiffs' considered to be improperly niotivated if they sought anonymity to engage in a "shell game" and 1substitute different anonymous plaintiffs; but also suggesti!ng that seeking to intimidate plaintiffs in a manner that sould discourage them-from exercising their rights gwould be an illegitimate motive for opposing anonymity),. vacated in part ön other grounds 620. F.3d 170 Á(3d , 131 S . Ct . 2958 Cir . 2010 ) ,. vacated and remanded 563 U. S . (2011); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.Rj.D. 464, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1997) seeking anonymity include gaiining a tactical advantage, the opposing. party's ability sto defend itself, .delaying litigation, and increasing costs to the opposing party) . (ststing that improper reasons fo (sugges ing imþairing - 19 - important considèration--"the bases upon which disclosure is feared ormsóught to.be. avoided, and the. substantiality of these bases". Lozano 7 City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp: 2d 477, 506 (M.D;-Pa.p2007) (and cases cited thereat), affd.ain part and vacatediin part onnother grounds 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, and remanded: 563. U. S . , 131 S . Ct . s2958 (2011) That consideration is influencedninsturn, by whether the, party * seeking protection is particularly vulnerable (factor 4) and whether the party'es confidentiality chas thusefar beent ihaintained (factor 7) . And the-sufficiency ofpthe basis «asserted for anonymitytalso inplicates societal interests:(factors 8 and 9) inasmuch as it depends .on .whether there is a "'strong social interestein concealingethe· identity of the plaintiff0". Wolfchild,v. JUnited States÷,62 Fed. Cl. .521, 553 -(2004) (quoting Doe vc Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1981)), revd. and remanded;on other grounds 559 F.3d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Considering the multiplicity; and cinterrelatedness - of f actors to be considered and the breadthiof the trial dourt's discretion in consideringothem, it is unsurprising that litigants thave been permittedtto proceed anonymously in a wi'de variety of cases. 9Further illustrating4the interrelatedness olfactors, one court has öbsèrved thát the consideration of whether the suit is challenging the 2.ctions ofe±the government or private individuals (factor 5 listed above) addresses primarily the potential prejudice and unfairness to private individuals in being sued by anonymous indivic.uals (see factor 6) . 320, 323-324 (11t,h Cir. 1992) . Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d - 20 - a. . Highly Sensitive, Personal Information Plaintiffs are often pe mitted.to proceed anonymousl in cases involving highly persofial or sensitive matters such as reproductive rights, sexual órientation or victimization, nd" health conditions, including mental illness, the disclosur of which might lead to stigmatization or ostracism; in such cáses, no particularized showing of other specific .harm is necess rily required. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant 537 F.3d 185 ·(2d Cir. 2008) (physical and sexual assault) ; Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. · for Choice, fInc., 253 F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001) (abortion);:Doe v.- U.S Air Force, 812 F.2d 738, 739 n.1 (D.C. Cir.. 1987) - ("The distr ct court granted plaintiff permission to file his compl int under a pseudonym because of the Air Force's belief that he is homosexual;"); Doe v. Penzatb, No. 3:1.0-CV 05154-MEJ (N.D. Cal., May 13, 2011) - (granting motibn for protective order) (sexual batitery, human trafficking, and forced labor); Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J.. 2006) (bipolar d sorder; the court noted a theoretical possibility" th t awareness of: the illness would result in damage to the plai tiff's professional reputatioh); D[ v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (hepatitis B from blood transfusion; "Although plaintiff h s made no particularized showing of any specific harm or stigma to her - 21 - caused by IproseáitingFthe cásie' uhderTér dwn nam plaintiff's spriiracy£ concerbs' aþpéa to be s sta tia on s ) . b. JPhysicäl Ha m I Another åatego'ry of basëè ikùÊÍch plaintdiffs are òftèr allowede to proceidganonymously invòllÑrès it(cid:0)540Àhonsin whi 1 disclosure of identity. is deemed to pose a credible risk of physical harm. ee e+.g Doé9vFStéÑáÑ, 653 F.2d at 186 (plaintiffs facedtpossible-sh(cid:0)570sîcalhartâ%écÅÜÂe of tÈÊi espousál ofnunjopula rèlisiPôdèÁviéiô(cid:0)541)"PIÈÏt(cid:0)541d4StÁtfÉN. 6 Í)oe F . 2d 920, 9221 ('9tli Èir 2 \198Ó) (dì¼cl$Âù¿e)ÕÏÊisÊrÙiÑmÈt è iddnti ty posed a ±isk of Á sëf ious%oÉlTy a rm" f; AÊonymÊus Commissioner,iU12''èT:Chak 94'liñ tiâx'dáficieå0Ùcãsàf risk ò "severe=physióaRhäriÉ"#toSthéftaxpayèr aiN1 faniÎ ý of.Èweiglfe t e general public ir terest in knowing the taxpayer' s identity) ; Doe a.~k:a. WC0612 v. U.S. Witness Prot. Prograni,"221 Ct. Cl. 940, 941-942 (1979). (cenyir g .mbtion to dismiss) (disclosure of ~ , identities of inc ividuals in witness protection program posed risk of "danger" and "risk of serious, harm") . c . Othe'r Si rni f i cant Narm There are also diverse cases in which courts have, allowed litigants t o proceed anonymously or pseudonymously to,protect them against "ot-her~harms" thãt are deeméd to be' sufficiently severe . Sealed Plainti f f v. Sealed Def endant , supra at 190 . In these cases the courts have ."protected social', ps~ychölogical, and economic interests; they have not always demanded proof of threats to the plaintiff's p ysical security nor. have they alwaÿs required threats to privacy fights." Steinman, "Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties:. When hould Litigants Be Permitted To Keep Their Identities Confidentia ?",. 37 Hastings L.J. 1,.75 (1985) (fn. ref. omitted). i. Social or Professional Stigma Some cases grant anonymity in large part because of the threat of social or professicnal stigma to such diverse, litigants as attorneys.and doctors suirîg to enjoin disciplinary proceedings,15 a job applicant suing to protect her reputation, public aid recipients," and a corporate defendant sued by insiders.18 Sometimes the risk of stigma is heightened because 15See, e.g., Doe v. Staté .Bar of Cal., 415 F. Supp. 308, 309 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976) permitted to maintain his ancnymity because .of adverse impact on his reputation), affd. 582 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1978) . (noting that the plaintiff attorney had been the possible See, e . g . , Doe v. U. S . Civil Serv. Commn . , 483 F . Supp . 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) fellowship suing with respect allegations in her file) . (unsuccessful job applicant for White House to derogatory and prejudicial See, e.g., Campbell v. USDA, 515 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D.D.C. 1981). (Social Security income applicant permitted to. sue anonymously to compel promulcjätion of regulations "to protect sensitive personal informatidh and to shield her from fear d abuse and harassment public") . from he neighbors, the media, and the 18See Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1044 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting with apparent proval that-the District Court had . ) (continùed. . 23, - the partygseekir g anonfmit"y bélòn§ s?tiöUå*j$áfti$1Ía ly vuln b group, suchgas -juvenirles$or ilTëgalÚmËigran 20 wo ii: corfómiùRÊtalia(cid:0)570o arm Somencases spermit litigañts tö·pfoceÊd aí onymo 1 o pseudonymously. th þrotect thëm agãìnstSjfoséibl c no è reta ato3y harm$jFor instance5, thet CÊ1rt òf A peals fó l e NinthqCircyit co 2cluded tshat? We(cid:0)576tfÅoÊdinary"e onômic h rm ustified allowi:1g Chinese workéf(cid:0)541,é plöyeá81 1 Ivfaki a Islands, to 4proceed(p(cid:0)541eudonyinóüsly1 t hélÊsÔ È 6ÈgÉ un r the Fair Labor Standards Act löf*1538 ÊL ) ch 6 76 5 t at 1060 c(current2ersionfat 294UfSMÅsècs 20 2 9 (200É ) (cid:0)576) I Thru XXHIrv. tAdvånced 9Textï#ld 4oïi. , 214 F . 3d t 10$2 . Court oft Appeals cóntrastéd tlie T"ektTel e nat f hë retaliation" faced by these worker , whicl ihb1 d thfm a i of employment, deportation, and possible arrest upon their return (.a . contint ed) granted pseudonymity "Tö prevènt and the pòssible disclosure of confidential concerning its 'af fairs")'. identificat icIn of the comp ny infbrmation See,· e.g., United' Stateå v. Doe, 385-F. Supp. 902, 903 (D. Arlz. 1974)." (juvenile de'li'nquent's identity protected because "these are juveni Le proceeding's")*. 20See, re:g., ?L'ozano v. City of Hazletor1, 496 F. Ñupp. 2d at the i^ssues here, combined with 514 ;(."The highly Legal nature"'of the intense publid interest and stfong 'level of emotion 'Êonnected with the. issue mean that the uhdocumented immigrants 'who. se k to participate- in th'cs' acti"on face 'éxt(cid:0)576a"òr'dina~ry~circumstances that require,anonymity if· they'hope- to pi-oceed w'ithóÜt . unsupportable burdens . " ) facing . . 24 - t-o China, with the consequen es faced by "typical" FLSA T plaintiffs, stating: "While threats of tertÀination and blacklisting are perhaps typ cal methods by which employefs retaliate against employees who assert their legal rights;it the consequences of this ordinarý retaliation to plaintiffs, afe extraordinary." Id. at 1069i 1071; see also-Gomez v'. Buckèye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, ;LO6 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (permitting FilSA plaintiff employees to proceed anonymously ."in order to sà!feguard against .any possible reprisals by their employers' that might result from the filing of this'lawsuit."). But see S. Methodist Univ. Association of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 0599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979) (denying anonymity for women . lawyers who had joined a title VII sex ·discrimination suit against two law firms) . The holding in S. Methodist Univ. .Association of Womën Law intimacy". that one information of tzhe intimacy÷ Two years !1ater the Court of Appeals clarified its opinion in S. Methodist Univ. Association of Womeñ Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 197i9), appears predicated partly on the court's statement characteristic common to all þases affording plaintiffs anônymity was that the plaintiffs "divu).ged personal utmost that Students did not purport , to elstablish the "utmost consideration . as a prerequisite to bringing an anonymous sùit . Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d f80, 185-186 (5th Cir. ;1981) u(pertNitting child plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in action challenging constitutionality of religiou observances in public schools) . The court ascertdining whether a party nay sue anonymously" but that· the decision "requires _a balancinc) of considerations calling for maintenance of a party's privácy against constitutionally-embedded pre(cid:0)541umptionof openness in judicial proceedings . " the customary and. indicated that ~therè was "no hard and fast formufa for L_,_ at 186 . . . p - 125 - In Does T Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp. ; supra at '' : 1068, the Court of Appeals held that in evaluating- the severity of potential retaliatory action, sthem trial courtvshould take into consideration, _anong other factors,, the, severity of t-he threatened harm, the reasonableness of the party's fearsµ and.the party's vulnerab..lity to harm. .Applying this test, ,the'Court of Federal Claims permitted Native American,plaintiffs to_proceed anonymously in a Tucker Act proceeding that pitted theiropersonal interests against. the interestssof, t-he communities of which they were members. Wolfchild v. United.States, -62 Fed. (cid:16)042Cl.at '521. Cit ing the plaint i f f s ' . risk -of economic -harm through the los s of per capita payments and their risk of losing membership in their communities if their identit.ies were disclosed, the .court found that the threatened harm was sufficiently esevere to justify_ their request for anonymity. Id. at ,553. The court also noted that letting, these p12intiffs proceed anonymously- accorded with the practice of the Bureau of Indian Af fairs to, provide anonymity for Native Americans in membership disputes with their , communities . Id. at 554. In so-callec . qui, tam. actions *arising undér the False Claims . Act, 31 U.S.C. se cs. 3729-3733 r (2006), 'pl'aintiffs sometimes se k to protect their identities on the basis of feäred retaliatory - 26 - harm._22 The results have been1mixed. CompaÊe UnÁted Stat s ex rel. Permison v. Siiperlhtive Techs., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2 561, 564 (E.D. Val 2007) (in a qu tam suit against the plaint ff's former employer, denying a r quest to seal the complaint r to grant anonymity becaúse alth ugh "fear of retaliation is ot entirely implausible, it is ertainly vague ånd h(cid:0)570potheticalat best"), and United States v Bón Secours Cottage Health Servs. 665. F. Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Mi h. 2008)- (denyinf a qui tam plaintiff's request to- màint in the seal in the case or alternativelf to^ rèdact ident ifying information from the r cord concluding that the plairitif f ' s fear of retaliation by her current dr future employers Éas insufficient to overcome the strong presumption favoring jublic access to judicial records), with 1 D e v. Boston Scientific Óorp. , No. 4:07-CV-2467 (S.D. Tex.', July 2, 2009) (granting a qui tam plaintiff's request to keep 1 r identity under'seal until he case was resolved because the plaintiff, who was for$eriy employed by a medical device company that was tlie subject f he 22"Qui tam" is shorthand or the Latin expression "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se i so in hac parte sequitur", meaning "who as well for the king.as for himself sues in this mattsr" Black' s Law Dictionary 1368 ((cid:0)540thed. 2009) . Private indiv$duals may bring qui the United States tcÍ recover damages against .persons who have submitted false oÉ fraudulent claims to the Goveihnment. Such an action Éllows the plaintiff to recover a poftion of any money recovered l$y the Government statute, a qui days after it is filed. emains under seal for at ec. 3730 (b) (2) . tam actions on l$ehalf of tam complaint _I_d 31 U.S.C. sec. 3730(d) ln the action. Id. (2006). By least 60 - 27 - qui tam icomplaintF feáred thát ehlinÊ Ì1 ic n it w 1 c ause her husbaríd, who sworkeci siri tlîe s me inÉiustfy, t c e ed n that he would b unable há obt r n w er$plòým it) Despite sorreMimilarities qui tam cÉses and tax whistleblower3cases diff in impôrtar t wa . Unlike th alse Claims Act, sectii'ön 7 23 Únålüdes no pro ision f t mpora ily searlingithe rècbrd Bub e . 6 ( (1) (a thc(cid:16)041rizìr g the Tax Court to maké an( p o(cid:0)570isionnécessary to prevent the disclosure of "confidential ilïfo(cid:0)570matiön". 1d ür li the a se È1aim t, see 31 U. S i C. seö.'3730 (h (2 0 ) seÊti antiretaliatòry*proÿisio21 s infr 15 c 623 conta n s p t III.C.luc.«iii Whêré s the i fendÈÏit n a qui i ca e wi generally be aan ndifi'dtia 1 ngó nr nt 1 t ty, he resporrderit i a t áx ¼histlèbl er ca e 1 alw ys be th Commissioner of t he IRs, whc i awÄre bf the whi t ower s identity. The stbjè'cDof ta histle loNer cl m, u 1 e th defendant in a qui tam"case, is not a party to the case and may not even be aware of the case.23 Finally, a tax whist51 blow r 23Neither sec ._ 7623 nor this Court' s Rules contain any to(cid:16)042the Cf*.. sec. 6015(e) (4) express provisioh fo'r 'notice ofilit$rvention with respect subgect of a whistleblower claiml in a' Tax Court proceeding to revlew"a whistlebl.ower award dete'rmination. (providing 'that i E an individu'alf petitions the Tax 'Coiirt~to determine relief Erom' jo'int and, sev'eral 'liability on a joint return, and an opportunit7 to become a 'party tò 'the procee'ding)-; Rule .325 (regarding notice and intervent!ion' by the nonpetitioning spouse in an action to determine relief from joint and several liabilit . ) the nonrequesting spouse is t'o receive ádequate notice (continued. . case under section 7;623 (b) , nlike a qui tam case,. is an ppeal from an administrative proce ding in which the whistleblo er's confidentiality typically wi 1 have been maintained. iii. CoÈfidential Informants Some courts have permit ed confidential informants, litigating in that capacity, to proceed anonymously. In particular, when a tax whistleblower brings an action under the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims sometimes allows the claimant to proceed anonymously as a "confidential informant". See Confidential Informant V United States, 46 Fed. Cl. I (2000); Confidential Informa t 92-95-932X v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 556 (2000.) ." Similarly, with little discussion a District Court recently affi med a magistrate,judge's . determination that a confidential informant should be allowed to proceed anonymously in an act ion stemming from a city's disclosing the confidential informant's identity to a newspaper. " (. . . continued) on a joint return) . "The Court of Federal Claims originally filed these decisions under seal and later made the decisions public after making redactions' requested by the parties. Informant v. Unitéd States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1, Informant 92-95-932X v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 556, (2000) ; see also Jarvis v. Udited States, 43 Fed. Cl. 529 (1999) (employing a similar procedure) . Court of Federal Claims another such case captioned Confidential Informant 59-05071 v. United States, No. 11-153C .(Fed. Cl. Mar. 10, 2011). See. Confidential (2000); Confi'dential There .is also pending ind the 1 55% filed -:29-- DKT v. City of Kokomo;v1:10-cv-0006.6-TÑþ-MJD (S I F b. 2011) . . .Although not determinative*of petitioner's request to litigate anonymously, _these cases'are-indicative of oür lecjal system's -general solicitude for confideritial informants. For instance, various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code generally prohibit the IRS from disclosing the identities of conf idential inf ormant s . See, e . g . ', se c . (cid:16)042610 3 (d) (1) , (h) (4 ) , (i) (6) . In addition in court proceedings the so-called informer privilege genera:.ly permits the Government to "withhold from disclosure the identity -of persons ·who furnish inforthatiôri of violations of law,to officers charged with enforcement öf -that . law." Roviaro v. United States, '353 U.S. 53, 59 (i957) . "The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge cf the commission of crimes to law-enforcement . officials and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages them to - 30 - perform t hat iobligation."25 As one court 1·ïas explained, the informer privilege. founded upon the proposition that an is an ancient doctrine ith its roots in the English common law, inf ormer may well suf f er} adverse e f fects f rom the disclosure of his identity. Illustrations of how physical harm may befall one who informs can be found in the reported cases. However, physical reprisal invocation of expected to take· more subtle forms such as economic duress, blacklisting or social ostracism. possibility that reprisa s of . some sort may occur constitutes nonetheless to the wholehearted cooperation of requisite of effective law enforcement. is not a prerequisitfe to the the citizenry which is a the likelihood of strong deterrent the privilege. Often, retaliation may be The Courts have long re ognized, therefore, the fear of reprisal must be insure cooperation; remòved and that "'the m st effective protection from retaliation3is the. anonyrïtity of {Socialist Workers PartV v. Attorney General United States), ,565. F.2dfl9, 22 (2d Cir. 1977); internal; citations omitt d; quoting Wirtz v. Contl. F1n. & Loan Co., 326 F.2d 561, 563-564 (5th Cir. 1964 ) the informer. '" (In re . ] that, to ' Although no privilege sitùilar to the informer privilege shields the identities of infc rmants who speak to private plaintlffs or thei(cid:0)570counsel ( opposed to Government counsel) is to be fairness and 2sThe informer privilege s not absolute but fundamental ¼equirements of balanced against disclosure in the litigation j$rocess. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) . Although Roviaro was a criminal case, in c1v11 cases the doctrine of informer privilege may apply when it appears that actions by the person who is the subject of See, e . g. , Socialist Workers sarty v. Attorney General United States), 565 F.2d 19,' 22 (2d Cir. 1977). there 1s ample authority for the próposition that the strength of' the privilege is greater in civil litigation than in criminal." Id. the informantëwill be the target of retaliatory the information. "Indeed, (In re 31 courts employ a balancing -test to protect confidential informants in such circuinstënces. , Sëe wohl, "Confidential ,Informants_in Private Li igaticn: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure", 12 Fordham J. Corp.. & Fin. L. 551., 575÷579 (2007).. For instance, in a case b uÛht by pr vate individuals against a company under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizatiions Act , 18 U. S . C. se cs . :1961-1968 (20 06) , the District'«Court |denied a defendant's motion to compel production of documents that would reveal the identities of the plaintiff's confidential sources within the company . Mgmt . Inf o . Techs . / Inc . v .> Alve ska -Pipeline Serv. Có., 151 F.R.D. 478 (D.D.C. 1993). Writing for' the court, Judge Sp,orkin described the risks of retaliation that whistleblowers 'face: - The case law, academic studies, and newspaper accounts well document . the kindnof- treatmentythat sis,usually visited upon public and private employees who speak out as a matter of conscience pn issuesmof jpublhic conóern. Fór example, a six-year study on whistleblowers by Myron Peretz Glazer and ;Penina Migda,Glazeiradetai<ls the füll speòtrum of management retaliation against etl igal, resistors whogspeak out agAiñatr cömpaný(cid:16)042or gdveisiinent- policy and the long-term adverse consequences such employees:can face. . See, Mýron Perët(cid:0)576Glaze r and Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in¼Governmerit and Indüst(cid:0)576y21f showed þigni Ei can, percentage fremainsout áf work "or undërem#1óýed,~~bitter aßout their punishment-, and uncertain of eveglging ablegto restore 4t,hei2r fully") . See also, Hathaway v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 981. F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir., 1992) (upholding datermination by Mérit systems Protection Board that e uployee was3threatened7ìth removals and ü sa i ques ona le employmentegractices) ; Unite&rStates Merit formance because*disclosure of factocý p (1990) (study of sixty-four whistleblowers lives - 32 - (Oct . 1981) Systems. Protection Board Office of Systems Review an Studies, Whistleblowing and the . Federal Employee: Blowing the Whistle on FrÈu, Waste, and Mismanagemen --Who Does It and What Happens 3 that while retaliation i?s not universal, a significan percentage of federal esployees .who reported waste or abuse felt they: were adjersely affected by speaking out) ; Matthew L. Wald, Whistleblower at Nuclear Laboratory Was DisciplirÈed, Labor Dept. Rulés, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1992 at M12 after speaking out on te evision, employee of government contractor was first isolated from other workers and supervisors md then transferred to [a] room containing radioactive waste). (describing episode where (noting The motive for reta!liation by employers is obvious: . 'stool pigeonã', or To their det ctor , wh¼stleblowers are viewed as snitchs', [sic] who are willing to publiÖly embarrass their co-workers and their companies in oÊder to satisfy their political, ethical, moral, or personal agendas. employees not only wish t!o -hurt their companies, detractors argue, but also wish to keep their jobs." industrial spys' Such their [Id. at 481-482, qu ting Westman, Whi'stleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge vii (1991) . ] According to one report, as of 2007 there were 36 Federal statutes with explicit provis ons to protect·public and pri ate employees who report violatio s of law. Wohl, suprà at 557. For instance, the False Claims Act contains an antiretaliat >ry provision. See 31 U. S. C. sec. 3730 (1É) . Moreover, almost a 1 the States have enacted statutes rotecting employees in the public and/or private sectors who rep rt iZlegal conduct . Wofil, s0pra at 557. In stark .contrast, sebtiori 7623 contains no antire taliatory provisions . It is the IRS' stated policy to treat tax whistleblowe s as confidential informants. The Internal Revenue Mantial (IRM) sta es: "To phe extent that the JIRS WhistlèbloiveÑOffi de erm nes·tShat qn individual.i;sga histleblower' under C section 7623, such individual isl-ialT be deemed to be a confidential informant whöse identitiyLshalTbe protected in accordance with ::RCssectionò6103s(h) (4) 6 Administratio , IRM (CCH) , pt .. 25 . 2 . Q. 11,3 at 223 217 (June 18, 2010) . The regulations undergsection 7623 state: No?ünauthoi-ized pefson will be a vised cf2the identity oflanvìñformant Sec. 3Ó . 625- (cid:16)042 1(e), Proced. & Admin. Regs. In Óublished suidÄndë*tó the pu lic on .how to f[ile tax whi>stleblower claims, the IRS states tlÉat "will p otect the identity of the cla*ima t to the fulfest extent permitted by law." Notice 2008-4, sec 3.06, 2008-1 C.B. 253 255.2s 2 Anal.ysis of Petitioner's Request for Ånon(cid:0)570mt In deciding v13ether petitióner shotil& be allówed to proceed anonymously, we,takesinto accoánt0notionlÿ'ÒetitiÒner s legitimate p ivagy interests asca corifidentìàl. íriformaht, bu also the .nature gand severity of1theveyéci!fiö harÈ ass rt d to arise fyom discloning petitioner s identït:y, nd wÊ balanbe th t potential7 harm againstvthe relevanthsociål -intérest s . See, . . , 2'This'nòtice ÊÌsÈ stht es I tt in ome circumstances, such as when the claimint is needed as a vitness in a±judicial proceeding, but beforeyproceediñg in such a^.case. Notice 2008-4, sec 3.06, 2008-1 C.B... 253, 255. the IR vill make "every effort"e.tosinform' the claiman tha,t it*may 1$e rie'cessary to reveal the claimant's identity - 34 - Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed D fëndant, 53'7 F.3d at 190-191; Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068; Wolfchild v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. at 521. a. SeveritV of Harm Petitioner asserts that rofessional ^stigma, retaliation, and economic duress will result if petitioner's identity is disclosed. As suggested by the preceding discussion, fears of such harm befalling a confidential informant are reasonable although necessarily difficul of proof. As a tax whistleblower, petitioner is especially vulnerable to such harm, we believe, considering the absence of an iretaliátory provisions in seötion 7623. Petitioner's counsel represents, and respondent does not dispute, that petitioner is o an age. and station in life that necessitate,continued employm nt$. . The*record reasonably supports the conclusion that disclosin petitioner's identity 'could adversely af,fect not merely p titioner's current employment but also petitioner's future empl yability. v -In particular, the record strongly suggests that hetitioner acquired the inforination in question not by chance but rather in the normal course of employment for X and that peti ioner was privy to internal deliberations and communications regarding the_events.that allegedly gave rise to X's underpayment. Revealing petitioner's status .as a tax whistleblower in these circumstances would likely 35 cause severewdåmægevtoTpetitionêr'4s*standing in^ thé profèssional communi ty Jhat . providesr pe ti t ioner ' s Lcustomarÿ "sòurce ^ðf livelihöod÷anducculdWwell jeopardize%>etitiòner''s employüteñt Moreover, the fact thatietitionèrais no lónder-émploÿed by X does not immuriize petitioner f òm thet possibility of retaliation. 3:If pëti:tiorie séêkh otheriemplöyäentuin the fúture, any prospect ive Jemplóyer coûldt reqüirë- pe t i tionér' t o pròvidè names of ;previousDemployers, %ncludifiòux, which could jeopardi e petitionei'jsFchances byebranding ipetiitionëf ä förmår whistleblowei,. Finally, peti*tionér da sóéedaý find t desíífabl . or inecessaryato isäekereempTòýméht wits X+ónly -to f ace retaliat iö as a whistleblowe walSee Hodgsonuvi Clidflies Martfin Inspectors of Petroleumy ?Inc , 159 ~Ë.2dó03÷," 3069¼5th dir. 1972) (fiiiding" för similar reasons that an informer's privilég was available to thè Government with respect to the defénd nt s foriner émployees in a case brought iinde the FLSÄ) . It is possible that ot-her judicial remedies, such as claims for torticus interference with contract .of business relstion(cid:0)541aHd défamation7migÊtN>é Ivåilsble to petitioner if X wereato gttempt to "poison the Nell States ex rel. Permison v. Superlative Techs., 2d 56,1 potentially available to a qüi antiret a¼iatory prowisions of inapplicable) . be unavail;ing where a prospective semployerulearnedtof petitioner's.whistleblöwing from a source other than X, e.g., f rom this Court ' s publi c records . But' even tliese. types 'of possible remedies would for petitioner. 1 See United Inc., 492 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. qVa. 2007) (commentinggon possible :remedies tam plaintiff for whom the t;hegalse Claims Act were In sum, petitioner has d monstrated a risk of harm thát far exceeds in severity mere embatrassment×or annoyance . The retaliation, ; professional ostracism, and economic vduress which petitioner reasonably fears«a$e, we believe, no less severe than the harm posed to attorneys and doctors suing to enjoin disciplinary proceedings, uns ccessful job applicants suing to protect t·heir reputation, public aid recipients, or Nativet Americans joining in a lawsuiË p;Ltting their personal inteÊests against those of their communities--all cases in,which plaintiffs have been allowed to proceed nonymously. See cases discussed supra ,Part III . C. 1. c . i . and ii . (cid:16)042But .whether vpetitioner' s harm is sufficiently severe to justify granting petitioner's request for anonymity depends upon additiänal considerations,, including the social interests at stake.. b. Social Int rests The social interests at take are mixed. On the one hand, for reasons previously discussed, there is strong social interest in protecting petitioner's id ntity as a confidential informant. On the other hand, the people generally have a right to know "who is using their courts" . -Doe . Blue Cross & Blue Shield Uflited of Wis.,. 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7 h Cir. 1997). Becàuse we have he d that respondent is 'entitled tô summary judcfmenti on a threshold legal issue. which does not dekend to any appreciable extent on petitioner's identity, we believe that the þublic's interest in - 3-7. - knowing petitigner's; identity isc#elatively weaki See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff N. Sealed .Defendant 537 .F.3d at"190 191; Does Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1 7 1073 Lozano v City of Hazleton, 96 F Sup%2d ét 512. D v Del Rio, 241 F . R . D . 15 (" [W.] here a lawsuits * * * Iseek o ra an abstract quest on7of lawathat a fectsv maný sitì1ilàrl åitúatëd indiyi luals, thq identitiesgofethe parti<cülar arties bringing the suit may e largely irrelevant to the4publid conåern with the nature of t process."a); Doe V. Hartz 52 F. upp. 2d 1027 1046 104 (.N.D.. Iowa 1999) . c . Other Considerations e parties3 agree t hat petictioner' s idehtity as a whistleblower has been; kept confidential so far? There is suggestiion tlgt petitioner has÷illegitimate mötiVesuin e es i c anonymity. And becauseerespondent2alréadÿ'knous pÑitione s identity, he will:not:be prejudióedlif petitione ßroceed anonymously . He does -not as sent -otherwise : e . More er grµnting petitioner se request for anonýtnfty accords with t he-yhistleblowery office s general édminist+ative practice, as applied toapet itioner of keeping whi(cid:0)541tleblöwes identities confidential. See Wolfchild v. Unitèd States, 62 ÎN It is unnecessåry for us to decfde and. we do not decide, to what extent whist1èblower see cing anönytnity in a case in which the whistleblower's identity were of greater public interest. the balancing test. might become mpre, onerous for a Cl. at 554 (citing such a consideration as ~a favorable factor in permitting plaintiffs to proc ed.anonymously) .- Respondent suggests that by pursuing .juc cials review, petitioner 'has chosen to relinquish the confidenti ity accorded by the Whistleblower Office. Respondent's take-it or-leave-it approach to confidentiality improperly mi limizes the practical value of udicial review, which is an ntegral part of the scheme under secticj>n 7623 (b) . Respondent' approach, which we cannot say is disinterested, would confront claimants with a dilemma of either forfeiting confidentiality to seek judicial review or forfeiting udicial review. The likely pshot would be á"chilling effect on some claimants who, have a- com elling need to proceed anonymously. This result would be at odds ith the ostensi-ble legislative purpose, of encouraging tax whistleblower claims and promoting public, confidence, through juc icial .oversighti , in the administration of the tax whi tleblower award program. 3. Conclusion: Granting Petitioner'Anonymity We conclude that granting petitioner's request for*anohymity strikes a reasonable balance between'petit'ioner's privacy interests as a confidential in ormant and the relevant social interests, taking into account the nature and severity of the asserted harm from revealing petitioner's identity and the relatively weak public interest in knowing petitioner's. identity. . Consequently, .pursuant to section 7461 (b) (1) and Rule 103 (a) we shall permit pet i.tioner to probÊd, effectively anónyìnously, as a "whi s t1eblower" . In furtherance of this decision we shall r ler the parties to redact from the existing record and from any future submissions any :.nformation that would tend to reveal petitioner's identity. Furthermore, because of concerns that revealing· X's identity could enable petitioner's identïty to be deduced, we shal] also order the parties to redact from the record X s name.snd any identifying information regarding X.3° D. Denying Petitioner'è Mötlì~on To Seal the 1 ecórd We believe that permitting petitioner to proceed anonymously and requiring redaction of identifying information under the measures just described will adequately protect petitioner's legitimate privacy interests without the need to seal the record, thereby preserving in large measure the public's ability to 29We do nOt nean to suggest that this balancing test would tax or should necessérily result in anonymity for all whistleblowers ir this Court. directive to the contrary, each request must stand upon its own. tiltimately, absent any legislative to proceed anonymously the identity of petitioner and conceal °Such redact ions should encompass those mandated by Rule 27 as well as any additional redactions necessary and appropriate to protect the identity of X. if anyr to which theWe do not consider in this case the extent, identity of protected inoa, case in whiêh discloèìng the subject's identity would not privacy interests. tend to feopardize the uhistleblower's legitimate the subject of a whistleblower claim should be - 40 - follow the legal proceedings in this case. Consequently; we shall deny petitioner's motio to seal the record." To reflect the foregoing An appropriate order will be issued, and order and decision will be entered for respondent . Reviewed by the Court . COLVIN, COHEN, VASQUEZ, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, GUSTAFSON, PARIS, and MORRISON,e JJ., agr e with this majority opinion. "We shall not lift the t emporary eal, however, until after the the parties have been þrovided an opportunity, to redact record pursuant'to the Court order. -41- HALPERN, . conctîrrih(cid:0)540:"Snitches get st'ïtchès " No do bt we can infer- Congress'Qawaféness of that old piece of advi e when it provided a þublic forum (the Táx Court) in which a whistlebloùer might seeki.reíriew öf hsi claim that îhe Commissioner erräd^in nôt5 þäying*her fó fingering a tax cl eat o detecting someone'sCùndéróáyinènt90f tiäk. While the majorit h s done an admirable job in assèm1511hg the law r gärdïn conf identiality, - Fda%otbl$elièvè?thath i t has ädequat-e considered whethef,^in Eliè?face+óf Congress' ichclice of a pubiic forum for such actions, we should fafE What amdunts to a ulè o law shielding whistle 16wers still in tilie workfÊrce ffom identi=fication. The evidence the majorftý^refies on. to 'suppÍort its conclusion that i$entifyilig petfitîibnéf °could advsrsely affecti hèr employment prospécts is pet*ikionef's affidavït that her present employek, ànd *any prospectiÜe emplöyer, woulél riot want to em%1c5y someone'knòùn to e a snitbh. Ñajblit op. pp. 4, 34-35. Th concltísion seems orrect but hot becåuse pet-itionè has proven that she, partláu larlik among winstlebloüers remäining in thë workforce, would ààel empIòyment- discriimination were we t revèa her identity) but because hër'claïmiings trûè, as a $Ãtter of common sense, for all whistleblowers remaining in the workforce whose identity i3 revealed.. W ile the majority suggests that the use femin:.ne personal pronouns as a convenience with no intent to identify petitioner's ehder public' s interest in knowing a whistleblower' s -identity might be stronger in a case, unlike . this one,. that is not disposed of on respondent's motion for summary judgment, the majority has identified a class.of whistleblowers (those in the .workforce) whose requests , for anonymity would, I assume (following the maioriry's opinion), be grantpd,s at least-in the(cid:16)042earlystages of a case.2 Without contradictirig thi_s case, what.additional evidence m ght we demand of t e next whistleblower coming before us, expressing a genuine fear of employment discrimination, and asking for at least temporary anonymity? The privacy protections äfforded by statute to _those participating in, or affectedgby, whistleblower actions may be inadequate . For, instance, thë National Taxpayer Advocate recommended to Congress in 20 .0 that it amend the Internal Revenue Code to require redac ion of third-party return information in administrative and judicial proceedings relating to wh.istleblower claims. hiational Taxpayer. Advocate, 2010 Annual Report to Congress 396-399 (2Õ10) (Legislative Recommendation: Protect Taxpayer Privacy in Whistleblower- Cases) . (cid:16)042 One .could. argue that Congress intended whistleblowers . to bear the privacy, risks inherent in. asking for review of their whistleblower cl.aims 2That is because^ the risk of' identification as a whistleblower and, exists from the beginning of a case, since, as.an administrative matter, number of each such case the letter "W". to identify whistleb ower cases, we add to the docket thus, the risk of employment discriminaÊion, -43- in a public forun (the Tax Court). But if Congress did not intend that, and because we are writing a rule rather than disposing of a sjngle case, I think it best we leave the fix to Congress. I have concurred in the result in this case because I think that we should give whistleblowers contemplating a section 7623 (c) (4) action fair notice that we will not automatically grant anonymity upon a.claim of possible employment discrimination. Here we to decide this case as I would, dissatisfied whistleblowers.with a fear of employment discrimination would, before filing a petition with the Court, weigh the expected dollar return from commencing a section 7623 (c) (4) action against the expected cost (measured in dollars) of the disadvantages associated wi.th the public disclosure of information that ordinarily becomes part of the case file and the public record in 2. Tax Court case. Some whistleblowers may find that the expected costs outweigh the expected benefits.3 Until (and unless). Congress acts, I believe that is the best we can offer. HOLMES and WHERRY, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion. 31 do not, however, fact-specific sho ing. T.C. 89 (2006) rule. out anonymity upon a sufficient, See, e.g., Anonymous v. Commissioner, 127