TAX COURT OPINION

Case: Michael D. Brown
Docket Number: 14660-22L
Judge: Buch
Opinion Type: bench
Filed: 03/05/2026
Pages: 12

United States Tax Court Washington, DC 20217 MICHAEL D. BROWN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 14660-22L. ORDER Pursuant to Rule 152(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall transmit with this order to petitioner and respondent a copy of the pages of the transcript of the trial in this case before Judge Ronald L. Buch at Los Angeles, California, containing his oral findings of fact and opinion rendered at the trial session at which the case was heard. In accordance with our prior opinion in this case, T.C. Memo. 2025-126, decision will be entered for the Commissioner. (Signed) Ronald L. Buch Judge Served 03/05/26 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bench Opinion by Judge Ronald L. Buch February 25, 2026 Michael D. Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Docket No. 14660-22L 3 THE COURT: The Court has decided to render oral findings of fact and opinion in this case, and the following represents the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion. The oral findings of fact and opinion are made pursuant to the authority granted by section 7459(b) of the Internal Revenue Code and Tax Court Rule 152. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as in effect at all relevant times. This collection case, brought pursuant to section 6330, was set for hearing solely on the question of the place of petitioner's legal residence on June 30, 2022, the date he filed his Petition in this case. For the reasons that follow, we conclude he resided in Texas on that date. FINDINGS OF FACT The facts of case involve the interplay between a lien proceeding and a levy proceeding. We will present the events chronologically, which will require that we bounce back and forth between the two proceedings. Mr. Brown had unpaid income tax liabilities for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 2009 and 2010 for which the Commissioner began taking collection action. On November 9, 2017, the Commissioner issued a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing, to Mr. Brown for 2009 and 2010. Mr. Brown requested an Appeals hearing. In April 2018, Mr. Brown submitted an offer-in-compromise proposing to pay $320,000 in satisfaction of his liabilities for 2009 and 2010 as well as for 2001 through 2007 and 2014. On November 5, 2018, the Commissioner sent a letter to Mr. Brown stating that he was returning the offer-incompromise because other investigations that may affect Mr. Brown's liability were pending. Now to the proposed levy. On August 26, 2019, the Commissioner sent a Notice of Intent to Levy to Mr. Brown relating to his liability for income tax, additions to tax, and penalties for 2001 through 2007, 2009 through 2011, and 2014. Some of those same periods were the subject of Mr. Brown's offer-in-compromise. Mr. Brown requested an Appeals hearing with respect to the proposed levy. Back to the lien. The Commissioner sent Mr. Brown a Notice of Determination dated August 31, 2020, sustaining the filing of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Meanwhile, the levy remained pending with Appeals. Mr. Brown timely petitioned the Court with respect to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5 Notice of Determination with respect to the lien, and that case was assigned Docket No. 11519-20L. In that lien case, Mr. Brown sought summary judgment, arguing that his offer-in-compromise was deemed accepted by operation of law because the Commissioner did not timely reject the offer. See I.R.C. § 7122(f). Then there was a quick succession of events in June 2022 relating to the proposed levy and the lien. On June 7, 2022, the Commissioner mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Determination, sustaining the Notice of Intent to Levy. A few weeks later, the Court denied Mr. Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment in the lien case, holding that the Commissioner rejected the offer-in-compromise on November 5, 2018, when he returned it to Mr. Brown. Brown v. Commissioner, 158 T.C. 187, 194 (2022). Just a week after that, on June 30, 2022, Mr. Brown filed a Petition with the Court with respect to the levy Notice of Determination, thus giving rise to this case. As with his Motion for Summary Judgment in the lien case, Mr. Brown asserted in his Petition that the offer-in-compromise was accepted by operation of section 7122(f). He argued that the Court's Opinion in the lien case was wrong. The Ninth Circuit affirmed our decision in the lien case in 2024. Brown v. Commissioner, 116 F.4th 861 (9th Cir. 2024). The lien case had concluded. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 But the levy case remained pending. On April 6 23, 2025, the parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues stating that the only substantive issue remaining in the levy case was whether "petitioner's offer in compromise was accepted by operation of I.R.C. § 7122(f)." The Stipulation of Settled Issues also stated that the parties disputed Mr. Brown's place of legal residence at the time he filed his Petition in this levy case. Mr. Brown filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, reasserting that the offer-in-compromise was deemed accepted by operation of law. We followed our holding in the lien case, which the Ninth Circuit had affirmed a year earlier. Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2025-126, at *6. The Court deferred entering a decision in this case until after the Court determines Mr. Brown's state of residence at the time he filed his Petition. Id. at *7; see also I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(G)(i). That is why we are here today. The Court held further trial on February 24, 2026, solely on the question of Mr. Brown's legal residence on June 30, 2022, when he filed his Petition in this levy case. The lien case and the levy case weren't the only things bouncing around during this timeframe. In the time surrounding Mr. Brown's filing of his June 30, 2022, Petition in this case, Mr. Brown was also bouncing around. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 7 Back in 2020, when Mr. Brown filed his Petition in his lien case, he alleged that he lived in Henderson, Nevada. The address he used on his Petition was the same address to which the Commissioner had mailed the notice of determination underlying that case. In his Answer, respondent admitted that Mr. Brown resided in Henderson, Nevada at the time he filed his Petition in that case. The Henderson, Nevada, residence was purchased and titled in Mr. Brown's son's name. Mr. Brown resided there until no later than March 2022, when Mr. Brown's son was forced to sell the Henderson, Nevada residence. In June 2022, respondent sent a Notice of Determination to Mr. Brown at a commercial address in Las Vegas, Nevada. That address was associated with Ryze Renewables, a company for which Mr. Brown had been a consultant. Mr. Brown did not reside at the Ryze Renewables address. On June 30, 2022, Mr. Brown filed his Petition in this levy case. In that Petition, Mr. Brown alleged that he resided in Vidor, Texas, which is about 90 miles east of Houston. Respondent denied the allegation as to where Mr. Brown resided. Mr. Brown's credit card statements from this timeframe provide little insight as to where he may have resided. The statement showing purchases from midFebruary to mid-March 2022 principally shows purchases in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 8 Nevada. The statement shows a flight from Las Vegas to Houston on February 20, 2022. Mr. Brown testified that it was during this trip that he moved his personal belongings to his parents' home in Vidor, Texas. That same statement also shows a fee paid to the United States Postal Service in early March 2022 for a change of address, and a fee paid for self-storage in Nevada. Mr. Brown testified that he moved his larger belongings, such as furniture, into a storage unit in Nevada before departing for Texas by automobile. Purchases shown on the credit card statement appear to support his having taken such a road trip. The statement also shows the purchase of an airline ticket to travel from Houston to San Diego on March 24, 2022, returning on March 29. The statement for that period was addressed to the Henderson, Nevada address. In contrast, the statement showing purchases for late June to late July 2022 was addressed to the Vidor, Texas address. That statement shows purchases scattered about various locations. There are a few purchases proximate to the Vidor address in late June and a plane ticket for Mr. Brown to fly to Mississippi on the date his petition was filed. Mr. Brown explained that he travelled to Mississippi looking for work. The statement shows various purchases in the Houston area. The statement also shows the purchase of an airline trip to San Diego with a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 9 stop in Las Vegas. Nearly all other credit card charges appear to be online purchases or recurring subscriptions. Mr. Brown's flights to San Diego were to visit his fiancé, Tetyana Voziy. They had previously lived together in Henderson. Ms. Voziy was not employed at that time, and when the Henderson house was sold, Mr. Brown and Ms. Voziy did not have another residence. She moved in with her mother in southern California. Mr. Brown made periodic trips to southern California to visit her. Ms. Voziy began working while in southern California, where she remained until moving to Las Vegas in late 2023. Mr. Brown and Ms. Voziy joined Life Time Fitness in August 2019, when they still lived in Henderson. Statements from Life Time Fitness show Mr. Brown's checking into clubs monthly. Mr. Brown explained that he gets his hair cut at the club whereas Ms. Voziy exercises there. As for the clubs where those haircuts took place, in January through March 2022, they were in Nevada. In April through June 2022, they were in California. In July 2022, it was in Houston, Texas. And in August and September, they were in clubs in California, Texas, and Nevada. Mr. Brown had a golf membership at the Beaumont Country Club in Texas in 2022. Statements with respect to that golf membership show several cart rentals in April 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 2022, none in May 2022, and a few in June and July 2022. In relation to the filing of the Petition in this case, the closest dates are June 18 and July 13, 2022. Respondent filed his Answer in this case in August 2022. Respondent denied petitioner's averment as to where he resided when he filed his Petition "for lack of sufficient information, knowledge, or belief." In October 2022, a revenue agent visited the residence of Mr. Brown's parents, which is where Mr. Brown had claimed to reside. Mr. Brown's mother informed the revenue agent that Mr. Brown had been living with them since early 2022. Mr. Brown registered to vote in Texas in November 2022. Mr. Brown obtained a Texas driver's license in November 2025. The foregoing summarizes the evidence presented to the Court, which included a handful of documents plus testimony by Mr. Brown, his mother, and his fiancé. What is perhaps more remarkable is the evidence that was not presented. There was no evidence of an alternative residence. There was no evidence of a place of employment. There was no evidence of a church Mr. Brown might have attended. There was no evidence of addresses used by Mr. Brown with third parties (other than two statements from one credit card company). Even companies who have electronic billing and receive electronic payment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 11 will often have an address for the customer. There was no evidence of addresses used by Mr. Brown on documents on which he might have provided a jurat, such as tax returns. OPINION Section 7482(b) provides the venue on appeal from a decision of this Court, unless stipulated to the contrary. In the case of a petition filed by an individual under section 6320 or 6330, the venue on appeal lies in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the taxpayer's legal residence is located when the Petition was filed. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(G)(i). "For purposes of that section the term 'residence' means domicile." Berkery v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 259, 262 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 91 T.C. 179 (1988) (citing Brewin v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1055, 1059 (1979), rev'd and remanded on other issues, 639 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Petitioners have the burden of proof to establish domicile at the time the petition was filed. Rule 142(a). The determination of an individual's domicile is primarily a question of fact. Kamikido v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-402. In Brewin, we held that "domicile is based on physical residence conjoined with the intent to remain thereat, at least for a time." 72 T.C. at 1059. The Supreme Court has likewise stated, "Residence in fact, coupled with the purpose to make the place of residence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 12 one's home, are the essential elements of domicile." Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939). "Statements of intent are evidence of domicile, but are given slight weight when such statements conflict with conduct." Brewin, 72 T.C. at 1059. We look to "conduct with respect to establishment of a principal home, its furnishings and objects, family history and familial associations, location of interest, and time spent thereat." Id. Courts can consider any number of factors when considering domicile. We have previously looked at where people work, where their family lives, the location of their property and assets, where they attend church or social clubs, and the address they put on their income tax returns. See Kamikido, T.C. Memo. 1979-402; Taira v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 662, 667-68 (1969); Whitmore v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 293, 297-98 (1955). This case presents a challenging set of facts. The record establishes that Mr. Brown did not have a residence of his own when he filed his petition. He no longer had his Henderson residence, and he did not live with his fiancé. Without a residence of his own, he stayed with his parents when he was not travelling. We can perhaps best resolve this case by analogy. Imagine a college graduate, affianced but unemployed following graduation. Such a graduate might 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13 move in with his or her parents until a job or marital residence could be secured. Although there is no intent to remain at the parents' residence permanently, the recent graduate has no other home. The recent graduate intends to remain with his or her parents indefinitely but not permanently. For the time being, the parents' residence is the recent graduate's place of legal residence. On June 30, 2022, Mr. Brown found himself in an analogous situation. Unemployed and affianced, his parents' home became his home by default. Although he did not intend to permanently remain at his parents' home, on June 30, 2022, it was his place of legal residence. This concludes the Court's oral findings of fact and opinion in this case. (Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the above-entitled matter was concluded.)