TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Raymond B. Magana
Docket Number: 10306-00L
Judge: Swift
Opinion Type: reported
Filed: 05/31/2002
Pages: 6

£Nt. | ERYTCE 118 T.C. No. 30 TS NLE , UNITED STATES TAX COURT RAYMOND B. MAGANA, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 10306-00L. Filed May 31, 2002. Held: Under sec. 6330(c)(4), I.R.C., in this judicial proceeding involving respondent's proposed collection activity, petitioner is precluded from relitigating a statute of limitations issue that was previously adjudicated in a related District Court proceeding. Respondent's motion for summary judgment with regard thereto is granted. . Held, further, in our review for an abuse of I.R.C., of issues, and other matter that were raised at discretion under sec. 6330(d)(1), respondent's determination, generally we consider only arguments, the collection hearing or otherwise brought to the attention of involve an allegation of recent, unusual hardship, or other special circumstance, cause us to make an exception to the general rule set forth herein and to consider petitioner's new hardship argument. the Appeals Office. This case does not illness or that might SERVED MAY 3 1 2002 - 3 - Background At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Bartlesville, Oklahoma. Based on an amended Federal income tax return filed by petitioner for 1980, on April 23, 1984, respondent assessed against petitioner the above $472,532 Federal income tax deficiency. In November of 1988, petitioner submitted an offer in compromise that was rejected by respondent. In October of 1990, the statute of limitations on collection under section 6502 was amended to provide a 10-year period from the date of assessment for the collection of Federal taxes (extended from 6 years). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, sec. 11317(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1388-458. On May 19, 1995, the United States brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to reduce to judgment respondent's above $472,532 unpaid Federal income tax assessment against petitioner for 1980. United States v. Magana, No. 95-CV-462-K (N.D. Okla., Jan. 26, 2000). In the above District Court proceeding, petitioner asserted that the period of limitations on collection of petitioner's unpaid tax liability for 1980 had expired as of May 19, 1995, the day on which the above suit was filed by the United States against petitioner. - 5 - In its ruling on the United States' motion for summary judgment relating to petitioner's unpaid tax liability for 1980, the District Court concluded that the period of limitations on collection of petitioner's tax liability for 1980 remained open. United States v. Magana, supra.2 Petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied in the above • District Court case, and petitioner did not appeal the District Court judgment. On June 18, 2000, that judgment became final. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). In United States v. Magana, supra, petitioner was represented by counsel. During petitioner's collection hearing with respondent's Appeals Office, petitioner, by way of counsel, again asserted the same statute of limitations contention. Also dur.ing the collection hearing, petitioner did not allege hardship, and petitioner did not wish to discuss any alternatives to the lien filings. Respondent's Appeals Office memorandum expressly states in this regard that petitioner's counsel "did not desire a discussion with regard to alternatives" to the lien filings and "Therefore, Appeals is unable to make an alternative determination that is less intrusive" than the lien filings. The District Court's ruling was based on the execution by the period of petitioner of an extension of collection, on an offer in compromise submitted by petitioner to respondent, and on the referred-to statutory extension of the period of limitations on collection from 6 years to 10 years. limitations on - 7 - petitioner's physical illness and the resulting cloud on title to petitioner's residence, petitioner's only significant asset). Petitioner makes no other argument with regard to the propriety of respondent's notice of determination. On February 13, 2002, at the hearing before us on respondent's motion for summary judgment, petitioner's counsel • acknowledged that petitioner's ill health was not recent but had- extended back over 20 years. Further, at that hearing, in response to a question from the Court as to why hardship had not been raised at petitioner's collection hearing or otherwise brought to the attention of respondent's Appeals Office, petitioner's counsel acknowledged that he had had an opportunity at the collection hearing to raise hardship but t.hat he had chosen not to do so. Statute of Limitations Discussion Respondent argues that under section 6330(c)(4) and under the principle of collateral estoppel petitioner is precluded in this case from asserting that no effective extension to extend the period of limitations on collection of petitioner's unpaid tax liability for 1980 was executed by petitioner. We agree with respondent. ground for opposing respondent's lien filings (namely, hardship) is not properly before this Court. Under section 6330(d)(1), respondent's notices of determination generally are to be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 185 (2001); Nicklaus v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120 (2001); Davis v. • Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 39 (2000); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609-610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000) (citing H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 266 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1020); MRCA Info. Servs. v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D. Conn. 2000). Under that standard of review, generally it would be anomalous and improper for us to conclude that respondent's Appeals Office abused its discretion under section 6330(c)(3) in failing to grant relief, or in failing to consider arguments, issues, or other matter not raised by taxpayers or not otherwise brought to the attention of respondent's Appeals Office. McCoy Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 557, 563 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The Tax Court * * * cannot find an abuse of discretion where there is no evidence that the Commissioner exercised any discretion at all"), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-693; Estate of Chimblo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-535, affd. 177 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1999); see also secs. 301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5, 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F5, Proced. & Admin. Regs. - 11 - not reflect on whether the determinations that are the basis of this petition were an abuse of discretion."). This case does not involve an allegation of recent, unusual illness or hardship, or other special circumstance, that might cause us to make an exception to the general rule set forth herein and to consider petitioner's new hardship argument. Further, under section 6334(a)(13) and (e), respondent may not levy upon petitioner's principal residence without approval of a Federal District Court.3 For the reasons stated, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment. An appropriate order and decision will be entered. Also, we note that this case does not involve a claim under 3 sec. 6015 for relief from joint and several liability, and the general rule set forth herein is not issue of whether such a claim under sec. 6015 may be raised in a collection proceeding under sec. 6330(d)(1) this Court. We leave that question for another day. intended to control the for the first time in