Improved security in cellular telephones

Abstract: In a system for delivering a security code to a cellular telephone (3) the cellular telephone holds a key X. The cellular telephone requests that an Authorization Center, AC, (6) assign a security code to the cellular telephone. The AC selects a security code, and encrypts it, such that key X is effective to de-crypt the code, yet the AC does not know key X.

Description: The invention concerns security measures for preventing hackers from making illicit telephone calls on cellular telephones and, more specifically, measures for assigning security codes to cellular telephones with a minimal number of parties having access to the security codes assigned. BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION A unique security problem exists in cellular telephones, which does not exist in ordinary telephones, and which is based on the anonymity of callers who use cellular telephones. In ordinary telephones, the callers are not considered anonymous, because telephone lines are always connected to identifiable premises, such as a house or an office. The party in possession of the premises is held responsible for the telephone calls, irrespective of who actually makes calls on the lines. However, in cellular telephones, no such physical connections exist. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a person making a cellular call. Nevertheless, procedures are undertaken to assure that only authorized persons are allowed to make calls. As one example of such procedures, cellular telephones are assigned serial numbers at the time of their manufacture. When a person subscribes to cellular telephone service, an Authorization Key, or A_Key, is assigned to the cellular telephone. The cellular telephone stores both the serial number, and the A_Key. When a person places a call, the cellular telephone first transmits a message to a cellular service provider, seeking authorization. This message includes both the serial number and the A_Key, in encrypted format. The cellular service provider then ascertains whether the A_Key has, in fact, been assigned to the serial number, and, if so, proceeds in completing the call. If not, the call is rejected. However, great care must be taken to prevent hackers from obtaining knowledge of the A_Keys which are assigned to the serial numbers. For example, if a hacker learns of a serial-number/A_Key pair, then the hacker can undertake the authorization requests discussed above, and obtain cellular telephone service illegally. It can be argued that the security procedures in common use do not provide maximum protection of the A_Key assignments. US-A-5 517 56,7 discloses a system in which a single MASTER unit is maintained, and several REMOTE units are also maintained. The MASTER contains two secret numbers SN1 and SN2. A REMOTE contains two secret numbers, which match those in the MASTER. Those secret numbers are used to periodically transmit a new communication key from the MASTER to the REMOTE. The communication key is used to encrypt and de-crypt messages. In the process of changing that communication key, the MASTER generates a random number and the new communication key. Then it uses those two numbers and the secret numbers SN to generate a transmission number G. That number G, together with the random number, is transmitted to the REMOTE. The latter reverses the process, using its secret numbers, to recover the new communication key. The process is periodically repeated, thereby making life difficult for hackers. If a hacker successfully steals one communication key, that key is only useful for a brief period, because it will soon be replaced by a new one. FR-A-2 681 165 shows generic security techniques. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION A cellular telephone needs a security code, which it uses to identify itself, when making calls. However, this security code must be kept secret, because a hacker in possession of the security code can illegally make calls, which will be billed to the cellular telephone. In one form of the invention, the cellular telephone is equipped with a de-cryption key. A cipher text version of the security code is delivered to the cellular telephone, over a cellular channel. The cellular telephone de-crypts the cipher text, using the key, to obtain the security code. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 illustrates three agents, namely, an Authorization Center, AC; a Trusted Industry Agent, TIA; and a cellular telephone, PHONE. These agents are involved in assigning an authorization code to the telephone. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate a sequence of steps involved in assigning an authorization code. Figure 4 illustrates a flow chart of steps involved in assigning an authorization code. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION Figure 1 illustrates three agents involved in the assignment of an A_Key to a cellular telephone, under the invention. One is the cellular telephone 3 itself. The second is an Authorization Center, or AC, 6. The third is a Trusted Industry Agent, TIA, 9. The Authorization Center 6 is equipped with a table 11, which contains pairs of numbers. Each pair associates an index, I, with an Electronic Serial Number, ESN. The TIA 9 is also equipped with a table 12, which contains other pairs of numbers. Each pair associates the index, I, with a number X. The phone 3 is manufactured to contain three numbers: (1) an X, here indicated as X2, (2) an I, here indicated as I2, and (3) an ESN, or Electronic Serial Number. The number X is preferably 64 bits in length. The X, I, and the ESN appear in tables 11 and 12. The table 12 was created by the manufacturer of the telephone, and delivered to the TIA 9. As will be seen, it is important that this table 12 be maintained in confidence. The other table 11 is also generated by the manufacturer, and is used by the Authorization Center to verify the identity of callers who wish to obtain an A_Key, as will be explained immediately below. Against this background, the assignment of the A_Key to the cellular telephone 3 can be viewed as requiring eight steps, which are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The agents which are actively involved in a given step are drawn in solid outline, for emphasis, while those which are not actively involved are drawn in phantom outline. In Figure 2A, the telephone 3 transmits its index, I2, together with its ESN, to the AC 6, as indicated by the arrow. This transmission can take the form of a normal cellular telephone call, but made to a specific telephone number, which the AC 6 answers. Preferably, the data is transmitted using the "cellular signalling message protocol," which is an industry-standard protocol. Alternately, the data can be carried by a sequence of Dual-Tone, Multi-Frequency (DTMF) signals. As another alternate, the cellular telephone can be equipped with a simple cellular modem 20 in Figure 1, which transmits, and receives, the data. After this transmission, the AC 6 is in possession of I2 and ESN, as indicated. The AC 6 consults table 11, and ascertains whether the two codes, I2 and ESN, belong to each other. If so, the AC 6 proceeds in the process of assigning an A_Key to the telephone 3. If not, the procedure terminates. Next, as indicated in Figure 2B, the AC 6 transmits the index I2 to the TIA 9. This transmission can be undertaken using network messaging, known in the art, and known security measures can be used by the TIA 9 to assure that the calling party is the genuine AC 6. The TIA 9 uses the index I2, as indicated in Figure 2C, to locate the X in table 12 which corresponds to I2. The TIA 9 is now in possession of both I2 and its associated X2, as indicated. As shown in Figure 2D, the TIA 9 then performs two computations. First, the TIA generates a random number, RAND. Then, using both RAND and X2, the TIA computes a number E, by using a non-reversible algorithm such as (1) SHA, Secure Hash Algorithm or (2) the algorithm known as MD-5, both of which are known in the art, or (3) CAVE, which is commercially available. The TIA transmits both E and RAND to the AC, as indicated in Figure 3A, thereby placing the AC 6 in possession of the four numbers I2, ESN, E, and RAND. Then, as indicated in Figure 3B, the AC selects an A_Key. The AC masks the A_Key, by using E as a mask. The masking process indicated in Figure 3B relies on the EX-OR function, as indicated by the cross-within-a-circle, but other masking operations are possible. The masking operation produces a number Z. As indicated in Figure 3C, the AC transmits both Z and RAND to the telephone 3. Then, as indicated in Figure 3D, the telephone 3 first recovers E, using the CAVE function, based on RAND and X2. Finally, the telephone 3 unmasks Z, by EX-ORing Z against E, to obtain the A_Key. The telephone 3 stores the A_Key. When the telephone 3 later makes an authorization request, as by contacting the AC, the telephone 3 transmits a code derived from the A_Key, together with its ESN. The AC ascertains whether the A_Key matches the ESN and, if so, allows the telephone 3 to continue with the call. Flow Chart Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating logic which implements one form of the invention. In block 50, the telephone 3 transmits I2 and its ESN to the AC, and requests an A_Key. In block 55, the AC, using table 11 in Figure 1, determines whether the ESN belongs to I2, and, if so, proceeds. In block 60, the AC transmits I2 to the TIA. In block 70, the TIA locates the X, which is X2 in this example, assigned by the manufacturer to I2. In block 75, the TIA generates RAND and, based on RAND and the X2 located in table 12, generates E. In block 80, the TIA transmits E and RAND to the AC. In block 85, the AC selects an A_Key, and masks it with E, to produce Z. In block 90, the AC transmits Z and RAND to the telephone. In block 95, the telephone derives E, based on RAND and X2. Then, in block 100, the telephone un-masks Z, using E, to obtain the A_Key. A significant feature of the steps of Figure 4 is that the process is fully automated. That is, no human observers are involved in, or witness, the computations. Since the process is full automated, and no humans witness the variables chosen, such as RAND, Z, and E, the only possible avenue of obtaining variables is to intercept transmissions between the AC and the telephone. But, as explained above, these interceptions do not produce the A_Key. Significant Features 1. One characterization of the invention is the following. As background regarding terminology, "plain text" refers to a message which is not encrypted. "Cipher text" refers to a message in encrypted form. An agent, AC, selects an A_Key, and encrypts the A_Key, as in Figure 3B, to produce cipher text, in the form of number Z. The encryption requires X2 for de-cryption. This is illustrated in Figure 3D, wherein X2 is required to obtain E, which is used to un-mask Z, to obtain the A_Key. However, the agent AC does not know X2. Restated, the agent AC produces cipher text, Z, which requires X2 for recovery of the plain text, A_Key, but the AC never uses X2, and has no access to X2. 2. As indicated in Figure 3D, three numbers, namely, RAND, X2, and Z, are required to obtain the A_Key. Of these, X2 is never available for interception by a hacker. That is, X2 is never transmitted between agents, not even on the ordinary telephone channel connecting the AC 6 with the TIA 9. The only source of X2 is the telephone 3 itself in Figure 1. However, it is assumed that the numbers, including X2, which are stored in the telephone 3 at the time of manufacture, are secure against discovery. That is, it is assumed that an excessive amount of reverse-engineering would be required to ascertain these numbers. Approaches to making these numbers secure are known in the art. It is also assumed, as stated above, that table 12 is not available to a hacker. Therefore, it is assumed that X2 is not available to a hacker, and, thus, that the A_Key assigned to the telephone 3 cannot be deduced. From another point of view, if, to make a call, the telephone 3 transmits its A_Key and its ESN to the AC 6 for authorization, a hacker must know these two numbers, in order to impersonate the telephone 3. However, the only party who knows which A_Key is associated with the telephone's ESN is the AC 6. Since the AC 6 sells cellular telephone service, it is assumed that the AC 6 will impose tight security on the knowledge of the A-Key/ESN assignments. 3. Transmissions between the AC 6 and the TIA 9 are considered secure. They are undertaken, for example, using network messaging approaches, perhaps using encryption. Consequently, only the data traffic running between the phone 3 and the AC, and occurring in Figures 2A and 3C, are subject to interception. However, this traffic provides no information which can lead a hacker to the A_Key. For example, assume the best case for the hacker: that he intercepts all of this traffic, and thereby obtains I2, ESN, RAND, and Z. But he needs the number E to unmask Z, to obtain A_Key, as indicated by the bottom line in Figure 3D. To obtain E, he needs number X2, as indicated by the second-to-last line. But X2 is secure within the telephone 3, as stated above. Thus, to repeat, if a hacker intercepts all interceptable transmissions, the hacker cannot deduce the A-Key. 4. Point number 3 illustrated the impossibility of a hacker obtaining A_Key through interception. An alternate possibility is that the hacker would act as an imposter, by representing himself as a telephone 3. In this scenario, the hacker finds no greater success. For example, assume that the hacker fabricates an index I, and successfully presents it to the AC, as indicated in Figure 2A. This I leads to a corresponding X, taken from table 12 of Figure 2C, which, in turn, leads to the mask E in Figure 2D. If the hacker could obtain mask E, the hacker could recover the A_Key, using the last step indicated in Figure 3D. However, the hacker never receives mask E, only Z and RAND. The hacker cannot obtain A_Key without mask E, and, for this, the hacker needs the X obtained from table 12 in Figure 2C. This X is available only to (1) the telephone 3, (2) the TIA 9, and (3) the manufacturer of phone 3, all of which are considered secure. Thus, fabricating an "I" leads to no success. 5. A given telephone 3 may request a new A_Key. This can occur, for example, when the owner of telephone 3 sells the telephone. When the new A_Key is requested, a new mask E is generated in Figure 3D, because the RAND of Figure 2D will be different, because random. The previous mask E becomes worthless, and the new A_Key cannot be deduced, using previous variables, such as RAND or Z, used to derive the previous A_Key. 6. The process indicated in Figures 2 and 3 places a strict limit on the parties who learn the A_Key assigned to telephone 3. Neither the manufacturer, nor the TIA, know the A_Key assigned to the telephone 3, because the AC selects the A_Key, and informs neither of these parties of the A_Key selected. Nor do either the manufacturer, nor the TIA, know which telephone 3 is involved in the A_Key assignment process of Figures 2 and 3. The manufacturer, of course, is completely uninvolved, and does not know of the call made in Figure 2A. Even though the TIA knows of the call, the TIA merely locates an X, based on an index I, in Figure 2C, and performs the two computations of Figure 2D. But the TIA has no knowledge of which "ESN" is associated with the "I," and thus does not know which telephone is making the call. 7. The invention imposes another strict limit, which is on the parties who are able to hack the A_Key assigned to telephone 3. As the discussion above indicated, knowledge of the X contained in the telephone 3 is a requirement for obtaining the A_Key. But, as also explained above, that knowledge cannot be obtained from the telephone 3 itself, because the telephone 3 has been made tamper-proof. The only source of the X is table 12, in Figure 2C, which is currently held by the TIA. However, the TIA is, by stipulation, considered an honest party who will not cooperate with hackers. The manufacturer is also a potential source of table 12, but is eliminated, on the basis of assumed honesty. In addition, the manufacturer will probably stand as a potential source of table 12 for only a very brief period of time, thereby significantly reducing the time-frame over which access to table 12 is even possible. That is, the manufacturer produces tables 11 and 12. Table 11 is delivered to the AC; table 12 is delivered to the TIA. After the deliveries, the manufacturer has no further interest in the tables and, in fact, will probably destroy its own copies, in order to eliminate the trouble and overhead involved with storing them. Thus, the manufacturer will be in possession of the tables for only a brief period of time, namely, from their creation to their delivery. This time can be as short as a few hours, or even minutes. 8. The manufacturer of the telephone 3 in Figure 1 programs the numbers X, I, and ESN into the telephone. However, there is no relation between these numbers and the A_Key. Restated, there is no way to deduce the A-Key from these three numbers. Further, every telephone is not required to own a unique X: different telephones can be assigned the same X, provided that the X's are un-correlated, in the statistical sense. 9. The E transmitted to the AC 6 in Figure 3A will be different, for different transactions, partly because E depends on a random number generated in Figure 2D, and partly because E depends on X. Both the random number and X will, in general, be different, for different telephones. 10. Preferably, the events of Figures 2 and 3 occur during a single telephone call made by the telephone 3 to the AC. Within the cellular telephone 3, data reception, transmission, and processing is performed by apparatus known in the art, and indicated by block 120 in Figure 1. The telephone 3 is linked to the AC by a cellular channel 125, and the AC is linked with the TIA by any suitable communication link 130. Numerous substitutions and modifications can be undertaken without departing from the scope of the invention as defined in the appended claims.

Claims: A method of assigning a security code to a cellular telephone, which stores a number X, an index I, and a serial number ESN, comprising the following steps: a) maintaining a table (12) with a custodian (TIA), which table contains multiple pairs of numbers, each pair associating an index I with a number X; b) receiving an index I and ESN from the cellular telephone; c) transmitting the index I to the custodian (TIA); d) causing the custodian (TIA) to i) identify the number X associated with the transmitted index I in the table, ii) generate a random number RAND, and iii) generate a mask E, based on X and RAND, e) selecting a security code A_Key; f) masking the security code A_Key with the mask E, to produce a number Z; and g) transmitting number Z and the random number RAND to the cellular telephone. Method according to claim 1, wherein the number X is never available for interception. Method according to claim 1, wherein the number X is never transmitted between parties. A method of assigning an A-key to a wireless telephone, which functions as a serial number of the wireless telephone in billing matters, comprising the following steps: a) maintaining an algorithm in the wireless telephone which i) produces the A-key when given a first code (RAND), a second code (Z), and a third code (X2), and ii) requires the first, second, and third codes collectively to produce the A-key; b) maintaining the third code (X2) within the wireless telephone; c) receiving, from a remote party, the first and second codes (RAND, Z) at the wireless telephone and delivering them to the algorithm; d) delivering the third code (X2) to the algorithm; and e) producing the A-key from the algorithm, using RAND, Z, and X2, and storing the A-key within the telephone. Method according to claim 4, wherein the third code (X2) is not known to the remote party transmitting the first and second codes (RAND, Z) to the wireless telephone. A method of assigning an A-key to a wireless telephone, which functions as a serial number of the wireless telephone in billing matters, comprising the following steps: a) maintaining an algorithm in the wireless telephone which i) produces the A-key when given a first code (RAND), a second code (Z), and a third code (X2), and ii) requires the first, second, and third codes collectively to produce the A-key; b) transmitting two codes, I and ESN, from the wireless telephone to a telephone service provider; c) relaying the code I from the telephone service provider to a third party (TIA); d) causing the third party (TIA) to i) ascertain the value of the third code (X2) from a table, based on code I; ii) generate a random number (RAND); iii) apply the ascertained value of the third code (X2) and the random number (RAND) to a non-reversible algorithm, to produce a mask (E); and iv) transmit the mask (E) to the telephone service provider; e) causing the telephone service provider to i) select an A-Key; ii) mask the A-Key, using the mask (E), to produce a transmission code (Z); and iii) transmit the transmission code (Z) and the random number (RAND) to the wireless telephone; and f) causing the wireless telephone to i) produce the mask (E), based on the received random number (RAND), and the non-received third code (X2); ii) produce the A-key, based on the received transmission code (Z) and the mask (E); and iii) store the A-key. A system for assigning an A-key to a wireless telephone, comprising: means for performing a method according to all the features of claim 6.

Inventors: MIZIKOVSKY SEMYON B, REEDS III JAMES ALEXANDER, MIZIKOVSKY, SEMYON B., REEDS III, JAMES ALEXANDER
Applicants: LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC, LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC.
Application year: 1998
Main classification: H04Q7
IPC codes: H04M1, H04L9, H04W12