An interlocking for a railway system

Abstract: An interlocking for a railway system, comprises first, control computing means (2) which commands route settings in the system and second, protection computing means (3) coupled with the first computing means (2) and which allows commands from the first computing means (2) to be brought into effect or otherwise in dependence on the state of the railway system.

Description: The present invention relates to an interlocking for a railway system. An interlocking for a railway system showing the pre-characterizing features of Claim 1 is known from DE 43 06 470. According to the present invention, there is provided an interlocking for a railway system, comprising functional computing means which commands route settings in the system in response to route setting requests; and assurance computing means coupled with the functional computing means, wherein the assurance computing means contains information concerning the signalling principles of the railway system and receives information concerning the state of the railway system and information concerning commands from the functional computing means; characterised in that in use, the functional computing means sends a route setting command received by both the railway system and the assurance computing means, the assurance computing means only allowing the command from the functional computing means to be brought into effect if the current state of the railway system is such that it would be safe to do so. The interlocking may include interface means, which interfaces with trackside equipment of the system, and a communication path between the interface means and the functional and assurance computing means. Preferably, the functional and assurance computing means have different designs to reduce the risk of common mode failures. If a command is not allowed to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means preferably causes the railway system to be put into a safe or more restrictive state. The assurance computing means could monitor commands from the functional computing means and issue a complementary command to allow a command from the functional computing means to be brought into effect if it is safe to do so. Alternatively, the assurance computing means could monitor commands from the functional computing means and if such a command (which could be in two complementary versions) is not to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means issues a negating command for that purpose. There may be at least one further such functional computing means, the or each further such functional computing means being coupled with a respective such assurance computing means and means for switching operation from one of the functional and assurance computing means arrangements to the other or another of the functional and assurance computing means arrangements. The present invention will now be described, by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings in which: Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a first example of an interlocking according to the present invention; and Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a second example of an interlocking according to the present invention. The interlocking systems to be described each comprises 3 parts: 1. A central interlocking processor. 2. A set of field equipment which provides the interface between the central interlocking processor and trackside equipment (such as points machines, signal lamps, automatic warning system (AWS) magnets, automatic train protection (ATP) equipment, etc). 3. A high speed serial communications path between the central interlocking processor and the field equipment. Important aspects of each of the systems are: 1. Separation of control (functional) and protection (assurance) functions within the central interlocking processor. 2. Diversity of design of the functional and assurance aspects, reducing the risk of common mode failures. In the first example, there is also separation of functional and assurance telegrams from the central interlocking processor to the field equipment. Referring to Fig. 1, a central interlocking processor 1 contains two separate, diverse, and non-divergent computers in series with one another. The architecture of the central interlocking processor is similar to the architecture of a mechanical lever frame. The first computer, an interlocking functional computer 2, which can be configured using familiar data structures, e.g. solid state interlocking (SSI) data, ladder logic or a representation of the signalling control tables, carries out a conventional interlocking function. The interlocking functional computer 2 performs the role of the signalman and levers in a mechanical lever frame. The second computer, an interlocking assurance computer 3, is a rule based computer which contains the signalling principles for the particular railway system where the interlocking is applied. The interlocking assurance computer 3 performs the role of the locks in a mechanical lever frame. There are three levels of rules contained within the interlocking assurance computer 3. The lowest level comprises fundamental rules which must be true for all railway authorities, e.g. the interlocking must not command a set of points to move when a track section through a set of points is occupied by a train. The second level comprises the signalling principles specified by the railway authority and are common to all installations for that railway authority. The third level represents the topological arrangement of the equipment in the railway system, for example expressing the relationship between a signal and the set of points it is protecting. The central interlocking processor 1 may contain one or two interlocking assurance computers 3 depending on the degree of diversity required by the railway authority. Reference numeral 4 designates a high speed serial communications path between the central interlocking processor 1 and a set of field equipment 10 which provides the interface between the central interlocking processor 1 and trackside equipment such as points machines, signal lamps, AWS magnets and ATP equipment. Both computers 2 and 3 receive telegrams reporting the status of the trackside equipment from the field equipment via the path 4 and paths 5 and 6 respectively. The interlocking functional computer 2 processes route setting requests from the signalling control arrangement of the railway system and applies its data to determine whether or not to set the route. If the interlocking functional computer 2 decides not to set the route, no further action is taken. If the interlocking functional computer 2 decides to set the route, it initiates a telegram via a path 7 to the field equipment 10 commanding the field equipment to set up the route (by moving sets of points and clearing the signal for example) and also forwards the telegram to the interlocking assurance computer 3 via a a path 8. The interlocking assurance computer 3 examines telegrams received from the interlocking functional computer 2 to determine whether the actions commanded in the telegram are safe given the current state of the railway system. If the interlocking assurance computer 3 determines that the commanded actions are safe, it initiates a complementary telegram via a path 9 to the field equipment 10, confirming the command from the interlocking functional computer 2. If the interlocking assurance computer 3 determines that the commanded actions are not safe, it initiates a negating telegram via path 9 to the field equipment, in which the field outputs are forced to their most restrictive safe state, for example not to move points or to light the most restrictive signal aspect. The field equipment 10 compares the telegrams received from the interlocking functional computer 2 and interlocking assurance computer 3. If the telegrams are complementary, the field equipment can safely execute the actions commanded in the telegram. If the telegrams are different, or one of the telegrams is not received, the field equipment reverts its outputs to the most restrictive safe state. In the first example, the interlocking functional computer and associated interlocking assurance computer arrangement may be duplicated as shown by way of another interlocking functional computer 2a and associated interlocking assurance computer 3a, with associated paths 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a and 9a. If a failure is detected in interlocking functional computer 2 and/or interlocking assurance computer 3, then operation is switched to interlocking functional computer 2a and interlocking assurance computer 3a via changeover arrangements 11. Referring to Fig. 2, in a second example, a central interlocking processor 1' also includes two computers, namely an interlocking functional computer 2' and an interlocking assurance computer 3' (which is configured as per interlocking assurance computer 3 of the first example) which receive telegrams reporting the status of the trackside equipment from the field equipment 10' via high speed serial communications path 4' and paths 5' and 6' respectively. The interlocking functional computer 2' again processes route setting requests from the signalling control arrangement of the railway system and applies its data to determine whether or not to set the route, but includes three processor modules 12, 13 and 14 each of which operates on two diverse representations of the interlocking functional logic to produce complementary versions of an instruction telegram, which are supplied to a communications module 15 which votes on a two out of three basis as to which two complementary versions of an instruction telegram are to be sent to the field equipment 10' via a path 7' and high speed serial communications path 4'. The interlocking assurance computer 3' monitors telegrams on path 4' via a path 16, and if a telegram or telegrams contravenes or contravene rules, it inhibits its action or their actions by issuing a negating telegram to the field equipment 10' via paths 9' and 4', so that the field outputs are forced to their most restrictive safe state. The interlocking assurance computer 3' may also impose a restriction on the actions of interlocking functional computer 2' via paths 9', 4' and 5' so that the computer 2' may not repeat an instruction which contravenes the rules. Such a restriction may be allowed to expire after a given time and/or be allowed to be manually overridden. The functions of the interlocking assurance computer 3' could be built in to the programmed functions of each of processor modules 12, 13 and 14 if desired. The interlocking assurance computer 3' could be used to test the correct functionality of the interlocking functional computer 2' before the latter is installed (possibly without the computer 3') using a stricter set of rules than would be followed in practice.

Claims: An interlocking 1 for a railway system, comprising: functional computing means (2) which commands route settings in the system in response to route setting requests; and assurance computing means (3) coupled with the functional computing means (2), wherein the assurance computing means (3) contains information concerning the signalling principles of the railway system and receives information concerning the state of the railway system and information concerning commands from the functional computing means (2); characterised in that in use, the functional computing means (2) sends a route setting command received by both the railway system and the assurance computing means (3), the assurance computing means (3) only allowing the command from the functional computing means (2) to be brought into effect if the current state of the railway system is such that it would be safe to do so. An interlocking according to claim 1, including interface means, which interfaces with trackside equipment (10) of the system, and a communication path (4) between the interface means and the functional (2) and assurance (3) computing means. An interlocking according to claim 1 or 2, wherein the functional (2) and assurance (3) computing means have different designs to reduce the risk of common mode failures. An interlocking according to any preceding claim, wherein if a command is not allowed to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means (3) causes the railway system to be put into a safe or more restrictive state. An interlocking according to any preceding claim, wherein the assurance computing means (3) monitors commands from the functional computing means (2) and issues a complementary command to allow a command from the functional computing means (2) to be brought into effect if it is safe to do so. An interlocking according to any preceding claim, wherein the assurance computing means (3) monitors commands from the functional computing means (2) and if a command from the functional computing means (2) is not to be brought into effect, the assurance computing means (3) issues a negating command for that purpose. An interlocking according to any preceding claim, wherein the functional computing means (2) issues each command in first and second complementary versions. An interlocking according to any preceding claim, wherein there is at least one further such functional computing means (2a), the or each further such functional computing means (2a) being coupled with a respective such assurance computing means (3a) and means for switching operation from one of the functional (2) and assurance (3) computing means arrangements to the other or another of the functional (2a) and assurance (3a) computing means arrangements.

Inventors: MOLLOY TIMOTHY JOHN, RYLAND HENRY ARCHER, TREMLETT MARK, MOLLOY, TIMOTHY JOHN, RYLAND, HENRY ARCHER, TREMLETT, MARK
Applicants: WESTINGHOUSE BRAKE & SIGNAL, WESTINGHOUSE BRAKE AND SIGNAL HOLDINGS LIMITED
Application year: 2000
Main classification: B61L19
IPC codes: B61L19, B61L21