TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Paul M. Daugerdas
Docket Number: 7350-20L
Judge: Goeke
Opinion Type: bench
Filed: 10/09/2024
Pages: 24

Paul M. Daugerdas, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent United States Tax Court Washington, DC 20217 Docket No. 7350-20L. ORDER Pursuant to Rule 152(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit herewith to petitioner and to the Commissioner a copy of the pages of the transcript of the hearing in this case before Judge Joseph Robert Goeke at Chicago, Illinois containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the trial session at which this case was heard. In accordance with the oral findings of fact and opinion, an appropriate order will be issued. (Signed) Joseph Robert Goeke Judge Served 10/09/24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Bench Opinion by Judge Joseph Robert Goeke 3 September 27, 2024 Paul M. Daugerdas v. Commissioner Docket No. 7350-20L THE COURT: The Court has decided to render oral findings of fact and opinion in this case. And the following represents the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion. The oral findings of fact and opinion shall not be relied upon as precedent in any other case. This opinion is rendered pursuant to Rule 152 and the Internal Revenue Code section 7459(b). Hereinafter, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code. And rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and 14 Procedure. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Pending before the Court in this collection due process case is Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on July 19th, 2024. The issues for summary adjudication are whether to sustain the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, whether to sustain a Notice of Intent to Levy, and whether to sustain Respondent's determination that Petitioner is not entitled to an installment agreement. Petitioner is currently in the Federal criminal justice system, and is in home confinement in Wilmette, Illinois. We sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing herein for the reasons explained. And also for the reasons explained herein, we do not sustain the 4 proposed levy. We further hold that Petitioner is not entitled to the installment agreement. We begin with a discussion of the background and facts of this case. Petitioner's underlying tax liability arises from court-ordered criminal restitution in an order issued by the Southern District Court of New York, number 1:09-cr-00581. The order of October 2013 provided the June 2014 JRG details of Petitioner's conviction, and required that he make restitution payments as a result of that conviction. His restitution was described by the District Court to be in monthly installments of ten percent of his gross monthly income over a period of supervision, to commence 30 days after his release from incarceration. We have previously held that the provision of the restitution order, that delayed payment until his release, does not preclude Respondent from assessing the ordered restitution, nor from filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. See our order of January 10th, 2022. Accordingly, we sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing in that January 10th, 2022 order. In the remand of this case, which followed our order of January 10th, 2022, the parties reconsidered the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing. And therefore, we will discuss that in this opinion, despite the fact that we 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 previously upheld the filing in our prior order. In the 5 January 10th, 2022 order, we remanded this case to the IRS Independent Office of Appeals to consider the findings of the District Court of the Southern District of New York regarding Petitioner's ability to pay the restitution amount. The restitution is before this Court based upon the analysis in the Internal Revenue Code, which allows Respondent to collect restitution based upon income tax or other tax liabilities. It is not contested that this restitution is properly the subject of a collection action in this Court under section 6330. However, Petitioner previously argued that the restitution should not properly be considered under section 6330. And that argument was addressed in our order of January 10th, 2022, and will not be considered in this opinion today. The facts of this case are as presented in the party's motion, and Respondent's reply to that motion. The parties have also filed a Stipulation of Facts, which forms the basis for the admission of certain underlying documents. We've also considered facts we discussed in our prior order of January 10th, 2022, in the context of this order and this opinion. Petitioner seeks summary adjudication that he does not own an interest in a personal residence in Wilmette, Illinois, and that his wife does not hold the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Wilmette property as his nominee. He argues we should not 6 sustain the proposed levy because the Internal Revenue Service is bound by the terms of the delayed payment obligation in the restitution order from the Southern District of New York, and thus has no authority to collect the restitution currently. Petitioner finally argues that he is entitled to an installment agreement that comports with the payment schedule in the restitution order. The Southern District of New York also issued a forfeiture order on June 26th, 2014. And this order provides information which is also relied upon in our analysis today. Respondent mailed the Notice of Federal Tax Lien to the Petitioner at the Wilmette address, because it was Petitioner's last known address, per his most recently filed tax return at the time of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing. At that time, Petitioner was incarcerated. The Notice of Federal Tax Lien was filed in the appropriate Illinois county. Petitioner ultimately received the Notice of Federal Tax Lien, and timely requested a hearing pursuant to section 6330. During that hearing, the Appeals officer requested that Petitioner submit Form 433-A. Petitioner told the Appeals officer that he did not own any assets, because the District Court had ordered the forfeiture of his assets during his criminal case, and that he had no income or monthly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 expenses due to his incarceration. He also explained that 7 he had no access to financial records because he was incarcerated. And he provided the Appeals officer with a copy of the forfeiture order. The Appeals officer took no steps to refute his claims regarding a lack of assets at that time. On March 6th, 2020, the Settlement officer issued a Notice of Determination sustaining the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing and the proposed levy, and denying the installment agreement under the delayed payment and schedule included in the criminal case. In the attachment to the Notice of Determination, the Appeals officer explained his determination that Petitioner may have an interest in the Wilmette property. Subsequently, in our analysis, we issued the order previously referenced, in which we remanded the case. And it was considered by a different Settlement officer in the Office of Appeals. That remand was in January 2022. At that time, Petitioner informed Appeals that he had transferred the Wilmette property to his wife on December 31st, 2010, before the restitution order was issued, and before the Notice of Federal Tax Lien was filed. He also produced to Appeals, on the remand, a quitclaim deed, a promissory note, mortgage, real estate transfer, tax receipt, and release of mortgage dated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 December 31st, 2012, to substantiate the transfer and also 8 provide to Appeals for the first time a Form 433-A, collection information statement. On that form, he reported no assets, other than a small bank account. The Petitioner told the Settlement officer that his wife paid him monthly mortgage payments for two years, beginning in 2010, and then paid the remaining balance in full. And that he used the sales proceeds to pay his legal fees. The only substantiation he could obtain to support these assertions, given the length of time that had transpired, was a canceled check that had been received by his law firm, showing the payment of substantial legal fees that exceeded the amount of the mortgage, which Petitioner asserts was paid by his wife in 2012. The release of the mortgage was not filed until January 9th, 2023. And Petitioner explains that he had simply overlooked the fact that he needed to file that 18 earlier. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Upon remand, the Appeals office issued two Supplemental Notices of Determination. One is undated. And it was mailed to Petitioner on March 27th, 2024, according to the information in the administrative record. And another, the second Supplemental Notice of Determination, was mailed on April 2nd, 2024. The administrative record establishes that Petitioner received 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 both of these supplemental notices. The undated 9 supplemental notice stated an incorrect date for when the original Notice of Determination was issued. At one point, Respondent represented to the Court that this was the reason for the issuance of the second supplemental notice. Both supplemental notices sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. However, they have multiple significant differences with respect to the proposed levy. The undated supplemental notice did not sustain the proposed levy. But the April 2nd, 2024 supplemental notice did, in fact, sustain the levy. The basis cited for sustaining the levy in the supplemental notice, is that the IRS has the potential to file a nominee lien against the Wilmette 14 property. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The undated supplemental notice states, regarding such levy action as a result of the nominee lien, the following: "You provided the documentation to substantiate your inability to pay. Collection is not sustained in the proposed levy action." The attachment to the undated supplemental notice further states, "Regarding the proposed levy action, the decision of Appeals is that, based on a review of the current financial information you provided, you presently lack the ability to make payment on the liability. As such, levy is at present not 25 appropriate." 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The attachment to the undated supplemental 10 notice discusses the Wilmette property, and provides that the property is held in Petitioner's wife's name. The undated supplemental notice concludes that taking into account all the factors, the Appeals officer concludes that the Taxpayer does not have an interest in the property and that the Taxpayer is therefore insolvent. The last sentence of the undated supplemental notice states, "It is my judgment the proposed levy is not sustained." The attached attachment that Appeals considered states that Petitioner is not entitled to an installment agreement. And that the restitution order does not stop Respondent from collecting tax immediately. In contrast, the April 2nd, 2024 supplemental notice sustains the proposed levy. With respect to the proposed levy, the April 2nd, 2024 supplemental notice states, "Collection reviewed your financial information statement, and determined you have no ability to pay. However, Collection believes you have an interest in real property. The property has been determined to be a potential 21 nominee." 22 23 24 25 Neither supplemental notice states a determination with respect to Petitioner's proffered installment agreement. However, we treat the Appeals determination to sustain the proposed levy in the April 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2nd, 2024 supplemental notice as a rejection of the 11 proffered installment agreement. We noted, during the hearing on this matter, that the proposed installment agreement did not include a comprehensive statement of Petitioner's income or expenses, and therefore did not provide sufficient information for Appeals to consider the installment agreement, despite the fact that the installment agreement offered was consistent with the order originally made in the Southern District of New York at the time of Petitioner's conviction. We previously held that Appeals was not bound by the terms of that order, and that the IRS was not restricted in its collection activities because of that order. Therefore, the lack of information to support a installment agreement causes us to find that there was no abuse of discretion in denying such agreement. Further investigation about the two Supplemental Notices of Determination is appropriate. Regarding the proposed levy, the Appeals activity records states on October 3rd, 2023, that Appeals, "Reversed its initial decision based on the counsel's analysis of the nominee. The initial decision was, the Taxpayer did not meet nominee, because he did not owe taxes. And the balance is the result of the restitution. However, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 after review of counsel's analysis, the balance 12 due does not have to be a result of taxes." The Settlement officer sent the reference memo to IRS Chief Counsel on February 14th, 2023, seeking advice, to which chief counsel responded in the September 22nd, 2023 memo. The Settlement officer substantially misrepresented facts in his memo to chief counsel. She wrote, "The Taxpayer continued to reside at the property and pay all costs associated with the property. In nearly 10 every way, he continued to hold out the property as his 11 own." 12 13 14 15 16 17 This was an odd statement, given the fact that for most of the period in question, the Petitioner was incarcerated, and that there's no evidence that the Petitioner paid the costs associated with the property. This is also an odd fact, in that it's inconsistent with the holding of the undated Supplemental Notice of 18 Determination. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The Settlement officer further stated in the request for advice the following: "Our overall impression of the motivation behind the 2011 transfer was a more general concern to harbor assets, generally from a host of potential threats, of which the IRS might have been considered one." This second statement is inconsistent with the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 fact that the Department of Justice seized about $170 13 million in assets from Petitioner. And he transferred the one-half interest in the house, which was worth about $450,000. The disparity between these amounts raises questions about the assertion as to Petitioner's motivation. The assertion about Petitioner's motivation is also oddly inconsistent between the two Supplemental Notices of Determination. The September 22nd, 2023 advice rendered by counsel contains almost no analysis of the facts pertaining to Petitioner's transfer of the Wilmette property, and does not provide significant advice of a factual nature. The advice is only three pages. We now turn briefly to questions raised by Respondent as to the admission of certain exhibits offered by Petitioner as attachments to Petitioner's Summary Judgment Motion, filed on July 19th, 2024. These exhibits, with the exception of declarations of Petitioner and his wife, are part of the administrative record, and therefore they will be admitted, despite the fact that they may be duplicative. The declarations provide support for the other materials offered in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment, which were provided to Appeals on remand. And these explanations, we believe, are consistent with the representations made to Appeals upon the remand. And they will be admitted into the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 record of this hearing, for purposes of this opinion. 14 The purpose of Summary Judgment is to expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and time-consuming trials. Florida Peach Corporation v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). The Court may grant Summary Judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(b). In deciding whether to grant Summary Judgment, we construe factual materials and draw inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand Corporation v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. at 520. However, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d). Also see Sundstrand Corporation, 98 T.C. 581 at 520. Where the validity of the underlying liability was properly at issue in the collection due process hearing, the Court reviews the Appeals determination de novo. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176 (2000). Where the underlying tax liability was not at issue, the Court reviews Appeals' determination for abuse of discretion; id. at 182. When we are forced with a question of law, the standard of review makes no difference, because we must reject erroneous views of the law. Kendricks v. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69, 75 (2005). 15 Here, the underlying assessment is not at issue, based upon findings we previously made in our order of January 10th, 2022. We review Appeals' determination to sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing and the proposed levy for abuse of discretion. However, we review Appeals' determination to reject the proffered installment agreement de novo, because the question of whether the restitution order limits the IRS's ability to collect the full amount of the restitution-based assessment currently is a question of law. When the standard of review is abuse of discretion, we consider whether Appeals' determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. See e.g. Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301, 320 (2005), aff'd 469 F.3d 27 (First Circuit, 2006). We do not consider an independent review of the facts, or substitute our judgment for that of Appeals. Murphy, 125 T.C. at 320. Nor will we be likely to supply a basis for Appeals' determination that Appeals does not provide itself, however, we will sustain a determination of less than ideal clarity, if the basis for the determination may reasonably be discerned. Malasky v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. 93, 106 (2018). Section 6330(c)(3) requires that Appeals verify 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the following during a collection due process hearing: 16 (1), the requirement of any applicable law or administrative procedure has been met; (2), any issues appropriately raised by the taxpayer; and (3), the collection action balances the need for efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. See also section 6320(c), and Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 184 (2001). As stated above, we sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing in our remand order. We held that the delayed payment obligation in the restitution order does not prevent the IRS from filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien to protect its interest. In that order, we addressed only the impact of the restitution order's delayed payment schedule, a question of law subject to de novo review. We did not consider whether Appeals abused its discretion by sustaining the Notice of Federal Tax Lien on the basis of the facts presented during the CDP hearing, as Petitioner did not raise that issue. Although we did not remand the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing, as stated previously, the parties did discuss it on the supplemental review. And for that sake, we will revisit the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing for abuse of discretion. We find no abuse of discretion. And 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 accordingly, we again, sustain the Notice of Federal Tax 17 Lien filing. Section 6323(j) authorizes withdrawal of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, if the filing of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien was premature, or otherwise not in accord with administrative procedures; (2), the taxpayer had entered into installment agreement that renders the Notice of Federal Tax Lien redundant; (3), withdrawal of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien will facilitate the collection of the tax liability; and (4), withdrawal of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien would be in the best interest of the taxpayer as determined by the National Taxpayer Advocate and the United States. Section 6323(j)-1. None of these elements are present in this case, and therefore, there is no support for the withdrawal of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Petitioner did not press an argument based upon these elements at the hearing on his Motion for Summary Judgment. We note that our decision to sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien has nothing to do with whether Petitioner's wife holds the property as his nominee. It is unnecessary to address the nominee issue to uphold the Notice of Federal Tax Lien issue. The Notice of Federal Tax Lien attaches to any property that the taxpayer acquires after the lien arises. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien holds the IRS's 18 place in line while it waits for the taxpayer to acquire property that might be used to satisfy the tax liability. Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2014-200 at 22. The Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing satisfies the requirement of the Internal Revenue Code, including section 6330(c)(4), because it is not more intrusive than is necessary to protect the interest of the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayers of the United States. We now turn to discuss the levy, which is primarily based upon Respondent's analysis that Respondent has an opportunity to collect funds through the nominee lien. Basic case law, as applied by the Northern District of Illinois, is helpful in considering Respondent's argument. Stone v. United States, 2014 Westlaw 1289788, (Northern District of Illinois, 2014), finds that Illinois State Courts have not specifically addressed the nominee theory. In the absence of specific guidance from the State courts, Federal courts have used a multi-factor standard to determine whether an individual is a delinquent taxpayer's nominee. See United States v. Cohen, 930 Fed.Supp.2d, 962, 979 (C.D. Ill., 2013); and United States v. N. States Investment, Inc., 670 F.Supp.2d 778, 788-89 (N.D. Ill., 2009). The applicable standard, as determined in Stone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 v. United States, is as follows. Whether a title holder 19 is a nominee depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether; (1), a close personal relationship exists between the nominee and the transferor; (2), the nominee paid little or no consideration for the property; (3), the parties placed the property in the name of the nominee in anticipation of collection activity; (4), the parties did not record the conveyance; and (5), the transferor continues to exercise dominion and control over the property. See United States v. Schaut, 2001 WL 1665314, at 3 (N.D. Ill., December 28th, 2001); United States v. McClellan, 1994 Westlaw 374471, at 3 (S.D. Ill., May 17th, 1994). In Stone, the Court weighed the factors and held that the wife was the husband's nominee. It called the recording of the deed the least significant factor, because the other factors were not so easily manipulated. Of importance, in the present matter, the Northern District of Illinois in Foreman v. Department of Treasury, 2005 WL 928508 (March 3rd, 2005), held that the taxpayer did not have standing to oppose a nominee lien, because he would not be legally injured if the IRS took the nominee's property. And that he can only benefit because the tax would be paid. This statement in this holding is consistent with the general concept of nominee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 liens, that the collection action is on the nominee, and 20 that generally it begins with the service of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien on the nominee. And the nominee then has the right to pursue defenses, including that the underlying taxpayer has no interest in the subject property. However, the action begins with service upon the nominee, and does not directly involve the taxpayer. This case is not an appropriate forum to decide the nominee issue, because Petitioner's wife is not a party to the case. It is not appropriate to adjudicate her rights in the Wilmette property without her participation. The Notice of Federal Tax Lien at issue here does not attach to the Wilmette property, because Petitioner does not hold legal title to the property. If the IRS files a nominee lien, Petitioner's wife would have an opportunity to assert her ownership and to litigate the question in an appropriate forum. Jewell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2016-239 at 19. As stated previously, Rule of Procedure 121(d) provides that when a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported as set forth in this rule, the nonmovant may not rest on the allegation or denial of that party's pleadings. The nonmovant must respond, setting forth specific facts, and supporting those facts as required by Rule 121(c) to show that there is a genuine dispute. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 We conclude that regarding the use of the 21 nominee lien as a basis for the underlying levy in Respondent's opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent has not provided sufficient evidence to sustain a rebuttal argument to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding collection by levy, because the facts Respondent alleges concerning the nominee lien are mere allegations, and are inconsistent with established facts in the administrative record. Respondent's allegations are not sufficient to sustain the denial of a Summary Judgment under our Rule 121(d). Secondly, levy is not necessary for the IRS to pursue the only collection Respondent has suggested. The nominee lien, the case law establishes, is pursued by serving a Notice of Federal Tax Lien on the owner of the property, which in this case would be Petitioner's wife. The IRS would seek to collect the nominee lien from her, and a levy on Petitioner would serve no purpose, even if Respondent could establish the elements of the nominee lien against Petitioner's wife, which we believe Respondent has failed to do so in the administrative record in the present case. Likewise, it is not necessary to resolve the nominee lien issue to decide whether Appeals abused its discretion to sustain the proposed levy. Given the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 contradictory determinations regarding whether to sustain 22 the proposed levy, we cannot say the Appeals determination was reasonable, especially in light of the fact that that determination was not based upon any significant facts. And there were no significant facts to support the determination in either the undated Supplemental Notice of Determination, nor in the later dated Notice of Determination. We find that the inconsistent Appeals determinations regarding Petitioner's ability to pay, based upon the threat of a nominee lien on the Wilmette property, to be inconsistent with the assertion that the Court should not decide whether, in fact, Petitioner's wife holds the property as Petitioner's nominee. The IRS believes that Petitioner's wife is the nominee. It should pursue that action against the property in the appropriate forum, and not as some ad hoc basis for supporting the levy in this case, because levy is not the remedy generally used to pursue a nominee lien. And a levy on the Petitioner clearly is misplaced, based upon the precedent, especially the precedent in the Northern District of Illinois and other district courts in the State of Illinois. We believe that the change of position by the Settlement officer between the initial Supplemental Notice and the later dated Supplemental Notice is not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 supported by the law, nor the facts. And therefore, it is 23 an abuse of discretion. Petitioner argues regarding the installment agreement, that he is entitled to an installment agreement in accordance with the delayed payment schedule in the restitution order. The restitution order provides as follows: "Monthly installment of ten percent of his gross monthly income over a period of supervision, to commence 30 days after his release from incarceration." We note at this point, Petitioner has no income, except for Social Security. And Respondent has not indicated any interest in pursuing collection, based upon the Social Security payments. Section 6159(a) authorizes the Commissioner to enter into written agreements allowing taxpayers to pay tax in installments, if it deems that the agreement will facilitate full or partial collection of the tax liability. The decision to accept or reject an installment agreement lies within the Commissioner's discretion. Thompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 173, 179 (2013). Thus, we review Appeals' rejection of an installment agreement for abuse of discretion. Oram v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1, 12-13 (2004), aff'd 412 F.3d 819 (7th Cir., 2005). We have previously rejected the argument that when a payment is due under the terms of a criminal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 restitution order, the payment schedule in the restitution 24 order limits the amount the IRS may collect. Carpenter v. Commissioner, 152 T.C. 2005, 2010-2011 (2019), aff'd 788 F. App'x 187 (4th Cir. 2019). Our holding was based upon the reasoning that the IRS's authority to collect restitution-based assessments under the Internal Revenue Code section 6201(a), is independent from Title 18 and the underlying criminal procedures. Carpenter, 152 T.C. at 2010-11. The practical concern with the installment agreement in the present matter is that there's no basis for the Appeals officer to have determined the Petitioner's ability to pay, nor the expenses the Petitioner incurs, and whether Petitioner can meet his living expenses based upon the Social Security payments, because none of that information was provided to the Settlement officer. Accordingly, we sustain the determination that an installment agreement is inappropriate at this time. During the hearing on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, we asked the Respondent, what harm would fall to Respondent if we denied the request for levy? Respondent offered no authority, and did not press the argument of harm in its post-hearing filing. Based upon our precedent, we believe there is no harm. In Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 114, 142 (2010), we held that, if 25 the Office of Appeals determined not to sustain the Notice of Lien or a proposed levy that was challenged in a CDP hearing, IRS collection personnel would be free to issue another Notice of Lien or Intent to Levy, as long as the period of limitations for collection remained open. Therefore, there's no extraordinary basis to sustain the levy here, based upon potential harm to Respondent. In summary, we sustain the Notice of Federal Tax Lien filing, and deny Petitioner's request for an installment agreement. However, we also do not sustain the attempt to collect via levy. Accordingly, a decision will be entered in accordance with these holdings. And this ends the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion in this matter. Off the record. JRG (Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the above-entitled matter was concluded.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25