TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Dwight S. & Antonina K. Platt
Docket Number: 4467-06
Judge: Chiechi
Opinion Type: memo
Filed: 01/31/2008
Pages: 23

RECORDED SERVIC E S-)AL I CAL . STAT . S,T . JUDGE CN\ECM 1 J FINS T .C . Memo . 2008-17 UNITED STATES TAX COURT DWIGHT S . & ANTONINA K . PLATT, Peti Toners v . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, R sponden t HERBERT & CHRISTINE BANGS, Petitioners v . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, R spondent Docket Nos . 4467-06, 7221-06 . Filed~January 31, 2008 . W . Randolph Shump, for petitioners in docket No . 4467-06 . Stuart Henry Levine, for petitioners in d 0 cket No . 7221-06 . Bradley C . Plovan, for respondent . MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINIO N CHIECHI, Judge : Respondent determined the following defi- ciencies in, and accuracy-related penalties under sectio n SERVED JAN 31 2008 - 2 - 6662(a)1 on, petitioners' respective Federal income tax for 2002 : Petitioners Deficiency Accuracy-Related Penalty Dwight S . Platt and $3,531 $70 6 Antonina K . Plat t Herbert Bangs and 2,175 435 Christine Bang s We must decide whether certain payments that petitioner Herbert Bangs (Mr . Bangs) made during 2002 to petitioner Antonina Platt (Ms . Platt) are deductible or excludable from Mr . Bangs' income for his taxable year 2002 and includible in Ms . Platt's income for her taxable year 2002 .2 We hold that they are not . FINDINGS OF FAC T All of the facts in these cases, which the parties submitted under Rule 122, have been stipulated by the parties and are so found except as stated below . Petitioners in the case at docket No . 4467-06, Ms . Platt and Dwight Platt (Mr . Platt), resided in Stevenson, Maryland, at the time they filed the petition in that case . Petitioners in the case at docket No . 7221-06, Mr . Bangs and Christine Bangs (Ms . 'Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue . All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure . 2Respondent made certain additional determinations in the respective notices of deficiency that respondent issued to petitioners in these cases, the resolution of which flows automatically from our resolution of the determinations in those respective notices that we address herein . See also infra not e 33 . - 3 - Bangs), resided in Ruxton, Maryland, at the time they filed th e petition in that case . On a date not disclosed by the record, M Bangs and Ms . Platt were married . At all relevant times , cluding while Mr . Bangs was married to Ms . Platt , Mr . Bangs par icipated in a pension plan ( Baltimore County pension plan) aintained by his employer, Baltimore County, Maryland . At tho e times, that was the only pension plan in which Mr . Bangs par t cipated . On March 2, 1983, Mr . Bangs and Ms . Plat t divorced pursuant to a decree of divorce (divorce decree) issued by the Circui t Court for Baltimore County . The divorce decre provided i n pertinent part : IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Defe pay to the Plaintiff, directly, as perman the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300) p effective October 1, 1982, payable until either party or the remarriage of the Pla ever shall first occur, subject to the fu the Court . dant shall nt alimony, r mont h he death of ntiff, whichther order o f IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Defe dant shall pay to the Plaintiff, as a monetary award, the sum of Thirty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($32,900), which sum shall be payable . within 90 days of Februar y 1, 1983 . (3 ' IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the afore aid monetary award shall be reduced to judgment on May , 1983 and shall draw interest at the legal rate from such date . * * 3We shall refer to the second-ordered paragraph quoted above as the divorce decree $32,900 lump-sum payment provision . - 4 - IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that with respect to the Defendant's pension, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff, if, as, and when he receives each pension payment, that sum which is determined in accordance with the following formula : 50 percent X (12 years and seven months of marriage _ by total years of employment) .14 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that if the Defendant voluntarily takes his pension as a lump sum, either before or after retirement, then Defendant shall, upon receipt of * * * said lump sum, pay to the Plaintiff the sum of Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500), with simple interest at the rate of te n (10) percent from July 1, 1983, to the date of payment . [Reproduced literally . ] During 2002, Mr . Bangs received monthly payments from the Baltimore County pension plan . Pursuant to the divorce decree provision in question, shortly after receiving each such monthly payment, Mr . Bangs made the following monthly payments totaling $8,803 .875 (monthly payments at issue) on the dates indicated by electronic transfers from a joint checking account that he and Ms . Bangs maintained to a checking account of Ms . Platt : Owe shall refer to the fourth-ordered paragraph quoted above as the divorce decree provision in question . 'The parties stipulated that during 2002 Mr . Bangs paid to Ms . Platt $8,883 pursuant to the divorce decree provision in question . That stipulation is clearly contrary to the facts that we have found are established by the record, and we shall disregard it . See Cal-Maine Foods, Inc . v . Commissioner , 93 T .C . 181, 195 (1989) . The record establishes, and we have found, that during 2002 Mr . Bangs paid to Ms . Platt $8,803 .87 pursuant to the divorce decree provision in question . Date of Payment 01/14/2002 02/13/2002 03/13/2002 04/15/2002 05/13/2002 06/13/2002 07/15/2002 08/15/2002 09/16/2002 10/15/2002 11/15/2002 12/16/2002 Amoun of Pa en t $728 .9 1 728 .9 1 728 .9 1 728 .9 1 728 .9 1 728 .9 1 728 .9 1 740 .3 0 740 .3 0 740 .3 0 740 .3 0 740 .3 0 Mr . Bangs and Ms . Bangs timely filed Form' 1040, U .S . Indi- vidual Income Tax Return (Form 1040), for thei taxable year 2002 (Mr . Bangs' return) .6 In that return, Mr . Ban s claimed a deduc- tion of $8,8837 for alimony . Mr . Bangs did no issue to Ms . Platt and did not file with the Internal Reven e Service any Form 1099 for a nominee distribution with respect t those payments . On January 18, 2006, respondent issued to Mr . Bangs a notic e of deficiency with respect to his taxable year 2002 (notice for Mr . Bangs' taxable year 2002) . In that notice, respondent disallowed the alimony deduction that Mr . Bangs claimed in Mr . Bangs' return . In the notice for Mr . Bangs' to able year 2002 , 'For convenience, we shall generally refer hereinafter only to Mr . Bangs, and not to Ms . Bangs . 7See supra note 5 . The record does not disclose why Mr . Bangs deducted as alimony $79 .13 in excess of t e $8,803 .87 that he paid to Ms . Platt during that year pursuant o that divorce decree provision . - 6 - respondent also determined that Mr . Bangs is liable for his taxable year 2002 for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) . Mr . Platt and Ms . Platt timely filed Form 1040 for their taxable year 2002 .8 In that return, Ms . Platt did not include in income the $8,803 .879 that she received from Mr . Bangs during 2002 . On January 18, 2006, respondent issued to Ms . Platt a notice of deficiency with respect to her taxable year 2002 (notice for Ms . Platt's taxable year 2002) . In that notice, respondent determined that Ms . Platt received $8,88310 of alimony that is includible in her income for that year . In the notice for Ms . Platt's taxable year 2002, respondent also determined that Ms . Platt is liable for her taxable year 2002 for the accuracy- related penalty under section 6662(a) . OPINION The parties submitted these cases fully stipulated under Rule 122 . That the parties submitted these cases under that Rule does not affect who has the burden of proof or the effect of a 'For convenience, we shall generally refer hereinafter only to Ms . Platt, and not to Mr . Platt . 9See supra note 5 . '°See supra note 5 . - 7 failure of proof .'1 Rule 122(b) ; Borchers v .~Commissioner , 9 5 T .C . 82, 91 (1990), affd . 943 F .2d 22 (8th C 1991) . In support of his argument that the mont ly payments a t issue are deductible or excludable from his i come and includible in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 20 2, Mr . Bang s advances several arguments . We first addres s Mr . Bangs' argument that the monthly payments at issue constitute alimony unde r section 71 and are deductible under section 215(a) . Ms . Platt and respondent take the position that those pa ents are no t alimony under that section .1 2 In advancing their respective positions o brief as to whether the monthly payments at issue constitu e alimony under section 71, Mr . Bangs and Ms . Platt rely on se tion 71 as amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), ub . L . 98-369, sec . 422(a), 98 Stat . 795 (amended section 71) . Respondent argues that amended section 71 does not apply o those payments . We agree with respondent .l 3 "The parties do not address sec . 7491(a) . need not decide whether the burden of proof shi under that section . That is because resolution presented here does not depend on who has the b In any event, we is to respondent of the issu e rden of proof . 12Respondent in each of these cases is in e holder . On brief, however, respondent agrees w position . sence a staketh Ms . Platt' s 13DEFRA also amended sec . 215 (amended sec . 215) . DEFRA, Pub . L . 98-369, sec . 422(b), 98 Stat . 797 . That applies with respect to (1) divorce and separat' amendmen t on instruments (continued . . .) - 8 - Amended section 71 applies with respect to (1) divorce and separation instruments executed after December 31, 1984, and (2) any such instruments executed before January 1, 1985, but modified on or after that date if the modification expressly provides that amended section 71 applies to such modification . DEFRA sec . 422(e), 98 Stat . 798 . In his reply brief, Mr . Bangs argues that section 71 before its amendment by DEFRA does not apply in the instant cases because he and Ms . Platt "effectively stipulated" that amended section 71 applies .14 We reject that argument . We note ini- tially that although Mr . Bangs and Ms . Platt take the position on brief that amended section 71 applies in these cases, they did not stipulate that that section applies . Even if Mr . Bangs and 13( . . .continued) executed after Dec . 31, 1984, and (2) any such instruments executed before Jan . 1, 1985, but modified on or after that date if the modification expressly provides that amended sec . 215 applies to that modification . DEFRA sec . 422(e), 98 Stat . 798 . The parties do not address whether sec . 215 before its amendment by DEFRA or amended sec . 215 applies in these cases . On the record before us, we hold that sec . 215 before its amendment by DEFRA, and not amended sec . 215, applies . "In his reply brief, Mr . Bangs also argues that amended section 71 applies because "the Commissioner made the assessments against both sets of taxpayers in order to avoid being 'whipsawed'" . We reject that argument . That respondent made the respective determinations at issue in order to avoid being whipsawed is irrelevant to resolving whether sec . 71 before its amendment by DEFRA or amended section 71 applies in these cases . In her reply brief, Ms . Platt does not address respondent's argument that sec . 71 before its amendment by DEFRA, and not amended section 71, applies in these cases . - 9 - Ms . Platt had stipulated that amended section 71 applies in thes e cases , the Court is not bound by stipulations of law . See, e .g . , Thoburn v . Commissioner , 95 T .C . 132, 144 n .l (1990) . The Circuit Court for Baltimore County i sued the divorc e decree on March 2, 1983 . The record does not establish that tha t court modified that decree after that date . the record befor e us, we hold that section 71 before its amendm nt by DEFRA, an d not amended section 71, applies in determinin whether th e monthly payments at issue constitute alimony . In his reply brief, Mr . Bangs states : if the pre-Tax Reform Act of 1984 version of I .R .C . 71 [ sectio n 71 before its amendment by DEFRA] is applicabl the Disputed Payments [monthly payments at issue] do not co stitute alimony . " Mr . Bangs thus concedes that if we were to ho l that section 71 before its amendment by DEFRA applies, whic h have, the monthly payments at issue do not constitute alimony un er that section . Based on Mr . Bangs' concession, we hold that t e monthly payment s at issue do not constitute alimony under sectio 71 before its amendment by DEFRA and are not deductible under section 215 (a) before its amendment by DEFRA .1 5 We turn now to Mr . Bangs' argument that Ms owner of an interest in the Baltimore County pe the divorce decree ordered him to pay her "if , 15See supra note 13 . - 10 - receives each pension payment, that sum which is determined in accordance with the following formula : 50 percent X (12 years and seven months of marriage = by total years of employment) ." As a result, according to Mr . Bangs, the monthly payments at issue are excludable from his income and includible in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 2002 . Ms . Platt and respon- dent argue that Ms . Platt did not own an interest in the Balti- more County pension plan .16 As a result, according to Ms . Platt and respondent, the monthly payments at issue are includible in Mr . Bangs' income and excludable from her income for the taxable year 2002 . Petitioners in each of these cases agree, and respondent does not dispute, that the Baltimore County pension plan consti- tutes a qualified pension plan within the meaning of section 401(a) .17 Moreover, none of the parties disputes that the Balti- 16See supra note 12 . "Sec . 401(a) provides in pertinent part : SEC . 401 . QUALIFIED PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, AND STOCK BONUS PLANS . (a) Requirements for Qualification .--A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section-- (1) if contributions are made to the trust by such employer, or employees, or both * * * for the purpose of distributing to such employees or their (continued . . .) - 11 - more County pension plan constitutes a govern ental plan as defined in section 414(d) .18 Inexplicably, ho ever, none of the parties addresses section 402(a) in advancing their respective positions as to whether the monthly payments t issue ar e excludable from Mr . Bangs' income and includi : m le in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 2002 .19 That sec t on governs th e 17 ( . . .continued ) beneficiaries the corpus and income accumulated by the trust in accorda plan ; of the fund ce with suc h (2) if under the trust instrumel possible, at any time prior to the s all liabilities with respect to empl their beneficiaries under the trust, of the corpus or income to be (withi year or thereafter) used for, or div purposes other than for the exclusiv his employees or their beneficiarie s t it is imtisfaction of yees an d for any part the taxable rted to , benefit o f All references hereinafter to a qualified pens qualified pension plan within the meaning of s on plan are to a c . 401(a) . "Sec . 414(d) defines the term "government plan established and maintained for its employ ment of the United States, by the government o political subdivision thereof, or by any agenc ity of any of the foregoing ." All references governmental plan are to a governmental plan w of sec . 414(d) . 1 plan" as " a es by the Govern- H any State o r or instrumental- ereinafter to a thin the meanin g "Instead, in support of their respective positions as to whether the monthly payments at issue are excl dable from Mr . Bangs' income and includible in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 2002, the parties rely on sec . 61( )(11) and on cases (e .g ., Pfister v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2002-198, affd . 359 F .3d 352 (4th Cir . 2004), and Witcher v . Co missioner, T .C . Memo . 2002-292) in which the Court based its re pective holdings on that section . Although sec . 61(a)(11) provi es the general rule that gross income includes income derived rom pensions, Congress provided a special rule in sec . 402(a) with respect t o . (continued . . ) - 12 - taxation of distributions from a qualified pension plan . Section 402(a) provides that any amount distributed from a qualified pension plan, including a governmental plan, is generally taxable to the distributee under such a plan . In Darby v . Commissioner , 97 T .C . 51 (1991), the Court addressed the meaning of the term "distributee" in section 402(a) in the context of a qualified pension plan, which was not a governmental plan (or any other qualified plan) that was not subject to the so-called spendthrift provisions of section 401(a)(13) .20 The Court held there that the term "distributee" in section 402(a) ordinarily means the participant or the benefi- ciary who is entitled under such a plan to receive a distribu- tion . Darby v . Commissioner , supra at 58 . In so holding,21 th e 11( . . . continued ) distributions from qualified pension plans . See Darby v . Commissioner , 97 T .C . 51, 58 (1991) . Unlike the instant cases, Pfister and Witcher did not involve qualified pension plans . Those cases involved Federal military retirement programs that are subject to Federal statutes that do not apply in the instant cases . The parties' reliance on sec . 61(a)(11) and on Pfister and Witcher is misplaced . 20A11 references hereinafter to the spendthrift provisions are to the provisions of sec . 401(a)(13) that, with certain exceptions, prohibit the assignment and alienation of benefits under a qualified pension plan . 21The rationale on which the Court based its holding in Darby v . Commissioner , supra , related in large part to Congress' addition to the Code in 1984 of the provisions relating to qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO provisions) . Those provisions include sec . 414(p), which defines the term "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO), and sec . 402(e)(1)(A) (origi- (continued . . .) - 13 - Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that he term "distributee" in section 402(a) means the ow:r of an interest i n a qualified pension plan . Id . at 66 . 21( . . .continued) nally enacted as sec . 402(a)(9)), which gover distributions or payments that are made pursu discussed below, when Congress enacted the QD 1984, those provisions did not apply to gover are not subject to the spendthrift provisions See secs . 414(p)(9), 401(a) ; sec . 1 .401(a)-13 Regs . ; see also H . Rept . 101-247, at 1443 (1 9 s the taxation of nt to a QDRO . As O provisions in mental plans that of sec . 401 (a) (13) a), Income Tax 9) . The legislative history of the QDRO prov 1984 states in pertinent part : Generally, under present law, benefi pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus p plan) are subject to prohibitions against alienation (spendthrift provisions . [sic] Several cases have arisen in which c been required to determine whether the * thrift provisions apply to family support ( e .g . , alimony, separate maintenance, and obligations) . * * * There is a divergence among [those courts] * * * . urts have * spend- obligations child support of opinion * * Reasons for Chang e The committee believes that the spen should be clarified by creating a limite d that permits benefits under a pension, etc divided under certain circumstances . In o provide rational rules for plan administer committee believes it is necessary to esta lines for determining whether the exceptio spendthrift rules applies . * * * thrift rules exception plan to b e der to [sic] , th e lish guide- to the - 14 - A question arises as to whether the definition of the term "distributee" in Darby v . Commissioner , supra , applies in the instant cases, where the qualified pension plan in question is a governmental plan that is not subject to the spendthrift provi- sions of section 401(a)(13) .22 We need not resolve that ques- tion . That is because, regardless of whether in the context of a governmental plan, such as the qualified pension plan involved in the instant cases, the term "distributee" in section 402(a) means the participant or the beneficiary under such a plan, as the Court held in Darby , or the owner of such a plan, as the parties apparently argue here, on the record before us, we find that for purposes of section 402(a) Mr . Bangs, and not Ms . Platt, was the distributee under the Baltimore County pension plan . The parties do not dispute (1) that during the year at issue Mr . Bangs, and not Ms . Platt, was a participant under the Balti- more County pension plan and (2) that during that year Ms . Platt was not a beneficiary of an interest in that pension plan . We thus consider only the parties' disagreement over whether Ms . 22In Powell v . Commissioner , 101 T .C . 489 (1993), the Court set forth an exception to the general definition in Darby v . Commissioner , supra , of the term "distributee" in sec . 402(a) . The Court held in Powell that that definition did not apply in a situation governed by community property laws where the former spouse's "rights were acquired by her directly at the outset and did not represent a transfer to her of rights which had previously accrued to [her husband]" . the Court further held in Powell that the former spouse was a "distributee" under sec . 402(a) who was "taxable on her share of the pension benefits" in question . Id . at 497-498 . Accordingly, Id . at 499 . Platt was the owner of an interest in the Bal timore Count y 15 - pension plan . In support of their respective positions as to whether Ms . Platt was the owner of an interest in the Bal imore County pension plan, the parties rely on the divorce decree provision in question . That provision requires Mr . Bangs o pay an amount determined pursuant to a formula stated there n "if, as, and when" he receives a payment from the Baltimor County pension plan . Contrary to Mr . Bangs' argument, the divorce decree provision in question does not provide that M . Platt is the owner of an interest in that plan .23 Nor has hat provision bee n construed to do so . In fact, the Court of Special Appeals o f Maryland concluded that the divorce decree pro ision in question granted nothing more than a monetary award to s . Platt . See Bangs v . Bangs , 475 A .2d 1214, 1223 (Md . Ct . S ec . App . 1984) . In Bangs v . Bangs , supra, Mr . Bangs appea ed from the divorce decree involved in these cases . In th t appeal, Mr . Bangs did not argue, as he does here, that the divorce decree provision in question provided that Ms . Platt as the owner of a n 23As discussed supra note 19, Mr . Bangs' reliance on Pfister v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2002 - 198, is mispl ced because that case involved a Federal military retirement pr gram that was subject to Federal statutes that do not apply in the instant cases . Mr . Bangs' reliance on Pfister also is misplaced because, unlike the divorce decree involved in the inst nt cases, the divorce decree involved in Pfister provided that the taxpayer in that case was to "be owner of, and receive, one-half of husband's disposable retired or retainer pay " . Id . - 16 - interest in the Baltimore County pension plan . Instead, he argued (1) that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Ms . Platt two monetary awards consisting of the payment ordered under the divorce decree $32,900 lump-sum payment provision 2' and the payments ordered under the divorce decree provision in question25 and (2) that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred by refusing to place a "cap" or "ceiling" on the latter payments . Id . at 1222-1223 . The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland agreed with Mr . Bangs that the payments ordered under the divorce decree $32,900 lump-sum payment provision and under the divorce decree provision in question were in the nature of a monetary award, id . at 1223, but disagreed with Mr . Bangs that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County had granted Ms . Platt two separate monetary awards unde r 24The divorce decree $32,900 lump-sum payment provision provided : IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff , as a monetary award , the sum of Thirty- Two Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($32,900), which sum shall be payable within 90 days of February 1, 1983 . 25The divorce decree provision in question provided : IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that with respect to the Defendant's pension, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff, if, as, and when he receives each pension payment, that sum which is determined in accordance with the following formula : 50 percent X (12 years and seven months of marriage = by total years of employment) . - 17 - those two provisions, id . The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted Ms . Platt only one monetary award consisting f the payment ordered under the divorce decree $32,900 lump-sum payment provi- sion and the payments ordered under the divor e decree provision in question . Id . at 1222-1223 . The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland also disagreed with Mr . Bangs' argum nt that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County erred by refusing o place a "cap" or "ceiling" on the latter payments . Id . at 122 . According to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the Cir uit Court for Baltimore County had broad discretion and did not abuse that discretion by determining a fixed percentage or Ms . Platt of the future payments that Mr . Bangs was to receive from the Baltimore County pension plan . Id . at 1222-1223 . The law of Maryland in effect at the time that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued the divorce ecree involved in the instant cases provides further support for our finding .that the divorce decree provision in question does of provide that Ms . Platt is the owner of an interest in the B ltimore County pension plan .26 The law of Maryland in effect t that time, Md . 26As discussed supra note 19, Mr . Bangs' reliance on Witcher v . Commissioner , T .C . Memo . 2002-292, is mispl ced because that case involved a Federal military retirement pr gram that was subject to Federal statutes that do not apply n the instant cases . Mr . Bangs' reliance on Witcher also is misplaced because, unlike the State law involved in the instant c ses, the State la w . ) (continued . . - 18 - Code Ann ., Cts . & Jud . Proc . sec . 3-6A-05 (1980 & Supp . 1983)(repealed and recodified as Md . Code Ann ., Fam . Law sec . 8- 205 by Acts 1984, ch . 296, secs . 1 and 2),27 did not authoriz e Maryland courts to transfer ownership of an interest in a pension plan as part of a divorce settlement . See generally Klingenberg v . Klingenberg , 675 A .2d 551, 555-556 (Md . 1996) . It was no t until 1986 that the legislature of the State of Maryland autho- rized Maryland courts to transfer ownership of an interest in a "pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensatio n 26( . . .continued) involved in Witcher authorized the court that issued the divorce decree involved in that case to award an ownership interest in a military pension as part of a divorce settlement . Id . 27The law of Maryland in effect at the time that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued the divorce decree involved in the instant cases, Md . Code Ann ., Cts . & Jud . Proc . sec . 3-6A-05 (1980 & Supp . 1983)(repealed and recodified as Md . Code Ann ., Fam . Law sec . 8-205 by Acts 1984, ch . 296, secs . 1 and 2), provided in pertinent part : [Sec .] 3-6A-05 . Monetary award . (b) The court shall determine the value of all marital property . After making the determination, the court may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not alimony is awarded . * * * In Deering v . Deering , 437 A .2d 883, 890 (Md . 1981), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held under the above-quoted provision that "a spouse's pension rights, to the extent accumulated during the marriage, constitute a form of 'marital property'" . - 19 - plan" as part of a divorce settlement . Md . ode Ann ., Fam . Law sec . 8-205(a) (2) (i) (West 2007) . 211 See genera ly Klingenberg v . Klingenberg , supra at 555-556 . On the record before us, we find that Ms . Platt was not the owner of an interest in the Baltimore County ension plan . On that record, we further find that, regardless of whether in the context of a governmental plan, such as the q alified pension plan involved in the instant cases, the term 'distributee" in section 402(a) means the participant or the b neficiary under such a plan, as the Court held in Darby v . Co missioner, 97 T .C . 28Md . Code Ann ., Fam . Law, sec . 8-205(a)( est 2007) provides in pertinent part : (a)(1) * * * after the court determnes which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property, the court may transfer ownership of an interest in property described in para raph (2) of this subsection, grant a monetary award, r both, as an adjustment of the equities and rights of he parties concerning marital property, whether or n t alimony is awarded . (2) The court may transfer ownership of an inter- est in : (i) a pension, retirement , prof t sharing, or deferred compensation plan, from one party to either or both parties ; .(ii) subject to the consent of ny lienholders, family use personal pro erty, from one or both parties to either or bot parties ; an d (iii) subject to the terms otf a y lien, real and used as property jointly owned by the parie the principal residence of the party s when they lived together * * * - 20 - at 58, or the owner of an interest in such a plan, as the parties apparently argue here, for purposes of that section, Mr . Bangs, and not Ms . Platt, was the distributee under the Baltimore County pension plan, unless the divorce decree qualifies under section 414(p) as a QDRO . The final argument that Mr . Bangs advances in support of his position in these cases and that we consider now is that the divorce decree involved in these cases qualifies under section 414(p) as a QDRO . If the divorce decree were to qualify as such, Ms . Platt would be an alternate payee29 under the Baltimore County pension plan . In that event, she would be treated for purposes of section 402(a) as the distributee under that plan of the payments to which she was entitled pursuant to the divorce decree provision in question . See sec . 402(e)(1)(A) . We reject Mr . Bangs' argument that the divorce decree qualifies under section 414(p) as a QDRO .30 The QDRO provision s 29Sec . 414(p)(8) defines the term "alternate payee" as "any spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such participant . " 30We note that the parties stipulated (QDRO stipulation) : "No 'qualified domestic relations order' ('QDRO') has been issued to either Antonina K . Platt or Herbert Bangs either on March 2, 1983 or at any time thereafter ." None of the parties argues that the QDRO stipulation means that the divorce decree involved in the instant cases may not qualify under sec . 414(p) as a QDRO . We shall independently address whether that divorce decree so qualifies . - 21 - that Congress enacted in 1984 did not apply o governmental plans . See sec . 414(p)(9) ; see also supra n to 21 . In 1989, Congress added section 414(p)(11) to the Code .31 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA), Pub . L . 10 -239, sec . 7841(a)(2), 103 Stat . 2427-2428 . Section 414(p)(11) provides that "a distribution or payment from a govern ental plan * * * shall be treated as made pursuant to a qualif ed domestic rela- tions order if it is made pursuant to a domes is relations order which meets the requirement of clause (i) of aragraph (1)(A)" of section 414(p) .32 Section 414(p)(11) applies my with respect to transfers of marital interests in governme tal plans that occur after December 19, 1989 . OBRA sec . 7841(a)(3), 103 Stat . 2428 . 31Congress added sec . 414(p)(11) to the C o conform generally [the tax rules relating to t ests in a governmental plan] to the tax rules qualified plans pursuant to the Retirement Equ 101-247, at 1443 (1989) . e in order "t o ansfers of interpplicable to other ty Act ." H . Rept . 32Generally, a domestic relations order q u 414(p) as a QDRO if that order (1) creates or existence of an alternate payee's right to, or alternate payee the right to, receive all or a benefits payable with respect to a participant 4l4(p) (1) (A) (i) ; (2) clearly specifies certain name and last known mailing address of the par name and mailing address of the alternate paye and (3) does not alter the amount or form of t sec . 414(p)(3) . With respect to governmenta l domestic relations order qualifies under sec . 4 that order creates or recognizes the existence payee's right, or assigns to an alternate payee receive all or a portion of the benefits payabl a participant under a plan . See sec . 414(p)(11 lifies under sec . ecognizes the assigns to an portion of the under a plan, sec . facts, such as the icipant and th e sec . 414(p)(2) ; e plan benefits, lans, however, a 14(p) as a QDRO i f f an alternate the right, t o with respect to 22 - The Circuit Court for Baltimore County issued the divorce decree involved in the instant cases on March 2, 1983 . On the record before us, we hold that section 414(p)(11) does not apply to that divorce decree . On that record, we further hold that the divorce decree involved in the instant cases does not qualify under section 414(p) as a QDRO and that Ms . Platt is not an alternate payee for purposes of section 402(a) . Accordingly, we further hold that Ms . Platt is not to be treated as a distributee under the Baltimore County pension plan of the payments to which she was entitled pursuant to the divorce decree provision in question . See sec . 402(e) (1) (A) . Based upon our examination of the entire record before us, we find that the monthly payments at issue are not deductible or excludable from Mr . Bangs' income and are not includible in Ms . Platt's income for the taxable year 2002 .3 3 We have considered all of the parties' respective conten- tions and arguments that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit, irrelevant, and/or moot . 33On brief, respondent does not advance any argument s in support of the respective determinations under sec . 6662(a) in the notice for Mr . Bangs' taxable year 2002 and in the notice for Ms . Platt's taxable year 2002 . We conclude that respondent has abandoned those determinations . Assuming arguendo that we had not concluded that respondent abandoned those respective determinations, on the record before us, we find that neither petitioners in the case at docket No . 4467-06 nor petitioners i n the case at docket No . 7221-06 are liable for the accuracyrelated penalty under sec . 6662(a) . To reflect the foregoing, - 23 - Decision will be entered for petitioners in ocket No . 4467-06 . Decision will be entered for respondent as t the deficiency and for petitioners as to the accuracy- related enalt under section 6662(a) in docket No . 7221-06 .