TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Green Sustainable Packaging, Inc.
Docket Number: 23692-15L
Judge: Nega
Opinion Type: bench
Filed: 12/21/2017
Pages: 21

UNITED STATES TAX COURT WASHINGTON, DC 20217 GREEN SUSTAINABLE PACKAGING, INC., Petitioner, v. ) ) ) ) Docket No. 23692-15 L. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent ) ) ) ORDER Pursuant to Rule 152(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit to petitioner and to respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the proceedings in the above case before Judge Joseph W. Nega at Chicago, Illinois, on October 23, 2017, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the trial session at which the case was heard. In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, decision will be entered for respondent. (Signed) Joseph W. Nega Judge Dated: Washington, D.C. December 21, 2017 SERVED Dec 21 2017 Bench Opinion by Judge Joseph W. Nega October 23, 2017 Green Sustainable Packaging, Inc. v. Commissioner Docket No. 23692-15L 3 THE COURT: The Court has decided to render the following as its oral findings of fact and opinion in this casey and the following represents the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion. In this Bench Opinion, unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. This Bench Opinion is rendered pursuant to section 7459(b) and Rule 152, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Timothy J. Edmier and Mitchell B. Goldberg appeared on behalf of petitioner. Jay Adams and Michael T. Shelton appeared on behalf of respondent. This case arises from a petition filed in response to respondent's Notice of Determination 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Concerning Collection Action(s) under section 6320 and/or 22 6330, dated August 20, 2015 (notice of determination), 23 which sustained the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. 24 We must decide whether to sustain the 25 determinations in the notice of determination. 973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net%ww.escnbers.net FINDINGS OF FACT 4 This case was tried on October 19, 201 in (3W Chicago, Illinois. A Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner's principal place of business was in the State of Illinois at the time it filed the petition. On May 20, 2009, petitioner, Green Sustainable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Packaging, Inc. (GSP), was incorporated in Illinois. At 11 all relevant times, James Fowler (Mr. Fowler) was 12 petitioner's sole shareholder and chief executive officer 13 14 (CEO). At all relevant times, petitioner was required to report its income and expenses annually on Form 1120, U.S. 15 Corporate Income Tax Return (Form 1120). 16 17 18 Petitioner's Form 1120 for tax year 2011 (2011 return) was originally due on March 15, 2012. At a time not established by the record, petitioner filed for and 19 was granted an extension with respect to its 2011 return 20 which provided petitioner until September 15, 201 CTWd to file A 21 22 its 2011 return. On November 8, 2012, the acting United States 23 Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois filed a 24 two-count information (information) in the U.S. District 25 Court of Northern District of Illinois (U.S. District BEEEI 973)406-2250loperations@escribers.net|www.escnbeisnet 5 Court) against Mr. Fowler. Specifically, that information alleged that Mr. Fowler was the President, Secretary, and sole shareholder of Rideau Packagin (F deau), an S Corporation incorporated in Illinois, that was required to file, at all relevant times, Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation (Form 1120S), for each of its tax years. Thus, the ordinary income and losses of Rideau flowed through, and was reported on Mr. Fowler's Form 1040, U.S. Individual A Income Tax Return (Form 1040). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 The information, however, alleged that Mr. 11 Fowler received income from Rideau, both in the form of 12 cash distributions and in payments for personal expenses, 13 which he did not report on his Forms 1040 for tax years 14 2005 and 2006, but rather, improperly characterized as 15 deductible business expenses on Rideau's Forms 1120S. 16 Accordingly, the information charged Mr. Fowler with one 17 18 19 20 21 count of attempt to evade or defeat tax in violation of section 7201 for tax year 2005, and one count of willful failure to file a return in violation of section 7203 for tax year 2006. On November 20, 2012, Mr. Fowler pleaded guilty 22 to thpde charges. On May 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court 23 sentenced Mr. Fowler to three years of probation, one year 24 of community confinement with work release, and ordered 25 Mr. Fowler to pay a fine in the amount of $350,000 and BEEIR 73)406-2250|operations@escribersmet|vmw.escnbersnet 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 restitution in the amount of $336,511. On June 4, 2013, petitioner filed its 2011 return. On October 7, 2014, respondent filed a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL) against petitioner for, inter alia, petitioner's tax year 201 and sent to petitioner a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under Section 6320, with respect to its unpaid Federal income tax liabilities, additions to tax, and interest for that tax year. On October 22, 2014, respondent received 12 petitioner's timely filed Form 12153, Request for a 13 Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing (Form 12153). 14 15 In that form, petitioner requested an equivalent hearing if its request for a collection due process hearing (CDP) 16 did not meet the requirements for a timely CDP hearing. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 In the Form 12153, petitioner also requested that the lien be withdrawn because: e 941 tax liability/penalties have been paid in full. As to the 2011 1120 liabilities, which consists sole [sic] of penalties and interest, Taxpayer has had a claim for abatement,fer such penalties pending since April 30, 2014. I have attached a copy of such abatement for penalties based on 973)406-2250|operations esailers.net j www.escribersnet 7 1 2 reasonable cause for your reference.' On December 22, 2014, respondent's Appeals 3 Office (Appeals Office) sent to petitioner a letter 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 informing petitioner that it had received petitioner's case for consideration. On January 5, 2015, the Appeals Office's Settlement Officer Amy C. Atterberry (SO Atterberry) sent to petitioner a letter (January 5, 2015 letter) informing petitioner that their telephone conference would take place on January 29, 2015. In that letter, SO Atterberry also informed petitioner (1) to send any additional 12 information to support petitioner's assertion that the 13 penalties should be removed from phe account and (2) to 14 15 16 submit Form 12277, Application for Withdrawal of Filed Form 668(Y)(c), Notice of Federal Tax Lien. On April 16, 2015, SO Atterberry sent to 17 petitioner a letter informing petitioner that petitioner 18 had missed the previously scheduled telephone conferenc 19 and that SO Atterberry had never received the information 20 that she had requested from petitioner in the January 5, 21 2015 letter. That letter provided petitioner with an 22 additional 14 days to submit the previously requested 23 24 25 information. On April 22, 2015, Timothy J. Edmier (petitioner's counsel) sent to SO Atterberry a letter in 973)406-2250|operations®escribers.net|vmw.escnbersnet 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 which petitioner's counsel stated that he had never received the January 5, 2015 letter and requested that SO Atterberry send him another copy of that letter so that he could gather the requested information. On April 30, 2015, SO Atterberry spoke with petitioner's counsel. At the conclusion of that call, SO Atterberry informed petitioner's counsel that they had not reached an agreement, she believed no reasonable cause existed, and that Appeals found only minimal hazards of 10 litigation existed; therefore, no settlement agreement 11 would be offered. Petitioner's counsel was also informed 12 13 14 that the request for withdrawal of the NFTL was denied as no application or verification was submitted. On May 11, 2015, petitioner's counsel sent to SO 15 Atterberry a letter in which petitioner's counsel (1) 16 claimed "[t]he reason for not filing such tax returns was 17 18 that Taxpayer's tax professionals wanted to wait until A the current audit was completed" and (2) cited what he claimed 19 to be a summary of the relevant Seventh Circuit case law 20 on the issue of petitioner's request for abatement of 21 penalties that was before SO Atterberry. That day, 22 petitioner's counsel also sent a supplemental letter to 23 the first letter in which petitioner's counsel stated his 24 version of the timeline and background on the issue 25 relevant to petitioner's case. BEEE 973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net{www.escribers.net On May 12, 2015, SO Atterberry held a follow-up 9 conference with petitioner's counsel. During that conference, petitioner's counsel stated that he believed petitioner's actions post-audit showed compliance as he quickly filed the missing returns and paid the outstanding tax liabilities. Therefore, petitioner's counsel stated that the Appeals Office should concede the failure to file penalt or consider a settlement based on hazards of A litigation. In response, SO Atterberry stated that there 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 was no Seventh Circuit case law supporting petitioner's 11 position, and that, in her view, petitioner was aware of 12 13 the filing deadline, but based on advice he had received, chose not to file. SO Atterberry also informed 14 petitioner's counsel that the failure to file and failure 15 to pay penalties were appropriatey 1 abating these 16 penalties did not meet the criteria for abatement. 17 On August 20, 2015, the Appeals Office issued to 18 petitioner a notice of determination. In that notice, the 19 Appeals Office found that petitioner (1) did not meet the 20 criteria for the withdrawal of the NFTL; (2) did not meet 21 22 the criteria to qualify for removal of the penalties based on reasonable cause; and (3) did not qualify for abatement 23 of interest. 24 von September 18, 2015, petitioner filed hi 25 petition with this Court. 1973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|vmwæscribers.net OPINION 10 I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review Sections 6320 and 6330 require the Commissioner to notify a taxpayer if he has filed a lien or intends to levy on that taxpayer's property. The notice must inform the taxpayer of his or her right to a CDP hearing regarding the filing of a lien or proposed collection action. Se ions 6330(a), 6320(a). In a CDP hearing taxpayers may raise any relevant issue or request the A consideration of a collection alternative. Sec 6330(c)(2) (A). Taxpayers may not challenge the existence A or the amount of underlying tax liability unless they did not otherwise have an opportunity to do so. Section 6330(c)(2) (B). Once the Commissioner issues a notice of determination at the conclusion of the CDP hearing, the taxpayer may seek judicial review by filing a petition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 with this Court. Se (d) . A 18 When the underlying tax liability was properly 19 at issue in the CDP hearing, we review the Commissioner's 20 determination de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 21 604, 610 (2000). Respondent concedes that petitioner is 22 entitled to challenge its underlying liabilities for the 23 additions to tax de novo. Accordingly, we review 24 petitioner's liabilities de novo. 25 Petitioner concedes it failed to file timely. 73)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|www.escnbersnet 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Petitioner maintains its failure was due to reasonable cause and believes the assessed additions to tax are inappropriate. Petitioner bears the burden of proving reasonable cause and establishing that the additions to tax are inappropriate. See Rule 142(a); Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 447 (2001). Petitioner also bears the burden of proof in establishing that respondent abused respondent's discretion in determining (1) not to abate under section 6404 (e) (1) (A) the interest remaining 10 at issue that respondent assessed with respect to 11 petitioner's tax year 2011 and (2) not to withdraw the 12 NFTL. See Rule 142 (a) ; sec 4 (h) ; Lee v. 13 Commissioner, 113 T.C. 145, 149 (1999); Goza v. 14 Commissioner, 114 T. C. 176, 181-182 (2000) ; Giamelli v. 15 Commissioner, 129 T. C. 107, 111 (2007) . 16 II. Section 6651(a)(1) Addition to Tax: Failure to File 17 18 Section 6651(a)(1) imposes upon taxpayers an 19 addition to tax for failure to file a timely return. 20 21 The addition to tax will not apply if the taxpayer shows its failure was due to reasonable cause, not 22 willful neglect. A taxpayer demonstrates Üb 23 reasonable cause when it shows that, despite exercising 24 ordinary business care and prudence, it was unable to 25 file the return on time. Se i,M 301.6651-1(c) (1), ' 52E|||| (973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|v.ww.escobeis.net 12 Proce & Adminiettati,m'1 Regulation The obligation to file timely is the taxpayer's, unambiguous and nondelegable, and reliance on an agent generally will not amount to a reasonable cause for untimely filing. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249-252 (1985). Taxpayers bear a heavy burden when attempting to prove reasonable cause for failure to file timely. Id. at 245; see Boles Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 77 F.3d 236, 241 (8th Cir. 1996). Petitioner concedes it failed to file a timely return for its tax year 2011. Petitioner argues, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 however, that it had reasonable cause because it was 13 disabled from filing its return because Mr. Fowler, who 14 relied upon the advice of his own counsel, Bradley 15 Williams, was told not to file his personal return and 16 petitioner's 2011 return until the completion of Mr. 17 Fowler's personal audit. (We shall refer to Mr. 18 Fowler's counsel from the personal audit/criminal 19 investigation, Bradley Williams, as "Mr. Fowler's 20 21 counsel" or "his own counsel".) A Petitioner was by no means disabled from 22 ensuring it was meeting its statutory duties.1 It was 23 24 1 In support of its contention that it was disabled by the 5 actions of Mr. Fowler, petitioner cites In ref American 73)406-2250|operations escribers.netlwww.escr:bers.net 13 not rendered incapable of filing by a series of factors largely beyond its control. See Boyle, 469 U.S. at 248 n.6. Petitioner's failure to file timely resulted from Mr. Fowler's decision to follow the advice of his attorneys who believed it was in his personal interest to postpone fi ing petitioner's 2011 return until the completion of Mr. Fowler's personal audit. Such advice is not reasonable in a situation as the one before this Court. As this Court has previously stated: "While a taxpayer who has relied upon an expert's advice that he is not legally obligated to file a return may have satisfied the 'reasonable cause' requirement, reliance upon an expert is not -reasonable in situations in which the taxpayer is advised that a return is due but he should not file. Advising a taxpayer to delay filing due to a pending criminal investigation is not substantive tax (continued) 1Biomaterials Corp., 954 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1992). We note that we are not bound by the decision of the Third Circuit with respect to the case at issue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Moreover, that case is factually distinguishable from the 25 one at hand. 73)406-2250lcçerations©escritwrs.netlwww.escnbers.net advice but a tactical maneuver." 14 Lilley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-602, aff'd without published opinion, 925 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Geddis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-191, 2005 WL 2078495, at *5 ("A pending criminal investigation does not constitute reasonable cause for failing to file a tax return when due."). In this case, Mr. Fowler, as petitioner's sole owner and CEO, was aware of petitioner's tax filing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 obligation. He also understood that his attorneys' advice 11 was not that petitioner was not legally required to file 12 petitioner's 2011 return, but that filing petitioner's 13 14 2011 return may have caused adverse consequences with respect to Mr. Fowler's personal audit.2 Lilley v. 15 Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1989-602 ("Taxpayers are not 16 excused from filing a delinquent return because they fear 17 18 2 At trial Mr. Fowler testified that he did not file 19 petitioner's 2011 return because he was worried about the 20 possible adverse consequences with respect to the pending 21 22 criminal investigation. He further testified that he is and was unsure of the distinction, if any, between WE 23 attorneys ' advice being for himself or for hie tioner. 24 Mr. Fowler did testify that the attorneys were engaged 25 only with respect to Mr. Fowler's criminal investigation. BEEE $73)406-2250loperations@escriEers.net|www.escnbers.net 15 that doing so might prejudice them in other litigation."). On the record before us, we find that petitioner was fully aware of its obligation to file its 2011 return, and his failure to file timely was "willful neglect" as he purposely waited until 2013 to file it to avoid possible adverse consequences with respect to Mr. Fowler's personal audit. On the record before us, we further find petitioner did not have reasonable cause for failure to timely file. On that record, we sustain respondent's determination as to the section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 III. Section 6651(a)(2) Addition to Tax: Failure to 13 Timely Pay 14 Section 6651(a)(2) imposes upon a taxpayer an 15 addition to tax for failing to pay taxes when due. Like 16 the addition for failure to file timely, this addition 17 will not be applied if the taxpayer establishes 18 reasonable cause for its failure. Se 51(a) (2). 19 To show reasonable cause, the taxpayer must have 20 exercised ordinary business care and prudence in making 21 adequate provisions for its reasonably foreseeable tax 22 obligations and have taken the appropriate and prudent. 23 24 25 steps necessary to ensure compliance therei6 A Section 301.6651-1(c) (1) , Proce ±µ=e Admin. Regs. As before, petitioner's reasonable cause 73)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|www.escnbers.net 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 argument takes the shape of reliance because it argues that it was disabled from filing its return because Mr. Fowler who, relying upon the advice of his own counsel, was told not to file his own personal return and petitioner's 2011 return until the completion of Mr. Fowler's personal audit. And as before, reliance on that advice does not constitute reasonable cause where that attorney's advice was not that petitioner was not legally required to file petitioner's 2011 return, but 10 that filing petitioner's 2011 return may have caused 11 adverse consequences with respect to Mr. Fowler's 12 personal audit. 13 14 Petitioner, however, also argues reasonable cause because it claims that Mr. Fowler and his advisors 15 mistakenly believed that petitioner was an S Corporation. 16 In support of that position, petitioner relies on the 17 18 testimony of Mr. Fowler and Tom Perez (Mr. Perez) , the accountant who prepared petitioner's 2011 return after Mr. 19 Fowler's personal audit was completed. We note that 20 petitioner did not provide any documentary evidence in 21 22 23 support of its position. With respect to Mr. Fowler's and Mr. Perez's testimony, we found their testimony to be in certain 24 material respects uncorroborated and inadequate to meet 25 petitioner's burden of proof. We shall not rely o lhEEEE 73)406-2250|operations@escribertnet|wwytesenbeitnet 17 1 2 3 4 5 their testimony to establish petitioner's position that petitioner had reasonable cause for failure to pay its tax liability for its tax year 2011. See, e.g., Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). At trial/Mr. Fowler testified that his counsel 6 mistakenly believed that petitioner was an S Corporation 7 8 9 10 11 and that, as a result, they believed the maximum late filing penalty imposed would be $2,340 per tax year. Mr. Fowler's testimony implied that had his counsel been aware of the fact that petitioner was not an S Corporation, and that their failure to file penalty would have been much 12 greater than $2,340, then his counsel may not have advised 13 Mr. Fowler not to file his own return or petitioner's 2011 return.3 Accordingly, it appears in such a 14 15 3 In faCt, petitioner admits as much in petitioner's response to respondent's motion for partial summary 8 judgment, titioner states: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The erroneous impression held by GSP's tax counsel that it was an S Corposetéea where any return filed by a shareholder would be treated as a return filed by the corporation, would have affected the nature of advice given to Jim [Fowler's] tax professionals that he not file his 2011 personal or corporate i.e., Pªtiti°°°r'³ 2°¹¹ r°tªr") °* r®tªr"³ 15EIEE ,9733406-2250|operations@escribersnet|www.escribers.net 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 situation, Mr. Fowler would have filed petitioner's 2011 return to avoid being faced with the much larger failure to pay addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2) that petitioner faces today. We note that not only does this argument directly conflict with petitioner's early'argument that it was "disabled" due to Mr. Fowler's actions as it appears Mr. Fowler's actions would have changed (i.e., filed petitioner's 2011 return), but it also does not help petitioner establish its burden of proof with respect to reasonable cause. On the record before us, we find that 12 petitioner did not have reasonable cause for failing to 13 timely pay the amount shown on its 2011 return. On 14 15 16 17 that record, we sustain respondent's determination as to section 6651(a)(2) additions to tax. A (jWN IV. Section 6404(e): Interest Abatement The Commissioner's power to abate an assessment 18 of interest involves exercise of discretion, and we A 19 shall give due deference to the Commissioner. 20 Interest on tax liabilities arises 21 automatically under section 6601, and the SO determined 22 23 that the interest on petitioner's 2011 tax liabilities had been properly assessed. Section 6404(e)(1) 24 authorized respondent to abate assessed interest that 25 is attributable to "any unreasonable error or delay by (973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net j w.vnescribers.net 19 1 an officer or employee of the [IRS]./fin performing a 2 ministerial or managerial act." A managerial act is 3 4 5 "an administrative act--minvolving the temporary or permanent loss of records...management of personnel." Se 1.6404-2(b) (1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. A 6 ministerial act is a "procedural or mechanical act that 7 8 9 does not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion." Id. subpara (2). Actions relevant to "decision concerning the proper application of 10 federal tax law" do not constitute "managerial" or 11 "ministerial" acts. Id. subpar (1) and (2); see 12 Sandberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-72 (holding 13 that the decision whether to subordinate a Federal tax 14 lien is not a ministerial act); Hawksley v. 15 Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-354 (stating that a 16 determination, whether or not correct, of Federal tax 17 18 liabilities is not a ministerial act). Petitioner did not identify, during the CDP 19 process or in this Court, any unreasonable error or 20 delay by any IRS officer or employee in performing any 21 ministerial or management act. 22 On the record before us, we find that 23 petitioner failed to carry its burden of establishing 24 that the interest remaining at issue is attributable in 25 whole or in part to any error or delay by an officer or MElB (973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|w.vw.escnbers.net 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 employee of the IRS, acting in his or her official capacity, in performing a ministerial act. On the record before us, we further find that petitioner has failed to carry its burden of establishing that respondent abused respondent's discretion in determining not to abate under section 6404 (e)(1) (A) the interest remaining at issue that respondent assessed with respect to petitioner's tax year 2011. On that record, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner did not qualify for abatement of interest. 12 V. Section 6323(j): Withdrawal of Notice of Federal Tax Lien 13 14 In Form 12153, petitioner also requested I 15 withdrawal of the NFTL. Petitioner, however, failed to 16 submit the required Form 12277, Application for 17 Withdrawal of Filing Form Notice of Fede 1 18 19 Tax Lien, nor did petitioner present any substantive arguments with respect to this withdrawal during its 20 CDP hearing or at trial. 21 Pursuant to section 6323(j), an NFTL may be 22 withdrawn without full payment and without prejudice 23 24 under the following conditions: (1) the filing of the NFTL was premature or otherwise not in accordance with 25 administrative procedures of the IRS; (2) the taxpayer 973)406-2250|operations@escribers.net|www.escnbersnet 21 1 2 3 4 had entered into an installment agreement under section 6159 to satisfy the tax liability for which the NFTL was imposed by means of installment payments, unless such agreement provides otherwise; (3) withdrawal of the NFTL 5 will facilitate collection of the tax liability; or (4) 6 7 8 9 with the consent of the taxpayer or the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), the withdrawal of such notice would be in the best interests of the taxpayer (determined by the NTA or the taxpayer) and United States. See Skidmore v. 10 Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-328; sec°4èeÑ 301.6323(j)-1, 11 Proced. & Admin. Regs. Even when the taxpayer has shown 12 that the withdrawal of the NFTL will facilitate collection 13 of the tax liability, withdrawal of the NFTL is 14 permissive, not mandatory. Sec 23 ( j) ; Berkery 15 Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-57. 16 17 18 It is clear from our review of the record that SO Atterberry verified the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedures were followed, properly 19 considered the issues petitioner raised during the CDP 20 21 22 23 hearing, and properly balanced the need for efficient collection of taxes with petitioner's legitimate concern that collection action may be no more intrusive than necessary. An SO's decision to decline to withdraw an 24 NFTL is discretionary, and none of the circumstances 25 permitting withdrawal are present in this case. See MEE 73) 406-2250 j operations©escribers.net | www.escribers a et 22 Kyereme v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-174; Crisan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-67; see also sect 301.6323(j)-l(c), Proced. & Admin. Regs. On the record before us, we sustain Ú\/d respondent's determination that the filing of the NFTL was appropriate. On that record, we sustain respondent's determination that petitioner did not qualify for withdrawal of the NFTL. VI. Conclusion Accordingly, a decision will be entered for respondent. This concludes the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion in this case. In reaching our holdings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 herein, we have considered all arguments made by the 14 parties, and to the extent not mentioned above, find those 15 arguments moot, irrelevant, out merit. That's the end of the Bench Opinion. We are adjourned in Chicago. (Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 BEEE 73)406-2250|operations@escr frers.net j wwwescribers.net