TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Wayne Peter Smithson & Lynn A. Smithson
Docket Number: 2432-10S
Judge: Carluzzo
Opinion Type: bench
Filed: 10/28/2011
Pages: 21

UNITED STATES TAX COURT 20217 Washington, D.C. WAYNE PETER SMITHEON AND LYNN A. SMITHSON, Petitioners, COMMISSIONER OF IÈTERNAL REVENUE, Re spondent . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Docket No. 2432-10S Pursuant to Rule 152 (b) , Tax Court Rules of Practice and O R D E R Procedure, it is ONDERED that the Clerk of the tran cript of herewith to petit oners and to respondent a copy of pages of SpeciaÜ.. Trial. Jud e Lewis R. Carluzzo at Jacksonville, Florida, on September 23, 2011, containing his oral fact and opinion rendered t the conclusion of trial. findings of the Court shall transmit the the trial of the above case before In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered under Rule 155. (Signed) Lewis R. Carluzzo Special Trial Judge Dated: Washington, D.C. October 28, 2011 SERVED NOV - 1 2011 1. Bench Opinior.. by Special Trial Judge Lewis R. Carluzzo 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Smithson v. Commissioner Docket No. 2432-10S September 23, 2011 TH1' COURT: The court has decided to render oral findings of fact and opinion in this case, and the following represents the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion. This bench opinion shall not be relief upon as precedent in any other case. This proceeding for the redeterminations of deficiencies is a Small Tax Case conducted pursuant to the provisions 02 provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Rules 170 through 175 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. This bench opinion is made pursuant to the authority granted by section 7459(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. as amended, and Rule 152 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Hereinafter in this bench opinion, unless otherwise specified, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect for the years in issue. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. WaVne Peter Smithson and Lynn A. Smithson appeared pro sese. LFura A. Price appeared on behalf of Respondent. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In a notice of deficiency dated November 18, 2009, Respondent determined deficiencies of $4,607 and $1,629, respectively, in Petitioners' 2006 and 2007 Federal income taxes. Tle issues for decision for each year are: (1) whether Petitioners are entitled to a deduction attributable to a real estate activity loss in excess of the amount allowed by R spondent, (2) Whether Petitioners are entitled to trade or usiness expense deductions in excess of the amounts allowed by respondent; and (3) Whether Lynn A. Såithson is ántitled to section 6015 relief. The resolution of the first issue depends upon whether either Petitioner qualifies as a "taxpayer in a real property trade or business" within the meaning of section 469(c) (7). Sone of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. At the time the petition was filed, as well as at all times re Levant here, Petitioners resided in Florida. Penitioners were married in 1968, and they have remained mar±ied to each other continuously from that time forward. Wayne Peter Smithson (Petitioner) was self- employed as a consultant and Lynn A. Smithson was employed as a registeced nurse during each year in issue. Pe:itioner has a long history of employment in various aspe:ts of the real estate industry. While a resident of loanoke, Virginia he was a licensed real estate Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5 agent involved primarily with commercial real estate transactions. On June 28, 1996 Petitioner and another individual formed Small Properties, LLC, a limited liability company oëganized under the laws of Virginia (Small Properties). At some point prior to the years in issue Small Properties obtained titled to three parcels of real estate in Roanoke, Virginia. O e property is located on Wasena Street and consists of Neveral contiguous buildings that house four retail store and six residential units all subject to a single deed the Wasena Street property). The other two c nsist of s parately deeded single family residential units, both ocated on Walnut Street (the Walnut Street properties). At all times relevant these properties were held for rent by Small Properties (collectively, the rental properties). At some point after the rental properties were acquired by Small Properties, Petitioner became its sole member, and ater.Petitioners' son, Todd Smithson, became a member of Small Properties. As of the years in issue, Petitioner held an 85 percent membership interest in Small Properties a d Todd Smithson held the remaining 15 percent interest. Fo various reasons during 2006, the rental history of the Wasena Street property was not good, and the property was sold sometime in the middle of that year. As Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 of the date it was sold, the Wasena property was vacant. On the other hand, the Walnut Street properties remained fully rented during each year in, issue, each subject to an annual lease. As n cessary, vacant rental units in any of the rental properties were shown to prospective tenants by a làcal realto . The record does not disclose how often, if at all, this occurred during each year in issue. The rental properties were age and, as might be espected, routine maintenance and repairs were necessary during both years in issue. For example, during 2006 the boiler unit ervicing the Wasena property had to be replaced. During each year the maintenance for the rental pi~operties was performed by Ray Henson, who worked as an independent contractor for Small Properties; Todd Smithson provided all of the landscaping for the rental properties. Small Properties maintained a checking account at CenTrust Bank in Orlando, Florida (the checking account). Income generated by the rental properties was deposited into that account and expenses related to those properties were páid from the checking account. As best as can be determined f om the banking statements and copies of canceled checks drawn on the checking account, Petitioner wás the only signatory to the checking account during the years in isshe. Ch cking account records for only one half of 2006 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 7 have been provided. Those records shows that Petitioner wrote 26 checks with respect to various expenses and expenditures relating to Small Properties, such as monthly mcþrtgage payments, local real estate taxes, insurances, utilities, supplies, maintenance, et cetera. For 2007, a review of the checking account statements and canceled checks show that Petitioner wrote 150 checks for the same purposes. The banking records also show other transactions, s ich as point of sale transactions and withdrawals from automatic te ler machines. Some of these transactions appears to r late to the rental properties; others do not. Alt hough the management structure of Small P(cid:16)041opertieshas not been fully explained, it appears that Petitioner w¼s primarily responsible for making what might be called "executive" or "managerial" decisions, including credit and reference checks for prospective tenants, lease preparation and review, making decisions regarding unusual maintenance ore repairs, and ensuring that the business of Small Properties functioned as it should. Petitioner did not maintain a daily calendar or log showing the detail of his involvement with Small Properties by time or activity on a day-to-day or property-by-property basis. Fo Federal tax purposes Small Properties apparently d d not elect to be treated as other than a partnership or either year in issue.. See sec. 7701; sec. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 8 301.7701-3 (b), Procedural and Administrative Regs. (commonly referred to as the "check-the-box" regulations). Accordingly, a Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership Income was filed by Small Properties for each of those years. Included with each of those returns is·a Form 8825, Rental Real Estate Encome and Expenses of a Partnership or an S Còrporation, on which the income and expenses attributable to the renta:. properties are reported. For 2006 the Form 8825 shows a net rental loss of $86,340; for 2007. the Form 8825 shows a net rental loss of $53,833. It does not appear that either Form 1065 was examined by Respondent, but if so, it does not appear that any adjustments were made to any of the items show on.either return. Nothing in the record suggest that Small Properties elected to be treated as other than a small partnership within the meaning of section 6231(a) (1) (B). As noted, in addition to his involvement with Small Properties during each year in issue, Petitioner was also self-em loyed as a consultant doing business as Cònsulting Services LTD (Consulting). This business was cónducted out of Petitioners' home for both years at issue and it involved consulting services provided by Petitioner in connection with various real estate investments, acquisitions and other transactions. Lynn A. Smithson had no involvement whatsoever in either the operation of Small Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Properties of Consulting. Petitioners' joint Federal income tax return for each year was timely filed. ·Each return was prepared by Petitioner. Lynn A. Smithson reviewed and signed each return although it probably would not be inaccurate to say that her rev:.ew was less than detailed. As relevant here, each return :.ncludes a Schedule C, Profit.or Loss From Business, on which the income and deductions attributable to consulting are reported, and each return includes a Schedule E, Supplemental Income and Loss, on which Petitioner's distributive share of the Small Properties' partnership loss is reported. For 2006, Consulting's Schedule C shows gross income of $3,895 and expense deductions of $35,851, resulting in a $31,956 net loss for that year. The Schedule E shows a $72,389 partnership loss attributable.to Small Properties (E5 percent.of $86,340). For 2007, Consulting's Schedule C shows gross income of $2,368 and expense deductions of $30,442, resulting in a $28,074 net loss for that year. The Schedule E shows a $45,758 partnership loss attributable to Small Properties (85 percent of $53,833). The following adjustments are made in the above- referenced notice of deficiency: (1) For both years, the distributive share. of Petitioner's partnership loss attributable to.Small Properties is disallowed to the extent Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 the loss exceeds $25,000,.see section 469(i), because, according to the notice, "the losses *** claimed in connection w:.th [petitioner's] LLC rental activity *** are attributable to a passive activity" and "it is also determine that *** [petitioner is] not a real estate professional'; (2) for both years some of the expense deductions claimed on the Schedule C's were disallowed partially or completely because according to the notice, "it has not been established that they were ordinary and necessary business expenses" and, if applicable, "the substantiation requirements of section 274 of the Internal Revenue Code have not been met"; and (3) for both years computational adjustments are made that require no further discussion. Although not usually relevant to the resolution of substantive tax issues presented to this Court, here it is appropriate to discuss briefly the procedural history of this case as it relates to Lynn A. Smithson's claim for section 6015 relief. As noted above, for each year in issue, a joint Federal income tax return was filed. The above-referenced notice of deficiency is addressed to both .Petitioners. The petition in this case, filed January 26, 2010 shows only Petitioner's name in the caption and is signed only by him. Because Lynn A. Smithson did not originally join in the petition, the deficiencies shown in Heritage.Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 the notice, presumably along with related amounts, were assessed in due course. See section 6213(c). In response to Petitioners' motion to leave to file an amendment to petition, filed October 25, 2010, by Order dated October 28, 2010, the amendment to petition was a lowed effe tively adding Lynn A. Smithson as a Petitioner, which in turn, triggered the application of the prohibition on assessmen s contained in.section 6213(a). By that time, however, collection actions had been taken against her in c¢nnection with the amounts assessed for each year in issue. At trial Respondent noted that administrative steps have been taken to reverse, or abate, those assessments. In the meantime, distressed over the collective aQtions against her with respect to income taxes Petitioners believed to be in dispute in this proceeding, Lynn A. Smithson made an application for relief under section 6015. We suspect that her application for that relief was made in large part to suspend the collection actions to which she was then subject. See section 6015(e) (1) (B) (i). If so, as it now standa, the relief, for all practical purposes, 1s not necessary. In any event, after extensive consideration by Réspondent's Appeals office, her request for section 6015 relief has been denied, and her entitlement to such relief remains in dispute in this case. Heritage ·Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 We turn our attention first to Petitioners' entitlement to deduct Petitioner's distributive share of the losses from Small Properties. In general and as relevant here, an ind:_vidual is not entitled to a deduction for a passive activity loss incurred during the taxable year. Section 469 (a) . A passive activity loss is defined as the e ccess of th aggregate losses from all passive activities for the taxaole year over the aggregate income from all passive acti ities for that year. Section 469 (d) (1) . A passive acti ity is any activity which involves the conduct of any trade or business and in which the taxpayer does not materially participate . Section 469 (c) (1) . For this púrpose, a "trade or business" is generally defined as any aótivity in connection with a trade or business or any activity for the production of income under section 212. Section 469 (c) (6) . Petitioner' s involvement with Small Properties during the years in issue qualified as a trade or business within the meaning of section 469. However, in general, a rental activity is treated as a passive activity regardless o whether the taxpayer materially participates in that acti ity. Section 469 (c) (2) , -(4) . However, if a taxpayer is described in section 469 (c) (7) , (sometimes that taxpayer is eferred to as a "real estate professional") section 469 (c) (2) does not apply, and the taxpayer' s rental activity, if conducted as a trade or business or for the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 production of income, is not treated as a passive activity if the taxpayer materially participates in the activity. Section 469(c) (1); Fowler v. Commission, T.C. Memo. 2002- 223; sec. 1.069-9(e), Income Tax Regs. The parties disagree over whether Petitioner is a taxpayer described in section 469(c) (7). That section contains two tests that a taxpayer must satisfy to be dèscribed in it. One requires that "more than one-half of the personal services performed in trades or businesses by the taxpayer during such taxable year are performed in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates". Section 469(c) (7) (B) (i). P titioner has clearly met this test as there is nothing in the record that suggests that Petitioner performed personal services in any trade or business other than a real property trade or business or business. See section 469(c) (7) (C). The second test requires that the taxpayer perform "more than 750 hou: s of personal services in real property trades of businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates". Section 469(c) (7) (B) (ii). This is a stand alone, objec ive test and this is where the parties part ways. i Bec ause there is no showing that an election to aggregate thë rental real estate activities during either year in issue has been made, each rental property is treated Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 . 14 1 2 3 4 5 as a separate rental activity. See section 469(c) (7) (A) (ii); see also sec. 1.469-9(h) (2), Income Tax Rëgs.; sec. .469-9(g) (3), Income Tax Regs. Here, that means that for 2006, the Wasena property is treated as one activity, as is each of the Walnut Street properties for a 6. total of three rental activities. For 2007, each Walnut 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 . Street prope ty is treated as a separate activity, for a total of two. According to Respondent, in.order to satisfy the requirements of section 469(c) (7), Petitioner must show that he performed more than 750 hours of personal services in each of the hree rental activities in 2006 (all told a total of 2,2ß0 hours), and more than 750 hours in each of the two rental activities for 2007 (all told, a total of 1,500 hours). We disagree with Respondent's interpretation of section 459(c) (7), however, as will be seen, the disagreement is of no consequence to the resolution of this issue. As we view the matter, the 750 hours referenced in section 469(2) (7) is computed by taking by taking into account the 2ours spent by a taxpayer performing personal services in ceal estate activities, regardless if the a¢tivities have been aggregated, but only if the taxpayer materially participated in each separate ·activity. See section 469(a); section 469(c) (7) (B) (ii) ("in real property Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 15 trades or businesses" and I emphasize the use of plurals "in which the taxpayer materially participates") The first step, therefore, in determining whether a taxpayer is described in section 469(c) (7) in a situation where multiple activities have not been aggregated is to consider each activity separately to see whether the taxpayer materially participated in that activity. If so, tlÈen the per onal services performed in that activity, measured in umber of hours, count towards the 750 hour threshold, i not, then the activity is not taken into account for purposes of section 469(c) (7). Ap lying our interpretation here, for 2006, we first consid r whether Petitioner materially participated in the activity involving the Wasena property and further consider whe:her he materially participated in each of the Walnut Stree: properties on a property-by-property basis. The same considerations are applicable to 2007, but because the Wasena property had been sold in 2006, only the Walnut Street prope ties need be taken into account. We expect that even if Respondent agreed with our interpretatipn of section 469(c) (7), argument would be made that Petitioner failed to establish that he materially participated in any of the activities on a property-by- property basis, and such as argument would find support if ohly because Petitioner did not specifically identify any Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 16 particular personal services performed with respect to any particular separate activity for either year in issue. Ne/ertheless, according to Petitioner, and in more or less generalized terms, he claims that the time spent performing personal services in each activity constitutes material par:icipation within the meaning of section 469(h). See Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 368 (2009); section 1.469 5T(a) ( ) through (7), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5725 (February 25, 1988). On the record before us, we would be reluctant to agree with him on an activity- by-activity aasis for either year in issue, but because it makes little difference we proceed by assuming without finding that he did, and consider whether Petitioner has met the 750 hour threshold for either year in issue. We accept Petitioner's generalized explanation of the type of Jersonal services he performed in each activity for each yea in issue. Although no doubt substantial, the amount of time he claims to have spent has been computed only with reEerence to petitioner's after-the-fact estimates, in this case, according to Petitioner, at least 75 hours per month. Lacking any detail regarding how Petitioner constructed this estimate, we are left to wonder whether the estimate includes the type of services not contemplated by material participation. See section 1.469- ST(f) (2). Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 17 We recognize that for purposes of section 469(c) (7), a taxpayer can establish the extent of personal services perEormed in an activity by any reasonable means. We further note that reasonable means "may include but are not limited to the identification of services performed over a period of time and the approximate number of hours spent performing sach services during such period, based on appointment aooks, calendars or narrative summaries". S(ection 1.469-5T(f) (4), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5727 (Fabruary 25, 1988). Nevertheless, we have consistently held that for purposes of that regulation, "ballpark {gaesstimates]" contained in postevent records, ajre generally given little, if any, weight in determining the extent of a taxpayer's participation in a real estate trade or business for purposes of section 469(c) (7). See, for example, Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-296; Carlstedt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-331; Speer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-323; Goshorn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-578. In this case, Petitioner kept no contemporaneous riecord or diary showing what services were provided in connection with which activity. His estimate of the hours spent in performing those activities is based in large part upon the number of checks written. for 2006, the record iíncludes only 26 checks, but we realize we only have records Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 18 for one-half of the year. For 2007 the records includes 150 checks. We'll assume that Petitioner wrote 150 checks per year and it took an average of one·hour per check, taking into account the review of the bill or invoice to be paid, drafting the check, recording the check in the check register and depositing the check in the mail. That would total 150 hours spent each year. We will also assume that Petitioner spent an additional hour every day of the year in some manner or another performing services in connection wïth the rental properties. No doubt on some days he spent more time, and no doubt on others he spent less or no time. After all, all of the physical repair work and maintenance on the renta properties was-being performed by others, and there has be n no showing that tenant turnover required unusual amou ts of time necessary to check prospective tenant credit and/or references. Totaling the hours per day with the time it took to write checks shows that Petitioner falls far short of satisfying the 750 hour threshold for either year in issue. It follows that Petitioner does not qualify as a real estate professional within the meaning of section 469(c) (7) for either year in issue and Respondent's adjustments reflecting that finding are sustained. Next we consider Petitioners' entitlement to the deductions, or portions of deductions, shown on the Schedule C that have been disallowed by Respondent. We begin by Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 19 noting that ?etitioners now concede to the correctness of màny of thos disallowance and those disallowance will not be further discussed. In each year a portion of the deduction for "car and truck expenses: has been disallowed. Déductions f r such expenses are subject to the strict substantiation requirements of section 274 and its correspondin regulation. Petitioners have not produced any substantiation, much less the type of substantiation contemplated by section 274, for the car and truck expenses to which the deductions relate. Consequently, Respondent's disallowance of a portion of the deduction for car and truck expenses is sustained for each year in issue. Respondent also disallowed a portion of the deduction for cleaning expenses shown on the Schedule C for ehch year. ccording to Petitioner, that deduction is attributable to the cost of dry cleaning his business suits. (Although no explained by Petitioners, we expect that the pprtion of the deduction allowed might have related to Lynn A. Smithson's employment as a registered nurse). Because Petitioner's business suits consist of clothing suitable for general use, the cost of the suits, or the costs of maintaining the suits are not deductible. See section 262; Y!eomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757 (1958). Respondent's disallowance of a portion of the cleaning expense deduction for each year is sustained. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 20 Other deductions claims on the Schedule C for each year have been entirely or partially disallowed. Petitioners have either conceded these deductions or were unable to explain to what the deduction related (for example, insurance expenses). In either event, Respondent's disallowance of these deductions in whole or in part are likewise sus':ained. Lastly, we consider Lynn A. Smithson's entitlement to section 6015 relief for either year in issue. Under the circumstance we think little benefit would be served by búrdening th's bench opinion with a detailed discussion of the underlying principles that govern such requests. Pe ;itioners have enjoyed a long and successful marriage. Lynn A. Smithson hardly fits the profile of a taxpayer that typically seeks such relief, and Petitioner, who fully supports her entitlement to relief, hardly fits the profile of what is commonly referred to as a "non- requesting spouse". It is fairly clear that the request for section 6015 relief was made in order to pre.vent the premature collection of the liabilities here in dispute. It is also clear that Petitioners will no doubt together share the additional tax burdens imposed upon them as a result of tþle findings made in this bench opinion. In any event, aölministrative actions taken by Respondent will reverse the collection actions previously taken, if only temporarily. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 In determining a taxpayer's entitlement to section 6915 relief, we review, de novo, Respondent's failure or refusal to administratively grant such relief and consider the evidence presented by the taxpayer at trial in so doing. See Porter v Commissioner, 132 T.C. 203 (2008); Porter v. Commissioner 132 T.C., strike that. Let's go off the record for a minute. (O f the record.) TH COURT: All right, that second site of Porter should be Po ter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008). For the most par , in support of Lynn A. Smithson's claims for spction 6015 relief, Petitioners rely upon the fact that she had no invol ement whatsoever in the operations of Small Properties o Consulting. That fact, however, in and of itself, does little to support her claims. Other factors much be taken into account. Here, the evidence relevant to the issue is included in what Respondent refers to as the "administratLve record" made in connections with Respondent's consideration of Lynn A..Smithson's request. Except for inconsequential details, suffice it to note that we take no issue ·with any of the findings or conclusions reached by Respondent's Appeal officer in denying her request. All things considered, we find that Lynn A. Smithson is hot entitled to section 6015 relief for either year in issue. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 . 9 10. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 22 To reflect .the foregoing, and to ensure that any agreements between the parties not obvious to the Court are given proper effect, decision will be entered under Rule 155. Th:_s concludes the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion :.n this case. (whereupon, at 9:11 a.m. , the bench opinion in the above-entitled matter was concluded.) // // / // // // // // // // // // // // // // // Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888