TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Cynthia Busche
Docket Number: 16043-10L
Judge: Gustafson
Opinion Type: memo
Filed: 12/07/2011
Pages: 34

T.C. Memo. 2011-285 UNITED STATES TAX COURT CYNTHIA BUSCHE, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 16043-10L. Filed December 7, 2011. R issued to P a not-ice of proposed levy, and P timely requested a hearing under I.R.C. sec. 6330. that request P asked for a face-to-face hearing and indicated that she desir'ed an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise, but P never made a concrete proposal of either. of proper tax withholding. As a result, R did not offer a face-to-face conference as P had requested. refused to participate in a telephone collection due process conference, and R issued to P a final notice of determination that R would sustain the proposed levy. P appealed that determination L to this Court, arguing that she was entitled to a face-to-face hearing. moved for summary judgment, and P opposed R's motion. P did not submit current evidence R In P Held: R's Office of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the proposed levy when (1) P generally requested an installment agreement but disregarded Appeals' multiple requests for a concrete proposal, and (2) P failed to supply information as to - 2 - her current compliance with tax witliholding obl igations . Cynthia Busche, pro se. David M. McCallum, for respondent. .I MEMiORANDUM OPINION GUSTAFSON, Judge This case is an ppeal by petitioner Cynthia Busche, pursuant to section 6330 d) ,1 asking this Court to review the notice of determination is ued by t he Office of Appeals ("Appeals") of the Internal Revenue Serv ce ("IRS") sustaining a proposed levy to collect Ms Busche s unpaid Federal income tax for the year 2008. The case is curre tly before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment filed August 18, 2011. Them princ1pal issue fo decisiôn is whether Appeals abused its discretion by denying Ms . Busche a face-to- face hearing. For the reasons explained below, we will grant respondent's motion. lExcept as otherwise noted, all section references are to , a d all R le references the Internal Revenue Code (26 . U. S. C. ) are to the Tax Court Rules óf Practice a d Procedure . Background The following facts are based on the documents in the record of the IRS' s hearing held pu suant to section 6330 (b) and (c) . As is discussed below, Ms . B sche did not raise any genuine issue as to these "facts. Ms . Busche ' s self -reported 200 8 liability On April 15, 2009, peti ioner Cynthia Busche timely filed a Form 1040, "U.S. Individual Incom Tax· Return", for the year 2008, on which she reported total tax liability of $11,342,. withholding credits of $4:"769, and . an unpaid balance due of $6,573. That is, the amount of t ax that the IRS proposes to collect by levy are not the esult of a deficiency determination by the IRS but rather are - as reported by Ms . Busche herself . The IRS' s initial attempts at collection The IRS assessed the ta(cid:0)541creported by Ms . Busche; and, because the balance due was npaid, the; IRS sent her in May and June 2009 notices of balance due . When Ms . Busche did not pay the balance due, the IRS sen her a "Final Notice of Intent to _. Levy and Notice of Your Righ to a Hearing" dated January 4, 2010. . Ms. Busche's request for a CDP hearing In response to that notice, Ms . Busche submitted to the' IRS, on January 20, 2010,. a Fprm 2153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing" .2 The form permits a taxpayer to indicate the nature of her collection due process ("CDP") hearing request by checking boxes selectively, b t Ms . B sche checked boxes almost indiscriminat ly. That is, she che ked not only the "Proposed Levy or Actual Levy" box (whic was appropriate, given her receipt of a notice of proposed levy but al o the "Filed Notice of Federal Tax Lien" box (as well as othe lien-related boxes, i.e., "Subordination";, "Discharge , and " ithdrawal"), even though our record shows no lien fil ng, the IRS alleges that none has ever been made, and Ms . Busche akes no allegation that she .received a notice of lien. Ms . Busc e check d the boxes indicating that she desired (cid:0)540bothan "Ins allment Agreement" and an "Offer in Compromise", though she latèr ackno ledged that "an Offer in Compromise * * * does not apply in this situation." Ms . Busche submitted her Form 12153 under a cover letter3 that included the following: 2Ms . Busche' s mailing included two similar orms 12153, one Even though it pre-dated the fina notice of of which, . dated "11-16-09", pertained tol 2008 and is at here. treated it as timely. those sheets do not appear in our record (despite the Court's invitation to Ms . Busöhe , Form 12153 (dated "8/24/20p9") pertains and is not at The form refers tö "Attac ed Sheets", but o years other than 2008 Ms . Busche ' s other flescribed belo ) . issue levy, the IRS issue here. 3The cover letter pur]¼arts to be da ed Janu ry 19, 2009, but it is clear, both from dates within the letter and from an accompanying affidavit, January 2010 . thàt the letter as actu lly composed in - 5 - On June 11, 2009, by registered mail #RA513114084US, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, AUSTIN, TX received payment, and authority to process payment ,with IRS form 56, discharge the 2008 IRS Debt of CYNTHIA L BUSCHE. evidence to the contrary. Debt UCC 3-603.W I have no evidence to the contrary. to I have no is discharged in full under the 4Ms. Busche's reference to "Form 56" apparently reflects the frivolous contention that * * * [; that] * has tricked the populace into * individual trust accounts, one for each citizen The federal government becoming U.S. citizens by entering into 'contracts' embodied in such documents as birth certificates and social security cards * secret, * implement her by the government parties with Bills of Exchange that are drawn on her trust account the remedy, can supposedly use the debt owed to [; and that one) who le"arns of and is able to the government holds the profits in to discharge her debts to third * *. * * * Bryant v. Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-759 (W.D. Va. 2007). purposes by filing "an IRS Form 56 ('Notice Concerning Fiduciary Relationship')--requesting that the Secretary remit amount] from his trust account". Gravatt v. United States, One can supposedly invoke this remedy for tax to him [an * * * Fed. Cl. (Sept. 27, 2011). 5Ms. Busche apparently invoked "UCC 3-603" on the grounds the remedy of obtaining his secret trust that "the Uniform Commercial Code ,(UCC) provides the means for a person to implement" funds from the Government, Bryant v..Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 759. Ms. Busche's home State's version of the cited provision--N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 25-3-603(b) "If tender of payment of an obligation to pay an instrument made to a person entitled to, enforce the instrument and the tender is refused, there is discharge". However, (2009)--provides: is the United States Government, as the sovereign, by such State statutes as the Uniform Commercial Code. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932); Texas Learning Technology Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 686, 693 (1991), affd. 958 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1992). [T]he only way income tax.liabilities can be settled or compromised is by * * * is not bound See (continued...) I dispute your claim of contract under 15 USC 1692g. Thus, although Ms. Busche i licitly con ended that her 2008 liability should be considered "discharg d" because of her rights to a secret trust fund, she did not, in Èer initial request for a CDP hearing, challenge the correctness of the tax liability that she had reported on her tax return, and she did not propose any specifics for an installment agreement o other collection alternative. Upon receipt of Ms. Bu¶che's request for a CDP hearing, the IRS's Office of Appeals send her an intr ductory letter dated April 15, 2010, explaining (among other hings) that such hearings take place "by: (1) telephone, (2) mail, and/or (3) personal interviews. If you prefer your hearing to be a s(...continued) following the procedures set forth in the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations thereunderf. * * * Bear v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-690, 64 T.C.M. 1432 (1992), affd. without published opinion 19 F.3d 26 (9th Cir. 1994). (CCH) 1430, What Ms. Busche cited is a provision in Title 15 of the ("Validation of Debts") United States Code, Chapter 41 ("Consumer Credit Protection"), Subchapter V ("Debt Collection Practices ). (2006) "debt collector", and Ms. Busche appears to havel assumed that the IRS is a "debt collector" for this purpose. That See id. sec. 1692a(6) include * * * debt ("The term 'debt collector' (C) any officer or employep of to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any is in the performance of his official duties"). imposes v rious requirements on a 15 U.S.C. sec. 1692g is not so. * * does not * the! United States * * * face-to-face conference at the Appeals Office closest to your residence/business address, please let us know immediately". On April 26, 2010, Ms. Busche promptly sent a.letter "demand[ing] a face-to-face onference". Appeals' requests for information and Ms. Busche's responses The Appeals Office replied by letter of April 27, 2010, in which it scheduled a telephone conference, not a face-to-face conference, for June 3, 20106-i.e., more than 5 weeks after the date of Appeals' letter. Appeals', letter explained: I have determined that an issue raised in your hearing request is: 1. 2. 3. a "specified frivolous position", the IRS in Notice 2008-14W * * *; or identified by a reason that position," but desire to delay or impede Federal administration.; or tax is not a "specified frivolous is a frivolous reason reflecting a a moral, religious, political, constitutional, conscientious; or similar objection to the imposition or payment of Federal reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws[.] taxes that 7Ms. Busche's Form 56 contention quoted above (see text (but notes 4-6 above), was not explicitly listed in Notice 2008-14, 2008-4 I.R.B. 310 (Jan. 28, 2008) the superseding Notice 2010-33, sec. III(20) and (21), 2010-17 I.R.B. 609). However, because Ms.i Busche later disclaimed her frivolous contention and Appeals did proceed to review her levy notice in a CDP hearing, we need not determine whether the "boilerplate", see Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 356, 358-359 (2011), letter of April 27, 2010, would have been sufficient to warrant non-consideration of Ms. Busche's request for a CDP hearing. is listed as frivolous in in Appeals' - 8 - Please be advised that !Appeals does not provide a face-to-face conference if the issuès you wish to discuss include frivolous issugs or issues hat Appeals considers as reflecting a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws. You will be allowed a face-to-face òonference on any legitimate issue you raised if you withdraw in writing within 30 days from the date of this letter, issues or issues reflecting a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal the frivolous tax laws. * * * * * * * To be allowed a face-to-face conference about collection alternatives, you must also have fiJed all required returns and provided all information requested in t is letter. * * * * For me to consider alternative collection methods such as an installment agreement or offer in compromise, you must provide any items list d below. filed all Federal tax returns required to be filed. Inh addition, you must have The items to be provided are: (cid:16)042 Proof of fil ng tax retur (s) for the following applicable p riods. Type of Tax: Form 1040, U.S. Return Period or Pe iods: 2009 * * * Individual income Tax (cid:16)042 Specific proposed installment agreement payment amount and payment date for consideration. * * * * * * * I cannot conside collection lalternatives at your Please send me the items listed or checked above by May 11, 2010. conference nor can I consider alterhatives during the hearing process without am enclosing the applicable forms aind a ret rn envelope for your convenience. the informaition re uested above. I li Ms. Busche responded by lett r. dated May 5, 2010, which again made no challenge to her self-reported tax liability for 2008 and stated: I wish to withdraw any so that I will be allowéd a face-to-face conference. rivolous or desire-to-delay issues, I still demand a face-to-face conference at the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA office. agree to a CDP Hearing by telephone or, by mail. I do not Ms . Busche did not provide, ith this repeated demand, the information that Appeals had requested in its letter of April 27, 2010. Appeals' second request for information Appeals therefore repli d by letter dated May 13, 2010, which stated: This is in response to our letter dated May 5, 2010 where you withdrew any frivolous or desire to delay issues. to allow a, face-tothe letter dated April 27, 2010 stated, face conference about cóllection alternatives you must also have filed all required returns and provided all requested in that letteµ. available to us, you have fi-led your-2009 .tax return with a balance due . However, you did not provide the other information requested. Based on the information As information The items to be provided are: . (cid:16)042 Your specific proposed collection alternative for consideration. (cid:16)042 If an Installment Agreement is your proposed collection alternative, please provide your specific pro sed installment agreement payment amount and pa ent date . - 10 - (cid:16)042 Proof of withholding paying compliance: Please provide proof of filing a(correct d Form W-4, Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate, with your employer to ensue the correc Federal tax is withheld from your pay. UU income Please send me the items listed or hecked above by May 25, 2010 . Collection alternatives cannot be co sidered without the information requested above nor can the face-to-face hearing be granted. provided by May 25, 2010, remain as scheduled on June 3, 2010 at 10:00 am. Central Daylight Time. Please call me for the teleplhone con erence will the informat on is not he conf rence. If all of the' determination and/ r decis on letter that If you do not participate in the co ference or respond to this letter, we issue will be based on your hearing request, any information you previously provided to this office about applicable tax periods, and the Ser ice's a ministrative f ile and records . the - Ms . Busche ' s responses Ms. Busche did not prövide the spec fics of her collection alternative . Rather, on May 25, 2010 (the date y which Appeals had asked for the införmation), Ms. Busche sent another letter, which stated: Thank you for your letter dated May 13, 201 May 17, 2010 . 2010. I received your corrëspondence on May 20, and postmarked the short suspense, I am Because of unable to respond to your letter in the timp you have given me . Three (3) working jdays is an u reasona ly short amount of time to respond considering the seriousn ss of this (3) wo king days, thre 8This request for information about withhol ing of taxes from Ms. Busche's wages was not request for information and[was presumably promp ed by Appeals' discovery that her recent 2009 return (1 ke her 2008 return at issue) reported taxes due but not withhe Ld. included in Appe 1s' prior - lle - matter. Your actions with the short suspense is causing undue delays, because I have ,to respond to each of your .correspondences. for a face-to-face hearing. confusing, causing more delays as I try to figure out your intent. no tricks and no lies. Furthermore you keep changing the rules Due to your above listed actions, ;Your rule changing is I must now demand I request an extension of respond to your letter dated May 13, 2010. to a June 3, 2010 telephonic hearing date. a mutually agreed upon face-to-face hearing at a mutually agreed upon date, time until June 25, 2010 to I do not agree I only agree to time, and location. I have a very busy schedule and want time to.this matter. take me some time. I have to do some research which will to devote the proper The letter made no challenge to Ms. Busche's self-reported tax liability for 2008. On June 3, 2010 (the.date Appeals had appointed for the telephone conference), Ms. Busche.did not call Appeals as directed in the April 27, 2010, letter. Instead, Ms. Busche sent Appeals another copy of her May 25 letter and requested a response. She did not challenge in that letter her self-reported tax liability for 2008, and she did not provide with that letter the specifics of her proposed collection alternative. On June 16, 2010, Ms. Busche sent Appeals another letter, again purporting to respond to Appeals's letter of May 13, 2010, and making demands for information from the IRS: [T]his letter is my final. response to your May 13, 2010 letter. It is not my intent to bring up frivolous issues, however the courts have determined that I cannot rely on IRS agents/personnel to provide accurate information, therefore - 12 - I am now requesting copies of along with your prerequisites for a face to face hearing. It is my understanding that face to face hearing, except for me asking for a face to face hearing. contrary. foÈ a face to face hearing. This is my 3fd request for a face to face hearing. I'believe there is no evidence to the I am now repeating my re¼uest the l¼w that requires me to go there are no reÒuirements for a In the spirit of cooperation, and whnting tÓ resolve.this matter in an expedient iway, you requested in your letter dated May 13, 2010: I am providing information that * * specific proposed collection alternative and specific proposed installment agreement payment amount and payment date has already been established on June 5, 2009 with registered mail number RA513114084US and was received by INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE on June 11, 2009. If an Offer in Compromise is your proposed collection alternative... This bullet point does not apply in this situation. Your criteria has been met, now please provide me with a proposed date and time (for a face-tþ-face hearing at the Asheville, North Carolina office. reply letter, and time for a face-to-face hearing at the Asheville, North Carolina office. I will confirm or propose an alternate date Upon receipt of your No letter of June 5, 2009, was attached to Ms. Büsche's letter of June 16, 2011; and no letter of June 5, 2009, appears in the record of this case (despitë the Court's!1invitation to Ms. Busche, described below). The transbript for Ms. Busche's 2008 income tax account shoüs that she made no payments in June 2009 (or at any other time) that could have been in conjunction with a proposaltof an installment agreement. Thus, as of the time of Ms. Busche's "final response" to Appeals, she had not provided the specifiics of a proposed - 13 - installment agreement or anyt other collection alternative, nor had she provided information about her compliance with tax withholding requirements, noï- had she made any challenge to her self-reported tax liability or 2008. Appeals' determination to proceed with collection On June 18, 2010, the Office of Appeals issued to Ms. Busche its "Notice of Determination Concerning Collection Action (s) under Section 6320 and/or 6330", ·which stated in part: The Appeals office has determined that the Notice of to Levy was appropriately issued based on applicable laws and procedures. relief to you, or even áonsider alternatives to the levy, because after you requested an appeal and a hearing was The Appeals of fered, you did not fully cooperate with us . office fully sustains the Compliance office proposed levy action. We could. not reach an agreement, extend any Intent * * * An attachment to the notice of determination stated in part: BRIEF BACKGROUND The CDP notice was for the unpaid income tax liability for your 2008 Form 1040, U.S. A review of assessed tax return was filed by you and reflected a balance due at untimely paying, penalties, and interest. the time of filing due to insufficient withholdings, the account transcript indicates that income Tax Return. Individual the self- * * * * * * * * * * Currently, data requested in the letters dated April 27, 2010 and May 13, 2010. the IRS has no record of receiving the financial * * * The letters had requested proof of withholding paying compliance and proof of 2009 Form 1040 filing compliance. * * April 27, 2010] requested your specific proposed installment For an installment agreement, the letter [of * - 14 - agreement payment amount and payment date for consideration and the completed Form 433-A with lsupporting documentation attachments. * * * * * * * * s * * today, you have not provided Òroof of{paying As of compliance, or the financial data néeded fo(cid:16)040any collection alternative or to provi:de a face-to¼face he$ring. Therefore, that the Notice of for the applicable tax period. sustained in full. the Appeals office is issuing thè determination Intent to Levy was appropriately issued The proposed levy action is * * * * * * * Verification of Legal and Procedural Requirements The requirements of applicable law or administrative procedures have been met and actions taken were appropriate under the circumstances. (cid:16)042 Assessment wás made on the applicable 2008 Form 1040 CDP notice period baSed on the return you filed, per IRC § 6201, and the notices and demand for payment address, wit in 60 days of required by verified from the accounth transcripts. the assessment, as RC § 6303. This information was letters were mailed to your last known (cid:16)042 There was a alance due when the CDP notice was issued per IRC § 6330 and § 6331(a). presently an amount due and owing. There is (cid:16)042 IRC § 6330(a) that a taxpayer be diven an oppoptunity for hearing imposes the,jrequirement 44s. Busche's request fbr a CDP heating had indicated an in both an installment agreement and an The réquest for Form 433-A, interest offer-in-compromise. Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals", conjunction with its discussion of an offer-in-compromise, and not specifically with reference to an installment agreement. purposes of this opinion we therefore overlook Ms. Busche's failure to provide Form 433-A. letter of April 27, 2010, was made in "Collection in Appeals' For [ - 15 - before -the Internal Revenue.Service can levy on the taxpayer's property. (cid:16)042 Per review of computer transcript, the CDP Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing was sent by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, also the address indicated on the CDP hearing request. to your last known address, which was . (cid:16)042 The timely reneived request for CDP Appeal was Per review of verified. the levy action has been suspended by the appropriate computer condition codes for the tax period at the computer transcript, issue. (cid:16)042 There is no offer in compromlse or installment agreement pending or currently in effect. is also no pending innocent spouse request. There (cid:16)042 There is no pending bankruptcy case, nor did you have a pending bankruptcy case at notice. was sent (11t U.S.C. § 362(a) (6)). the time the CDP (cid:16)042 This Appeals employee has had no prior involvement with this taxpayer concerning the applicable tax periods before this, CDP case. On the Form 12153, you did not challenge the existence or the amount of the self-assessed income tax liability. Tax Court proceedings On July 14, 2010, Ms. Busche filed a timely petition pursuant to section 6330(d) (1), appealing the collection determination and asking this Court to review it. Her petition argues at length that she was wrongly denied a face-to-face hearing before the Office of Appeals. On August 18, 2011, the IRS moved for summary judgment. By order served August 26, 2011, the Court ordered Ms. Busche to - 16 - file and serve a response add explained her responsibility as a non-movant responding to such a motion. On September 9, 2011, she filed a response. By'order served Séptember 28, 2011, the Court pointed out an apparent gap in Ms. Busche' opposition and ordered that she be permitted to file a supplemental response, which she then did on October 12, 2011. Discussion I. Applicable legal principles A. Summary judgment standards I Where the pertinent fadts are not iñ dispute, a party may move for summary judgment td expedite the litigation and avoid an unnecessary (and potentially expensive) trial. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988) Summary judgment may be granted where there is no genuine iss e as toy any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter pf law. Rule 121(a) and (b); see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). The party moving for summary judgment (here, the IRS) bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and factual inferences will be drawn in the manner most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (here, Mä. Busche). Dahlstrom v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 812, 821 (1985); Jácklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). Hgwever, Rule 121(d) provides: - 17 - . When a motion for summary judgment supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of such party's pleading, but such party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that genuine issue for trial. * is made and there is a * * In compliance with Rule 121(b), the IRS made and supported a showing of the facts of the case, and it was incumbent on Ms. Busche to "set forth specific facts", supported by affidavits or otherwise, to contradict the IRS's showing. B. Collection review procedure When a taxpayer fails tö pay any Federal tax liability within 10 days of notice and demand, the IRS may collect the unpaid tax by levy on the taxpayer's property, pursuant to section 6331. However, before the IRS may proceed with that levy, the.taxpayer is entitled to administrative and judicial review pursuant to section 6330.. Administrative review is carried out by way of a hearing bef.ore the. Office of Appeals pursuant to section 6330(b) and (c); and, if the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the.outcome there, she can appeal that determination to the Tax Court under section 6330(d), as Ms. Busche has done. For the CDP hearing befòre the Óffice of Appeals, the pertinent procedures are set forth in section 6330(c). First, the IRS's Appeals officer must obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or - 18 - administrative procedure have been met. Sec. 63 0(c) (1). In the case of a levy to collect ä self-reported tax liability, the basic requirements, see sec. 6331(a)., (d , for w ich Appeals must obtain verification are: the IRS's time y assessment of the liabïlity, secs. 6201(a) (1), 6501(a); thé giving to the taxpayer of notice and demand for payment of the iabilit , sec. 6303; and the giving to the taxpayer;of notice of intentio to levy and of the taxpayer's right to a hearing, secs. 6330(a) 6331(d). (We discuss below Ms. Busche's 11th-hour att mpt to aise a 1 "verification" issue.) Second, the taxpäyer may "raise at the hear ng any relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the roposed levy", including challenges to the appropriàûeness of the collect on action and l' offers of collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c) (2) (A). Ms. Busche's principal contèntion--that he shou d have gotten a face-to-face hearing for cònsideration o an ins allment agreement--pertains to that second set o issues i.e., offers of collection alternatives, and we discuss this iss e below. Additionally, the taxpayer may cont st the xistence and amount of the underlying tax liability i she di not receive a notice of deficiency and "did not otherw se have an opportunity to dispute such tax liabil!ìtý." Sec. 6330 (c) (2) (B). The liability at issue here is that which Ms. Busche self-reported on her 2008 tax return, so she'did not receive a notice of - 19, - deficiency and did not have a prior opportunity to.make such a dispute. (We'discuss below her failure to raise such a dispute before the Office of Appeals.) When the Office of Appeals issues its determination, the taxpayer may "appeal such determination to the Tax Court", pursuant to section 6330(d) (1), as Ms..Busche has done. In such an appeal, we review de novo any determination of the Office of Appeals as to the underlying liability that is properly at issue; and as to collection matters we review the determination of the Office of. Appeals for abuse of discretion--that.is, we decide. whether the determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. See Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), affd. 469 F.3d 27g (1st Cir. 2006); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176 (2000). II. Ms. Busche's arguments In Ms. Busche's opposition to the IRS's motion for summary judgment, we discern four arguments that we now address. A. Verification In her supplemental opposition to the IRS's motion, Ms. Busche raises for the first time the issue of "verification". The totality of her contentiön is as follows: The respondent has not verified that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure were met. I have no evidence to the contrary, and have yet to see evidence to the contrary from the Respondent. - 20 - As we explained above, the:Office of Appeals is required by statute to "obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or ad inistrative procedure have been met". Sec. 6330(c) (1). A taxpayer may challenge that verification in an appeal to this Court whether ör not he raised verification before the Office of Appeals. See Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197·(12008). However, Ms. Busche's verification challenge is unavailing, for three reasons. 1. Omission from Ms. Busche's petitiòn A petition commencing a CDP case in0 this Court must contain-- Clear and concise assignments of each and every error which the petitioner alleges to have been committéd in the notice of determination. of error shall be deemed to be concéded. Any issue not raised in the assignments Rule 331(b) (4). Ms. Busche's petition d d not raise lack of verification as an assignment of error, and she therefore conceded lack of verification. However, even if we take note of Ms. Busche's self-represented status and construe her pleadings broadly, the outcome does not change, as we now show. 2. Lack of "reasons for the mendmenh" If we were to find in Ms. Busche's opposition to the IRS's motion for summary judgment a latent or mplicit motion to amend her petition to raise the issue of verification,! we would then address that motion to amend under the s andards||of Rule 41(a):. - 21 - the adverse party, and leave shall be a party may amend a, pleþding only by leave of Court or by . written consent of given freely when justibe so requires. be allowed after expira ion of petition, however, which would involve conferring jurisdiction on the Court over a matter which otherwise would not come within ips jurisdiction under the petition as then on file. state the reasons for the amendment * added. A motion for leave to amend a pleading shall * *. [Emphasis No amendment. shall . the time for filing the Ms. Busche states no reasons for an amendment, and it is therefore not possible to conclude that,"justice.* * * requires" an amendment . On the contrary, apart from Ms. Busche's general statement in her.brief that ."responden has not verified", the record before us contains . nothing t suggest anything other than that verification was indeed duly obtained: Appeals' notice of determination gives a detail d account of verification of all the bas ic requirements , and Ms . Busche s IRS transcript (i . e . , a Form 4340, "Certificate of Assess ents, Payments, and Other Specified Matters") that was submitted with the IRS's motion for summary judgment confirms that those requirements were met. Ms. Busche suggests no particular defect in that verification, and a motion to amend her petition would be denied. 3. Lack of "specific facts" to dispute verification Even if verification weie deemed to be properly pleaded in this case, the IRS would still be entitled to summary judgment on the point . The IRS' s motion made and supported a showing of verification; and under Rule 121 it was therefore incumbent on - 22 - Ms. Busche "not [to] rest uÒon the mere állegations or denials of such party's pleading" but rather to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue fo trial. (Emphasis added.) This obligation was not hidden from Ms. Busche. Rather, in view of Ms. Busche's self-represented status, the Court stated in its order dated August 24, 2011-- If Ms. Busche disagrees with t e facts set out in the then Ms. The response should support the facts by attaching relevant lBusche's res onse should point out IRS's motion, the specific facts in dispute. Ms. Busche's version of documents and/or by attaching one or more a fidavits (i.e., written statements that are signed ánd sworn before a notary) or unsworn declarations that are made "under penalty of perjury" disagrees with the IRS's argument as to the law, then her response should also set out her position on the disputed legal (see 28 U.S.C. sec. 1746). If Ms. Busche issues. Ms. Busche's attention is direôted to Tax Court Rule 121 (available on the dourt's website at www.ustaxcourt.gov), which sets out filing, opposing, and resolving motions for summary judgment. the principles for * * * Notwithstanding this tutorial on summary judgment, Ms. Busche made only the most general contention--"respondent has not verified that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative procedure we e met"--and peither stated nor supported the "specific facts" that Rule 121 requires. The IRS is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the matter of verification under section 6330(c) (1). B. Face-to-face hearing - 23 - Ms. Busche's principal argument is that she was wrongly deprived of a face-to-face CDP hearing before Appeals, and she appears to contend in effect that she had an absolute right to such a hearing (rather than the telephone hearing she was offered) without regard to anything that she might have done or failed to do. As she stated in her opposition to the IRS's motion, "It is my understanding that there are no requirements for a face-to-face hearing, except for me asking for a face-to- face hearing." If Ms. Busche were right, then a taxpayer would have the unilateral power to delay collection of tax until after a face-to-face hearing, even if she had nothing to.say or propose once the hearing took place. In fact, a taxpayer does not have an absolute right to a face-to-face hearing:. Section 6330(b) (1) provides simply that a "hearing shall be held" by Appeals", and the statute does not prescribe the nature of that "hearing". As we have previously observed: the Appeals level have historically been Hearings at conducted in an informal setting. enacted section 6330 * the existing nature and function of Appeals. Nothing in section 6330 or the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to alter the nature of an Appeals hearing * * When Congress * *, Congress was fully aware of * * * *. Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41 (2000). The regulations implementing the CDP process provide as follows: - 24 - * informal in nature and do not require CDP hearings are'* * the Appeals officer or employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer's representat±ve, A CDP hearing may, but iis not required to, consist of a face-to-face meeting, dne or more w itten or oral communications between an Appeals officer or employee and the taxpayer or the taXpayer's repräsentative, or some combination thereof. face-to-face meeting. to hold * * * * * * * * * * taxpayer who presents in the CDP hearing request [A] relevant, non-frivolous reasons fortdisagreement with the proposed levy will ordinarily be offered an opportunity for a face-to-face conference at taxpayer's residence. the Appeals of ice closest to * * * A face-to-face CDP conference concerning a collection alternative, such as an installmentjagreement or an offer to compromise liability, will not be gþanted unless other taxpayers would be elisible for thejjalternative in similar circumstances. an opportunity to demodstrate eligibility for a collection alternative and to becÒme eligible for a collection alternative, conference. in all cases,ja taxpayer will be given in order to obtain a face-to-face * * * * * * Sec. 301.6330-1(d) (2), Q&A-D6 through -D8, Proced. & Admin. Regs. (26 C.F.R.) (emphasis added). We therefore address the question of whether Ms. Busche was entitled to a face-to-face hearing under this standard, and we find that.she was not. Herirequest for CDP hearing asserted a frivolous issue (i.e., the secret trust fund invoked by Form 56), which certainly did not entitle her to a face-to-face hearing. After she withdrew that frivolous argumeht, no concrete issue or proposal remained to flesh out her CDP h aring request, and her reasserted "demand" for a face-to-face hearing lacked any - 25 - justification at all. Despite explicit requests by the IRS, she failed to provide a specific proposal for an installment agreement and failed to provide information that she was eligible for such an agreement (i.e., information that she was in compliance as to withholding of tax from her wages). On that record, there was nothing to be discussed at a face-to-face hearing, so the IRS sensibly declined to schedule one. Ms. Busche alleged, in her response to the IRS's motion, that she had "provided the requested financial data" to Appeals. To support that allegation, she cited a document .(her letter of June 16, 2010) that in turn cites another document (a supposed letter of June 5, 2009) that:the Court thought might implicate a genuine issue of material fant as to whether Ms. Busche might have made a specific proposal for an installment agreement. (According to the letter of June 16, 2010, the alleged letter of June 5, 2009, provided a "specific proposed installment agreement payment amount and payment date".) However, no letter dated June 5, 2009, was attached to.her response. Because such a letter, if it had been sent, might have been material to Ms. Busche's case, the Court issued its order of September 28, 2011, which stated: Petitioner's response includes an "Attachment A" includes a letter dated June 16, 2010. letter refers to a proposal dated June 5, 2009 (received by the IRS June 11, 2009), which proposal response. letter also refers to other (The June 16; 2010, is not included with petitioner's that That - 26 - correspondence, as does a letter of June 28, 2010, included in Petitioner's "Attachment B".) that is In a reply filed September 27, 2011, t e IRS asserts that its adminisitrative file does not include a copy (at 9) of the alleged proposal of June 5, $009. Ms. Busche should carefully review the IRS's motion papers (including its;reply) and note its assertions about what Ms. Busche did and did not submit to IÈS Appeals during her collection due process hearing. Ms. Busche's obligation in opposing the IRS's motion is to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial". 121(d).) Her presentation may fall short if she fails to submit include in our court record any documents that she relies on but that are not yet the documents she relies on. To enable her to (Rule in our record, it is ORDERED that, no later than October 12, 2011, petitioner Cynthia Busche may, supplement may include any documedts, not yet submitted, on which she intends to rely to oppose the IRS's motion (including, she wishes, her proposal of June 5, 2009). to her response to the IRS's motion in which she if she wishes, file a if Ms. Busche did file a supplement to her response, but that supplement makes no mention of, and did not attach, a letter of June 5, 2009, or any other document. Consequently, as our rëcord now stañds, Ms. Busche still has not--despite the Court's ex licit invita ion--described specific installment agreement terms that she claims to have proposed to Appeals during her CDP hearing. She has implicitly alleged that she proposed such terms to other IRS personnel in June 2009, but has not actually made a showing that she did so at any time. The IRS has asserted, and its record shows, hat Ms. Busche did not propose specific terms. Under Rule 121, Ms. Busche was, again, obliged "not [to) rest upon the mere allegations or denials of - 27 - such party's pleading" but .rather to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." (Emphasis added. ) Since she did not do so, we conclude for purposes of the IRS's motion that Ms. Busche, did not propose installment agreement terms to Appeals and was therefore not entitled to a face-to-face hearing to discuss an installment agreement that she did not propose . Where a taxpayer proposes a collection alternative such as an installment agreement, the hearing (whether face-to-face or by telephone) 1s a means for Appeals to consider the proposal. Where denial of a face-to-face hearing would impede adequate consideration of a collection alternative, then that denial might itself be .an abuse of discretion. However., the ultimate question is not whether a face-to-face hearing was held but whether Appeals abused its discretion by .not agreeing to a collection alternative.. That is not how Ms. Busche frames the issue, but that is in fact the real issue. We find that Appeals did not abuse its discretion, for two reasons that are obvious in what we have already said: First, it was not an abuse of discretion for Appeals to reject collection alternatives when Ms. Busche had proposed none. See Cavazos v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. 2008-257 (citing Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69, 79 (2005)); see also Nelson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.(cid:16)0412009-108 (Appeals did not - 28 - abuse its discretion in suÅtaining a lie when a taxpayer requested an·OIC generally but had not p epared öne). Second, it was not an[abuse of disc etion f r Appeals to consider Ms. Busche ineligible for an in tallmen agreement on the ground of her failure to show compli nce wit current withholding obligations. See Giamelli v Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 111-112 (2007). It appears that fo the yeÅr at issue (2008) Ms. Busche's liability was underp id beca se her income tax-withholding was inadeq¼ate. When du ing the CDP process Appeals obtained her return for the next year (2 09), it saw that her self reported liability was again un erpaid ecause of inadequate withholding. Lest Ms". Busche continu to fall further and further behind, Appeals had a legiti ate int rest in assuring that her withholding be adeduate on a going-forw rd basis. Ms. Busche failed to provide the informa ion tha could grant that assurance and thereby rendered hers lf inel gible for an installment agreement. Appeals did not åbuse it discretion in declining to enter into an installment a reement with her. C. Underlying liabilïty In her supplemental opposition to t e IRS's motion, Ms. Busche raises·for4the first time the issue o her underlying liability for the tax that- íFs the subjec of the proposed levy. The totality of her contention is as follows: Since Petitioner was þot granted th reques ed face to face collection due process hearing (CDPH). [Sic.] Petitioner - 29c - was not give a chance to dispute the Respondents alleged 2008 tax liability. Therefore, since a Notice of Determination was mailed, thereafter was to request Petitioner's rights to ä face to face CDPH. which requires the Petitionef to challenge the existence or the amount of the self-assessed income tax liability prior to a face to face CDPH. the Petitioner's only option the Tax Court hearing, to enforce There is no law * * * On the contrary, the regulations implementing the CDP process provide: "A face-to:-face conference need not be granted if the taxpayer does not provide the required information set forth in A-Cl(ii) (E) of paragraph (c).(2)", sec. 301.6330-1(d) (2),, Q&A-D8, Proced. & Admin. Regs. (26 C;F.R.), and the cross-referenced provision requires that the taxpayer must state "The reason or reasons why the taxpayer disagree with the proposed levy", ill._ par. (c) (2), Q&A-Cl(ii) (E). A CDP petitioner may certainly dispute even a liability that she self-reported on her own return, see Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 1, 8-9 (2004); but Appeals can hardly be expected to intuit that the taxpayer might now disagree with herself. Rather, the taxpayer must raise with Appeals the issue of underlying liability. Under the regime described in the regulations, a face-to-face hearing may be granted only upon a showing that there is something to be accomplished at a face-to- face hearing. The regulation requires that, before a hearing will be granted, the taxpayer must state the "reasons" she disagrees with the levy (which reasons might include a contention that she does not owe the tax). A taxpayer may not hide her - 30 - contentions, demand a faceLto-face heariñg witho t justification, and then disclose her contentions only if and after the IRS capitulates to her demand. r Consistent with the regulation, the Office of Appeals informed Ms. Busche in its letter of April 27, 2Ô11: To be allowed a face-to-face confer nce abo t collection alternatives, you must also have fi ed all equired returns and provided all information reques ed in this letter. During the hearing, collection alternatives, appropriateness of collection actioh", and spousal defenses] . " [c] hallenge s to t e * . I must consider * * [ erification, * - * , * * * (! * (cid:16)042 We may also consider whether you bwe the amount due, but only if you did ot rece ve a statutory notice of deficiency or have not ptherwise had an opportunity to dispute yoùr liability with Appeals . the: determination and/ r decision letter that If you do not participate in the cohference or respond to this letter, we issue will be" based on your hear ng requ st, any information you previously provided to this office about applicable tax periods, and the Ser ice's a ministrative f ile and records . the None of Ms. Busche's submissions to Appe ls chal _enged the liability. She failed to justify a face to-face hearing and refused to participate in a telephone he ring. Appeals therefore based its determination onì the informatibn availhble to it, which did not include any challencje to underlying liability. We therefore now review a determination that did .not address ,and could not have addressed undérlying liability. As we explained in Giamèlli v. Commissioner, 129 T. C. at 112 - 113 : Section 6330 (c) (2) (B) pêrmits a taxpayer to "raise at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of underlying tax liability" under certain circumstances.., The statute [i.e., section 6330 (c) (3)] contemplates consideration of hearing. it cannot be a part of * if an issue is never raised at the hearing, he Appeals of f icer' s determination issues "raised" by the taxpayer at the the Thus, * * --and our jurisdiction under section 6330 (d) (1) to review a "determination" does not ext nd to issues that were not so raised and that are therefore outsi e any such determination. Underlying liability is theréfore not properly before us in this case. Moreover, as with the issue of verification, see supra part I I . A, Ms . Bus che ' s chal enge of underlying liabili ty would fail for the additional reasóns (1) that she did not plead in her petition that her liability is less than was assumed in the proposed levy (and she provides no warrant for allowing. an amendment to her petition to add such a contention) and (2) that in opposing the IRS' s motion for summary judgment, she did not assert or support "specific acts" to show a lesser liability. We therefore do not entertain her vague assertion about an unelaborated dispute as to hèr 2008 income tax liability. I. - 32 - D. The IRS's supposed failure to provide information In Ms. Busche's "final response" letter to Appeals, she stated: "I am now requesting copies of the law (cid:16)041hatrequires me to go along with your prerequisites for a face to face hearing." In her supplemental response to the IRS's motion, she argues: "If Petitioner is required to respond to any and all letters from respondent in a timely fashion then Respöndent is required to do likewise"; and since Appeals did not give her the requested copies, she argues that its determination was therefore "premature" (so that, she says, we should deny the IRS's motion for summary judgment). We assume, for purposes of the IRS's motion, that there could be circumstances in which Appeals' failure to answer questions could disable a taxpayer from participating meaningfully in the CDP process, so that the notice of determination might reflect an abuse of discretion. However, that is not the case here. Ms. Busche in effect posits a symmetry between Appeals and the taxpayer ("If Petitioner is required * * * then Respondent is required")--a symmetry that the law does not actually provide. A CDP petitioner is, by definition, a taxpayer with an assessed liability who has received a notice and demand, has not paid the liability, and has been served with a collection!notice. The IRS, on the other hand, is the agency authorized and required by law to collect that liability. By filing a CDP hearing request, the taxpayer asks Appeals to inte rupt that collection process; and to evaluate such a request, Appeals needs . information that it can most reasonably get from the taxpayer. Given that dynamic, the system imposes on the takpaye certain burdens that she must meet in order to justify the interruption of collection activity that she has requested. The IRS ïs not without burdens of its own, but the IRS's burdens are thòse imposed on it by statute, as discussed above, not additio al burdens imposed by the taxpayer. The CDP taxpayer does not ha e the prerogative to add to the IRS's obligations and to suspend the CDP process (and thereby to suspend collection of tax) uhtil the IRS has satisfied her demands. Rather, the taxpay r has the rights conferred on her by statute; the IRS has the dut .es 1mposed on it by statute; and the Tax Court will enforce those rights and duties by applying the statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder. We hold that, in deciding whether Ms. Busche qualified for a face-to-face hearing, the IRS was not obl ged to cite chapter and verse to Ms . Busche . onclusion On.the record before us, we cannot hold that the decision of the Office of Appeals to sustain the proposed levy was .arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. As a result, we conclude that the Office f Ap eals did not abuse its II - 34 - discretion, and we hold that respondent s entit ed to the entry of ,a decision sustaining the determinati n as a rpatter of law. To reflect the foregoing, . An appropriate order and decision will be entered. El