A METHOD AND APPARATUS EMPLOYING ONE-WAY TRANSFORMS

Abstract: This invention describes and specifies a cryptographic method/system employing one-way invertible transforms. In one embodiment, many different encryption keys can correspond to one single decryption key that decrypt different versions of ciphertext created by the many different encryption keys uniquely to the original plaintext; and in another embodiment one single encryption key can correspond to many different decryption keys that give different decrypted results. The encryption key is so constructed that it allows a high level of parallel computation.

Description: A METHOD AND APPARA TUS EMPLOYING ONE-WAY TRANSFORMS BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION Field of the Invention This invention relates to systems and devices that implement and make use of one-way transforms and to apparatuses and methods that realize the one-way property via processes and/or protocols. Background Description One-way transforms play an important role in forming the basis for data security. The idea of asymmetric invertible one-way transform was introduced in "New Directions in Cryptography" by W. Difϊϊe and M. Hellman, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Vol. IT-22, 1976, pp. 644-654. Since then, many schemes and systems for the realization of asymmetric one-way functions came into being. The RS A cryptosystem is described in U.S. Patent No. 4,405,829 to R. Rivest, A. Shamii- and L. Adleman. The ciyptosystem of T. ElGamal is depicted in "A Public Key Ciyptosystem and a Signature Scheme based on Discrete Logarithms", IEEE Transactions on Information Theoiy, Vol. 31, 1985, pp. 469- 472. The more recently advanced cryptographic systems using elliptic curves started with V. Miller' s paper "Use of Elliptic Curves in Cryptography", Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO ' 85 Proceedings, Berlin: Springer-Vei ag, 1985, pp. 417-426. OBJECTS AND SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION It is an object of this invention to provide methods of invertible one-way transforms and to provide means for constructing devices that realize invertible one-way transforms. It is another object ofthis invention to improve on prior art and to provide better methods of realizing invertible one-way functions. This invention facilitates unbalanced correspondence between encryption keys and decryption keys, where one correspondence defines the association of a single encryption key with many different decryption keys and another correspondence defines the association of a single decryption key with many different encryption keys. The cryptographic keys by this invention are complete where, once generated, no additional key parameters nor changes in either key parameters or key parameter values are required for performing encryption or decryption multiple times. The loose coupling nature, the fast speed, and the robustness and resilience of the cryptographic scheme ofthis invention, suit this invention to a wide range of applications. One of the most important aspect of this invention is, in addition to being plaintext-aware, the absence in the ciphertext of any characteristics of the keys. This results in it being chosen-text attack resistant and intrinsically zero-knowledge. This invention can be used for bulk data encryption as well as key transport. The absence of data or key dependent cryptographic operations offers inherent resistance to side channel attacks, such as differential power analysis, making it suitable for smart cards. In the special case of id cards, encryption key may be embedded, requiring minimal RAM. In such cases, failure of cards is limited to individual cards and not the overall system. Owing to the plaintext- aware property of the one-way transform ofthis invention, the validity and integrity of the enciphered data blocks are inherent, requiring no separate or additional enforcement. Therefore, tampering with ciphertext, such as bit-flipping, can be easily detected. The polynomial indistinguishability of the encryption key from random bits can easily make encryption key transport undetectable when applying steganography, with only a much lower security requirement: key authenticity. The construction of the cryptographic keys of this invention has the potential for high parallelism to offer fast encryption and, furthermore, cost can be adjusted by selection different level of parallelism. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Let the functions for generating the encryption and decryption keys be denoted by/() and b() respectively, and a cryptographic transform T using some parameters p by T p (). Then the following can hold for the transforms (i.e. encryption and decryption) of this invention: for any determinant D and random input I and T, I ≠ T if and only if ftp, I) ≠βO, T) and/or b(D, I) ≠ b(D, I'), and for any x that is properly encoded, x = where a determinant is a sequence of properly encoded symbols, the value of which determines, in conjunction with any applicable random input, both the actual cryptographic key parameters and the introduction of random noise. In one embodiment ofthis invention, the communication of a secret is realized through the use of a secrecy primitive, an entity associated with two parties who have different knowledge about said entity. In particular, some secret known to one party and securely conveyable to another party is contained in such an entity which itself is not required to be kept secret. By making use of this entity, the two parties may securely establish still another entity that is totally independent of the secret contained in the secrecy primitive and is cryptographically symmetric, i.e. the two parties can share a secret. In another embodiment, some encryption key parameters are converted to a different representation to facilitate other cryptographic techniques. In still another embodiment, random noise independent of the value of any other cryptographic key parameter is incorporated. In yet another embodiment, encryption key parameters are represented in self- contained (c.f. next paragraph for definition) components to facilitate independent calculation on these components. An example is given here for illustration purposes. Let us assume X = {x l5 x 2 , ..., x n } is a set of positive integers satisfying: X{ > (2 -l)(xι + x 2 + ... + Xn) for 2<i<n, and is transformed to Y = {yi, y 2 , ..., y n } via one or more rounds of invertible strong modular multiplication (i.e. each modulus used is greater than the largest possible subset sum of the set that is being applied the strong modular multiplication). Suppose Z = {z 1? z 2 , ..., z n } is the final transformed version with t-k ≥ 0 noise components, where t is an arbitraiy or random number and Zi for l≤i≤n are vectors of t dimensions, denoted as Zj = (z_ tl , Zj )2 , ..., Zμ). Let x, p 2 , ..., p t be t pairwise co-prime numbers and J = {j l9 j 2 , ..., j k } be a set of randomly selected indices such that zy = Vj % P j if j e J (where % denotes the modular function), and Zy is a random number modulo P j otherwise, and that the product of P j for j e J is greater than the largest possible subset sum of Y. In essence, Y is reduced to a residue system with arbitrary or random numbers inserted in arbitrarily or randomly picked dimensions in the vectors. This reduction by p ls p 2 , ..., p can also be multiplicative modular reduction. In such residue system representation, the Zy's are self-contained, which means that, with regard to pertinent cryptographic operations, computation performed on y ! can be equivalently carried out with each individual of the zy independently. If we lay out Z, with each of its vector element as a row, we will have a matrix format: z 2,l> z 2,2, --. 5 z 2,t and the random components are the columns of random numbers Zy for l≤i≤n where j g J. Z and P j for l≤j≤t are the encryption key, and are not required to be kept secret. Let the data stream be assembled into nh-bit blocks with necessaiy padding of random bits, where each block is further divided into n sub-blocks i, d 2 , ..., d n of h bits each. A block is encrypted to c l5 c 2 , ..., c t in the following way: c j = (d lZlj + d 2 Z 2j + ... + d n z n)j ) % p j , forl≤j≤t The C j gj, for the mere purpose of recovering the original data, are simply discarded and ignored. Then the original data block is recovered via the recovery of the individual sub- blocks dj, d 2 , ..., d„. One specific recovery processes is to convert the c jeJ from the residue system by the p j 's using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to a subset sum of Y in the normal positional number system, and to then apply the round(s) of inverse strong modular multiplication. Finally, the normal decomposition of a superincreasing subset sum can be used to recover the sub-blocks di, d 2 , ..., d n . Another type of one-way transform is carried out through the use of a secrecy primitive. In one embodiment, the method of elimination via a protocol can securely single out from the digitized secrecy primitive bits of interest as shared secret. However, in other embodiments, the shared secret can be established indirectly through the establishment of another shared secret. In the following example, one type of indirect establishment of a shared secret is manifested. The general idea behind is that two parties, X and Y, will perform a protocol using a set of encryption keys as a secrecy primitive that may be known to observers. From the execution of the protocol, it is infeasible for an observer to deduce the secret established between X and Y, even though the observer learns eveiything of the actual transmissions between the two parties, besides having the knowledge of the encryption keys. We assume that Y has m authentic encryption keys T 1; T 2 , ... , T m for which X has the corresponding decryption keys and can learn about the values of certain bits encrypted. To be specific, we assume that X can learn the value of the t; th bit encrypted using Ti. Y will encrypt random bits using the sets of encryption keys and send the encrypted version to X. X will instruct Y to perform certain actions, such as changing the logical index of the t ^ bit as in the detailed demonstration that follows. By the end of the protocol, Y will be able to learn that X intended to convey the bit positions tj. We assume the random data bit blocks used for T r are: 1 st data block: 10111010001010110100111011010000 2 nd data block: 11101010011110010101110111010100 3 rd data block 10001110101010100101110101010101 4 th data block 01001000111101100110101010011111 5 th data block 01110001011001000101110111011101 6 th data block 10100011011011001010100001110101 We also assume, without loss of generality, that t x = 11 and X intends to have Y logically change the indices t i9 for l≤i≤m, to the target logical position 17, where the bit position is zero-oriented, counting from left. At the start, the physical positions and the logical positions are the same: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 1415 16 17 18 19 202122 23 2425262728 29 30 31 ILP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91011 12 13 1415 IE 171819202122 2324252E 272829 3031 Here PP stands for Physical Position, LP stands for Logical Position, ILP stands for Initial Logical Position, and FLP stands for Final Logical Position. To logically move the bit from the 11 th position to the 17 th position we need to move right a total of 6 bits. We may randomly express 6 as the sum of k integers, i.e. we design it so that after k shifts, the 11 th bit is logically moved/changed to the 17 th . In our example, since we are using 6 data blocks, k will be 6, i.e. after 6 shifts we make sure the logical position of the 11 th bit is the 17 th . We assume that we have 6 = 2 + (-8) + 13 + φ + 0 + (- 1), where φ is a non-zero integer, functionally non-contributing to the sum (6). It indicates a shift that is not effective with regard to the bit of interest, i.e. the logical shift is done only to bits with value opposite to that of the bit of interest. The following is an example execution of the protocol. Y encrypts the first data block and sends the encrypted version to X. After decryption, X obtains the value of the 11 th bit in the data block to be 0. He instructs Y to logically right shift 2 positions (i.e. equivalently adding 2 to the logical position) all bits corresponding to the bits in the data block having value zero Recall, the first number in the breakdown of 6 (into 2 + (-8) + 13 + φ + 0 + (-l)) is 2 and that is how the right shift of 2 comes about. The physical positions (zero oriented) of the bits in the first data block having value zero are: 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31. The logical positions corresponding to those physical positions are incremented by 2 and the resulting logical positions will become: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 LP 0 3 2 3 4 7 6 9 10 11 10 13 12 15 14 15 18 17 20 21 20 21 22 25 24 25 28 27 30 31 0 1 Notice that the increment is addition modulo 32, i.e. with the block size as the modulus. In other words, the shift is cyclic in essence. Therefore, the logical positions 30 and 31 become 0 and 1 respectively after the increment. The physical 11 th bit of the second data block (that is encrypted by Y) is 1, X instructs logical shifting of all one-bits -8 positions (or shifting left 8 positions). The one-bits in the second data block are in physical positions 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 29. After logical shifting, the results are: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 LP 24 28 26 3 28 7 30 9 10 3 2 S 4 15 14 7 18 9 20 13 12 13 22 17 16 17 28 19 30 23 0 1 Similarly, the results from the third data block are: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 LP 24 9 7 16 28 7 30 22 10 16 2 18 4 28 14 20 31 9 31 13 12 13 3 17 7 17 9 19 11 23 13 1 In the fourth round, X is to instruct a fake shift (φ-shift), one that does not affect the logical index of the bit corresponding to the 11 th physical bit. Such an instruction is indicated by φ. After the fourth data block, for which we assume a right shift of 4 (i.e. φ =4) for the zero-bits because the 11 th bit has value 1, the logical positions become: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 LP 28 9 11 20 28 11 2 26 10 16 2 18 8 28 14 24 3 9 31 17 12 17 3 21 7 21 13 19 11 23 13 1 After the fifth data block, none of the logical positions changes as we instructed a zero shift. This is of course an actual no-operation, a waste that can be eliminated in actual practice. It is here, however, to illustrate the functional difference between an actual no- operation and a functional no-operation. Both contributes nothing to (6) the actual positions shifted for the bit of interest (11 th ), but the φ-shift does change some logical indices. After the last (sixth) data block, the logical positions finally become: PP 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 FLP28 8 11 19 27 10 2 26 9 16 2 17 8 28 13 23 3 8 31 16 12 16 2 20 6 21 13 19 10 23 12 1 The logical index value corresponding to the 11 th physical position is 17, functionally signifies that the 11 th physical position has now 'logically' become the 17 th as desired. The same can be done with the other m-1 encryption keys, to move the t h bit logically to the target logical position 17. This can be done either sequentially, one bit block after another, or better still in parallel. When the protocol completes, the logical index 17 must appear in each and every of the FLP rows. The identification process for t t is as follows. For any FLP row, if a certain logical index is missing, that logical index in all other (m- 1) FLP rows is eliminated. For example in the above example, index 4 is not in the FLP row, then index 4 is eliminated from all other FLP rows. If after this elimination process, there are still more than one distinct logical index not eliminated, which will be very rare if k and m are chosen appropriately, the protocol can be re-executed or extended with more rounds. In other words, k can be increased with the application of more random bit blocks for each encryption key. When only one distinct logical index is left, the physical index corresponding to the logical index is the one X intends to communicate to Y. If Y again encrypts m random bit blocks β l5 β , ..., β m using T ls T , ..., T m respectively, X and Y would be able to share the knowledge of the value of the t; th bit in β ; . However, the remaining index in a FLP row could have multiple appearances. For instance, logical index 28 appears in both the 0 th and the 13 th entries in the FLP in the above example. Should X have chosen 28 as the target logical position to shift to, Y would still not be able to know if physical index 0 or 13 X intended. But this can be easily overcome with other means. Assuming, for example, that the i th FLP row has more than one physical index corresponding to a logical index, bits of βj in all those physical bit positions can be set to the same value so that the two parties can always have the same value for the t_ th bit of βj. The above example of one-way transform realized via a protocol gets the one-way property from utilizing a set of encryption keys. Such encryption keys can have more than one distinct decryption keys that decrypt a same ciphertext to different results. One should notice that any entity possessing the authentic encryption keys will be able to execute the protocol with X, and an attacker can also compromise the contents of the communication between X and Y. Therefore, the legitimate communicating parties have to properly identify each other to guarantee that the encryption keys are authentic at party Y. Furthermore, they must make sure that their communication is not compromised, by applying data integrity techniques which abound in prior art. It should be obvious and clear to one skilled in the art that the examples are for illustration purposes only. Parameters and assumptions used in the examples are for the convenience of explanation ofthis invention. In practice and actual implementation of this invention, proper parameters and parameter values should be chosen to meet the requirements of the applications.

Claims: I claim 1. A cryptographic method, where a non-empty set F of encryption keys Fj, F 2 , F 3 , ... are associated with one single deciyption key B satisfying b(/(m))=m for any input m and for b being a deciyption function employing B and for / being an encryption function employing any Fj e F, comprising: obtaining arbitrary and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; generating a deciyption key; generating one of a plurality of corresponding encryption keys; supplying an enciyptor with said enciyption key; accepting a message m; encrypting m by said enciyptor to ciphertext c using said enciyption key; supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and decrypting c by said decryptor to recover m using said decryption key. 2. A cryptographic method for establishing a secret between two parties comprising: generating a secrecy primitive; and establishing said secret between said two parties using said secrecy primitive. 3. A cryptographic method as in claim 1 comprising: obtaining arbitrary and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; generating a decryption key; generating a corresponding enciyption key through a series of transforms where at least one of said transforms facilitates the introduction of arbitrary or random noise of any desired sufficient amount; supplying an enciyptor with said enciyption key; accepting a message m; encrypting m by said enciyptor to ciphertext c using said enciyption key; supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and deciypting c by said decryptor to recover m using said decryption key. 4. A cryptographic method as in claim 1 comprising: obtaining arbitrary and or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; generating a deciyption key including a set of parameters p in normal positional number representation; generating a corresponding encryption key comprising: converting p to self-contained components; constructing encryption key parameters from said self-contained components by inserting zero or more arbitrary/random components in arbitrarily or randomly chosen component positions; and generating all other encryption key parameters; supplying an encryptor with said enciyption key; accepting a message m; encrypting m by said enciyptor to ciphertext c using said encryption key; supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and decrypting c by said decryptor to recover m using said deciyption key. 5. A cryptographic method, as in claim 1, adopting n integer functions fj, f 2 , ..., f„ mapping from [0, 2 h ) to [0, 2 h +δ), where h > 1 and 2 h +δ > 1, comprising: obtaining arbitraiy and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; generating a decryption key, including the generation of a first set of positive integers X ={xι, x 2 , ..., x„} and a second set of positive integers W = {wi, 2 , ..., w„} satisfying i > β^ + β 2 x 2 + ... + βi-i i-i + γjWi + γ 2 2 + ... + γi i where, for l≤i≤ transforming X to Y = {yi, y 2 , ..., y n } and W to U = {ui, u 2 , ..., u„}, including an optional permutation and one or more rounds of invertible strong modular multiplication; and further transforming Y to Z = {zi, z^, ..., z n } and U to V = {v x , v 2 , ..., v n } satisfying the following: a- Po? Pij •••J Pt-i are pairwise co-prime b. Zi = (Zi )0 , Zi,ι, ..., for l≤i≤n and q > 1 c J = {joj ji ? ••• > jk-i} is a set of arbitrary or random indices where 0≤j 0 , j 2 , •••, j k - ι<t d. S = {s 0 , Si, ..., s k- ι} is an arbitrary or random set satisfying: 0≤s θ5 Si, ..., s k-1 <qt, and S % t = {s 0 %t, Sι%t, ..., s k-1 %t} = J e. Ilpjej > βiyi + β 2 y2 + • • • + β n y n + YιUι + γ 2 u 2 + ... + γ n u n g. z_ t _ iS are arbitraiy or random numbers modulo p s%t for 0≤s<qt h. Vj = (Vi, 0 , vι,ι, ..., Vi, qt -ι) for l≤i≤n i. v, jS6S = Wi % p s%t j. v i(S(ϊS are arbitrary or random numbers modulo p s%t for 0≤s<qt. 6. A ciyptographic method as in claim 5 further comprising: supplying an encryptor with said enciyption key; encrypting by said enciyptor one or more nh-bit data blocks which are divided into h- bit sub-blocks d 1} d 2 , ..., d„, where each block is encrypted to c = (c 0 , c 1? ..., c qW ) with c s = (d,z 1)S + d 2 z 2>s + ... + d,,^ +/ 7 (d 1 )v 1)S +/ 2 (d 2 )v 2)S + ... + ,(d n )v n , s ) % p s%t for 0≤s<qt; supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and decrypting by said decryptor each of said encrypted blocks c to recover said data blocks, by extracting C = {c s | s e S} from c and by repeating, for each d 4 for l≤i≤ n, the following: a. converting C to a form where d t can be determined b. obtaining di from said converted C c. removing from said converted C the quantity that di introduced. 7. A ciyptographic method as in claim 6, where said encryption is carried out, in lieu, independently on self-contained components, comprising: calculating c by carrying out two or more of said additions (+) and/or by computing two or more of said terms diZy and/(di)vy in parallel. 8. A cryptographic method, as in claim 1, for communicating a message securely from a first party E to a second party D comprising: obtaining at party D arbitraiy and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; generating at party D a decryption key to be kept secret; generating at party D one of a plurality of corresponding encryption keys; distributing said encryption key from party D to party E; accepting a message m at party E; encrypting m to ciphertext at party E, employing said enciyption key; transmitting said ciphertext frompaity E to party D; receiving said ciphertext at party D; and deciypting said ciphertext at party D to recover m, employing said deciyption key. 9. A ciyptographic method as in claim 8 further comprising: applying chaining in the encryption of m to c with zero or more blocks of arbitraiy or random bits pre-pre-pended to m. 10. A ciyptographic method, as in claim 5, using dynamic mapping for communicating a message securely from a first party E to a second party D which generates said enciyption key to be kept secret and said decryption key to be sent to party E, further comprising: agreeing upon a set of mapping functions/,/, ..., , for said current communication by said two parties, where said set of mapping functions only observe their domain and range restrictions and are independent of and unrelated to any other encryption or decryption parameters; distributing said enciyption key from party D to party E; accepting a message m at party E; encrypting m to ciphertext at party E, employing said enciyption key and/, /, ...,/,; transmitting said ciphertext from party E to party D over a communication channel; receiving said ciphertext at party D; and decrypting said ciphertext at party D to recover m, employing said deciyption key and l l. A ciyptographic method, as in claim 2, where one enciyption key F x is associated with a non-empty set B x of deciyption keys B x l , B X;2 , ..., B xn satisfying b,-( (m)) ≠ b j (βιή)) for one or more input m if i≠j, with b,- and b j being decryption functions employing B X)i and B^ j respectively and / being an enciyption function employing F x , comprising: obtaining at a first party D arbitrary and/or random input from which ciyptographic keys are generated; generating at party D secret decryption keys B 1 , B 2 , ..., B k where B e B x for l≤x≤k; generating at party D enciyption keys F l5 F 2 , ..., F k as said secrecy primitive, where F x corresponds to B x for l≤x≤k; distributing said enciyption keys from party D to a second party E; and establishing said secret between said two parties by making use of said encryption keys and deciyption keys. 12. A cryptographic method, as in claim 11, for establishing said secret comprising: generating at party D said enciyption keys and decryption keys; disuϊbuting said enciyption keys from party D to party E; receiving said enciyption keys at party E; encrypting arbitrary or random data blocks at party E employing said enciyption keys; transmitting said encrypted data blocks from party E to party D over a communication channel; receiving at party D said enciypted data blocks from party E; decrypting said encrypted data blocks employing said decryption keys at party D to obtain information/characteristics about said data blocks; and communicating to party E by party D, based on said information/characteristics gained about said data blocks, instructions to transform a special entity to a form from which party E leams said secret party D intends to convey and establish. 13. A cryptographic method as in claim 12 further comprising: using said estabUshed secret for further secure communications and cryptographic applications between said two parties. 14. A cryptographic method as in claim 1 for the zero-knowledge authentication/identification of a party possessing said secret deciyption key comprising: proving said authenticity/identity by said party through the exhibition of the abiUty to deciypt any valid ciphertext messages using said deciyption key. 15. A cryptographic system, where a non-empty set F of complete encryption keys F is F 2 , F 3 , ... are associated with one single deciyption key B satisfying b(/(m))=m for any input m and for b being a deciyption mechanism employing B and for / being an enciyption mechanism employing any Fi e F, comprising: means for obtaining arbitrary and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; means for generating a deciyption key; means for generating one of a plurality of corresponding enciyption keys; means for supplying an enciyptor with said enciyption key; means for accepting a message m; means for encrypting m by said enciyptor to ciphertext c using said enciyption key; means for supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and means for decrypting c by said decryptor to recover m using said decryption key. 16. A cryptographic system as in claim 15 comprising: means for obtaining arbitraiy and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; means for generating a deciyption key including a set of parameters p in normal positional number representation; means for generating a corresponding enciyption key comprising: means for converting p to self-contained components; means for constructing encryption key parameters from said self-contained components by inserting zero or more arbitrary/random components in arbitrarily or randomly chosen component positions; and means for generating all other encryption key parameters; means for supplying an enciyptor with said enciyption key; means for accepting a message m; means for encrypting m by said encryptor to ciphertext c using said encryption key; means for supplying a decryptor with said decryption key; and means for decrypting c by said decryptor to recover m using said deciyption key. 17. A cryptographic system, as in claim 15, with means for implementing n integer functions /, /, ..., /, mapping from [0, 2 h ) to [0, 2 h +δ), where h > 1 and 2 h +δ > 1, comprising: means for obtaining arbitrary and/or random input from which cryptographic keys are generated; means for generating a decryption key, including the generation of a first set of positive integers X ={x l5 x 2 , ..., x,,} and a second set of positive integers W = {wi, ' w 2 , ..., w„} satisfying i > + γ 2 w 2 + ... + γj i where, for l≤i≤n, γ ; = (β ; ) and β; e[0, 2 h ); means for transforming X to Y = {yi, y 2 , ..., y n } and W to U = {ui, u 2 , ..., u„}, including an optional permutation and one or more rounds of invertible strong modular multiplication; means for further transforming Y to Z = {z 1? z 2 , ..., z__} and U to V = {v x , v 2 , ..., v n } satisfying the following: a. POJ is •••? Pt-i are pairwise co-prime b. Zi = (Zi, 0 , zy, ..., Zi, qt-1 ) for l≤i≤n and q > 1 c. J = {joj ji ? ••• ? jk-i} is a set of arbitrary or random indices where 0≤j 0 , j 2> ••-, - ι<t d. S = {so, s l5 ..., s k-x } is an arbitrary or random set satisfying: 0<s 0 , Si, ..., s k- ι<qt, and S % t = {s 0 %t, Sι%t, ..., s k-1 %>t} = J e. IlpjeJ > β l Yl + β2Y2 + • • • + βnYn + YlUi + γ 2 U 2 + ... + γ n U n g. are arbitrary or random numbers modulo p s%t for 0≤s<qt h. v t = (v 1)0 , Vi,ι, ..., Vi, qt- ι) for l≤i≤n i. v 1)SeS = Wi % p s%t j. v JιSøs are arbitrary or random numbers modulo p s%t for 0≤s<qt. 18. A cryptographic system as in claim 17 further comprising: - means for supplying an enciyptor with said enciyption key; means for encrypting by said encryptor one or more nh-bit data blocks which are divided into h-bit sub-blocks d 1? d 2 , ..., d n , where each block is encrypted to c = (Co, ci, ..., c qt-1 ) with c s = + d 2 z 2 , s + ... + d n z„ jS +/( 1 )v 1 , s +/(d 2 )v 2 , s + ... +/(d„)v n , s ) % p s%t for 0<s<qt; means for supplying a decryptor with said deciyption key; and means for deciypting by said decryptor each of said encrypted blocks c to recover said data blocks, by extracting C = {c s | s e S} from c and by repeating, for each i for l≤i≤n, the following: a. converting C to a form where di can be determined b. obtaining d 4 from said converted C c. removing from said converted C the quantity that di introduced. 19. A cryptographic system as in claim 18, where said encryption is earned out, in Ueu, independently on self-contained components, comprising: means for calculating c by carrying out two or more of said additions (+) and/or by computing two or more of said terms diZy and/(di)vy in parallel. 20. A cryptographic system, as in claim 15, for communicating a message securely from a first party E to a second party D comprising: means for obtaining at party D arbitrary and/or random input from which ciyptographic keys are generated; means for generating at party D a deciyption key to be kept secret; means for generating at party D one of a plurality of corresponding encryption keys; means for distributing said encryption key from party D to party E; means for accepting a message m at party E; means for encrypting m to ciphertext at party E, employing enciyption key; means for fransmitting said ciphertext from party E to party D; means for receiving said ciphertext at party D; and means for deciypting said ciphertext at party D to recover m, employing said deciyption key.

Inventors: ZHANG JINGLONG F, ZHANG, JINGLONG, F.
Applicants: ZHANG JINGLONG F, ZHANG, JINGLONG, F.
Application year: 2001
Main classification: H04L9
IPC codes: H04L9